













*(For private circulation.)*

# **HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.**

COMPILED BY

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H. H. THE NIZAM'S GOVERNMENT,

**HYDERABAD (Deccan).**



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**(VOL. II.)**

**TREATIES.**

**CONTINGENT AND SUBSIDIARY FORCES.**

**THE BERARS.**

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# EPITOME OF CONTENTS.

## **Treaties.**

PAGES

Complaint regarding the non-observance by the Nizam's Government of the terms of the treaty made as to the rights of Jaghirdars in territory formerly owned by the Peishwa—Illegal charge of transit dues on British goods—The Resident demands the abrogation of the duties in accordance with the terms of the commercial treaty—The Finance Committee recommends the disbandment of the troops of the Contingent maintained in excess of those provided for by treaty—Vexatious interference with trade owing to the infraction of the commercial treaty by the Nizam's Officers ... ..	1	to	1
The Nizam's Government to introduce regularity into the Department of the collectorate of city customs, remodels its rules—Irregularities in the old system—The provision regarding the exportation of grain from the Nizam's dominions in the Treaty of 1802—The surplus revenue of the Berars absorbed by the expensive management of the districts ... ..	3	to	1
Review of the circumstances under which the Treaty of 1853 was concluded and of the events which led up to the treaty—The Nizam's objections to receiving the insignia of the Star of India—The restoration of the Raichore and Dharaseo districts—The management of the Berars—The Godavery territory appropriated by the British Government without the relinquishment of one rupee of imperial revenue—The one-sided character of the British alliance with the Nizam ... ..	5	to	
Strain cast on the general revenues of the Hyderabad State by the necessity of providing for officials who were thrown out of employment by the assignment of the Berars—Suggested restoration of the alienated districts as an act of justice to the Nizam—Lord Dalhousie regarded the Berars as simply mortgaged to the British Government, and not as irrevocably alienated from Hyderabad—The Nizam's opposition to the cession of the Berars—The political portion of Colonel Davidson's report for 1862 alleged to have been suppressed—British relations with the Nizam ... ..	8	to	
The result of British policy in dealing with Hyderabad—The Subsidiary Force, its origin, development and history—The Contingent established on the basis of a force which the Nizam was bound by treaty to furnish in time of war—Large expenditure on the Contingent, and consequent increase of the Nizam's indebtedness to the British ... ..	10	to	11
The Nizam's endeavours to liquidate the debt—Salar Jung's appointment as Minister—His services to the British during the Mutiny—The Nizam's interest in the Mysore State—The Treaty of 1853 considered ... ..	11	to	15
The permanent maintenance of the Contingent not provided for by moral or legal right—The Nizam only consented to the assignment of territory on the understanding that it was not to be perpetual—The restitution of the Raichore and Dharaseo districts ... ..	13	to	17

# EPITOME OF CONTENTS.

PAGES

Lord Dalhousie's Hyderabad policy—Generals Fraser and Low's incumbency of the Hyderabad Residency. The Nizam repudiates the desire to disband the Contingent—General Low's conciliatory conduct towards the Nizam .....	15 to 16
Treaties, engagements and sunuds relating to Hyderabad, compiled by C. U. Aitchison, B. C. S.—Introductory observations ... ..	16 to 21
Treaty entered into by the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nizam, under date the 14th May 1759 ... ..	21 to 23
Treaty with the Nizam, under date the 12th November 1766 ... ..	23 to 25
Translation of a Sunnud under the seal of Nizam Alee Khan, for the five Circars—Translation of a Discharge, under the seal of Nizam Alee Khan, to Oomdut-ool-Moolk, Suraj-ood-Dowlah, Mooneer-ood-Deen Khan Bahadoor, Munsoor Jung, Foujdar of the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut, from the borders of the Palnand country to the further extremity of those of the Malabar country, and to the sons and heirs of the said Oomdut-ool-Moolk Bahadoor—Translation of the Petition supposed to be presented by Oomdut-ool-Moolk Bahadoor's Wukeel—Translation of an obligation given to His Highness Nizam Alee, by general Calliaud, on the part of the Nawab Suraj-ood-Dowlah—Translation of an obligation given to His Highness Nizam Alee, by General Calliaud, on the part of the Nawab Suraj-ood-Dowlah ... ..	25 to 26
Treaty of Perpetual Friendship and Alliance concluded, in February 1768, by the Honourable East India Company with the Nawab of the Carnatic and the Soobah of the Deccan ... ..	26 to 31
Translation of a Sunnud, under the Soobah's seal, dated the 22nd of the moon Shavul, 1181, equal to the 12th of March 1768—Translation of a Sunnud, under the Soobah's seal, dated the 22nd of the moon Shavul, Hijree 1181, equal to the 12th of March 1768—Translation of a Sunnud, under the Soobah's seal, dated the 21st of the moon Shavul, Hijree 1181, equal to the 11th of March 1768—Translation of a Sunnud, under the seal of the Soobah, dated the 21st of the moon Shavul, Hijree 1181, equal to the 11th of March 1768—Translation of the Zimir, containing a petition which is supposed to be presented by the Mutusuddees, and to have been signed by the Soobah, signifying his consent thereto—Translation of a Sunnud, under the Soobah's seal, dated the 21st of the moon Shavul, Hijree 1181, equal to the 11th of March 1768—Translation of a Discharge, under the Soobah's seal, dated the 2nd of the moon Shavul, Hijree 1181, equal to the 11th of March 1768—Translation of a Sunnud, under the Soobah's seal, dated the 21st of the moon Shavul, Hijree 1181 equal to the 11th of March 1768 ... ..	31 to 34
Treaty Alliance with Bazalut Jung, 1779—Circular addressed to all Deshmookees, Zameendars, Deshpandias, and Tenants of the Circar of Murtezamuggur, commonly called Guntoor.—Translation of the Nizam's order to Coyf Jung for the surrender of the Guntoor Circar to the Company, delivered to Captain Kennaway, the Resident at the Nizam's Durbar, the 18th September 1788 ...	34 to 36
Copy of a letter from Earl Cornwallis to the Nizam deemed equal to a Treaty, written 7th July 1789—Extract from Journals of the House of Commons, 15th Martii, 1792... ..	36 to 38
Tripartite Treaty of 1790 ... ..	38 to 41

	PAGES
Treaty with the Nizam, with two separate Articles, 1798 ... ..	41 to 45
Separate Articles appertaining to the treaty with the Nizam—Separate Articles appertaining to the Perpetual Subsidiary Treaty concluded between the Honourable English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Asoph Jah Bahadoor on the 1st September, A.D. 1798—Partition Treaty of Mysore, 1799 ... ..	45 to 52
Separate Articles of the Treaty with the Nizam—Treaty with the Nizam, dated the 12th October 1800 ... ..	52 to 59
Separate and Secret Articles—Commercial Treaty with the Nizam, dated the 12th April 1802—Instrument under the signature of the Governor-General in Council, delivered to the Nizam (Secunder Jah) on his accession to the musnud, recognising all the former treaties and engagements with Nizam Alee, deceased.—Engagement between Secunder Jah and the Company, dated the 7th August 1803.—Additional Articles of Treaty between the Honourable East India Company on the one part, and His Highness Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Meer Utkur Alee Khan Bahadoor, Soobah of the Deccan, his children, heirs, and successors on the other; to be considered as appertaining to the treaty of perpetual and general defensive alliance concluded at Hyderabad on the 12th of October, A. D. 1800, or 22nd of Jemmadec-ool-Awul, A. H. 1215.—Partition Treaty of Hyderabad, with His Highness the Soobehdar of the Deccan, 1804 ... ..	63 to 64
Treaty between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Soobehdar of the Deccan, and his children, heirs, and successors, for the further confirmation of friendship and unity of interests, concluded through the agency of Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, Esq., Resident at the Court of his said Highness, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by His Excellency the Most Noble Francis Marquis of Hastings, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, one of His Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General in Council, appointed by the Honourable the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company, to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Forces, dated the 12th December 1822. ... ..	64 to 70
Treaty confirmatory of former Treaties, dated the 17th October 1831 ... ..	70 to 71
Treaty between the Honourable the English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor, settled by Colonel J. Low, C.B., Resident at the Court of His Highness, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by the Most Noble James Andrew Marquis of Dalhousie, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, and Governor-General, appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, dated the 21st May 1853 ... ..	71 to 78
Supplemental Treaty between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain on the one part, and His Highness the Nawab (Ufzool-ood-Dowlah Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor) on the other part, settled by Lieutenant-Colonel Cuthbert Davidson, C.B., Resident at the court of His Highness, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by His Excellency the Right Honourable Charles John Earl Canning, G.C.B., Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, dated the 7th December 1860 ... ..	78 to 80



## Contingent and Subsidiary Forces.

PAGES

The suggested removal of the Subsidiary Force from Hyderabad considered—A detachment of the Contingent to be posted at Warangole—Orders issued to officers of the Contingent to apprehend Rohillas in their districts ...	83 to 86
General Fraser suggests to his Government the dismissal of the mercenaries in the Nizam's Government, but the Government of India repudiates the project—Rumoured abolition of the Contingent—Deputation of Rohillas—Defeat of a body of Rohillas near Ellichpore by a detachment of the Contingent—The Minister requests the aid of the Subsidiary Force in expelling Rohillas from the city ...	86 to 89
The abolition of the Contingent discussed—Opinion expressed that the Subsidiary Force would be ample for the internal security of the country, if the Contingent was abolished—The Nizam's financial difficulties due to the burden imposed by the necessity of maintaining the Contingent ...	89 to 91
Statement of the Nizam's receipts and expenditure in 1850—The demoralization of the Nizam's Government due to the expenditure on military establishments, which absorb nine-tenths of the total revenue of the country—Strength of the Contingent and Subsidiary Forces—Ghoolam Hoosain engages the Nizam's troops near Ellichpore ...	91 to 94
A correspondent of a Madras newspaper writes questioning the accuracy of the figures published regarding the Nizam's revenue and expenditure, and contending that the Nizam's financial embarrassments are caused by the maintenance of an unnecessary force of mercenary soldiers in his dominions and not by the expenses on account of the Contingent and Subsidiary Forces ...	94 to 97
The accuracy of the financial statement published by the Madras paper supported—The arguments of the correspondent above referred to contested by the Editor—The correspondent's reply—The Editor continues the controversy and quotes Article 12 of the Treaty of 1800 to prove that the Nizam did not bind himself to support a permanent Contingent, but merely to furnish a certain military force during times of war... ..	97 to 106
Urgent necessity for the deportation of the Nizam's mercenary troops—Continuation of the discussion regarding the establishment and maintenance of the Contingent—Statement of the strength of the mercenary troops in the Nizam's employ—List of districts and the amounts paid for them by their holders ...	106 to 115
The Nizam repudiates any desire to reduce the strength of the Contingent—The Arabs being directed by the Nizam to coerce Nuseeb Khan and Boodun Khan to relinquish the charge of their districts, refuse to act—The Resident urges the banishment of the Arabs and the Pathans from the Nizam's dominions—Reductions in the Khas Rissala ...	115 to 117
Proclamation issued by the Bombay Government prohibiting the passage of foreign adventurers through British territory without a passport—The Governor-General directs the disbandment of the 5th Cavalry Rissala in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 1853—Boodun Khan agrees to a reduction of his military establishment—Abolition of moonshee's fees by Salar Jung ...	117 to 119
Expected receipt of orders from the Governor-General concerning the Arabs—postponement of the disbandment of the 5th Rissala—Dismissal of Arabs—Dismissal of Hubbeeb Saleh, Mahomed Khan, Sultan Nuwaz-ool-Moolk and Sultan Ghalib by the Nizam ...	119 to 122

Attack on Major Mayne's force by Arabs at Eawuntpoora—The Resident addresses the Nizam demanding the punishment of the offenders, complaining of the evils brought upon the country by the cruelty and oppression of the Arabs, and expressing an opinion that if ever the friendship of the two Governments is destroyed it will be through the conduct of these mercenaries—The Arabs assemble at the Minister's in large numbers and give an evasive written answer to the Resident's demands ... ..	122 to 124
Comments on the Resident's letter—Arab creditors in Courts of Justice—Measures for the dismissal of the Arabs progress slowly—Nineteen hundred members of the tribe dismissed since Salar Jung's accession to office—Recovery of mortgaged districts yielding a revenue of 40 lakhs of rupees ... ..	124 to 125
Article from the <i>Calcutta Review</i> for 1849, giving a history of the Contingent and Subsidiary Forces; conflicting character of the evidence furnished regarding Hyderabad events; the poverty, anarchy, and wretchedness existing in the State due to the system of administration, which tends to the production of corruption and abuses; the weakness and disorders of the State also due to the necessary consequences of the Nizam's political situation; the treaty of 1800, providing for the maintenance of a Contingent force in time of war one immediate cause of embarrassment; the costly character of the force; a great point for enquiry is whether any system can be adopted to relieve the people and save the Government from further difficulties; the disbandment of the mercenary troops would afford great relief to the finances; character and disposition of the Nizam; necessity of entrusting the administration to men of character and capability, of active mind and energetic will; the causes of the disorders are not irremovable, nor the finances of the State irretrievable; nothing but a thorough reform, however, penetrating to every part of the State will suffice to accomplish its regeneration; the history of the Contingent and Subsidiary Forces sketched ... ..	125 to 173
Sultan Ghalib dismisses 270 of his Arabs—Arrest of the Jamadar of Toopran, a notorious malefactor—General order by the Governor-General (Lord Dalhousie) regarding the attack on Brigadier-General Mackenzie ... ..	173 to 176
Proposed removal of troops from Jaulnah to Aurungabad—Arrival of Mr. Temple at Hyderabad—Speculations as to the objects of his visit—Description of the Lungur procession at Hyderabad ... ..	176 to 180
The maintenance of the Hyderabad Contingent and the treaties relating to it—Character of the Reformed Troops—Improvement in their equipment and discipline—Presentation of colours to the 2nd Regiment Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent ... ..	180 to 183
Description of the Lungur procession—Detachment of men from the Hyderabad Contingent engaged on the side of the British in the Afghan War—The strength and character of the Nizam's Army—Reductions in the Reformed Troops—The Army Commission and its suggestions ... ..	183 to 194

## The Berars.

PAGES

Arrangements entered into for the Civil Administration of Berar, and the changes necessitated consequent on the reduction of the Nizam's Contingent—Dislodgement of Jaghirdars in the assigned districts owing to the change of administration—Services of the Jaghirdar of Ellichpore and his claims to consideration—The Nizam desires to reinstate the Jaghirdar and directs his Minister to give the British other territory in exchange for Ellichpore ...	197 to 200
The Assigned Districts are quietly handed over to the British Commissioner by the Talookdars—Examination of Talookdars' accounts—Lord Dalhousie's reference to Hyderabad in his minute on Indian Administration—Criticism of Mr. Yule's Administration Report for 1864-65 ...	200 to 202
Demand by the Nizam for the restoration of the Berars and the acknowledgment by the Viceroy of his reversionary right in the kingdom of Mysore—Increase in the salaries of the officers of the Berars Commission—The Nizam's right to the surplus revenues of the districts—The Nizam's demand for the restoration of the Berars discussed ...	202 to 209
Disposal of the surplus revenues—Criticism of the Treaty of 1853 and of the negotiations which led up to the assignment of the districts—Rumoured offer by a Baroda banker of a loan of nine lakhs of rupees for the redemption of the Berars—Consideration of the circumstances which led up to the cession of the territory—The Nizam's reluctance to make a territorial cession in discharge of the debt due on account of the Contingent ...	209 to 213
Increase of the revenue of the districts under British administration—Sir Salar Jung's advocacy of the Berars question—The proposed loan by the Baroda banking firm—The Nizam's credit in the money market considered—Relation of the circumstances leading up to the assignment of the Berars—A plea for the consideration of the Nizam's claim for the restoration of the districts ...	213 to 218
Arguments in favour of the raising of a loan for the redemption of the Berars—The Nizam's fidelity to the alliance with the British—The maintenance of the Hyderabad Contingent not provided for by territory—Grounds upon which the arguments for the retrocession of the districts are based ...	218 to 222
General Fraser's action in the negotiations for the cession of the Berars—Retrospect of the circumstances under which the province came into the possession of the British—Improved condition of the peasantry in the districts under British Management—Responsibility of the British Government for Chundoo Lall's misrule ...	222 to 226
The Calcutta Foreign Office decides not to reply to the representations made in regard to the restoration of the Berars, and resolves to keep the province as if no claims had been put forward for its restoration. Mr. Saunders addresses an assembly of the principal nobles of Hyderabad at the Residency, announcing that the Government of India was displeased at the prosecution of the Nizam's claims to the restoration of the Berars and was determined not to discuss the question during the minority of the Nizam—Comments on the address ...	226 to 229
The circumstances attending the appointment of Chundoo Lall—Mobariz-ood-Dowlah's imprisonment in Golcondah for complicity in the Wahabee conspiracy—The close of Chundoo Lall's career ...	229 to 231

The justice of the Nizam's claim to the Berars not invalidated by His Highness's minority—Other objections to the retrocession of the Berars considered—Rumoured design of the British Government to remove Sir Salar Jung from Hyderabad ... ..	231 to 234
The Berars held in trust and not in sovereignty by the British Government—The negotiations for the assignment of the Berars and the conditions under which the districts were transferred—Surplus <i>abkaree</i> revenue of Secunderabad and Jaulnah due to the Nizam as a set-off to the Contingent debt—The Nizam debarred by law from raising money from British subjects or Europeans ...	234 to 237
Denial of the alarming statements circulated with reference to the condition of affairs at Hyderabad and the action of the Resident—The reputed authorship of the statements—Consideration of the conditions under which the Berars are held by the British Government—The action of the Foreign Office in regard to the Berars question—The refusal of the British Government to discuss the question during the Nizam's minority ... ..	237 to 244
The maintenance of the Hyderabad Contingent argued to be a distinct and perpetual obligation imposed upon the Nizam's Government by treaty—Sketch of the history of the Subsidiary Force and of the Contingent—Criticism of Lord Salisbury's action in the Berars question—The Governor-General's policy towards the Nizam's Government regarded in England as a flagrant breach of good faith—The discussion of the question of the restitution of the Berars closed by the return of all Sir Salar Jung's letters on the subject ... ..	244 to 249
The Nizam not a feudatory of the British Government— <i>Résumé</i> of the Nizam's claims for the restoration of the Assigned Districts—The steps taken by the Regents to secure a recognition of the Nizam's claims to the districts—The policy of the British Government regarding the Hyderabad State Railway, and the offer of the Nizam's Government to liquidate the Berars ... ..	249 to 258
Criticism of the Treaty of 1860—Letter from Colonel Yule regarding the assignment of the Berars—Inability of the Nizam to meet the Prince of Wales in Bombay—Sir Salar Jung's visit to England and its connection with the Berars agitation—Sketch of the British relations with the Nizam ... ..	258 to 271
Article entitled "Sir Salar Jung and the Berars" from <i>Tinsley's Magazine</i> —Major Evans Bell's opinion regarding the assignment of the Berars—Discussion of the Berars question in England—Early relations of the British with Hyderabad State ... ..	271 to 289
Criticism of the position taken up by the English Press in reference to the Berars question—Probable discussion of the question in Parliament—Denial of the assertion that the Berars have been ceded in perpetuity—Lord Salisbury's visit to Sir Salar Jung in London said to be liable to misconception ... ..	289 to 295
Historical <i>résumé</i> of the British relations with the Nizam's Government—Lord Metcalfe's Hyderabad policy—British relations with the Nizam's Government—The origin and history of the Hyderabad Contingent—Lord Dalhousie's Hyderabad policy—Discussion of the Berars question ... ..	295 to 317
The object of Sir Salar Jung's visit to England—Lord Salisbury and the restoration of the Berars—Sir Salar Jung alleged to be the bearer of a formal petition for the restoration of the Berars—Reported recommendation by Lord Salisbury for the appointment of a Commission to consider the question—Correction of misstatements made in certain newspapers with reference to the Berars question ...	317 to 323

The Nizam's objections to the permanent cession of the Berars—Constitution of the Commission appointed to consider the Berars question—Sir Salar Jung in London—The Nizam's right to the restoration of the Berars clearly established—Reply to the argument that the districts may be misgoverned if restored to the Nizam ... ..	323 to 329
Origin of the Hyderabad Contingent—The cession of the Shorapore State to the Nizam, an act of justice and not a gift—Original cause of the interference of the British Government in the management of the State ... ..	329 to 331
Criticism of the rumoured appointment of the Commission to consider the Berars question—Mr. Laing-Meason's article on the Berars question in <i>Macmillan's Magazine</i> —The surplus revenues of the districts—Allegation of bribery made against Sir Salar Jung in his agitation of the Berars question—Denial of the statement that an inquiry was to be made into the Nizam's claims to the Assigned Districts—No inquiry needed as the British took possession of the districts without any right to them whatever ... ..	331 to 336
Services of the Nizam's Government to the British during the Mutiny—The English Cabinet decides that the Berars question cannot be entertained during the minority of the Nizam—Denial given to the rumour that Sir Salar Jung intends visiting England a second time—Drought in the Berars... ..	336 to 338
London <i>Statesman</i> article (July 1, 1880) on the restitution of the Berar provinces—General Fraser's proposals for the reform of Hyderabad rejected by Lord Dalhousie—Extravagant expenditure on "the Nizam's Army" as it stood in 1848—Lord Dalhousie promises to reduce the establishment, but fails to do so for several years—Origin and history of the Contingent—Its connection with the financial embarrassments of the Nizam's Government—The assignment of the Berars—There was no balance against the Nizam at the time of the assignment—The Contingent valuable to the British, but not to the Nizam—The Nizam only consented to sign the Treaty of 1853 on compulsion—Consideration of the circumstances attending the conclusion of the Treaty of 1860—Sir Salar Jung's appointment to the Ministry on the death of his uncle Suraj-ool-Moolk—The good effect produced by his reforms ... ..	338 to 352
London <i>Statesman</i> article (October 1, 1880) on the restitution of the Berar provinces—The disposal of the surplus revenues of the provinces—The Nizam's reversionary right in the Mysore State—Death of the Nizam Afzool-ood-Dowlah—Association of Shums-ool-Oomrah with Sir Salar Jung as Co-Regent—Agreement of the Co-Regents in the Berars question—The Regents propose in 1872 that a cash security should be substituted for the territorial assignment of the Berars, but their offer is rejected by the Government of India in a despatch dated Simla, 24th of September 1873—Receipt of a despatch from the Secretary of State for India confirming the refusal of the Government of India to entertain the proposal of 1872—Further applications by the Co-Regents for the restitution of the Berars—The Nizam's claim to the restitution unanswerable—Intimidation of Sir Salar Jung by the Calcutta Foreign Office—The Resident at Hyderabad refuses to receive any further communications from the Co-Regents on the subject of the Berars—History and antecedents of Vikar-ool-Oomrah—The Nizam Afzul-ood-Dowlah dismisses Sir Salar Jung from office—Vikar-ool-Oomrah's connection with the conspiracy to oust Sir Salar Jung from office—Personation of Mrs. Davidson—Vikar-ool-Oomrah prohibited from appearing at the Nizam's durbars—His subsequent restoration to favour and appointment as Co-Regent—Mr. Saunders' address to the Hyderabad nobles at the Residency—Disastrous political results of Vikar-ool-Oomrah's appointment ...	35

Article in the London <i>Statesman</i> of January 1, 1882, entitled "Habet"—The argument that the Nizam either acquiesced in, or was indifferent to, the British occupation of Berars disproved—The allegation that the late Shums-ool-Oomrah was indifferent about the Berars and acquiesced in their retention, denied ...	363 to 367
London <i>Statesman</i> article (July 1, 1881) on the restitution of the Berar provinces—"A Tale of Shame"—Historical <i>résumé</i> of the British relations with the Hyderabad Government—The burden imposed by the necessity of supporting the Contingent the cause of the Nizam's financial embarrassments—Frequent changes of Ministry—Mortgage of the Nizam's Jewels to supply funds for the pay of the Contingent—Payment of the Contingent from the Residency treasury—The Nizam's extreme aversion to a territorial cession on account of the Contingent—Deceitful conduct of the Residency authorities in alleging that orders had been issued for the movement of troops on Hyderabad when no such orders had been issued—Betrayal of the Nizam by Boorhan-ood-Deen and conclusion of the Treaty of 1858—The Nizam's efforts after restitution—Loyalty of the Nizam and Sir Salar Jung to the British during the Mutiny—Rejection of the Nizam's offer to substitute a pecuniary for a territorial guarantee for the support of the Contingent—Lord Salisbury's Hyderabad policy—Mr. Saunders' breakfast table harangue to the Hyderabad nobles—Detailed history of Sir Salar Jung's subsequent endeavours to secure the restitution of the Berars—Hyderabad excluded from the programme of the Prince of Wales's tour in India—Inability of the Nizam to meet the Prince of Wales in Bombay—Sir Salar Jung visits England and is accorded permission to submit a complete statement of the case for the restitution of the Berars—Presentation of the statement—Treatment of Sir Salar Jung and the Nizam at the Delhi Assemblage—Death of the Ameer-i-Kabeer, Shums-ool-Oomrah, and appointment of Vikar-ool-Oomrah as Co-Regent in his stead—His unsuitability for the post—His connection with the attack on the Residency—Sir Salar Jung objects to Vikar-ool-Oomrah's appointment and proposes the appointment of Busheer-ood-Dowlah as Co-Regent in his stead—Sir Salar Jung is informed that if he does not acquiesce in the final orders of the Government of India in reference to the appointment of a Co-Regent, he will be deported to Madras—Sir Salar Jung yields to the Government of India, but disclaims all responsibility for the appointment—Sir Salar Jung signs a paper pledging both the Regents not to agitate the question of the Berars during the Nizam's minority—Dismissal of Mr. Olliphant, Sir Salar Jung's private secretary—The Secretary of State replies to Sir Salar Jung's appeal by informing him that the consideration of the Berars question would be postponed until the Nizam came of age—Vikar-ool-Oomrah attempts to wrest from his nephews a portion of their ancestral estates—Support of his pretensions by Sir Richard Meade and Major Euan Smith—Vikar-ool-Oomrah lays claim to the Jehannooma gardens—The nephews submit to the claim on certain conditions—Vikar-ool-Oomrah advances claims to other districts belonging to his nephews—The Resident supports the claims—Anarchy in the districts owing to the contending claims of rival parties—Inquiry at the Residency into Vikar-ool-Oomrah's claims to his nephews' estates—Presentation of an appeal to the Foreign Office by the nephews against the Resident's decision—Prevalence of rumours at Hyderabad "fatal to the character both of the Resident and Major Euan Smith."—Sir Salar Jung consents to allow his nephew to be appointed to conduct the mock inquiry set up to justify the Ameer's transactions—Bad effects produced on the Nizam by his evil surroundings—Death of the elder of Shums-ool-Oomrah's nephews—Outrage on his remains by an armed force in the pay of Vikar-ool-Oomrah—Demand for an inquiry into the charges against Sir Richard Meade...	367 to 398

Article from the <i>London Statesman</i> (September 30th, 1881)—Excessive cost of the administration of the Berars—The disposal of the surplus revenues of the districts—Extract from Edwin Arnold's "Marquis of Dalhousie's Administration of British India"—The origin of the Contingent—Relation of the circumstances leading up to the assignment of the Berars ... ..	398 to 406
Extracts from Major Evans Bell's "Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy."—Copy of all treaties and engagements between the Nizam and the British Government and of all correspondence between the two Governments relative to the assigned districts, together with an account of the income and expenditure of the districts and of the cost of the Contingent ... ..	406 to 409
Letter dated 6th July 1859, from Colonel Davidson to the Secretary to the Government of India, forwarding financial statement showing the receipts and disbursements of the Berars from June 1853 to 30th April 1858—Result shows a debit against the Nizam of Rs. 9,31,612-14-11½—steady increase of the revenue from Rs. 34,59,754-5-1 in the first to Rs. 42,71,338 in the last year—Customs duties to the extent of Rs. 14,29,518-5-8 remitted since 1854-55 ... ..	409 to 412
Letter dated 9th July 1860, from Secretary to the Government of India, to Colonel Davidson, acknowledging receipt of the latter's letter, and expressing an opinion that as the Government of India were bound to furnish the Nizam with yearly accounts it was not creditable that it had not been done... ..	412 to 413
Letter dated 7th July 1860, from the Secretary to the Government of India to Colonel Davidson, expressing the thanks of the Government of India to the Nizam for his services during the Mutiny, requesting His Highness's acceptance of presents valued at a lakh of rupees, ceding to His Highness in perpetuity the lapsed state of Shorapore, and requesting certain modifications in the Treaty of 1853. ... ..	413 to 416
Letter dated 5th January 1861 from Lord Canning to Sir Charles Wood, Bart., Secretary of State for India, forwarding documents relating to the negotiations preceding the completion of the Treaty of 1860, and stating that the Nizam readily agreed to most of the proposals made to him, but was unwilling to dispense with the obligation of the British Government to render accounts of the receipts and expenditure of the Assigned Districts, although he ultimately consented to do so on its being explained to him that the Government of India desired to hold the districts in trust and not in sovereignty, and that they "would be restored to him in entirety whenever it should seem fit to the two Governments to terminate the engagement under which the Contingent was kept up."—Enumeration of the terms finally agreed upon ... ..	416 to 418
Letter dated 6th August 1860, from Colonel Davidson to the Secretary to the Government of India, relating to the subject of the accounts of the Contingent—Letter dated 12th August 1860, from Colonel Davidson to the Secretary to the Government of India, detailing the Nizam's objections to the proposed arrangements for the Treaty of 1860. ... ..	418 to 422
Translation of a note dated 21st July 1860, from the Resident to the Minister, requesting the Nizam to accept presents from the Governor-General to the value of a lakh of rupees and to enter into the arrangements for the conclusion of the Treaty of 1860—Translation of a note dated 11th August 1860, from Sir Salar Jung to Colonel Davidson, announcing the Nizam's acceptance of the Viceroy's presents and agreeing in the main to the arrangements of the Treaty of 1860—Further correspondence on the same subject ... ..	422 to 425

Letter dated 5th September 1860, from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Hyderabad, regarding the rendering of the accounts of the Assigned Districts and the management of the districts—Draft of the treaty of 1860	425 to 428
Letter dated 5th September 1860, from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India to the Commissioner of Nagpore, requesting him to depute an officer to take possession of the Godavery districts when the Nizam's Government made them over. Correspondence relating to the proposed frontier line of the new districts.	428 to 430
Copy of telegram dated 29th September 1860, from Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Hyderabad, stating that the Government expects that as the Nizam has absolutely agreed to the cession of the Godavery districts he will not recede from that position—Copy of telegram dated 12th October 1860, from the Resident to the Foreign Secretary, stating that the Nizam adheres to his determination to require the surplus revenue of the Berars and does not consent to the Berars being put under the Commissioner of Nagpore. Letter from Colonel Davidson, Resident at Hyderabad, to the Foreign Secretary, stating the result of his interviews with the Nizam with reference to the treaty of 1860.—Further correspondence on the subject, including a letter from the Nizam to the Resident, accepting in the main the agreements proposed to him, and a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Resident, announcing that the Government of India will not press the points to which His Highness objects—Lieutenant Glasford appointed to the charge of the districts on the left bank of the Godavery	430 to 443
Letter dated 7th December 1860, from Colonel Davidson to the Foreign Secretary forwarding supplemental treaty entered into that day between the Nizam and the British Government—Translation of a letter dated 7th December 1860, from Sir Salar Jung to the Resident, expressing, on behalf of the Nizam, his feelings of friendship towards the British Government and his satisfaction at the conclusion of the treaty—Further correspondence relating to the treaty, to the districts restored to the Nizam, and to the revenues of the Berars...	443 to 483
Return to an order of the House of Commons, dated 6th April 1854, of all papers relative to territory ceded by His Highness the Nizam in liquidation of debts alleged to have been due by His Highness to the British Government—Correspondence between Lord Dalhousie and the India House relative to the non-payment of the debt due to the British Government by the Nizam	483 to 490
Extract Foreign Letter from India, dated 2nd July 1853, announcing the conclusion of the treaty of 1853—Despatch from the Political Department dated 2nd November 1853, approving of the terms of the treaty	490 to 492
Minute by Lord Dalhousie dated 1st January 1851, directing the Resident to request payment of the debt due to the British, to convey to the Nizam the surprise and dissatisfaction of the Government of India at the delay in the appointment of a Minister, and to secure a territorial guarantee for payment of the debt if no effectual steps are taken for its liquidation.—Letter dated 4th January 1851, from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Hyderabad, embodying the above instructions	492 to 495
Letter dated 4th Feb. 1851 from General Fraser, Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, reporting upon the districts most suitable to be assigned for the pay of the Contingent, and recommending the cession of the whole of the Nizam's territory for a definite number of years in place of the partial cession of territory proposed—Memo. by Captain Taylor regarding the districts most suitable for assignment	495 to 513



Minute by Lord Dalhousie, dated 27th May 1851, detailing the arrangements to be made with regard to the assignment of districts by the Nizam and expressing entire dissent from and disapproval of the policy proposed by the Resident—Letter from Lord Dalhousie to the Nizam demanding a territorial assignment on account of the Contingent and requesting the Nizam to dismiss his mercenary troops—Letter dated 6th June 1851, from Lord Dalhousie to the Resident, transmitting the foregoing letter and conveying instructions with regard to the course to be pursued towards the Nizam ... ..	513 to 528
Letter dated 29th September 1851, from General Fraser to Lord Dalhousie, transmitting a letter from the Nizam promising payment of the debt due to the British Government, and to take measures for the reduction of the mercenaries—Letter dated 16th July 1851, from General Fraser to the Secretary to the Government of India, detailing the negotiations which had taken place with regard to the payment of the Contingent—Correspondence between General Fraser and Suraj-ool-Moolk relative to the debt due to the British Government—Statement of monthly payments to be made regularly and punctually in future on account of the Contingent, commencing from the beginning of Fuslee 1261, or the 15th July 1851—List of hoondees furnished by the Nizam's Government in part payment of the debt—Payment of the first instalment of the debt ...	528 to 550
Letter dated 20th August 1851, from General Fraser to the Secretary to the Government of India, forwarding a letter from Captain Taylor referring to the largely increased circulation of debased coins proceeding from the Seegor and Gudwal mints, and suggesting that the coinage of Wagingera pice should be renewed as formerly in Shorapore—Letter dated 16th August 1851 from Resident to Captain Taylor, acknowledging receipt of letter, stating that Nizam's Government has under consideration certain measures for the improvement of the coinage, and concurring in the suggestion that the coinage of Wagingora pice should be renewed ... ..	550 to 555
Correspondence relating to the places on which it would be convenient to the Nizam to draw hoondees in liquidation of the second instalment of the debt—Resolution of the Government of India directing that the hoondees should be drawn on the principal cities of the North-Western Provinces of Bengal—Correspondence relating to the non-acceptance of four of the hoondees received in part payment of the debt ... ..	555 to 560
Letter dated 5th December 1851, from the Resident at Hyderabad to the Secretary to the Government of India, detailing the negotiations which had taken place with the Nizam regarding the payment of the Contingent debt—Correspondence between the Resident and the Minister on the subject—Hoondees amounting to Rs. 87,73,547-8-6 received in part payment of the second instalment of the debt—List of hoondees ... ..	560 to 568
Letter dated 7th December 1851, from the Resident at Hyderabad to the Secretary to the Government of India, announcing that orders have been issued for the discontinuance of any further enlistment for the Contingent, and enumerating the grounds upon which he (General Fraser) believes that the Nizam does not wish for any diminution in the strength of the Contingent ...	568 to 570
Minute dated 3rd January 1852 by the Governor-General, expressing an opinion that the Contingent is unnecessarily costly, and that the same should be maintained at a less expense—Minute dated 28th December 1852 by the Governor-General in Council, announcing Colonel Low's appointment as Resident ... ..	570 to 572

Letter dated 16th March 1853, from Colonel Low to the Secretary to the Government of India, reporting the chief occurrences which took place during the first nine days after his arrival at Hyderabad—Minute of a private conference held between Colonel Low and the Nizam on the 12th March 1853, no third person being present till towards the end of the Resident's visit, when the Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk was called in	572 to 577
Minute by the Governor-General, directing that the Nizam shall be informed that as he has failed to provide for its support in a satisfactory manner, the Contingent is to cease, but the reduction must be gradual and an assignment of districts must be made to meet the expenses of the force whilst its reduction is in progress. Moreover, as the Nizam will in such case no longer have any just claims on the consideration of the Government of India, the principal sum of debt, with interest which it was prepared to surrender, must be liquidated. When all this shall have been effected from the revenues of the assigned districts, they will be restored—If the Nizam refuses to yield up the districts military occupation will be ordered	577 to 596
Letter dated 3rd May 1853, from Colonel Low to the Secretary to the Government of India, acknowledging receipt of full instructions for his guidance in the projected negotiations with the Nizam's Government, and enclosing a draft of a treaty to be offered for His Highness's acceptance, and announcing result of a prior interview at which the Nizam expressed his repugnance at entering into a new treaty	596 to 599
Letter dated 4th May 1853, from Colonel Low to the Secretary to the Government of India, reporting the negotiations with the Nizam relative to the proposed new treaty, and detailing the result of an interview held on the 30th April, at which the Nizam expressed his extreme dislike to a cession of territory to provide for the pay of the Contingent	599 to 605
Letter dated 10th May 1853, from Colonel Low to the Secretary to the Government of India, detailing the result of a second interview with the Nizam held on the 7th May—Letter dated 13th May 1853, from Colonel Low to the Secretary to the Government of India, detailing the result of an interview with Shums-ool-Oomrah regarding the projected treaty at which the latter, on behalf of the Nizam proposed that districts should be made over to him (Shums-ool-Oomrah) and the Resident jointly	605 to 611
Letter dated 14th May 1853, from Colonel Low to the Secretary to the Government of India, detailing the results of a second interview with Shums-ool-Oomrah and intimating that Suraj-ool-Moolk had gained over to his interests the famous Booran-ood-Deen	611 to 614
Letter dated 19th May 1853, from Colonel Low to the Secretary to the Government of India, relating how, through the instrumentality of Booran-ood-Deen, the Nizam was ultimately induced to acquiesce to the treaty—Terms of the treaty.	614 to 619
Letter dated 21st May 1853, forwarding copy of the treaty entered into with the Nizam	619 to 622
Minute dated 2nd April 1853 by Sir F. Currie, Bart., concurring in the terms of Lord Dalhousie's minute, and expressing an opinion that owing to the constitution and character of the Contingent, it ought not to be employed in taking possession of territory to be provided for the pay of the Contingent against the Nizam's will—Minute dated 4th April 1853 by the Hon. J. Lewis on the same subject—Treaty concluded at Hyderabad on the 21st May 1853	622 to 629

Letter dated 22nd May 1853, from Colonel Low to the Secretary to the Government of India, reporting what occurred at the Durbar at which the treaty was signed.	629 to 631
Minute dated 30th May 1853, by Lord Dalhousie, summarising the provisions of the treaty and ratifying the same	631 to 634
Minutes by the Hon. J. Lewis and the Hon. J. Dorin, with reference to the treaty—Minute by the Governor-General concurred in by the Members of Council, regarding a discrepancy between the schedule sent by Colonel Low and that estimated by General Fraser, and pointing out the course to be followed under the circumstances	635 to 637
Letter dated 19th June 1853, from Colonel Low to the Secretary to the Government, announcing the signature of the treaty by the Nizam, explaining the apparent, but not real, discrepancy between the estimates made by General Fraser himself of the value of certain districts and intimating that the Nizam urged his claim to the Abkaree revenues of Secunderabad	637 to 639
Letter dated 2nd September 1853, from Colonel Low to the Secretary to the Government of India, announcing the peaceable transfer of the Assigned Districts to the British, dealing with certain difficulties connected with the determination of the boundaries of the districts, and giving an estimate of the revenue at the time of the transfer	639 to 643
Minute dated 20th September 1853, by the Governor-General, expressing gratification at the peaceable transfer of the Assigned Districts, observing that more territory has been taken than is required, and expressing an opinion that the districts to the extent of the difference between the amount required for the pay of the Contingent and the amount received from the districts should be restored.	644 to 645
Minutes by the Hon. Colonel Low, the Hon. J. Lewis and the Hon. J. Dorin, concurring in the Governor-General's opinion that territory representing the surplus revenues of the districts should be restored—Further minute by the Governor-General to the same effect—Letter dated 18th October 1853, from the Secretary to the Government of India to Major Davidson, Officiating Resident at Hyderabad, conveying instructions for the restoration of the Balaghad Berar in accordance with the Governor-General's minute	645 to 646
Letter dated 22nd November 1853, announcing that the Balaghad Berar had been restored to the Nizam	646 to 648
Return to an address of the House of Commons dated 20th August, 1867, for "copies of any correspondence that may have passed since the year 1865 between the Nizam's Government and the Indian Government on the subject of the cession of Berar; and of the political section of the administration reports for 1861 and 1862, made by Colonel Davidson, Resident at Hyderabad	648
Despatch dated 14th February 1867, from the Governor-General in Council to the Right Hon. Lord Cranborne, Secretary of State for India, forwarding copy of papers relative to the Nizam's proposition for the restoration of the Berars, states that the alleged claims of the Nizam against the British Government were found after careful inquiry to have no existence, and dealing with the Nizam's claim to the expected lapsed sovereignty of the Mysore State	648 to 650
Letter dated 14th November 1866, from Sir George Yule to the Secretary to the Government of India, forwarding copy of a letter dated 27th October from Sir Salar Jung, demanding the restoration of the Berars, and dealing with the arguments used by Sir Salar in his letter—Sir Salar Jung's letter complains of the neglect of the British Government to furnish accounts of the Assigned	

Districts and to pay over the surplus revenues of the districts as provided by treaty; states that the Nizam's Government requires the restoration of the Berars to provide means for necessary reforms; and claims a share in the expected lapsed sovereignty of Mysore and a share in the revenues of Goomsoor and Kurnool ... ..	650 to 655
Letter dated 13th February 1867, from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Hyderabad; acknowledging the receipt of Sir Salar Jung's letter, and stating that after careful consideration, the Viceroy has come to the conclusion that the claims urged by Sir Salar Jung "are altogether baseless and unsupported by a shadow of right," and that the "spirit of extravagant assertion which pervades Sir Salar Jung's letter, unworthy alike of his princely master's dignity and of his own reputation for enlightened statesmanship, leaves the Governor-General in Council no alternative but to require that the future communications of the Hyderabad Darbar shall be framed in a tone more serious and circumspect." Examination of the circumstances which are said to have given the Nizam rights co-ordinate with those of the British Government in the territories of Goomsoor, Kurnool and Mysore respectively...	655 to 668
Letter dated 9th April 1867, from the Governor-General in Council to Sir Stafford Northcote, Bart., Secretary of State for India, forwarding a communication from the Government of Fort St. George, reporting the extent of military assistance rendered by the Hyderabad Government in the campaigns of 1835-36 and 1839, respectively. Further papers relating to the same subject ... ..	668 to 675
Letter dated 31st May 1867, from the Secretary of State for India to Governor General of India in Council, acknowledging the receipt of the correspondence relating to the restoration of the Berars and concurring in the Governor-General's conclusions on the several points touched upon ... ..	675
Extract from Colonel Davidson's Administration Report for 1860-61—Political Section ... ..	675 to 677
Article in the <i>Friend of India and Statesman</i> , dealing with the question of the restitution of the Berars ... ..	677 to 682
The Marquis of Hartington agrees with Sir Richard Meade's desire that there should be an official inquiry into the charges brought against him by the <i>Statesman</i> ... ..	682 to 685
Sir David Wedderburn proposes to move the House of Commons for a return of papers relating to Hyderabad—The Marquis of Hartington's reply to a question relative to the charges against Sir Richard Meade—Sir Stuart Bayley's departure from Hyderabad to England... ..	685 to 691
The Marquis of Hartington states, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, that from an inquiry made by the Government they were of opinion that it was conclusively proved by papers in their possession that Sir Richard Meade had acted under the orders and in entire accordance with the wishes of the Government of India—Mr. Reid gives notice in the House of Commons that he will move an address to the Queen, asking Her Majesty to disband the Contingent and restore the Berars ... ..	691 to 692
Rumoured restoration of the Berars on the Nizam attaining his majority—Increase of the revenue of the Hyderabad state from thirty to ninety lakhs under Sir Salar Jung's administration—Corruption in the Nizam's Dominions—Proposed visit of the Nizam to England ... ..	692 to 696

Extract from Colonel Meadows Taylor's "Story of My Life"—The writer proceeds to Nuldroog on the assignment of the Berars and takes possession of the district placed under his charge—Description and history of Nuldroog—Boundaries of the district placed under his charge—Settlement of the district—Judicial Administration—Suppression of dacoity—Oppressed and impoverished condition of the cultivators of the district on his taking charge—Introduction of a regular system of village accounts—Difficulties of the administration ... ..	696 to 707
Increased cultivation of land establishment of a new market town at Kelinga—Account of revenue collections—Distress in the districts—Visit of the Resident—His approval of the administrative work in the Nuldroog district—Departure of Lord Dalhousie—Opinion as to the character of his administration—Appointment of Mr. T. N. Maltby as Chief Commissioner—The cave temples of Kharosa—Death of Mr. Bushby—Measurements for the completion of the Bhatoree embankment—Visit of Colonel Davidson, the new Resident ... ..	707 to 715
Appointment of Colonel Taylor to the Deputy Commissionership of North Berar—Proceeds to Booldana to take up his appointment—Revenue survey operations—Nominated settlement officer and surveyor in chief to the Assigned Districts—Subsequently appointed Deputy Commissioner of Berar—Presentation of a Marathi address—Proceeds to Jaulnah—Adventure at Shahgurbh with mutineers—Arrival at Jaulnah—Despatch of the Hyderabad Contingent to Central India to operate against the rebels—Hyderabad during the Mutiny ... ..	715 to 724
Colonel Taylor proceeds to Booldana, and is well received by the people—Description of Booldana—Alarm and uneasiness of the people after the fall of Delhi and Lucknow—The position of the Berars—Loyalty of the Rajpoots of Akola—Corruption amongst the <i>chuprassies</i> —Unsettled condition of the country and prevalence of vague rumours—Flattering letter received from Mr. Maltby regarding the condition of the Nuldroog district—Ordered to Hyderabad and appointed Commissioner of Shorapore ... ..	724 to 729
Rumoured renewal of the demand for the restoration of the Berars on the accession to power of the Liberal Ministry—Statement of the circumstances attending the cession of the districts—Improvement of the revenue receipts ... ..	729 to 732
Discussion of the Berars question ... ..	732 to 737

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# TREATIES.

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# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

## TREATIES.

ENGLISHMAN, *October 23, 1848.*—The following is from Hyderabad, dated the 6th instant :—

“I believe this Government pays little attention to the stipulations of the treaty with the English when it may concern the interests of individuals to whom its provisions have been extended. The treaty made with the Nizam on the expulsion of the Paishwa guaranteed certain rights of Jaghires and Enaums to the subjects of the Poona Government lying in countries ceded to the Nizam. The conditions have not been invariably fulfilled, and there is a recent instance of a remonstrance addressed to General Fraser, in which the complainant says:—‘Notwithstanding I have presented you with three or four letters from the Agent at Poona, and have been for the last five years incurring debt and distress.’ ‘Although the matter is provided for by your treaty, you do not attend to it,’ &c. ‘It is inconsistent with the usage of your Government,’ &c. This is all a little too sharp and too direct for a native petitioner, but it is no wonder that neither his patience nor his temper were under subjection for a longer time. The Resident’s answer, conveyed to him through a Moonshee, of which he has made a memorandum, is to the following effect:—‘Commissioners are about to be appointed conjointly by the Nizam’s and the Company’s Government to inquire into and adjust the stipulations of the treaty. Carry your case to them for redress.’ This is effectual and satisfactory though it comes late. But when it is perceived, as it is by the answer of the Resident, that redress was due, either to admit or deny the right of the complainant, it was something peculiar that no decision had been come to in a period of five years. How heavy and cumbersome the work of the Resident must be, when matters are allowed to remain unadjusted and uninvestigated for periods of five years.”

ENGLISHMAN, *July 25, 1855.*—The following is from Hyderabad, dated the 7th July :—

“Great efforts are making on the part of the Minister to put down the exactions which are made on traffic passing on the Godavery, as well as to prevent the charge of transit duties, which, contrary to treaty, are charged on the produce and manufactures of the British territories. I do not expect immediate success from the measures of the Minister. He will not be able to effect at once what a conjunction of Residents and Ministers has not been able to effect for the last fifty-three years. This provision of the treaty is an example of what was advanced by Lord Dalhousie in his Burmese minute to the effect that by our treaties we make rights for our subjects, and obligations for ourselves, which become a mockery and a delusion.”

ENGLISHMAN, *September 20, 1855.*—The following is from Hyderabad, dated the 6th of September :—

“On Saturday last the Resident had an audience of the Nizam ; he had been directed by his Government to require from His Highness the performance of a condition of the commercial treaty, *id est*, the abrogation of transit duties on traffic passing to and from the British territory. In what manner the question was discussed, or how adjusted, I do not know. Common report affirms that, in the style usual to His Highness, he directed his Minister to carry into effect the requisitions of the British Government.”



ENGLISHMAN, *July 5, 1860*.—The following is from Hyderabad, dated 19th June :—

“The provisions of the commercial treaty of 1802 with Hyderabad annulling all charge of transit duties on the produce of the English territories to merchants subjects of that Government have not been, up to this period, carried into effect. The Resident has now taken measures which cannot fail to give proper effect to this provision of the treaty, and much benefit will be conferred on persons trading with the English territories. I should wish to see transit duties on all traffic, either foreign or internal, abrogated by the Nizam’s Government.”

ENGLISHMAN, *January 6, 1862*.—The following is from Hyderabad, Deccan, 26th December 1861 :—

“The treaties of 1853 and 1860 stipulate that on the payment of a specific sum from the revenues of territories to be assigned for that purpose the English Government will maintain a contingent for the Nizam, of two thousand horse and five thousand infantry, and pay any surplus of revenue that may accrue to the Nizam’s Government. At the time the first treaty was delivered to the Nizam a schedule was presented to him with it which exhibited the actual number of troops maintained as being somewhat more than two thousand three hundred horse, and the infantry as somewhat more than five thousand five hundred. The Finance Committee submitted to the English Government that the numbers in excess of the amount stipulated for by treaty should be disbanded, as affording a saving for the English Government of more than one hundred and fifty thousand rupees. The treaties are a bar to this consummation, for they provided expressly that the Nizam’s Government should receive the surplus. The recommendation of the Finance Committee, however, established one point positively, that the supernumerary numbers of the Contingent might be reduced consistently with the treaties, and without detriment to the affairs of either State. As this conclusion has been arrived at, the Nizam’s Government, which, though in an improved financial condition, by the recent restoration to it of some part of the districts that had been assigned to the English Government, is not overflowing with wealth, may fairly ask to have the proposed reduction made for its benefit. The English Government can have no plea for refusing the request, nor would it condescend to set up any. If it did I should understand that further expositions of the question had shown that the reduction could not be made without detriment to the affairs of the one or the other of the two States. I do not know that the Nizam’s Government will make the proposal ; if it do not, it will be to the neglect of its own proper interest.”

ENGLISHMAN, *January 13, 1862*.—The following is from Hyderabad, Deccan, dated 2nd January :—

“The commercial treaty with the English Government has been a source of constant vexation, fraud, and injustice. Its provisions affect the trader very generally, and in other directions the Nizam’s Government. In regard to the trader, who derives from the treaty certain privileges, it has been nearly a dead letter. Till recently the Government officials in the districts, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances and injunctions of their Government, have continued to charge transit duties and to exact, at the capital and in a few districts, a higher cess than that provided by the treaty. Every instance of the infraction of the treaty would lead to a lengthened suit if penalty for the offence were to be exacted. And the consequence is that infractions of the treaty by officers of the Government lead to no other result than the refunding of the money extorted by them from the trader. This is, in fact, no punishment, and the practice continues unabated. On the other hand, the trader, if a subject of the English Government, or residing in our cantonments, or enjoying, in any way, English protection, uses it to evade the regulations of the Nizam’s Government, and is only put down after long delay, for which His Highness’s Government is, however, to blame, and after much discussion and examination, by the intervention of the Resident. The Nizam’s Government, to introduce regularity into the department of the collectorate of the city customs, is remodelling its rules. The

power and influence of various parties have procured them extraordinary licenses. The Ameers, the high civil and military officers, all possess the privilege of paying no duties upon the goods they import into the city. The license so given to these persons is indicated by a silver ring which the Government bestows upon them, and the production of that ring at the *chowkee* passes the goods under its protection free to the houses of the importers. If this license were fairly dealt with, not a little blame would attach to the Government for granting so preposterous a license, but the holders of these rings use them freely for the service of their friends and dependants, and the Government is defrauded beyond the limits it had prescribed for these frauds upon itself. It will be said that the parties who make so improper a use of the ring are liable to punishment. It is really no such thing, for the power and influence which procured the rings for them will shelter them from being subjected to punishment. Of this we may judge from the circumstance that, instead of the Government having the power to repress this license of free importation of goods, its authority has been recently defied, and the peon executing its orders has been seized and maltreated. A reference, I understand, has been made to His Highness the Nizam on the subject, and he has rendered satisfaction to the Minister, whose authority was insulted, by telling him that it should not occur again. The collectorate department of the city customs has been placed under a Parsee gentleman of the name of Bapoojee, a person of good character, well versed in mercantile affairs, and a traveller. Besides the entire remission of duties on exports and imports to certain parties, to others—of course, the powerful, the opulent, and the influential traders—a reduction of duties is granted on piece-goods. I will only enumerate this ; and instances of other reductions may be gathered from it. Four per cent. is charged to the influential trader, and, with an unintelligible irregularity, from seven to eight per cent. to the poorer trader. Here were injustice and injury to be obviated. If the Government chose to indulge its subjects, the indulgence in the case ought to have been reversed. The Minister would have been justified in putting the same imposts upon the richer traders that are paid by the poorer. It was a matter of some difficulty to struggle with these opulent and influential persons when united for a common interest ; and it has been arranged that six per cent. shall be charged to all traders alike. Here is at once a heavy grievance. The Kurora has invaded an immemorial usage, and resistance is offered at the *chowkees* to what are called his illegal exactions, and the city is rife with complaints that goods are stopped and trade is obstructed. I hope the Kurora will persist ; but I fear the combined influence of these opulent sahookars will prevail. The chief authority will be but too accessible to the complaints and false statements they will make to it by a thousand tongues. It will be said, with you in Calcutta, that ‘truth will prevail at last ;’ it is no such thing ; nobody inquires here ; everybody speaks falsely ; and it is a matter of choice on which side belief may preponderate. There are a thousand obstructions to every measure of reform that is proposed. The interests of the great suffer from these, and their opposition is too powerful to be overcome. No new measure, however judicious and beneficial, but is opposed ; and it cannot be otherwise. Patriotism is quite unknown ; there is no moral rectitude ; and the intellect of the leading persons, such as it is, is perverse. You can govern, in fact, and to speak the plain truth, nowhere in India but by the bayonet ; and the bayonet at Hyderabad is, unfortunately, not in the hands of its administrative power.”

ENGLISHMAN, *February 5, 1862*.—The following is from Hyderabad, Deccan, dated 24th January :—

“I observe in the *Englishman* of the 10th of January a notice of a question now pending between the Nizam’s and the British Governments respecting the exportation of grain from the territories of the former. By the ninth article of the treaty of 1802 the contracting parties agree that no grain shall be exported from the territories of either unless under special license ; but that a license shall be granted immediately upon the application of either party. Here is an obvious trimming ; but it is fairly to be inferred that situations are contemplated where the license may properly

be refused. We have had three bad harvests within the Nizam's dominions, and the present season gives us no better prospect. The price of grain has been rising year after year, and is now risen between twenty-five and forty per cent. It is by no means as yet at a famine price, and, though I do not expect the occurrence actually of what is called a famine, there is no doubt but that much distress will be produced by a scarcity of grain, and consequent high prices. That this will be the case may be inferred from the wants of the surrounding country, suggesting a difficulty of relief being received, if it should be wanted, from the neighbouring territories. Opinions generally advocate free trade, and with propriety. I would even go with Vattel and justify the rape of the Sabines; that is, I conceive that a nation wanting a commodity has a right to compel another possessing a superfluity of it to barter it. And the question between the Nizam's and the English Governments depends upon the fact as to whether the Nizam's country possesses a superfluity of the commodity required by the other. I have no means of forming an opinion upon this subject, but the opinion of the Minister must form a considerable guide to a satisfactory conclusion. The Nizam's country must be considered to be in the condition of a garrison. It can receive no supplies from abroad; it must depend for subsistence upon its own storehouses and granaries; and if it apprehend distress and difficulty from parting with its hoard self-preservation makes it its first obligation to provide for its own safety by not parting with it. It is the habit to impute contumacy to the Nizam's Government in not yielding to all the propositions of the British Government. It is unfair to make the assertion without examining the questions upon which they have split. It would be found, perhaps, that it was more sinned against than sinning. I would observe of Lord Canning's administration that though certain one-sided proposals have been made to the Nizam's Government they have been at once withdrawn when the objectionable character of these proposals has been submitted to His Lordship."

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TIMES OF INDIA, April 2, 1866.—The arrangement by which we hold and administer the fertile districts of northern and western Berar may be regarded as one of the most prominent results yet remaining of Lord Wellesley's policy of subsidiary alliances. It would be somewhat wearisome to trace the various changes in ceded and assigned districts belonging to the Nizam that have occurred since 1800, when the treaty of Hyderabad bound firmly together the interests of the Company with those of the then great Mussulman Soubadar of the Deccan. The terms and circumstances of the arrangement under which we now administer some of the finest portions of the Nizam's country, differ in outline from those made in 1800; but essentially the bargain is of the same nature. Whatever may be thought of its political advantages to ourselves, when stated in pecuniary terms, it has from the first been vastly in our favour. In 1800 the troops we engaged to maintain in virtue of the cession cost us under 40 lakhs of rupees, and the "ceded territory" was computed to yield a revenue of 63 lakhs. At present some 24 lakhs only are required for the payment of the "Hyderabad Contingent" for the maintenance of which the "Assigned Districts" of Berar are placed under our management, and we gain from them a revenue of nearly 50 lakhs. By the terms of the treaty the Nizam is entitled to the surplus revenue, which, according to the above statement, should be at least 18 lakhs, that is, after allowing 8 lakhs for civil management, or four annas in the rupee, which sum Lord Canning admitted was not in excess of the amount usually spent in British districts. But the term "management" is an expansive one. The Foreign Office at Calcutta has ever an exigent troop of *protégés* to provide for, and the result is that the whole of the 50 lakhs is duly disposed of to English *employés*, while the Nizam has not even a paltry annual acknowledgment for this alienation of one of his finest provinces. It is only for the purpose of keeping up the Hyderabad Contingent that we hold Berar at all. That Contingent has been of invaluable service to us during the Mutiny; therefore to the Nizam and other native sovereigns it must look mean and sordid on our part to stretch so much for our pecuniary advantage the permissive interpretation of the treaty. The services performed by the Contingent in Central India under Sir H. Rose and General

Whitlock are well known ; but it is not so often remembered that these troops were paid for us by the Nizam, who also gave them *batta* besides.

At the time of which we speak we were liable to the Nizam for every rupee spent by us in excess of the charge stipulated for in the treaty. We believe that at the time Berar was assigned the Nizam's understanding was that our charges would not exceed two annas in the rupee. Lord Canning admitted that our administration was much more expensive than would be that of the Nizam. His Lordship, however, seemed to think that there was not more expended than might be needful for efficient government, nor more than we were spending in some of our own districts ; but he does not seem to have ascertained whether anything was gained in Berar by his excessive expenditure. There is good reason to fear that there would then, as now, be nothing to show in proportion to the lavish draughts from the revenue. In many districts now, where territory under the direct administration of the Nizam joins our assigned districts, the contrast in outward appearance, as to roads and other evidences of material well-being, shows a contrast much to our disadvantage, and says little for the results of that quiet political *looting* which is going on in Berar—all according to treaty. Recurring to Lord Canning's remarks on Berar, he summed them up by expressing the opinion that we were not acting justly in charging the Nizam more than it would have cost him to administer the districts himself, or more than he paid for the administration of his other provinces. At that time we were only spending four annas in the rupee ; what would His Lordship have said could he have foreseen that in a very few years, as is the case at present, we should be spending the whole revenue received ? This expenditure in our hands is merely a tribute exacted ; it is in no way pretended that we do more in the way of government for Berar than its rightful ruler would do ; and as to public works we do as little as possible.

It was in 1853, during the Residency of General Low, that the treaty was concluded with the late Nizam under which Berar is now administered from Calcutta *via* Hyderabad. The pressing motive for concluding the treaty was that we might under its provisions obtain the settlement of a debt of some fifty lakhs of rupees. But it is worth while to inquire how the debt of fifty lakhs due to us from the Nizams was incurred. It consists of arrears in the payment which the Nizams, under various treaties since 1800, have engaged to make to the Contingent Force, which has been at the disposal of our Government during war time ever since our alliance with the Hyderabad durbar. A considerable portion of the fifty lakhs, it should be remarked, consisted of interest due at the time of the adjustment. As to the principal debt, it was incurred by the failure of the Nizam to fulfil the undue obligation which the treaty laid on him of maintaining the Contingent for our service. The Nizams have been "Our Faithful Allies" indeed, as Captain Hastings Fraser styles them, but they have stretched their faithfulness so far that they have been unjust to themselves and to their own people. We have, besides, good reason for supposing that a certain amount of compulsion was used to compel the late Nizam to enter into the treaty of 1853. By the treaty of 1800 the Nizam engaged to furnish for us a force of 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry. In 1807 a charge was made tending, as in all other cases of our doings at Hyderabad, to the increase of English patronage and power. A regular body of horse was organized under the command of British officers ; and, besides, troops of all other arms on the European model were added. After these changes the charge on the Nizam amounted to more than 40 lakhs per annum, a sum then equal, we believe, to one-third of his whole revenue. Little wonder that he should rapidly become indebted to us at this rate of reckoning ; but is not the question forced upon us whether in equity the Nizam is not our creditor instead of our debtor on account of these continuous transactions concerning the Contingent ? Be it observed that, according to the treaty, it was only during time of war that we could oblige the Nizam to provide the Contingent Force. Yet for a period of thirty-three years previous to the treaty assigning Berar there had been profound peace throughout Southern India ; but for all that we had somehow compelled "Our Faithful Ally" to keep up this enormous standing army, for no purpose that can be seen but the feeding our insatiate

desire for patronage. During several years the monthly charge on His Highness for English officers alone amounted to some Rs. 80,000; and in the thirty-three years of peace before the assignment we must have extracted from him—for the payment of troops kept for our interests—the enormous sum of thirteen crores of rupees (£13,000,000). Had the Contingent been maintained at its present strength during this long period, costing only 24 lakhs annually, the Nizam would have been saved some 5½ millions sterling. It may be that the strict letter of the treaty supported us in this systematic course of extortion—though judging by inference we very much doubt it—but the whole history of the Nizam's debt to us reads more like the regular exactions of a conquering State than like the arrangements by mutual consent between two powers equally free and independent, as was really the position of the Nizam and the Honourable Company. It is good to have a faithful ally, but it is unworthy of a great and strong power to turn that alliance to its own sole aggrandizement. More than that, it is unjust, and the strongest power on earth cannot perpetrate injustice with impunity.

It was under General Low in 1853 that the treaty was signed by which the Nizam temporarily relinquished to us the management of the provinces now known as the "Assigned Districts." It was first proposed that the Nizam should cede in perpetuity certain districts yielding thirty-four lakhs annually—a somewhat one-sided bargain it must be confessed, but well illustrating the principle of our dealings with the Hyderabad durbar. There need be little wonder, however, at this encroaching spirit, for it was about this time, as noticed in the House of Commons, that Lord Dalhousie in a letter to the Nizam delivered himself of the following ruthless and bullying expression:—"And whose power" (that of the British Government) "can crush you at its will." We cannot refrain, in passing, from asking where could be the statesmanship of a man who with the story of the Nizam's unfaltering faithfulness before him could utter such a coarse threat as this. However, by alternate bullying and persuading, the Nizam was induced to entrust to us a large portion of Berar and other districts in the south, viz., Raichore and Dharaseo.

The further consideration of our relations with this court we shall resume in an early issue.

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TIMES OF INDIA, *April 3, 1866*.—In discussing our relations with the Nizam in yesterday's issue we found that our alliance with this prince had proved a source of advantage to us in several ways. So apparent was this to both the Home Government and the Government of India that in 1860 it was deemed desirable to reward His Highness in some signal way, not only for the services that the Contingent had performed in Central India during the Mutiny, but still more for the strenuous and successful efforts made to stem the spirit of mutiny in Hyderabad itself both by the Nizam himself and by his Minister, Salar Jung. "The Exalted Order of the Star of India" had recently been instituted, and the Nizam was amongst the first recipients of the decoration. Yet it was for him a very questionable honour, though with true Asiatic politeness he arranged to receive in open durbar the Star along with the Khureeta reciting the reasons for its bestowal. As a Mahomedan prince the Nizam could not without doing violence to his prejudices receive actual investiture of the "Star" and the sash or collar on which it was suspended, so that the final ceremony was put off from time to time. Another drawback to the value of the distinction was that in the despatch covering the other documents respecting the gift it was spoken of by the Persian word *touk*. Unluckily this word is familiarly used to describe a collar or necklace worn by slaves, or at any rate is a term indicative of servitude in the party receiving such a gift. With regard to more substantial recompense to the Nizam there was considerable show made of our generosity. The principal debt of fifty lakhs, in respect of which the assignment of Berar, &c., was obtained from His Highness, was remitted by the Government of India. The districts of Raichore and Dharaseo were proposed to be returned to him. In this there was no great merit on our part, seeing that the districts already belonged absolutely to him. They yielded a revenue of twenty-one lakhs, and this transfer still left us in possession of territory yielding 24 lakhs, to which were

added 8 lakhs of revenue from additional districts bordering on the Berars, to complete our demand as security for the due payment of the Contingent, and sundry other items included in the provisions of the treaty. We restored to the Nizam, therefore, only 13 lakhs' worth of territory. The guarantee for the due fulfilment of the treaty having been afforded us by our holding 32 lakhs' worth of districts in Berar, we had no pretext for retaining the southern provinces. Various advantages were gained by us in the negotiations ; indeed, it is said by those best conversant with the matter that the balance of advantages under the supplementary treaty of 1860 was much in our favour.

It was then attempted to obtain the Nizam's consent to our management of Berar through any channel and agency that we pleased. As already intimated, the monarch would not hear of this for a moment. Colonel Davidson, the then Resident, finding that grand point was unattainable, was actually directed to higggle and chaffer to obtain for the Indian Government the privilege of drawing revenue from the Nizam's territory without rendering any account, and also for the privilege of spending whatever *we* deemed suitable. The Nizam eventually agreed to this, but on his part he asked that, as provided by the treaty of 1853, he should receive whatever surplus revenues there might be after our expenditure. It is needless to repeat that nothing has been paid over, nor is it likely that there will be. Another point the Nizam contended for was that the Assigned Districts should be managed by the Resident from Hyderabad. This, after considerable demur, has been complied with, to the advantage of both parties. Our Most Gracious Sovereign expressed a wish that the Native Chiefs of India should be adequately rewarded for their fidelity. In the case of the Nizam we have shown that this has not been given effect to, even by the arrangements ostensibly made for the purpose. There is a further point connected with our having taken from His Highness certain districts on the left bank of the Godavery (which with woods and forests we may at the lowest estimate set down as equal to the debt which some imagine we so generously relinquished), and this yet requires explanation. In this case we appropriated to ourselves land valued at half a million sterling without relinquishing one rupee of imperial revenue. It will scarcely be believed, but such is the fact, that the Foreign Office at Calcutta sought to take advantage of the Nizam's former misunderstanding, and attempted to pin him to an implied promise made under those circumstances. We have every reason to believe that the Hyderabad papers will be called for this year in the House of Commons, and then only shall we learn the true nature of our dealings with this Prince. There could not, we may remark, in the somewhat difficult circumstances of Hyderabad at the present juncture, have been a more suitable Resident than Mr. Yule has proved to be, and both Nizam and Minister have felt full confidence in, and been well pleased with, him.

Enough has been said to show that our alliance with the Nizam has been a one-sided and partial one throughout, and that, notwithstanding his being systematically over-reached, he and his predecessors have been faithful to the English cause through French intrigues, Mahratta attacks, and latterly amidst fierce and fanatical mutineers. We retain the administration of some of the best portions of the Nizam's dominions in spite of his earnest wish to the contrary, and after the cancelling of the original debt on account of which the sequestration was made. By repeated treaties we have agreed to pay to the Nizam the surplus revenue of the districts we hold, but not a rupee does he receive, although we collect some fifty lakhs annually and the payment for the Hyderabad Contingent amounts only to twenty-four lakhs. There is one result very injurious to the Nizam's Government that inevitably flows from our retention of Berar, and which will be obvious enough when mentioned. On our assumption of the Assigned Districts all the officials of the Nizam were thrown out of employment. Many of them belonged to families who hereditarily held the higher posts in the Magistracy and Revenue Department. These and their followers, having no resource, flocked to Hyderabad, where Salar Jung was compelled to entertain them out of the general revenues. In fact, he had thrust on him by the assignment a crowd

of pensioners—men consuming the resources of his State without the chance of giving any services in return. It will readily be seen what perplexity and embarrassment these circumstances must cause both to the Nizam and his Minister. A few of these men have been provided for by grants of land in other parts of the Nizam's territory, but still the incubus exists, which nothing but the restoration of Berar to its rightful owner will enable the Hyderabad Durbar to overcome. The annual payment for the Contingent amounts, as we have said, to 24 lakhs. This sum the Nizam could easily and would cheerfully pay in advance if we would restore to him his territories.

Little need be said by way of pointing the moral of our present relations with the Nizam. It is very evident that the subject demands the serious attention of all who desire the settlement of our internal affairs, and who wish to see our rule distinguished by a consistent regard to justice and fair-dealing. It is very certain it has not been so in the case of this Prince; but happily the memory of the injury that has been done may even now be completely obliterated by the British Government restoring the alienated districts to their ancient ruler, and by the manifestation of a frank and generous spirit. By this just course we should add incalculable strength to our power throughout Southern India. There are, we are well aware, those who counsel a different course, and who speak in the coolest tone of "the Nizam's concurring in the erection of Berar into one of our ordinary provinces." This obtuseness to the common political considerations of *meum* and *tuum*, and such desires to consider only our own convenience, would, if allowed full swing, keep India in a perpetual ferment. There is not one of the sovereign princes of India with whom one could so well afford to be just as with the Nizam. Before leaving this subject we should just draw attention to the fact that Colonel Davidson in 1862 sent in his report as usual, but in that report no political section appears. This is a circumstance that demands searching investigation. It is impossible to believe that Colonel Davidson compiled his report without an elaborate political section, therefore the inference is that his report did not support the spoliation of the Nizam: hence its suppression, as we imagine, by the Calcutta Foreign Office. On a reference to all Hyderabad reports previous, and subsequently to 1862, a political section invariably forms a part of the report. Why, then, an omission in 1862?

As a commentary on our treatment of the Nizam, we can quote some pertinent remarks from a high authority. In para. 17 of a despatch from the Secretary of State for India acknowledging receipt of the Bhootan treaty the following terms occur:—"The existence of a strong Government in the neighbouring States, and the prosperity of their subjects, are among the best securities for the permanent peace of our frontiers. To deprive the Government of a contiguous country of the means of enforcing its authority over its chiefs and functionaries, and of compelling them to execute the engagements which it has entered into for the maintenance of the peace and security of our frontier, can in no case be sound policy. In this view it would not be advisable to "impair the resources of the Bhootan State," &c., &c. We venture to suggest to our Indian authorities the pursuit of a policy equally liberal to "our Faithful Ally the Nizam," since the retention of Berar by the British Government seriously weakens the executive power at his Court and seriously diminishes the resources of his State.

We have now clearly shown that the Nizam's difficulties commenced owing to the insatiable desire of former Governors-General of India to exercise patronage by posting their friends to the Nizam's Contingent; that had the Contingent been maintained on its present footing the Nizam would have been richer by 5½ crores; that instead of giving effect to Her Majesty's intention, we tricked the Nizam out of certain districts, which were subsequently made over to Nagpore; that the Contingent has been as useful to us as to the Nizam, while he has paid them throughout; and that at a period when the troops might have been urgently required in his own country they were co-operating with Lord Clyde on the banks of the Jumna, having accompanied Sir Hugh Rose throughout his entire campaign.

Such are a few of the indisputable facts connected with our alliance with the Nizam.



**TIMES OF INDIA, May 22, 1866.**—In reviewing, as we did lately, the relations subsisting between the British Government and the Native State of Hyderabad, we pointed out how vastly different was the line of policy adopted by Government in its dealings with the native princes from that recommended by the former Secretary of State for India in his despatch regarding the Bhootan treaty. A correspondent, whose letter will be found in another column, makes a quotation from the same despatch, and points to our treatment of the Mysore Rajah as a striking commentary upon it. It is needless to dwell upon the results that would inevitably flow from a uniform adherence to a strictly just, if not to a generous, policy in all that concerns the native princes of India. Though their power may not be such as it once was, nor such as to cause us any serious annoyance now, yet—if, in these days, we must look at everything from a utilitarian point of view—their influence is not entirely gone, nor is it so limited as not to be worth securing. Even if circumstances were otherwise, is it consistent with the dignity and position of the British nation, or with the pretensions that it has all along made to these princes, to twist about the meaning of words and terms for the sake of a little self-aggrandizement which it can do very well without? Can it be believed that the English will ever effect that civilization and regeneration of India for which they appear so solicitous, while the acts of Government constantly tend to foster a spirit of distrust and suspicion of insincerity on our part to which the natives are—we regret to say, not without good reason—already inclined? What can be more calculated to keep alive these suspicions, and to widen the gulf between the two races, than the want of good faith which has been manifested by Government in its treatment of the Rajah of Mysore and His Highness the Nizam? Government may interpret the wording of treaties to suit its own view; yet it must be remembered that an immense amount of semi-official and private correspondence takes place between the contracting parties, when explanations are fully entered into as to the scope and object of the agreement about to be made, and that these represent the true spirit of the treaty. Now it is well known that, in the case of the Nizam, Lord Dalhousie looked upon the assigned districts as simply mortgaged to the British Government, not as irrecoverably alienated from Hyderabad; and he argued, as also did Lord Canning, that they might be restored to His Highness. It is also well known that the Nizam was very much opposed to assigning Berar, and that threats and intimidations were resorted to in order to compel his agreeing to the one-sided arrangement. We have already stated that there seemed good grounds for the suspicion that the report for 1862 sent in by the late Colonel Davidson, the then Resident at Hyderabad, was tampered with before it saw the light—that, in fact, the whole of the political section was suppressed. This suspicion has since then received various confirmations, and there is now nothing for it but to believe that we have here a case which finds something like a parallel in the suppression of the Afghan papers. Indian subjects are now, however, beginning to attract more attention throughout England, as well as in Parliament, and we entertain good hope that there are many members of Parliament who will extract a pledge from Government that the palpable wrongs which have been done the Rajah of Mysore and the Nizam shall be speedily redressed.

**TIMES OF INDIA, October 2, 1866.**—*Our Relations with the Nizams.*—The history of our relations with the Nizamate, from the date of our assuming the attitude of a protecting power to recent and brighter times, must be read with regret by any one who has a jealous regard for our national character, and the effect our policy produces upon the native mind. Professing to protect the Nizam's dominions from external rapacity and domestic disorder, to guarantee their integrity and ameliorate their condition, we have greedily absorbed district after district ourselves. We have in reality forced the Nizams to surrender to us territory which they were actually paying us to preserve to them. This is the plain English of the transactions that have spread over a good many years. Our protection of Hyderabad has involved a gradual and considerable disintegration of that State. Protection under such conditions is a misnomer. The idea of one State protecting another, and cutting off huge slices of the latter's territory to pay for the protection,



till at last the protected power dwindles down to a shadow of what it was, and the protector waxes proportionately portly, is an absurdity, to say the least of it. If such a result be inseparable from the nature of the connection, protection must be a questionable privilege, scarcely less disastrous indeed than open hostility. Had we simply beaten the Nizams in fair fight and dictated terms as conquerors we could hardly have gained more in the way of territorial aggrandizement, short of a complete annexation or occupation of the conquered country, than we have obtained by a plausible show of friendship and the insidious process of protection. In the first instance, we concede that the Nizams voluntarily contracted the connection. It gave them great influence in the Deccan, and a more brilliant *prestige* than their own arms had gained for them. But our patronage did not turn out so valuable as they had a right to expect : it became a burden instead of a privilege, and they very naturally desired it to cease. When a rupture took place between the Government of Hyderabad and the Mahrattas during the Governor-Generalship of Sir J. Shore, and hostilities commenced, application was made by the Nizam, Asoph Jah, for the co-operation of the subsidiary force with his own troops. This was denied, and the Nizam was ignominiously beaten by the Mahrattas, and forced to agree to a dishonourable treaty. The subsidiary force consisted at that time of two battalions, and the treaty of 1768 stipulated that these battalions were to be placed at the disposal of the Nizam upon his requisition, provided he paid the expenses of their maintenance. The terms of the treaty contained no reservation which could justly be construed into a prohibition of their being employed against the Mahrattas. Sir J. Shore's conduct was severely blamed, and the injustice of our policy fully admitted. We had broken our engagement, the presence of our troops had become undesirable, and the Nizam consequently declined their services for the future. This he undoubtedly had a right to do. No clause in the treaty rendered their maintenance obligatory upon him. He was merely entitled to their co-operation, on his requisition ; he was not bound to keep them longer than he thought fit. But it did not suit the policy of our Government to allow our hold upon him to be shaken off thus easily. Lord Wellesley, foreseeing the dangerous preponderance that French influence would obtain in the Deccan on the decline of ours, resolved that the subsidiary force should not leave the Nizam's dominions, but that, on the contrary, a firmer footing than ever should be procured for it. With these views he prepared the treaty of 1798, and by steady pressure induced the Nizam to affix his signature to it. The preamble of the document states that "Whereas his Highness Asoph Jah Bahadur has from the greatness of existing friendship expressed a desire for an increase of the detachment of the Honourable Company's troops at present serving His Highness, the Right Honourable Earl of Mornington, Governor-General, has taken the proposals to that effect into his most serious consideration," &c. Now this, following as it does immediately upon the Nizam's warmly expressed desire for the withdrawal of the troops, is a piece of cool effrontery. The framers of the treaty would have us believe that they were actually conferring a favour upon His Highness out of a feeling of disinterested friendship ; whereas there is no shadow of doubt that their real motives were a dread of the growth of French influence and a desire to curb the power of the Nizam. The treaty goes on to stipulate that the subsidiary force shall be increased to a total of six thousand sepoys, with guns and suitable staff. The yearly cost was to amount to Rs. 24,17,100, payable in four equal instalments. Should delay occur in the payment of these instalments, assignments should be granted to the Company on the collections of certain districts.

It is amusing to notice the businesslike way in which we always managed to obtain a material guarantee for the payment of any sums due by the Nizam to us. He once attempted to effect a similar arrangement with us, but we were not in the habit of giving such good security as we required from others, and we showed our sense of his temerity in proposing such a scheme by snubbing the unfortunate Resident, Mr. Johnson, for entertaining the idea for a moment, and eventually removing him from the post. The grand object of the treaty was to render the subsidiary force a permanent institution, not liable to be dismissed at the Nizam's

pleasure, and this it most effectually accomplished. The State of Hyderabad was henceforth under our protection, and we shall now see whether it gained much by the bargain. It is very plain from the fact of our providing for any irregularity of default in the payment of the instalments by a material security that we were alive to the probability of such an event, and had very good reason to expect it. The resources of the Nizamate were at that time at a low ebb. The Mahratta war had added to its financial difficulties considerably, and we must have known that the payment of this large annual sum was a terrible burden, if not altogether disproportionate to the resources of the State. Not content, however, with imposing this heavy load, we very soon contemplated increasing its weight.

**TIMES OF INDIA, October 4, 1866.**—*Our Relations with the Nizams, II.*—*A bye-way of Modern Indian History.* In 1800 a fresh treaty was presented to the Nizam. In this he was required to sanction the further reinforcement of the subsidiary troops by two battalions with guns and a regiment of cavalry, so that the force would consist in future of 8,000 bayonets and other arms of the service in proportion. Admitting virtually the utter impossibility of the Nizam's finding the wherewithal to pay this large body, and intent upon his maintaining it nevertheless, Lord Wellesley introduced a clause, by which the whole of the territories acquired by the Nizam under the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, together with those acquired by him under the treaty of Mysore in 1799, were to be handed over to the Company, for payment of the expenses of the augmented subsidiary force. It is said that the suspicious designs of the Mahrattas and the distracted condition of the Peishwa's government suggested to Lord Wellesley the expediency of increasing the subsidiary force; but, however advisable it might be with regard to ourselves, we had no right whatever to saddle the Nizamate with such a burden. It would have been more consistent with our honour as a great Power to have protected the smaller State at a cheaper rate. By article 12 of this treaty the Nizam was further bound in case of war to place six thousand infantry and nine thousand cavalry at the service of the Company. This contingent was eventually officered by Englishmen, and, like the subsidiary force, became a permanent establishment. But there was never any pretence that its permanence, like that of the subsidiary force, was secured by any treaty or less formal stipulation. Lord Dalhousie, himself the moving spirit of the policy that obliged the Nizam to keep it up after the war in 1817, was forced to admit that "as an honest man" he could not quote any treaty which compelled the Nizam to keep up this expensive establishment in times of peace. When we find him—as if smitten with a sort of pity, or remorse, or shame—stating that "we cause the Contingent to become a "much heavier burden upon the Nizam's resources than it ought to be," we feel that the case must have been bad indeed to wring such an admission from him. "The staff," he goes on to say, "is in my humble opinion preposterously large; "the pay and allowances and charges of various kinds are far higher than they "ought to be." He was quite right. The force in 1851 consisted of eight regiments of infantry, five of cavalry, and four field batteries. It gloried in five brigadiers, with their brigade majors. The military secretary drew the same salary as the adjutant-general of the Bengal army! One feels almost inclined to laugh at this preposterous extravagance and unblushing waste of other people's money. The yearly cost of this contingent was £400,000. For more than thirty years this sum was paid, although it was naturally an exhaustive drain upon the Nizam's finances. At last a time arrived when he was unable to meet the demand. In 1848 the arrears amounted to £750,000. The Governor-General pressed upon the Nizam the necessity of liquidating this debt before it reached more alarming dimensions; General Fraser, the Resident, who was the channel of communication, intimated that the principal must either be paid down at once, or certain specified portions of His Highness's territory be handed over to the Company. Another material guarantee! The Nizam, anxious to avoid the latter alternative, promised to pay the sum in two instalments. The web was now complete—he writhed and struggled, but the meshes of debt were too strong for him. At the suggestion, nay almost at the command, of the creditor, he had indulged in expenses which in-

volved him in the toils, and now the creditor was remorseless and pitiless in the exaction of the uttermost farthing. The first instalment was actually paid in full in October 1851. But meanwhile the contingent had to be paid, and the money which ought to have gone to the pay was required to liquidate the instalment. Consequently a fresh debt was contracted in addition to the remaining half still owing, so that in a very short time the unfortunate Nizam found that his liabilities were as formidable as ever. In short, he was hopelessly involved. We had fathered upon him an establishment which he could not maintain, and the natural result followed. After a great deal of hesitation on his part, and a display of stern inflexibility on ours, he was obliged to accept the alternative of a cession of territory, and, yielding to our dictation, assigned to us the productive districts of Berar. More recently the maintenance of the contingent force has been definitively settled, and its services have been on many occasions of the highest value to the Nizam and credit to itself. A gleam of sunshine began to break upon the hitherto cloudy future of Hyderabad. The appointment of Salar Jung to the office of Minister has proved a real blessing to the State. The reign of order may be said to have been established, and there is every prospect of its continuance. The conduct of this excellent Minister during the Mutiny called forth the warmest acknowledgments from us, and for once, and let us hope for ever, we ceased to tax the resources of the Nizam, and even went so far as to perform a graceful act of generosity. But in the proposed annexation of Mysore another small cloud has arisen. In deciding upon the extinction and appropriation of that State we are manifesting a cool indifference to the rights and interests of the Nizam. We seem quietly to ignore the fact that Mysore was created a separate State not by any mere fiat of ours, but by a mutual agreement between the then Nizam and ourselves. We are treating his successor as if he had no nearer interest in the ultimate fate of Mysore than the Emperor of China has. And yet we are perfectly aware that the Nizam has a right, equal with that which we arrogate to ourselves, to a share in the spoil. Its right is founded upon the first principles of political honesty. He would have obtained half of Mysore after the death of Tippoo, had it not been made a distinct government by the partition treaty. Common justice demands that the division should be effected now if the distinct government be abolished. In times like these, however, when, even in Europe, treaties seem to serve only for momentary settlements of disputed points, which either contracting party may set aside at pleasure, without any forfeiture of honour or principle, it may seem almost idle Quixotism to talk of moral obligations in matters of this nature. Let us hope that this selfish disregard of what is right and just has not infected our counsels, and that our Government has not altogether forgotten the "*honestum*" in its pursuit of the "*utile*."

TIMES OF INDIA, October 30, 1866.—*Our Relations with the Nizams, III.—A bye-way of Modern Indian History.—The Treaty of 1853.*—The treaty by which the assignment of the Districts of Berar and the Raichore Doab was effected was signed and sealed by the Nizam in open durbar in June 1853. The object of the British Government in framing it was to procure a material guarantee for the payment of the debt of fifty lakhs which the Nizam had contracted, to place the Contingent force upon a solid and permanent basis, to obtain the complete control of that force, and to provide for all its future expenses. By the terms of the treaty the British Government bound itself to maintain this force under the new title of the "Hyderabad Contingent," and to keep it up to an effective total of 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and four field batteries. To pay for its support, the Nizam was to assign to the exclusive management of the British Resident the Districts of Berar, the Raichore Doab, and certain parcels of territory upon the borders of the Sholapore and Ahmednuggur Collectorates, yielding together an annual gross revenue of about 50 lakhs of rupees. This was also to provide for the payment of Appa Dessaji's *chout*, and Mahiput Ram's family allowance, and to cover interest upon the Nizam's debt of 50 lakhs, at the rate of six per cent., so long as the principal should remain unpaid.

Now, in the first place, we had no moral or legal right whatever to insist

upon the *permanent* maintenance of the Contingent force. The proposition was discreditable to us, because we were perfectly aware that its permanence had never been contemplated by the treaty that exacted it, and that the Nizam's resources had already been overtaxed in supporting the costly establishment. The very idea of asking the Nizam to hand over territory for the support of a force which had already plunged him helplessly into debt, and which he was not obliged by any treaty or less solemn obligation to keep up at all, is an outrage upon common sense and justice. Our duty was plain enough. Instead of insisting peremptorily upon the maintenance of the Contingent as a permanent establishment, and demanding the cession of districts equal to one-third of the Nizamate to pay for its expenses, it would have been fair to have urged the immediate reduction or even disbandment of the force. To liquidate the arrears of pay which we had advanced, we might with justice have required the temporary assignments of such districts as the Nizam should consent to transfer to us, on the understanding that as soon as the debt was paid the districts should be handed back to him. This course would have been honourable to us, and justly advantageous to the Nizamate. In fact it was the only legitimate loophole of escape that was open to it, from the financial ruin that threatened it. But we had set our hearts upon rendering the Contingent a standing force under our immediate control, and we were not to be diverted from the accomplishment of our object by squeamish notions of political honour. We had a right, some may think, to propose whatever we considered likely to be advantageous to ourselves; and the Nizam having consented to our proposition there could be no question of its justice or injustice. To such we would reply that the Nizam consented because he was helplessly in our power, and virtually obliged to listen to our dictation. His consent was reluctant, and due solely to pressure, and sheer inability to oppose our wishes. "What is the use of answering?" said the Nizam, when Colonel Lowe, the Resident, pressed him for a distinct reply to the demands of the British Government—"if you are determined to take districts, you can take them without my either making a new treaty, or giving any answer at all."

We were "determined to take districts," but we wished to make the transaction as respectable and legitimate as possible. So we framed a treaty and forced the Nizam to sign it. It should be observed that the conveyance of the districts to us amounted only to an *assignment*, not to a complete surrender of proprietary rights on the part of the Nizam, or a cession of the sovereignty *in perpetuo*. This is a most important distinction, and it may lead eventually to considerable embarrassment. In the first instance, there is no doubt that Lord Dalhousie contemplated a simple annexation or sequestration of the districts, and caused this project to be communicated to the Nizam by Colonel Lowe. At an audience which the latter obtained of His Highness for the purpose of conveying these instructions, the Nizam expressed himself to the following effect: "You told me that you were going to propose a new treaty, but you never told me that such a treaty as this was to be proposed to me; you never told me that you were to ask me to give up a large portion of my dominions *in perpetuity*. Did I ever make war against the English Government, or intrigue against it, or do anything but co-operate with its wishes, that I should be so disgraced?" Waxing warm he went on to say: "You cannot understand the nature of my feelings in this matter. I am a sovereign prince, born to live and die in this kingdom, which has belonged to my family for seven generations. You think that I should be happy if I were to give up a portion of my kingdom to your Government *in perpetuity*? I should feel that I was disgraced." This language establishes beyond question the fact that Lord Dalhousie coveted the possession of the districts not merely as a temporary guarantee or pledge, but as a cession with the full rights of ownership, and that a proposal to that effect was conveyed to the Nizam by Colonel Lowe. The communication smote the unfortunate prince with dismay and indignation. We were pushing our demands too far. It was possible that even the Nizam might turn exasperated upon his pitiless and tormenting creditors. The unmistakable repugnance which he exhibited to the alternative suggested the advisability of a modification of the scheme,

and so it came to pass that the idea of a sequestration of the territory was abandoned, and the Nizam was required only to *assign* it to the *exclusive management* of the Resident.

Now what is the exact nature of the interest which the assignment has given us? Have we a right to hold the districts for ever, or are we bound to restore them to the Nizam at some period or other? It is plain that the understanding on which the Nizam consented to the assignment was that the sovereignty of the districts was not to pass out of his hands, and that the possession of them by the British Government was not to be perpetual. It was this idea of the *perpetuity* of our control over them that so chafed and irritated him; and it was to remove this insuperable objection that we substituted the scheme of mere assignment. If we now shift our ground, and revert to the original idea of a perpetual and final cession, which we publicly disclaimed, we shall be clearly perpetrating a downright fraud. The whole transaction will assume the character of an artful dodge, a successful attempt to hoodwink the Nizam, to throw him off the scent, to disguise our real sinister motives under a seeming regard for his feelings, until we should find ourselves in a position to throw off the mask, and show, without shame or risk, how completely we had outwitted him. To shelter ourselves under the plausible quibble that although we are not justified in assuming the *sovereignty* of the districts we are at liberty to retain the perpetual *management* of them in our hands would be a policy utterly unworthy of our character as a great and generous nation. The fact of the Nizam's harping upon the point of perpetuity, and of his retaining the title, while he gave us the actual possession, proves that he looked for the restitution of the territory at some period or other. The fact is we hold it as a security or pledge for the payment of certain liabilities. The treaty does, it is true, provide for the permanent maintenance of the Contingent; and if we are to stick to the *letter* of the law it would seem that our possession of the districts on which the maintenance of the Contingent depends should be permanent also. Logically this is indisputable; and the only remedy we can suggest would be the abolition of the treaty, which enjoins upon us the carrying out of a policy which we disclaimed when we framed it, and which logically invests us with powers not belonging to us *in foro conscientie*. On the whole, the question of the ultimate fate of Berar is one of the most embarrassing that our Government will have to decide upon in its relations with the Nizam. We give it every credit for a desire to inaugurate a less self-seeking policy than that which its predecessors pursued. The restitution of the Raichore Doab and the district of Dharaseo in 1860 to the Nizam, as a recognition of his loyalty during the trying period of the Mutiny, argues a liberality, and an anxiety to repair the injuries of the past, that is as creditable as it is novel. It would seem almost as if we repented us of the hard bargain we had driven—as if we felt that the treaty of 1853 had placed us in a position to which we had no moral right. The object of that treaty was illegitimate, so far as it referred to the provision for the permanent maintenance of the Contingent; the terms in which it is couched have given us powers which are opposed to the spirit in which it was understood by the Nizam when he consented to sign it; and the result is that we find ourselves in an anomalous position—professing that we have no right to the sovereignty of the territory assigned to us, or to its ownership *in perpetuo*, yet holding it *in perpetuo*, and virtually, though not nominally, exercising all the rights of ownership. There are certain grave defects in the working of this treaty, which may occasion serious complications; but these we intend to notice at another opportunity.

TIMES OF INDIA, November 8, 1866.—*Our Relations with the Nizam.*—The following is a letter signed "D":—

"In your issue of the 30th ultimo you have published an article headed 'Our Relations with the Nizam.' It is an 'over true tale,' and will cause a blush on the cheek of every Political in India of the present day whose ideas have undergone that moral revolution similar to what the railway has created in Berar and the Central Provinces. But in justice to the memory of the dead it must be notified that in his demi-official correspondence Lord

Dalhousie deprecated the probably trumped-up scheme of his coadjutor, Colonel Lowe. He was for either disbanding the Contingent, or withdrawing the Resident and the British flag from the Residency, and annexing by force of arms a portion or the whole of the kingdom of the Nizam. His biographer will no doubt correct this if I am mistaken. The late Lord Dalhousie was not of a temperament to cajole and flatter. It was either the 'whole or none' system; but his lieutenant had not his daring, so they at Hyderabad propped up an arrangement which was 'neither fish, flesh, fowl, nor red-herring;' and the inevitable result will and must be that the Assigned Districts will have to be restored to the Nizam whenever he respectfully petitions the Sovereign Empress of Hindustan for their restoration, and pays into the Residency Treasury the 26 or 28 lakhs required for payment of the Contingent yearly. While treating upon the Nizamate, a most startling fact is that General Fraser, the Resident, is said to have suggested to Lord Dalhousie the dethronement of the Nizam. Had such a proposal been carried out, the Indian Mutiny would have taken many years to extinguish."

\* \* \* Our correspondent should have given better authority than "it is said" in support of his "startling fact" as to General Fraser—a statement which we entirely doubt. It is inherently improbable because of the well-known leaning of General Fraser to the Nizam. In "Our Faithful Ally the Nizam," written by Major Hastings Fraser, the General's son, Chapter XX. details all the leading circumstances connected with the "Cession of Berar." General Fraser, it appears, most faithfully acted up to his duty in pressing the (late) Nizam for payments formally due by him to the British Government, and supported Lord Dalhousie's demand on the Nizam for the assignment of territory—a step which was not carried out until the time of Colonel Lowe in 1853. Though, as stated in page 272 of his son's work, General Fraser made a definite proposal towards the transfer of the management of certain districts as security for the Nizam's debts, the reader is reminded in a footnote that whatever might be the ultimate destination of the districts mentioned in the text their proposed assignment, as suggested by General Fraser, was for a *temporary purpose* only,—and, as we have said, the Nizam resisted, and that successfully, the proposal to cede territory in perpetuity. —ED. T. of I.

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TIMES OF INDIA, November 22, 1866.—*The Story of Berar*.—The following is a letter signed "Delta" and dated November 13 :—

"Your paper of 8th November, containing 'D's' letter on our relations with the Nizam's Government, has just reached me, and as I was for many years employed in the Hyderabad country and know both General Fraser and General (then Colonel) Lowe well, you will perhaps give the following a corner in your columns.

"Touching the former it may suffice to remark that you are correct in what you state in your foot-note as to his feelings towards the Nizam and the contemplated temporary assignment of certain districts for the purposes therein indicated. Regarding General Lowe I can merely say that from what dropped from his own lips he too was a well-wisher of the Nizam, and that he did what was of course most distasteful to that potentate in a way as little unpleasant as possible; for he appreciated better than his predecessor the necessity for some radical measure to rescue the Hyderabad Government from its daily increasing difficulties.

"The Nizam was of course opposed to any plan calculated to tie his own hands, and, amongst other arguments, urged that there was nothing in the old treaty binding him to keep up the Contingent on its existing footing. General Lowe acquiesced, remarking that it was quite open to His Highness to dispense with the services of the regular officers and resume the immediate control of it himself. This took the Nizam—a shrewd enough man—all aback, and he at once repudiated the entertainment of such an idea. Then it was that General R. Lowe put it to him whether it was becoming the dignity of a prince like him to keep his army ever in arrears and clamouring for their pay, and that if he wanted to maintain the Contingent on its present footing he must really make some definite arrangement for its support. The assignment of the Berars, Raichore, and Dharaseo was the result.

"The transfer was for certain specific purposes, viz., the expenses of the Contingent, the interest on the debt to Government, and the payment of some Mahratta *chout*, and I fancy terminable with the necessity. At any rate, I did not hear the word perpetuity, and I was present at the closing scene, during which, considering the unpleasant nature of the transaction, the Nizam was most good-

humoured. This I attribute chiefly to his personal feeling for General Lowe, who though firm was most conciliating, and was much esteemed by the natives for his straightforwardness—the most prominent feature in his character. It is needless to say he acted under orders from the Governor-General, who fully approved of all that was done.”

\*Treaties, Engagements, and Sunnuds relating to Hyderabad, Mysore, and Coorg, compiled by C. U. AITCHISON, B.C.S.—*From Malcolm's History of India and Reports by successive Residents.*

The fortunes of this family were founded by Kurnr-ood-deen Assuf Jah, a distinguished soldier of the Emperor Aurungzeb, who in 1713 was appointed Nizam-ool-Moolk and Soubadar of the Deccan, but eventually threw off the control of the Delhi Court. Asuf Jah died in 1748, and was succeeded by his second son Naseer Jung, the eldest son Ghazee-ood-deen Khan holding high office at the Court at Delhi. The claims of Naseer Jung were disputed by Mozuffer Jung, his nephew, with the support of Dupleix, the Governor of the French settlements, who saw in the establishment through his influence of Mozuffer Jung as Soubadar of the Deccan, and of Chunda Sahib a claimant for the Nawabship of the Carnatic, a sure means of securing the ascendancy of the French in India. The support which Mozuffer Jung received from the French was, in those times, of itself sufficient reason to induce the English to lend their aid and influence to Naseer Jung. Mozuffer Jung fell into the hands of his uncle, by whom he was imprisoned, but in the following year, after the murder of Naseer Jung by Pathan rebels, he was released, and with the support of the French assumed the authority of Soubadar. After his accession Mozuffer Jung received into his service a body of French troops under command of Bussy, and assigned to the French large territories near Pondicherry, the province of Karikal, and the town and district of Masulipatam. He was soon after killed in a mutiny of his troops. His only son being a minor, Salabut Jung, the third son of Assuf Jah, was placed in power by the influence of the French, in gratitude for which Salabut Jung confirmed many of the privileges enjoyed by them, and assigned several districts in the Northern Circars for the pay and equipment for the French auxiliaries in his service.

On the outbreak of the war between France and England in 1756, the French were driven out of the Northern Circars by an English force. Salabut Jung, who had advanced to oppose the English, did not feel himself strong enough, without the aid of his French auxiliaries, who had been recalled by Count Lally, to risk a battle, and was glad to conclude a Treaty (No. I.) granting Masulipatam and other districts to the English in enam, and binding himself to exclude the French from his dominions. The acquisitions of the British in the Northern Circars were confirmed by a Firman of the Emperor of Delhi in 1765, at the same time that the Dewanee of Bengal, Behar and Orissa was obtained.

Salabut Jung was deposed in 1761 by his younger brother Nizam Ali, and died two years afterwards in prison. In 1765 Nizam Ali devastated the Carnatic, but was driven back. At the same time an English force took possession of the Carnatic in virtue of a Firman from the Emperor of Delhi. The Nizam was making active preparations for the continuance of hostilities, but the Madras Government, then labouring under pecuniary difficulties and alarmed at the prospect of a war, deputed General Calliaud to Hyderabad to negotiate peace. The negotiations resulted in a Treaty (No. II.) by which for the Circars of Ellore, Ciccacole, Rajamundry, Moostafurnugger and Moortizanugger or Guntoor, the British Government agreed to furnish the Nizam with a subsidiary force when required, and to pay nine lakhs a year when the assistance of their troops was not required. The Nizam on his part engaged to assist the British with his troops.

The Circar of Guntoor, which the Nizam had given in jaghir to his brother Buzlut Jung, was not to be taken possession of till the latter's death, except in the event of his creating disturbances in the Carnatic.

\* For correspondence relating to these Treaties, see pp. 408 to 677.



Under this Treaty a corps of two battalions joined the Nizam for the reduction of the fort of Bangalore in the possession of Hyder Ali, with whom the British Government was then on hostile terms ; but it was soon withdrawn in consequence of the Nizam having treacherously deserted the British alliance and invaded the Carnatic in conjunction with Hyder Ali. The Nizam, however, was soon compelled to separate from Hyder, and in 1768 another Treaty (No. III.) was concluded between the British Government and the Nawab of the Carnatic on the one part and the Nizam on the other, by which the Nizam revoked all Sunnuds granted to Hyder Ali by the Soubadars of the Deccan, agreed to cede to the English the Dewanee of the Carnatic above the ghats which had been seized by Hyder Ali, on condition of their paying him seven lakhs of rupees a year ; not to interfere with the possessions of the Nawab of the Carnatic ; and to accept a reduced payment for the Northern Circars. The engagement between the English and the Nizam mutually to assist each other with troops was altered into an agreement to furnish the Nizam on requisition with two battalions of sepoys with guns, on condition of the Nizam defraying their expenses, it being understood that the force was not to be employed against any person in alliance with the English.

In consequence of Bazalut Jung collecting French troops in Guntoor, it became necessary in 1774 to call on the Nizam to order their removal. No results followed the Nizam's orders. But in 1779 Bazalut Jung, threatened by Hyder Ali, craved the protection of the English and agreed with the Madras Government (No. IV.) to rent to them the Guntoor district, to dismiss the French troops, and to receive English troops adequate for the defence of the district. This engagement, which was concluded without reference to the Nizam, was considered by him to be a breach of the Treaty of 1768, and was disallowed by the Supreme Government. The district of Guntoor, which in the meantime had been transferred to the Nawab of the Carnatic on a ten years' lease, was restored to the Nizam's officers. The same unseemly acrimony which had characterized the discussions regarding the Treaty concluded by the Bombay Government with Ragoba in 1775 disgraced the discussion of this Treaty between the Supreme Government and the Government of Madras.

In 1782 Bazalut Jung died and the Guntoor Circar, which ought to have lapsed to the English, was retained by the Nizam's officers. In 1788 a Resident was sent to Hyderabad to demand restitution of the district and to adjust the tribute due to the Nizam, the payment of which had been allowed to fall into arrears. The demand for the restoration of Guntoor was complied with (No. V.) ; but the dispute regarding the arrears of tribute could not be adjusted at Hyderabad. It was by mutual consent referred to the decision of the Governor-General, and Meer Abdul Cassim was deputed by the Nizam to Calcutta to represent his interests. After allowing for the revenues collected from Guntoor by the Nizam, the arrears due by the British Government were reduced to the sum of Rupees 9,16,665. The mission of Meer Abdool Cassim was productive of a new engagement (No. VI.) explanatory of the Treaty of 1768. By this engagement, which was in the form of a letter from Lord Cornwallis, but was declared to be as binding on the British Government as a regular Treaty, it was explained that the words in the 6th Article of the Treaty of 1768 " whenever the situation of affairs will allow of such a body of troops to march into the Deccan " should be understood to mean that the force engaged for by that Article should be granted whenever the Nizam should apply for it, provided that it should not be employed against any power in alliance with the British Government.

On the breaking out of the first war with Tippoo Sultan, Lord Cornwallis made every effort to secure the co-operation of the Nizam, by promising him full participation in the advantages which might result from the war. A Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance (No. VII.) was concluded with him on 4th July 1790. By this Treaty, to which the Peishwa was made a party, it was stipulated that the Nizam and the Peishwa should invade Tippoo's territories, and should furnish a contingent of 10,000 horse to be paid for by the British Government,



that an equal division should be made of the territories conquered, that certain polygars and zemindars who had formerly been dependent on the Nizam and Peishwa should be placed on their former footing, and that if, after the conclusion of peace, Tippoo should attack any of the contracting parties, the others should join and punish him. On the termination of the war territories yielding an annual revenue of 13,16,000 pagodas were made over to the Nizam as his share of the conquests.

After the conclusion of peace Lord Cornwallis transmitted to Hyderabad and Poona proposals to reduce to a definite Treaty the mutual guarantee against Tippoo which had been stipulated for in the Treaty of 1791. But owing to the delay and evasions of the Peishwa, whose designs against Tippoo and the Nizam would have been frustrated by the engagements proposed, the conclusion of the Treaty was abandoned, although the Nizam had given his verbal consent to it.

At this time the Mahrattas revived a claim against the Nizam for arrears of chout and threatened hostilities if it was not satisfied. The Nizam applied to the British Government for aid, but Sir John Shore was precluded by the Treaties with the Mahrattas from interfering further than as a mediator. The war which broke out in 1795 terminated in the convention of Kurdla, by which the Nizam was compelled to cede to the Mahrattas territories yielding a revenue of thirty-five lakhs of Rupees, to pay three crores of Rupees, and to give his Minister Azim-ool-Omrah as a hostage for the fulfilment of these terms. Three-fourths of the territory ceded by the Nizam was afterwards recovered during the dissensions which followed the death of Madho Rao Peishwa.

The resentment created in the mind of the Nizam by the refusal of the British Government to aid him in his extremities, or to permit the subsidiary force to accompany him in the war, led him to entertain in his service a body of troops commanded by French officers, and to dismiss the British subsidiary force. Friendly relations with him were therefore threatened with rupture; but before matters came to a crisis the rebellion of his son Ali Jah compelled him to beg the return of the subsidiary force. The return of the Minister Azim-ool-Omrah from Poona was also favourable to British influence, and as the threatening attitude of Tippoo made a closer connection with Hyderabad desirable, a Treaty (No. VIII.) was concluded on 1st September 1798, by which the subsidiary force was made permanent and raised to six battalions costing Rs. 24,17,100 a year; the Nizam's French corps was to be disbanded; the British Government was to arbitrate between the Nizam and the Peishwa, or in the event of the Peishwa not consenting to that arrangement, to protect the Nizam from any unjust and unreasonable demands of the Mahrattas.

On the outbreak of the second war with Tippoo in 1799, the subsidiary force and the Nizam's army co-operated with the British troops, and after the fall of Seringapatam the Nizam received by the partition Treaty of Mysore (No. IX.) districts yielding 6,07,332 Pagodas. To this were subsequently added two-thirds of the territories which were offered to, but rejected by, the Peishwa. The jealousy with which the Mahrattas viewed the operations against Tippoo, and the threatening attitude which they assumed, led the British Government to strengthen their connection with the Nizam, and a new Treaty (No. X.) was concluded with him on 12th October 1800, by which two battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry were added to the subsidiary force, and for the payment of the force the Nizam ceded all the territories he had acquired by the Mysore Treaties of 1792 and 1799, yielding about 17,58,000 Pagodas, subject to some exchanges to secure a well-defined boundary. The Treaty regulated the duties on which the subsidiary force was to be employed, secured the Nizam in the sovereignty of his dominions, prohibited his entering into political negotiations with other States, and made the British Government the arbiter in his disputes with other powers. In consequence of the equivocal conduct of the Nizam in the first Mahratta war and the refusal of his officers to receive the wounded in the battle of Assaye into the forts of Dowlatabad and Daroor, an additional article was added to the Treaty of 1800, requiring the contracting parties to admit the troops of either party into their forts when called upon.

In 1802 a Treaty (No. XI.) was concluded to improve the commercial relations between the British Government and Hyderabad, by limiting the duty on imports to 5 per cent. and regulating the manner in which it should be levied. With the exception of the duties levied under this Treaty all transit duties have recently been abolished in the Nizam's dominions. Duties of every kind on grain have likewise been abolished and the prohibition which had formerly been put on the export of grain has been removed.

Nizam Ali died in 1803 and was succeeded by his son Sekunder Jah, who went through the farce of obtaining the confirmation of the Emperor of Delhi. On his accession all existing Treaties were confirmed (No. XII.). At the close of the Mahratta war the Nizam received by the partition Treaty of Hyderabad No. XIII.), dated 28th April 1804, the cession of the Deccan territories conquered from Sindia and Nagpore. In 1808 died Meer Alim, the Nizam's able Minister and a sincere friend of the British Government. As it was essential to the maintenance of the alliance that the Nizam's Minister should be well disposed to the British, long and stormy discussions took place with the Nizam regarding the appointment of a successor. At last Moneer-ool-Moolk was appointed, but under an engagement to refrain from taking any active part in the affairs of the State, leaving the management to Chundoo Lall, who was entirely dependent on British influence for his elevation to power. The Nizam himself, whose sanity was doubted, lived a secluded life, and took no interest in the administration. Under Chundoo Lall the reform of the military establishments was commenced and a regular army disciplined by British officers was organized.

The Nizam's army proved of much service in the Pindaree and Mahratta wars in 1817, and after the overthrow of the Peishwa these services were recognized by the Treaty of 12th December 1822 (No. XIV.), whereby the Nizam received a considerable accession of territory, was released from all arrears of tribute which he owed to the Peishwa, and from all future demands of it, and some exchanges of territory were effected to secure a well-defined frontier. The Nizam was bound to protect the rights of the landholders in the districts made over to him; a stipulation which has led to constant and unpleasant discussions with his Government. In 1847 a commission was appointed to enquire into all claims under this guarantee. The claims finally allowed amounted to Rs. 1,00,147.

Sekunder Jah died in 1829 and was succeeded by Naseer-ood-Dowlah, with whom a Treaty (No. XV.) was concluded confirming all existing Treaties. During the latter years of Sekunder Jah's rule, the country had suffered much from the almost irresponsible administration of Chundoo Lall. The revenues of the State were farmed to contractors who were supreme in their several districts. As a consequence, the grossest oppression prevailed, and the disciplined force under British officers, which Chundoo Lall had organized, was repeatedly called out to repress local rebellion. The country was in the possession of robber bands, and the roads were unsafe except for persons travelling with larged armed escorts. For the restoration of order, it became necessary to employ British officers in the different districts, who settled the amount of revenue to be levied, and under their administration the country soon improved. The State moreover was deeply involved in debt both to merchants and to the British Government. The annual payments to the Nizam for the Northern Circars was bought up for a sum of Rs. 1,66,66,666, by which the Nizam's Government was extricated from its difficulties.

When Naseer-ood-Dowlah succeeded, he requested that the direct interference of the British officers in the administration might be discontinued. The Nizam's request was complied with. He was assured that, provided he maintained inviolate the settlements made by the British officers until the period for which they were made should expire, the British Government would withdraw from all interference, and the Nizam would be absolute both in the selection and removal of his Minister, and in all other matters of internal administration. The withdrawal of interference was immediately followed by the return of disorder and misrule. Every department of the government became disorganized, and the credit of the

State was so bad that bankers refused to grant loans. Chundoo Lall therefore resigned the office of Minister on the 6th September 1843.

For some months the Nizam endeavoured to transact business himself, but he at length, with the approval of the British Government, appointed as his Minister Sooraj-ool-Moolk, son of the former Minister Moneer-ool-Moolk. In the meantime the pay of the contingent had fallen greatly into arrears, and advances had to be made from the British treasury. The Nizam, however, was distinctly informed in 1843, that in the event of further advances becoming necessary, a territorial security for the payment of the debt would be demanded. The contingent force owes its origin to the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800, by which the Nizam agreed in time of war to furnish 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry to co-operate with the British army. Although the Treaty gave the right only to an occasional use of the Nizam's troops, the practice was to require a certain portion to be maintained ready for service at all times whether in peace or war. Part of the Nizam's army was commanded by European officers. It had been in various ways reformed at the request of successive Residents, and particularly by Mr. Henry Russell in the year 1814 and 1816, and it was made subject to the Articles of War. Still the Contingent was essentially a part of the Nizam's army. No efforts were made to pay off the debt on account of the Contingent either by Suraj-ool-Moolk or by his successors in office, Amjad-ool-Moolk and Shums-ool-Oomrah, who were appointed in 1848 and 1849 with the approval of the British Government. In 1849 a demand was made for the payment of the debt by 31st December 1850. No steps were taken for payment, and in 1851 a territorial cession was demanded to liquidate the debt, which now amounted to upwards of Rs. 78,00,000. A payment of Rs. 40,00,000 was at once made, and the appropriation of the revenues of certain districts was promised to meet the remainder. The demand for a territorial cession was therefore withdrawn. But no real improvement followed. The Resident was again obliged to make advances for the payment of the Contingent, and in 1853 the debt had again risen to upwards of Rs. 45,00,000.

Some new arrangement was absolutely necessary. Therefore in 1853 a new Treaty (No. XVI.) was concluded with the Nizam, by which the British Government agreed to maintain an auxiliary force of not less than 5 000 infantry 2,000 cavalry, and four field batteries of artillery ; and, to provide for its payment and for certain pensions and the interest on the debt, the Nizam ceded in trust districts yielding a gross revenue of fifty lakhs of rupees, it being agreed that accounts should be annually rendered to the Nizam, and that any surplus revenue which might accrue should be paid to him. By this Treaty the Nizam, while retaining the full use of the subsidiary force and Contingent, was released from the obligation of furnishing a large force in time of war, and the Contingent ceased to be part of the Nizam's army and became an auxiliary force kept up by the British Government for the Nizam's use.

Naseer-ood-dowlah died in 1857 and was succeeded by his eldest son Afzul-ood-Dowlah, the present Nizam. During the Mutinies of 1857 the maintenance of order at Hyderabad was important for the success of the military operations in the Deccan and Central India. The hopes of the disaffected were excited by the succession of a new Chief, and on 17th July an attack was made on the Residency. It was repulsed. The efforts of the Resident to preserve order were ably seconded by the Nizam's intelligent Minister Salar Jung, nephew of Suraj-ool-Moolk, who was appointed with the approbation of the British Government on his uncle's death in 1853. Salar Jung, by his enlightened policy and the abolition of the system of farming the revenues, has done much for the improvement of the country and the suppression of the plundering Rohillas who have so long disturbed the peace.

The provisions of the Treaty of 1853, which required the submission of annual accounts of the Assigned Districts to the Nizam, were productive of much inconvenience and embarrassing discussions. Difficulties had also arisen regarding the levy of the 5 per cent. duty on goods under the Commercial Treaty of 1802. To remove these difficulties and at the same to reward the Nizam for his services

in 1857, a new Treaty (No. XVII.) was concluded in December 1860, by which the debt of fifty lakhs due by the Nizam was cancelled ; the territory of Shorapore which had been confiscated for the rebellion of the Rajah was ceded to the Nizam ; and the districts of Dharaseo and the Raichore Doah were restored to him. On the other hand, the Nizam ceded certain districts on the left bank of the Godavery, traffic on which river was to be free from all duties ; and agreed that the remaining Assigned Districts in Berar, together with other districts making up a gross revenue of Rs. 32,00,000, should be held in trust by the British Government for the purposes specified in the Treaty of 1853 ; but that no demand for accounts of the receipts or expenditure of the Assigned Districts should be made. It was the object of the British Government to obtain the sovereignty of the Assigned Districts, so as to administer them through any agency it pleased ; but to this the Nizam could not be prevailed on to consent. The Treaty of 1860 does not affect the duties levied on goods imported into or exported from the Nizam's territories. These remain as before at 5 per cent., except on salt on which the Nizam is allowed to take a higher duty as an offset to the duty levied by the British Government on opium grown in Hyderabad. Two estates held by relatives of the late Rajah of Shorapore, and life pensions to the widows amounting to Rs. 26,800 a year are guaranteed by the British Government.

Owing to a misunderstanding between the Nizam and his Minister, the Nizam resolved in 1861 to remove Salar Jung from office, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Resident. But the British Government refused to give countenance to the dismissal of a Minister who had so admirably discharged the duties of his office, and reminded the Nizam that no ruler, whatever his power or capacity for governing, can afford to dispense with an able and faithful Minister, and that the Nizam's proceedings would be viewed as anything rather than as a proof of wisdom and justice. Salar Jung was maintained in office.

The Nizam has been created a Knight of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India. In 1861 he conferred (No. XVIII.) on the Resident authority to inquire into and punish offences committed by Europeans and others in the Hyderabad territory. The chief if not the only practical value of this Sunnud consists in the proof it affords that the Nizam distinctly consents to the trial of such offences by the British Government and waives all claim to have them tried in his own Courts. But the Sunnud of itself does not vest the Resident with power to try and sentence British subject for offences committed in the Nizam's territories. The British Government alone can confer such power. The practice of the Resident therefore is to act on the Sunnud only to the limited extent of transmitting such offenders to a Court in British territory for trial.

The Nizam has received a guarantee (No. XIX.) that any succession to his State, which may be in accordance with Mahomedan law and the customs of his family, will be recognized.

The area of the Hyderabad territory is 95,337 square miles and the population 10,666,080. The only feudatory of the Nizam is the Rajah of Gudwal, who is independent in his internal administration so long as he pays an annual tribute of Rs. 1,15,000.

## No. I.

### Treaty with the Nizam, 1759.

A copy of Requests made by Colonel Forde to Nawab Salabut Jung, and his compliance thereto, in his own hand.

The whole of the Circar of Masulipatam, with eight districts, as well as the Circar of Nizampatam, and the districts of Condavir and Wacalmanuer, shall be given to the English Company as an enam (or free gift), and the Sunnuds granted to them in the same manner as was done to the French.

The Nawab Salabut Jung will oblige the French troops which are in his country to pass the river Ganges within fifteen days ; or send them to Pondicherry, or to any other place out of the Deccan country, on the other side of

the river Kistna ; in future he will not suffer them to have a settlement in this country, on any account whatsoever, nor keep them in his service, nor assist them, nor call them to his assistance.

The Nawab will not demand or call Gauzepetty Rauze to an account for what he has collected out of the Circars belonging to the French, nor for the computation of the revenues of his own country, in the present year ; but let him remain peaceable in it in future, and according to the computaion of the revenues of his country before the time of the French, agreeably to the custom of his grandfather and father, and as was then paid to the Circar, so he will now act and pay accordingly to the Circar, and if he (the Rajah) does not agree to it, then the Nawab may do what he pleases. In all cases the Nawab will not assist the enemies of the English nor give them protection.

The English Company, on their part, will not assist the Nawab's enemies nor give them protection.

Dated, moon Namadan, the 16th Hegira, 1172, which is the 14th of May 1759.

I swear by God and his Prophet, and upon the holy Alcoran, that I with pleasure agree to the requests specified in this paper, and shall not deviate from it even an hair's breadth.

Firman from the Mogul for the Northern Circars, 1765.

In these happy times, our Firman, full of splendour and worthy of obedience, is descended, purporting, that whereas Salabut Jung Bahadoor, Soubadar of the Deccan, conferred the Circar of Siccacole, &c., on the French Company, and that in consequence of its not being confirmed by us, either by Firman or otherwise, the high, mighty, glorious Chiefs of the Khans, chosen of the Omrahs, Sepoy Sirdars, truly faithful, worthy of receiving favours and obligations, our invariable and never-failing friends and well-wishers, the English Company (having sent a large force for that purpose) did expel the French therefrom ; we, therefore, in consideration of the fidelity and good wishes of the above high, mighty, &c., &c., English Company, have from our throne, the basis of the world, given them the aforementioned Circars, by way of enam or free gift (without the least participation of any person whatever in the same), from the beginning of the Fussul of Tuccancooul, in the year of Phasely 1172, equal to the month of April 1762 ; it is incumbent, therefore, on you, our sons, Omrahs, Viziers, Governors, Mootsuddes, for the affairs of our Dewanship, Mootecophils, for those of our kingdom, jagbirdars, and karorees both now and hereafter, for ever and ever, to use your endeavours in the strengthening and carrying into execution this our most high command, and to cede and give up to the abovementioned English Company, their heirs and descendants, for ever and ever, the aforesaid Circars, and esteeming them likewise free, exempt, and safe from all displacing or removal, by no means whatever either molest or trouble them on account of the Dewan's office or those of our Imperial Court.

Looking upon this high Firman as an absolute and positive order, obey it implicitly.

Dated the 24th of the moon Sophar, in the sixth year of our reign, equal to the 12th of August 1765.

Forms made use of on the back of the Firman.

From the Secretary setting forth that His Majesty had been pleased to sign a petition (supposed to be from the Company) of the same date as the Firman, directing that whereas Salabut Jung Bahadoor, Soubadar of the Deccan, conferred the Circar of Siccacole, &c., on the French Company, and that in consequence of its not being confirmed by His Majesty, either by Firman or otherwise, the high, mighty, &c., &c., English (having sent a large force for that purpose) did expel the said French therefrom ; His Majesty, therefore, in consideration of the fidelity of the aforesaid English Company, has given them (without the participation of any person whatever in the same) the above-mentioned Circars by way of enam or free gift.

Then follow two orders from the Mogul ; the first supposed to be in his own hand, addressed to his son, Mirza Mahomed Akbur Shah Bahadoor, telling him to comply with the contents of this Firman ; the other directing that the English Company be under his son's command or in his Ressacla.

The whole attested, under Kazzi Inauyet Khan's seal, to be a true copy from the original.

## No. II.

### Treaty with the Nizam, 1766.

A Treaty of perpetual honour, favour, alliance, and attachment, between the great Nawab, high in station, famous as the sun, Nawab Ausuph Jah Nizamool-Moolk Nizam-ud-Dowlah Meer Nizam Ally Khan Bahadoor Phutta Jung Sepoy Sirdar, and the Honourable English East India Company : signed, sealed, and ratified, on the one part, by His Highness the said Nawab ; and on the other by John Calliaud, Esq., Brigadier-General, invested with full powers, on behalf of the said Company. Done at Hyderabad, the 9th of the moon Gemace-dussuny, in the year of Hegira 1180, equal to the 12th of November 1766.

#### Article 1.

The two contracting parties do, by virtue of this Treaty of honour, favour, alliance and friendship, solemnly engage a mutual assistance to esteem the enemies of one the enemies of both ; and contrariwise, the friends of one the friends of the other.

#### Article 2.

The Honourable English East India Company, in return for the gracious favours received from His Highness, consisting of Sunnuds for the five Circars of Ellour, Siccacole, Rajahmundry, Moostafurnugger and Moortizanugger, expressing the free gift thereof on them and their heirs, for ever and ever, do hereby promise and engage to have a body of their troops ready to settle the affairs of His Highness's government in everything that is right and proper, whenever required ; provided that they be at liberty to withdraw the whole, or such part thereof as they shall judge proper, whenever either the safety of their own settlements and possessions, or the peace and tranquillity of the Carnatic, be the least endangered : in case of falling out of which circumstances (which God forbid) they do promise and engage to give the most timely notice thereof to His Highness in their power.

#### Article 3.

The Honourable English East India Company do further engage and promise that in whatever year the assistance of their troops shall not be required, they will pay to His Highness, as a consideration for the free gift of the above-mentioned five Circars, for ever and ever, the following sums, by kists, as specified in the 8th Article of this treaty, viz., for the three Circars of Rajamundry, Ellour and Moostafurnugger, five lakhs of rupees ; and for those of Siccacole and Moortizanugger, as soon as they are in their hands, and the settling the same is well effected, two lakhs each ; in all nine lakhs of rupees per annum.

#### Article 4.

The reduction of the Siccacole Circar, by the blessing of God, the Company will effect as soon as possible ; but that of Moortizanugger, in consideration of His Highness having, by former agreements, given it to his brother Bazalut Jung as a jaghir, the Honourable English East India Company do promise and engage not to take possession of until it be His Highness's pleasure, or until the demise of his said brother ; but to prevent all future disputes and difficulties that may hereafter arise concerning the same, the aforesaid Company do further explain their intentions in the following Article :—

#### Article 5.

As the Circar of Moortizanugger borders on that of Nizampatam and the country of the Carnatic, which by virtue of the former and present Treaties and

alliances, the aforesaid Company are bound to maintain and protect in all its extent, therefore in case the said Bazalut Jung, his Agents or dependents, should cause any disturbances to the prejudice thereof, it is hereby agreed on by both parties that the aforesaid Company shall then have it in their power to take immediate possession of that Circar.

#### Article 6.

As, by the tenor of the second Article of this Treaty, the aforesaid Company have engaged to furnish a body of troops to be ready to march to the assistance of His Highness, it is agreed on by both parties that the expenses thereof shall be paid in the following manner, to wit, if the expense of the number of troops His Highness may require should fall short of the sum of the five lakhs of Rupees mentioned to be paid for the three Circars of Rajahmundry, Ellour, and Moostafurnugger, the Company will account to His Highness for what balance may remain due ; and in case of its exceeding the above-mentioned sum, the aforesaid Company do hereby engage themselves to be answerable for the payment of the remainder. The same agreement, in like manner, to hold good for the sums stipulated to be paid for the two Circars of Siccacole and Moortizanugger, when settled.

#### Article 7.

In consideration of the fidelity, attachment, and services of the aforesaid Company, and the dependence His Highness has upon them, his said Highness, out of his great favour, does hereby entirely acquit the above-mentioned Circars of all arrears and demands, down to the present date of these writings.

#### Article 8.

In case the assistance of the Honourable Company's troops is not required, the annual stipulated sum, expressed in the third Article of this Treaty, the aforesaid Company do engage to pay, in three kists, after the following manner, and to give Soucar security for the same, viz., the first payment the 31st of March ; the second the 30th of June ; and the third the 31st of October.

#### Article 9.

Whenever His Highness goes into winter quarters, and the troops of the other Sirdars have leave for that purpose, those of the aforesaid Company shall have leave also to depart to their own country.

#### Article 10.

His Highness engages to give as early notice as possible, not less than three months, of the service in which he will require the assistance of the troops of the aforesaid Company, that they may have timely notice to make the necessary preparations, and that the number of troops sent may be sufficient for the service required of them, of which the aforesaid Company are to be left the entire and sole judges ; and as the success of all expeditions depends much upon secrecy in council, both parties do hereby engage themselves not to reveal any such designs as they may communicate to each other until every thing on both sides is ready for execution.

#### Article 11.

The Honourable English East India Company, in consideration of the diamond mines, with the villages appertaining thereto, having been always dependent upon His Highness's Government, do hereby agree that the same shall remain in his possession now also.

#### Article 12.

His Highness, in order to convince the whole world of the great confidence and trust he reposes in the English nation, agrees and consents that the fort of Condapillee shall be entirely garrisoned by the troops of the aforesaid Company ; in consideration of which the aforesaid Company do hereby agree and consent likewise that there be a killadar therein on the part of His Highness, and that the usual jaghir annexed to the killadary shall be ceded to him.

## Article 13.

In virtue of this Treaty of mutual favour, alliance, and friendship, between the two contracting parties, His Highness promises and engages to assist the aforesaid Company with his troops when required : reserving to himself the same liberty of withdrawing the whole, or any part thereof, in the same manner as is expressed, for the aforesaid Company, in the second Article of this Treaty, whenever the same shall become necessary.

## Article 14.

In virtue of the above Treaty of favour, alliance, and friendship, both parties do mutually and solemnly engage to the punctual and strict observance of all and every one of the above-mentioned Articles, that from this time all doubts and suspicions shall cease between them, and in their room a perpetual, just, and sincere confidence be established, so that the great affairs of the Deccan government and the business of the Company may increase every day in honour, riches, and happiness, from generation to generation.

In confirmation of which, His Highness, on the one part, and John Calliaud, Esquire, Brigadiere-General, invested with full powers from the English Company, on the other, have hereunto affixed their hands and seals.

Dated in Hyderabad the 9th of the moon Gemace-dussuny, in the year of the Hegira 1180, equal to the 12th of November 1766.

Translation of a Sunnud, under the seal of Nizam Ally Khan for the five Circars.

Be it known to the deesmookees, deespondees, muccuddums, husbandmen, and inhabitants of the Circars of Rajamundry, Ellour, Moostafurnugger, Siccacole and Moortizanugger, belonging to the Soubaship of Hyderabad, that out of our great favour and goodness, from the 9th of the moon Gemace-dussuny, in the year of Phasely 1176, equal to the 12th of November 1766, the whole of the said Circars (the jaghir of the Moostafurnugger, *alias* Condapillee fort, and the usual villages appertaining to the diamond mines excepted) are now given to and conferred upon the European English Company by way of enam, or free gift, for ever and ever, agreeable to their petition signed by us ; in return for which, they the English Company are to pay the annual sum of nine lakhs of Rupees, and to stand to all sebbendy charges, and whatever earthly or heavenly mischances may happen : you, therefore, our above-mentioned deesmookees, &c., are hereby required, with contented minds, to live in obedience to the above Company's deputies, and to pay the proper revenues at the fixed and stated times.

Looking upon this as a positive order, obey it accordingly.

Dated the 9th of the moon Gemace-dussuny, in the year of the Hegira 1180, equal to the 12th of November 1766.

Translation of a Discharge, under the seal of Nizam Ally Khan, to Omdet-ool-Moolk Serajah Dowlah Anneverdeen Khan Bahadoor Moonsoor Jung, Foujdar of the Carnatic Payen Gaut, from the Borders of the Palnau country to the further extremity of those of the Malavar country, and to the sons and heirs of the said Omdet-ool-Moolk Bahadoor.

In consideration of the fidelity and attachment the said Omdet-ool-Moolk Bahadoor has promised and engaged to my Court by the means of General Calliaud, and in return for the sum of five lakhs of Rupees (agreeable to the petition hereunto mentioned, countersigned by us) this discharge is now given to him, the said Omdet-ool-Moolk, his sons and heirs, for the whole of the above-mentioned countries, as well the past, present, as the future also.

Translation of the Petition supposed to be presented by Omdet-ool-Moolk Bahadoor's Vakeel.

In consequence of the fidelity and attachment Omdet-ool-Moolk Bahadoor has promised and engaged to Your Highness's Court by the means of General Calliaud, I beg leave to hope that, in return for the sum of five lakhs of Rupees, a



discharge for the past, present, and future may be given to him (the said Oomdet-ool-Moolk Bahadoor), his sons and heirs, for the Carnatic, from the borders of the Palnaud country to the further extremity of those of the Malavar country.

Dated the 9th of the moon Gemace-dussuny in the year of the Hejira 1180, equal to the 12th of November 1766.

Translation of an Obligation given to His Highness Nizam Ally, by General Calliaud on the part of the Nawab Serajah Dowlah.

Whereas evil-minded people have taken great pains, by false representations and otherwise, to instil doubts and suspicious into His Highness's mind regarding Oomdet-ool-Moolk Serajah Dowlah Anneverdeen Khan Bahadoor ; in order, therefore, to prevent all causes for the same in future, and strengthen and establish, in the strongest manner, the alliance, attachment, and fidelity, between His Highness the said Oomdet-ool-Moolk Bahadoor and the English Company, I, John Calliaud, Esq., Brigadier-General, do hereby promise and engage, on the part of the said Oomdet-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, that he will do nothing prejudicial to the interests of His Highness, or contrary to the friendship and alliance by the means of the said Company now happily established between them, for the true and just performance of which the aforesaid Company do hereby become securities.

Given at Hyderabad, the 11th of the moon Gemace-dussuny, in the year of the Hejira 1180, equal to the 14th of November 1766.

Translation of an Obligation given to His Highness Nizam Ally, by General Calliaud, on the part of the Nawab Serajah Dowlah.

I, John Calliaud, Esq., Brigadier-General, do hereby promise and engage, on the part of Omdet-ool-Moolk Serajah Dowlah Bahadoor, that agreeable to the terms which His Highness has done for him, he, the said Omdet-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, one month after my arrival at Madras, shall pay into the hands of Soucars, for the use of his said Highness, the sum of five lakhs of Rupees, for the performance of which the Company are hereby made securities.

Dated at Hyderabad, the 11th of the moon Gemace-dussuny, in the year of the Hejira 1180, equal to the 14th of November 1766.

### No. III.

Treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance with the Nawab of the Carnatic and the Soubah of the Deccan, 1768.

A Treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance made and concluded at Fort St. George, between the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, in conjunction with the Nawab Wolau Jah Oomdet-ool-Moolk Ummeer-ool-Hind Serajah Dowlah Anneverdeen Khan Bahadoor Moonsoor Jung, Sippha Sirdar of the Carnatic Payen Gant, on the one part, and the great Nawab high in station, Ausuph Jah Nizam-ool-Moolk Meer Nizam Ally Khan Bahadoor Phuttah Jung Sippha Sirdar, Soubah of the Deccan, on the other part ; by the Honourable Charles Bouchier, Esq., President and Governor of Fort St. George, and the Council thereof, on behalf of the said English East India Company ; the Nawab Woolau Jah Oomdet-ool-Moolk, on behalf of himself, as Nawab of the Carnatic ; and the Nawab Recun-ood-Dowlah Dewan, invested with full powers, on behalf of the said Nawab Ausuph Jah Nizam-ool-Moolk, his heirs and successors, as Soubah of the Deccan. Done on the 23rd day of February in the year 1768 of the Christian era, and on the 4th of the moon Shevail, in the year of the Hejira 1181.

Whereas, on the 12th of November, in the year of the Christian era 1766, or on the 9th of the moon Gemace-dussuny in the year of the Hejira 1180, a Treaty was concluded at Hyderabad by and between General John Calliaud, invested with full powers, on behalf of the English East India Company, and the Nawab Ausuph Jah Nizam-ool-Moolk, &c., on behalf of himself, as Soubah of the Deccan, with a design to establish an honourable and lasting friendship and alliance between the

## TREATIES.

two contracting powers ; and whereas some misunderstandings have since arisen, which have perverted the intent of the said Treaty, and kindled up the flames of war ; now be it known to the whole world, that the before-mentioned Nawab Ausuph Jah and the English Company, with the Nawab Wolau Jah, have entered into another Treaty of the strictest friendship and alliance, on the following conditions :—

### Article 1.

The exalted and illustrious Emperor of Hindustan, Shah Allum Padtcha, having, out of his gracious favour and in consideration of the attachment and services of the English East India Company, given and granted to them for ever by way of enam, or free gift, the five Circars of Moostafurnugger, Rajahmundry, Siccacole, Moortizanugger, or Condavir, by his royal Firman, dated the 12th of August, 1765, or on the 24th of the moon Suphur, in the 6th year of his reign ; and the Nawab Ausuph Jah Nizam-ool-Moolk, as Soubah of the Deccan, having by the second and third articles of the aforementioned Treaty, ceded and surrendered by Sunnuds, under his hand and seal, to the English East India Company for ever the aforementioned five Circars, it is now further acknowledged and agreed by the said Ausuph Jah Nizam-ool-Moolk, Soubah of the Deccan, that the said Company shall enjoy and hold for ever, as their right and property, the said five Circars, on the terms hereafter mentioned.

### Article 2.

By the aforementioned Treaty of Hyderabad it was stipulated that the Nawab Ausuph Jah having given the Circar of Moortizanugger, as a jaghir to his brother the Nawab Ummeer-ool-Oomrah, Sonjah-ool-Moolk, Bahadoor Bazalut Jung, the Company should not take possession of the said Circar till after the death of Bazalut Jung, or till he broke the friendship with the said Company by raising disturbances in the country of Nizampatam or the Carnatic ; and though the Company might justly claim a right to take possession of the said Circar, from the late conduct of Bazalut Jung, yet in consideration of their friendship for Ausuph Jah and his family, and that they may not distress his affairs by obliging him to provide his brother Bazalut Jung with another jaghir, the Company do agree and consent that Bazalut Jung still hold the Circar of Moortizanugger, on the aforesaid conditions, or till it be the pleasure of Ausuph Jah that the Company should take possession thereof ; provided that the said Bazalut Jung returns immediately to his own country of Adony, and neither keeps with nor receives from Hyder-Naique any vakeel or correspondence, but lives in peace and harmony with the English Company and the Nawab Wolau Jah, and gives no protection or assistance whatever to the said naique, or any of his people, nor any other enemies of the Company, or the Nawab of Wolau Jah, but if this Article shall at any time be infringed, the Company shall be at liberty by virtue of this Treaty to take possession of and keep the Circar of Mortizanugger in the same manner as the other four, and the Nawab Ausuph Jah engages to assist them therein with his troops, if necessary.

### Article 3.

The fort of Condapillee with its jaghir shall for ever hereafter remain in possession of the English Company, and be garrisoned with their troops, under their own officers only, notwithstanding anything to the contrary stipulated in the 12th Article of the Treaty of Hyderabad.

### Article 4.

Narraindoo, one of the zemindars of the Circar of Siccacole, having lately raised disturbances in the Itchapore country, and refused (as he alleges, in conformity to the Nawab Ausuph Jah's orders) to pay his rents, or obedience to the Company, the Nawab Ausuph Jah agrees, on the signing and exchange of the present Treaty, to write letters not only to Narraindoo but to all the zemindars in the Circars of Ellour, Moostafurnugger, Rajahmundry, and Siccacole, acquainting them that they are in future to regard the English Company as their sovereign, and to pay their rents and obedience to the said Company, or their deputies, without

raising any troubles or disturbances. The Nawab Ausuph Jah further agrees that he will not in future encourage or protect, in raising troubles or disobedience, any zemindars, renters, or servants of the English Company, or the Nawab Wolau Jah, who on their parts engage the same to His Highness Ausuph Jah.

## Article 5.

It has been the constant desire and endeavour of the English Company and the Nawab Wolau Jah to preserve their possessions in peace, and to live on terms of friendship with the Soubah of the Deccan : they still desire to do the same ; and though the operations of war have lately obliged the Company to send their troops towards Hyderabad, and to take possession of the Circars of Commamet and Worangole, yet, as a proof of their friendship for the Nawab Ausuph Jah, &c. Soubah of the Deccan, on the signing and exchange of this Treaty, the Company's troops shall be recalled to the fort of Commamet, from whence they shall also retire into their own Circars, so soon as the Soubah with his army has crossed the Kistna, leaving the fort of Commamet to the Soubah's deputy. And, as a further proof of the Company's sincere desire to preserve a friendship with the Soubah of the Deccan, they agree to bury in oblivion what is past, and to pay him annually for the space of six years, to be computed from the 1st of January 1768, or the 10th of the moon Shibaun, in the year of the Hegira 1181, the sum of two lakhs of Arcot Rupees, at Madras or Masulipatam, that is to say, one lakh on the 31st of March, and also one lakh on the 31st of October, or two lakhs every year, and one lakh more at each of these periods, whenever the Circar of Condavir is put into the Company's possession. The Company moreover promise, that if they peaceably possess the Circars during the aforesaid term of six years and the Soubah gives them no trouble, they will pay annually, from the 1st of January 1774, the sum of five lakhs, in two equal payments, as before expressed, or of seven lakhs, if Condavir be then in their possession ; but in case the Soubah, or the Mahrattas by his instigation, should invade the Circars of Carnatic, or they, or any other power, should conquer the Circars from the English Company, the payment of the said sums shall be suspended till peace and the Circars are restored to the Company.

## Article 6.

It was stipulated in the former Treaty made at Hyderabad that the Company and the Soubah should mutually assist each other with their troops when required, and their own affairs would permit ; but it being apprehended at present that such an agreement may subject both parties to difficulties, and that misunderstandings may arise on that account, it is now agreed only that a mutual peace, confidence, and friendship, shall subsist for ever between the English Company, His Highness Ausuph Jah, and the Nawab Wolau Jah ; the enemies of either shall be regarded as the enemies of the other two powers, and the friends of either be treated as the friends of all ; and in case any troubles should arise, or any enemies invade the countries under the government of either of the contracting parties, the other two shall give no countenance or assistance to such enemies or invaders. The Company and the Nawab Wolau Jah, willing, however, to show their voluntary attachment to the Soubah, will always be ready to send two battalions of sepoys and six pieces of artillery, manned by Europeans, whenever the Soubah shall require them and the situation of their affairs will allow of such a body of troops to march into the Deccan, provided the Soubah pays the expense during the time that the said troops are employed in his service.

## Article 7.

The exalted and illustrious Emperor, Shah Allum, having been pleased, out of his great favour and high esteem for the Nawab Wolau Jah, to give and grant to him and his eldest son, Meyen-ool-Moolk Omdet-ool-Oomrah, and their heirs, for ever, the government of the Carnatic Payen Gaut and the countries dependent thereon, by his royal Firman bearing date the 26th of August 1765, or the 27th of the moon Zuphur, in the sixth year of the said Emperor's reign ; and the Nawab Ausuph Jah Nizam-ool-Moolk, &c., having also, out of his affection and regard for

the said Nawab Wolau Jah, released him, his son Meyen-ool-Moolk, &c., and their heirs, in succession, for ever, from all dependence on the Deccan, and given him a full discharge of all demands, past, present and to come, on the said Carnatic Payen Gaut, by a Sunnud, under his hand and seal, dated the 12th of November, 1766 ; in consideration of the said Nawab Wolau Jah having paid the Soubah five lakhs of Rupees, it is now agreed and acknowledged by the said Ausuph Jah Nizam-ool-Moolk that the said Nawab Wolau Jah, and after him his son Meyen-ool-Moolk and their heirs in succession, shall enjoy for ever as an ultungah, or free gift, the government of the Carnatic Payen Gaut, in the fullest and amplest manner, the said Nawab Ausuph Jah promising and engaging not to hold or keep up any kind of correspondence with any person or persons in the said Carnatic Payen Gaut or in the Circars before and now ceded to the English Company, except the said Nawab Wolau Jah or the said English Company, by the means of their President and Council of Madras, who, on their part, in conjunction with the said Nawab Wolau Jah, engage likewise not to hold or maintain any correspondence with any person or persons in the Deccan, except the Nawab Ausuph Jah, his Dewan, and the securities whose names are hereunto subscribed.

#### Article 8.

The Nawab Ausuph Jah, out of his great regard and affection, and from other considerations, having been pleased to grant and confer on the Nawab Wolau Jah, and his eldest son Meyen-ool-Moolk Omdet-ool-Omrah, several Sunnuds, *viz.*—

An ultungah Sunnud for the whole of the Carnatic.

An ultungah Sunnud for the whole of the pergunnah of Imungundela, with the Gudda of Ghunpoora.

An ultungah Sunnud for the whole of the villages of Cathasera, &c.

An ultungah Sunnud for the killadary of the fort of Colaur.

An ultungah Sunnud for the whole of the district of Sonedaupé ; and a full and ample Sunnud, containing a discharge for all demands, past, present, and future, on account of the Carnatic, &c.

It is hereby agreed that all and every one of these Sunnuds shall be regarded equally binding with any other Article of the Treaty, and be as duly observed by the Nawab Ausuph Jah as if entered here at full length.

#### Article 9.

Hyder Naique having for some years past usurped the government of the Monsore country, and given great disturbances to his neighbours by attacking and taking from many of them their possessions, and having so lately invaded and laid waste with fire and sword the possessions of the English Company and the Nawab Wolau Jah in the Carnatic, it is certainly necessary for their peace and for the general benefit of all the neighbouring powers, that the said Naique should be punished and reduced, so that he may not hereafter have the power to give any person further trouble : to this end, the Nawab Ausuph Jah hereby declares and makes known to all the world, that he regards the said Naique as a rebel and usurper, and as such divests him of, and revokes from him, all Sunnuds, honours, distinctions, conferred by himself or any other Soubah of the Deccan, because the said Naique has deceived the Nawab Ausuph Jah, broken his agreement, and rendered himself unworthy of all further countenance and favours.

#### Article 10.

That the English Company may hereafter carry on their trade peaceably on this coast of Coromandel, and also on the coast of Malabar, and that they, with the Nawab Wolau Jah, may hold the Carnatic and their other possessions in peace, it appears necessary that the countries of Carnatic Balagaute, belonging to the soubadary of Viziapore, now or lately possessed by Hyder Naique, should be under the management and protection of those who will do justice and pay obedience to the high commands from Court : it is therefore agreed by the Nawab Ausuph Jah, that he shall relinquish to the English Company all his right to the Dewany of the said Carnatic Balagaute, belonging to the soubadary of

Viziapore, and that the Company shall present an urzee, or petition, to the royal presence, to obtain from the Emperor Shah Allum a Firman, confirming and approving their right thereto. But that the Nawab Ausuph Jah, as Soubah of the Deccan, may not lose his dignity or the revenue arising from the said countries, the English Company agree to pay him annually, out of the Dewany collection, from the time they are in possession thereof, the sum of seven lakhs of Arcot Rupees, including Durbar charges, being the sum annually paid heretofore, in two equal payments, at the space of six months from each other, provided the said Ausuph Jah, Soubah of the Deccan, assists the said Company and the Nawab Wolau Jah in punishing Hyder Naique, and neither receives from or sends either vakeels or letters to him.

Article 11.

As the English Company do not intend to deprive the Mahrattas of their chout, any more than the Soubah of his pesheush, which used to be paid from the Carnatic Balagaute, belonging to the soubadary of Viziapore, now or lately possessed by Hyder Naique, it is hereby agreed, and the Company willingly promise to pay the Mahrattas regularly and annually without trouble for the whole chout, as settled in former times, from the time the said countries shall be under the Company's protection as Dewan; provided, however, that the Mahrattas guarantee to the Company the peaceable possession of the said Dewany: to this end, the Nawab Ausuph Jah promises to use his best endeavours, jointly with the English and the Nawab Wolau Jah, to settle with the Mahrattas concerning the chout of the said countries, how and where it is to be paid, so that there may be no disturbances hereafter on that account between any of the contracting parties or the Mahrattas.

Article 12.

All the foregoing Articles are sincerely agreed to by the subscribing parties, who resolve faithfully to execute and abide by the same, so that a firm and lasting friendship may mutually subsist between them: and while such an alliance subsists, what power will dare to disturb the possessions of either party? The English Company and the Nawab Wolau Jah will endeavour on all occasions to show their friendship and attachment to the Nawab Ausuph Jah Nizam-ool-Moolk as soubah of the Deccan, and look on the support of that Government as the support of their own; in short, there will be no manner of difference in interest between them.

In witness and confirmation of all the above Articles, and every part of the aforegoing Treaty, we whose names are under-written have interchangeably subscribed to and sealed three instruments, of the same tenor and date, *viz.*, the President and Council of Fort St. George, on behalf of the English East India Company, at that place, this 26th day of February, in the year of the Christian era 1768; the Nawab Ausuph Jah, Soubah of the Deccan, at his Camp, near Pillere, on the 22nd day of the moon Shevaul in the year of the Hegira, 1181; and the Nawab Wolau Jah, for himself, at Fort St. George, the 7th day of the moon Shevaul, in the 1181st year of the Hegira.

The	(Signed)	CHARLES BOURCHIER.
	"	SAMUEL ARDLEY.
Company's	"	JOHN CALL.
	"	GEORGE STRATTON.
Seal.	"	GEORGE DAWSON.
	"	JAMES BOURCHIER.
	"	GEORGE MACKEY.

N. B.—The names of the contracting parties were transposed in the parts kept by each of them, and each took the precedence by turn.

The above contracting parties, to wit, the President and Council of Fort St. George, on behalf of the English East India Company; the great Nawab, high in station, Ausuph Jah, Soubah of the Deccan; and the Nawab Wolau Jah, Soubah of Mahomedpoor, having duly considered, and voluntarily entered into the above Articles, which they have respectively signed and sealed in our presence, we, whose names are hereunto subscribed, do solemnly promise and engage, under our hands

# TREATIES.

and seal, that we will guarantee to the said English Company and the Nawab Wolau Jah, the due and just observance of the above Treaty on the part of the Nawab Ausuph Jah.

I take God to witness that of my own free will I am security.

The Seal of  
Ruccun-ud-  
Dowlah.

I swear by Vencatash and Bail Bahadoor that of my own free will and consent I am security.

The Seal of  
Ram Chunder  
Rauze.

I swear by Sactasha and Bail Bahadoor that I am truly and sincerely security.

The Seal of  
Beer  
Bahadoor.

I swear by Vencatash and Bail Bahadoor that of my own free will and consent, I, Dundaveram, Vakeel to Mahaudavarow, Pundit Predane, am security on the part of the said Mahaudavarow.

The Seal of  
Dundaveram.

*N. B.*—The foregoing guarantee agreement was signed and executed, by the guarantees subscribing the same, and annexed to the parts of the Treaty delivered to the Company and the Nawab ; and to the part delivered to Nizam Ally Khan, the following guarantee or agreement was fixed, *viz.*—

The above contracting parties, to wit, the great Nawab, high in station, Ausuph Jah, Soubah of the Deccan ; the Nawab Wolau Jah, of Mahomedpoor ; and the President and Council of Fort St. George, on behalf of the English East India Company, having duly considered, and voluntarily entered into the above Articles, which the said President and Council, on behalf of the said English East India Company, have signed and sealed in my presence, I the said Nawab Wolau Jah, whose name is hereunto subscribed, do solemnly promise and engage, under my hand and seal, that I will guarantee to the said Nawab Ausuph Jah the due and just observance of the above Treaty on the part of the said English East India Company.

The  
Nawab's Seal.

And we, the said President and Council of Fort St. George on behalf of the said English East India Company, do solemnly promise and engage, under our hands, that we will guarantee to said Nawab Ausuph Jah the due and just observance of the above Treaty on the part of the said Nawab Wolau Jah.

(Signed) CHARLES BOURCHIER.  
SAMUEL ARDLEY.  
JOHN CALL.  
GEORGE STRATTON.  
GEORGE DAWSON.  
JAMES BOURCHIER.  
GEORGE MACKEY.

Translation of a Sunnud, under the Soubah's seal, dated the 22nd of the moon Shevaul, Hegira 1181, equal to the 12th of March 1768.

Be it known to the deesmookees, deespondees, muccuddems, husbandmen, &c., inhabitants of the Rajahmundry, Ellour, Moostafurnugger, Moortizanugger and Siccacole Circars, belonging to the Soubahship of Foakund, Booncaud,

Hyderabad, that, agreeable to the Firman of Shah Allum, Padsha Gauze, to the English East India Company, and my regard and friendship to them (the said English East India Company), I have again conferred upon them, by way of enam, for ever and ever, all and several of the above Circars, whole and entire, together with the fort and jaghir of Condapillee, in consequence of a Treaty of friendship and alliance which has lately been concluded between me, the said Company, and Ummeer-ool-Hinde Wolau Jah Bahadoor, and which was executed, on the part of the said Company, by the Governor and Council of Madras, and on the part of Ummeer-ool-Hinde Wolau Jah Bahadoor by himself, in the aforesaid place of Madras, the 7th of the moon Moorah, Hegira 1181, equal to the 26th of February 1768; and by me, now in the encampment of my victorious army, near Pillere, this 22nd day of the moon Shevaul, Hegira 1181: you, therefore, the whole of the said deesmookees, deespondees, mucuddems, &c., look upon the said English East India Company as your masters, and be in every respect obedient to them, exerting yourselves in the payment to them of the proper revenues of the said Circars at the fixed and stated times.

Look upon this as a positive and absolute order, and obey it accordingly.

Dated as above.

On the back of the Sunnud are the attestations of the Muttasuddees of the offices of Huzoor Mustouphy and Dewan, and copies thereof have been registered in their books.

Translation of a Sunnud, under the Soubah's seal, dated the 22nd of the moon Shevaul, Hegira 1181, equal to the 12th of March 1768.

In these times the Dewanny of the Carnatic Balagaute country, belonging to the Soubahship of Daurel Zuphur Vizapore, before or now possessed by Hyder Naique, with the whole of my right and title thereto, has been conferred upon the English East India Company, they, the said English East India Company, engaging, after being in possession thereof, to pay annually into my treasury (Durbar charges included) the sum of seven lakhs of Rupees, muzzur or peshcush; you, therefore, the zemindars, both high and low, of the said Carnatic Balagaute country, belonging to the said Soubahship, live in due obedience to the said Company, paying them the proper revenues thereof at the fixed and stated times. And whereas Hyder Naque is a rebel and usurper, I have therefore deprived him of all his honours and dignities; you are by no means, therefore, to pay any attention to his deputies or vakeels, but are to stop all correspondence either with him or them.

Look upon this as a positive and strict order.

Dated as above.

On the back of the Sunnud the petition from the Muttasuddees, supposed to be presented, is inserted; and the Muttasuddees of the several offices of Huzoor, Dewan, and Mustouphy, have attested that copies thereof have been registered in their books.

Translation of a Sunnud, under the Soubah's seal, dated the 21st of the moon Shevaul, Hegira 1181, equal to the 11th March 1768.

In these times, agreeable to the high Firman of Shah Allum, Padsha Gauze, the Dewany Rockshigurry and Meer Autushy of the Carnatic Payen Gaut and Balagaute countries, from the banks of the river Kistna towards Pulnaur to the boundaries of Bombay (including the Malavar country), together with the whole of the forts, jaghirdars, zemindars, pollygars, killadars, enamdars, rozcedars, &c., belonging thereunto, have been conferred, by way of enam ultungan, whole and entire, without the participation of any one, upon Omdet-ool-Omrah Meyen-ool-Moolk Assed-ool-Dowlah Hussein Ally Khan Bahadoor Zoolpheaur Jung: you, therefore, our sons, brothers, officers, and Muttasuddees, of the Nizamship of the Deccan, and Mootecophils of our affairs, both new and old, at present and to come, agreeable to the above Firman and this Sunnud, exert yourselves in the strengthening of this business for ever and ever, delivering up the said countries

from generation to generation, and esteeming him as exempt and free from all displacing and removal, also acquitted and discharged from the whole of the demands of the Dewany, &c., give him no trouble or molestation whatever, either for the soubadary or foudary peshcush, or any other charges or expenses.

Look upon this as an order, and by no means act in anything contrary to what is herein expressed, nor require a new Sunnud every year.

Translation of a Sunnud under the Soubah's seal, dated the 21st of the moon Shevaul, Hegira 1181, equal to the 11th March 1768.

Be it known to the deesmokees, deespondees, husbandmen, and inhabitants of the district of Sundacope, belonging to the soubahship of Vizianpore, that the said district, agreeable to what is desired in the zimir, or back of the Sunnud, has been assigned over as an ultungah to Siphilool-Moolk Unwarood-Dowlah Mahomed Unwar Khan Bahadoor Hossein Jung; you will therefore live in true and just obedience to the Amuldar of the said Siphilool-Moolk, and pay the proper revenues at the fixed and stated times.

Look upon this as an order, and act agreeable thereto.

Translation of the Zimir, containing a petition which is supposed to be presented by the Muttasuddees, and to have been signed by the Soubah signifying his consent thereto.

The form of the petition runs thus: the vakeel of Wolau Jah Ummeerool-Hinde begs that the district of Sundacope, whole and entire, may be conferred upon Siphilool-Moolk Unwarood-Dowlah Mahomed Unwar Khan Bahadoor Hossein Jung by way of ultungah, and that a Sunnud for the same may be made out and signed by your Highness; respecting this, we wait your orders.

The Sunnud for the pergunnah of Imungundala (belonging to the Circar of Chumpoora) to Hosseinool-Moolk Hemadood-Dowlah Mahomed Abdulla Khan Bahadoor Heyabber Jung runs the same as the former Sunnud, excepting the term *whole* being inserted therein; the date thereof is likewise the same as the other.

Translation of a Sunnud, under the seal of the Soubah, dated the 21st of the moon Shevaul, Hegira 1181, equal to the 11th of March 1768.

Be it known to the deesmokees, deespondees, husbandmen, and inhabitants of the pergunnah of Hewalee, Hyderabad, &c., Circar of Mahomednuggur, of the soubahship of Hyderabad, that the village of Cutkasera, belonging to the above pergunnah, in the manner as is expressed on the back of this Sunnud, has been assigned over by way of ultungah to Ummeerool-Hinde Wolau Jah in order to defray the expenses of his father's tomb; you will therefore live in perfect and true obedience to the Amuldar of the said Wolau Jah, paying them the proper revenues at the fixed and stated times.

Look upon this as an order, and obey it accordingly.

In the zimir at the back of the Sunnud, containing the supposed petition, the village of Cutkasera, &c., is mentioned.

Translation of a Discharge, under the Soubah's seal, dated the 21st of the moon Shevaul, Hegira 1181, equal to the 11th of March 1768.

To the high in rank and station, our dear brother Wolau Jah Ummeerool-Hinde. From the time that your father Anneverdeen Khan Bahadoor, the martyr, held from the family of Anseephea the soubahship of the Carnatic, and the Siccacole, Rajahmundry, &c., Circars (belonging to the soubahship of Ferkunde, Booneaud, Hyderabad) to the time of his martyrdom, and from thence, during your time, till the present instant and the date of this discharge, all accounts and demands of the Circar have been settled and forgiven, every pice and every cash; and there remains now, under no pretence whatever, either to myself, my children, or brothers, as well for past, present, or future, any demands, either upon you, your children, or heirs, on account of the soubadary or foudary peshcush, or the Dewany Rockshigurry, Meer Autushy, &c. charges; in proof of which I have written this paper, by-way of discharge, that it may hereafter appear.



Translation of a Sunnud, under the Soubah's seal, dated the 21st of the moon Shevaul, Hegira 1181, equal to the 11th of March 1768.

In these times, the killadarship of the fort of Chunpoora (belonging to the Circar of that name, and dependent upon the soubahship of Hyderabad) together with the jaghir annexed thereto, and the troops belonging thereto exempt from all chout, agreeable to what is mentioned in the zimir or back of this Sunnud, has been given and conferred by way of ultumgah to Nusseer-ool-Moolk Intzain-ood-Dowlah Mahomed Sullaubut Khan Bahadoor Nusseer Jung, that he, the said Nusseer-ool-Moolk may not deviate in the least in the proper care and attention thereto, either in the furnishing or charging of provisions, or regulating the troops, according to the established custom ; you, therefore, the zemindars and deesmookees, esteeming the said Nuseer-ool-Moolk as invested with absolute powers in the killadarship, pay him the proper revenues at the fixed and stated times, and look upon him as entitled to the usual perquisites and advantages of the said fort.

Esteem this as an order, and obey it accordingly.

On the back of the Sunnud is the petition, reciting the contents of the Sunnud.

The Sunnud of the killadarship of the fort of Colaur (belonging to the soubahship of Viziapore) to Muddam-ool-Moolk Roshun-ood-Dowlah Hauphiz Mahomed Munnowur Khan Bahadoor, Bahadoor Jung, runs the same as that for the fort of Chunpoora (excepting that the whole of the jaghir is mentioned in this) ; the date is also the same as the other.

The whole of the Sunnuds are endorsed by the Muttasuddees of the Dewany Mustouphy and Huzzoor offices, and copies of all have been registered in their books.

#### No. IV.

Treaty of Alliance with Bazalut Jung, 1779.

Heads of a Treaty of friendship and alliance between the Nawab Ameer-ool-Omrah Shujah-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, and the Governor and Select Committee of Fort St. George, in behalf of the English East India Company, 1779.

##### Article 1.

The English Company agree to rent from the Nawab Shujah-ool-Moolk Bahadoor the Circar of Moortizanugger, commonly called Guntoor, clear of sebundy, for whatever he now annually receives from it, as will appear by the accounts of collections of the Aumil now residing there.

##### Article 2.

We, the English Company, shall always have at heart the good and prosperity of the Nawab Shujah-ool-Moolk. He shall dismiss from his service the French soldiers now with him. We will send him what troops he may want (the quota to be settled hereafter), who will remain with him constantly and obey his instructions. They are, however, only to be employed within the districts belonging to him, or for the defence of his country in case of an attack from a foreign enemy ; but these troops are on no account to be carried out of his country, or those of the zemindars dependent upon him. If his affairs should at any time require his going to visit his brother, the Nawab Nizam-ool-Dowlah Bahadoor, their troops shall attend him and be always with him.

##### Article 3.

The expenses of their troops shall be regulated by the Company's custom, and the accounts having been signed by the Nawab shall be paid monthly from the rent of the Guntoor Circar. The remainder of the rent shall be regularly remitted in soucar bills to the Nawab. In case of any improper behaviour or disrespect shown by the commanding officer or any other European officer of our troops, upon representation being made to us by the Nawab, we shall remove such officer and appoint another in his room.

## TREATIES.

### Article 4.

If the Nawab Shujah-ool-Moolk's territories be invaded by an enemy, we shall, besides the troops that are stationed with him, send such a sufficient force as we can spare to his assistance. The ordinary and extraordinary expenses of such troops, whatever they may amount to, shall be paid agreeable to the Company's established customs by the Nawab, who will sign the accounts. If any disputes arise between our soldiers and sepoys and the ryots and the servants of the Nawab, punishment shall be inflicted by our officers on our men, agreeable to the English laws and customs. The English officers and their people shall not interfere with the servants and ryots of the Nawab, and shall not protect or countenance them in any shape. In case of any dispute, where the Nawab's people appear to be in the wrong, they shall be delivered up to him for punishment.

### Article 5.

The customary allowances of the zemindars of the Guntoor Circar, amounting annually to five thousand Pagodas, shall continue as before. The fort and jaghir villages of Condavir shall remain under the management of the servants of the Nawab; but a garrison of English troops, as may be deemed necessary for the defence of the fort, shall be stationed with the killadar.

### Article 6.

If the Company shall demand a body of horse from the Nawab, he shall let them have a number according to his abilities; and the said cavalry shall be returned to him, and their expenses paid, as soon as the service for which they shall be required is finished.

These Articles we promise, in general, to fulfil on our part, until a more full and explicit Treaty can be drawn out, which shall be drawn out as soon as possible.

Witness our hands and the seal of the Company, in Fort St. George, the 27th day of April 1779.

Sunnud from Bazalut Jung.

Ameer ool-Omrah,  
Shujah-ool-Moolk,  
Amud ood-Dowlah,  
Meer Mahomed Serif Khan,  
Bahadoor,  
Bazalut Jung,  
the devoted servant of his  
glorious Majesty,  
Shah Allum  
Bahadoor.

To all deesmoockees, zemindars, deespondees, and tenants of the Circar of Moortizauugger, commonly called Guntoor, be it written:

The aforesaid Circar has at this time been given to the glory of merchants, the English Company, at a certain rent, commencing from the beginning of the year of Phasely 1188.

You are therefore to give your attendance on the Naibs of the aforesaid Company, and punctually pay to them the just revenue due to the Circar (Government). After this a fresh Sunnud, setting forth the rent which is fixed upon, shall be granted, and you are to act agreeable thereto. Let this be punctually observed.

Dated 12th Mohrem, in the 1193rd year of the Hegira.

No. V.

Translation of the Nizam's Order to Seyf Jung for the surrender of the Guntoor Circar to the Company, delivered to Captain Kennaway, the Resident, at the Nizam's Durbar, the 18th September 1788.

At this time Captain Kennaway, being come to the presence on the part of Lord Cornwallis, and having made a demand of the Guntoor, is charged with the settlement of affairs between His Highness and the English Company; you are

therefore, immediately on receipt of this order, to deliver up the Circar in question to the servants of the Company without opposition, and with your jumma wausil baukee account, your own effects, and whatever is with you belonging to Government, repair to the presence.

A true translation of what was delivered to Captain Kennaway as a copy of the sealed order sent to him for Seyf Jung.

(Signed) N. B. EDMONSTONE,  
Assistant to the Department.

#### No. VI.

Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to the Nizam, deemed equal to a Treaty, written 7th July 1789.

Your Highness's letter, containing strong expressions of friendship, was presented to me by Meer Abdool Cassim, and has afforded me the most inexpressible satisfaction. I have perfectly understood all the matters entrusted to the verbal communication of Meer Abdool Cassim, and the sincere and friendly sentiments which I have discovered Your Highness to be impressed with towards me have induced me to show the confidence I place in Your Highness's declaration, by candid and explicit conversations with Meer Abdool Cassim on subjects of the highest importance; and as they all of them have a tendency to strengthen and increase our friendship, I shall communicate without reserve to Your Highness what has occurred to me relative to them.

It was with no small concern I found on my arrival, in charge of the control of all the Company's affairs, that one of the eventual and most essential points of the Treaty of friendship and alliance made in 1768 between Your Highness and the Company, remained unexecuted on both sides, *viz.*, the surrender of the Guntoor Circar to the Company, and the regular discharge of Your Highness's demand for the pesheush from the Company. Anxious, notwithstanding, that by urging the due performance of this Article, I should not intrude on Your Highness while engaged in pursuits of importance, I postponed all negotiations on the subject until I was convinced that Your Highness, uninterrupted by war, had full leisure to consider the propriety of the performance of this Article of the Treaty; and until you might have had sufficient opportunity to put implicit confidence in my assurances for the punctual discharge of the pesheush for the Northern Circars. I then deputed Captain Kennaway to Your Highness's Court, with instructions to make the demand of the Guntoor Circar by virtue of the Treaty of 1768; to assure Your Highness of my firm intention to discharge the balances, upon fair statement, due to Your Highness on account of the pesheush; and to impress you with the sincerity of my intentions for its regular payment hereafter.

I have already expressed my satisfaction at Your Highness's immediate compliance to deliver up the Guntoor Circar to the Company, and have assured Your Highness of my firm intention to persevere in a strict system of faith to engagements; and now, with such a proof of the sincerity of Your Highness's friendship and good faith, I have, from a desire to testify to Your Highness that I am impressed with similar sentiments, entered into a full discussion of every Article with Meer Abdool Cassim, in order that such parts of it as are undefined and bear an obscure and doubtful meaning may be so explained, as shall preclude every necessity of future discussion, remove all grounds of misunderstanding, and give stability and permanency to that friendship which now subsists between us.

In adopting this rule of conduct, I do no more than fulfill the intention of the King of England and the British nation, who, by the system lately established for the government of this country, had in view the important end of giving efficacy to the existing Treaties between the English and the powers of Hindostan, and of securing a due performance thereof in future. This communication, I am persuaded, will fully satisfy Your Highness of the propriety of my declining the proposal of Meer Abdool Cassim for entering into a new security for the discharge of the pesheush, by mortgaging a portion of the Circars, considering, as I do, the faith of the English nation pledged for the due payment of it.

In proof of the sincerity of my intentions that the Treaty should be carried into full effect, I agree that, in the sixth Article of the Treaty, the words "whenever the situation of affairs will allow such a body of troops to march into the Deccan," shall be understood to mean, that the force engaged for by this Article, *viz.*, two battalions of sepoys and six pieces of cannon, manned by Europeans, shall be granted whenever Your Highness shall apply for it, making only one exception, that it is not to be employed against any power in alliance with the Company, *viz.*, Pundit Pirdhun Peishwa, Ragojee Bhoosla, Madajee Sindia, and the other Mahratta Chiefs, the Nawab of Arcot and Nawab Vizier, Rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore. That the battalions at present not defined in number shall not consist of less than eight hundred men each. That the six field pieces shall be manned with the number of Europeans which is usual in time of war. That the expense to be charged to Your Highness shall be no more than the exact sum which it costs the Company to maintain a body of that force, when employed on service in the field, and that this expense be as per separate account. That this detachment shall march within two months, or sooner if possible, after it is demanded, and Your Highness shall be charged with the expense of it from the day it enters Your Highness's territories until it quits them on its return to the Company's ; with the addition of one month at the average calculation of the whole amount, in order to defray the charges the Company must necessarily incur to put such a force in state fit for service.

I have so fully discussed the Articles of the Treaty that relate to the Nawab of Arcot and the Carnatic, on the representation of Meer Abdool Cassim, that a mere reference to the Articles themselves will inform Your Highness of the full force of my arguments : and although the long existing friendship between the Nawab and the Company might be urged as further ground for declining the proposal of Meer Abdool Cassim, his right to the possession of the Carnatic Payen Gaut is fully established and admitted by the seventh and eighth Articles and papers appertaining to them ; there can therefore be no necessity for troubling Your Highness with other reasons.

In regard to the Articles relative to the Dewany of the Carnatic Balagaute, Your Highness must be well convinced that circumstances have totally prevented the execution of these Articles, and the Company are in the full enjoyment of peace with all the world ; but should it hereafter happen that the Company should obtain possession of the country mentioned in these Articles, with Your Highness's assistance, they will strictly perform the stipulations in favour of Your Highness and the Mahrattas. Your Highness must be well assured that while Treaties of peace and friendship exist with any Chief, negotiations that tend to deprive that Chief of any part of his possessions, unprovoked on his part, must naturally create suspicions in his mind unfavourable to the reputation of Your Highness and to the character of the Company, since the only grounds on which such negotiations could be carried on rest on a Treaty existing upwards of twenty years, the execution of which is yet unclaimed, and since no provocation has hitherto been made to justify a breach in the present peaceable and amicable understanding between each other.

As I am at all times desirous that such circumstances as carry with them impediment and hindrance to good order and government, without bearing the smallest advantage to either side, should be so changed, as to produce the good effects expected from Treaties ; and as the affairs of both parties might suffer great injury from being excluded from corresponding with the other powers of the Deccan, I agree that in future either party, without a breach of Treaty, shall be at liberty to receive or send vakeels to correspond with any powers in the Deccan, in such manner as may be expedient for the benefit of their own affairs, under the condition that the object of such intercourse or correspondence be not hostile to either of the governments.

I have in many instances, as well through Captain Kennaway as to Meer Abdool Cassim, and in the first part of this letter, declared my firm intention to execute the Treaty of 1768, and to live in perpetual amity and friendship with Your Highness, and Your Highness will be convinced, from the explanations I have given to those Articles in the Treaty of ambiguous and obscure meaning, that

I am earnestly desirous of the adjustment of every matter on grounds fair and liberal. But it is necessary, in consideration of the subjects of conversation with Meer Abdool Cassim, that I should point out to Your Highness that unless just cause should be given for entering into new Treaties, the laws of my country, the injunctions of the King and Company of England, as well as the faith and honour of the English, prohibit me from entering into any negotiations to make new Treaties; and I have confined my conferences with Meer Abdool Cassim to the explanation of that made in 1768, with a view to a more perfect execution of it. On this account I have not judged proper to comply with such requests as have been made by Meer Abdool Cassim that in any shape tend to alter the spirit of that Treaty. A further argument to impress Your Highness with the propriety of this determination, is the sanction and support of His Majesty and the Company of England to those measures that coincide with their instructions. I have mentioned this circumstance merely to assure Your Highness of the strength of my assertions and the value of my engagements in regard to the Guntoor Circar and the other Articles of the Treaty; and I trust that this clear explanation of the ambiguous Articles of the Treaty will render it effectual, and will afford Your Highness a convincing proof of the Company's determination to adhere to the faith of it.

Although I have not agreed to enter into a new Treaty with Your Highness through Meer Abdool Cassim, for the reasons above assigned, yet Your Highness, in consideration of the authority vested in me by the King and Parliament of England, will consider my letter, though merely purporting a clear explanation of the several Articles in the Treaty of 1768, strong and efficient upon the English Government in India, equally so as a Treaty in due form could be, since the Members of the Council have given their cheerful acquiescence to its contents.

For further particulars of my sentiments I beg leave to refer Your Highness to Meer Abdool Cassim, whom I have considered during this negotiation as faithfully attached to Your Highness, fully acquainted with Your Highness's interests, and your most confidential servant, empowered to settle any agreement for the mutual benefit of the two Governments. I have accordingly communicated to him without reserve all that has occurred to me on the subject of the elucidation of the Treaty of 1768, in the same manner as if Your Highness were present; nevertheless, as Your Highness's concurrence and approbation are necessary to give a final sanction to the Articles discussed, I have thought proper to mention them in this letter. For the rest, Your Highness may have the most assured confidence, that I will most faithfully abide by all the engagements I have entered into on the part of the Company.

Extract from the Journals of the House of Commons, 15th Martii 1792.

Resolved, that it appears that Earl Cornwallis's letter, dated the 7th July 1789, to the Nizam, was meant to have, and has had, the full force of a Treaty executed in due form.

## No. VII.

Treaty with the Nizam, 1790.

Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance between the Honourable United English East India Company, the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, Soubadar of the Deccan, and the Peishwa, Sewoy Madho Rao Narain Pundit Pradhan Bahadoor against Fulti Ali Khan, known by the denomination of Tippoo Sultan, settled by Captain John Kennaway on the part of the said Honourable Company, with the said Nawab Ausuph Jah, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by the Right Honourable Charles Earl Cornwallis, K. G., Governor-General in Council, appointed by the Honourable the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies.

### Article 1.

The friendship subsisting between the three States agreeable to former Treaties shall be increased by this, and between the Honourable Company and His

Highness the Nizam, the three former Treaties concluded with the late Salabut Jung, through Colonel Ford, in the year 1759, with the Nizam through General Calliaud in the year 1766, and the Treaty of 1768 with the Madras Government, together with Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 7th July 1879, which is equivalent to a fourth Treaty, remain in full force, except such Articles of them as may by the present Treaty be otherwise agreed to, and perpetual friendship shall subsist between both parties and their heirs and successors agreeably thereto.

## Article 2.

Tippoo Sultan having engagements with the three contracting powers has notwithstanding acted with infidelity to them all, for which reason they have united in a league, that to the utmost of their power they may punish him and deprive him of the means of disturbing the general tranquillity in future.

## Article 3.

This undertaking being resolved on, it is agreed that on Captain Kennaway's annunciation to the Nawab Ausup Jah of the actual commencement of hostilities between the Honourable Company's force and the said Tippoo, and on Mr. Malet's announcing the same to Pundit Prudhan, the forces of the said Nawab Ausup Jah and Pundit Prudhan, in number not less than 25,000, but as many more and as much greater an equipment as may be, shall immediately invade the territories of the said Tippoo, and reduce as much of his dominions as possible before and during the rains, and after that season the said Nawab and Pundit Prudhan will seriously and rigorously prosecute the war with a potent army, well appointed and equipped with the requisite warlike apparatus.

## Article 4.

If the Right Honourable the Governor-General should require a body of cavalry to join the English forces, the Nawab Ausup Jah and Pundit Prudhan shall furnish to the number of 10,000 to march in one month from the time of their being demanded by the shortest and safest route with all expedition to the place of their destination, to act with the Company's forces; but should any service occur practicable only by cavalry they shall execute it, nor cavil on the clause of "To act with the Company's forces." The pay of the said cavalry to be defrayed monthly by the Honourable Company at the rate and on the conditions hereafter to be settled.

## Article 5.

If in the prosecution of the war by the three allies, the enemy should gain a superiority over either, the others shall to the utmost of their power exert themselves to relieve the said party and distress the enemy.

## Article 6.

The three contracting powers having agreed to enter into the present war, should their arms be crowned with success in the joint prosecution of it, an equal division shall be made of the acquisition of territory, forts, and whatever Circar or government may become possessed of from the time of each party commencing hostilities; but should the Honourable Company's forces make any acquisitions of territory from the enemy previous to the commencement of hostilities by the other parties, those parties shall not be entitled to any share thereof. In the general partition of territory, forts, &c., due attention shall be paid to the wishes and convenience of the parties relatively to their respective frontiers.

## Article 7.

The under-written polygars and zemindars, being dependent on the Nawab Ausup Jah and Pundit Prudhan, it is agreed that on their territories, forts, &c., falling into the hands of any of the allies, they shall be re-established therein, and the nuzzurana that shall be fixed on that occasion shall be equally divided amongst the allies. But in future the Nawab Ausup Jah and Pundit Prudhan shall collect from them the usual pesheush and kundnee which have been heretofore annually collected, and should the said polygars and zemindars act unfaithfully towards the

Nawab or Pundit Prudhan, or prove refractory in the discharge of their peshcush and kundnee, the said Nawab and Pundit Prudhan are to be at liberty to treat them as may be judged proper. The Chief of Shanoor is to be subject to service with both the Nawab and Pundit Prudhan, and should he fail in the usual conditions thereof, the Nawab and Pundit Prudhan will act as they think proper.

List of the Polygars and Zemindars.

Chittledroog  
Annugoondy  
Henponelly  
Billarce  
Roydroog  
Heychungoondch

Cannagheery  
Kittoor  
Hannoor  
The district of Abdul Hakim Khan,  
the Chief of Shanoor.

Article 8.

To preserve as far as possible consistency and concert in the conduct of this important undertaking, a vakeel from each party shall be permitted to reside in the army of the others, for the purpose of communicating to each other their respective views and circumstances, and the representations of the contracting parties to each other shall be duly attended to, consistent with circumstances of this Treaty.

Article 9.

After this Treaty is signed and sealed, it will become incumbent on the parties not to swerve from its conditions at the verbal or written instance of any person or persons whatever, or on any other pretence; and in the event of a peace being judged expedient, it shall be made by mutual consent, no party introducing unreasonable objections, nor shall either of the parties enter into any separate negotiations with Tippoo, but on the receipt of any advance or message from him by either party, it shall be communicated to the others.

Article 10.

If after the conclusion of peace with Tippoo he should attack or molest either of the contracting parties, the others shall join to punish him, the mode and conditions of effecting which shall be hereafter settled by the contracting powers.

Article 11.

This Treaty, consisting of eleven Articles, being this day settled and concluded by Captain John Kennaway with His Highness the Nawab, Captain Kennaway has delivered to His Highness the Nawab one copy of the same in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself; and the Nawab has delivered to Captain Kennaway another copy in Persian, executed by himself, and Captain Kennaway has engaged to procure and deliver to the Nawab in sixty-five days a ratified copy from the Governor-General, on the delivery of which the Treaty executed by Captain Kennaway shall be returned.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Paungul, on the 20th of Shawaul, 1204 Hegira, or 4th of July 1790 E. S.

Ratified by the Governor-General in Council, the 29th day of July 1790.

Honourable  
Company's  
Seal.

(Signed) CORNWALLIS.  
" CHARLES STUART.  
" PETER SPEKE.  
" E. HAY,

Secretary to Government.

Separate Agreement with the Nizam, 1790.

Articles of Agreement between His Highness the Nizam and the East India Company, for sending the battalions on their march from Bengal, 1790.

Article 1.

From four to six battalions of the Bengal detachment shall be sent to His Highness the Nizam, under the command of an experienced officer, together with a complement of guns, manned by Europeans, the whole equipped in the established

manner (under the conditions agreed upon for sending the original two battalions), for the precise monthly charge which they stand the Company in, as it shall be stated by the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis. The orders of His Highness, either for their operations in the field or for carrying on sieges, shall be put in execution by mutual consultation between the Commanding Officer of His Highness's army and the Commanding Officer of the English detachment, who will be a man of experience and versed in the rules of war.

## Article 2.

The pay of the said detachment shall be charged to His Highness from the period of its arrival at Vagtour, or of its junction with His Highness's army.

## Article 3.

The pay of the said detachment shall be defrayed from the receipts from Tippoo's country, that is, what accrues from the present war; but if delay should occur in those expected receipts, the Company shall pay the expenses out of the peshcush that will be payable for the Fussully year 1200, and take credit for the amount. Whatever may fall short, after taking credit for the pay of the detachment, shall be made up in ready money by His Highness.

## Article 4.

Whenever a letter from Lord Cornwallis, requiring the dismissal of the said detachment, shall arrive, provided it is at leisure from service, and also whenever His Highness shall think proper to dismiss them, there shall be no hesitation on either side.

## Article 5.

Whatever plunder shall fall into the hands of the said detachment shall be given up to His Highness; excepting only any considerable open or concealed treasure, which, agreeable to the second Article of the Treaty, is to be divided amongst the three confederates.

## Article 6.

A proper body of good cavalry, under the command of experienced and trusty Officers, shall be detached by His Highness, to act with the battalions, agreeable to the concerted plans of the officers of both bodies.

Form of Captain John Kennaway's signature.

An agreement, in regard to sending for the Bengal detachment, settled agreeable to the above Articles, which I shall transmit to Lord Cornwallis, and request a speedy answer.

(Signed) JOHN KENNAWAY.

(A true translation.)

(Signed) N. B. EDMONSTONE.

N.B.—The Nizam's signature is affixed to every Article.

## No. VIII.

Treaty with the Nizam, with two separate Articles, 1798.

An enlarged perpetual Subsidiary Treaty between the Honourable United English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, Soubadar of the Deccan, his children, heirs, and successors, settled by Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by the Right Honourable Richard, Earl of Mornington, Knight of the Most Honourable Order of St. Patrick, one of His Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General in Council, appointed by the Honourable Court of Directors of the said Honourable East India Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies.

Whereas His Highness Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor has, from the greatness of existing friendship, expressed a desire for an increase of the detach-



ment of the Honourable Company's troops at present serving His Highness, the Right Honourable Earl of Mornington, Governor-General, has taken the proposals to that effect into his most serious consideration ; and the present juncture of affairs, and the recent hostile conduct and evil designs of Tipoo Sultan, as fully evinced by his sending ambassadors to the Isle of France, by his proposing to enter into a Treaty, offensive and defensive, with the French Republic against the English nation, and by actually receiving a body of French troops into his dominions and immediate pay, rendering it indispensably necessary that effectual measures for the mutual defence of their respective possessions should be immediately taken by the three allied Powers, united in a defensive league against the aforesaid Tipoo Sultan, the aforesaid Governor-General in consequence empowered Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick, Acting Resident at the Court of His Highness the Nizam, to enter, in behalf of the Honourable United English East India Company, into certain engagements with His Highness Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, for a permanent increase of the Honourable Company's troops in His Highness's pay, in the proportion and on the condition specified in the following Articles, which must be understood to be of full validity when this Treaty shall be returned signed and sealed by the Governor-General.

#### Article 1.

Such parts of the letter from Earl Cornwallis to His Highness the Nizam, dated the 7th July 1789, and which has always been considered in the light of a Treaty, as relate to the stationing of troops with His Highness, are to be considered as in full force ; that is, the services of the new permanent subsidiary force are to be regulated precisely by the same restrictive clauses that operate on the present detachment, unless the Peishwa shall hereafter consent to any alterations in those conditions, and His Highness likewise approve of the same.

#### Article 2.

Agreeably to the practice in the Company's service, the new subsidiary force shall be subject to relief, either partial or entire, as often and in such manner as the Company's government may require ; provided, withal, that no diminution takes place by such means in the stipulated number to be stationed with His Highness.

#### Article 3.

The proposed reinforcement of subsidiary troops shall be in the pay of this State from the day of their crossing the boundaries. Satisfactory and effectual provision shall be made for the regular payment of this force, which, including the present detachment, is to amount to six thousand sepoy with firelocks, with a due proportion of field pieces, manned by Europeans, and at the monthly rate of Rs. 2,01,425. The yearly amount of subsidy for the aforesaid force of six thousand men, with guns, artillerymen, and other necessary appurtenances, is Rs. 24,17,100. The said sum shall be completely discharged in the course of the year, by four equal instalments ; that is, at the expiration of every three English months, the sum of Rs. 6,04,275 in silver, of full currency, shall be issued, without hesitation, from His Highness's treasury ; and should the aforesaid instalments happen to fall at any time the least in arrears, such arrears shall be deducted, notwithstanding objections thereto, from the current kist of peshcush payable to His Highness on account of the Northern Circars. Should it at any time so happen, moreover, that delay were to occur in the issue of the instalments aforesaid, in the stated periods, in such case assignments shall be granted on the collections of certain districts in the State, the real and actual revenue of which shall be adequate to the discharge of the yearly subsidy of the aforesaid force.

#### Article 4.

The duties on grain and all articles of consumption, as well as on all necessaries whatever, for the use of the new subsidiary force, shall be commuted, agreeably to the practice that obtained with the former detachment. A place likewise shall be fixed on as the head-quarters of the said force, where it shall always remain, except when services of importance are required to be

performed ; and whenever either the whole or part of the said force is to be employed in the business of the State, a person of respectability, and who is a servant of this Circar, shall be appointed to attend it. The commanding officer and officers of the said subsidiary force shall be treated in all respects in a manner suitable to the greatness and dignity of both States.

## Article 5.

The said subsidiary force will at all times be ready to execute services of importance, such as the protection of the person of His Highness, his heirs and successors, from race to race, and overawing and chastising all rebels or excitors of disturbance in the dominions of this State ; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor, like sebandy, to be stationed in the country to collect the revenues thereof.

## Article 6.

Immediately upon the arrival of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, the whole of the officers and servants of the French party are to be dismissed, and the troops composing it dispersed and disorganized, that no trace of the former establishment shall remain. And His Highness hereby engages for himself, his heirs and successors, that no Frenchman whatever shall ever hereafter be entertained in his own service, or in that of any of his Chiefs or dependants, nor be suffered to remain in any part of His Highness's dominions ; nor shall any Europeans whatever be admitted into the service of this State, nor be permitted to remain within its territories without the knowledge and consent of the Company's government.

## Article 7.

The whole of the French and sepoy deserters from the Company's service that may be in the French or any other party of troops belonging to this State, are to be seized and delivered up to the British Resident ; and no persons of the above description are to be allowed refuge in future in His Highness's territories, but are, on the contrary, to be seized without delay and delivered up to the British Resident : neither shall any refuge be allowed in the Company's territories, but sepoy deserters from the service of His Highness shall, in like manner, be seized and delivered up without delay.

## Article 8.

Whereas His Highness the Nizam, from considerations of prudence and foresight, and with a view of avoiding manifold evils, has determined on dismissing the French from his service, and on dispersing and disorganizing the troops commanded by them, as specified in the sixth Article, and on entertaining a perpetual standing force of the Honourable Company's in their room, subject to the limitations and restrictions prescribed by Earl Cornwallis's letter to His Highness the Nizam, mentioned in the first Article ; it is therefore agreed, with a view to the mutual benefit of His Highness and the Peishwa, and the happiness of their respective subjects, that the Company's government will use their best endeavours to have inserted, with the consent and approbation of both, in the new Treaty in contemplation between the three Allied Powers, such a clause as shall set each at ease with regard to the other. Should the Peishwa, however, not accede to a proposal so highly advantageous and profitable to both governments, and differences hereafter arise between the two States, namely, that of the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor and of Rao Pundit Pradhan, in such case the English Government hereby engage that, interposing their mediation in a way suitable to rectitude, friendship, and union, they will apply themselves to the adjustment thereof, conformable to propriety, truth, and justice : the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor accordingly hereby engages never to commit on his part any excess or aggression against the Circar of Rao Pundit Pradhan ; and in the event of such differences arising, whatever adjustment of them the English Government, weighing things in the scale of truth and justice, may determine upon, shall, without hesitation or objection, meet with full approbation and acquiescence.

Article 9.

All former Treaties between the English and the Government of the Nawab Ausuph Jah and the Peishwa remain in full force. Should hereafter the Rao Pundit Prudhan express a desire to enter into subsidiary engagements, similar to the present, with the Company, the Nawab Ausuph Jah will most readily give his concurrence.

Article 10.

This enlarged subsidiary Treaty, consisting of ten Articles, being this day settled by Captain Kirkpatrick with the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, Captain Kirkpatrick has delivered one copy hereof, in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the Nawab, who, on his part, has also delivered to Captain Kirkpatrick one copy of the same, duly executed by himself; and Captain Kirkpatrick hereby engages to procure and deliver to His Highness, in the space of fifty days, a ratified copy from the Governor-General, in every respect the counterpart of the one executed by himself; and on the delivery of such copy, which will then have become a full and complete instrument, the Treaty executed by Captain Kirkpatrick shall be returned. In the meanwhile no time shall be lost in writing for the advance of the proposed reinforcement.

Signed, sealed, and executed at Hyderabad the 1st September Anno Domini 1798, or 19th Rubby-ul-Awul, Anno Hegiræ 1213.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Acting Resident.

Separate Articles appertaining to the Treaty with the Nizam.

Separate Article appertaining to the perpetual Subsidiary Treaty concluded between the Honourable English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor on the 1st of September, Anno Domini 1798, or 19th Rubby-ul-Awul, Anno Hegiræ 1213.

Whereas, in conformity to a wish expressed by His Highness the Nizam, the stipulation in the sixth Article of the subsidiary Treaty, respecting the delivering up of the French, is agreed to be made a separate one, His Highness hereby engages that after the arrival of the Company's troops at Hyderabad, the whole of the French officers and soldiers in his service shall be apprehended, in such way as Captain Kirkpatrick may point out, and be delivered up to him, or for a time be kept in confinement, in a habitation belonging to this Circar, but in the custody of the Company's troops, and upon the re-organization of the party lately under the command of the aforesaid French officers and soldiers, shall, within the space of two months, be delivered up to the British Resident. Strict orders shall, moreover, be given to all talookdars on the frontiers, and to those in charge of all fords and passes, to seize any Europeans whatever attempting to pass their respective stations, and send them immediately, with all due precautions, prisoners to Hyderabad, where they shall instantly be delivered up to the British Resident. On the above condition it is hereby agreed that the Frenchmen thus delivered up shall not be considered as common prisoners of war, nor be in any respect maltreated. They shall be conveyed at the Company's expense and with as little restraint as possible to England, and from thence be sent by the first favourable opportunity to France, without being detained for a cartel or exchange of prisoners.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad the 1st September, Anno Domini 1798, or 19th Rubby-ul-Awul, Anno Hegiræ 1213.

J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Acting Resident.

Separate Article appertaining to the perpetual Subsidiary Treaty concluded between the Honourable English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, on the 1st September, Anno Domini 1798, or 19th Rubby-ul-Awul, Anno Hegiræ 1213.

No correspondence on affairs of importance shall in future on any account be

carried on with the Circar of Rao Pundit Prudhan, or with any of his dependants, either by the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor or by the Honourable Company's government, without the mutual privity and consent of both contracting parties ; and whatever transactions, whether of great or small import, may in future take place with the aforesaid Rao Pundit Prudhan or his dependants, a reciprocal communication of the same shall be made to the other contracting party without delay and without reserve.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad the 1st September, Anno Domini 1798, or 19th Rubby-ul-Awul, Anno Hegiræ 1213.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Acting Resident.

### No. IX.

#### Partition Treaty of Mysore, 1799.

Treaty for strengthening the alliance and freindship subsisting between the English East India Company Bahadoor, His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah, Bahadoor, and the Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor, and for effecting a settlement of the dominions of the late Tippoo Sultan.

Whereas the deceased Tippoo Sultan, unprovoked by any act of aggression on the part of the allies, entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and admitted a French force into his army for the purpose of commencing war against the Honourable English Company Bahadoor and its allies, Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor and the Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor ; and the said Tippoo Sultan having attempted to evade the just demands of satisfaction and security made by the Honourable English Company and its allies for their defence and protection against the joint designs of the said Sultan and of the French, the allied armies of the Honourable English Company Bahadoor and of His Highness Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor proceeded to hostilities in vindication of their rights and for the preservation of their respective dominions from the perils of foreign invasion and from the ravages of a cruel and relentless enemy ; And whereas it has pleased Almighty God to prosper the just cause of the said allies, the Honourable English Company Bahadoor and His Highness Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, with a continual course of victory and success, and finally to crown their arms by the reduction of the capital of Mysore the fall of Tippoo Sultan, the utter extinction of his power, and the unconditional submission of his people ; And whereas the said allies, being disposed to exercise the rights of conquest with the same moderation and forbearance which they have observed from the commencement to the conclusion of the late successful war, have resolved to use the power which it has pleased Almighty God to place in their hands for the purpose of obtaining reasonable compensation for the expenses of the war and of establishing permanent security and genuine tranquillity for themselves and their subjects, as well as for all the powers contiguous to their respective dominions. Wherefore a Treaty for the adjustment of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultan between the English East India Company Bahadoor and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, is now concluded by Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the forces of His Britannic Majesty and of the English East India Company Bahadoor in the Carnatic and on the Coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard, Earl of Mornington, K.P., Governor-General for all affairs, civil and military, of the British nation in India ; and by the Nawab Meer Allum Bahadoor on the part and in the name of His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, according to the undermentioned Articles, which, by the blessing of God, shall be binding upon the heirs and successors of the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure, and of which the conditions shall be reciprocally observed by the said contracting parties.

## Article 1.

It being reasonable and just that the allies by this Treaty should accomplish the original objects of the war (*viz.*, a due indemnification for the expenses incurred in their own defence, and effectual security for their respective possessions against the future designs of their enemies), it is stipulated and agreed that the districts specified in the Schedule A, hereunto annexed, together with the heads of all the passes leading from the territory of the late Tippoo Sultan to any part of the possessions of the English East India Company Bahadoor, of its allies, or tributaries, situated between the ghauts on either coast, and all forts situated near to and commanding the said passes, shall be subjected to the authority, and be for ever incorporated with the dominions of the English East India Company Bahadoor, the said Company Bahadoor engaging to provide effectually, out of the revenues of the said districts, for the suitable maintenance of the whole of the families of the late Hyder Ali Khan and of the late Tippoo Sultan, and to apply to this purpose, with the reservation hereinafter stated, an annual sum of not less than two lakhs of Star Pagodas, making the Company's share as follows :—

	Canterai Pagodas.
Estimated value of districts enumerated in the Schedule A, according to the statement of Tippoo Sultan, in 1792.....	7,77,170
Deduct provision for the families of Hyder Ali Khan and of Tippoo Sultan, two lakhs of Star Pagodas, in Canterai Pagodas .....	2,40,000
Remains to the East India Company .....	<u>5,37,170</u>

## Article 2.

For the same reason stated in the preceding Articles, the district specified in Schedule B, annexed hereunto, shall be subjected to the authority, and for ever united to the dominions, of the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, the said Nawab having engaged to provide liberally from the revenues of the said districts for the support of Meer Kummer-ood-deen Khan Bahadoor, and of his family and relations, and to grant him for this purpose a personal jaghir in the district of Gurrumcondah, equal to the annual sum of Rs. 2,10,000 or of 70,000 Canterai Pagodas, over and above and exclusive of a jaghir which the said Nawab has also agreed to assign to the said Meer Kummer-ood-deen Khan for the pay and maintenance of a proportionate number of troops to be employed in the service of his said Highness, making the share of His Highness as follows :—

	Canterai Pagodas.
Estimated value of the territory specified in Schedule B, according to the statement of Tippoo Sultan in 1792 .....	6,07,332
Deduct, personal jaghir to Meer Kummer-ood-deen Khan, Rs. 2,10,000, or.....	70,000
Remains to the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor.	<u>5,37,332</u>

## Article 3.

It being further expedient, for the preservation of peace and tranquillity and for the general security on the foundations now established by the contracting parties, that the fortress of Seringapatam should be subjected to the said Company Bahadoor, it is stipulated and agreed that the said fortress and the island on which it is situated (including the small tract of land, or island, lying to the westward of the main island, and bounded on the west by a nullah, called the Mysore Nullah, which falls into the Cauvery near Chenagal Ghaut) shall become part of the dominions of the said Company, in full right and sovereignty, for ever.

## Article 4.

A separate government shall be established in Mysore ; and for this purpose it is stipulated and agreed that the Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor, a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, shall possess the territory hereinafter described upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

## TREATIES.

### Article 5.

The contracting powers mutually and severally agree that the districts specified in Schedule C, hereunto annexed, shall be ceded to the said Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah, and shall form the separate government of Mysore, upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

### Article 6.

The English East India Company Bahadoor shall be at liberty to make such deductions from time to time from the sums allotted by the first Article of the present Treaty for the maintenance of the families of Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultan, as may be proper, in consequence of the decease of any member of the said families; and in the event of any hostile attempt, on the part of the said family or of any member of it, against the authority of the contracting parties, or against the peace of their respective dominions or the territories of the Rajah of Mysore, then the said English East India Company Bahadoor shall be at liberty to limit or suspend entirely the payment of the whole or any part of the stipend hereinbefore stipulated to be applied to the maintenance and support of the said families.

### Article 7.

His Highness the Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor shall be invited to accede to the present Treaty; and although the said Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor has neither participated in the expense or danger of the late war, and therefore is not entitled to share any part of the acquisitions made by the contracting parties (namely, the English East India Company Bahadoor and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor), yet for the maintenance of the relations of friendship and alliance between the said Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor, the English East India Company Bahadoor, His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowla Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, and Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Bahadoor, it is stipulated and agreed that certain districts, specified in Schedule D, hereunto annexed, shall be reserved for the purpose of being eventually ceded to the said Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor, in full right and sovereignty, in the same manner as if he had been a contracting party to this Treaty; provided, however, that the said Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor shall accede to the present Treaty in its full extent within one month from the day on which it shall be formally communicated to him by the contracting parties, and provided also that he shall give satisfaction to the English East India Company Bahadoor and to His Highness Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, with regard to certain points now depending between him, the said Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor and the said Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, and also with regard to such points as shall be represented to the said Peishwa, on the part of the English East India Company Bahadoor, by the Governor-General or the British Resident at the Court of Poonah,

### Article 8.

If, contrary to the amicable expectation of the contracting parties, the said Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor shall refuse to accede to this Treaty or to give satisfaction upon the points to which the seventh Article refers, then the right to and sovereignty of the several districts hereinbefore reserved for eventual cession to the Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor shall rest jointly in the said English East India Company Bahadoor, and the said Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, who will either exchange them with the Rajah of Mysore for other districts of equal value more contiguous to their respective territories, or otherwise arrange and settle respecting them, as they shall judge proper.

### Article 9.

It being expedient, for the effectual establishment of Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah in the government of Mysore, that His Highness should be assisted with a suitable subsidiary force, it is stipulated and agreed that the whole of the said force shall be furnished by the English East India Company Bahadoor, according to

the terms of a separate Treaty to be immediately concluded between the said English East India Company Bahadoor and His Highness the Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor.

## Article 10.

This Treaty, consisting of ten Articles, being settled and concluded this day, the 22nd of June 1799 (corresponding to the 17th of Mohurram, 1214 Anno Hegiræ), by Lieutenant-General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard, Earl of Mornington, Governor-General aforesaid; and by Meer Allum Bahadoor, on the part and in the name of His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor; the said Lieutenant-General Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, have delivered to Meer Allum Bahadoor one copy of the same, signed and sealed by themselves; and Meer Allum Bahadoor has delivered to Lieutenant-General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, another copy of the same, sealed by himself; and Lieutenant-General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, and Meer Allum Bahadoor, severally and mutually engage that the said Treaty shall be respectively ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor-General under his seal and signature within eight days from the date hereof, and by His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, within twenty-five days from the date hereof.

The  
Nizam's  
Seal.

Ratified at Hyderabad, by His Highness the Nizam, on the 13th day of July, Anno Domini 1799.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Resident.

## SCHEDULE A.

The Company's Share.

The following districts from Nuggur or Bidnore.

	C. Pagodas.	F.	C.	C. Pagodas.	F.	C.
Korial (Mangalore) Bekul and Neliceram ... ..	1,33,662	7½	0			
Karkul ... ..	11,393	2½	0			
Barkoo ... ..	48,389	8½	0			
Khoolshaulpore ... ..	26,361	7½	0			
Bulkul ... ..	9,177	0½	0			
Gairsopah ... ..	9,192	0½	0			
Hunavur (Onore)... ..	17,482	9½	0			
Mirjann ... ..	8,953	4½	0			
Anoolah, Punchmahil, and Shedasooghur (or Soonda Payen Ghaut)..	28,332	2	0			
				2,92,945	2½	0
Bilghay ... ..	.....			18,929	4½	0
Carried over.....	.....			3,11,874	6½	0

## TREATIES.

## SCHEDULE A—(continued).

	C. Pagodas F. C.	C. Pagodas F. C.
Brought forward.....	.....	3,11,874 6½ 0
<i>Coimbatore, &amp;c., viz.</i>		
Coimbatore...	80,000 0 0	
Dansingecotah ...	35,000 0 0	
Cheoor ...	27,000 0 0	
Chinjany ...	27,000 0 0	
Darapoor, Chuckerghery ...	64,000 0 0	
Settimungalum ...	30,000 0 0	
Undoor ...	8,000 0 0	
Perondoor...	14,000 0 0	
Vizimungal (Aravarcourchy) ...	20,000 0 0	
Errode ...	20,000 0 0	
Coroor ...	41,000 0 0	
Coodgully ...	15,000 0 0	
Caveryporam ...	4,000 0 0	
		3,85,000 0 0
<i>Wynaad (from Amudnugur Chickloor) from Talooks belonging to Seringapatam.</i>		
Panganoor...	15,000 0 0	
Suttikal Alambady and Kodahully ...	15,200 0 0	
Oussore ...	18,096 0 0	
Decanicotah and Ruttungeery ...	14,000 0 0	
Vencatigyracotah...	6,000 0 0	
Ankushungeery and Solageery ...	4,000 0 0	
Bangloor ...	3,000 0 0	
Talmulla and Talwoddy (2 Talooks of Hurdunhully) ...	5,000 0 0	
		80,296 0 0
		7,77,170 6½ 0
Deduct provision for the maintenance of the families of Hyder Ali Khan and of Tippoo Sultan, Star Pagodas 2,00,000 ...	.....	2,40,000 0 0
Remains to the Company ...	Canterai Pagodas	5,37,170 6½ 0

## SCHEDULE B.

## The Nizam's Share.

## Gooty.

	C. Pagodas. F. C.	C. Pagodas. F. C.
Fyse Hussur Kubal ...	15,568 0 0	
Kona Koonlah ...	7,500 0 0	
Pamri ...	11,000 0 0	
Wurjur Kurroor ...	8,998 1 0	
Yursutty Murajcherroo ...	5,902 0 0	
Bheim Rapah ...	4,800 0 0	
Muttur ...	2,700 0 0	
Pravalli Munnimong ...	9,426 3 0	
Chunampilly ...	8,951 8 0	
Mulkaira Kooboo ...	22,251 8½ 0	
Koortunni ...	8,800 0 0	
Yarki ...	22,673 1 0	
		1,28,571 1½ 0
Pennacoondah ...	.....	60,000 0 0
Murrugsera ...	.....	8,000 0 0
Hundytentpoor ...	.....	16,000 0 0
Kongoor (remainder of) ...	.....	11,629 0 0
Kunchundgoondy (remainder of) ...	.....	10,000 0 0
Of Gurrumconda, all the districts not ceded in 1792...	.....	1,85,810 0 0
Puttungheery (from Seringapatam) ...	.....	10,000 0 0
Rydroog (6 Talooks) ...	.....	1,02,856 0 0
Kurnool Pesheush...	.....	66,666 0 0
From Chitteldroog Jerrynulla (1 Talook) ...	.....	7,800 0 0
		6,07,332 1½ 0
Deduct personal jaghir to Kummer-ood-Khan and relations ...	.....	70,000 0 0
Remains to the Nizam ...	.....	5,37,332 1½ 0



## SCHEDULE C.

Districts ceded to Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor.  
Talooks belonging to Seringapatam.

	C. Pagodas. F. C.	C. Pagodas. F. C.
Puttun Attorkrun ... ..	11,000 0 0	
Mysore Attorkrun or Rehmur Nazeer ... ..	11,500 0 0	
Nuzzer Bar... ..	14,000 0 0	
Hurdunhully ... ..	15,000 0 0	
Periapatam... ..	6,200 0 0	
Muddoor ... ..	13,200 0 0	
Hetghur Dewancotah ... ..	8,000 0 0	
Betudapoor... ..	7,000 0 0	
Tyoor ... ..	8,000 0 0	
Yelandoor ... ..	10,000 0 0	
Malwelly (Yulinahbad) ... ..	9,000 0 0	
Tulkar Sosilah ... ..	8,100 0 0	
Nursipoor ... ..	10,200 0 0	
Yertourah ... ..	7,200 0 0	
Bailoor ... ..	15,700 0 0	
Arkulgoor ... ..	4,300 0 0	
Chinipatam... ..	12,100 0 0	
Bullum (Mungirabad) ... ..	10,000 0 0	
Hussen ... ..	7,900 0 0	
Honawully ... ..	9,400 0 0	
Nagmungul ... ..	4,700 0 0	
Belloor ... ..	3,100 0 0	
Maharage Droog ... ..	10,000 0 0	
Gram ... ..	3,500 0 0	
Rangheery ... ..	7,400 0 0	
Turkarumb ... ..	7,400 0 0	
Alimudnugger Chicklocr... ..	10,000 0 0	
Kurp ... ..	12,000 0 0	
Ternoy Khaira ... ..	9,000 0 0	
Coondghul ... ..	5,008 9 0	
Hoolior droog ... ..	4,000 0 0	
Kirkairy ... ..	4,065 0 0	
Chennyputtan ... ..	9,138 0 0	
Nooggairly... ..	3,000 0 0	
Mairlatesh and Kismagepoor ... ..	6,100 0 0	
Sucknyputtan ... ..	6,200 0 0	
Banc rawar, Guradungilly and Henenhelly ... ..	10,000 0 0	
Boodihall ... ..	7,000 0 0	
Nidghul ... ..	6,000 0 0	
Pasghur ... ..	10,000 0 0	
Hagulwary... ..	12,000 0 0	
Goomna pollum ... ..	10,000 0 0	
Bangalore ... ..	55,000 0 0	
Magry ... ..	8,400 0 0	
Mudgeny ... ..	26,000 0 0	
Coorjgherry ... ..	4,000 0 0	
		4,60,811 9 0
Cankenelly ... ..	8,300 0 0	
Nulwung and Doorbillah... ..	16,000 0 0	
Anicul ... ..	10,300 0 0	
Byroodroog ... ..	4,000 0 0	
Hyboor ... ..	7,000 0 0	
Dewanhelly ... ..	20,045 0 0	
Ootradroog... ..	5,000 0 0	
Chinroydroog ... ..	8,000 0 0	
Toonk or and Deoroy ... ..	18,000 0 0	
Nidgegul and Macklijdroog ... ..	16,000 0 0	
Kundykeera and Chullnaighelly ... ..	26,000 0 0	
Chota Balapoor ... ..	80,000 0 0	
Coler ... ..	80,000 0 0	
Jungameotah ... ..	13,000 0 0	
Chuckmoogalum ... ..	8,134 4 0	
Kudoor ... ..	7,129 7½ 0	
		3,17,509 1½ 0
<i>Serra (remainder of).</i>		
Serra and Amrapoor ... ..	55,000 0 0	
Hoosuttat ... ..	50,754 0 0	
Burra Balapoor ... ..	44,000 0 0	
		1,49,754 0 0
Carried over.....	.....	9,28,075 0½ 0

## TREATIES.

## SCHEDULE C—(continued).

	C. Pagodas	F.	C.	C. Pagodas	F.	C.
Brought forward.....	.....			9,28,975	04	0
<i>Nuggur (above Ghaut.)</i>						
Kusbah ... ..	29,145	43	2			
Cooldroog ... ..	28,818	03	2			
Koompsee ... ..	8,094	24	0			
Kope ... ..	22,864	54	2			
Wasthara ... ..	6,818	9	0			
Eckairy and Sagur ... ..	39,411	04	2			
Ghooty (Hoahly) ... ..	11,006	84	0			
Surbtowannundy ... ..	10,458	04	2			
Terryanwitty ... ..	17,424	0	0			
Shikarpoor... ..	11,774	04	0			
Anuntapoor ... ..	10,191	94	0			
Lakouly-danwas ... ..	11,629	64	1			
Oodgunny ... ..	13,614	14	0			
Jimoga ... ..	16,883	5	0			
Hoolighonore ... ..	6,583	54	1			
Biddery ... ..	10,835	5	2			
Chingeery Beswapatam ... ..	22,091	14	3			
Terry-keerah ... ..	14,076	44	2			
Azimpoor ... ..	10,696	24	3			
				3,02,417	6	6
<i>Chittledroog (remainder of) 12 Talooks.</i>						
Kusbah ... ..	20,874	74	1			
Beem Sumendar ... ..	12,148	4	2			
Doodiary ... ..	12,984	94	0			
Husdroog ... ..	11,936	24	3			
Muttoor ... ..	10,392	34	2			
Murkal Murroo ... ..	12,662	94	3			
Tullick ... ..	11,854	04	0			
Burm Sagur ... ..	10,163	64	0			
Kunkopah ... ..	12,542	04	2			
Bilchoor ... ..	10,683	14	2			
Hinoor ... ..	10,910	0	2			
Goodycottah ... ..	11,330	54	3			
				1,48,583	14	9
Deduct two Pergunnahs of Hurdunhilly, viz., Talman and Talwaddy, included in the Company's share ... ..				5,000	0	0
Canterai Pagodas ... ..				13,74,076	8	1

## SCHEDULE D.

## The Peishwa's Share.

	C. Pagodas.	F.	C.
Harponelly (6 Talooks) ... ..	1,10,030	84	0
Soonda (above the Ghauts) ... ..	59,377	0	0
Aunagcondy ... ..	60,101	0	0

From Chittledroog, two Talooks, viz.,—

	C. Pagodas.	F.	C.
Holubkaira ... ..	11,425	44	0
Mycoondah ... ..	12,226	94	0
	23,652	3	0

From Bidnore, one Talook, viz.,—

Hurryhur ... ..	10,796	0	0
Canterai Pagodas ... ..	2,63,957	34	0

Ratified at Hyderabad, by His Highness the Nizam, on the 13th day of July,  
Anno Domini 1799.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Resident.

## Separate Articles of the Treaty with the Nizam.

Separate Articles appertaining to the Treaty of Mysore, concluded on the 22nd of June 1799 (corresponding to the 17th of Mohurram, Anno Hegiræ 1214) between the Honourable English East India Company Bahadoor and the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor.

## Article 1.

With a view to the prevention of future altercations, it is agreed between His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor and the Honourable English East India Company Bahadoor, that to whatever amount the stipends appropriated to the maintenance of the sons, relations, and dependants of the late Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultan, or the personal jaghir of Meer Kummer-ood-deen Khan, shall hereafter be diminished, in consequence of any one of the stipulations of the Treaty of Mysore, the contracting parties shall not be accountable to each other on this head.

## Article 2.

And it is further agreed between the contracting parties that in the event provided for by the eighth Article of the Treaty of Mysore, two-thirds of the share reserved for Rao Pundit Prudhan Bahadoor shall fall to His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowlah Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, and the remaining third to the Honourable English East India Company Bahadoor.

The  
Nizam's  
Seal.

Ratified at Hyderabad, by His Highness the Nizam, on the 13th day of July, Anno Domini 1799.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Resident.

No. X.

## Treaty with the Nizam, 1800.

Treaty of perpetual and general defensive alliance between the Honourable the English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, Soubadar of the Deccan, his children, heirs, and successors; settled by Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick, Resident at the Court of His Highness, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by the most Noble Richard, Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious Order of St. Patrick, one of His Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General in Council, appointed by the Honourable the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and Governor-General in Council of all the British possessions in the East Indies.

Whereas, by the blessing of God, an intimate friendship and union have firmly subsisted for a length of time between the Honourable English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, and have been cemented and strengthened by several Treaties of alliance, to the mutual and manifest advantage of both powers, who, with uninterrupted harmony and concord having equally shared the fatigues and dangers of war and the blessings of peace, are in fact become one in the same in interest, policy, friendship, and honour. The powers aforesaid, adverting to the complexion of the times, have determined on principles of precaution and foresight and with a view to the effectual preservation of constant peace and tranquillity, to enter into a general defensive alliance, for the complete and reciprocal protection of their respective territories, together with those of their several allies and dependants, against the unprovoked aggressions or unjust encroachments of all or of any enemies whatever.

## TREATIES.

### Article 1.

The peace, union, and friendship so long subsisting between the two States shall be perpetual; the friends and enemies of either shall be the friends and enemies of both; and the contracting parties agree that all the former Treaties and agreements between the two States now in force and not contrary to the tenor of this engagement shall be confirmed by it.

### Article 2.

If any power or State whatever shall commit any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against either of the contracting parties, or against their respective dependants or allies, and, after due representation, shall refuse to enter into amicable explanation, or shall deny the just satisfaction or indemnity which the contracting parties shall have required, then the contracting parties will proceed to concert and prosecute such further measures as the case shall appear to demand.

For the more distinct explanation of the true intent and effect of this agreement, the Governor-General in Council, on behalf of the Honourable Company, hereby declares that the British Government will never permit any power or State whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights or territories of His Highness the Nizam, but will at all times maintain and defend the same, in the same manner as the rights and territories of the Honourable Company are now maintained and defended.

### Article 3.

With a view to fulfil this Treaty of general defence and protection, His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah agrees that two battalions of sepoys and one regiment of cavalry, with a due proportion of guns and artillerymen, shall be added in perpetuity to the present permanent subsidiary force of six battalions of sepoys of one thousand firelocks each, and one regiment of cavalry five hundred strong (with their proportion of guns and artillerymen), so that the whole subsidiary force furnished by the Honourable East India Company to His Highness shall henceforward consist of eight battalions of sepoys (or eight thousand firelocks) and two regiments of cavalry (or one thousand horse), with their requisite complement of guns, European artillerymen, lascars, and pioneers, fully equipped with warlike stores and ammunition, which force is to be stationed in perpetuity in His Highness's territories.

### Article 4.

The pay of the above-mentioned additional force shall be calculated at the rate of the pay of the existing subsidiary force, and shall commence from the day of the entrance of the said additional force into His Highness's territories.

### Article 5.

For the regular payment of the whole expense of the said augmented subsidiary force (consisting of eight thousand infantry, one thousand cavalry, and their usual proportion of artillery) His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah hereby assigns and cedes to the Honourable East India Company in perpetuity all the territories acquired by His Highness, under the Treaty of Seringapatam on the 18th March 1792, and also all the territories acquired by His Highness under the Treaty of Mysore on the 22nd June 1794, according to the Schedule annexed to this Treaty.

### Article 6.

Certain of the territories ceded by the foregoing Article to the Honourable Company being inconvenient, from their situation to the northward of the river Toombuddrah, His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah, for the purpose of rendering the boundary line of the Honourable Company's possessions a good and well-defined one, agrees to retain the districts in question, namely, Copul, Gujjinderghur, and others (as marked in the annexed Schedule) in his own possession; and, in lieu thereof, assigns and cedes in full and in perpetuity to the Honourable

Company the district of Adoni, together with whatever other territory His Highness may be possessed of, or is dependent on His Highness's Government, to the south of the Toombuddrah, or to the south of the Kistnah, below the junction of those two rivers.

#### Article 7.

The territories to be assigned and ceded to the Honourable Company by the fifth Article, or in consequence of the exchange stipulated in the sixth Article, shall be subject to the exclusive management and authority of the said Company and of their officers.

#### Article 8.

Whereas the actual produce of a considerable portion of the districts ceded to the Honourable Company by Article fifth is ascertained and acknowledged to be greatly inferior to their nominal value, as specified in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty, and the said districts cannot be expected for a long course of years to reach to their said nominal value ; and whereas differences might hereafter arise between the contracting parties with respect to the real value of the same, and the friendship and harmony happily subsisting between the contracting parties be disturbed by discussions relating to the adjustment of accounts of the produce and value of the said districts ; in order to preclude all causes of any such future difference or discussion between the two States, the said East India Company agrees to accept the said districts (with the reservation stated in the sixth Article) as a full and complete satisfaction for all demands on account of the pay and charges of the said subsidiary force ; and therefore to whatever extent or for whatever length of time the actual produce of the said districts shall prove inadequate to the amount of the subsidy payable by His Highness on account of the said subsidiary force, no demands shall ever be made by the Honourable Company upon the treasury of His Highness on account of any such deficiency or on account of any failure in the revenues of the said districts, arising from unfavourable seasons, from the calamity of war, or any other cause. His Highness the Nizam, on his part, with the same friendly views, hereby renounces all claim to any arrears or balances which may be due to him from the said districts at the period of their cession to the Honourable Company, and also to any eventual excess in the produce of the said districts, beyond the amount of the subsidy payable by His Highness on account of the said subsidiary force, the true intention and meaning of this Article being, that the cession of the said districts and the exchanges stipulated in the sixth Article shall be considered as a final close and termination of accounts between the contracting parties with respect to the charges of the said subsidiary force.

#### Article 9.

After the conclusion of this Treaty, and as soon as the British Resident shall signify to His Highness Ausuph Jah that the Honourable Company's officers are prepared to take charge of the districts ceded by the fifth Article, His Highness will immediately issue the necessary perwannahs or orders to his officers to deliver over charge of the same to the officers of the Company ; and it is hereby stipulated and agreed that all collections made by His Highness's officers subsequent to the date of the said perwannahs or orders, and before the officers of the Company shall have taken charge of the said districts, shall be carried to the account of the Honourable Company.

#### Article 10.

All forts situated within the districts to be ceded as aforesaid shall be delivered to the officers of the Honourable Company with the said districts ; and His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah engages that the said forts shall be delivered to the Honourable Company as nearly as possible in the same state as that in which His Highness received them.

## TREATIES.

### Article 11.

His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah will continue to pay the subsidy of the former subsidiary force and also that of the additional troops from his treasury in the same manner as hitherto observed, until the Honourable East India Company's officers shall have obtained complete possession from His Highness's officers of the country ceded to the said Company by the fifth Article. The Company will not claim any payments of subsidy from His Highness's treasury after their officers shall have obtained possession of the said districts from the officers of His Highness.

### Article 12.

The contracting parties will employ all practicable means of conciliation to prevent the calamity of war ; and for that purpose will at all times be ready to enter into amicable explanations with other States and to cultivate and improve the general relations of peace and amity with all the powers of India, according to the true spirit and tenor of this defensive Treaty. But if a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other power whatever, then His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah engages that, with the reserve of two battalions of sepoys which are to remain near His Highness's person, the residue of the British subsidiary force (consisting of six battalions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry with artillery) joined by six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse of His Highness's own troops, and making together an army of twelve thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, with their requisite train of artillery, and warlike stores of every kind, shall be immediately put in motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy ; and His Highness likewise engages to employ every further effort in his power for the purpose of bringing into the field as speedily as possible the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions ; with a view to the effectual prosecution and speedy termination of the said war, the Honourable Company in the same manner engage on their part, in this case, to employ in active operations against the enemy the largest force which they may be able to furnish over and above the said subsidiary force.

### Article 13.

Whenever war shall appear probable His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah engages to collect as many benjarahs as possible, and to store as much grain as may be practicable in his frontier garrisons.

### Article 14.

Grain and all other articles of consumption and provision, and all sorts of materials for wearing apparel, together with the necessary quantity of cattle, horses, and camels, required for the use of the subsidiary force, shall, in proportion to its present augmentation, be, as heretofore, entirely exempted from duties.

### Article 15.

As by the present Treaty the union and friendship of the two States are so firmly cemented as that they may be considered as one and the same, His Highness the Nizam engages neither to commence nor to pursue in future any negotiations with any other power whatever without giving previous notice and entering into mutual consultation with the Honourable East India Company's Government ; and the Honourable Company's Government on their part hereby declare that they have no manner of concern with any of His Highness's children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom His Highness is absolute.

### Article 16.

As by the present Treaty of general defensive alliance, mutual defence and protection against all enemies are established, His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah consequently engages never to commit any act of hostility or aggression against any power whatever ; and in the event of any differences arising, whatever adjustment of them the Company's Government, weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may determine, shall meet with full approbation and acquiescence.

## Article 17.

By the present Treaty of general defensive alliance, the ties of union, by the blessing of God, are drawn so close that the friends of one party will be henceforward considered as the friends of the other, and the enemies of the one party as the enemies of the other; it is therefore hereby agreed that if in future the Shorapore or Gudwall zemindars, or any other subjects or dependants of His Highness's Government should withhold the payment of the Circar's just claims upon them, or excite rebellion or disturbance, the subsidiary force, or such proportion thereof as may be requisite, after the reality of the offence shall be duly ascertained, shall be ready, in concert with His Highness's own troops, to reduce all such offenders to obedience. And the interests of the two States being now in every respect identified, it is further mutually agreed that if disturbances shall at any time break out in the districts ceded to the Honourable Company by this Treaty, His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah shall permit such a proportion of the subsidiary troops as may be requisite to be employed in quelling the same within the said districts. If disturbances shall at any time break out in any part of His Highness's dominions, contiguous to the Company's frontier, to which it might be inconvenient to detach any proportion of the subsidiary troops, the British Government, in like manner, if required by His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah, shall direct such proportion of the troops of the Company as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose to assist in quelling the said disturbances within His Highness's dominions.

## Article 18.

Whereas, by the favour of Providence, a perfect union, harmony, and concord, have long and firmly subsisted between the Honourable East India Company, His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah, His Highness the Peishwa Rao Pundit Pradhan and Rajah Raghojee Bhooslah, therefore should His Highness Rao Pundit Pradhan, and Rajah Raghojee Bhooslah, or either of them, express a desire to participate in the benefits of the present defensive alliance, which is calculated to strengthen and perpetuate the foundations of general tranquillity, the contracting parties will readily admit both or either of the said powers to be members of the present alliance, on such terms and conditions as shall appear just and expedient to the contracting parties.

## Article 19.

The contracting parties being actuated by a sincere desire to promote and maintain general tranquillity, will admit Dowlut Rao Sindia to be a party to the present Treaty whenever he shall satisfy the contracting parties of his disposition to cultivate the relations of peace and amity with both States, and shall give such securities for the maintenance of tranquillity as shall appear to the contracting parties to be sufficient.

## Article 20.

This Treaty, consisting of twenty Articles, being this day settled by Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick with the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, Captain Kirkpatrick has delivered one copy thereof in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the said Nawab, who, on his part, has also delivered one copy of the same, duly executed by himself; and Captain Kirkpatrick, by virtue of especial authority given to him on that behalf by the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, hereby declares the said Treaty to be in full force from the date hereof, and engages to procure and deliver to His Highness in the space of thirty days a copy of the same from the Governor-General in Council, in every respect the counterpart of that executed by himself; and on the delivery of such copy the Treaty executed by Captain Kirkpatrick shall be returned; but the additional subsidiary force specified in the third Article shall be immediately required by His Highness the Nizam and furnished by the Honourable Company, and all the other Articles shall be in full force from this time.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad on the 12th October, Anno Domini 1800, or 22nd Jemmadee-ul-Awul, Anno Hegiræ 1215.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,

Resident.

## Separate and Secret Articles.

Separate and Secret Articles appertaining to the Treaty of perpetual and general defensive alliance concluded between the Honourable English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor on the 12th October, Anno Domini 1800, or 22nd Jemmadee-ul-Awul, Anno Hegiræ 1215.

## Article 1.

The Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan shall be admitted to the benefits of this general defensive alliance on the following condition :--

*First.*—Rao Pundit Prudhan shall accept the mediation of the Honourable Company's Government for the amicable adjustment, on the basis of the Treaty of Mah, of all claims or demands of chout, and of all other claims or demands whatever, on the territories or Government of His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah.

The British Government will also take into consideration the claims of His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah to a total exemption from chout, and will arbitrate, on the principles of justice and equity, any question now existing, or which shall hereafter arise, relative to the same, between Rao Pundit Prudhan and the Nawab Ausuph Jah ; provided Rao Pundit Prudhan shall agree to accept the said arbitration ; and Rao Pundit Prudhan shall not be admitted to the benefit of this general defensive alliance, until he shall have agreed to accept the arbitration of the British Government, with respect to the said claims of the Nawab Ausuph Jah to a total exemption from chout.

*Secondly.*—Rao Pundit Prudhan shall give full satisfaction to the Honourable East India Company on the various points depending between him and the British Government in India.

*Thirdly.*—If Rao Pundit Prudhan shall agree to the following conditions, the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah will assist him in the restoration of his just authority in the Mahratha Empire.

*Fourthly.*—For this purpose Rao Pundit Prudhan shall agree to subsidize in perpetuity such a body of the said Company's troops as shall hereafter be judged necessary for the restoration and maintenance of his authority.

## Article 2.

Rajah Raghojee Bhooslah shall be admitted to the benefit of this general alliance on the following conditions :—

*First.*—Rajah Raghojee Bhooslah shall accept the Honourable Company's arbitration of all unadjusted points between His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah and the said Rajah, according to the tenor of subsisting Treaties.

*Secondly.*—Rajah Raghojee Bhooslah shall agree to such equitable interchanges of territory with the Honourable East India Company as shall be judged necessary to complete or improve their respective frontiers, or to such cessions of territory (in consideration of a just pecuniary equivalent) as shall be judged necessary to the same purpose.

## Article 3.

If, contrary to the spirit and object of this defensive Treaty, war should hereafter appear unavoidable (which God avert !), the contracting parties will proceed to adjust the rule of partition of all such advantages and acquisitions as may eventually result from the success of their united arms.

The contracting parties entertain no views of conquest or extension of their respective dominions, nor any intention of proceeding to hostilities, unless in the case of unjust and unprovoked aggression, and after the failure of their joint endeavours to obtain reasonable satisfaction, through the channel of pacific negotiation according to the tenor of the preceding Treaty. It is, however, declared that, in the event of war, and of a consequent partition of conquest between the contracting parties, His Highness Nawab Ausuph Jah shall be entitled to participate equally with the other contracting parties in the division of every territory which may be acquired by the successful exertion of their united arms,



provided His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah shall have faithfully fulfilled all the stipulations of the preceding Treaty, especially those contained in the twelfth and thirteenth Articles thereof.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad on the 12th October, Anno Domini 1800, or 22nd Jemmadee-ul-Awul, Anno Hegiræ 1215.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Resident.

### Schedule referred to in the Treaty.

Schedule of His Highness the Nizam's territorial acquisitions by the Treaty of Seringapatam, dated the 18th May 1792, and by the Treaty of Mysore, dated the 22nd June 1799, and which, in conformity to the fifth and sixth Articles of the annexed Treaty, are now, together with the talook of Adoni, and all other talooks situated to the south of the rivers Toombuddrah and Kistnah, ceded in full and in perpetuity to the Honourable East India Company.

### List of Talooks acquired by the Treaty of Seringapatam.

	C. Pagodas.	F.	A.	P.
Sidhout, 6 Talooks ... ..	81,885	9½	1	0
Chinnoor, 6 ditto ... ..	65,427	4½	0½	0
Kumlapoor, 4 ditto ... ..	50,729	3½	3	0
Vo-oor, 6 ditto ... ..	70,684	9	2½	0
Budwail, 3 ditto ... ..	54,883	0	4	0
Jumoonul Murrow, 7 ditto ... ..	90,643	7	1	0
Kummum, 7 ditto ... ..	1,30,148	2½	1	0
Kunnuckgherry, 3 ditto ... ..	30,952	4½	1	0
Chit Koontah, 1 ditto... ..	11,298	9½	0	0
Gudtoor, 1 ditto ... ..	17,846	4½	0	0
Cœl Konetah, 1 ditto ... ..	10,224	9	3½	0
Opulpaha, 1 ditto ... ..	10,098	1½	1½	0
Nursapoor, 1 ditto ... ..	8,397	5½	3	0
Bisspul, 1 ditto... ..	11,074	11½	0	0
Donypahr Wurdwarum, 1 ditto ... ..	12,402	3½	1	0
Poodtoor, 2 ditto ... ..	22,979	4	2	9
Chutwail or Multwaur, 8 Talooks ... ..	1,30,769	3½	1	9
Monyaulpalo, 1 ditto ... ..	6,000	0	0	0
Nussam, 1 ditto ... ..	17,802	2½	0	0
Bungumpully and Chunchummullah, 2 ditto ... ..	41,804	9½	0	0
Onak, 1 ditto ... ..	20,000	0	0	0
In Goody, 4 ditto ... ..	51,782	8½	0	0
Bulhary and Kurkoor, 1 ditto ... ..	23,000	0	0	0
Weonlahwempelly, 1 ditto ... ..	12,565	0	0	0
Kopoul, 8 ditto ... ..	1,06,137	3½	1	0
Gajjinderghun, 8 ditto... ..	1,01,977	9	0	0
Kunnuckgherry, 1 ditto ... ..	79,100	0	0	0
Singaputtun Oopalwurrah, 1 ditto ... ..	20,000	0	0	0
Hunmuntecond, 1 ditto ... ..	15,000	0	0	0
Busswahpoor, 1 ditto ... ..	5,000	0	0	0
Mokah, 1 ditto... ..	12,162	6½	2	0
In the Talooka of Kookoor ... ..	370	2½	1	9
Total ... ..	13,16,666	6½	2	0

### List of Talooks acquired by the Treaty of Mysore—Gooty (remainder of).

	C. Pagodas.	F.	A.
Eye Hissur (the fort dependencies) ... ..	15,568	0	0
Kundundlah ... ..	7,500	0	0
Paumry ... ..	11,000	0	0
Warkur Kunoor ... ..	8,998	0	0
Yarutty Muracheeroo ... ..	5,902	0	0½
Beem Rajah ... ..	4,800	0	0
Nuttoor ... ..	2,700	0	0

# TREATIES.

	C. Pagodas.	F.	A.
BiAlly Mutty Murgh ... ..	9,426	3	0
Churtumpully ... ..	8,951	0	0
Mutyhurah Huttoor ... ..	22,251	9½	0
Koondunty ... ..	8,800	0	0
Yarghy ... ..	22,673	0	0
Pencoondah ... ..	60,000	0	0
Minighsherrah ... ..	8,000	0	0
Hundy Ununtpoor ... ..	16,000	0	0
Koorkoor (remainder of) ... ..	11,629	0	0
Kanchungoondy ... ..	10,00	0	0
Gurrucondah ... ..	1,85,810	0	0
Ruttungherry ... ..	10,000	0	0
Ragdroon, 6 Talooks ... ..	1,02,856	0	0
Kinnool Peishcush ... ..	66,666	0	0
Kunymullah, 1 Talook ... ..	7,800	0	0
Umrahpoor Noomautty ... ..	10,000	0	0
Anungoondy ... ..	60,100	0	0
Hurpunkully, 6 Talooks ... ..	1,10,030	8½	0
Wurnahpoor, and sundry other villages in the Chittledroog district ... ..	5,840	1½	0
Total ...	7,93,300	10½	0
Grand Total ...	21,09,968	5	3

The districts situated north of the Toombbuddrah, which conformably to the sixth Article of the annexed Treaty remain with His Highness the Nizam to be deducted from the above, as follows :—

	C. Pagodas.	F.	A.
Koopul, 8 Talooks ... ..	1,06,137	3½	0
Cajjirdughur, 8 ditto. ... ..	1,01,977	9	0
Kunnauckgherry, 1 ditto ... ..	79,100	0	0
Villages of the Anagoondy district situated to the north of the Toombuddrah ... ..	8,710	0	0
Villages of the Tukkulcottah district, situated likewise north of the Toombuddrah... ..	855	0	0
Retained by His Highness the Nizam ... ..	2,96,780	0½	0
Remains to the Honourable Company ... ..	18,13,188	4½	3
Add to the Adoni country, which together with all His Highness's remaining possessions, south of the Toombuddrah, is, by the sixth Article of the annexed Treaty, ceded in exchange for the above districts to the Honourable Company ...	Rupces... 8,34,718	12	0

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad, the 12th October, A.D. 1800, or 22nd Jemaul-ul-Awul, A.H. 1215.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Resident.

Additional Article of Treaty between the Honourable East India Company on the one part, and His Highness Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Meer Ukbur Ali Khan Bahadoor, Soubah of the Deccan, his children, heirs, and successors, on the other ; to be considered as appertaining to the Treaty of perpetual and general defensive alliance concluded at Hyderabad on the 12th of October 1800 A.D., or 22nd of Jemmadee-ul-Awul 1215 A.H.

## Article.

In the event (which God, however, avert !) of joint war breaking out hereafter with any other power, it is hereby agreed that, during the continuance thereof, all officers and all troops, whether individually or collectively, belonging to either of the contracting parties, shall have free ingress and egress to and from all the territories, and to and from all the forts belonging to each other respectively ; and it is hereby further agreed that all officers, whether Civil or Military, belonging to

either Government, shall, when requisite, employ all their power and all the resources at their command in facilitating the operations of the troops employed, to whichever of the two contracting powers they may happen to belong.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad, this 9th of January 1804, agreeing with 25th Ramzan, A.H. 1218.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Resident.



His Highness's Mark.

His  
Highness's  
Little Seal.

His  
Highness's  
Great Seal.

(A true copy.)  
(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Resident.

# No. XI.

## Commercial Treaty with the Nizam, 1802.

Treaty for the improvement and security of the trade and commerce between the territories of the Honourable East India Company and of His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah, Soubadar of the Deccan; settled by Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick, Resident at the Court of His Highness, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by His Excellency the Most Noble Richard, Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the Most Illustrious Order of Saint Patrick, one of His Britannic Majesty's Privy Council, Governor-General in Council, Captain General and Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Forces in India, appointed by the Honourable the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and Governor-General in Council of all the British possessions in the East Indies.

Whereas a well-regulated commerce is essential to the opulence and prosperity of the people and to the wealth and power of the State; and whereas a free and secure commercial intercourse tends to maintain and improve the relations of amity, peace, and concord between contiguous nations:

Wherefore the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah, anxious to improve by every possible means the close and intimate connection now happily established between the two States, and to extend the benefits of their union to their respective subjects, have agreed on the following Articles of a Treaty of Commerce between the two States:—

### Article 1.

As the testimony of the firm friendship, union, and attachment, subsisting between the Honourable Company and His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah, the Honourable Company hereby agree to grant to His Highness the free use of the seaport of Masulipatam; at which port His Highness shall be at liberty to establish a commercial factory and agents under such regulations as the nature of the Company's Government shall require, and as shall be adjusted between the Governor-General in Council and His said Highness.

### Article 2.

His Highness's ships bearing his flag shall be entitled at all times to the protection of His Britannic Majesty's and of the Honourable Company's ships of war, and shall be admitted into all the ports belonging to the British Government in India upon the footing of the most favoured nations.

## TREATIES.

### Article 3.

There shall be a free transit between the territories of the contracting parties of all articles being the growth, produce, or manufacture of each respectively ; and also of all articles being the growth, produce, or manufacture of any part of His Britannic Majesty's dominions.

### Article 4.

All rahdarry duties and all duties collected by individual renters or zemindars on goods passing to and from the territories of the contracting parties shall be abolished, and all zemindars, renters, &c., shall be strictly prohibited from committing any acts of extortion or violence on the merchants passing through the respective territories of the contracting parties.

### Article 5.

A duty of five per cent. and no more shall be levied at Hyderabad indiscriminately on all articles of merchandize whatever imported into His Highness's dominions from the Company's possessions. No articles shall pay duty more than once. The duties payable shall be regulated by a just valuation of the article or commodity on which they shall be charged, and which shall be determined by an invoice, authenticated by the seal and signature of the proper Officers on each side ; nor shall any arbitrary valuation of any article or commodity be admitted to enhance the amount of the duties payable thereon, and the said duties shall be fixed and immutable except by the mutual consent of the contracting parties.

### Article 6.

The Honourable East India Company shall on their part adopt similar arrangements in every respect for the purpose of facilitating the transit through their dominions of all articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of His Highness's territories, and of guarding the same from all unjust exactions or vexatious imposts whatever.

### Article 7.

The duties payable to the Honourable Company on all articles imported into their territories from His Highness's dominions shall be collected in the mode prescribed by the fifth Article at Masulipatam alone, or at one or more places according to the convenience of the merchants belonging to His Highness's dominions ; and the said place or places shall be fixed with the consent of His Highness the Nizam, it being understood that no article imported from His Highness's dominions shall in any case pay duty more than once, whether the said duty be collected at Masulipatam or elsewhere.

### Article 8.

A duty of five per cent. and no more shall be levied once by His Highness's Government, and be made payable at Hyderabad on the prime cost of all commodities purchased in His Highness's dominions for exportation.

### Article 9.

No merchants or traders under the Company's Government shall be allowed to re-vend in the dominions of the Nawab aforesaid the productions or manufactures of his territories purchased by them therein. Neither shall any grain be exported from the territories of the Nawab aforesaid into those of the Honourable Company without a special licence for the purpose ; nor any more grain be purchased in His Highness's territories than what is necessary for the consumption of the subsidiary force. But it is at the same time hereby agreed that, in cases of necessity, permission shall reciprocally be granted immediately on application for the transportation of grain, free from all duties whatever, into the respective territories of the two contracting powers in Hindoostan and the Deccan.

### Article 10.

The traders under both Governments, namely all such as shall traffic from the Honourable East India Company's territories to the territories of His Highness the

Nawab Ausuph Jah, and *vice versa*, shall, upon the importation of their commodities into the respective territories, pay once a duty of five per cent. according to the terms prescribed in the foregoing Articles. With respect to others who do not come under the above description, such as traders from foreign parts or inhabitants of Hyderabad, who have always paid the usual duties, the kurrarah shall, as heretofore, levy duties from them according to custom.

Article 11.

The preceding regulations shall take effect and be established in the respective territories of the contracting parties on the 1st day of September next, answering to the 2nd of Jemmadee-ul-Awul, A.H. 1217, after which day no duties shall be levied in any other manner than in conformity to the stipulations of this Treaty.

Article 12.

This Treaty, consisting of twelve Articles, being this day settled by Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick with the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, Major Kirkpatrick has delivered one copy thereof in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the said Nawab, who on his part has also delivered one copy of the same duly executed by himself: and Major Kirkpatrick, by virtue of special authority given to him in that behalf by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, hereby declares the said Treaty to be in full force from the date hereof, and engages to procure and deliver to His Highness in the space of fifty days, a copy of the same from the Governor-General in Council, in every respect the counterpart of that executed by himself, and on the delivery of such copy the Treaty executed by Major Kirkpatrick shall be returned.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad, this 12th day of April, A.D. 1802, or 8th day of Zehidge, A.H. 1216.

Seal of  
the Nizam.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Resident.

No. XII.

Instrument under the signature of the Governor-General in Council, delivered to the Nizam (Secunder Jah) on his accession to the musnud, recognising all the former Treaties and engagements with Nizam Ali, deceased.

The friendship and alliance which so firmly and happily subsisted between His late Highness the Nawab Nizam Ali Khan, Soubadar of the Deccan, and the Honourable Company's Government, shall be considered to subsist with equal force and sincerity, and shall continue for ever unimpaired between His late Highness's eldest son and successor, the Nawab Secunder Jah, and the Honourable Company, and all Treaties and engagements which subsisted between His late Highness and the Honourable Company's Government shall be considered to be in full force to all intents and purposes. And His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council hereby declares, on the part of the Honourable Company, that the British Government is effectually bound by the said engagements and Treaties, and that the said engagements and Treaties shall be duly observed until the end of time.

Given under the seal of the Honourable Company, and the signature of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, at Fort William in Bengal, this 24th day of August 1803.

Engagement between Secunder Jah and the Company, 1803.

The friendship and union which so strongly and happily subsisted between the late Nawab Nazim Ali Khan Bahadoor (whose soul is in Paradise) and the Honourable Company's Government are to be considered as perfectly unimpaired, and shall meet with no interruption whatever. All existing Treaties and engagements likewise that were contracted with the late Nawab aforesaid are in full force to all intents and purposes; and we hereby declare that we are effectually bound by the

engagements and Treaties aforesaid, and by the blessing of God, the said Treaties and engagements shall be duly observed until the end of time.

Signed and sealed on the 7th day of August, Anno Domini 1803, answering to Rubbee-oos-Sanee, A. H. 1218, with seal and signature of Meer Foulaad Ali Khan Secunder Jah Bahadoor, Soubadar of the Deccan, and delivered in duplicate, on the day aforesaid, by His Highness himself to Major James Achilles Kirpatrick, Resident at the Court of Hyderabad.

The Seal  
of the Nawab  
Secunder Jah. |

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Resident.

### No. XIII.

#### Partition Treaty of Hyderabad with His Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan, 1804.

Treaty for the settlement of general peace in Hindoostan and the Deccan, and for the confirmation of the friendship subsisting between the Honourable English East India Company and its allies, His Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan and His Highness Rao Pundit Prudhan Peishwa Bahadoor, settled between the said Honourable Company and the said allies by Major James Achilles Kirpatrick, Resident of the Court of Hyderabad, in virtue of the powers delegated to him by His Excellency the Most Noble Richard, Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the Most Illustrious Order of Saint Patrick, one of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General in Council of all the British possessions, and Captain General of all the British land forces in the East Indies.

Whereas, by the terms of the Treaties of peace concluded by Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, on the part of the Honourable Company and its allies, with the Maharajah Senah Saheb Soubah, Rajah of Berar, at Deogaum, on the 17th of December 1803, and with Maharajah Dowlut Rao Sindia, at Surjee Anjengaum, on the 30th of that month, which Treaties have been duly ratified by the Governor-General in Council and by the allies of the British Government, certain forts and territories have been ceded by Maharajah Senah Saheb Soubah, and by Maharajah Dowlut Rao Sindia, to the Honourable Company and its allies, the following Articles of agreement, for the settlement of the said forts and territories, have been concluded by the British Government and by the said allies :—

#### Article 1.

The province of Cuttack, including the pert and district of Balasore, and all cessions of every description made by the second Article of the Treaty of Deogaum, or by any Treaties which have been confirmed by the tenth Article of the said Treaty of Deogaum, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to the Honourable English East India Company.

#### Article 2.

The territories of which Maharajah Senah Saheb Souba formerly collected the revenues, in participation with His Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan, and those formerly possessed by Maharajah Senah Saheb Soubah, to the westward of the river Wurdah, ceded by the third Article of the Treaty of Deogaum, and the territory situated to the southward of the hills, on which are the forts of Nernullah and Gawilghur, and to the westward of the river Wurdah, stated by the fourth Article of the Treaty of Deogaum to belong to the British Government and its allies, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to His Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan, with the exception of the districts reserved to Senah Saheb Soubah in the fifth Article of the said Treaty of Deogaum.

#### Article 3.

All the forts, territories, and rights of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Sindia in the Doab, or country situated between the Jumma and Ganges, and all his forts,

territories, rights, and interests in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypore and Jodhpore, and of the Rana of Gohud, ceded by the second Article of the Treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to the Honourable Company.

Article 4.

The fort of Baroach and territory depending thereon, ceded by the third Article of the Treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to the Honourable Company.

Article 5.

The fort and city of Ahmednugger, together with such part of the territory depending thereon as is ceded by the third Article of the Treaty of Surjee Anjengaum to the Honourable Company and its allies, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to His Highness the Peishwa.

Article 6.

All the territories which belonged to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Sindia before the commencement of the late war, situated to the southward of the hills called the Adjunttee Hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapore, the town and district of Gandapore, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery, ceded by the fourth Article of the Treaty of Surjee Anjengaum to the Honourable Company and its allies, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to His Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan.

Article 7.

All cessions made to the Honourable Company by any Treaties which have been confirmed by the ninth Article of the Treaty of Surjee Anjengaum shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to the Honourable Company.

Article 8.

This Treaty, consisting of eight Articles, being this day, the 17th of Mohurram, corresponding with the 28th of April, settled and concluded at Hyderabad by Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick, with His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah Meer Akber Ali Khan Bahadoor, Soubadar of the Deccan, the said Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick has delivered to His said Highness a copy of the same, in English and Persian, under the seal and signature of the said Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick, and His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah Meer Akber Ali Khan Bahadoor has delivered to the said Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick another copy also in Persian and English, bearing His Highness's seal and signature; and the aforesaid Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick has engaged to procure and deliver to His said Highness without delay a copy of the same, duly ratified by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, on the receipt of which by His said Highness the present Treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the Honourable the English East India Company and His Highness, and the copy of it now delivered to His said Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah shall be returned.

Done at Hyderabad, this 28th day of April, Anno Domini 1804, or 17th day of Mohurram, Anno Hegiræ 1219.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,  
Resident.

No. XIV.

Treaty between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan and his children, heirs, and successors, for the further confirmation of friendship and unity of interests, concluded through the Agency of Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, Esq., Resident at the Court of His said Highness, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by His Excellency Most Noble Francis, Marquis of Hastings, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Knight G.C. of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, one of His Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council,

Governor-General in Council, appointed by the Honourable the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Forces.

Whereas certain rights, forts, and territories have come into the possession of the Honourable East India Company from the States of Nagpore and Holkar, and in consequence of the reduction and occupation of the dominions of the Peishwa, the following Articles of agreement for the settlement of the said rights, forts, and territories have been concluded by the said Honourable Company and His said Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan.

#### Article 1.

All former Treaties and engagements between the two States now in force and not contrary to the tenor of this Treaty shall be confirmed by it.

#### Article 2.

The arrears of all claims and demands of chout, and of all other claims whatever on the territories or Government of His Highness the Nizam, due by His said Highness to the Peishwa, are hereby declared to be extinguished, and His said Highness is released in perpetuity from the payment of all chout of every description on account of any part of his possessions.

#### Article 3.

His Highness the Nizam being desirous of possessing certain of the districts acquired by the late war on account of their situation within the exterior line of His Highness's frontier, the following exchanges of territory are hereby agreed upon for His Highness's benefit and the mutual convenience of the contracting parties.

#### Article 4.

The districts formerly belonging to the Peishwa as specified in the Schedule A, hereunto annexed, and estimated at the annual sum of Rupees 5,69,275-8, are hereby transferred in perpetual sovereignty to His Highness the Nizam.

#### Article 5.

The districts formerly belonging to the Rajah of Nagpore according to the Schedule B, hereunto annexed, and estimated at the annual sum of Rupees 3,13,743-8, together with the forts of Gawilghur and Narnulla, and the range of hills on which they are situated, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to His said Highness.

#### Article 6.

The districts of Umber and Ellora, formerly belonging to Maharaj Mulhar Rao Holkar, and estimated at the annual sum of Rupees 1,89,373, shall also belong in perpetual sovereignty to His said Highness.

#### Article 7.

His Highness the Nizam on his part hereby cedes to the Honourable Company in perpetual sovereignty the whole of his rights and possessions situated on the west or right bank of the river Seena, according to the Schedule C, hereunto annexed, and also the whole of his rights and possessions situated with the district of Ahmednuggur as detailed in the said Schedule, the whole being estimated at the annual sum of Rupees 4,31,785-3½.

#### Article 8.

His Highness the Nizam also cedes, for the purpose of their being transferred in perpetual sovereignty to the Rajah of Nagpore, the whole of his participated rights and possessions situated on the east or left bank of the river Wurdah.



according to the Schedule D annexed to the present Treaty, and estimated to produce an annual revenue of Rupees 75,000.

Article 9.

Certain assignments of chout within the territory of His Highness the Nizam, to the estimated annual amount of Rupees one lakh and twenty thousand, having been guaranteed to Appa Dessaye and the Putwardhuns, His Highness the Nizam hereby agrees to pay the aforesaid sum annually to the Honourable East India Company in perpetuity.

Article 10.

His Highness the Nizam also engages to confirm and continue all enams and wurshasuns and all individual and charitable allowances of every description whatever which may have been granted either on the chout payable by His Highness to the Peishwa, or any portion of the districts formerly belonging to the Peishwa, and now acquired by His said Highness under the fourth Article of the present Treaty, provided those grants shall have been in force at the breaking out of hostilities with the Peishwa in the month of November 1817, and that the holders of them shall have performed the conditions prescribed in Mr. Elphinstone's proclamation, dated the 11th of February, 1818.

Article 11.

This Treaty, consisting of eleven Articles, having been this day settled by Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, Esquire, with the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, one copy thereof has been delivered to the said Nawab, and the Nawab on his part has delivered one copy of the same duly executed by himself to the aforesaid gentleman, who engages to procure and deliver to His Highness a copy of the same from His Excellency the Governor-General, in every respect the counterpart to this executed by himself, after which the copy executed by the aforesaid gentleman shall be returned.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad, 12th December, A.D. 1822, 27th Rubbee-ul-Awul, A.H. 1238.

The  
Nizam's  
Seal.

(Signed) C. T. METCALFE. L. S.  
"  
" HASTINGS.  
" J. ADAMS.  
" J. FENDALL.  
" J. H. HARRINGTON.

Ratified by the Governor-General in Council, at Fort William in Bengal, this 31st day of December 1822.

(Signed) GEORGE SWINTON,  
Secretary to Government.

A.

Schedule of the districts formerly belonging to the Peishwa, and now transferred by the 4th Article of the annexed Treaty to His Highness the Nizam.

Oomurtchair	...	...	...	...	}	
Julgaum	...	...	...	...		
Wyezapoor Scorage	...	...	...	...		
Untoor	...	...	...	...		
22 Villages of Talook Rahisbone Scornije.	...	...	...	...		
Dhabany Scorage	...	...	...	...	}	Total ... Rs. 5,69,275 8 0
Detached Villages	...	...	...	...		
Shewlee Peer	...	...	...	...		
Hirpoor Talooka	...	...	...	...		
Ghal Nandoor	...	...	...	...		
Sundry Villages	...	...	...	...	J	

# TREATIES.

## B.

Schedule of the districts formerly belonging to the Rajah of Nagpore, and now transferred by the 5th Article of the annexed Treaty to His Highness the Nizam.

Akoal ... ..	}	... ..	Rs. 3,25,000	8	0
Argaum ... ..					
Wumais ... ..					
Bhatooly ... ..					
Kulkal ... ..					
Deduct the revenue of Moongaum held by Sreedhur Pundit and Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, half of the village Belkhaira held by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder.	}	... ..	Rs. 11,257	0	0
Total ... ..			Rs. 3,13,743	8	0

## C.

Schedule of the rights and possessions of His Highness the Nizam, situated on the west or right bank of the river Seena and within the district of Ahmednuggur, the whole of which are now transferred, by the 7th Article of the annexed Treaty, to the Honourable Company.

### WEST OF THE SEENA.

In the pergunnah of Mohul, Circar of Purainda,—

The Kusbeh, &c.		Wurwul.
Koorwullee, &c.		Ram Higna, &c.
Phool Chircholee.		

In the pergunnah of Raseen, Circar of Ahmednuggur,—  
Koortee, &c.

In the pergunnah of Pandia, Circar of Pairgaum,—

Ahmednuggur.		Mentchgaum.
Saurergaum, &c.		Siraul, &c.

Loonee, &c.

In the pergunnah of Wangee, Circar of Purainda,—

Luhwa.		Kunder.
Krishbeh, &c.		Hitnowra.

In the pergunnah of Mundroop, Circar of Sholapoor,—

Mundroop, &c.		Meerree, &c.
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In the pergunnah of Taimhoornee, Circar of Puraindar,—

Ahola, &c.		Hutgaum.
Wuralee.		Kusbeh of Taimbhoornee.

In the pergunnah of Chumargoonda, Circar of Ahmednuggar,—

Paleywarre, &c.		Saitphut.
Kurgut.		Korygaum.
Koondaiza.		Ghautgaum, &c.

In the pergunnah of Konywulleet, Circar of Ahmednuggar,—

Kusbeh of Nandnuj.		Amba Julgaum, &c.
Hurmulla.		Sogaum, &c.
Pargaum.		Mamdgaum, &c.

In the pergunnah of the Burdole, Circar and Soobah of Beejapoor,—

Tanklee, &c.		Part of the village of Mandra.
Jujeesumnee, &c.		Codree Kunnoor.
Charchars, &c.		Chouttee and other Ubwaubs granted to the Putwurdhuns.

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

In the pergunnah of Oondergaum, Circar of Purainda,-  
Marra, &c.

In the pergunnah and Circar of Purainda,—

Koordoo and 19 other khalsa villages.		Oopla.
Badlonee, and 11 other villages.		Papnass.

WITHIN THE DISTRICT OF AHMEDNUGGUR.

In the pergunnah of Kurwah,—

Adulgaum.		Kolegaum.
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In the pergunnah of Jamkhair,—

Kurdlah.	Sonegaum.
Jamkhair.	Sountany attached to the fort or
Loney.	Purainda.
Pumpulgaum.	Dhurrungaum.

In the turruff of Ranjungaum,—

Anguah.		Bhowsee.
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In the talook of Khaim,—

Khaim.		Nimborry.
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In the talook of Ahmednuggur,—

Kohrgaum.	Mandway.
Mreddurgaum.	Pargaum Kolhot.
	Balwany.

In the pergunnah of Pangree,—

Bhatamray.		Chickroud.
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In the Circar of Sungannair,—

Rahlay.

In the pergunnah of Nawassa,—

Sallabutpoor.	Sooltanpoor.
Boorhampore.	Kurmure.
Hingangaum.	Koontaphul.
Chanday.	Tondoolce.
Lohorwarry.	Sallut Wurgong.
Dairhgaum.	Dewallany.
Moreguhan.	Wankkree.
Ballyponduree.	Mallwany.
Neembgaum.	Nimbay.
Prowrah Sungaum.	Prekargaum.
Pathewully.	Khandlay Khaddlay.
Koorneet Sengway.	Amulnair.

Total within the district of Ahmednuggur and on the  
west bank of the river Seena ... ..Rs. 4,31,785 3 0½

## D.

Schedule of the participated rights and possessions of His Highness the Nizam, situated on the east or left bank of the river Wurdah, and now ceded by His said Highness, according to the 8th Article of the annexed Treaty, for the purpose of being transferred to the Rajah of Nagpore.

In the pergunnah of Arwees,—	}	Total ...Rs. 75,000 0 0
Circar of Gawcib.		
In the pergunnah of Ashtce,—		
Circar of Gawcil.		
In the pergunnah of Amnair,—	}	
Circar of Khavila.		

(Signed) G. SWINTON,  
Secretary to Government.

Substance of a Mahratta Proclamation issued on the 11th of February 1818, by the Honourable M. Eliphinstone, sole Commissioner for the settlement of the territories conquered from the Peishwa.

From the time when Bajee Rao ascended the musnud his country was a prey to faction and rebellion, and there was no efficient government to protect the people. At length Bajee Rao was expelled from his dominions and took refuge in Bassein, where he was dependent on the bounty of Cundee Rao Rastia. At this time he entered into alliance with the British Government, and was immediately restored to the full possession of his authority : the tranquillity that has been enjoyed since that period is known to all ranks of men. At Bajee Rao's restoration the country was laid waste by war and famine, the people were reduced to misery, and the government derived scarcely any revenue from its lands ; since then, in spite of the farming system and the exactions of Bajee Rao's officers, the country has completely recovered, through the protection afforded it by the British Government, and Bajee Rao has accumulated those treasures which he is now employing against his benefactors. The British Government not only protected the Peishwa's own possessions, but maintained his rights abroad. It could not without injury to the rights of others restore his authority over the Mahratta Chiefs, which had expired long before its alliance with him ; but it paid the greatest attention to satisfy his admissible demands, and succeeded, in spite of many difficulties, in adjusting some and putting others in a train of settlement. Among these were Bajee Rao's claims on the Guicowar. The British Government had prevailed on that Prince to send his Prime Minister to Poona for the express purpose of settling those demands, and they were on the eve of adjustment, with great profit to the Peishwa, when Gungadhur Shastry, the Guicowar's vakeel, was murdered by Trimbuckjee Dainglia, the Peishwa's Minister, while in actual attendance on his court and during the solemn pilgrimage of Punderpore. Strong suspicion rested on Bajee Rao, who was accused by the voice of the whole country ; but the British Government, unwilling to credit such charges against a Prince and ally, contented itself with demanding the punishment of Trimbuckjee. This was refused, until the British Government had marched an army to support its demands ; yet it made no claim on the Peishwa for its expenses, and inflicted no punishment for his protection of a murderer : it simply required the surrender of the criminal ; and on Bajee Rao's compliance, it restored him to the undiminished enjoyment of all the benefits of the alliance. Notwithstanding this generosity, Bajee Rao immediately commenced on a new system of intrigues, and used every exertion to turn all the power of India against the British Government. At length he gave the signal of disturbances by fomenting an insurrection in his own dominions, and prepared to support the insurgents by open force. The British Government had then no remedy but to arm in turn. Its troops entered Bajee Rao's territories at all points and surrounded him in his capital, before any of those with whom he had intrigued had time to stir. Bajee Rao's life was now in the hands of the British Government ; but that Government, moved by Bajee Rao's professions of gratitude for past favours and of entire dependence on its moderation, once more resolved to continue him on his throne, after imposing such terms on him as might secure it from his future perfidy. The principal of these terms was a commutation of the contingent which the Peishwa was bound to furnish, for money equal to the pay of a similar body of troops ; and on their being agreed to, the British Government restored Bajee Rao to its friendship, and proceeded to settle the Pindarees, who had so long been the pests of the peaceable inhabitants of India, and of none more than the Peishwa's own subjects. Bajee Rao affected to enter with zeal into an enterprise so worthy of a great Government, and assembled a large army on pretence of cordially assisting in the contest ; but in the midst of all his professions he spared neither pains nor money to engage the powers of Hindostan to combine against the British ; and no sooner had the British troops marched towards the haunts of the Pindarees than he seized the opportunity to commence war, without a declaration, and without even an alleged ground of complaint. He attacked

and burned the house of the British Resident, contrary to the laws of nations and the practice of India, plundered and seized on peaceable travellers, and put two British officers to an ignominious death. Bajee Rao himself found the last transaction too barbarous to avow ; but as the perpetrators are still unpunished and retain their command in his army, the guilt remains with him. After the commencement of the war, Bajee Rao threw off the mask regarding the murder of Gungadhur Shastry, and avowed his participation in the crime, by uniting his cause with that of the murderer. By these acts of perfidy and violence Bajee Rao has compelled the British Government to drive him from his musnud and to conquer his dominions. For this purpose a force is gone in pursuit of Bajee Rao, which will allow him no rest ; another is employed in taking his forts ; a third has arrived by the way of Ahmednuggur ; and a greater force than either is now entering the Kandeish, under the personal command of His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop. A force under General Munro is reducing the Carnatic, and a force from Bombay is taking the forts in the Concan, and occupying that country, so that in a short time no trace of Bajee Rao will remain. The Rajah of Sattara, who is now a prisoner in Bajee Rao's hands, will be released and placed at the head of an independent sovereignty, of such an extent as may maintain the Rajah and his family in comfort and dignity. With this view, the fort of Sattara has been taken, the Rajah's flag has been set up in it and his former ministers have been called into employment. Whatever country is assigned to the Rajah will be administered by him, and he will be bound to establish a system of justice and order : the rest of the country will be held by the Honourable Company. The revenue will be collected for the Government, but all property, real or personal, will be secured. All wuttun and enam (hereditary lands), wurshasun (annual stipends), and all religious and charitable establishments will be protected, and all religious sects will be tolerated, and their customs maintained, as far as is just and reasonable. The farming system is abolished. Officers shall be forthwith appointed to collect a regular and moderate revenue on the part of the British Government, to administer justice and to encourage the cultivators of the soil. They will be authorized to allow of remissions, in consideration of the circumstances of the times. All persons are prohibited paying revenue to Bajee Rao or his adherents, or assisting them in any shape. No reduction will be made from the revenue on account of such payment. Wuttundars, and other holders of land, are required to quit his standard and return to their villages within two months from this time. The zemindars will report the name of those who remain ; and all who fail to appear in that time shall forfeit their lands, and shall be pursued without remission until they are entirely crushed.

All persons, whether belonging to the enemy or otherwise, who may attempt to lay waste the country or to plunder the roads, will be put to death whenever they are found.

#### No. XV.

#### Engagement of 1831.

The friendship and union which have been so strongly and happily established from of old between the Honourable Company and the late Nawab Ausuph Jah Mozuffer-ool-Moomalik Nizam-ool-Moolk Nizam-ood-Dowlah Nawab Meer Akber Ali Khan Bahadoor Futteh Jung (whose soul is in Paradise) shall always continue on the same footing between His Highness Ausuph Jah Mozuffer-ool-Moomalik Nizam-ool-Moolk Nizam-ood-Dowlah Nawab Meer Furkhund Ali Khan Bahadoor, the eldest son and successor of the deceased Nawab, and the said Honourable Company.

All existing Treaties, engagements, and relations that were contracted or established between the two States during the time of the late Nawabs Nizam-ool-Moolk Nawab Meer Nazim Ali Khan Bahadoor, and Nizam-ool-Moolk Nawab Meer Akber Ali Khan Bahadoor, shall remain in full force to all intents and

purposes ; accordingly the Right Honourable the Governor-General, on the part of the said Honourable Company, declares that the British officers are effectually bound by the engagements and Treaties aforesaid, and that by the favour of God the stipulations of the said Treaties and engagements shall be duly observed till the end of time. In assurance whereof the Governor-General has given in writing these few lines in the shape of an engagement.

Signed and sealed at Simla, on the twentieth day of September 1831, A.D., answering to the 13th Rubbee-oos-Sanee 1247, A.H., and delivered in duplicate on the 17th day of October 1831, by Major J. Stewart, Resident at the Court of Hyderabad, to His Highness Nawab Ausuph Jah Mozuffer-ool-Moomalik Meer Furkhund Ali Khan Bahadoor Futteh Jung, Nizam of Hyderabad.

Governor-  
General's  
Seal.

(Signed) W. BENTINCK.  
" H. T. PRINSEP,  
Secretary.

### No. XVI.

Treaty with the Nizam, dated the 21st May 1853.

Treaty between the Honourable the English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Mulk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, settled by Colonel John Low, C.B., Resident at the Court of His Highness, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by the Most Noble James Andrew, Marquis of Dalhousie, Knight of the most Ancient and most Noble Order of the Thistle, one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, and Governor General, appointed by the Honourable Company, to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies.

Whereas friendship and union have subsisted for a length of time between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, and have been cemented and strengthened by Treaties of general defence and protection ; and whereas in the lapse of time many changes in the condition of Princes and neighbouring States have taken place, by reason of which it has now become expedient to revise the military arrangements that were formerly agreed upon for the fulfilment of the said Treaties ; and whereas differences and discussions have for some time existed between the contracting parties regarding the adjustment of charges connected with portions of the military arrangements subsisting between the States ; and whereas it is fit and proper, and for the mutual advantage of both powers, that such differences should now be finally settled, and that the recurrence of such discussions, which tend to disturb the friendship and harmony of the contracting parties, should effectually be prevented : wherefore the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor have agreed upon the following Articles of a Treaty between the States :—

#### Article 1.

The peace, union, and friendship so long subsisting between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor shall be perpetual ; the friends and enemies of either shall be the friends and enemies of both ; and the contracting parties agree that all the former Treaties and agreements between the two States now in force, and not contrary to the tenor of this engagement, shall be confirmed by it.

#### Article 2.

The subsidiary force, which for general defence and protection has been furnished by the Honourable East India Company to His Highness the Nizam, shall be continued, and shall consist, as heretofore, of not less than eight battalions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry, with their requisite complement of guns, and European artillerymen, fully equipped with warlike stores and ammunition.

Unless with the express consent of His Highness, there shall never be less than five regiments of infantry, and one of cavalry (with a due proportion of artillery) of the said subsidiary force stationed within the territories of His Highness, and the residue of such subsidiary force shall at all times be brought into His Highness's territories without delay, on His Highness making requisition therefor.

The said subsidiary force shall be employed when required to execute services of importance, such as protecting the person of His Highness, his heirs and successors, and reducing to obedience all rebels and excitors of disturbance in His Highness's dominions; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, or, like sebundee, to be stationed in the country to collect revenue.

#### Article 3.

The Honourable East India Company further agrees that, in lieu of His Highness's present contingent, it shall maintain for His Highness, his heirs and successors, an auxiliary force, which shall be styled the "Hyderabad Contingent," according to the provisions for the maintenance of that force which are detailed in 6th Article of this Treaty.

It shall consist of not less than five thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, with four field batteries of artillery. It shall be commanded by British officers, fully equipped and disciplined and controlled by the British Government, through its representative the Resident at Hyderabad.

Whensoever the services of the said contingent may be required, they shall be afforded at all times to His Highness the Nizam, fully and promptly, throughout his whole dominions. If rebellion or disturbance shall be excited, or if the just claims and authority of His Highness shall be resisted, the said contingent, after the reality of the offence shall have been duly ascertained, shall be employed to reduce the offenders to submission.

#### Article 4.

As the interests of the two States have long been identified, it is further mutually agreed that if disturbances shall break out in districts belonging to the Honourable East India Company, His Highness the Nizam shall permit such portions of the subsidiary force as may be requisite to be employed in quelling the same within the said districts. In like manner, if disturbances shall break out in any part of His Highness's dominions contiguous to the territories of the Honourable East India Company, to which it might be inconvenient, owing to the distance from Hyderabad, to detach any portion of the subsidiary force, the British Government, if required by His Highness the Nizam, shall direct such portions of its troops as may be most available to assist in quelling the disturbances within His Highness's dominions.

#### Article 5.

In the event of war His Highness the Nizam engages that the subsidiary force, joined by the Hyderabad Contingent, shall be employed in such manner as the British Government may consider best calculated for the purpose of opposing the enemy, provided that two battalions of sepoys shall always remain, as settled by former Treaties, near to the capital of Hyderabad; and it is also hereby agreed, that, excepting the said subsidiary and contingent forces, His Highness shall not under any circumstances be called upon to furnish any other troops whatsoever.

#### Article 6.

For the purpose of providing the regular monthly payment to the said contingent troops, and payment of Appa Dessaye's chout, and the allowances to Muhiput Ram's family, and to certain Mahratta pensioners, as guaranteed in the 10th Article of the Treaty of 1822, and also for payment of the interest at six per cent. per annum of the debt due to the Honourable Company, so long as the principal of that debt shall remain unpaid, which debt now amounts to about fifty lakhs of Hyderabad Rupees, the Nizam hereby agrees to assign the districts mentioned in the accompanying Schedule marked A, yielding an annual gross revenue of about fifty lakhs of

Rupees, to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at Hyderabad, and to such other officers, acting under his orders, as may from time to time be appointed by the Government of India to the charge of those districts.

## Article 7.

By the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 the British Government can in time of war call upon that of His Highness the Nizam to furnish nine thousand cavalry and six thousand infantry to accompany the British troops in the field ; the present Hyderabad Contingent, which is to be maintained at all times (whether in peace or war), is accepted as an equivalent for the larger body of troops above specified to be furnished in time of war ; and it is accordingly hereby declared that the Nizam shall not be called upon at any time by the British Government to furnish any other troops but those of the subsidiary force and the Hyderabad contingent, and that part of the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800, which requires the Nizam to furnish nine thousand cavalry and six thousand infantry, is accordingly hereby annulled.

## Article 8.

The districts mentioned in Schedule A are to be transferred to Colonel Low, c. B., the Resident, immediately that the ratified Treaty shall be received from Calcutta ; and that officer engages on the part of the British Government, that the Resident at the Court of Hyderabad for the time being shall always render true and faithful accounts every year to the Nizam of the receipts and disbursements connected with the said districts, and make over any surplus revenue that may exist to His Highness, after the payment of the contingent and the other items detailed in Article 6 of this Treaty.

## Article 9.

This Treaty, consisting of nine Articles, being this day concluded and settled by Colonel John Low, c.B., on behalf of the Honourable the English East India Company, with the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, Colonel Low has delivered one version thereof, in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the Nawab, who on his part has also delivered one copy of the same to Colonel Low, duly executed by His Highness ; and Colonel Low hereby engages to deliver a copy of the same to His Highness the Nizam duly ratified by the Governor-General in Council, within thirty days from this date.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad, 21st May A. D. 1853, 12th Shaban A. H. 1269.

The  
Initials of  
the Nizam.

The Seal  
of Colonel  
Low.

(Signed) J. LOW, Colonel, Resident at Hyderabad.

„ DALHOUSIE.

„ J. LOWIS.

„ J. DORIN.

Ratified by the Most Noble the Governor-General of India in Council, at Fort William in Bengal, on the 18th June 1858.

(Signed) C. ALLEN,  
Secretary to the Government of India.

## A

Schedule of Districts in Berar, Payen Ghat, the Raichore Doab, and borders of the Sholapore and Ahmednuggur Collectorates, Bombay Presidency, transferred to the management of the British Resident at Hyderabad, agreeably to the provisions of the 6th Article of the Treaty of 1853 (Fuslee 1263) entered into by the Honourable East India Company with His Highness the Nizam.



# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

The Districts in Berar, Payen Ghat, transferred to British management are those lying to the north of the range of hills, which extends from Adjuntah on the west to Woon, near the Wurdah, on the east. Any villages not named underneath, within the above-mentioned boundary, will be included hereafter among those transferred to the management of the British Resident at Hyderabad :—

<i>Pergunnah.</i>	Rs.		Rs.
Ankola ... ..	1,24,944	Brought forward...	13,44,168
Dhianda ... ..	1,33,844	<i>Pergunnah.</i>	
Baragaon... ..	17,381	Buroor ... ..	90,394
Thoogaon... ..	61,425	Soorli ... ..	2,991
Kurar Balughat ... ..	2,250	Unjingaon Barce... ..	2,918
Posud do. ... ..	17,158	Seerecala, <i>alias</i> Teerala ... ..	7,014
Argaon ... ..	10,000	Nowsaree... ..	1,036
Nurse Balughat... ..	73,129	Bukee ... ..	1,468
Mahore do. ... ..	14,360	Elichpoor ... ..	1,00,000
Chichole do. ... ..	12,722	Kuruchgaon ... ..	1,00,000
Larkhair ... ..	4,556	Unjingaon ... ..	1,05,219
Yawuk, <i>alias</i> Yawuth Mahal ... ..	2,287	Dharoor ... ..	20,000
Kulum ... ..	2,510	Akoli ... ..	*6,500
Chiknee ... ..	2,501	Bulgaon ... ..	*5,000
Mahagaon ... ..	11,370	Budneragungae... ..	59,843
Nargaon ... ..	975	Punchgawar ... ..	30,371
Ralagaon ... ..	8,750	Salood ... ..	23,912
Pundur Kowra ... ..	2,000	Papoo, <i>alias</i> Papul ... ..	7,911
Bokshee Kheir ... ..	2,000	Punjmahagaon ... ..	51,921
Wunmaidee ... ..	28,033	Reithpoor ... ..	61,710
Munba ... ..	12,000	Chinchona ... ..	11,139
Boodnara Pooljee ... ..	32,068	Khed Beloor ... ..	14,910
Boonkee ... ..	2,702	Seena ... ..	14,820
Dhamodee, <i>alias</i> Dhamoree ... ..	18,923	Banoda ... ..	17,855
Gooboo ... ..	6,000	Bathkolee ... ..	38,596
Bowenbir... ..	*14,000	Pathrote ... ..	1,37,932
Julka ... ..	*3,000	Malkheira ... ..	10,871
Seerala ... ..	10,000	Palus Kheir ... ..	10,011
Poosda ... ..	*5,000	Sawurgaon Taklee ... ..	2,500
Urgaon (small) ... ..	*1,500	Neir Pursoopundit ... ..	8,360
Akote ... ..	77,000	Nandgaon Kazee ... ..	13,263
Urgaon ... ..	1,25,000	Davikota ... ..	3,226
Julgaon ... ..	97,000	Dhamunko ... ..	2,899
Jamodee ... ..	35,155	Parsolee ... ..	2,200
Morsee ... ..	36,000	Manjurkheir ... ..	8,525
Pala ... ..	3,000	Oomrawutee Rancee ... ..	4,665
Malghat ... ..	15,000	Hewur Kheir ... ..	22,601
Dhoolghat ... ..	2,401	Annair ... ..	6,855
Soongaon... ..	7,500	Sirisgaon ... ..	19,189
Moondgrum ... ..	1,500	Danapoor. ... ..	75,000
Juroor ... ..	9,000	Manna ... ..	22,000
Karla ... ..	8,020	Girowlee ... ..	10,000
Bhilkheira ... ..	2,563	Koorun ... ..	18,000
Oomrawutee ... ..	58,442	Moortuzapoor ... ..	45,000
Pathore Shaikh Baboo ... ..	15,881	Mungaloor Pir ... ..	40,000
Barsee Taklee ... ..	12,076	Koora ... ..	45,000
Babun ... ..	3,881	Mungaloor Dustigeer ... ..	12,000
Nandgaon ... ..	18,592	Kusba Korum Kheir, &c. ... ..	8,708
Pathooda... ..	24,001	Dhumej, &c. ... ..	5,320
Punjur ... ..	16,682	Assulgaon ... ..	10,105
Peepulgaon Raja ... ..	37,946	Akote ... ..	9,000
Buneirabeebee ... ..	37,759	Balapoor ... ..	2,41,275
Kolapoor ... ..	33,807	Mulkapoor ... ..	51,319
Thulagaon ... ..	21,173	Raichore ... ..	2,499
Tiktal ... ..	3,500	Rajoora ... ..	3,742
Lakpooree ... ..	2,401	Rohenkheir ... ..	2,491
Raoja ... ..	1,500	Chandore... ..	20,727

Carried over...13,44,168

Carried over...29,94,979

# TREATIES.

Brought forward...				29,94,979	Brought forward.				30,31,652
Nandoora..	...	...	...	9,846	Darsangvee	...	...	...	6,159
Nundgaon	...	...	...	3,736	Daria	...	...	...	17,436
Jeypoor ..	...	...	...	4,146	Karinjabeebee	...	...	...	23,535
Koklee ..	...	...	...	990	Karoo Dhamini	...	...	...	14,297
Devulghat	...	...	...	17,955	Kamurgaon	...	...	...	2,230
Carried over...				30,31,652	Total...Rupees.				30,95,309
Deduct amount of personal jaghirs marked thus*									35,000
					Total...Rupees...				30,60,309

The above amount is exclusive of deli sadur, roosooms, muktas, yeomeeas, enams, and all charitable allowances hitherto held, which will only be paid to the several claimants after they have established their rights by the production of proper Sunnuds or other official documents acknowledged to be correct by the Nizam's Government.

Districts in the Raichore Doab transferred to the management of the British Resident, the boundaries of which are the river Krishna and Toombuddrah on the north, south, and east, and the Honourable Company's frontier belonging to the Bombay Presidency on the west. Any talookas or villages not named underneath, within the above-mentioned boundary, will be included hereafter among those transferred to the management of the British Resident at Hyderabad.

				Rs.
Purgunnah Deodroog, &c. and the talooka of Kadloor, &c...	...	...	...	1,07,872
The Gudwal Peshkush	...	...	...	1,15,000
Pergunnah Huvellee, Raichore, &c., Mahalat	...	...	...	3,95,380
Ditto Kanghery, &c. and Gooboor and Tharana	...	...	...	2,22,280
Ditto Koopul, &c.	...	...	...	1,84,887
Ditto Moodkee and Moodgul	...	...	...	59,063
Ditto Gungawuttee	...	...	...	66,860
Total...Rupees				11,51,342

No claims in these districts will be allowed for personal jaghirs hitherto held till the rights to the same shall have been established by the production of proper Sunnuds or other official documents acknowledged to be correct by the Nizam's Government.

The above rule is also applicable to roosooms, muktas, yeomeeas, enams, and all charitable allowances.

Districts on His Highness's Western Frontier, bordering on the Honourable Company's Bombay Collectorates of Ahmednuggur and Sholapore.

I.—The sixteen Villages in the Beer District, on the boundaries of the Jamkhair talooka, in the Honourable Company's territory, namely : —

				Revenue.		
				Rs.	a.	p.
Karegaon	...	...	...	902	11	3
Hutola	...	...	...	773	14	6
Khoptee	...	...	...	574	5	6
Bhudkul	...	...	...	740	5	6
Morala	...	...	...	1,595	13	0
Meenda	...	...	...	374	7	0
Warjur	...	...	...	1,189	0	0
Roopoor	...	...	...	104	8	6
Kotun	...	...	...	1,965	4	0
Secrapoor Dhomala	...	...	...	1,417	15	0
Bitelha	...	...	...	1,452	3	9
Bawee	...	...	...	505	0	0
Jam ...	...	...	...	292	0	0
Vurnee	...	...	...	624	3	0
Madmapoor	...	...	...	232	10	0
Vadoli	...	...	...	436	11	0

Total...Rupees 13,181 0 0

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

## II.—All the Villages in the Districts of

Katec.	Nuldroog.
Mardeo.	Tooljapoor.
Peranda.	Lohāra.
Dharasco.	Gunjotee.
Bhoom.	Alund.
Kullum.	Afzulpoor.
Latoor.	

And which districts are within the boundaries on the north and east of the Manjira, on the west on the Honourable Company's territory in the Ahmednuggur and Sholapoor Collectorates of the Bombay Presidency, on the south of the Bheema, and on the east in as direct a line as can possibly be drawn between the town of Nittoor on the Manjira, and Afzulpoor on the Bheema, yielding a gross revenue of about eight lakhs of Rupees per annum, exclusive of personal jaghirs, yeomeeas, roosooms, and charitable allowances.

No claims on these districts will be allowed for personal jaghirs hitherto held till the rights to the same shall have been established by the production of proper Sunnuds or other official documents acknowledged to be correct by the Nizam's Government.

The above rule is also applicable to roosooms, yeomeeas, enams, and all charitable allowances.

The Talookas detailed hereafter, belonging to Surf-i-khas, and the Noblemen mentioned underneath, will be left to the Revenue management of the Officers appointed for that purpose by the Hyderabad Government.

### BERAR.

	<i>Surf-i-khas Talookas.</i>						<i>Rs.</i>
Budnera Gungace	...	...	...	...	...	...	59,843
Punchgohan	...	...	...	...	...	...	30,371
Salood	...	...	...	...	...	...	23,912
Papoo, <i>alias</i> Papul	...	...	...	...	...	...	7,911
Punj Mahagaon	...	...	...	...	...	...	51,921
Reithpoor	...	...	...	...	...	...	61,710
Chinchona	...	...	...	...	...	...	11,139
Khedbelloora	...	...	...	...	...	...	14,910
Seeona	...	...	...	...	...	...	14,820
Bunoda	...	...	...	...	...	...	17,855
Bath Kolec	...	...	...	...	...	...	38,596
Pathrot	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,37,932
Malkheira	...	...	...	...	...	...	10,871
Palas Kheira	...	...	...	...	...	...	10,011

### *Jaghir Talookas belonging to Siraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor.*

Dhurecapoor	...	...	...	...	...	...	75,000
Manna	...	...	...	...	...	...	22,000
Garowlee	...	...	...	...	...	...	10,000
Koorum	...	...	...	...	...	...	18,000
Moortezapoor	...	...	...	...	...	...	45,000
Mungaloor Dustigeer	...	...	...	...	...	...	12,000
Mungaloor Pir	...	...	...	...	...	...	40,000
Kora	...	...	...	...	...	...	45,000

Rupees... 2,67,000

### DOAB TALOOKAS.

#### *Belonging to Surf-i-khas.*

Mooshkee and Moodgul	...	...	...	...	...	...	59,063
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Total.....Rupees 8,17,865

TREATIES.

Talookas on the west of His Highness the Nizam's Territories, bordering on the  
Collectorates of Ahmednuggur and Sholapore.

SURF-I-KHAS.

Villages in the Lohara Talooka.

" " Gunjotee "  
" " Alund "

Shums-ool-Oomrah Bahadoor's Talooka of Afzulpoor.

In lieu of the deficiency in the originally estimated value of the western districts bordering on the Sholapore and Ahmednuggur Collectorates, transferred to British management, also in lieu of certain Surf-i-khas villages in the Valley of Berar, inserted in the preceding lists, and the jaghir of Bhom, belonging to Rajah Urjoon Bahadoor, all as detailed below.

DETAIL.

Rs.  
Deficiency in the estimated amount of gross Revenue in the Western Districts... 4,58,506

SURF-I-KHAS.

*Names of Villages.*

Pandarkoora	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Rs.	2,000
Mombhar	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	"	12,000
Pergunnah Budnara Pooljee	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	"	32,068
Savurgaon Taklee	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	"	2,500
									48,568
Pergunnah Bhom, Rajah Urjoon Bahadoor	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		41,100
								Rupees...	5,48,174

His Highness the Nizam transferred to the management of the British Resident at Hyderabad the talookas mentioned underneath in the Province of Balaghat, Berar.

LIST.

Rs.

Pergunnah Mehkar	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	38,339
Do. Sindkhair	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	17,588
Do. Mulkapoor Pangree	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	11,350
Do. Seooloo	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	13,451
Do. Lonhar	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8,937
Do. Wakhud	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,159
Do. Gatpooree	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6,279
Do. Karoomatergaon	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7,511
Do. Futeh Khelda	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	27,666
Muoje Kopta	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	722
Kusba Dondgaon	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4,109
Sayur, &c., of the above Mahalat	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7,563
Pergunnah Bassim	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	60,891
Do. Ounda	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	20,197
Do. Sirpoor	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	22,857
Mouza Moongla...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,286
Pergunnah Kulumnooree	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	38,770
Do. Oomurkhair...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	89,208
Do. Tamsa	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	15,054
Do. Munnata	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8,171
Do. Sewala	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	24,515
Do. Patchlagaon	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8,470
Do. Nandapoor	...	{ 10,981 }	...	...	...	...	...	...	26,600
		{ 15,619 }							
Kusba Seogaon	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,731
Muoje Chickultana, Pergunnah Chartana	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	829
Do. Dawulgaon, Pergunnah Lohgan	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,848
Do. Ursolee, and other villages, Pergunnah Kooror	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,142
Do. Dhar	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8,012
Do. Leh, &c...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,869

Carried over...4,84,124

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

	Rs.
Brought forward...	4,84,124
Muoje Koorurgaon ... ..	5,000
Do. Salapoor, Pergunnah Patree ... ..	14,000
Villages in the Pergunnah or Kurar ... ..	6,656
Do. Talooka Kurar ... ..	6,000
Mouza Chandoor, Pergunnah Sirpoor ... ..	438
Do. Untolee, and other villages of Pergunnah Chintoor ... ..	4,895
Mouza Davulgaon, Pergunnah Sindkhair ... ..	2,345
Pergunnah Unsing ... ..	6,159
Do. Keesoor ... ..	12,257
Do. Darsoor, with villages ... ..	6,079
Mouza Kunaut ... ..	650
Total...Rupees	<u>5,48,601</u>

List of Pergunnahs, Kusbas, and Muojes in Balaghat, Berar, agreeably to their estimated value in Schedule A of a Treaty between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nizam, ratified on the 18th June 1853, which have been restored to His Highness the Nizam's immediate authority in accordance with instructions conveyed in a Despatch from the Government of India, No. 4409, dated the 18th of October 1853.

	Rs.
Pergunnah Oomur Khair ... ..	89,208
Do. Kulumnooree ... ..	38,770
Do. Nandapoor ... ..	26,600
Do. Sewala ... ..	24,515
Do. Ounda ... ..	20,197
Do. Tamsa ... ..	15,054
Do. Munnata ... ..	8,171
Do. Chichole... ..	12,722
Do. Mahagaon ... ..	11,370
Do. Patchilagaon ... ..	8,470
Muoje Dhar ... ..	8,012
Do. Leh, &c. ... ..	1,867
Kusba Seogaon ... ..	1,731
Pergunnah Kurar ... ..	2,250
Villages, Pergunnah Kurar ... ..	6,656
Do. Talooka Kurar ... ..	6,000
Muoje Salapoor, Pergunnah Patree ... ..	14,000
Do. Koorurgaon ... ..	5,000
Do. Untolee, and other villages of Pergunnah Chintore... ..	4,895
Do. Chickultana, Pergunnah Chartana .. ..	829
Do. Ursoolee and other villages of Pergunnah Kooror ... ..	5,142
Do. Moongla, Pergunnah Sirpoor ... ..	1,286
Do. Chandoor do. ... ..	438
Total...Rupees	<u>3,13,183</u>

(Signed) C. DAVIDSON,  
Officiating Resident.

Dated at Hyderabad,  
22nd November 1853 (20th Suffur 1270).

## No. XVII.

Supplemental Treaty between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain on the one part, and His Highness the Nawab Afzul-ood-Dowlah Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, on the other part, settled by Lieutenant-Colonel Cuthbert Davidson, C.B., Resident at the Court of His Highness, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by His Excellency the Right Honourable Charles John Earl Canning, G.C.B., Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council.

Whereas it will be for the convenience of both the contracting parties to the Treaty of 1853 and will simplify the relations of the two Governments, if certain modifications of that Treaty are made, and whereas certain matters not dealt with

in that Treaty call for adjustment between the two contracting parties, and whereas it is the desire of the Governor-General in Council to give all possible solemnity to certain acts, marking the high esteem in which His Highness the Nizam is held by Her Majesty the Queen, therefore the following Articles have been agreed upon and determined between the Viceroy and Governor-General on behalf of Her Majesty, and the Nawab Afzul-ood-Dowlah Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor.

#### Article 1.

All Treaties and engagements between the two States and not contrary to the tenor of this engagement are hereby confirmed by it.

#### Article 2.

The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council cedes to His Highness the Nizam in full sovereignty the territory of Shorapore.

#### Article 3.

The debt of about fifty (50) lakhs of Hyderabad Rupees due by the Nizam to the British Government is hereby cancelled.

#### Article 4.

His Highness the Nizam agrees to forego all demand for an account of the receipts and expenditure of the Assigned Districts for the past, present, or future. But the British Government will pay to His Highness any surplus that may hereafter accrue after defraying all charges under Article 6 and all future expenses of administration, the amount of such expenses being entirely at the discretion of the British Government.

#### Article 5.

The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council restores to His Highness the Nizam all the Assigned Districts in the Raichore Doab and on the western frontier of the dominions of His Highness adjoining the Collectorate of Ahmednuggur and Sholapore.

#### Article 6.

The districts in Berar already assigned to the British Government under the Treaty of 1853, together with all the Surf-i-Khas talooks comprised therein, and such additional districts adjoining thereto as will suffice to make up a present annual gross revenue of thirty-two (32) lakhs of Rupees currency of the British Government, shall be held by the British Government in trust for the payment of the troops of the Hyderabad Contingent, Appa Dessaye's chout, the allowance to Mohiput Ram's family, and certain pensions mentioned in Article 6 of the said Treaty.

#### Article 7.

The Surf-i-Khas talooks and additional districts mentioned in the foregoing Article are to be transferred to the Resident as soon as this Treaty is ratified.

#### Article 8.

His Highness the Nizam cedes to the British Government in full sovereignty all the possessions of His Highness on the left bank of the river Godavery and of the river Wyne Gungah above the confluence of the two rivers, viz., the talooks of Rakapilly, Buddrachellum, Cherla, Albaka, Noogoor, and Sironcha.

#### Article 9.

The navigation of the river Godavery and its tributaries, so far as they form the boundary between the two States, shall be free, and no customs duties or other cesses shall be levied by either of the two contracting parties, or by the subjects of either, on goods passing up or down the aforesaid rivers.

#### Article 10.

This Treaty, consisting of ten Articles, being this day concluded and settled by Lieutenant-Colonel Cuthbert Davidson, C.B., on behalf of the Viceroy and

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

Governor-General of India, with the Nawab Afzul-ood-Dowlah Nizam-ool-Moolk Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, Lieutenant-Colonel Cuthbert Davidson has delivered one version thereof in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the Nawab, who on his part has also delivered one copy of the same to Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson duly executed by His Highness ; and Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson hereby engages to deliver a copy of the same to His Highness the Nizam duly ratified by the Viceroy and Governor General within thirty days from this date, when this copy herewith signed and sealed by the British Resident will be returned.

Signed, sealed and exchanged at Hyderabad on the twenty-sixth day of December A.D. 1860, 12th Jummadec-sanee 1277.

Seal.

(Signed) CUTHBERT DAVIDSON,  
Resident.

Seal.

(Signed) CANNING.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, in Camp at Amerpattan, on the 31st day of December 1860.

(Signed) A. R. YOUNG,  
Offg. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. XVIII.

Seal.

Translation of a Sunnud from the Nizam's Government, dated 30th  
Zehidge 1277 Hegira (10th July 1861.)

Whereas many Europeans, foreigners and others, descendants of Europeans, and born in India, are resident in the territory of His Highness the Nizam ; and as disturbances arise amongst themselves and the inhabitants of the said territory ; it is hereby made known by the Nizam's Government that, in the event of any dissension or dispute arising among the classes aforementioned within the said territory, except those employed by this Circar and its dependants, the Resident at Hyderabad, or other officer or officers whom he may from time to time consider it desirable to vest with the same, shall be empowered to enquire into and punish any such offences.

No. XIX.

Copy of a Sunnud granted to His Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad,  
dated 11th March 1862.

Her Majesty being desirous that the Governments of the several Princes and Chiefs of India who now govern their own territories should be perpetuated, and that the representation and dignity of their Houses should be continued ; I hereby, in fulfilment of this desire, convey to you the assurance that on failure of natural heirs any succession to the Government of your State, which may be legitimate according to Mahomedan law, will be upheld.

Be assured that nothing shall disturb the engagement thus made to you so long as your House is loyal to the Crown and faithful to the conditions of the Treaties, grants or engagements, which record its obligations to the British Government.

(Signed) CANNING.

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## CONTINGENT AND SUBSIDIARY FORCES.

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# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

## CONTINGENT AND SUBSIDIARY FORCES.

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *April 25, 1846.*—A correspondent, writing on the subject of our suggestion for the removal of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, acquaints us with a circumstance corroborative of the view taken by us regarding the origin of the difficulties lying in the way of such a measure which had not previously engaged our notice.

When former Ministers governed the Nizam's country, and especially during the predominance of Chundoo Lall, the appearance of his capital was so tranquil that our rulers found themselves in a position to do fearlessly what now they are reluctant to attempt; and on one occasion, ere ever a Contingent under British officers had been called into existence, the head quarters of the Subsidiary Force were removed from thence to Jaulna, the trivial amount of two battalions only being left at Hyderabad for the purposes of co-operation with the executive, whose subservience to our enemies was a contingency not then apprehended at Calcutta. A systematic course of impolicy on our part has now so changed the aspect of affairs that, notwithstanding our need for the employment of the force elsewhere, we are afraid to avail ourselves of its services, lest the domination of factions adverse to us should precipitate the Nizam's Government into proceedings irreconcilable with our dignity and dangerous to our interests. Powerless himself to control the discordant elements of his dominion, the unfortunate Sovereign might be driven hither and thither at the will of his soldiery whenever our restraint was for a time suspended, and the absence of the British troops might prove the season for licentious excesses resembling those but lately perpetrated at Lahore. We do not anticipate that His Highness would personally suffer, but the capital and its inhabitants must run a fearful hazard of disturbance. Our measures have both rendered us odious, and the native Government contemptible in the sight of the people. There is not left among their nominal rulers one capable of asserting the mastery or filling the place of old Chundoo Lall, whose abilities were undoubted and his sway practical, whatever his failings or his vices may have been. Matters are now brought to such a pass that nothing less than a miracle can by domestic means effect regeneration at Hyderabad, or place our influence there upon its former footing. The direct and absolute management of the kingdom by European agents will alone avail for the carrying out of objects such as these. Even were we to appoint a Minister of our own selection, his instrumentality could neither prop up the tottering throne of the Nizam, nor yet drive away our numerous adversaries who surround it. Under the most favourable circumstances his power for good must fall far short of that possessed by our former nominee, Meer Allum, and what did *his* Ministry achieve on our behalf or that of the Deccan and its Sovereign? He was an excellent theoretician, and promised fairly when we lifted him to eminence against his master's will, but not one single pledge then given by him was ever honestly redeemed. His policy improved nothing, reformed nothing, and gave satisfaction to none—not even to the British Resident, who lent him countenance and strength. Every existing abuse became aggravated while he held the reins, and though it is true that he was free from the profligacy which has characterized most Ministers before and after him, and that the Government did not break down as it has since been on the point of doing, we must remember that he allowed in others those wickednesses wherefrom he was himself exempt. Phlegmatic and superstitious, he owned certain checks upon his personal conduct not usually acknowledged by an Asiatic ruler, but they did not render him a whit

the more useful, beneficent, or upright in his general superintendence of the State. He was, wrote one who knew him well by careful observation, "a very extraordinary person; of all the natives of India he had an understanding the most nearly approaching to the vigour and comprehension of European intellect. He looked at once to the substance of everything that was presented to him, and was as much a stranger to forms in his mode of transacting business as in the ordinary habits of his life. He was unquestionably a man of great talents for public affairs, but he was utterly deficient in those qualities of the heart which often supply the want of powerful intellectual faculties. He was ambitious, unfeeling, vindictive, and relentless; he never remembered a kindness or forgot an injury, and although he was fond of the appearance of charity, and courted popular applause, he had no feeling for his fellow-creatures, either individually or collectively. Both his situations and his talents gave him the power of doing more good perhaps to his Government than any individual who has ever been employed under it, yet he aggravated many abuses and never redressed one. He raised the assessment, already too heavy, throughout the country, and made an additional imposition of one anna in the rupee, or  $6\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. on the whole revenue, for his personal emolument. His administration was chiefly passed in a struggle for power with the Nizam, and all the worst qualities of the Nizam's character were exasperated and confirmed by his injurious and offensive treatment!"

Such is the character drawn of Meer Allum by Mr. Russell in his despatch of November 24th, 1819, forming part of the appendix to his letter to the Honourable Court of Directors bearing date September 21st, 1824; and it is worthy of especial notice that the individual thus portrayed was the person selected by the Company's Government and forced as Minister upon the reluctant Nizam for the purpose of making the Deccan acquainted with the blessings of an able and upright administration, so long and mischievously estranged from it! Possessed of such extensive natural powers, and political opportunities of so ample a description, he nevertheless did nothing for his country, although he succeeded through our means in diminishing the strength and degrading the dignity of his master the Nizam, whose character and conduct were habitually traduced by him to the British Resident. On one occasion he even carried his presumption to the length of quitting the city and taking up his abode at the Residency, affecting that he had done so for change of air and the benefit of medical advice; but the Nizam was at the same time made to consider the step as the result of a ministerial defection from his Government under the patronage of the British executive, and sustained by a large portion of the troops (whom Meer Allum persuaded to encamp around him), together with several of the public departments, the officers of which waited on that personage at the Residency for the purpose of receiving his direction about the conduct of national affairs.

Before such a combination the Nizam felt himself obliged to bend, and having yielded up all that was sought from him he endured the bitterness of seeing his insolent servant visited and caressed by the Resident and the principal members of the European community, he himself meanwhile becoming the passive guest of the man who had betrayed him! Upon the Government thus strangely ordered Mr. Russell remarks as follows, in his letter above quoted:—

"On the death of Azim-ool-Omra in 1804 we forced Meer Allum on the Nizam, and so many of the inconveniences which attended his administration were considered (with what justice it is not now necessary to examine) as having arisen from that source, that when Meer Allum died in 1808 it was determined to abstain altogether from interference, and to leave the Nizam the uncontrolled selection of his Minister."

This was undoubtedly a wise resolve, but the Company soon fell into the new and equally fatal error before noticed by us, of alienating their representatives alike from Minister and Sovereign, and thereby eventually throwing both into the power of a host of domestic enemies, who have now the rule over them, and render necessary, or at least expedient, our maintenance of some twenty thousand men in the Hyderabad dominions, with the view of preventing those dangerous out-

breaks of an inimical spirit which would ensue if that restraint were suddenly withdrawn.

This state of things is of our own producing, and we are therefore bound to use measures for ensuring its correction by the removal of the licentious mercenaries who now overawe the Government, and by such an amount of positive interference with internal details as shall enable us to employ the Contingent on the Nizam's behalf without any fear whatever of prostituting its legitimate uses. If these two points were carried as they ought to be, and *must be* soon or late, we should have no difficulty in effecting the abstraction of the Subsidiary Force.

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *January 21, 1847*.—Accounts from Hyderabad inform us that a detachment of the Nizam's Contingent is to be posted at Wārangole, one of the districts to which a presumed deputy of Mr. Dighton is to receive appointment for the present. This may be perhaps a necessary measure, since no station to the eastward of the capital has hitherto been occupied by any part of the Contingent, but we should like to know what special call for the movement has arisen just now. It looks like an arrangement for the benefit of private individuals.

ENGLISHMAN, *October 23, 1847*.—We continue the extracts from our Hyderabad letters :—

“The Arabs were ordered to Chunchuljoora, a suburb of the city, the former residence of the Pathans before their expulsion. The Arabs still remain just where they were. It ought also to be remarked that though the Resident prohibited advances being received from Talookdars of districts the order is a dead letter, and it may be questioned whether the advances in some instances do not exceed the entire revenue of the country for the year. Nothing, however, is taken from Mr. Dighton's naibs !”

ENGLISHMAN, *March 1, 1848*.—The following is from Hyderabad, dated the 15th ultimo :—

“The Rohillas, a decree for whose expulsion in consequence of their misdeeds and crimes was issued in June last, nine months ago, who have ever since been living in tents, may be said to have had a nine months' grace given to them to re-enact those misdeeds and crimes ; for they are just as free, and I presume not less inclined to commit them than they were before, and the Government has entailed upon itself this penalty for its abortive measure, that it has to pay them subsistence money so long as it detains them. This is the profitable result of our interference, of our working with such hands as Suraj-ool-Moolk's, who is prompt to promise but incapable to perform.”

ENGLISHMAN, *May 16, 1848*.—The following is an extract of a letter from Hyderabad, of the 3rd instant :—

“The deportation of the Rohillas was an act in which the British Government had appeared, through its agent, to take an active and prominent part. Orders had been issued to the officers serving in the different stations of the Contingent to trace them out and to apprehend them. Those who were gathered together for deportation, and encamped near the Residency, were visited by the Assistant Resident and Officiating Resident, and lectures were read to them by the last on converting the sword into the ploughshare. The measure of deportation *en masse* was a wild, unjust project. It did not reduce crime, it merely changed its locality, and there was injustice in punishing the innocent with the guilty. I am glad to observe that instructions from the Governor-General forbid interference on the part of the Resident, the Nizam's Government being allowed to take its own course. The mischief, however, lies in this, we have interfered to take away their bread, when our strength is no longer employed to keep them down ; they must plunder for subsistence or be re-employed.

"Colonel Beatson was sent against a place (where the Rohillas had been making a disturbance) called Rae Mahoo, in the Berar district. They gave up their fort on being summoned, and I believe, as they are considered to have been ill-used, there is some intention of seeing them paid whatever may be due to them ; but from whence is the money to come ? I hope the intention will not be as incomplete as all other money projects.

"The Minister has not paid the Contingent this month ; he is said to be coquetting—withholding the money, which he is said to possess, to meet such importunate contingencies as may come upon him after his dismissal from office.

"Ghoolam Hussun Khan of Ellichpore remains where he was ; the Resident's interference has ended in smoke, that is, it has had no result either to maintain or to dispossess Ghoolam Hussun Khan."

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ENGLISHMAN, *June 3, 1848.*—The following is from Hyderabad, dated the 19th ultimo :—

"General Fraser had suggested to his Government the dismissal of all the (so-called) mercenaries in the Nizam's Government. *A propos* this is one of the projects of reform which the Minister has embodied in his schedule of reforms, adopted from General Fraser, or *vice versa* if they will, but that will be no improvement. The Government have repudiated the project, reminding General Fraser of his failure on a smaller scale, and suggesting to him its total inutility, as they would return again. But what had become of the difficulties of the projected plan ? The English were to fight and beat them into subjection, but who was to pay them ? If the English, too, then the project included within itself the entire subversion of the Nizam's Government, for to be reimbursed we must have regulated its concerns. But how does the Minister, if sanctioned, mean to carry out his project when he lays down the outline ? Are we so imbecile as to receive general axioms of government as all-sufficient, without the detail of measures which are to give efficacy to his plans ? The Minister proposes to do justice and to have efficient Courts. This is quite essential towards a good government, and towards its general dispensation he has proposed to appoint numerous judges to the districts, certainly a necessary primary measure. The judges are appointed, and, I would stake my existence, have been reported to the Supreme Government, and Suraj-ool-Moolk may, if the Government do not see far, have full credit for good administration,—for an abstract love of justice, if credulity, notwithstanding the events of each day, can extend so far,—but the judges who are appointed do not get their salaries. The receipt of that is dependent upon the Talookdar in whose district they are employed ; they are dependent upon the party most likely to be involved more numerous than others in suits, and they are totally devoid of powers. All that was wanted was a clap-trap report to the Government of India, and Suraj-ool-Moolk has succeeded in his object, but justice is not now dispensed here or in the districts, any more than before. The Judge of Paremda writes he cannot obtain pay for the escort attached to his department ; his whole time is employed in appeasing their clamour : he has no time to do justice, had he the power to render it."

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MADRAS SPECTATOR, *June 21, 1848.*—There is a report current at Hyderabad, arising from the tenor of some letters from England, to the effect that the Court of Directors, with a view to relieving the Nizam's Government from some of its pecuniary embarrassments, are about to abolish the Contingent. We cannot credit this story in its full extent, but that a very extensive reduction of the cost of that force may have been determined on is probable enough. Justice and expedience alike dictate retrenchment, and the real efficiency of the Contingent would in no wise be impaired by it ; but to extinguish the Nizam's army altogether would seem a hazardous experiment, unless, indeed, some cheaper force were substituted for it. With the aid of that body to fall back on, the executive can ill control the turbulent spirits of the Deccan, and how, in the absence of it,

could rebellion be suppressed? Moreover, the interests of the British provinces might be imperilled by the disbandment of that force, since the lawless hordes that would gather head in the Nizam's dominions might make their way across our border, and so either levy contributions on our defenceless villagers, or render necessary an augmentation of military strength in those quarters for the purpose of keeping them in check. The former alternative could not of course be endured, and a recourse to the latter would therefore seem inevitable if the Contingent should be abolished; but, limited as is the disposable force of the Company at present, any such demand must be highly inconvenient, not to use a stronger term. It is further questionable whether the British Government could honourably leave the Nizam unprotected, after having by their policy prostrated his power. In the days of his pride, or rather that of his predecessors, they concluded treaties with the Deccan kingdom very much to their advantage, and it were hardly fair for them now, when that kingdom is borne down by difficulties not a little of their creation, to leave its ruler a prey to rival factions, and its people the victims of cruelty and rapine. His Highness would never surrender willingly the army of the Deccan, although he might rejoice at being freed from a portion of its cost, and to use compulsion toward him in his misfortunes were neither generous nor just. Some considerable body of troops is essential to the peace of the country, which but for the Contingent would be threatened with an Arab war, and the Nizam will have to pay for them equally, by whatever name they may be called. We trust, therefore, that the home authorities will act prudently, and not rush at once into extremes. They have put off the reformation of his military establishment so long, and the position of the Deccan is now so critical, owing to the disorganization which prevails there, that extreme caution should be observed in the introduction of radical changes. If the cost of the Contingent were reduced, as it might be, to the extent of one-half, economical reform would have gone as far in that direction as it safely can be carried.

There is a report abroad to the effect that Suraj-ool-Moolk had asked Colonel Low to assist him in expelling the Rohillas, and that he had met with a refusal. We do not feel disposed to attach much credence to it, but if such a request was made there can be little doubt that it miscarried.

ENGLISHMAN, *December 21, 1848.*—We continue our extracts from our Hyderabad letters :—

“We have the Rohillas—who were brought into the vicinity of the Residency for deportation, and encamped there till their claims would be adjusted and paid, because the Government has failed to fulfil any one engagement—employed in plundering the country for subsistence. They have recently plundered an opulent village, Desaeepet, and have carried off women. This is no small misery to a country, but it is quite incomprehensible how the Minister, who was incapable of bringing these marauders into subjection with the whole strength of the numerous soldiery of this Government, should have been designated by Lord Dalhousie as having formed high designs for the amelioration of the condition of the Nizam's country and subjects.

“Nothing can so prominently exhibit the imbecility of the late administration as this measure, in its progress from first to last, regarding the deportation of these Rohillas. The measure, if it did not originate in the Resident, as I believe it did, had his entire sanction, and his interference to promote it was avowed. Circular letters to the officers of the Contingent commanding stations were written to assist in carrying the measure into effect, General Fraser gave a personal examination to the accounts of the Rohillas, and when certain preliminary measures were completed, the Rohillas for deportation, some hundreds, were encamped in the vicinity of the Residency preparatory to their deportation, which was to follow upon the adjustment and payment of their just demands. Pending these they were to receive a daily allowance for their maintenance, and during the year and a half that they remained in the vicinity of the Residency a great deal of interest appeared to be taken in their concerns, or in securing their

deportation. Captain Malcolm, the Assistant Resident, was employed to muster them often ; and at times, in common with him, General Fraser visited their camp.

"The conditions on which the Rohillas had quitted the Nizam's capital, understanding the Resident in some measure to guarantee them, were that their just claims should be paid, and whilst these were under adjudication that they should be maintained. Of the first nothing has been heard to this day, and there was faithlessness in the last engagement ; for this so-called honest Minister with high designs, always for the future, ceased to give them after a time the money allotted for their subsistence. In the failure of the project to deport them the money consumed on their subsistence has been so much lost to Government without a purpose, and the ill-used Rohillas are now maintaining themselves in the best way they can, by plundering the country.

"Their situation has become this. Did the Nizam require the aid of the Contingent to expel them General Fraser would find it incumbent upon himself to require assurance from the Nizam's Government that justice should be done in regard to their claims. The Rohillas have been put in a position by the late Minister not only to claim exemption from punishment for the depredations they may commit, but to commit the Nizam's Government to an extremity (if they did but know it), by plundering the Company's frontiers. But all this time where was the immense numerical strength of the Nizam's army, that it was not employed, as the least evil, to expel the Rohillas? The injustice towards them had been perpetrated, and its redemption has become difficult, for the Rohillas have to account for plunder, violation, and bloodshed."

ENGLISHMAN, *June 13, 1849.*—The following is the conclusion of our Hyderabad letters :—

"The Contingent has lately rendered good service. A body of Rohillas, about five hundred in number (the numbers are variously stated), were first encountered by a detachment from Ellichpore. I believe they did not stand a close contact, fled into the jungle when the guns were opened upon them, and much execution was not done. The same body, or a remnant of it,—for they are said to have been about three hundred strong ; I should have said they were serving under the pseudo-Appa,—were overtaken by Brigadier Hampton at the head of 114 horse, and nearly annihilated. It has been a brilliant affair, and attended with little loss to the Rissala. You have of course heard of these affairs. I epitomize an account of them to hang upon it other matters connected with these Rohillas. Other bodies of them are committing depredations, and three detachments of the Contingent, from Ellichpore, Hingolee, and Mominabad, are in the field. It is impossible they should escape.

"There is again a great stir, as far as rumours and reports contribute to make a stir, about turning out—deporting—the Rohillas from Hyderabad, the very measure (an absurd one, for they came back again) betraying, in the want of control by its police and its laws, an imbecile inefficiency in the Government. The Minister has asked the aid of the Subsidiary troops to expel those from the city who reside in its precincts, and the Indian Government, to which the requisition has been referred, has properly refused compliance. It cannot have forgotten what the papers reported at the time, the extreme ferment that was caused in the city by the march of a detachment of the Subsidiary force into it to relieve Suraj-ool-Moolk from the drum-beating importunity of the Line-wallas for their pay, and the Minister is thrown upon his own resources for their expulsion. They are very ample, but the Minister has desired to make a demonstration by the imposing troops of the English to secure obedience. The chance of a general rising from employing them is not to be risked, and though I do not believe the Rohillas would hold out against the troops of the Nizam, backed by the whole strength of the Subsidiary to be called eventually into action, yet there is no choice left to the Minister, and, bloodshed or no bloodshed, their expulsion must be undertaken. The avoidance to shed blood on such occasions is neither good policy nor clemency."

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *July 12, 1850.*—Two influential journals of the other Presidencies, the *Friend of India* and *Bombay Times*, have taken up the question, so often broached by us, of the iniquitous drain on the Nizam's finances arising from the British forces which he is obliged to keep up. We call them both British, for although the Contingent is nominally His Highness's army he has little more control over it than the meanest of his subjects. Whatever his necessity for the use of it may be, he must satisfy the scruples of the Resident before he can employ a single man. At this very moment his Government requires troops to subdue a refractory subject, and yet cannot obtain them. He has to pay nearly forty lakhs per annum for a service that might be altogether or almost done away. There is no manner of reason why the Contingent should not be abolished. The Subsidiary Force should be ample for the internal security of the country if properly disposed, and against external enemies no protection is now needed. When Lord Wellesley arranged with the then Sovereign for the cession of territory yielding sixty-three lakhs a year the Deccan was menaced by formidable foes, who have long since disappeared. Beyond the limits of his own dominions the Nizam has now no hostile power to dread except that of the British. It is clearly preposterous therefore, under this altered state of things, that the policy of the year 1800 should be adhered to half a century after. What was then essential to the safety of the Deccan, or was at least made to appear so, is at this time wholly superfluous, and, being superfluous, is evil in the last degree. The maintenance of a needless standing army is one of the greatest mischiefs that can befall a State, and most especially a bankrupt State, like that of Hyderabad; no possible extenuation can be offered for it. But, not content with having permanently subtracted sixty-three lakhs of rupees from the Nizam's revenue as the pecuniary equivalent of one British force whose occupation exists no longer, the Company persist in saddling that unfortunate prince with another army, costing forty lakhs additional, whose service he cannot command. According to a statement in the *Bombay Telegraph and Courier*, His Highness further entertains mercenaries at a cost of sixty-four lakhs per annum, but this is his own choice, and we therefore say nothing about it. Our present business lies with the expense to which he is put by British forces; that of the Subsidiary, having been taken at once in the form of territory, cannot now be remitted. In strict equity, perhaps, when a bargain is made for the payment of a certain amount in return for certain services, the receiver of the sum ought to desist from taking it so soon as he has no longer those services to perform. The compact presupposed that the demand on him would be perpetual, and therefore made his recompense perpetual likewise, but when circumstances have so altered as that almost no possibility exists of his being any longer called upon for an equivalent to the money he surely should forego his claim! He has a legal right to enforce it in the terms of the bond, but we are doubtful of his moral. Now to apply this to the case of the Subsidiary Force. The treaty between the Nizam and Lord Wellesley guaranteed protection to the Deccan in exchange for the Ceded Districts, and so long as His Highness had need of that protection the bargain was equal. His necessity, however, has long absolutely ceased. The Contingent is amply sufficient for the maintenance of domestic order, and foreign aggressors there are none to dread. His Highness therefore sustains an annual outlay of sixty-three lakhs of rupees and gains nothing by it. Now supposing that he paid that sum out of his treasury, instead of having commuted it by ceding territory, he would be fully entitled to negotiate for the removal of the Subsidiary Force, nor could the Company decline acceding under his distressed circumstances; nay, it would be their duty to recommend that measure alternatively to allowing the ruin of the State. As the case stands, however, the burthen of the Subsidiary Force cannot be shaken off. If every man of it were withdrawn to-morrow the Nizam would profit nothing. John Company has got the Ceded Districts, and, although he performs no substantial service in exchange for them, he will never let them go. Such a sacrifice at the shrine of purest equity is quite out of the question. But, albeit the Nizam can obtain no relief



on that score, he may be freed from the Contingent, which is still paid by his exchequer, though very irregularly. As the proper work of the Subsidiary Force is at an end, and it now lacks employment, it should be made to step into the shoes of the other army and allow of its disbandment. The Company have committed a grievous injustice in cajoling His Highness into the continued support of two large forces at a cost of above a million sterling, and they are bound to take off the load of that one which can be got rid of. Whatever else may be necessary to restore the financial equilibrium of the Deccan, a great reduction in the military expenditure of its Government is the first thing of all. According to the figures of the *Bombay Telegraph* the net public revenue of the country is but Rs. 1,22,79,545, of which amount the Contingent and the Nizam's mercenaries swallow up no less than Rs. 1,04,37,966, leaving a balance of only Rs. 18,41,579 to defray all the charges of the Court, and other civil contingencies. In the face of these facts can any one marvel at the bankruptcy of the Nizam? The wonder would be if he were less ruinously circumstanced than he is. His own civil list and the pensions of his family exceed the small sum unabsorbed by military charges to the extent of about ten lakhs of rupees, and the whole annual deficit of the revenue amounts to more than twenty-seven lakhs! That the pay of the Contingent should have fallen largely into arrears is only what might have been expected in this state of things. It must continue to do so until a thorough reform takes place. But, not satisfied with having mainly caused the Nizam's embarrassments, the Company are now about to visit the consequences of them on his head. It is credibly asserted that he will be compelled either to clear off the arrears, presently amounting to sixty lakhs, and which are increasing at the rate of about three lakhs per mensem, or to make a further cession of territory, at the close of the current year—a demand morally unjustifiable, though legally competent, considering all the circumstances of the case. We do not mean that the Nizam ought to be excused from ultimate redemption of his debt, but only that, having as it were driven him into difficulties which incapacitate him for punctuality, the Court of Directors should deal gently. Moreover, along with their demand for the sum owing, they ought to tender him future relief by proposing the removal of the Contingent, either in whole or in part, as fast as that can be achieved. Except they do this their proceeding to extremities on account of the past will be a ruthless measure. They should at the same time also urge on him the dismissal of his mercenary levies, or a large portion of them, who uselessly consume the income of the State. By the reduction of these and the cutting down of the Contingent a saving of 50 or 60 lakhs might soon be effected, and then the Nizam's Government would recover its lost credit, and pay off all its debts. In the event, however, of such a halcyon arrangement, it might be expedient to raise a few military police corps, to assist in preserving the tranquillity of the Deccan, as lawlessness has been there suffered to gain head so freely that the withdrawal of a large number of troops would perhaps encourage the growth of it unless these substitutes for them were provided.

#### “ THE NIZAM: HIS RECEIPTS, EXPENDITURE, AND PROSPECTS.”

“ Amidst the various imperfect and conflicting notices which are so constantly given in the papers of the three Presidencies regarding the disorganization of the Nizam's finances and his country, we, in common with many others, have felt the want of some specific data to enable us to comprehend his actual position and the cause of his financial embarrassments. We have felt that a detailed statement of his receipts and expenditure would give us a clearer insight into his affairs than fifty columns of loose remarks. We are delighted, therefore, to find that the *Bombay Telegraph and Courier* has at length furnished us with the information which has been so long required. By some means or other, possibly through the aid of some *clairvoyante*, the editor of that journal has obtained access to the figured statements which have been drawn up at Hyderabad for the instruction of the British Government, and has at once admitted the public to participate in his good fortune.

“The following is an abstract of these documents :—

The revenues of the Districts assigned to the Dewanee for the public purposes of Government amount, after deducting the charges of management, to.....Rs. 1,22,79,545

“The disbursements are thus classed :—

To His Highness the Nizam, his family and servants .....	28,01,027
The Contingent troops, Appa Dessae, &c. ....	40,24,114
The Government troops, viz., 5,645 horse and 26,665 infantry .....	64,13,852
Munsibdars, Moonsiffs, and those holding charitable gratuities ...	17,80,126
	<hr/> 1,50,19,119
Annual deficiency .....	Rs. 27,39,574

“The document then details with the utmost minuteness the various means by which the revenue might be improved, and raised from 1,22,79,545 to 1,60,82,995 rupees, and the various retrenchments of which the expenditure is susceptible. Whether augmentations and reductions to such an extent would be found feasible when the revision of the finances was entrusted to honest and able agency may possibly admit of a doubt, but there can be no question that there is boundless waste both in the department of receipts and expenditure, as there must always be, in public as well as in private affairs, when the party has ceased to be his own master, and lies at the mercy of others. The compiler of this document proposes to leave the allowance for His Highness and his family untouched, and merely to retrench the expense of his servants to the extent of 69,968 rupees a year. The paper is said to have been drawn up by the Duffurdars of the Nizam, and of this we have the most satisfactory evidence in the fact that it leaves the charge for the Contingent in all its integrity, while it proposes to cut down the troops of the Native Government of Hyderabad from 64 lakhs of rupees a year to 33 lakhs. Had the document been prepared by one who was not anxious to conciliate the British Government, he would not have avoided all allusion to the expense of the Contingent. He likewise suggests the reduction of the Civil establishment by 5 lakhs a year, and thus endeavours to exhibit the possibility of a reduction of no less than 39 lakhs a year, which would turn a deficit of 27 lakhs into a surplus of nearly 50 lakhs.

“The great original source of all the pecuniary embarrassment and social demoralization of the Nizam's Government is the utter disproportion of its Military expenditure to the general revenues. For a country which has nothing whatever to apprehend from external enemies, and in which troops can be required only to support the police, the sum expended on the army is one hundred and four lakhs, out of a revenue of one hundred and twenty-two lakhs. We believe there is no instance on record, under the worst of Native Governments, of so monstrous a grievance as that which has grown up during the last fifty years at Hyderabad, since our will has been law at that capital.

“The consequences of this unexampled state of things are fatally visible in the entire ruin of the administration and the finances, and in the exhaustion of the people, who are ground to the earth by the exactions of those whom the Nizam's Government, having squeezed them in the first instance, have sent forth to squeeze its subjects. But to obtain a complete view of the affairs of this principality, which was taken under our protection half a century ago, we must go back to the treaty of 1800, when Lord Wellesley took the power of the sword from the Nizam, and constrained him to pay a subsidy for the British troops employed to defend his territories from external enemies. Soon after, this subsidy was commuted for a cession of territory yielding sixty-three lakhs of rupees a year, in return for which Lord Wellesley engaged to maintain ‘eight thousand firelocks, one thousand horse, with their requisite complement of guns, European artillerymen, lascars and pioneers, fully equipped with warlike stores and ammunition, which force was to be stationed in perpetuity in His Highness's territories.’ The Nizam engaged by treaty also to provide in time of war 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry to join our standard ; and the British Government has saddled him with the charges of a Contingent force, commanded by its own European officers, in time of peace, at an expense little short of 40 lakhs of rupees. If, for the sake of comparison, we add the revenues of the districts ceded to us in 1800 to those which the Nizam still enjoys, we shall find that the revenues applicable to the Civil administration

and the military defence of this territory amount to about 185 lakhs of rupees, and that the three distinct armies which are now maintained entail the following expense :—

1. The British Subsidiary Force, which was to be stationed in perpetuity in this territory .....	Rs. 68,00,000
2. The Contingent.....	„ 40,28,000
3. The Nizam's own rabble of 32,000 men .....	„ 64,18,000
	<hr/> Rs. 1,67,36,000

that is to say, *nine-tenths of the public revenues of the country* which the Nizam possessed in 1800, are absorbed in the cost of a military establishment in a country which has not a single foreign enemy to fear, and the troops of which have no other duty than to keep down the internal opposition occasioned by the grossest misgovernment. The first step in reform is the reduction of the extravagant expenditure at present lavished on the Military establishments. The sum now due to the British Government is said to amount to between 60 and 70 lakhs of rupees, and we are informed on all sides that the Governor-General has fixed the 1st of January next for the peremptory payment of this sum. We owe it to the interests of our own territories strictly to exact the payment of it from the Nizam, but we have a still higher duty to perform to that country, which has been reduced to its present state of disorganization under our protectorate, and in part from the measures we have forced on its Government. Supposing the debt to be discharged, either from the private hoards of the Nizam, or through exactions levied from his Talookdars, still a Government with an annual deficit of 27 lakhs of rupees can enjoy neither peace nor security. In any arrangement which may be made at the beginning of the next year we must look not merely to the immediate relief of our own finances, but to the future and permanent relief of the people, who are subjected to all the miseries of a bankrupt yet still extravagant Government. The Military force must be reduced, and brought strictly to accord with the wants of the country. This, and this alone, will place the finances of the State on a satisfactory footing. The happiest arrangement which could be devised would unquestionably be to incorporate the principality at once with our own territories, and grant an allowance to the Nizam fully adequate to his largest wishes. Under our administration less than one-half the force now maintained would be sufficient to preserve the internal tranquillity of the country, and the revenues, under a mild assessment, would yield a large annual surplus, for public improvements. In this case the dignity of the Nizam might, it is true, be compromised, but the prosperity of the country and of the people would be indefinitely promoted. But we have entered into treaties with the ancestor of the present incumbent, and our national faith must be maintained, and however desirable the change might be it cannot be consummated without his participation. The Nabob now derives about seventeen lakhs of rupees a year from his own crown lands independently of the sum mentioned above. If this income were augmented to twenty-five lakhs, and the whole of his disorderly rabble of troops was disbanded, and the efficiency of the Government maintained by the aid of a portion of the Subsidiary Force and of the Contingent, there would be a clear surplus of half a million sterling a year. At the same time the people would obtain substantial relief by the introduction of our equitable institutions. But it is easier to perceive the advantage of such an arrangement than to point out the mode in which it can be compassed, consistently with our engagements.”—*Friend of India, June 27.*

“THE NIZAM'S CONTINGENT.

“The time is now approaching when we shall be constrained perforce to redress some part of the injustice, and abate somewhat of the wrong, the Nizam has suffered at our hands under the provisions of the treaty of 1800. By the compact in question the Nizam is bound to produce 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry in time of war. At the period when the arrangement was made his dominions were surrounded by dangerous enemies, and while we undertook to fly to his aid in case of emergency it was but reasonable that he should provide an efficient force to co-operate with his allies in his behalf. At the present time the Contingent consists of 2,750 cavalry, 725 artillery, 5,752 infantry, and 170 hill rangers,—or, in all, of 9,397

fighting men. With these there are 84 European officers—two colonels, three majors commanding divisions, one superintending surgeon, two captains acting as paymasters, ten captains commandant, thirty-nine captains, thirteen lieutenants, thirteen surgeons, and one assistant surgeon. But not only is the whole Contingent an enormously expensive and superfluous affair in time of peace, but it is most expensively constructed. There are three brigadiers, three brigade-majors, and five paymasters : the duties of the last named class of officers might easily be otherwise performed, and the brigadiers and brigade-majors might be reduced to two with advantage. But while we compel the Nizam to keep up his Contingent at 10,000 men, costing close on thirty lakhs of Company's rupees a year, we insist on his paying for the Nagpore Subsidiary Force. This consists of about 3,000 fighting men, and costs the Nizam nearly as much as the Contingent. As if not sufficiently embarrassed by the charges of the two armies thus forced upon him, the Nizam maintains of his own accord, and on his own account, some 35,000 mercenaries, about as disorderly and dangerous a force as ever was embodied, and assuming that these cost no more than forty lacs of rupees we shall have for a State which can have no enemies, and has no means of getting into war, and which, if it had, has the armies of India to fight for it, a standing army of 50,000, maintained at a cost of above a million sterling. The Contingent and Subsidiary Force are of course properly paid ; the mercenaries are always in arrear, and constantly noisy and mutinous when the fancy strikes them to demand their pay. Instead of enforcing order they are the great sources of discord in the State. But the Nizam regards his dignity as built up in their maintenance, and will not be induced to reduce them. We are not prepared to say what amount of military force is requisite for the protection of the peace of the Deccan ; we should think that beyond the disturbances occasioned by the casual outbreaks, or resistance of powerful landholders to authority, or the occasional incursions of predatory hordes, it was not very liable to be endangered : on this all are agreed, that a very much less force than is now maintained is perfectly sufficient for all the ends in view, and that nothing can be more unjust than to insist on the maintenance in time of peace, when there are no risks of war, and British sway prevails on every side, of a force stipulated for only in the case of actual hostilities.”—*Bombay Times*, July 3.

MADRAS SPECTATOR, July 22, 1850.—“A well-informed correspondent sends us the following respecting the Nizam's dominions :—

“Various articles appear from day to day in the journals of India describing the state of disorder which prevails throughout the length and breadth of the Nizam's dominions, and recording the robberies and murders which are daily committed in that unhappy country. All this state of confusion and crime is ascribed to the weakness and imbecility of the Native Government, whereas the real cause lies in the Machiavellian and iniquitous policy of our own. The Nizam pays 40 lacs a year for the use of a Contingent which renders him no sufficient service, though it is a force amply sufficient to maintain the most perfect tranquillity from one end of His Highness's dominions to the other, but the aid of this force is not accorded to the Native Government without the sanction of the Resident, who is authorized to withhold that sanction unless he is satisfied with the justice and propriety of the reasons which lead the Nizam and his Minister to ask for the assistance of that Contingent ; and somehow or other he never is satisfied. At this moment a person named Goolam Hussein, the father-in-law of the late Jagcerdar of Ellichpore, whose estates, in consequence of his having died without issue, have lapsed to the Nizam, retains possession of those estates *vi et armis* ; he has raised a force of about 4,000 men, who lately engaged the troops of the Nizam near Ellichpore, on which occasion about 50 or 60 lives were lost, yet the aid of the Contingent is not allowed to put down this open rebellion, because Goolam Hussein avers that he has paid a nuzzurana of 3,25,000 rupees to the Nizam's Government. His Highness's Minister, however, makes out a very different story, and asserts that the collections he has realized during the time which he has held illegal

possession of the jageer far exceeds the amount of the nuzzurana paid. It matters little whichever story be true.

“ ‘The state of things in Berar is a disgrace, less to the Nizam’s Government, which is too weak to rectify the evils, than to the British Administration, which permits a wholesale and retail slaughter to be perpetrated close to cantonments filled with bodies of disciplined troops commanded by British officers, for whose services the Nizam parts yearly with about a third of his revenues, but whose services he never obtains, as some reason or other is found for negating every application made for their assistance.

“ ‘The game the British Government is playing is evident as the sun at noon-day. A good case is wanted to despoil the Nizam of his dominions. They have already got him deeply into their books, but a debt, owing to his having had to maintain forces with which they saddle him without the vestige of a right, will hardly prove a sufficient *casus belli*; but a good array of bloody feuds, murders, forcible abductions, plunderings and burnings of villages, &c., &c., &c., will give an excellent pretext for affording to the Deccan the protection and blessing of the Company’s Government, and look remarkably well in some future Hyderabad Blue Book !!! ”—*Bombay Gazette*, July 12.

MADRAS SPECTATOR, July 31, 1850.—“ SIR,—I observe by your issue of the 12th instant that the *Bombay Telegraph* and *Times*, the *Friend of India*, and yourself, and I dare say many other journals which I have not happened to see, have entered in good earnest on the discussion of the Nizam’s financial embarrassments, and, to use your own words, ‘the iniquitous drain upon them arising from the British ‘forces which he is obliged to keep up.’ The *Telegraph* seems to have furnished the text for these remarks in a formidable phalanx of figures, said to have been drawn up by the Nizam’s Dufturdars, and conveyed to him, as the *Friend* supposes, by *clairvoyance*, and in his new faith in mysterious agency the *Friend* professes to place the most implicit reliance upon these figured calculations, and declares them to be worth all other statements put together.

“It is well remarked by a late writer that ‘this is peculiarly an age when men ‘are befooled by figures. Few people are cautious enough to resist a tempting calculation. It never enters into their heads to suppose that there may be gross error, ‘radical fallacy, and often deliberate fraud, in the imposing array of ciphers which ‘are ostentatiously paraded for their instruction.’ I am much disposed to think that the *Telegraph*’s figures are more or less liable to one or all of these imputations; let us in the first place examine the credibility of the supposed authority, the Dufturdars. In your issue of the 10th you published a letter from your correspondent at Hyderabad, who says that these parties, the Dufturdars, stood accused of embezzlement to the extent of fifteen lacs per annum, and that in consequence the Nizam had resumed all their possessions. Do you believe your correspondent, or do you not? If you do, why pin your faith upon the statements of men who not only are unworthy of belief, but who might have an obvious reason for misstatements, in order that their own peculations might be concealed? If you do not believe him, why publish without comment the stories of your correspondent, which in that case we must suppose to be scandalous?

“I believe the figured statements to be wrong both ways, but, not being a *clairvoyant*, I shall not attempt to substitute any other figures for them, as mine might be equally erroneous. I would only on this point suggest the propriety of caution in receiving as true statements which are not well authenticated.

“The object of this letter, however, is to make some remarks upon the main principle of the argument urged by you and your brother-editors that the British Government has imposed upon the Nizam an undue burthen, in the shape of military establishments, to which you impute his present difficulties.

“The Nizam’s Government has always been dependent upon foreign aid for military support. Before its connection with the English he paid the Mahratta chouth, I believe about 30 lacs per annum, and in addition maintained 20 battalions of infantry with artillery under M. Raymond. But the arrangement was

ineffectual, for at the battle of Kuddlah the Nizam lost a moiety of his possessions. Since his alliance with England he has not lost an acre of his patrimonial territory.

"In undertaking to support the Nizam against all comers there is no doubt that the English Government subserved its own views; but the Nizam also derived his full advantage from the treaty, and it is preposterous to argue that the expense of such military aid ought to be defrayed out of the revenues of British India. Every country is bound to support the army necessary for its own defence.

"If, then, it should appear that the Company in its treaty with the Nizam, or subsequently, has extorted from him more than his share of the expense of maintaining that Military system which is admitted to be necessary for his security as well as our own, then the Company has been a hard taskmaster. If, on the other hand, he pays less, in proportion to his revenue, than is expended by the Company, he surely has no just cause of complaint.

"Here then we join issue. The treaty was formed in 1800. At that time the Nizam, including the newly acquired country taken from Mysore, and the jaghires then and since alienated, had a revenue not less, but rather more, than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  crores of rupees. Under the treaty he agreed to cede the new districts, estimated at sixty-three lacs, for the Subsidiary Force, and to maintain and, when required, to furnish a Contingent of 9,000 horse and 6,000 foot, the cost of which may be estimated at 50 lacs, making in all 1,10,00,000, bearing a proportion of 11 to 25, or much less than half his revenue.

"What the Company's revenues then were I do not know. They are now estimated in round numbers at 22 crores, and the Military establishments of all kinds, exclusive of Police, are put down at 15 crores, being a proportion of two-thirds of the whole.

"But besides this the British Government has to supply all the costs and materials of the heavy and expensive wars into which she is forced as the paramount power. The full benefit of these contests is enjoyed by the Nizam, as a protected power, but he is not required to contribute one rupee towards the expenditure.

"Thus far, then, I think you will admit that the Nizam was not unfairly treated.

"The next question is, has the English Government exacted more from the Nizam than the treaty covenanted? You all say yes, that the Contingent is in excess of the treaty, and that it therefore ought to be abolished. It is true that the Contingent was not provided for, but a contingent consisting of 9,000 horse and 6,000 infantry was included in the treaty. 9,000 horse at the commuted cost of Rs. 40 per man and horse gives forty-three lacs, and allowing only seven lacs more for the infantry and sirdars we have a total of fifty lacs which the Company can compel the Nizam to maintain, but the cost of the Contingent is only thirty-two lacs.

"That remarkably candid and trustworthy writer the editor of the *Friend of India*, by an artful arrangement of his words, endeavours to lead the public to believe that both the Contingent is required by the Company and also the 15,000 troops; but he has no grounds for such an assertion, Refer to historical facts. In 1803-4 the large Mahratta armies of Holkar and Scindiah were beaten and destroyed in the Nizam's country, and his capital saved from pillage, by the English army, and the Nizam gave no assistance. In 1817-18-19, when a new Mahratta war broke out all around the Nizam's frontiers, he was only required to furnish the Russell Brigade, a corps or two in Berar for a short time, and Davie's Horse—in all perhaps 4,000 men of the present Contingent. In all subsequent wars his assistance, whether in men or money, has never been required, although the English Government has been occasionally severely pressed both for troops and funds.

"He has all this time never ceased to enjoy the full advantage designed by the treaty, the most perfect security from foreign aggression.

"But you say again that when the treaty was framed the Nizam was surrounded by powerful enemies; that he is now protected by our own frontiers, then why make him support an army which is not required? The Madras territories are in like manner surrounded by the sea and by friendly frontiers, but is the Madras army therefore useless, or could it be safely disbanded?

"The Governments of India, both Native and English, are essentially military Governments, wholly dependent upon efficient troops for the stability of their power, and England and her allies must maintain their armies or resign their sovereignty. If you could show that since the treaty the English have been able to reduce their own military charges, then you might justly require that the treaty should be modified in favour of the Nizam; but we all know that the Company has constantly been compelled to increase her armies, in a ratio more than proportionate to the increase of revenues, and that her wars and armies have involved her deeply in debt.

"That the Nizam's 'debts have increased, are increasing, and ought to be 'diminished,' no one will dispute, but so far as Military establishments are concerned the fault lies at his own door rather than at that of the Company. He has at his command 8,000 subsidiary troops to defend him from external attack, and he has 8,000 disciplined troops to protect him from any organized rebellion or opposition in his own territory. If besides this he chooses to maintain 32,000 of a rabble army, at the cost of 64,00,000 per annum, surely the English are not to blame for this. This army is admitted to be the source of all the disorders in the capital and elsewhere. They are totally inefficient for all military purposes, and they would become dominant over the Nizam the moment his regular troops were withdrawn.

"You advise that both the Contingent should be withdrawn and his irregular army reduced, and that the Subsidiary troops should be made available for internal protection; you forget that the Subsidiary Force is precluded by treaty from such interference, and that to render effectual assistance it would be necessary to subdivide and spread it over the country, thus exposing our troops to be insulted and destroyed in detail—a position which no army ought to occupy in a foreign State.

"On the other hand, military strength is absolutely necessary to the Nizam internally, or he would not be able to collect his revenue. The whole population is armed, some of the zemindars are powerful, and every town and village is full of 'sowars,' who now follow peaceful avocations under the wholesome fear of the Contingent, but who would follow war as a trade if these troops were withdrawn.

"The whole question seems to me to lie between the Contingent of 8,000 men and the rabble army of 32,000 men. One or other ought to be reduced, because the Nizam cannot afford to pay both, and assuredly does not require a force of such numerical strength. The Contingent supports order, is efficient for every purpose of war, whether within or without the Nizam's frontier, and costs Rs. 32,00,000. The irregular army creates disorder, would sooner or later bring the Nizam into collision with the Company, is unfit for military service, and costs Rs. 64,00,000. I think myself that their number might be advantageously reduced to 12,000 men for personal guards and city and fort duties, and that the rest should be discharged. I doubt whether many would have to be discharged, as those in the secrets of the prison house say that the greater number are paper men; but the Nizam pays for the whole.

"In times of profound peace it may seem safe enough to disband regular troops, but I doubt whether the English and their allies maintain a soldier too many for their mutual security. And if troops are to be maintained, be assured that as a principle regular troops should be kept up. When we were struggling for political existence in the North-West, in Afghanistan, in Gwalior, and in the Panjab, it would have been a fresh cause of disquiet if the critically placed and extensive country of the Nizam had been in the military occupation of lawless soldiery. After our reverses in Afghanistan there was a Mahratta movement in the north of the Nizam's country, which in a fortnight more would have become formidable. The irregular soldiers could not have subdued the insurrection, and perhaps might have sympathized with the insurgents. The Contingent quelled it in a few weeks. When you gentlemen of the press recommend that the Contingent should be disbanded in order that the Nizam may keep up his rabble army, you should consider the question in a political as well as a financial view; but either way the Contingent has the advantage: it costs less and is more efficient for all useful and lawful purposes.



[We will notice this letter another day. Our correspondent very much misconceives what we said, and he has read the *Spectator* to little purpose for years past if he supposes that *we* wish to keep up the rabble army of the Nizam. His arguments in favour of the military financial burthens laid on that sovereign are by no means convincing.—Ed. M. S.]

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *August 2, 1850.*—Pursuant to our promise, we shall now consider the letter published in our last issue from a Deccan correspondent, who differs with us regarding the justice of the policy pursued toward the Nizam. This writer questions the correctness of the financial data furnished by the *Bombay Telegraph* on the authority of the Nizam's Dufturdars, but we see no reason to doubt their approximation to the truth. The statement was prepared for the British Government, which possesses means of ascertaining any serious amount of miscalculation relative to the outgoings and income of the Deccan. Those who compiled it may be dishonest—although our well-informed Hyderabad correspondent speaks highly of them—and yet have given a faithful report. Granting even that they embezzle fifteen or twenty lacs per annum, or twice that amount, it does not follow that they either underrate or overrate the burthens on the exchequer. Whether the mercenary army said to be entertained by His Highness exists wholly or but in part, there is little doubt that he pays for it the sum set down, and our correspondent admits as much in the latter part of his letter. Truth to say, however, the merits of the case between the Nizam and the Company are independent of the balance sheet of the Dufturdars. The extent of his means is sufficiently, and the cost of the Subsidiary Force and Contingent fully, known to the world at large. Setting aside all other considerations, therefore, we need only attend to those two points. The sum paid by the Nizam for British protection is about one hundred lacs per annum, including the returns from the Ceded Districts, and we maintain this to be utterly unwarranted by his necessities and disproportioned to his funds. We do not, however, deem the imposition a breach of treaty, as our correspondent supposes, since chapter and verse may be shown for it, but only inequitable under existing circumstances. The argument used to justify it is of an extraordinary kind. Because, says our correspondent, the Company are obliged by their own necessities to keep up a vast army and wage expensive wars, therefore the Nizam—who has no voice in the matter and but a remote interest—must continue to pay the same contribution that he did when surrounded by enemies, however needless to his security and disproportioned to his means! This reasoning is defective in its ethics, as a few words will make appear. We grant our correspondent's proposition that "every country is bound to support the army necessary for its own defences," but it is clear that one State lies under no obligation to share the military expenses of another incurred without its concurrence and bringing it no return. With the Company's North-Western wars, whether of defence or aggression, the Nizam has nothing to do. He stipulated for protection, and it was accorded on certain terms. Whether the British lose provinces or gain them is immaterial to him, so long as he enjoys what he has paid for—security from foreign aggression; and this would still have been preserved to him had the Company engaged in none of their latter struggles nor raised their empire to its present height. Our correspondent argues that "the full benefit of these contests is enjoyed by the Nizam as a protected power, but [that] he is not required to contribute one rupee towards the expenditure." We are, however, at a loss to discern what he gains. It is true indeed that were the British unable to hold their own position in India they would be equally so to guard him, and that he has therefore a constructive interest in their success; but we need not take the supposition of their discomfiture into account, especially as the question is not whether the Nizam ought to maintain troops for service in the British provinces, or against the foes of the British elsewhere, but whether he should be compelled to support for the defence of his own kingdom, at a ruinous cost, forces far in excess of any strength that can be required. He is politically bound to do so, no doubt, by the letter of his treaties, but we are discussing the equity of the subject, and not the compacts. Since those compacts were entered



into, an entire change of circumstances, unforeseen at that period, has taken place, and the Nizam pays million after million without obtaining any return. It is idle to talk of his needing both Subsidiary Force and Contingent. If they were adequate for his protection, internal and external, fifty years ago, when powerful enemies menaced him, they must surely be far in excess of what is requisite *now*, when he has no foreign foes at all, but lies embosomed in the British territories! Our correspondent, however, observes in answer to this argument that "the Madras territories are in like manner surrounded by the sea, and by friendly frontiers, but (he inquires) is the Madras army therefore useless, or could it be safely disbanded?" It is strange that the total want of analogy between the two cases should have been thus overlooked. If the Madras Government had no domestic disaffection or lawlessness to apprehend they too *might* cut down half their army, and if they were likewise as free from the risk of outward human enemies as from aggression by old Neptune the remaining moiety might be dispensed with; but neither of those contingencies can presently occur. A sufficient force to repress disorders must necessarily be kept up, and as foreign danger may at any moment threaten us by land or water we need to have also troops available for the encounter. The Deccan, however, is differently situated. So long as British supremacy endures it is absolutely exempt from the risk of external aggression, and therefore requires not an army to protect it. The friendship of the British Government stands equally as good as legions of bayonets. For domestic purposes alone are troops now needed by that kingdom, and despite the contrary opinion of our correspondent we maintain that the sixty-three lacs paid annually for the Subsidiary Force—the sum, by the way, is probably much increased since the cession of territory—ought to cover every outgoing on *that* score, inclusive of military police. Our correspondent reasons that as the British have been unable to reduce *their* military charges since the treaty of 1800, and as these bear a much larger proportion to the revenues of the Company than is borne to his revenue by those of the Nizam, the latter has therefore no cause for complaint. Surely, however, this is an unsound argument. The Company maintain not a single regiment beyond what they actually require,—nay, their forces fall short of the strength admitted to be desirable in a precautionary point of view,—while the Nizam, on the other hand, is saddled with a large superfluity of men, because his predecessors wanted them or were persuaded that they did so fifty years since! Even our correspondent concedes this last point as against the Subsidiary Force, where he says that "the Contingent supports order, and is efficient for every purpose of war, whether within or without the Nizam's frontier," at a cost of between thirty and forty lacs. We ask little more of him than that frank admission. If the case be so, the British Government ought to propose a new treaty to the Nizam, undertaking to afford him protection and to conserve the peace of his dominions in return for the Ceded Districts. We care not how this is accomplished in name, whether by the abolition of one force, or the partial withdrawal of either, only let relief be afforded. As to the mercenary troops of His Highness, we are quite of the same opinion with our correspondent. They do great mischief and no service, and should be reduced to a small body, not exceeding what he proposes. The Company, however, cannot consistently urge the Nizam to dispense with his "rabble army" while they disallow him the use, on every possible pretext, of the British forces for which he pays. He has been in a measure driven to retain mercenary troops, and is being so at the present moment by the denial of assistance to him in the case of the Nawab of Ellichpore. His command of his own "army" is practically less substantial than the prerogative of choosing its own Ministers vested in the British Crown. He may summon them to the field, but their movements depend on a superior power. This anomaly requires to be done away, if not altogether, at least in a measure. We are advocates of a thorough reform of his military affairs, and not merely of a one-sided interference. Let the British abate the drain which *their* troops create on the exchequer, at the same time causing them to do better service, and they will then be in a position to exhort His Highness to dispense with his ruffian levies.

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *August 19, 1850*.—"The difference of opinion between you and me rests upon this. You argue that the Nizam has only a remote and constructive interest in the stability of British supremacy and in the wars by which it is upheld. I contend that his interest is direct, immediate, and inseparable; that it is identical, that he must stand or fall with the English; and therefore that he is bound to bear an equal share in the expense of maintaining these military establishments which are admitted by you to be necessary for the maintenance of the British power, and are therefore assumed by me to be equally essential for the support and continuance of the Nizam's.

"You say this is an extraordinary argument, but it is the principle on which our treaty with the Nizam was based, and it is the only principle on which we could afford to make offensive and defensive alliances with the native princes throughout India.

"You argue that there is no analogy between the case of the Madras army and that of the Nizam's, and thus you prove it, that 'if the Madras Government had 'no disaffection or lawlessness to apprehend they too might cut down half their 'army,' and, again, 'that if they were free from the risk of outward human 'enemies they might dispense with the other half,' and you add that 'the Deccan 'is differently situated.' But if your able Hyderabad correspondent is to be believed—if only one-half of the raw-head and bloody-bones stories which I see chronicled in the *Spectator* are founded on fact—there is more lawlessness and disaffection in the Nizam's capital than in the whole of the Madras Presidency; and geographically speaking, as I shall presently show, the Nizam's country is more exposed to external attack than are the Madras frontiers.

"My argument, however, was not intended to rest upon analogy of circumstance, but upon identity of interest.

"You insist upon it that the Nizam is surrounded by friendly frontiers, that his position in this respect is totally different from what it was when the treaty was framed, that he was then surrounded by powerful enemies, and that now in equity he should be released from the obligations of the treaty, by which he is not now benefited.

"I think you are partly wrong in your facts and wholly wrong in your inference.

"As regards your facts, the revised treaty was framed in 1800. After the death of Tippoo Sultan and the partition of Mysore, all the south and eastern frontiers of the Nizam remain as they were then placed. On the west the Peishwah then existed as a subsidized State, but the Mahratta power, of which he was the nominal head, has passed into the hands of Holkar and Scindiah, and the Nagpore and Gwalior States, barring the protection of the British, menace the Nizam's frontiers as much now as then. It is my opinion that if the English withdrew their alliance from the Nizam to-morrow, and left him and his Mahratta neighbours to settle their old quarrels, the Nizam would fall into the same predicament as he was rescued from at the end of the last century. The reduction of the Peishwah hardly diminishes his danger. There are no people in India who retain so strong a national feeling as the Mahrattas; they have not yet forgotten that they were a conquering and a ruling power, and if Nagpore and Scindiah were free to make a crusade against their Mahomedan neighbour, there is no doubt that the Mahrattas of the Deccan and the Concan would swarm to the golden standard as heartily as if the Peishwah were still at Poona.

"But were it otherwise, and that the Mahratta power is broken, by whom was it broken but by the English? by whom is it still kept in subjection but by the English? and how then can it be said that the Nizam has not derived, and does not continue to derive, the full benefit of his expensive alliance?

"However, the question is not whether the Nizam is threatened merely on his frontiers. The danger to him and to us, and to all sovereign powers in India, is from within as well as from without. Look at the map of British India, and you will find that our frontiers are nowhere seriously threatened by a foreign foe. All the States around and about us are in friendly alliance or close subjection, or are seemingly powerless to do us harm. But our armies are not therefore useless. Of

the Company's country you truly say that there is not a soldier too many, yet the danger is not from this State nor from that, but is inherent in our position as a whole. The natives of India might at any moment rise in their simple strength and cast us out, as Samson broke the new cords by which he was bound. It is not a visible enemy which threatens us or our allies, it is a pervading invisible danger, which renders it absolutely necessary that we should be prepared at all points and at all times. To do this all the regular troops now in India are barely sufficient. To support these armies the Honourable Company expend year by year more than two-thirds of her revenue. The Nizam is in immediate dependence upon the Company for his political existence, and it seems to me to be perfectly fair that he should bear his full share of the cost.

"I am glad that you do not advocate the keeping up the Nizam's rabble army, but the tendency of your argument leads to that result, because you say abolish the Contingent. One or other is necessary to the Nizam; without military strength of some kind available for internal use he could neither govern his country nor collect his revenue, and I endeavoured to show in my last letter why the Subsidiary troops are not eligible for this description of duty.

"Again, therefore, I say that the question rests between the Contingent and the undisciplined army. If the Nizam's finances are to be relieved, one or other of these forces should be reduced.

"You say that the Contingent is not allowed to assist the Nizam when he requires assistance, and you instance the case of the Ellichpore Nawab. In general, whenever organized resistance to Government is offered, the Contingent is employed, and its presence in the country has a powerful moral effect. Why assistance has not been given to this particular case I do not know, but I have no doubt there is a sufficient reason, and your own correspondent seems to think that justice lies on the side of the Nawab.

"I wrote in my last letter that every village was full of 'juwaus,' not of 'sowars,' or perhaps I did not write it, but I meant to do so."

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *August 19, 1850*.—Our Deccan correspondent has returned to the charge, in support of his argument regarding the justice of taxing the Nizam for the maintenance of military forces disproportioned to his necessity and far beyond his means. He contends that the interest of His Highness is direct, immediate, and inseparable from that of England; that with the English he must stand or fall; and that he therefore is bound to bear an equal share in the expense of supporting those establishments which are admitted to be requisite for the preservation of the British power, whereon his own salvation depends. Upon this principle, according to our correspondent, the treaty with the Nizam was based, and as he still derives all the advantages secured to him by the alliance he is bound to continue his payments for it. The Mahratta confederation which formerly threatened to overwhelm His Highness was only broken up by the British, and would unite against him once more whenever the check imposed on it was withdrawn. He is consequently indebted to the Company for his political existence, and hence the supposed equity of compelling him to maintain the Contingent. Such is briefly the drift of our correspondent's argument, to which we demur *in toto*; its premises are erroneous, and the conclusions drawn from them wrong. His Highness was never bound by treaty to bear an equal share in the expense of maintaining those military establishments which are necessary for the security of the British power. He paid once for all by the transfer of part of his dominions, for the protection of the remainder against all external foes, and, although he covenanted to render assistance to the British during time of war—and *during that only*—by joining a certain amount of force with theirs for field service beyond his own territories, he did not bind himself to entertain a permanent Contingent. The letter of the treaty is explicit on this point. When last we wrote we had it not at hand for reference, and our admission of his obligations went therefore much too far, but having since consulted the document we are in a position to maintain his title to relief, both on legal and equitable grounds. He is *not* internationally

pledged to support the army miscalled his own. Let us quote the treaty on this point.

"But if," runs the 12th article, "war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other power whatever, then His Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah engages that with the reserve of two battalions of sepoys, which are to remain near His Highness's person, the residue of the British Subsidiary Force (consisting of six battalions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry, with artillery), joined by six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse of His Highness's own troops, and making together an army of 12,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, with their requisite train of artillery and warlike stores of every kind, shall be immediately put in motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy; and His Highness further engages to employ every further effort in his power for the purpose of bringing into the field, as speedily as possible, the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions, with a view to the effectual prosecution and speedy termination of the said war; the Honourable Company in the same manner engaging on their part in this case to employ in active operations against the enemy the largest force which they may be able to furnish, over and above the said Subsidiary Force."

Now the foregoing article, which furnishes the only pretext of authority for the creation of a Contingent, certainly pointed at a very different matter. By virtue of it the British Government might call on the Nizam to send his quota into the field whenever war broke out,—although it is obvious that the treaty never contemplated his marching men to the North-West, in which direction alone for many years past our serious wars have lain,—but he is left unrestricted as to the source from whence his quota should be drawn, and at liberty to disband the troops composing it, or otherwise to use them at his pleasure, on the conclusion of each peace. The notion of a fixed Contingent, British-officered and obeying British orders, and kept up irrespective of peace or war, was never so much as dreamed of if we may judge from their language by the authors of the treaty. It is at all events not hinted at in the article, and we need not go beyond its scope to guess the secret purpose of the framers. The Company therefore are destitute of any shadow of right under that treaty to impose the Contingent on His Highness, nor can they manufacture a constructive title so to burthen him out of their admitted option to make him join forces when before the foe. No such power of commutation is vested in any one contracting party. If both sides agree to substitute for the particular thing stipulated something either less or more, it will of course become binding on both, but this has not been done as between the English and His Highness. Our correspondent must therefore abandon his position touching the equity and legality of the measures that have been pursued with respect to the Deccan. Whether the Nizam would have gained or lost had the Company adhered to the letter of their treaty, and compelled him to furnish the prescribed quota whenever they went to war, instead of saddling him with a permanent Contingent, is nothing to the purpose. The course they have taken was one dictated by their own interests, and by no consideration for him, and it therefore cannot be pleaded as an offset to the imposition practised upon him. Our correspondent argues that the Contingent cannot be dispensed with on account of the lawlessness of the Nizam's capital, but this is quite beside the mark. The terms of the treaty of 1800 show that the Deccan could dispense even with the major part of the Subsidiary Force, so far as regards its domestic necessity, even when no Contingent existed, and it were absurd to suppose that order could not be maintained *now* through the agency of the former force if the latter was withdrawn. Our Hyderabad correspondent, to whom the other writer refers as an authority on his side, never gave any colour to such an hypothesis; on the contrary, he expressly repudiates the presumption that the Contingent is essential to the tranquillity of the Deccan. Were the Nizam's finances restored to order, the main source of domestic turbulence would be removed. The necessities of the State oblige it to defraud its servants, both military and civil, and to resort to all manner of extortions and oppressions, which provoke resistance and beget weakness by alienating the affections of its

subjects. Thus it is incapacitated, both morally and physically, for the vindication of its own supremacy, and obliged to wink at the petty feuds of its dependants, which cause so much public evil. Let the exchequer be once replenished—and the abolition of the Contingent would soon put it in funds—and we will answer for His Highness being able to do without their services.

MADRAS SPECTATOR, August 28, 1850.—In our last notice of the Nizam's relations with the British Government we disposed of the presumed obligation under which he lies to maintain a permanent Contingent, showing that the treaty concluded by his predecessor only binds the Deccan to furnish a certain military force for service against the enemy during actual war. That portion of his covenant the present Sovereign has not been called on to fulfil, but the omission of the Company to exact its performance can never warrant their burthening him with a perpetual source of expenditure of quite a different kind, for which no provision was made in the treaty. As regards the equity argument of our correspondent it has been proved incompatible with the letter of His Highness's obligations, and may equally be pronounced hostile to the spirit of them. Setting aside the special terms of the compact between himself and the British, he stands precisely in the same position as every other Native State. They all—we speak, of course, of those in alliance with Leadenhall Street—enjoy a tranquil existence by virtue of British protection, and would become exposed to outward dangers if that safeguard were removed. These are facts that no one dreams of disputing. But if our correspondent's conclusion from them be right, if the circumstance of mutual interest in the preservation of the British power really astricts one protected Prince to go on augmenting his contribution to the military chest of India in proportion to the increased warlike expenditure of the Company, the same liability must be common to them all. Every one has an equal reason to desire the continued supremacy of his protector, and each should therefore promote it to the utmost of his power. Treaties are to be appealed to, not for the deciding of questions about *how much* John Company has a right to call for,—his title being bounded only by the limit of his necessities,—but for the fixing of the minimum which each State shall give. They determine the point whereat each may be assessed *downward*, but leave it open to the British to carry the assessment *upward* according to their own will and pleasure! This we take to be the substance of our correspondent's reasoning, which is of an extraordinary kind. It leaves the Native Princes at the mercy of the British, how far soever the destiny or the lust of conquest of the dominant power may choose to drag them in its train. They are made by it no better than feudal dependants, whose whole means wait on the command of their superior, and who must submit to be ruined for his advantage whenever he demands the sacrifice! Now that this doctrine is altogether opposed to the principles of international law, and involves a totally new reading of the force of treaties, we need not tell our educated friends. By virtue of it every large State whose protecting shadow hangs over a smaller one might drain the vital energies of the latter in pursuit of its selfish designs. Let us take, for example, the case of the British power in connection with North-Western wars. The first Afghan expedition was a wholly unjustifiable aggression, dictated by the ambition and the circumstances of the Whigs. Its disastrous termination led to fresh efforts in the same quarter, involving an enormous sacrifice of money; and the subsequent necessity for encountering Seikh and Scindean foes without doubt was greatly owing to the injustice of that first measure. Its evil cried aloud in the ears of all the natives of India, awaking at once both their wrath and their fears, and disposing those sovereigns who had still the power of resistance to prepare for that struggle to which they believed themselves doomed. But for this deplorably false and heavily punished step it is most probable that neither Scinde nor the Punjaub would have supplied us with battlefields—at least not until hereafter. Granting, however, that they might have done so independent of the Afghan invasion, it is obvious that the cost of *that* memorable undertaking—if our correspondent argues rightly—should have fallen in part upon protected Princes,

although it was entirely a wanton movement, engaged in without their knowledge or concurrence, and promising, even if successful, no possible advantage to them. Nay, in so far as it tended to alienate the natives generally, to push the British frontier to a perilous distance from the seat of strength, to bring us into contact with dangers of a new description, and to create fresh demands on the financial and military resources of the Company, it was a stroke of policy opposed to the safety of those States whom we protect! Now, does our correspondent mean to argue that the Nizam should share the extraordinary burthens entailed by such a war? If he shrinks from maintaining that position let him remember he abandons his whole argument, and yet how can he stand on a foundation so rotten? If the Deccan treaty binds His Highness to contribute in any case, he is bound by it in all, there being no reservation about just or unjust wars.

But further, if that interpretation of the treaty of 1800 holds good, if the Nizam is liable to the maintenance of a permanent Contingent in order to uphold the supremacy of the British power,—which is our correspondent's proposition,—he may obviously claim a participation in the conquests made under the secret articles of the same treaty.

"It is however declared," run they, "that in the event of war and of consequent partition of conquests between the contracting parties, His Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah shall be entitled to participate equally with the other contracting parties in the division of every territory which may be acquired by the successful exertion of their united arms; provided His Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah shall have faithfully fulfilled all the stipulations of the preceding treaty, especially those contained in the 12th and 13th articles thereof."

We shall here be met, however, with the objection that a mutual partition of conquests is only guaranteed when the "exertion of the united arms" of the Nizam and Company has led to their achievement—a contingency which never happens, as His Highness does not take the field. We admit the letter of the argument, but repudiate its force for the following reasons:—

His Highness is never called on to send troops to the scene of action, neither would he be suffered to, although he should propose it. He *does* "faithfully fulfil," however, the requirements which the Company have substituted for that obligation by pretended virtue of the provisions of the treaty, and is therefore clearly entitled to demand his reward.\* The equitable construction contended for by our correspondent must be allowed to His Highness as well as urged against him. We do not support either proposition in the abstract, but those who grant the one cannot fairly deny the other. It will never do to strain the treaty in favour of the Company under pretence of construing it equitably and at the same time to bind His Highness down to its bare letter.

While adverting to the above subject, we may as well correct an error fallen into by a writer of the *Bombay Times*, who alleges that the Supreme Government offered to disband the Contingent for a pecuniary consideration, so long since as 1829. The real facts of the case are as follows:—During Mr. Martin's tenure of the Residency, in the year above mentioned, the English officers superintending districts were withdrawn, and the Resident gave out with much publicity, as though he desired that result, that the Contingent would be abolished on the request of the Nizam. The then Minister was advised, however, not to make such a proposal, as his administration derived vigour from the presence of the Contingent, and he concurred in that view, observing that he should not avail himself of the option although it were offered. Subsequently it appeared that the Governor-General had given no authority to Mr. Martin to make such an intimation, but he was privately informed that the disbandment might follow on an application from the Nizam. Here, however, the matter rested, and nothing formal was proposed or done. As for the scarcely honourable design attributed to the Company, of exacting a money payment in exchange for the Contingent, we need not hold it up to scorn. If, as is maintained by us, the British had no right to saddle His Highness with that burthen, as little have they to demand a consideration for the taking of it off.

\* The accident of occasional non-payment of the Contingent does not affect our argument.

The writer in the *Bombay Times* goes on to argue that as the Nizam once had the option given him of disbanding the Contingent and did not take advantage of it, he is therefore to be disallowed any future place for repentance. This doctrine, however, will not go down. It is unsound in the abstract, since his refusal at one time—he being bound by no condition of “once for all”—could not bind him for ever. Moreover, the circumstances under which he, or rather his Minister, declined agitating the question in 1829 have since been altogether changed. His Highness could then command the services of the Contingent at his own option, and it therefore formed a useful branch of his military establishment, properly called his own army; but three years afterward, in defiance of decency and justice, the Court of Directors, instead of withdrawing their officers from the force, as they ought to have done, made it wholly subservient to the will of the Resident, under pretence that they could not suffer *their* servants to be employed unless he was first satisfied of the justice of the cause. Had the Nizam foreseen that the troops would be thus taken out of his hands he would doubtless have got rid of them in 1829, and indeed his Minister did propose that measure when Lord Metcalfe was Acting Governor-General, but without effect. As the case now stands, His Highness should be held free at any time to shake off his vexatious burthen, which he certainly would do if the opportunity were afforded him.

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *September 9, 1850.*—The able letter of our correspondent “A. J. O.” on the subject of the Nizam’s expenditure and resources, which appeared in the *Spectator* of the 4th instant, has certainly enlightened us as to the extent of mercenary force maintained by His Highness, at least on paper, but without at all satisfying us of the propriety of keeping up the Contingent. That question may be viewed under two aspects; firstly, that of equity, and secondly, that of expedience. As regards the former there exists no treaty binding the Nizam to support a permanent Contingent. He is only liable to furnish one when the Subsidiary Force takes the field against some enemy, as is clearly implied, adjacent to his own territories. This he did in the wars with the Peishwa, Scindia, the Raja of Berar, and Holkar, becoming a party to the treaties concluded with those powers, and sharing in the territorial acquisitions gained from them by the British. If the Company thought proper, His Highness must of course fulfil the same obligation whenever they were engaged in war, upon the same terms, but they have long ceased to make the requisition. This forbearance on their part, however, as we before pointed out, cannot justify them in imposing on him a costly army which he never engaged to entertain. “A. J. O.” argues that the arrangements between the Company and the Deccan cannot be opened up; that a revision of them would involve the resettling of our relations with every Native State belonging to the same class; that the Nizam has received the full benefit of his engagements,—the British having faithfully adhered to theirs,—and that he ought therefore to be kept to his. Now without conceding the first point, namely, that the compact between the two powers cannot be revised, let us inquire what “A. J. O.” would gain by our concession of the rest? Hold the Nizam to his bargain as rigidly as you please, but still you cannot bind him to that for which he never bargained at all. The Contingent as it now stands is indefensible by any plea of treaty right to impose it. Even admitting all that can be urged in praise of it, the question of its international equity will remain where it was.

Then, as regards the supposed impossibility of remodelling the engagements of the Nizam, we have yet to learn wherein it consists. No obligation would thereby be laid on the Company of revising other treaties of the same class, each must be treated according to its own merits; but that in every case of hardship like that of the Deccan a revision should take place common justice dictates. Further, “A. J. O.” will find that the obstacles apprehended by him did not occur to the Court in Leadenhall Street when they had this very subject under their consideration twenty-six years ago. The Directors then suggested the propriety of pursuing that course which he now reprobates, and it would be difficult to advance more or stronger arguments against the existing Contingent than are contained in their despatch. The humiliating subjection of the Native State, to which it must



inevitably lead ; the doubtful equity of its imposition on the Nizam ; the impolicy of awakening those suspicions which it was calculated to excite, and the certain ruin that must overtake any Government which submitted to it, were all portrayed by the India House in the most unequivocal terms. We quote several paragraphs from the letter in question, which was written in January 1824, and will be found among the Hyderabad papers, page 389 :—

“ Para. 79. In judging of any arrangement it is desirable that all the good and all the evil attendant upon it should be brought distinctly into view ; and it appears to us that all the advantage to be derived from appointing European officers to discipline and command the troops of States in alliance with us consists in this, that the corps will thereby be rendered more efficient. This is doubtless an advantage, though by no means so important an advantage in the present state of India as it was when there was a greater probability of wars and warlike confederacies being directed against British interests. Nay, it is not perhaps going too far to say that, under existing circumstances, it is desirable that the Native Princes should be discouraged from entertaining large military establishments ; and it even merits consideration whether in cases where they are bound to us by treaty to maintain a certain force it might not be politic, if not altogether to absolve them from such engagements, at least to modify or relax their obligations, so as to bring the cost of them within the means of the Native State. When a larger force is kept up than the State can afford to pay, revenue for a time is extorted from the people at the point of the bayonet ; rapacity soon defeats its own ends ; the public resources, instead of improving, decline ; the pay of the troops falls in arrear ; discontent leads to mutiny ; the soldiers are converted into freebooters, and predatory associations are formed, which the protection due to our subjects and the interest we have in preserving the general tranquillity compel us to put down at whatever cost.

“ Para. 80.—But supposing the advantage of securing to our allies the possession of an efficient military force to be far more unequivocal than it appears to be, it surely will be allowed to be an advantage which may be purchased at too high a price. It is material therefore to inquire what is the price paid for this advantage, such as it is, or, in other words, to consider the evils attendant on the policy as it affects, first, the Native States ; secondly, our own interests ; and, thirdly, the interests of both conjointly.

“ 1st.—As it affects the Native States it appears to us to be humiliating and galling in the extreme. The proceeding of appointing European officers to the command of corps raised and maintained by princes whom we have not, as yet at least, professed to treat as dependent, must be felt as a fresh inroad on their remains of independence ; as an exclusion of the higher class of natives from the places of power, trust, and emolument which they have hitherto held, and of which it is both cruel and unjust to deprive them ; and as indicative of further designs on our part which we assuredly do not entertain, and which it is very undesirable to have imputed to us.

“ Para. 81.—With reference also to the 15th Article of the Treaty of 1800 with the Nizam, it appears to us very doubtful whether the proceeding be consistent with good faith, particularly if, as stated by the Marquis of Hastings, the mode of officering and paying the reformed corps renders them in effect a part of our army, upon whose fidelity we may rely, even in a rupture with their nominal chief.

“ Article 15th.—As by the present treaty the union and friendship of the two States are so firmly cemented as that they may be considered as one and the same, His Highness the Nizam engages neither to commence nor to pursue in future any negotiations with any other power whatever without giving previous notice, and entering into mutual consultation with the Honourable East India Company's Government ; and the Honourable Company's Government on their part hereby declare that they have no manner of concern with any of His Highness's children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom His Highness is absolute.”

“ Para. 82.—The separation which this view implies of the military from the civil power cannot fail to paralyze the energies, and in course of time to destroy the existence, of any Government which submits to it. That our subsidiary system



tends to produce these results cannot be doubted ; but the results were at least retarded by the possession on the part of Native States of a military force of their own over which we exercised no control. Deprived of control over that force they cannot long retain the internal management of the country, and when this is given up it is clear that the Governments exist only in name.

"Para. 84.—It is a self-evident proposition that in proportion to the extent of power vested in any individual ought to be the strictness of responsibility for its due exercise, and the checks upon its abuse. The European officers in the service of the Nizam and the Nagpore Raja are vested with power civil as well as military ; they not only discipline and command the corps to which they are severally attached, but they are entrusted with the administration of revenue and police, and in both capacities they appear to us to be equally exempt from responsibility. The authority of the Residents, however great in other respects, does not legally extend to those officers, and even were the Native Governments less inefficient it is not within the competency of the British Indian Government to render British subjects amenable to their laws. Setting aside, too, the anomaly in the constitution of a military force of which the troops would be subject to one law and the officers to another, we are doubtful whether the Articles of War contain any provision applicable to offences committed by British officers when employed in the service of a foreign prince."

The authority of the Honourable Court, we presume, will be allowed considerable weight, and it is plain that they took pretty nearly our view of the Contingent when the Nizam's circumstances were less desperate than they are at present. We leave "A. J. O." and our other Deccan antagonist to digest the above opinions at their leisure.

With reference to the Nizam's mercenary forces, it is unaccountably assumed by both correspondents that we wish for their retention in his service, at the same time that we seek the abolition of the Contingent, than which position nothing can be further from the truth. For years past have we been urging, even while ignorant of the vast expense of those lawless troops, the propriety of getting rid of them—not by a sham deportation like that of the Rohillas, but by effectual measures. Let the British Government press this point on the Nizam as earnestly as possible, but let them at the same time relieve His Highness of the Contingent, as circumstances will admit. If not altogether disbanded, it ought at all events to be brought down to the level of that of Gwalior, which would reduce its cost by about one-half. Whatever can be said of the expedience of retaining the troops, the European commissioned officers should assuredly be reduced largely. It might indeed be the better plan to withdraw them *in toto*, as the Honourable Court contemplated, and to hand the army over to the Nizam, who is now master of it only in name. His Highness would consent to reduce his irregular forces if he had the command of those disciplined troops miscalled "his own." With these and the Subsidiary Force order could be maintained, and the joint diminution of military outgoings would relieve the Government from that embarrassment which is the main source of all disturbances. The rapacity occasioned by financial difficulties leads the chiefs and people to rebel ; the mercenaries are mutinous because they cannot get paid ; and the executive is weak and contemptible because it can place no dependence on their fidelity. Under these circumstances, what wonder that tumult and outrage should abound !

Into the wide question of the expedience of maintaining the Contingent unimpaired, for the Nizam's own sake, we cannot go further at present. It is the belief of many competent persons that the Subsidiary Force alone, with his irregulars, would prove sufficient. Those connected with the Contingent are of course otherwise minded, but association and interest so clearly render them partial judges that their evidence must be taken with reserve. "A. J. O.'s" estimate of the valuable resources of the Deccan, and of the easy process by which its affairs might be placed on a proper footing, is highly interesting and important. If he be correct, the state of that kingdom is by no means desperate, and it therefore becomes the duty of the British Government to press the necessary reforms on His

Highness with all the urgency of which they are capable. Representations through the Resident are not sufficient. The Governor-General ought to visit Hyderabad himself, or to depute Sir Henry Pottinger for that purpose, in order that a definite arrangement might be made. If the Nizam were thus forced into a thorough consideration of his circumstances, and of the inevitable ruin to which he is fast tending, and if the means of relief were at the same time demonstrated to him, he would no doubt give way. At all events, since the Company have largely contributed to his embarrassments, it is the bounden duty of their executive to make trial of this last chance of retrieval. Should it fail through his obstinacy his fall be on his own head.

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *September 13, 1850.*—The following is a letter, dated 29th ultimo :—

“While I fully recognize your right to controvert my opinions, and to prove me to be wrongheaded and pigheaded on this knotty question of the Nizam's Contingent, yet it certainly does appear to me to be somewhat beside and beyond fair argument to place in your editorial columns a perverted representation of my meaning, and then to father this spoilt child of your own imagination upon my pen. In your journal of the 19th ultimo you begin by telling your readers that ‘our ‘Deccan correspondent has returned to the charge in support of his argument ‘regarding the justice of taxing the Nizam for the maintenance of military forces, ‘disproportioned to his necessities and far beyond his means’; but with all courtesy I must deny that I ever put forward so incongruous a proposition. I admit as fully as you do that his military establishments are too large, and that they ought to be reduced. But the question is, what description of force should be maintained? and my argument was and is that the *regular* troops, whether imposed upon him by the British Government, or originating in the exigencies of the State, are neither disproportioned to his necessities nor beyond his means.

“Then, again, you plainly impute to me by inference that I had argued that the Nizam was bound by treaty to support the Contingent as now constituted, and you quote a clause of the treaty to prove that this was not the case; and in a variety of ways you endeavour to demolish the assumption as altogether wrong and erroneous, and thereupon you call upon me ‘to abandon my position.’

“But you were all the time fighting with an enemy of your own invention. Did I ever assert that the Contingent was provided for under the treaty? Did I not expressly admit in so many words that ‘the Contingent was *not* provided for ‘in the treaty?’ What I did say was that *a* Contingent *was* provided for, *viz.* 9,000 horse and 6,000 foot; that the yearly cost of this would be at least equal to Rs. 50,00,000 per annum; that if maintained it would add nothing to the security of the Nizam's power, but contrariwise; that the present Contingent, though less in number, is more effective and costs much less; and that the British Government, in accepting the Contingent as a substitute for that which was mentioned in the treaty, did in fact release him from a large burthen imposed by the treaty, for a less one that was suggested to him by his own friends and Ministers rather than fastened upon him by the Company.

“I fully admit, then, what I have never denied, that the Contingent, as now constituted, is not covered by the treaty; but that His Highness's true interests would be benefited by abolishing the Contingent, and recurring to the more severe letter of the treaty, is what no person really instructed in the mysteries of Hyderabad politics would venture to assert, and no judicious friend of His Highness could reasonably suggest to the Prince so ruinous a policy.

“The information extracted from the *Englishman* into your paper of the 19th ultimo, which shows that the Nizam's revenue is much larger than was supposed, and that the amount annually lavished upon his irregular army is still more extravagantly preposterous than was before stated to be the case, strongly corroborates my previous opinions. By this statement it would appear that the total revenue of the Nizam is above three crores of rupees, and that the yearly payment to *irregular* troops is one crore and twenty-six lakhs. If this money were fairly expended it

ought to support an army of 50,000 men. I say so because the Dufturdars made out that sixty-four lakhs, which is only one-half, supported 32,000. By depriving the Nizam of the Contingent you would throw him entirely on this description of force for internal protection. Let us then endeavour to estimate their power to protect him.

"Why, according to your own showing, a single Jaghirdar, the Nawab of Ellichpore, is able successfully to resist and to defeat in the field all of this numerous and costly armament which he is able to employ, and you and your correspondent at Hyderabad 'cry aloud and spare not' that the Contingent may be sent to the rescue. Let us assume that General Fraser in declining to employ or to suffer the employment of the Contingent is doing wrong; and if you knew the ability, the judgment, and the experience of this respected officer as well as we do in this part of the country you would hesitate to assume anything of the kind, but conceding this for the moment it still remains to be answered how it happens that this expensive army of the Nizam is unable to cope in the field with the Ellichpore rabble? Take away the Contingent, leave the Nizam to his own devices, and in a few years not one Zemindar or Nawab, but ten or twenty or more, would be in arms, and how long would he maintain his position, surrounded by enemies, with his finances diminished in the full amount of the revenue of the refractory districts? The urgent call for the Contingent to put down the Ellichpore Nawab, the proved inability of the irregular troops to subdue his weak levies,—all which I think I have seen stated and admitted in your own columns,—surely destroys the assumption that the Contingent is either superfluous or useless.

"You say, however, that the disbandment of the Contingent would release thirty-two lacs of rupees per annum, that money is the sinew of war, and with an increased income the Nizam would be the better able to protect himself. The argument is good as far as it goes, but if with an expenditure of one hundred and twenty-six lacs per annum little or nothing is gained of actual strength I am afraid the addition of thirty-two lacs would only be throwing good money after bad.

"I feel the strongest assurance that the Contingent better answers the purpose of the Nizam, and better answers the just and lawful views of the British Government, by securing the peace and loyalty of the Deccan, than any given number of irregular troops could possibly do; and the only question on this point which seems to remain is whether the Contingent is extravagantly paid or unnecessarily expensive.

"Upon this subject the greatest delusion exists, and for more than twenty years has been sedulously kept up by parties disappointed and jealous in some instances and ignorant in others. The press of India constantly repeat the cuckoo note that we are over-officered, and that the service is loaded with abuses. What is the fact? The pay of officers is exactly the same as in the Company's army, but no pension is allowed to superannuated local officers, and the Company provide pensions for their own officers serving under the Nizam, so that no European draws from His Highness one rupee beyond what he earns by his daily service.

"Then again as regards our numbers. In the infantry and artillery the system of drill and discipline is the same as in the Company's army. In the cavalry the system is different, but the equal or superior efficiency of this branch is hardly questioned. It is not denied by any one that the service is highly efficient; and this results from the exertion of a proportion of four officers to each infantry corps, two to the cavalry, and one to each company of artillery. Allowing for casualties, it would not be possible to reduce this strength without impairing the discipline and efficiency of the army. As regards the natives, the sepoy received eight and nine Hyderabad rupees, and the cavalry forty Hyderabad rupees per man and horse, while it seems that the irregulars receive as much as fifteen rupees for a foot-soldier, and fifty-six for a horseman.

"And now I turn to another point which you have discussed at large in your issue of the 21st, and that is the right of the British Government to claim the assistance of the Nizam in her wars with other States. It is amusing enough that

when the letter of the treaty happens to support your own views you throw the treaty in my face and will allow of no modification, even though beneficial to the native Government ; but when the terms of the treaty seem to bind the Nizam to assist in all wars whatever, you scout the idea of so monstrous an exaction, and warn me off such rotten ground.

"I did not, however, argue that the Nizam was bound by any clause in the treaty to share the expense of every war we engaged in. What I said was that the treaty was based on the principle of mutual protection, offensive and defensive ; that the interests of the Nizam and the British had become identical, and on the part of the Nizam dependent, and that he was therefore bound to support, in a fair proportion to his revenue, the military system essential to his own political existence.

"The treaty, as quoted by you, surely justifies this inference, which is also supported by reason, equity, and the necessities of the case.

"Neither do you conduct your argument quite fairly, if you will pardon me for saying so. There have been five general wars in India since the treaty was signed. You select one of the five, that of Afghanistan, which you consider to be unjust, impolitic, and aggressive ; and you ask me whether I would dare to maintain that the Nizam should have been compelled to share the costs of a war so objectionable. If, like you, I had insisted upon a rigid adherence to the letter of the treaty in other particulars, I could very easily answer by a quotation from the clause republished in your own paper, that the Nizam was undoubtedly bound to supply a Contingent of 15,000 in the first place, and eventually, if called upon, to contribute his whole military strength at all risks and at all costs ; and touching our conquests in that quarter I dare say the Company would have given him his share of the same ; but, as I do not happen to be hampered by such a narrow view of the existing treaty, I have no hesitation in saying that I conceive the treaty only referred to unavoidable and defensive wars.

"But why make a stalking-horse of the Afghan war ? Let us take all the wars since the treaty was framed, and then see whether the Nizam has been unfairly treated by his great ally. Firstly, there was the Mahratta war of 1803-4-5 ; secondly, the second Mahratta war of 17-18-19 ; thirdly, the Burmese and Bhurtpore wars simultaneously carried on, and, as was supposed at the time, in secret concert and conspiracy ; fourthly, the Afghan and Sind wars, which I give up ; and, fifthly, the wars of the Punjab, when the safety of the British Government was jeopardized by the sudden invasion of a powerful and unprovoked enemy. In all these wars the British Government was severely pressed, both for men and resources. In only one of them was the Nizam required to give a portion of the quota he was bound to give under the treaty. In two of the wars his own frontiers were invaded, and the enemy beaten was his own old and determined foe. In two of the wars he was only interested so far that his political existence depended upon the success of the British arms ; but this interest is so obvious and direct that it might have warranted his being called upon to fulfil the terms of the treaty. Can it be justly said that the Company ask too much, that he should maintain peace within his own territories, which is all that has been required of him ? This being the actual state of our past relations with the Nizam, you must excuse me if I hold strongly to my original opinions, that His Highness has *not* been overtaxed by the British Government to support military establishments ; that the treaty *was* framed on a fair principle of mutual assistance ; that the Nizam *has* enjoyed the full benefit secured to him by the treaty ; and, on the other hand, that much less has been required of him than, whether politically or equitably, he was bound to contribute.

"I observe you harp upon the Contingent being permanent, while the 15,000 men stipulated for in the treaty were only for occasional service ; but troops for occasional service—where the exigency is constantly liable to occur, and frequently does occur—must be constantly maintained, or they would be totally inefficient in the field, both in discipline and material. No one, however, disputes that the Nizam requires for internal security a larger body of men than either the Contingent,

as now constituted, or the 15,000 men laid down in the treaty ; and the only question is which should be retained. Again and again I say the Contingent, and that the relief to the Nizam's finances ought to come out of the one crore and twenty-six lacs, be the sum less or more, now wasted annually upon troops absolutely ineffective for all useful service, and notoriously the cause and the ruthless agents of whatever disorder and bloodshed take place in the country.

"Observe that I write as the fast friend of the Nizam, whose salt I have eaten for twenty-five years. You assume that the Contingent is a heavy burthen fastened upon the Nizam by an exacting superior. This is hardly so. Sir John Shore discountenanced the scheme altogether ; the Marquis of Wellesley sanctioned the admission of a few officers to supersede the French officers then dismissed, but with hesitation ; the Court was understood to have objected to the arrangement, and only gradually to have accorded an assent to its continuance. But the service was remodelled and placed on its present footing by a staunch supporter of the native Government, Sir H. Russell.

"Since his time we have had Sir C. Metcalfe, Mr. Martin, Colonel Stewart, and General Fraser. These high functionaries are supposed to have been variously affected towards the Nizam, and to have differed in their political views ; but all were unanimous on one point—that the Contingent should be maintained in a state of efficiency. This coincidence of opinion in so many men of eminent ability, of enlarged local experience, with a full knowledge of facts, is surely deserving of some respect. For my part, I feel a perfect conviction that to hand over the Nizam into the unsafe keeping of a turbulent soldiery not kept in subjection by superior military strength would be a mere preliminary to the unavoidable annexation of his country to British India."

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MADRAS SPECTATOR, *September 16, 1850.*—We have lately devoted so much space to the consideration of the Nizam's military affairs that it is out of the question to pursue the controversy further which our nameless Deccan correspondent forced upon us. Moreover, were we to discuss all the points raised in his last letter, published by us on Friday, we should go again over much of the ground already trodden, to our fatigue and that of our readers. He must therefore allow us to dismiss the subject as briefly as possible, resting assured that we have no intention of treating him with disrespect. He accuses us of an unfair representation of his argument, in that we said he had maintained the justice of taxing the Nizam for the support of military forces disproportioned to his necessities and far beyond his means. Upon a careful reperusal of the correspondence, however, it appears to us that such really was the upshot of our opponent's meaning rendered in plain words. He strenuously urges the maintenance of the Contingent as necessary and equitable, while we deny it to be either the one or the other. To our judgment, therefore, he is the advocate of that which constitutes a needless, unrighteous, and heavy burthen on the finances of the Deccan. The Nizam's self-entertained mercenaries are nothing to the purpose. Whether His Highness has less or more of these in pay is a matter purely of domestic import, and which cannot affect the equity or otherwise of his enforced relations with the British Government. If he chooses to beggar himself after that fashion, it is his own lookout, but we broadly deny that his being saddled with the Contingent can be justified by the fact that he might economize the charge of his irregular troops. Doubtless he could do so, and would if he were wise, but what has that to do with the question of the relief which he is entitled to claim at the hands of the Company ? The two things are totally distinct, and must not be confounded. His obstinate folly affords no excuse for a continuance of British injustice. Let the latter be arrested, and leave him to perish—if he will perish—by the sole agency of the former. Our correspondent will answer, however, that there is no injustice, because His Highness cannot do without the British force, but this is a matter of opinion on which we are free to conclude for ourselves. The mere assumption of the fact cannot establish its correctness, and we dispute it every inch.

Again, our correspondent taxes us with wrongly attributing to him the false

position that the Nizam is bound by treaty to support the present Contingent. As in the former instance of imputation, however, we must hold that we did him no wrong. All we said was that he upheld the equity of the course pursued towards that Prince in saddling him with a permanent Contingent, for which neither he nor his ancestors stipulated. Now, does not the language of our correspondent warrant that representation? On the 21st July he expressed himself as follows:—

“The next question is, has the English Government exacted more from the Nizam than the treaty covenanted? You all say yes, that the Contingent is in excess of the treaty, and that it therefore ought to be abolished. It is true that the Contingent was not provided for, but a Contingent consisting of 9,000 horse and 6,000 infantry was included in the treaty. 9,000 horse at the commuted cost of Rs. 40 per man and horse gives forty-three lacs, and allowing only seven lacs more for the infantry and sirdars, we have a total of fifty lacs which the Company can compel the Nizam to maintain, but the cost of the Contingent is only thirty-two lacs.”

Again on Friday last he thus reiterates the same view:—

“Did I ever assert that the Contingent was provided for under the treaty? Did I not expressly admit in so many words that ‘the Contingent was *not* provided for in the treaty?’ What I did say was that *a* Contingent *was* provided for, *viz.*, 9,000 horse and 6,000 foot; that the yearly cost of this would be at least equal to fifty lacs per annum; that if maintained it would add nothing to the security of the Nizam’s power, but contrariwise; that the present Contingent, though less in number, is more effective and costs much less; and that the British Government, in accepting the Contingent as a substitute for that which was mentioned in the treaty, did in fact release him from a large burthen imposed by the treaty for a less one than was suggested to him by his own friends and Ministers, rather than fastened upon him by the Company.”

We put it to our readers whether these passages do not only justify what has been done in excess of the treaty, but likewise imply that a permanent Contingent of some kind *was* provided for by its stipulations! In his former epistle the writer does not even hint at the important circumstance that *no* Contingent was engaged for except during actual war, when the Subsidiary Force took the field; and although he notices our *stress* on that point in his latter communication, it is only for the purpose of disallowing its force. Clearly therefore he assumes the existence of obligations on the Nizam which are in excess of those contemplated by the treaty, and this was the sum of our imputation. For the remainder of his last letter, it must pass without further remark except on two points. The first is his argument that the Contingent cannot dispense with any of its European commissioned strength—an assumption so totally opposed to the admissions of almost all military writers who have handled the subject that we marvel at its boldness. Why are the Bengal irregular corps and the Gwalior Contingent efficient with a much smaller complement of officers than is allotted to that of the Nizam?

The second topic that we would allude to is our correspondent’s remark concerning the manner in which we deal with the Deccan treaty. At one time he tells us we bind him by the treaty where it suits our own purpose, and at another refuse to be bound by it when it militates against us; the case, however, is not so. We are perfectly willing to stand to the letter and spirit of that document in every particular. All we stipulate is that it shall be strictly applied in the Nizam’s favour as well as to his disadvantage, and understood in its natural sense, without any straining such as it was subjected to by our Deccan correspondent. Had that writer been content to take it thus, he never could have built thereon his fanciful theory about the Nizam’s engagements which we have controverted.

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MADRAS SPECTATOR, June 5, 1850.—The following is from our correspondent at Hyderabad, dated the 14th ultimo:—

“I should have said that the Contingent, which was formed in 1812 or thereabouts continued to serve the Nizam on all his occasions, on the requisition

of his Government, without any question being raised as to the justice of the cause for which their services were required till 1832, when the Court of Directors left it to the discretion of the Resident, in the following words, to comply or not, as he should think proper, with the requisition of the Nizam's Government for their services :—

“ 18th.—With respect to the general state of the country, we can only direct that you will instruct the Resident never to forget the solemn obligation he lies under, in no case to permit the Subsidiary Force, or even the Nizam's own army so long as it is officered by British subjects, to obey the requisitions of the Minister, until he has first satisfied himself that the purpose for which their services are required is a just one, and even then to require from the officer in command the fullest reports of all his proceedings.”

“ The expense of the first Subsidiary Force to the Nizam, which consisted of 6,000 firelocks with their complement of guns and European artillerymen, was 24 lacs a year. The addition made subsequently to the Subsidiary Force, of 2,000 firelocks and 1,000 swords, was eighteen lacs thirteen thousand one hundred and eighty-eight Cantarry pagodas, which taken at an exchange of 3 rupees 6 annas per pagoda, gives near 61 lacs. The charge between the one and the other Subsidiary appears to me very disproportionate. I have therefore hoped that the generosity of the Company may consider it as some retribution to remit to the Nizam the debt of his Government, more especially on the ground of the burden it has imposed upon the Nizam by a Contingent, unnecessarily kept up in a time of peace, unauthorized by the treaty, and, though paid by the Nizam, not under his control. It has been, as the *Times* has said, raised as an addition to our own military resources. If so, the Nizam is entitled to the last degree of consideration, for the difficulties in which the British Government has involved him for the promotion of its own objects.”

ENGLISHMAN, November 21, 1850.—The following is from Hyderabad :—

“ The *Friend of India* desires to know the number of Arabs and Patans within the Nizam's dominions. The information you are about to furnish will be very nearly accurate.

“ The Arabs paid by the Dewanee establishment of the Nizam, which you are to understand as distinct from the Khas (the Nizam's own) and the Jageerdaree establishments, in 1848 were 5,234. Rajah Ram Bux recently authorized Abdoolah bin Ali to levy, it is variously stated, from 400 to 1,200 Arabs. I incline to the opinion that it must have been the smaller number, but the embodying of either number would not have included within it more than 100 real Arabs, the remainder would have been made up out of the ranks of the common classes, and as the Nizam has ordered the disbandment of this body, if it were ever raised, I think I shall not be much above the mark in supposing that 100 Arabs alone have from this source been added to the numbers within His Highness's dominions. A census of the Arabs would exhibit their numbers as multiplied twofold ; there is not a Sahookar of any opulence, there is not a Talookdar of any degree, nor a man scarcely, who has anything to gain or lose, that does not hire Arabs for his protection. The resort for these guards, with a few exceptions, is generally to the Arab chiefs, who supply them from the Government troops, and so secure double pay for themselves ; the numbers hired by each individual are not furnished with any exactness, but the advantage to the party hiring them directly from the chiefs is, that although a diminished number serve his ordinary occasions, on those of importance he may be and is supplied with any numbers that the chief of his party can furnish. I would therefore exclude from a census of the Arabs those that may be so exhibited as being in private service. About 300 persons, principally Mowalluds or half-caste Arabs, may be calculated as being employed distinctly from those let out by the Arab chieftains. The Nizam includes in his body-guard between three and four hundred Arabs, and Shums-ool-Oemra about four hundred ; then the Arabs serving the Zemindars feudatories of the Nizam, other opulent Zemindars and Jageerdars, with others out of employ,



as, for instance, those who served at Badamee and Beloorgee, may be estimated at about a thousand more. So that upon the whole I conclude the Arabs—rather the party of Arabs, for the bands of the chiefs include a number of Mowalluds and not a few of the inhabitants of the country—as being between seven and eight thousand. The real Arabs may be estimated as being about 4,000.

“The Patans are about 1,500 in number; the commands held by their chiefs exceed 5,000 soldiers; but as Government Arabs are as well included in this number it may be reckoned upon that they would be supported, if the strength of the Arabs be taken as between seven and eight thousand, by four thousand men under their own immediate command. The Arabs and Patans are at issue, and there would be no coalition between them upon any matter referring to the interests of one of the parties alone; but an altercation between them and the English Government could only proceed from the enforcement of some principle equally affecting them all, and a common cause would be made. Of the Patans I suppose it may be reckoned from historical experience that, as heretofore, they will be true to no party, and will readily sell themselves to the strongest.

“But if a coalition be ever formed we have other warlike tribes, and it will be a moot point whether these make common cause with the rebellious or serve the Government. The Rohillas within the capital and dispersed about the country are about 1,100 in number, and will take side for pay, and without any forethought of consequences. If the Arabs desire to have them they will certainly get them.

“In the pay of the Nizam there are 1,286 Seikhs: their numbers throughout the dominion cannot fall far short of 3,000; 1,412 Scindees, 65 Roomees or Turks, and 100 Moguls. These are the foreign mercenaries. The Scindees and Seikhs as nations should take part against us; but I doubt that patriotism will be influencing. Their conduct will be regulated by their fears and interests.

“The statement that I have made that three-fourths of the country are held by some sort of lien by the Arabs and Patans is not very exaggerated. It is troublesome to enumerate their possessions, nor have I complete knowledge of what they do possess. My information is derived in this respect from private sources, and, though I am not satisfied of its entire accuracy, I present it as giving a clue to the Resident—whom this Government and its officers are concerned constantly to deceive—to arrive at facts. It is noticeable of these districts (I do not know of all) that one man may hold districts in all the four cardinal points, and the fact is they do so. A Talookdar obtains his districts only in consideration of a sum of money, and there are scarcely any who ever see their districts.

#### Districts held by Patans :—

	Rs.
Ellichpore, by Golam Hossain Khan .....	1,50,000
Raichore, {	
Kunnuckgerce, { Sultan Nuwaz-ool-Moolk .....	4,00,000
Gungawuttee, {	
Beer, { Raffack Yawur-ood-Dowlah .....	4,00,000
Naldroog, &c., {	
Nurse, { Saleh Mahomed Khan .....	1,25,000
Posud, &c., {	
Omrawuttee, {	
Akote, { Budhan Khan, held in the respective	
Kadloor, { names of Yenkut Row, Alunad Ali, and {	10,00,000
Deedroog, { Jadhrow for Meer Ebnam .....	
Megulgiddah, {	
Eduallahad, {	
Buroor, {	
and the lately sequestered personal jagheers of Rajah Bishen	
Chund, name not known, held in the name of Sad-ood-Deen	
Hyder, the son of his Vakeel, Ali Mahomed Khan.	
Goolburgah, {	
Warwall, {	
Rajoorah, { Nusseeb Khan in the name of Barban- {	7,00,000
Chichoi, { ood-Deen .....	
Dhunasurree, {	
Rajkoondah, {	



# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

		Rs.
Ambah, Jogae, Umbar, Jaulnah, Patree, Oon, Manuck Ghur, Korurayall, Mahore, Sayonah, Gudwall, Moongoor, Dahundah, Koelkoondah, Saram,	{ Mehtab Khan in the name of Govind Row .....	5,50,000
	{ Hussun Khan Mundozac.....	3,00,000
	Muddun Khan .....	1,50,000
	Eusoof Khan .....	60,000
	{ Mahomed Khan .....	3,00,000
	Total.....Rs.	<u>44,35,000</u>

## Districts held by Arabs :—

		Rs.
Narainpatt, Goormutkall, Ootloor, Mucktull, Tickmaul, Purgee, Gujwail, Latoor, Saradhoon, Buswunt, Chimnoor, Mahadeopoor, Bhauswarrah, Udloor, Nelingah, Sarbar, Belolce, Mudhole, Bhougeer, Azimpait, Naudair,	{ Abdoolla bin Ali, held in the names of different parties .....	10,00,000
	{ Oomer bin Aooz, held in the name of Ram Row and several others .....	10,00,000
	Total.....Rs.	<u>20,00,000</u>

“ Districts held by the Nizam's subjects, Government passing bonds for payment of advances made by them to the Arab chiefs:—

		Rs.
Ellgundel, Khummum, Bhainsa, Kullumnoorie, Akolah, Mehkur, Nelgoonda, Neermull, Bodhun, Benolah, Candahar, Bloom, Khooldabad, Bassim, Purbunnec, Karinjah,	{ Goolam Nukee Khan, Talookdar, protected by Abdoolla bin Ali and Budhun Khan, Musheir Jung, Talookdar, protected by Abdoolla bin Ali .....	8,00,000 2,50,000
	{ Mohib Ali, Talookdar, protected by Ab- doolla bin Ali.....	6,25,000
	{ Koorban Ali, Talookdar, protected by Bafanna .....	3,50,000
	{ Shere Affghan Jung, Talookdar, protected by Abdoolla bin Ali .....	1,50,000
	{ The jagher of the sons of the late Rajah Row Rumba, managed by Oomer bin Aooz .....	1,00,000
	{ Ramkishun Das, Talookdar, protected by an Arab, through the medium of Rajah Eswunt Row, the Sheristadar of the Arabs .....	3,00,000
	{ Golan Yaseen Khan, Talookdar, protect- ed by Nuseeb Khan .....	4,00,000
	Total.....Rs.	<u>29,75,000</u>

“ The private jageers are estimated to be about 25 lakhs of rupees ; of these I hold that at the least 15 lakhs of jageers are mortgaged to capitalists, principally

to Arabs and Patans ; but in those cases where they are mortgaged to other capitalists these capitalists find protection for their lien on the property from Arabs and Patans."

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *December 27, 1850*.—We learn, from a source which leads us to receive the news as authentic, that the Nizam, in communication with General Fraser, has repudiated the entertainment of any wish for a reduction of the Contingent. If so, however, it is presumable that he was led to the subject by the Resident, and since that functionary, no less than the Supreme Government, desires the unimpaired maintenance of the force, he may very probably, without dictating to His Highness, have so expressed himself as to guide the latter to a conclusion that by declining to sanction retrenchment, even although formally suggested to him, he would gratify the British power. Under the impression that such has been the case, we do not attach much importance to the declaration of the timid Prince, which may speak anything rather than his private sentiments. But even supposing that the case were otherwise, and that he really did desire to keep up the present strength of the Contingent, it would afford no proof of the propriety of that measure. He is incapable of discerning, or unwilling to follow out, what will conduce to the true interests of his State, and except the Company press on his acceptance the reforms necessary to secure it his political salvation will never be achieved. His present vacillation is quite unintelligible, and favours the persuasion that he knows not which way to turn. Even speculation can read no other meaning in his halting between the extremes of Shums-ool-Oomra and Suraj-ool-Moolk. The prevalent anticipation seems to be that he will ultimately cast himself, in a moment of disgust and alarm, into the hands of the British Government, and on their own terms.

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *February 19, 1851*.—From our Hyderabad correspondent, dated 11th instant :—

"The Arabs have now for the first time refused to obey the orders of the Nizam. They had heretofore been but too prompt to execute his commands. Two Patan Chiefs, Nusseeb Khan and Boodun Khan, have been ordered to relinquish the charge of their collectorates, which they, as it is usual here, evade doing ; and the Arabs have been ordered to coerce them, but make no movement. I take it to be the commencement of an understanding between the warlike tribes that a common cause may soon demand their mutual co-operation. The Nizam, who whilst the Arabs maintained his authority was powerful to exact obedience from the less powerful of his servants, is now left without a resource. Although the disobedience of the Arabs prostrates the Nizam's authority, his change of position will be unfelt by him, as some sort of money accommodation will be made to him by his contumacious servants, to soothe him into good humour with themselves and to qualify his degradation."

ENGLISHMAN, *April 22, 1851*.—The following is from Hyderabad, dated the 10th instant :—

"It is reported, but nothing has as yet appeared to confirm the truth of the report, that the Resident has again urged the banishment from the Nizam's dominions of the Arabs and Pathans. As it is impossible that this should not be an object with the British Government, a fitter opportunity for carrying it into effect could not be found. If British troops were now employed against the Arabs at Wunpurty, a sort of fort rather more respectable than a common mud gurhee, it would lead to one of three results. Abdoolla bin Ali must give in, and consign the immediate actors at Wunpurty to Government, concealing his own participation in their conduct, for such punishment as it may choose to inflict. In such case their deportation, which would be a necessary consequence, would thin the ranks of the Arabs by 300 men, the number said to be employed at Wunpurty. Opportunities of this nature, and they occur quite too often, would throw the war to a distance from the capital, and enable us to cut off the Arabs in detail. We have

the examples of Badami, Meerchur, and Beloorgee that the body of the Arabs do not make common cause, and take part in these isolated affairs. But any measure affecting the reduction of the strength of the Arabs would be useless unless the Nizam were bound down by the Resident not to enlist more Arabs, nor to permit his Arab Jemadars to recruit for the completion of the complement of their bands. The next condition is that other Arabs might possibly reinforce the party at Wunpurty. This would be no disadvantage to us, the greater the number opposed to us the more would the ultimate work of breaking their strength, and rendering them powerless to do harm, be facilitated. The example would be salutary, and it is not likely that with the knowledge of our strength impressed upon their minds the other Arabs would attempt any rescue of their countrymen from the fate to which the Government might choose to consign them. Here, then, there would be no involved question of accounts. The party would be treated as rebels, and would too readily accept the condition of retiring from the country with the wealth they had already amassed, and held within their own immediate possession, without looking for the realization of their demands against the subjects of the Nizam, or the Government itself. There is one other condition not likely of occurrence, that the Arabs may make common cause with their countrymen. If ever we mean to expel them from the Nizam's dominions neither a better motive nor a more advantageous position could be provided for us. We shall have to contend against rebels and depredators; and we shall be absolved from the necessity of adjusting involved accounts and fraudulent contracts, in the settlement of which we and the Arabs can never agree.

"The course we contemplate for relieving the country from the incumbrance of the warlike tribes which infest it is a fair settlement of their demands, consequent upon their discharge from the service and their quitting the country. I very much doubt whether the good intention to do the Arabs justice would not be frustrated by the unfairness and exorbitancy of their demands, and under such circumstances lead to bloodshed, with the advantage to the Arabs of holding the city, and thence compelling us for its safety into an adjustment, not upon terms such as justice would recognize, but by composition. I hear the Nizam has engaged that Talib-ood-Dowlah should sequester the zemindaree of Wunpurty, and pay the creditors of the Zemindar from its revenues. The Arab chiefs have deputed two officers of their party to endeavour to prevail upon the assailants of Wunpurty to accept these terms. Whilst the deliberation and discussions at this Court have been pending, three or four infants, snatched from their mothers' breasts, have perished from want of sustenance."

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *September 29, 1851*.—From our Hyderabad correspondent, dated 20th instant:—

"The Nizam is occupied in mustering the sowars of the Surf Khas, a portion of the Khas Rissalah, consisting of about 1,700 men, and in apportioning a reduced salary to each man—something about one-half. If this reduction be carried out throughout the whole of the Khas Rissalah, consisting of a body of 5,645 horse, and maintained at an annual charge of 34,61,983 rupees, it may be fairly reckoned upon that a saving, if not of half the amount, of 14 lacs may be effected. But the Nizam works slowly. His average rate of muster is about 20 men per day, and many a holiday intervenes. His Highness pays one month's reduced salary to each man, a something to enable him to prolong his existence, and to mark his future pay. There is of course much discontent. Two men have signalized themselves by chucking the money back in at the window through which it had been showered upon them. Although, as you may suppose, the discontent is general, no man will leave the service; they have nowhere to go, and they will receive whatever is given to them. In this circumstance of their receiving one month's pay we may see that their arrears are lost for ever.

"The Munsubdaree establishment costs the Nizam 11 lacs of rupees per annum. A reduction proportionate to that of the Khas Rissalah, *viz.*, 4 lacs of rupees, may be made in this body without encroaching upon the actual receipts of

individuals. I believe so much as 7 lacs are not paid to the Munsubdars, the difference being pocketed by the Sheristadars. The numerical reduction of troops in the Infantry and on the Jagirdaree establishment, both of troops and rates of pay, would give a considerable amount of saving. But I have only mentioned the Munsubdars as, in common with the Surf Khas, it is a work of no difficulty. The other reduction will require labour and firmness of purpose to carry it through."

ENGLISHMAN, *October 12, 1852*.—The following is from Hyderabad, 29th ultimo:—

"I send you a printed copy of a proclamation made at Bombay; it of course refers to Hyderabad. This shows what the Government desires, and gives the portent that it will not be very long before it is accomplished.

"By the bye, two thousand men, I should now say three thousand three hundred, added by new enlistments to the strength of the Arabs, is also a positive numerical accession. All the Arabs, in and out of the service, would make common cause, but new levies admit of half-caste Arabs and natives of the Deccan being enlisted among their ranks, and indeed these constitute something less than one-half of the numbers, now amounting to 8,500, commanded by Arab chiefs.

"The first great point is to pay the Arabs and dismiss them. Lord Dalhousie has already strenuously recommended that this should be done to the utmost fraction of their claims; hence it follows that an adjustment with them upon such terms will necessarily bring, in consequence of the new enlistments, an additional payment upon the party which may have to settle their claims.

"The Bombay *Official Gazette* contains the subjoined proclamation regarding *Foreign Adventurers*:—

"PROCLAMATION.—Whereas the peace of native States in the interior is endangered by the immigration of foreign adventurers seeking military service within those territories, and the peace of the districts of the British Government which are contiguous thereto is also liable to disturbance from the same cause, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council is pleased to forbid a passage through the districts subordinate to the Presidency of Bombay to any foreigner who may be proceeding to the territories of native States in the interior, without a passport from the Senior Magistrate of Police in Bombay, or the political or local police authority at the port or frontier station by which he may enter the British jurisdiction; and any such person attempting to violate this prohibition shall be arrested, and required to give satisfactory security to refrain from such attempts before he shall obtain his release from custody, failing which he shall be sent back to his own country.

By order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council,

"A. MALET, Chief Secretary.

Bombay Castle, 7th Sept. 1852."

"The *Times* remarks that this is all quite right and proper of course, but wonders whom Government has in its eye. 'The proclamation is not issued without some specific cause: what is the cause?'"

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *October 31, 1853*.—From our Hyderabad correspondent, dated 24th instant:—

"In sequence of the recent treaty with the Nizam, which provides that the Contingent shall be limited to five thousand foot and two thousand horse, the Governor-General has directed the disbandment of the fifth Cavalry Rissala; His Lordship, however, has sanctioned that such men of the Rissala as choose to enlist for continuous service in Burmah shall be placed upon the establishment of the Company. I consider that did the condition on which service is offered to these men concur with that of the regular establishment, admitting of periodical reliefs, the men would gladly and thankfully enlist. In the present dearth of service for such men in India, subsistence has become the prominent want, and scarcely leaves them an alternative. But I still fear that this continuous service will be a bar to the enlistment of the greater numbers, and perhaps of the most approved part, of the soldiery. It is difficult to a Mussulman to quit even for a time the happy climate, the exuberant soil, the *dolce far niente*, the refinement of music and poetry and the gorgeous ceremonies of his country, social and religious. But to expatriate himself altogether, to go into what he will consider exile for ever, for

subsistence, will be hard to be borne with, and if the terms of the enlistment be accepted, which I very much doubt, they will be accepted with extremest reluctance."

ENGLISHMAN, *November 5, 1853*.—The following is from Hyderabad, dated 21st ultimo :—

"The disbandment of a Rissala of the Hyderabad Contingent, the 5th, is now about to be carried into effect. The arrangement is consequent upon the late treaty, which limits the number of the troops to be employed in the Contingent. A proposal is made to the disbanded troops to receive them into the Company's service if they will enlist for permanent service in Burmah; I do not know how the proposal may take. Expatriation is difficult to a native of India; but on the other hand a subsistence, to use a truism, is a vital want and will prevail. The poor fellows are brave and good men, have every one's sympathy, and I hope there is a sufficiency of vacancies in the other Rissalas to permit the absorption of a number of these discharged men. A colony of such men might be useful to us in Burmah."

ENGLISHMAN, *November 17, 1853*.—Our Hyderabad correspondent says :—

"A second reduction has been made in the military establishment. Boodun Khan, who had obtained great notoriety in Suraj-ool-Moolk's administration, and had been raised to the pro-consulates of many districts and to a large military command, upon a composition with the Minister, in consideration of the district of Indore, yielding a revenue of about a lakh of rupees per annum, being assigned to him, has agreed to the disbandment of all his new levies, and to a reduction by one-third of the troops he held under Rajah Chundoo Lal, promising as part of the condition made with him not to sue for his arrears, nor for the large debt he claims till the Government shall have arranged for the payment of all its debts. This arrangement is advantageous to the Government, inasmuch as it precludes a present tumult and brings in a saving by the disbandment of the troops. The assignment of Indore is nothing in access of his former tenure, it only goes a small way to make up for the 4 or 5 lakhs of annual revenue which Boodun Khan has lost in Berar by the late cession. But then by the reduction of his military command he has to pay less money to military retainers. The measure is not the best, it is not that which a Government in possession of full authority would carry out; it is an expedient, and upon the whole has been judiciously arranged.

"Another abuse has been corrected. The Minister's Moonshee-khana were allowed fees of office. This led to great abuses, and the Minister has compounded with his Moonshees by increasing their salaries. I do not hear that much corruption is imputed to the Moonshees. The Minister should take care that in the capacity of either avowed or concealed vakeels of parties these men do not get privately salaried."

ENGLISHMAN, *November 19, 1853*.—The following is from Hyderabad, the 5th instant :—

"We understand here that the Governor-General will shortly send instructions regarding the Arabs—I hope regarding their final disposal. The instructions will in all probability come with the new Resident, and it is presumable that, whatever they may have for their object, a discretionary power will be left to the Resident as to the mode of carrying them out. If the intention be the entire reduction of their bands, and as a necessary consequence the deportation of the Arabs, the work will be arduous and exposed to one of two results—that of satisfying the Arabs in regard to their pecuniary claims much upon their own terms, or of bringing them to submission by force of arms. It is needless to reiterate that they occupy the capital of the Deccan, and that, unless we subject the city to a bombardment, the carrying its streets will expose us to hazards similar to those of the late fight at Aurungabad, and at much greater disadvantage. For whilst we attack certain points we shall have others to defend. The bombardment of the city will be one of those equivocal acts, apparently a measure of precipitation, which the British

Government will probably eschew, at all events try to avoid. Independently of the almost indiscriminate carnage of friends and foes and neutrals which would follow laying the capital of an ally in ruins, we should have a popular clamour raised against the act in England, and decidedly, though of less effect, a European clamour. On the other hand, pecuniary satisfaction may be rendered them at no great cost perhaps, but it will be too humiliating if we are forced into submission to their demands, and costly besides, for we should be bound then to settle with every captain of a band, with every Talookdar, and with every Sahookar on the same principles on which we may adjust with the Arabs. In a wholesale measure there is difficulty ; but in moving deliberately and discreetly towards the end the object may be attained without much difficulty in a period of two years, perhaps within one. It is proposed here by the Nizam's Government to dismiss the recent levies of all descriptions made in Suraj-ool-Moolk's time. The reduction of these, connectedly with those raised by Ram Bux would reduce the strength of the Arabs to about five thousand men, such as it was in Rajah Chundoo Lal's time ; and following this measure, which the two leading jemadars have all along advocated, a further reduction of the strength of the old band might be effected. In such case the strength of the Arabs would be sufficiently curtailed to admit of their being brought into subjection to the Government, as they have before been. The Arab chiefs now presiding over large bands would be content, if not deprived altogether, to remain at the head of reduced parties, or if their pride, as I believe it would, should be opposed to the change in their position, to leave their relatives in charge. I am confident that so long as the measure against them was not a measure of general hostility we should find amongst their influential men numerous partizans to aid our object.

"In the disbandment of the new levies which I have suggested, taking all classes of persons, about seven or eight thousand would be dismissed ; of these I consider 5,000 might have relation to the Arab bands, of which about 1,500 might be Arabs, and the remainder either half-caste Arabs or the inhabitants of the country dressed up to represent Arabs. The disposal of these men would be difficult, and their discharge would lead for a time to the disorders which ordinarily prevail when large bodies of troops are disbanded anywhere. The Deccanese, if the Government be strong, would soon fall into their old occupations ; and, as I deprecate altogether measures of wholesale deportation, it might be so ruled that the supernumerary Arabs shall of themselves leave the country. It should be made highly penal for any Zemindar, Talookdar, military Jemadar, Sahookar, or any other class of person to entertain Arabs in his pay. The Government should equally avoid giving commands of Arabs beyond the allotted numbers to any persons whatsoever. But in denying to the subject the right to retain Arabs in his private pay, the Government should recollect that it is denying to him the right of effectual protection for his person and property (to the honour of the Arabs be it said that with one solitary exception, they have invariably kept faith with their employers, and are alone the persons trusted by the people here), and the Government should take care preliminarily to provide competent security for the lives and properties of its subjects. It is too commonplace to suggest that this can only be done by proper judicial and police establishments. Neither will be effectually provided unless the Resident have a directing influence. If the Government of India is about to take measures to regulate affairs in relation to the Arabs, I shall not despair of seeing all things put right. Once in motion the British Government cannot stop half-way."

ENGLISHMAN, *November 25, 1853.*—The following is from Hyderabad, dated 11th instant :—

"The order for the dismissal of the 5th Rissalah, to take place on the 1st November, was out, and money was sent by bills falling due exactly to the day to pay them off, that no demur as to time in their disbandment might occur. I am happy to say Major Mayne defers execution of the order till the further pleasure of the Governor-General on a petition of the Rissalah transmitted by Major

Mayne shall be taken. Whether this delay has been adopted in advertence to a Russian war or not it is in every way proper. If we have a Russian war and troops be required to be sent from India to take part in it, we can neither dispense with our best troops, such as these Rissalahs are (recollect they carried the barricade at Jeswunt Poora, and volunteered to lead the storming party at Dharoor), nor with the local officers. The troops of the Company, already said to be too thinly officered, will not be able to spare any to do duty with the Contingent; indeed the Government would most probably think it advisable to draft officers from the troops remaining behind, to complete the complement of those going to Egypt. And if there be an Arab outbreak the services of an effective Contingent will be much required, and no body of men are more capable or willing than the Rissalahs to do service against them."

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *November 28, 1853.*—From our Hyderabad correspondent, dated 19th instant :—

"A first dismissal of Arabs has taken place, in progress, but I fear in slow progress, towards the reduction of others. Syed Ali Girbanee, a jemadar of 100 Arabs, has been dismissed in due form, and his entire arrears, 10,000 rupees, than which nothing more is claimed by him as such, have been tendered to him. He refused to accept this unless 15,000 rupees more are paid to him on account of jokum chittees which he holds of the late Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk. A jokum chittee—this word will frequently be used—is a guarantee of payment by a powerful servant of Government on behalf of the Government to some third party, a creditor of the Government not strong enough to obtain payment from the Government by his own efforts. A resort to these jokum chittees was frequent during the late administration of Suraj-ool-Moolk, and it will be found, when the time comes, to involve extensive responsibility and for very heavy sums. It is needless to remark that these jokum chittees were of some—I would say of considerable—effect, or they could not have come into general practice. The Minister, whose rule of conduct is to pay all arrears to parties discharged, but to postpone payment of other pecuniary claims to the general arrangement that may be made for the discharge of all the liabilities of Government, has resorted, as he can enforce nothing in the present state of things, to a measure exhibiting good judgment. He has said to Syed Ali—and he could do no otherwise with the example set to the whole country by Lala Bahadoor, who has forcibly extorted from him the revenue of Narainpet to cover his own jokum chittee given in favour of Oomrowgeer—that he would pay his jokum chittees, but, in common with him, he would discharge the parties in whose favour the chittees were given. This has arrested proceedings. A week has passed and the Arab, Syed Ali, has not presented himself, neither with the jokum chittees nor to receive his arrears. If this man throw the question into abeyance, conceive the immense power of the Arabs, whether he succeed or not in his ultimate object, in the circumstance of his seeking a pretence to force upon the Government that he was not discharged, because, although by his own lacs, he was not paid. What can be done under these circumstances? The Nizam will not ask aid of the English, and the English Government will not press its interference upon the Nizam, though the necessity of the case requires it. The alternative to it is the state of disorder, the bloodshed and cruelties which may be witnessed here every day. The question is not altogether one-sided; we have no right to interfere. Our engagements with the Nizam, the primary cause of this disorder, certainly admit of a balancing of the question on grounds of public law. We have on the one hand the faith of treaties, on the other the first great principle that every treaty which leads to an infraction of the laws of Nature is null.

"Suppose we should say to the Nizam, We break up the subsidiary treaty and withdraw our troops—a thing hardly to be done in the face of the late treaty. The Nizam might say, Restore to me the lands you hold from me as subsidy. The obvious reply would be, The infraction of the treaty is on your part, and humanity imposes it as a duty upon us that the inhabitants of the country ceded by you,

who have enjoyed the benefits of our rule, should not be given over to your tender mercies. The Nizam might shift his ground and say, Pay me the revenues. Government cannot be wanting to a reply :—The Subsidiary Force, which we have heretofore maintained for your service by those revenues, will now be required to protect our territories from the consequences of the disorders and anarchy prevailing in yours, and those revenues must go to pay the force. Restore your Government to good order or put it under our control so as to guarantee to us that those disorders shall not again prevail, and we will willingly renew the treaty and restore the subsidiary troops to you on the original conditions. Lord William Bentinck contemplated (*vide* Oude Minute) the cancelment of subsidiary treaties and was only deterred from carrying his opinions into practical effect by his fears of the disorders which would prevail in Native States. As they now exist in despite of the subsidiary treaties, their cancelment would be of little consequence. If it add to the aggravation of disorders, it would the sooner be terminated, and we might see Abdoolah bin Ali the powerful and just ruler of the Deccan, recognized by the British Government and forming treaties with it."

ENGLISHMAN, *December 20, 1853*.—Our latest intelligence from Hyderabad, dated 7th instant, is as follows :—

"Hubbeeb Saleh, a commander of 170 Arabs, has had 70 of his party dismissed.

"Mahomed Khan, a jemadar, holding a considerable command of 700 horse and a numerous motley infantry, has had one-third of his military establishment reduced by an arrangement which I think judicious and beneficial. The number of the soldiery is not reduced; but their pay is curtailed by one-third. The contract of Mahomed Khan for troops was heavy; the troops were not paid more than the Government now allows him,—the surplus, a very considerable amount, was pocketed by the chief. I shall be glad to see it form part of the reform that the Government should look to the soldiers receiving their full pay without any diminution. I have not said, as in the case of Oomer bin Aooz, that Mahomed Khan sanctions the arrangement; his position was different from Oomer's. Oomer held the districts, and to dispossess him troops (which the Government literally has not for services of any importance) must have been sent to the districts. Mahomed Khan's districts were included in those lately assigned to the English and were lost to him; he had no choice but to accept others upon such terms as the Government pleased to grant him.

"Sultan Nuwaz-ool-Moolk was ousted from his districts in a manner similar to Mahomed Khan. His military command, excepting that it is not so extensive, is established on the same pay and allowances as Mahomed Khan's. The same terms of allowances upon a reduced scale as those given to Mahomed Khan are now offered to him, but he will not accept them; a protracted negotiation has been the result; he must yield in the end, unless indeed he can influence the Nizam to support him. His Highness is not disposed to prevent the reductions, which are now being made according to his own views, namely, that there shall not be reduction in the numbers, but in the pay, of the troops. His Highness's observation to this effect was remarkable,—his Government was a faqueer's scanty dish out of which the brotherhood might partake of what they could get.

"Sultan Galib—commanding 500 Arabs on the Nizam's household establishment and 550 on the Dewanee (recent levies made under orders from Rajah Ram Bux when Minister, and confirmed by the subsequent administration of Suraj-ool-Moolk)—has been dismissed by the Nizam; but Sultan Galib will not accept the dismissal at the hands of the Nizam or of his Government unless he receive nine lakhs of rupees, the Government only allowing five to be due, which he claims from it. It will end in some sort of composition, and the persistence of the Minister may succeed in dismissing the new levies, those attached to the Dewanee. Sultan Galib continues to provide guards at the palace; this is wise, it is strength to him; but in the same proportion it is unwise in the Nizam's Government to permit it. It, however, cannot help itself.

"The Resident was yesterday closeted with the Minister. The Arabs, the



theme of prominent interest here, are said to have been the subject of their conference. There is reason to believe that an arrangement for their dismissal was proposed in a specific and distinct form, and if the arrangement be such as I believe it to be I hope it may be accepted by the Supreme Government."

ENGLISHMAN, *March* 28, 1854.—Our Hyderabad correspondent writes as follows, the 15th instant :—

"The Resident saw the Nizam the other day. Authentic reports of the conference are not yet abroad. The best information, that which I select from many rumours, is that he presented His Highness with an epitome of the proceedings taken in the conduct of the Arab Chaous (sous-lieutenant) Tabith or Sabith, who fired from the walls of the suburbs of Aurungabad on Major Mayne's force when assaulting Eswuntpoora, and he took the occasion to convey advice that must be considered both friendly and salutary, inasmuch as he endeavoured to impress him with a wholesome dread of the consequences to his sovereignty that must result from licentious foreign troops being allowed to control his Government and prevail against his authority. What I do hear, however, authentically is that the Minister has expressed his satisfaction at the tone, the manner, and the good sense of Mr. Bushby's expostulations. To preclude mistakes, and to obviate misapprehensions in regard to what I state, it is necessary to observe that I know as well as others do that the Minister was not present at the first part of the conference between His Highness and the Resident. If it be said, in disqualification of my information, How, then, came the Minister to form an opinion upon the subject of the conference? my only answer is that I have stated a fact."

ENGLISHMAN, *April* 6, 1854.—The following is from Hyderabad, dated 19th ultimo :—

"I have received a copy of the two papers presented by the Resident to the Nizam. One has reference entirely to the aggressions committed by some Arabs on Major Mayne's party at Eswuntpoora; the other is a spirited expostulation by Mr. Bushby with the Nizam on the subject of his affairs. I do not recollect precisely what I last wrote to you; but I consider that the authentic account I now send you is not contradictory to the other, but may stand beside it.

"The one paper, in the first 11 paragraphs, describes the offences committed by the Arabs of Eswuntpoora, and states that an earlier representation was not made to the Nizam because the Resident was desirous previously to collate information, which although he does not possess fully, he has sufficient matter to submit to His Highness. One part of the second paper is worthy of remark: if I understand it correctly (it is badly transcribed in that part), it is to the effect that all the Arabs in the city of Aurungabad would have co-operated with the first aggression but for their early dispersion by the movement of a part of Major Mayne's force. If this be true we see in it the temper of the Arabs towards us. I say this for those at a distance; to me no new proof of their spirit of hostility towards us is wanting to confirm my long-established opinion upon this subject. But I would say at the same time that howsoever clanship may dispose the two leading Arab Jemadars, Abdoolla bin Ali and Oomer bin Aooz, to shelter their own people, they are the last men in the world (they are wealthy and sensible) to put themselves in hostile array against the power of the English. In regard to the intention of the Arabs at Aurungabad to attack us, I am disposed to refer it to the rabble soldiery, and imagine (I have no information upon the subject) that they were restrained by their lieutenants. If it be otherwise, then the bands serving at Aurungabad have made themselves liable, if not to other punishment, to dismissal from the service.

"The last seven paragraphs of the one paper are important, and I have translated them for you.

"Para. 12.—The English Government cannot allow such offences to pass with impunity. It is the duty of the British Government, from considerations of its own dignity, and the relation subsisting between the two States, to demand

from the Sirkar that it should inflict condign punishment on all offenders ; and it is necessary to make an example.

“ 13th.—The English Government cannot allow the execution of punishment to remain at the disposal of the Arabs, or of the officers of the Nizam's Government, for the obvious reason that neither is the punishment awarded adequate to the offence, nor is there any certainty of its being carried into effect.

“ 14th.—It is obligatory, therefore, on the British Government to demand that the persons of the offenders be delivered to it, with a view to their expulsion from, and consequent prohibition to return to India. If any such offenders return to India the prohibition to return will be sufficient for their arrest, and the English Government will inflict such punishment on them as it may think proper.

“ 15th.—It is due from His Highness the Nizam that he should give consideration to the opinions of the Governor-General communicated to him two years ago, and reflect upon the evils brought into his dominions by the oppression and cruelty of the Arabs residing within them. Their insolence has reached this point, that they have fired upon the troops of the English Government when employed in your Highness's service. Your Highness is well aware that upon all persons who maintain such offenders the English Government will bring the full weight of its power and authority.

“ 16th.—If there possibly could be a reason for annulling the subsisting friendship between the two Governments, it is foreseen that the English Government will find cause for it in the conduct of the foreigners ; for, notwithstanding representations which have been made, the Nizam has not participated in the desire of the English Government, nor consented to discharge or reduce them.

“ 17th.—The Governor-General deems it proper to communicate his views upon such matters to His Highness, that if any such offences should occur again it will be incumbent upon him to take direct and vigorous measures in regard to the Arabs in the service of the Nizam.

“ 18th.—It is the business of the Nizam to apprise all the Arabs in his country of the fixed determination of the Governor-General, and to proclaim it.

“ The Resident, in a spirited remonstrance made by a statement in writing, tells His Highness that the officers of his Government are everywhere under subjection to the Arabs, that their oppression and cruelty pervades all classes, high and low, and are spread over the whole of the country, and that his personal dignity has suffered degradation at their hands. He goes on to tell the Nizam that the repression of these continually increasing abuses is entirely in his hands, and that it remains with His Highness whether they shall be repressed or continue.

“ The last expression of the Resident, that it is entirely in the hands of the Nizam to repress those abuses, is pithy and significant. The Nizam has no power within the reach of his direct and immediate authority to contend with the Arabs. The inference thence is plain : he will have the strength of the English, according to treaty, to aid him whenever he chooses to ask for it.

“ The language of the 16th paragraph of the paper, which tells the Nizam that it is foreseen the cause of rupture between the two States will arise from the conduct of the foreign mercenaries, is explicit as to this, that after this the Nizam, who takes no warning, will be held responsible for their deeds of aggression and hostility. There is no departure here from international law, and it is due in justice to the English Government to say that he has been repeatedly warned of the consequences likely to result to himself from the disorders of his Government. He might take counsel, but I fear he will not.

“ The Arabs yesterday assembled at the Minister's in great numbers,—all the jemadars with large retinues. They gave in their answer in writing to the Resident's paper. I understand the answer is evasive ; they do not know who the offenders are : whoever they are, the Government is at liberty to punish them. I shall probably obtain a copy of their answer, and will send to you as much of it as may be necessary to form a conclusion to this letter.

“ The premium on the bagh chulnees has been rising gradually, and stands to the buyer 10 per cent., to the seller 9½.”

ENGLISHMAN, *April 22, 1854.*—The following is from Hyderabad, dated 9th instant :—

"The memorandum delivered by the Resident to the Nizam on the 13th ultimo contained but one positive demand, the delivery to the English Government of the Arabs who fired upon the Contingent at Eswuntpoora ; compliance with this demand is insisted upon in a manner too peremptory to be resisted, the Nizam being told that the English Government cannot recede from it. The rest of the paper, where it is not expository of positions and facts, is a denunciation of the consequences which will result to the Arabs and to the Nizam's Government if any future aggression or offence be committed by the former towards the English Government. I thence consider that this matter, though not finally disposed of, will soon be peaceably terminated. The one point for immediate observance by the Nizam's Government is the delivery of the offenders to the English Government. This will shortly be carried into effect, and dispose of the question for the present ; but the denunciation still impends over the Nizam's Government, and it will be its duty to avoid the penalty of which it has fair warning. Of the two offenders demanded to be given up, one, Subit, is in the hands of the Minister, I understand at his entire disposal ; the other, Bahudad, is lying concealed in the provinces. His place of concealment has been disclosed to the Government by the Arabs, a party of whom are now in pursuit for his apprehension. This will settle the question for the present, and as to the future we have a promise from the Arabs of obedience and good conduct, and accordingly the chiefs have made a proclamation, under the direction of the Minister, among their tribe, that they will not for the future make dangahs, or have any money dealings, under pain of expulsion from the Nizam's territories and confiscation of their property.

"I believe the Arabs to be for the present sincere in the expression of their intention, but I consider their pecuniary involvements to be of such a nature as to offer a moral impossibility to their fulfilling their engagements if nothing is done to put them in train of adjustment.

"A court of justice can do nothing. An Arab creditor presents to the court a claim against a debtor for Rs. 1,000. The debtor submits to the court an assignment for Rs. 10,000 which he holds from the Government under acceptance of the drawee, Talookdar, overdue for months and years, and unpaid. The court can do nothing against either of these parties ; it understands the transaction as a juggle between the former Minister and the Talookdar, to rid the former of the importunity of the claimant. The debtor submits to the court that, whilst he held these assets, he is neither a profligate, a dishonest nor an insolvent debtor,—that it is upon a three years' arrears of salary that he claimed from the Government,—that he has sold all his property for immediate subsistence, and is entirely destitute. The court, in common humanity, nay in common justice, can do nothing to this man, nor can it do anything to any purpose for the creditor, and yet something, according to law and usage, is due to him. The court evades a present settlement, and gives a deed of protection for three years against the creditor to the debtor. The debtor accepts it as a *pis aller*, the creditor is wholly dissatisfied. Cases of this nature accumulate. The Arabs discuss the subject amongst themselves, consider themselves ill used in not being paid whilst their debtors have claims against the Government, and resort to their old course of extorting payment to the full measure of their demands. The question will arise in the end as to whether it is not due to the creditor that his just debts should be paid to him by his debtor's debtor. I presume before long this question will be before the English Government. They will look to being paid, and if the intervention of the Government be not employed, or is not effective, for the adjustment of their claims, their resort after a time will be to the same measure they had been in the habit of pursuing with success. I hope to see something done to avert this, else the oppression towards the Nizam's subjects will be renewed with the greater audacity, because of the main requisition of the English Government having been allowed to pass idly by and without any effect.

"In regard to the Nizam's Government we have recently seen it dismissing

Sultan Galib and his band of 1,050 Arabs. I wish this dismissal had been part of a system, and not the effect of His Highness's resentment (I am not complaining of any wrong in that) for an offence offered to himself. The intention professed by the Government to reduce the strength of the Arabs has gained a snail-paced progression. One Syed Ali Geerbancee with a following of 100 Arabs has been dismissed by the Minister in part execution of his system. Since his succession to the ministry he has dismissed, independently of Sultan Galib's party, about 500 Arabs. This would indicate sincerity in his professions, but whether a simple dismissal from the service is any reduction of the strength of the confederacy I do not know. The Arabs dismissed from the service of the Government obtain service immediately with its subjects; and until perfect protection be provided for all of these by the laws of the country and the power of the Government it would be as hard to prevent persons hiring Arabs for the protection of their property and persons from illegal violence as it would be to prevent householders in Calcutta from hiring chowkedars for their protection from burglars.

"We are very quiet, one good effect of the Resident's late movement. This of course is temporary. The impression now existing will in time be effaced, and the old course renewed. There are bazaar reports of plundering Rohillas being again abroad; there is ground for presumption that the report is false, as the locality assigned to the depredations is said to be in the vicinity of the Contingent at Boden."

ENGLISHMAN, *May 3, 1854*.—The following is from Hyderabad, dated 19th ultimo :—

"In pursuance of the system I have mentioned, the Minister has arranged to dismiss 250 Arabs, half of Bafana's command, and to recover from him the district of Amba, on which he had some sort of pecuniary lien. This arrangement has of course been made subordinately to the payment of a portion of his claims on the Government. I understand that upon the whole it is a good financial measure. Since the accession of Salar Jung to the ministry 1,800 Arabs, including Sultan Galib's party, have been dismissed. The Government benefits by a reduction of expenses, but the dismissed Arabs do not leave the city. The Arab jemedars make room for them by dismissing the Mowulads, who, being in nothing but dress dissimilar to the Deccancees, change their habiliments and are entertained in the new bands of Alegoles (mixed soldiers) now being raised by the command of the Nizam to supply the place of Sultan Galib's."

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *May 3, 1854*.—From our correspondent at Hyderabad, dated 24th ultimo :—

"The disbandment of Hussen Salih's party will make the number of the Arabs disbanded since the accession of Salar Jung to office 1,900. He has also been successful in redeeming districts from mortgage. Of districts yielding revenue to the amount of 75 lacs of rupees belonging to the Minister's department there was not one when he succeeded to office that was not mortgaged. He has recovered 40 lacs of rupees of revenue, which now comes clear of all payments into the treasury."

CALCUTTA REVIEW, No. XXI., Vol. XI. (1849)—*Hyderabad Papers*. (Printed in conformity to the Resolution of the Court of Proprietors of East India Stock on the 3rd March 1824.) 2. *General Orders of the Nizam's Army*. 3. *Hints on Irregular Cavalry, by Captain C. F. Trower, 1845*.

No portion of India has been more prominently put forward, or occasioned more discussion, than the Hyderabad State; and such has been the extent to which the affairs of that unhappy country have engaged public attention that for many years past the Indian Press has rarely permitted any act of the Nizam's Government to pass unnoticed. Our readers need have no apprehension of being involved in all the perplexity of these discussions. We have hitherto abstained from taking any part in it ourselves, and we are not now about to engage in it from any feelings

of a personal nature. We have no desire either to excuse the errors of one party or to exaggerate the offences of another. Our solicitude is solely for the amelioration of the country and for the welfare of the people, and if we knew one party more capable than another of bringing that about, to him we would point. Neither do we intend on this occasion to enter upon any grave consideration of the government or misgovernment of the country, though when we do make bold to "expatiate and confer on state affairs" we shall endeavour to preserve that dispassionate impartiality which we sincerely feel upon this so much agitated question.

The task we have assigned to ourselves lies in another direction. Our immediate business is with the "Nizam's Contingent," its rise, progress, and present condition; but before entering upon its history it is necessary as an introduction that we should make some few observations on the present aspect of affairs, and take a brief retrospect of the causes which have brought the Nizam's Government into its present condition.

There is no part of India of which the reports are so opposed to one another. They resemble the contradictions of the two knights on the subject of the shield which was gold on one side and brass on the other. Each described truly what he saw, and only erred in supposing that to be the whole.

The Hyderabad politicians, like the English knights, would appear to see only one side of the shield. For while some zealous partizans, in their estimate of persons, have rung the changes upon the folly and incapacity of the executive Government, and shown a disposition to exaggerate failure or local embarrassment, there have been others equally ready not only to excuse all faults and imperfections, but to magnify every success. This ought not to be wondered at, seeing as we do every day that eulogy and invective may be had for the asking. There is, unhappily, no longer any room for controversy on this part of the question, for the conviction of all parties whose opportunities have allowed them to form a judgment on the condition of the country, and on the characters of the leading individuals at the capital, now yield to the irresistible evidence of this notorious fact—that in the ministerial arrangement towards the close of the past year, where, out of many selections one might have been made that incurred some risk only of being wrong, the choice has fallen in a quarter which cannot by any chance be right; though it is but due to the nobleman to whom we refer to state that the office, instead of being of his own seeking, is believed to have been forced upon him by his master against his inclination. But if the Nizam have neglected all those persons who are capable of aiding him, and shown but little wisdom in his recent selection of a Minister, it must never be forgotten with what benevolent motives he has, within a comparatively short period, disbursed from his private treasury, for the use of the State, the sum of two crores of rupees. We wish we could add for the benefit of the State; for, although appropriated no doubt with the best intentions, it is lamentable to reflect that at such a time so large a sum should have been so injudiciously distributed as to tend to no permanent advantage, either in retrieving the embarrassments of the State or in alleviating the difficulties of the country.

The spectacle of this once flourishing country—so peculiarly favoured by its climate, its fertility, and its situation, showing to what a height of prosperity it might be brought under the management of a just and humane Government—reduced to a state of poverty, anarchy, and wretchedness by the vices and abuses of its rulers, presents an instructive, though melancholy, object of contemplation.

By what causes, then, it may be asked, has this state of things been produced in the Deccan? There has been peace in Southern India for the last twenty-eight years. No barbarous enemy has within that period ravaged the country. The Government has been allowed to rule in all important matters almost in its own way. With uninterrupted peace and security, with everything in short that is commonly supposed to ensure national prosperity, how is it that the Nizam's Government, with its vast natural resources, has fallen into a condition of ruin and misery?

"The disorders in the Nizam's affairs," Mr. Russell recorded so far back as 1819, "are not of recent origin. The Government of Hyderabad has not been in a secure or flourishing condition at any period during the last seventy years." Again,

“when the present minister, Rajah Chundu Lall, succeeded to his office, in 1809, every department of the Government was already in a condition tending rapidly to decay.”

The troubles owe their origin to circumstances beyond the control of any particular minister; nor should blame be imputed to any man or set of men, though of the respective merits of the several late ministers it may be observed that they would have lost nothing by following the favourite maxim of the Emperor Akbar, who is said to have borne upon one of his seals “I never knew a man lost upon a straight road.” The defect belongs more to the system than to the agents by whom it is administered. Every administration for the last fifty years has been one of shifts and expedients. Every department of the Government has become in consequence notoriously corrupt. Bribes are given when contracts are to be procured. Bribes are given when accounts are to be settled. And bribes are given when disputes are to be adjudicated. Every situation is sold, and therefore every situation is abused. No one acts from humanity, no one acts from justice; and as no one will interest himself for another gratuitously, right, justice, and influence are alike to be purchased. As no public officer is inaccessible to a bribe, the whole Government in all its various offices has been linked together by corrupt practices against the interests of the State. All being alike actuated by one only passion, the thirst of gain, it is evident that where this system is universal the Government *must become* oppressive, and the very foundations of justice and good rule be destroyed in every department of the State. The base becomes undermined, and the Government in consequence insecure; for in policy as in architecture the ruin is the greater when it begins with the foundation. That the system is bad and injurious to the interests of the country is apparent, were any evidence wanting, in the oft-told tale of decrease of revenue, the misery and oppression of the lower classes, the insecurity of life and property; and, worse than all, because the source of every evil, the system of anticipating the public revenue, and of farming it from year to year to the highest bidder—producing thereby a succession of collectors or contractors over whom there is no check—who in many instances reside at the capital, leaving their duties in the interior to be performed by some inefficient and irresponsible deputy—who have no interest in the welfare of the cultivating classes beyond the current year—and whose only aim is extortion in order to be prepared for the exactions which may at any time be levied on them by the Government itself. Instances might be adduced where the collectors have in consequence become so wealthy as to be enabled to present the Government periodically with ten and even twelve lakhs of rupees.

But instead of attempting to trace the source of the evil, or wasting time in unavailing regrets at what can never be recalled, we will at once make this concession, that the weakness and disorders of the Hyderabad Government, irrespectively of the evil administration common to all Native States, are in some degree the necessary consequences of the Nizam's political situation, and that from causes arising out of an alliance with us the Nizam is as much the victim as the author of the abuses which we are now deploring.

We need only point to the treaty of 1800 as one immediate cause of embarrassment, by the continual drain made on the revenues of the country for the maintenance of a contingent force, commencing from the formation of the first brigade in 1813. And however much this may have contributed to the advancement of our mutual interests, it has undoubtedly tended very materially to exhaust the treasury of one whom we professed to befriend. By the treaty in question the Nizam is bound to provide in time of *war* 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry. Out of this engagement has arisen in *time of peace* the present expensive force, at a sacrifice of nearly one-third of the revenue, for we believe we are not wrong in estimating the cost of the Contingent at 40 lakhs of Hyderabad rupees, or about 32 lakhs of Company's rupees a year; and although our information may not be so correct in regard to the income of the State,—the accounts having for many years been accommodated to circumstances,—we have no reason to estimate it at the present time at more than one crore and a half of Hyderabad rupees. The result is an empty treasury, heavy debts, large arrears to the city troops, and no credit.

Let us not, however, mistake the nature of the evils and give our attention exclusively to the means of replenishing the treasury. Exhausted as the finances are, we still think there are higher considerations even than finance, and that the general amelioration of the country is of still greater importance ; for no gain on the score of revenue can ever ultimately compensate a Government for the sufferings of its subjects, and for the numerous other evils of incalculable magnitude which experience has shown to be inseparable from the vicious system of native administration.

In this situation of affairs the great point for inquiry is whether any system can be devised for relieving the people from oppression, and saving the country from further depredation ; and whether there exist any means of adjusting the public finances, or of supplying the present alarming deficiency in the revenue. The discussion of these several important and very inviting questions would exceed our limits. But if on the subject of finance we come to consider generally the course which policy prescribes there can be but one opinion. When the income of an individual falls off, he either contrives to increase it or he retrenches his expenditure ; or, rejecting this prudent alternative, he becomes bankrupt. The same principle applies to a Government, and it is obvious that the Deccan State has long been in the predicament of the imprudent man in all that regards the conduct of its affairs. If the income of the country is inadequate to its expenditure, if it cannot be increased and if the State will not limit its expenses, ultimate ruin must be the consequence. Relief can only be sought in a reduction of expense, and if the Nizam would but consent to disband the greater part of the numerous inefficient and useless troops which are upheld for a purpose avowedly of utility, but practically of mischief, great resources would unquestionably be found.

Of these mercenaries, belonging to various tribes, there cannot be less than some 35,000 in and about the capital. They are at best but a turbulent body of adventurers, and on more than one occasion when clamouring for their pay have shown themselves a mischievous and mutinous band. Several attempts have been made to rid the country of these people—a measure far more easily devised than carried out, owing to the inability of the Government to pay them their arrears previously to discharging them.

We are aware that our native friends are extremely ungrateful to the great men in their neighbourhood who take the trouble of forming plans for their future welfare. They have an unfortunate propensity of being happy in their own way, and of managing their own affairs themselves. But if our common interests be inseparable, as we believe them to be, then the time cannot be far distant when something must be attempted to retrieve the affairs of this exhausted country. We would hope that some forbearance and moderation may then be shown, and even any little display of occasional petulance and fretfulness under his leading-strings be forgiven the Nizam ; for in stepping in at the present crisis (when moderate concession may conciliate and preserve) to mend the fortune of our ally we shall establish a reputation throughout India opposed to our *reputed* policy, and secure a certain advantage to ourselves by the continuance of undisturbed tranquillity in the Deccan. And if it be true that part of the mischief is to be ascribed to the Minister of our own elevation, who ruled with absolute sway for thirty-five years, or in other words to our own interference, it is for that reason the more incumbent upon us to rectify our own misdoings. When that time shall arrive we hope to see our sincerity and disinterestedness practically evinced, not only in repairing the machine without destroying it, but also in mending the fortune of our ally without taking the opportunity of mending our own ; for the least that can be expected of a self-constituted reformer is that his services shall be gratuitous.

It is said that the Nizam wishes to conduct the affairs of his Government in person, and has been influenced by this feeling in his choice of the new Minister. We hope not. He tried it before and failed, not so much perhaps from natural incapacity as from the want of the requisite experience and information. Beneficent in intention, and by no means destitute of good qualities, he has the good of his people at heart, but the misfortune not to know how to accomplish it. Success in



such circumstances is hopeless. He is popular, as he deserves to be, among his own subjects, for not only is he neither cruel nor oppressive in his own person, much as he may look on and allow it in others, but he never witnesses distress without a desire to alleviate it. Yet let it at the same time be acknowledged that no oppression is so severe as that which prevails in lax Governments, where the rich and powerful *will* prey upon the poor and weak. Irresolution and vacillation are his great defects. He has neither firmness for the management of his people, nor ability and perseverance adequate to the administration of the finances. Incapable of foresight, his measures necessarily fail after being pushed to a certain length, as much from the unreflecting manner in which his plans are formed as from his necessities which allow them no time to come to perfection. In this way part of the work is mismanaged, and the rest left undone, while his ill-digested plans tend rather to confirm than to extirpate the evils they are intended to destroy. His amusements are of the most puerile kind, and the great object of those about him is to feed not only his pleasures but also his vanity, by instilling into his mind that nobody can rule like himself—all the while keeping the cares and realities of government at a distance. His dislike of the English, their habits and manners, is well known; and the minions about him take good care to keep this feeling alive by not only alienating his mind in every possible way from the English, but by making him believe that all that we do proceeds from interested motives. He is consistent in nothing but in his prejudices and in his opposition to the views of the Resident. His chief object is counteraction, and if it can be discovered that there is one party more acceptable to us than another, or one more attached to our interests than another, that in itself would be sufficient to excite jealousy, and to deprive him of the Nizam's countenance and favour; for those very qualities which would recommend a person to us would be fatal to the Nizam's confidence in him as a minister. In other respects he is said to possess an amiable disposition.

But to talk to him of the science of government, of the sources of national prosperity, of the causes of national decay, is to place before the Nizam images which he cannot comprehend. His views of policy are very limited. Instead of perceiving how much the prosperity of his subjects would add to the strength of his Government, his ideas would seem to be confined to maintaining everybody without diminution of their unlawful gains, such even as are made by fraud. In this lies the difficulty of regulating the finances, because retrenchment would interfere with some man's job. Nor is there any indication of his ever having meditated, much as we believe he desires it, any precise design for the welfare of his subjects or the prosperity of his dominions.

Nothing can be more praiseworthy than the ruler of a country acquainting himself with the concerns of his own people; and much as one would naturally desire to see the legitimate sovereign in the exercise of his proper functions, yet as incapacity may be fully as mischievous as bad intention, we confess our trepidation at seeing the reins of government in such hands, and should be very glad to see this amiable and well-meaning Prince retire into the privacy of his palace, and his sedality diverted into a channel more suited to his habits and bent of mind. For while we believe that his errors and weaknesses proceed more from the head than the heart, and are to be ascribed to his position, and that his rule has never been disfigured either by designed cruelty or rapacity, yet so great is his timidity, indecision, and vacillation, that notwithstanding all his good intentions the Government has become so paralyzed and powerless as scarcely any longer to possess the means either of doing good or preventing evil.

That the machine has been going downhill for the last fifty years is a melancholy fact; and that it has not already fallen to pieces excites astonishment,—though, looked at in one point of view, a cheering inference may be drawn, for in so much vitality there must be some principle of good. And if the Government, hitherto so grossly mismanaged, could only be extricated from its present embarrassments, and placed under the direction of a vigorous mind, a better revenue system gradually organized, oppression altogether abolished, and other gross errors in the interior administration rectified, there might yet be some hope of establishing a new



order of things at once wise and salutary. To carry through such principles, the administration must be entrusted neither to the Nizam nor to his favourites, but to men of character and capability, of active mind and energetic will; and if native instruments of the requisite qualifications cannot be found, recourse must be had to European agency. Whether the crisis shall be for evil or for good depends, under Providence, mainly upon ourselves. It will be for us to sow the seed, yet without weeding the ground well the desired harvest cannot be looked for.

But it is of little use, without the men to carry them out, to describe the measures for the amelioration of the country. The causes of the disorders are not, we believe, irremovable, nor its finances irretrievable. The State possesses the resources, if it will only produce them, and make a wise application of them; but when we look around for one to keep the machine in a right direction we find none equal to the task. There are no projects, no ideas. All is veiled in darkness and corruption. There is no plan for the benefit of the country. There is only a sigh for the past, and nothing for the future. Yet one would suppose that the swift shadows of coming events were sufficiently ominous to startle the Government from its indolence.

There is a certain degree of calamity which overwhelms the mind. The Nizam would appear to be reduced to this state. Yet he has daily an example before him, as his ministers have had for the last ten years, that vigour both of mind and body, although the ordinary accompaniments, are not always confined to youth; but however much the Resident may counsel and advise, however much he may resent the evils which he daily witnesses, the more earnest, the more anxious, the more eager he is, so much the more must he feel his heart sink within him at what he encounters. Painful indeed must it be to one in such a situation to behold as it were the vitality of the State gradually disappearing before him.

We are no advocates for violent innovations in the original institutions of a native Government; but where corruption and venality have taken such root, nothing less than a reform, which, commencing in the root of the State, shall be felt through the trunk and all its limbs even to the minutest ramification, can eradicate the existing evils. To remove all impurity, to heal all the wounds inflicted by misrule, the huge Angean stable must be cleansed,—a task that might well dismay Hercules himself. We may then, and only then, to borrow happier language than our own, trust “that all things may continually amend from evil to good, from good to better, and from better to the best.”

We will now enter upon the history of the Contingent.

It is a matter of history that the Government of Hyderabad had been unfortunate in every war in which it had been engaged between the death of Nizam-ul-Mulk, the founder of it, who died in 1748, and the treaty of Paungul in 1790, with the single exception of a short campaign against the Mahrattas which Nizam Ally conducted with some success in 1761; and the result had in every instance been attended with a loss of territory or of revenue. The grandfather of the present Nizam had good reason, from the unfortunate results of the battle of Kurdla in 1795, to be dissatisfied with the conduct of his own chiefs and troops. The few who did their duty were ill rewarded, and the rest were suffered to fall rapidly into neglect. Such conduct might have been foretold from the manner in which the troops of that day were recruited and organized.

The Nizam—reduced both in power and resources, irritated also by the disastrous results of the campaign which he in a great measure attributed to the English, in consequence of the two battalions then forming the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, which had been subsidized from the British Government by the treaty of 1790, not being allowed to accompany him into the field—gave the first proof of his dissatisfaction by intimating on his return to the capital his wish that the British troops should be withdrawn. The same feelings of ill-will which dictated this measure led him also to give his attention to the increase and improvement of a large body of infantry commanded by an enterprising French officer of the name of Raymond. It was the policy of the French party to magnify the power and resources of their own country, and on all possible occasions to depreciate the character and

credit of Great Britain. The French corps composed the largest and most efficient part of His Highness's military establishment, and after the peace the Nizam, sensible of the value of their services and the importance of augmenting and improving the force, put great power into the hands of its commander, and assigned territorial revenue for the regular payment of the troops.

The Resident remonstrated against this proceeding. He further remonstrated against the intention of sending a detachment to occupy a post immediately upon the frontier of our own possessions.

The Governor General, deeply disquieted by this last measure, after instructing the Resident as to the line of conduct he was to pursue in endeavouring to prevail upon the Nizam to recall the detachment, concludes as follows :—

"These arguments, urged in firm but moderate and conciliatory language, will, I hope, prevail on the Nizam to comply with my wishes and acquiesce in the recall of the detachment. I deem this a point of the first importance ; but if he should still persist in his determination to continue it at Kurpah you will adopt the language of remonstrance, and ultimately acquaint him that I shall in this event be compelled, with whatever reluctance, to advance a body of troops towards our frontier."

At this critical juncture an event occurred, fortunate perhaps for both parties. The Nizam, alarmed by the rebellion of his eldest son, hastened to solicit aid and support of his ancient allies, whose friendship he had so recently slighted. An armed support was freely afforded, and for a time the French suffered neglect, while the English were treated with favour ; but no sooner were the Nizam's fears dispelled than his former prejudices returned, and the French received every encouragement to recruit and improve their force.

Notwithstanding this the Nizam expressed his willingness to dismiss the French provided the English Subsidiary Force was increased ; but the conditions of the arrangement were considered incompatible with other engagements, and no decisive steps were taken. In this difficulty a medium course suggested itself—that of encouraging English adventurers to enter the service of the Nizam, in the hope that they might be useful in counteracting the views of the French ; but the expedient entirely failed, and little or no advantage resulted from it. The English made no advance, while Raymond's corps grew up into a regular and well-trained army.

The French corps, originally about fifteen hundred, had in a few years increased to eleven thousand, and in 1798 amounted to fourteen thousand men, with more than one hundred European officers and subordinates. Its discipline, although inferior in some respects to our own army, was far superior to the infantry of other native powers. There were field-pieces to each regiment with a park of forty pieces of ordnance and a complete equipment of military stores, together with a well-trained body of artillerymen, many of whom were Europeans. Arsenals and foundries had been formed for their equipment, and every effort made which could add to their strength and stability.

These improvements had taken place subsequent to the battle of Kurdla ; for when on that occasion Raymond, who had nearly expended his ammunition, sent to the magazine for fresh supplies, he was told by the Nizam himself that "as he was bound by contract to furnish ammunition he should not have any."

The French corps, as constituted in 1798, formed the only efficient part of the Nizam's military establishment, and retained such a degree of ascendancy over the councils of the sovereign as to be an object of serious alarm to his Minister. Azim-ul-Omrah, the Minister to whom the business of the State was almost wholly entrusted, had repeatedly complained of their overbearing spirit and his inability to control it. The Nizam himself, although at one time reluctant to part with his French adherents, began at length to perceive that the actual power and resources of his own Government were passing into the hands of a party whose growing

\* The foundry, a large mass of red brick, is yet to be seen on a hill in the vicinity of the Residency.

ascendancy might some day be turned against himself. These considerations, added to the reasoning of his Minister, in the end prevailed; and the Nizam agreed to accept the alliance of the English on their own terms.

Negotiations were accordingly renewed with a view to place the English Government upon a more secure footing, and to induce the Nizam to abandon his French allies. The disposition of the Minister continued favourable to the English Government, and after some little difficulty he succeeded in overcoming the prejudices of his sovereign, and inducing him to give his assent to a negotiation for the dismissal of the French corps, and the increase of the English Subsidiary Force.

M. Raymond, by whom the corps was originally formed, had died a few months previous to this, and disputes respecting a successor had occasioned serious dissensions among the troops. General Perron at length succeeded to the command; and although an active and enterprising officer, and one well acquainted with the principles of the military art, his influence was not of a nature to avert the fatal blow now about to be inflicted on the French interest by the British Government. For this corps, so long the source of annoyance and apprehension, was now sentenced to dispersion, and the talents of its officers were unable to arrest its fate.

In the latter part of 1798 a new treaty was formed with the Nizam, by which the Subsidiary Force was increased to six battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and artillery in proportion. The Nizam engaged by this treaty to disband the French corps in his service, and to deliver over its officers to the British Government.

The Nizam and Minister, now both alarmed at the exorbitant power of the French party, were, as we were, anxious for their removal from the capital; but as the time approached for their expulsion the Sovereign, either from the influence of intrigue or alarm, hesitated. The Minister, swayed by fear, likewise hesitated. In a situation so important there was no time for reflection. The Nizam and his Minister were compelled to make choice between the English and the French, and, as was to be expected, they determined in favour of the English. A proclamation was issued by which the troops were informed that the Nizam dismissed the French officers from his service, and that the men were released from all obedience to their European officers. The sepoys, who were encouraged to submission by the promise of future service under other officers, after some little hesitation laid down their arms, and the French officers surrendered themselves as prisoners, the whole affair occupying but a few hours.\* Out of these materials arose various regiments called "Line," some of which continue as a mockery to the present day.

Thus was the power and influence of the French, who were on the point of erecting their standard at Hyderabad, completely annihilated in the Dekhan, and the Nizam, released from their control, rendered an efficient ally of the British, and enabled to co-operate with effect in the war soon after produced by the perfidy and restless ambition of Tippoo.

The British Resident of that day deserves mention here as being the public officer who negotiated and concluded the treaty by which this important service was performed. The British interest at the Court of Hyderabad had temporarily devolved upon Captain (afterwards Colonel) James Achilles Kirkpatrick, and so high was the sense which Lord Mornington entertained of Captain Kirkpatrick's services on the occasion that he recommended him as deserving of some mark of royal favour. He was subsequently appointed Resident on the resignation of his brother, Colonel William Kirkpatrick.

During the war in Mysore such were the successful exertions to bring the Nizam's contingent into the field that the Governor General deemed the subject worthy of special notice.

"This force," writes the Governor General to the Home Government in March 1799, "under the general command of Mir Allum, formed a junction with the army on the 19th February; and it is with the greatest satisfaction that I remark to your Honourable Court the beneficial effects which the Company have already

\* An interesting narrative of these proceedings is given in Lushington's *Life of Lord Harris*.

derived from the recent improvements [?] of an alliance with the Court of Hyderabad. The Nizam's contingent actually arrived in the vicinity of Chittur in a state of preparation for the field before General Harris was ready to proceed on his march from Vellore."

In October 1800 Colonel Kirkpatrick, after a long and arduous negotiation, succeeded in concluding a new treaty with the Nizam, whereby the political ties which connected the British Government with the State of Hyderabad were drawn together more closely than before; while the money subsidy hitherto paid by His Highness in defrayment of the expenses of the British troops employed in defence of his country was commuted for the territories since known as the ceded districts. It is by this treaty that the Nizam is bound to furnish, in the event of a war between the contracting parties and a third State, a force, as before mentioned, of 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry; and the first occasion on which we find them employed appears to have been with the Hyderabad subsidiary force under Colonel Stevenson against the Mahratta confederacy in 1803.

On the death of Nizam Ali Khan in August 1803, notwithstanding the hostile designs of parties to excite commotions in the State, and to disturb the regular order of succession in support of Furrud-un-Jah, the younger son, Secunder Jah, owing in a great measure to the judicious measures adopted by Colonel Kirkpatrick, succeeded to the vacant musnud of his father, without the slightest opposition; and the energies of the new Government were immediately directed to a vigorous co-operation with the British forces against the common enemy. The power of the Court of Hyderabad, stimulated by the unremitted exertions of the Resident, proved eminently useful, and contributed in no small degree to the speedy and glorious termination of the war in the Dekhan.\*

The sudden death of Azim-ool-Omrah was the next occasion, and the last of particular importance, that exercised the vigilance and address of Colonel Kirkpatrick. Numerous were the candidates who contended for the high station of this intelligent Minister. In spite, however, of the active intrigues of the several competitors, Colonel Kirkpatrick was enabled to keep the appointment in suspense until he received the instructions of the Governor General on the subject. The result is well known. The vacant office was conferred by the Nizam on Mir Allum, a nobleman of the Court distinguished beyond any other for his political sagacity and experience.

In October 1805 Colonel Kirkpatrick died, and Captain Sydenham was appointed Resident, in which office he continued until 1811, when he was succeeded by Mr. (since Sir Henry) Russell.

After the disbandment of the French force it became the fashion to maintain corps of infantry resembling in some degree those in the Company's army; and to such an extent was this carried that the corps of women which mounted guard in the interior of the palace, and accompanied the ladies of the Nizam's family whenever they moved, were taught to carry muskets, drums, &c., and to perform the manual and platoon exercises according to the French fashion. Two battalions of females, of one thousand each, accompanied the Nizam into the field in 1795, and were present at the battle of Kurdla, where, at least, they did not behave worse than the rest of the army. The battalions were commanded by two of the principal female attendants of the Nizam's family. The present Nizam still maintains an establishment of women; and, however humiliating it may appear to the European mind, this corps may still be seen giving its sentries, presenting arms, and performing duties which ought more properly to belong to the regular soldier. It would pain the heart of some of our disciplinarians to see a sentry's musket giving place to a smiling infant, or perhaps the infant on one shoulder, the musket on the other. But this, although a digression, is no imaginary picture.

Some few years after this we find the Nizam's troops, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, located in Berar, having their head-quarters at Aurungabad.

\* M. Perron, Scindia's General, wrote to the French commandant of the fort of Allighur in September 1803—"Nizam Ali Khan is dead, his son has withdrawn his army, and declared war against the English. Fear nothing!"

The cavalry were of two descriptions—Circari and Jaghirdari. The Circari cavalry, by far the most numerous, were composed of small parties raised and commanded by different sirdars. The whole system was faulty in the extreme. The head of a Pagah would let out his party for a certain sum per horseman, for which sum, horse, rider, arms, accoutrements and ammunition were engaged to be furnished. Every casualty was to be borne by the owner, so that it was the interest of the horseman to avoid everything that would endanger the safety of his horse. A muster master was appointed, but it was soon found that he not only imposed upon the Government himself, but connived at the imposition of others. The muster roll of the Circari cavalry gave 7,150, and of the Jaghirdari 4,340. But many of these horses had no existence but on paper. Of the Jaghirdar cavalry about 1,800 belonged to Salabut Khan, about 900 to Subhun Khan, and the remainder, in small parties of from twenty to a hundred horsemen, to different inconsiderable Jaghirdars. Of the infantry there were about 3,000 irregular, and about 5,000 regular. The irregular infantry were Circar troops, except one small corps of about 700 men belonging to Nawab Shums-ul-Omrah. Of the regular infantry two battalions, of about 900 men each, belonged to Salabut Khan, and the remainder were called the Nizam's establishment of regular infantry.

In the year 1804 a proposal was made to the Nizam to maintain a regular establishment of the Silladar cavalry, similar to the Mysore horse. After some negotiation the Nizam consented generally to the plan, but as he objected to all those parts of it by which alone the efficiency of the establishment would have been ensured the proposal was necessarily abandoned, since without some satisfactory arrangement for the regular payment of the troops they would not have been at all superior to any other party of horse in the Nizam's service.

As may be supposed, the whole system of the Nizam's military establishment was defective. The only way in which our influence could be usefully exerted was in keeping their numbers complete, in getting them more regularly paid, and in suggesting plans for their disposition and employment.

The irregular infantry were fit for nothing better than the duty of sebundies, nor could anything better be expected of men whose nominal pay was five rupees a month, and that paid irregularly.

The two regular battalions belonging to Salabut Khan were very respectable corps. They were commanded by an Englishman of the name of Drew, who had a few other Englishmen employed as officers under him. The men were dressed like our sepoys, and armed with our muskets, and, what was of much greater importance, they were regularly paid.

The Nizam's own establishment of regular infantry was to us the most important part of his whole army. It consisted of six battalions, nominally of 800 men each, divided into two brigades, each brigade commanded by an European officer called a major, with an European adjutant to each battalion. The men were dressed and armed like our sepoys, and their establishment of native officers was nearly the same as that maintained in our own native corps. Part of this establishment is said to have been brought to a respectable state of discipline; but in consequence of the withdrawal of all supervision and control they soon lost not only the benefit of every improvement they had previously gained, but acquired most of the defects to which an establishment of the kind under a native Government is liable. They are described as being at one time incomplete in numbers, loose in discipline, badly armed, and irregularly paid.

To make these establishments really effective, the Resident, who had early applied himself to the organization and discipline of the Nizam's troops, recommended that the number and respectability of the European officers should be gradually increased, the men well paid and regularly disciplined, supplied with arms and accoutrements from our own stores, and the general superintendence and control over the whole vested in a British officer, who should exercise the necessary degree of personal authority, and keep the Resident constantly informed of their real condition.

As no encouragement was then given to continue this proposed reform, the

Resident seems to have confined himself to inducing the Nizam's Government to introduce some system of regularity in the organization and payment of a few of the battalions at Hyderabad.

Of the troops at the capital there were two battalions, with a small number of guns, in the old French lines, commanded by Major George Gordon. After his violent death, effected in cold blood by a rebel, his brother Major Edward Gordon succeeded to the command. These troops do not appear to have been in any way subject to the orders of the Resident, but under the direct control of the Nizam's Minister, by whom they were paid. In 1812 they mutinied for their pay, tied up their commanding officer to a gun, and threatened to blow him away unless their pay was given them, together with a free pardon for their offence. Both were promised. Funds were sent from the Residency treasury. But the chief mutineers were punished, as the Resident considered that no promise should be held good which was exacted under such circumstances. After this the battalions were reformed, taken under the protection of the Resident, and located in a new cantonment near the old French foundry.

This brigade, subsequently designated the "Russell brigade" out of compliment to the Resident, was permitted to purchase, under certain arrangements, ammunition and stores from the Company's arsenal at Secunderabad. The brigade consisted of nearly 2,000 men together with a train of one 24-pounder, four 6-pounders, and two 5½-inch howitzers.

In 1813 Mr. Russell induced the Nizam's Government to allow him to disburse the pay of one battalion from the proceeds of the Peishkush, and to extend the same arrangement to the second battalion as soon as it was completed.

The attention of our Government was now directed to effect a reduction in the Nizam's irregular battalions, and to supply their place with corps formed on the plan of the "Russell brigade." While these arrangements were in progress for the organization of the "Russell brigade," the Nizam's regular infantry in Berar was placed under the general control of the Political Agent in that quarter, who was assisted in his military duties by a staff officer under the designation of Brigade Major. Captain Sydenham was the Political Agent, and Lieutenant Parker, of the Madras cavalry, his Brigade Major.

Considering the nature of the establishment as it then existed, the number of persons interested in keeping up the abuses of it, and the difficulties which attended every attempt at innovation, quite as much was in a short time done towards the accomplishment of a reform as could reasonably be expected, though great care and constant attention were necessary to carry on the system of improvement, as well as to confirm the good which had already been effected.

The regularity with which the Political Agent succeeded in prevailing on the local Government to pay the troops in Berar was in itself an object of first-rate importance; and the arrangements which he made for mustering the men, filling up vacancies, and supplying stores were also highly judicious.

The Political Agent in Berar acted of course under the orders of the Resident of Hyderabad. The Resident, whose heart was in reform, was desirous that the whole of the six corps of regular infantry should be kept complete in numbers, and in every respect put upon an efficient footing; but as much time would necessarily be required for the adoption of the plan to its fullest extent, and as many difficulties stood in the way, it was wisely determined, so as to avoid the danger of undertaking too much at once, to introduce the system gradually—to limit the immediate measures of reform to the four battalions which composed the first and second brigades—and to transfer the remaining battalions to the exclusive authority of the native officers of the local Government.

The battalions which were the best disciplined were the first equipped, and ammunition for the ordnance and small arms was now for the first time supplied from the Company's arsenal, though the supply was very judiciously restricted to those corps which in all other respects were in a complete state of discipline and equipment.

The condition of these corps might be traced in a great measure to the support

which they received from our political authorities, but still more to the individual character of their commanders. The class of men, too, were widely different, depending of course upon the care that had been taken in recruiting and selecting them, for the rate of pay was everywhere the same. The Russell brigade was formed out of the finest men that Hindustan could produce, while most of the other regiments were recruited with less care. Some of them were composed of the refuse of the old French corps, others again of the personal adherents of their several commandants, while it was well known that in some of the regiments their numbers were to be found only on paper.

In 1814 Lieutenant Hare, of the Bombay army, was appointed to the command of the Russell brigade, and, at the instance of the Minister, Rajah Chundu Lal, European officers were in due course appointed to the small bodies of artillery and cavalry attached to the force.

This brigade, under the energetic measures of Mr. Russell, and through the skill and assiduity of Captain Hare and the officers under him, attained, as we shall have occasion to show, the highest state of efficiency, and formed the basis upon which the whole of the Contingent was subsequently organized.

In September of the above year the following order was published to the troops, remarkable only as being the first order issued on their new organization :—

“The divisions at present denominated cohorts shall be equally divided in two regiments, each to be completed to the following establishment :—

EUROPEANS.				NATIVES.								ATTACHED.									
Commandant.	Adjutant.	Sergeant Major.	Qr. Mr. Sergeant.	Subedars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Drummers and Fifers.	Buglers.	Packallies.	Naiques.	Sepoys.	Total.	Armourers.	Blacksmith.	Bellows Boy.	Carpenter.	Chuckler.	First Dresser.	Second Dresser.	Dhobis.	Hujjams.
1	1	1	1	10	55	56	20	3	10	53	800	1007	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10

“It being supposed that all European officers attached to a corps of this kind are already conversant with their duty in every respect, regulations—which of course would approach as near as possible to His Majesty’s or those laid down by the Honourable East India Company for the government of their troops—are rendered unnecessary. It is also expected that unanimity, the essential support of discipline and subordination, which is so necessary in every person engaged in the military profession, shall exist in the corps.

“As soon as the regiments are formed, it is to be hoped that emulation between the two corps will take place. The state that a corps is in with regard to discipline must redound or detract from the military character of the officers attached to it, although it is in the service of an ally of the Honourable Company ; yet the sanction and support given to it by the lending of its officers authorizes that strict mode of discipline introduced into their native army, and for which their officers are at all times accountable, in whatever situation they may be placed. Among all nations every individual with an army is subject to the rules and regulations adopted by that army.”

During the year 1815 the reform of the Russell Brigade was prosecuted with great industry and perseverance. A Brigade Major was appointed in the person of Captain Jones, of the Madras army. Other nominations and appointments were made to the European ranks of both commissioned and non-commissioned. A code of articles of war was authorized by the Nizam’s Government, and other useful regulations introduced for the discipline and well-being of the force in all its branches. The men were ruled by the best of all rules, the fear of punishment and

the hope of reward. Of the native officers we find the services of some "dispensed with by His Highness the Nizam," others again promoted for "gallant conduct." Nor were the interests of the whole as a body disregarded, for a proportionate increase was made to the pay of each grade, from the subadar to the private respectively.

About the middle of this year the brigade was ordered into the city to suppress a disturbance created by the princes. Mobariz-ud-Dowlah, the Nizam's youngest son, had proceeded to the extremity of seizing and confining a servant of the Residency. Captain Hare's brigade with two guns were accordingly ordered into the city. As the force approached the prince's house it was fired upon, for the houses on both sides of the road were occupied by armed men, who offered a determined and formidable resistance. The brigade pushed on resolutely, and with their guns blew open two of the gates, but they found that within which offered still greater obstacles than the gates without; and after a severe contest and an ineffectual attempt to penetrate into the prince's house the force was under the necessity of retiring, but not without considerable bloodshed and the death of an officer belonging to the Resident's escort.

The Nizam acted with great determination on the occasion. He enforced his orders for imposing an effectual restraint upon the violence of his sons, directed measures to be taken for apprehending and punishing their associates, and in the end removed the princes to the neighbouring fort of Golconda. Under the immediate sanction of the Nizam's own authority, tranquillity was soon restored to the city.

"The following," writes Mr. Russell in addressing Captain Hare, "are extracts from despatches which I have received from Mr. Secretary Adam, in reply to my reports on the subject of the service on which a detachment of your brigade was employed on the 20th August :—

"The Governor-General perused with concern your report of the loss sustained by Captain Hare's brigade in the attack on Mobaruz Jung's house, and His Lordship especially laments the death of Lieutenant Darby. The failure of that plan cannot in any degree be ascribed to the conduct of the brigade, or of Captain Hare, who, as well as the other officers and the troops under his command, merit His Lordship's approbation for their steadiness, perseverance, and gallantry under very trying circumstances."

"I have great pleasure," adds Mr. Russell, "in being the channel of communicating to you this honourable testimony to the conduct of a corps in whose welfare I shall always feel the warmest anxiety, from private inclination as well as public duty."

The year 1816 gave an Invalid and Pension establishment to the Russell Brigade. The subjoined extract of the Resident's letter on the occasion deserves a place here, as expressing sentiments highly honourable to his feelings, and showing the interest Mr. Russell continued to take in the child of his adoption. "Having," concludes Mr. Russell, "the honour and prosperity of the brigade most deeply at heart, I rejoice at this arrangement, as I do at every measure which contributes to the advantage of the native officers and men composing it. I request you will assure them of my constant protection and support. I shall always watch over their interests with the cordial anxiety of a friend, and I expect of them in return that they will cultivate a proper sense of the benefit they enjoy, that they will emulate the spirit of their European officers, and that they will distinguish themselves by the faithful and zealous discharge of their duties both in quarters and on service."

To give importance to the occasion a salute of nineteen guns was fired from the artillery, a *feu-de-joie* from the infantry, and all prisoners were released from confinement—a compliment paid as much perhaps to the Nizam's Minister, from whom the boon ostensibly emanated, as to the occasion itself.

Captain Hare appears to have understood the character of the native soldier. He took every opportunity of encouraging them by kindness and consideration, stimulating their pride, and animating them by the hope of reward.



As an indication of it, the following order was issued on the occasion of his brigade parading for the first time with the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force :—

"The commanding officer requests commandants will communicate to the officers and men under their command his entire approbation of their conduct and soldier-like appearance on parade the first time they have had an opportunity of appearing under arms with British troops, and hopes they will proudly support the good character and opinion which they have gained. He in consequence directs that there be no parades for exercise for eight days from this date."

In this year, Lieutenant Sotheby,\* of the Bengal Artillery, joined the Russell Brigade as commander of the artillery, being the first artillery officer appointed to the Contingent. Of Lieutenant Sotheby, then a young officer, little could be known ; but his intimate knowledge of all professional details soon became conspicuous, and made him invaluable in his new position. Without any facilities but such as were derived from his own personal exertions, he had everything to form and everybody to instruct ; and nothing but the most active zeal and most untiring industry (for he was a painstaking man of laborious and minute arrangement) could have enabled him to overcome the difficulties against which he had to contend. Under this able officer the Nizam's artillery was originally organized, and to him is chiefly to be ascribed whatever merit may be due for the state of efficiency which the Ordnance Department in all its details is acknowledged to have attained.

Towards the end of the year the Resident inspected the brigade, when Mr. Russell, who cannot be made to speak too often, expressed himself in the following terms :—

"I have sincere pleasure in assuring you of the gratification which the performance of the Russell Brigade at the review yesterday morning afforded me. Their appearance and movements were in every respect as good as could be either expected or desired. To me, who have frequently witnessed their progress and discipline, and who know the skill and industry which have been employed in their improvement, this was only a confirmation of the opinion I already entertain ; but I heard several experienced officers who were on the ground, and who had not had the same opportunities of knowing the brigade that I had, unanimously speak in the highest terms of their proficiency. I request therefore that you will accept my congratulations and my thanks, and that you will have the goodness to convey the expression of my applause to all the officers and men of the brigade."

In the same year (1816) the subject of a reform of the Nizam's cavalry was brought under the notice of the Supreme Government, for the incursions of the Pindarries required that some vigorous measures should be adopted for the protection of Berar. As the Pindarries were famed for their proficiency in the art of running away, so it became essential to organize troops that could run after them ; for rapidity of movement was all that was necessary in the contest with those plundering adventurers. Irregular cavalry, efficient, and equipped for rapid movement, were the description of troops required ; since the constitution of regular troops unfitted them for competing with the quick and desultory excursions of the Pindarrie horse.

The Nizam's own establishment of cavalry, as it existed in Berar, increased the evils which it was employed to suppress. The troops were as much dreaded by the peaceable inhabitants whom they were sent to protect as were the Pindarries ; and the province itself suffered infinite distress from their depredations. The resources of the country were neglected, the poorer people oppressed, and the military force capable only of mischief. Such were the evils of the native system, requiring the strenuous interference of our political and military authority to check. Some parties of the jaghirdar cavalry were nevertheless susceptible of improvement as having a better description both of men and horses : these it was proposed to select, to form them into light and efficient troops, and to remodel them upon a new and improved system under European control.

The general principles were to provide for the immediate organization of 7,500 cavalry in Berar alone. Rajah Govind Bukhsh, who then exercised chief authority

\* Now Major Sotheby, C.B., Retired List.

in Berar, was called upon to furnish the greater portion. Some reluctance was at first shown, but after rather a lengthened discussion the Rajah acceded to the propositions of the Resident, which were negotiated by Captain Sydenham with great zeal and intelligence—qualities that were conspicuous throughout the whole of that officer's proceedings. The Rajah consented to furnish a body of 5,000 cavalry for the protection of Berar against the Pindarries; but as that number could not be immediately organized the party of Mysore horse then in the Deccan were retained for the defence of Berar, for they were of a superior description to the Nizam's own cavalry, being composed of men who had learned in the school of Hyder and Tippu the duties of light troops.

The portion of the Jaghirdar horse were to be furnished, the greater part by Salabut Khan, and the remainder by other parties in Berar, to be under the orders of Nawab Futteh Jung Khan, a leader of approved courage and fidelity, and a near connection of Salabut Khan.

So many important considerations, both local and personal, were involved in this reform as to render the accomplishment of the task one of no little difficulty. The Nizam it was known would throw impediments in the way, for it was his habit to oppose every measure proposed by us, without reference to its intrinsic merits. There was the possibility also of exciting the opposition of the Minister, as his concurrence in these changes would naturally draw upon him the violent hostility of all those powerful chiefs whose emoluments would be curtailed by the proposed alterations; for every abuse requiring to be corrected would necessarily be attended with pecuniary loss to some person or other. Added to these considerations was the fear of wounding the pride of the chiefs in placing them under British officers. The success which had attended the officering of the infantry was considered by no means conclusive, since the character and the habits of the persons composing that force were essentially different from the mass of those of whom the cavalry would be formed.

But the two principal objects necessary to a proper constitution of the force were its payment and the placing it under efficient command. Any plan of reform undertaken without the security of these two measures would be found totally nugatory. These being accomplished, there would be no difficulty in surmounting all other obstacles, and introducing such minor provisions as might be thought necessary.

The plan was at length submitted to the Minister, who agreed to its adoption.

The jaghirdars and others were required to pay their troops with punctuality; and as the greater portion of them belonged to Salabut Khan it was anticipated, from the arrangements already introduced by that chief, that a regular system of payment might be depended on. No change was necessary in regard to the payment of the Mysore horse, as funds for that purpose were already provided from the Resident's treasury, and the amount repaid by the Rajah of Mysore. The troops were guaranteed the continuance of their long-established usages and customs. The pay of each silladar horseman was fixed at 40 Hyderabad rupees. Every horse killed or disabled on service was to be paid for by the State. And other beneficial arrangements were introduced, which made the situation of both native officers and soldiers more advantageous, more creditable, and more secure in every respect. With all classes the proposed plan was extremely popular, and the service soon became, as it has been ever since, one of much request among natives of respectability and character.

The next point for consideration, and one requiring much circumspection, was the selection of a European officer possessing the various qualifications necessary to the efficient discharge of the delicate and arduous functions of the chief command of the party; for although for ordinary and internal purposes the command might still be exercised by the native officers, yet the cavalry would neither be placed upon a respectable footing, nor maintained in efficiency, nor employed with any advantage to the State unless commanded and led by European officers.

Alluding to the description of officers required with irregular cavalry, Mr. Russell, as we gather from a small publication at the head of this article, thus expresses himself:—

“He would have to lead and direct them on all occasions, to guide them by

his knowledge, and encourage them by his example ; and above all he would have the difficult task of surmounting the prejudices of caste and religion, and reconciling the men to act with cheerfulness under his authority. But for this duty, difficult and complicated as it is, I have no hesitation in recommending Captain Davis. The integrity of his character, his known gallantry and enterprise, his temper and experience, his habits of personal activity, his acquaintance with the language, manners, and prejudices of the natives, and his skill in their peculiar modes of horsemanship eminently qualify him for such a charge."

The direct superintendence of the troops in Berar had been previously vested in the Political Agent there ; but in 1817 the system was modified, and the cavalry and infantry were respectively placed under the immediate command of two officers of the Company's service specially selected for the duty,—the general control and direction of the whole still remaining with the chief political officer on the spot, whose authority was to be exercised on the same principles which regulated the authority of political residents over officers commanding subsidiary forces.

Major Pitman, of the Bengal army, who accompanied Mr. Elphinstone in his mission to Cabul, was nominated to the general command of the Nizam's regular infantry in Berar. The war which was close at hand prevented any immediate reform, but at the close of it he commenced with rather a severe hand,—forcing some of the old European officers to retire on pensions, replacing them by Company's officers, and driving most of the old men out of the ranks, but producing thereby a result which raised the regiments to a level with those in the Company's service.

Captain Davis, who had previously commanded one of the battalions of the Russell Brigade, and who, as we have just shown, had been strongly recommended by the Resident, was appointed to the command of the cavalry brigade, composed of four risalahs of 1,000 each. To Captain Davis was left the execution of all the details for carrying out the proposed plan of reform in the cavalry, and, that nothing might impede the progress of the good work, he was allowed by the Governor-General to select his own instruments to aid him in the important and difficult undertaking. The undermentioned officers were accordingly appointed :—

Lieutenant H. B. Smith.....	Madras army.
Captain Pedlar .....	} Bombay army.
Lieutenant Wells .....	
Lieutenant John Sutherland .....	

Through the exertions of Captain Davis and his officers, this force on the breaking out of the Pindarrie campaign was considered sufficiently organized to take its place with the army under Sir Thomas Hyslop. Their services throughout the war were "most exemplary," and afforded an opportunity of showing the discernment which had guided Captain Davis in his selection of the officers to serve under him.

In the same year a small regiment of native cavalry of 300 men was organized on the plan of our regular cavalry, attached to the Russell Brigade, and the command of it given to Captain Jones, the Brigade Major.

The plan of lending English officers to discipline the troops of our native allies was at one time considered of very doubtful policy, and was at first proceeded on with caution ; but after a time, the ground being supposed safe, it gradually enlarged, and in the end extended throughout the Nizam's regular army. But this reform was not effected at once, nor without difficulties that might not have been overcome but for the enlightened views of the British Resident who then watched over our interests at Hyderabad, directed and supported as he was by a corresponding spirit at the Presidency.

On this subject we find among the Hyderabad papers the following letter from the Home Government, under date the 3rd April 1814 :—

"In our despatch of the 23rd December 1813 we apprised you of our intention, at a future period, to communicate our sentiments upon the subject of encouraging our allies to form regular battalions, disciplined after the European methods, and commanded by British officers."

2. "We have subsequently given to that subject all the attention which its importance required ; and, upon full consideration, we are led to apprehend more danger from the extension of the European system of military discipline amongst the troops of the native powers than we can expect to derive from their services."

3. "To the superiority of European discipline is to be attributed the establishment of the British empire in India ; and in proportion as that discipline is extended amongst the natives not in our service we must consider the power we have acquired exposed to hazard."

4. "The various contingencies which occur in the conduct of the affairs of so large an empire as we possess in India have at all times made it advisable to avail ourselves of the assistance of native troops not actually in our service, and to place them upon such occasions under the command of officers belonging to the Company's army."

5. "But we look upon the adoption of such temporary expedients in a very different light from the establishment of a system formed for the express purpose of introducing European tactics, in all their regulations and details, into the armies of any of the native Governments."

6. "In extending our subsidiary alliances we have not been insensible to the risk of increasing our native force beyond that proportion of European troops which ought always to accompany every augmentation of our Indian army ; but we felt at the same time that there were circumstances connected with those subsidiary alliances which counterbalanced the evil they were in some degree calculated to produce."

7. "The subsidiary force absolutely constitutes a part of our own army, is entirely under our own control, and can be changed, or even withdrawn, at the discretion of our own Government ; and although it is supported at the expense of our allies, affording them protection and authority whilst in amity with us, it gives them no strength in the event of hostile disposition."

8. "It appears to us that the proposed plan, without the advantages which have been stated, is liable to all the objections which can be urged against the subsidiary system : and whatever weight may be due to the opinions that have been brought forward in its support, the possible consequences of its establishment we deem of a magnitude sufficient to deter us from authorizing its further encouragement, particularly with reference to the artillery, an arm in which it ought to be our policy not to extend the knowledge of it to the natives."

9. "You will observe by their military despatch of the 8th November 1814 that the Court of Directors are thoroughly impressed with the necessity of preventing the absence of our European officers from their regimental duties. The gradual reduction which they have ordered in the number of those officers in itself constitutes a sufficient reason for not allowing them to serve with the native powers."

Again in January 1818.—"The doubts," the Court observe, "which we have formerly expressed as to the policy of encouraging, generally, the princes in amity with us to maintain large bodies of regular infantry are by no means removed."

The Court appear to have had in mind the failure of a similar scheme in 1775, when the assistance of British officers being granted to discipline the Oude troops it was found necessary in less than two years to discontinue the plan, for the following reasons recorded by Warren Hastings on the 5th May 1777 :—

1st. "The superior pay and emoluments enjoyed by the officers in the Nawab's service excited murmuring and dissatisfaction among those who remained in the Company's service, and by discouraging their zeal and attention to their duty tended to the general relaxation of discipline."

2nd. "The want of effectual checks had been deeply felt, the principle of moderation which should actuate the conduct of officers in their public disbursements having been found to have little influence when the expense was defrayed by a State on which they had no natural and permanent dependence. Hence the burthen had become too enormous for the Nawab to bear."

3rd. "The service having been too remote for the British Government to observe and restrain all abuses in it, local interests were acquired, and opportunities of making undue advantages afforded."

4th. "The officers employed on this service being exempt from the Articles of War, the British Government had no further influence over them than such as was created by a dread of losing their profits, which alone was insufficient to restrain excesses proceeding from the same principle."

This reasoning, even if suitable to the transactions of 1777, could not, with reference to the great change in our political position in the course of fifty years, be applicable to 1818. And here we may pause to inquire, where might we now be, had the several schemes for the advancement of our Empire in the East been moulded upon results dependent on accidental circumstances of fifty years previous?

While these views, expressed in a strain of timidity, were finding their way to India, the reform of the Nizam's military establishment was still persevered in; for already had the Governor-General given his sanction to the employment of British officers in His Highness's service. To withdraw them would have been unwise, as without European control the corps would soon have become disorganized and have sooner or later reverted to their former inefficiency under European or East Indian adventurers. British officers were continued. At the recommendation of the Resident, King's officers, Company's officers, and individuals not in either of the services were appointed. These last mentioned officers were, as they continue to be, designated "local officers." As early as 1823 we find as many as one hundred officers in the Nizam's service, forty of them local officers. It will be shown that at a subsequent period the employment of King's officers was prohibited, and at a still later period the prohibition was extended to local officers.

A question very early arose in respect to the rank which local officers were to hold in the service, as since the employment of King's and Company's officers in the Nizam's service the relative position of the local officers had become materially changed. It was determined that officers holding King's or Company's commissions should take precedence of those who had no commissions; but, with the view of consulting the feelings of the latter class, every proper care was directed to be taken against local officers being employed on detached duty with any of the junior officers of the King's or Company's service.

As it was important that the Reformed Troops should be regulated in their discipline and in all their internal arrangements by the same principles which prevailed in our own army, a code of articles of war, similar to that furnished to the Russell Brigade, was made applicable to the Berar infantry.

In June of this year, when Sir Thomas Hyslop, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, assumed the general control of political and military affairs in the Deccan, the Nizam's army was supposed to consist nominally of about 70,000 men, though probably not more than two-thirds were actually kept up; and even of that proportion the only useful part were the reformed horse, and the establishment of regular infantry, and those only because they were paid, clothed, and armed through British influence, and controlled by the ability and exertions of British officers.

The reformed horse, consisting of 4,000 men, under Captain Davis, were stationed in different parts of Berar. Its organization had now been completed. And the gallant affair which had recently taken place in Khandeish afforded practical proof of the value of the services which might be expected from it. A party of 600 men under the personal command of Captain Davis, after a rapid march of fifty miles, charged a body of Trimbukji's adherents near four times their strength, strongly posted, and prepared to receive them. The enemy was almost immediately broken and repulsed, leaving some hundreds killed and badly wounded on the field. Both Captain Davis and Captain Pedlar, the only one of his European officers who had then joined him, received severe wounds.

The Nizam's establishment of regular infantry, as before stated, consisted of six battalions with artillery attached to them, of which two were stationed at Hyderabad and four in Berar.

The two battalions at Hyderabad composed the Russell Brigade, commanded by Captain Hare. The men were chiefly Hindus, natives of Hindustan. They did no duty in the city, nor with any other troops in the Nizam's service. In name

alone did they belong to the Nizam. They were paid regularly every month from the Resident's treasury, and considered themselves as Company's troops. For all practical purposes they were as much so as those on our own immediate establishment, and could be made quite as useful; for under Captain Hare the Russell Brigade had by this time attained the highest state of efficiency.

The four battalions in Berar had not had the same advantages as the Russell Brigade. They were well spoken of, and when employed on service had done their duty. They were commanded by European officers, and disciplined and equipped like our own troops. Three of the battalions were said to be in good order, but the fourth, of which the command was at that time vacant, was from various circumstances not in such good condition as the other three. Captain Seyer, of the Bengal Army, who had highly distinguished himself in the Nepal war, in which he was severely wounded, was subsequently appointed to this vacancy. From this and Major Pitman's appointment great advantage was anticipated, and ultimately the Berar infantry became part of the present Contingent.

There were, besides, the troops under Salabut Khan, a chief who had always been distinguished for his attachment and fidelity to our interests. They consisted of 1,500 horse and 2,000 infantry, paid from the produce of the jaghirs held by him under the Nizam's Government in the neighbourhood of Ellichpur. Salabut Khan's Horse, although not equal to the Reformed, were the next best in the Nizam's service.

The infantry composed a brigade under the command of Captain Lyne, of the Company's army. The men approached in discipline to our own troops; but the inveterate abuses which existed in the corps, the number of officers and men whom it had been found necessary to discharge, together with an irregularity in their payment, had prevented so great an improvement being accomplished as might have been desired. They were in consequence not in a condition to act as regular troops with our army.

All that could be expected therefore of Salabut Khan's cavalry and infantry was that they should defend that part of the Nizam's territories contiguous to Ellichpur.

No brigade in India was more highly disciplined, or more complete in appointments, camp equipage, and bazars, than the Russell Brigade. It accompanied the army to Malwa in 1817, composed part of Sir John Malcolm's division at the battle of Mehidpur, and the records of that day show that no corps was organized on better military principles, or better performed its duty. "The Commander-in-Chief," as we gather from a General Order of that day, "notices in the highest terms of praise the steadiness, courage, and discipline of \* \* \* \* \* and the Russell Brigade under Major Hare." And among those officers who in General Orders received the public thanks of the Commander-in-Chief we find the names of Captain Hare, commanding the Russell Brigade; Captains Larride and Currie, commanding the 1st and 2nd Regiments, Russell Brigade; and Lieutenant F. S. Sotheby, commanding the artillery, Russell Brigade.

Most of the other regiments co-operated with divisions and detachments of the British army. The Ellichpur brigade served with Colonel Deacon's detachment, Major Fraser's regiment with Major Pitman's, Captain Blake's with Major Davis's. But none of those corps approached in discipline to the Russell Brigade, nor, with the exception of Major Fraser's and perhaps Captain Blake's, were they disciplined in a degree to admit of their taking their place even in brigade.

During this year the Reformed Troops were frequently employed against the strongholds of bands of freebooters known by the names of Naiks and Bhils, who had long infested the province of Berar, and whom it was strongly suspected the local officers of the Government secretly encouraged in order to share in the plunder. The gallantry of Jemadar Shaik Kader Bukhsh, with a party of two hundred reformed horse, was conspicuous. Dismounting his small party, he stormed and carried a strong ghurry sword in hand. The troops under Major Pitman were successfully employed in reducing the fort of Urjingaum, and detachments under Major Fraser and Major Elliot respectively were employed at different times in similar operations

and always with equal success. A party of reformed horse under Lieutenant John Sutherland likewise distinguished itself against the garrison of Newas. The gallant conduct of Lieutenant Sutherland and his party was thought deserving of being brought to the notice of the Governor-General; and in order to encourage and confirm the spirit of emulation which the example of Captain Davis and his European officers had infused into their troops, the Resident forwarded letters both from himself and Rajah Chundu Lall to the several native officers of the party, who were respectively addressed by the title of Khan and Rae, applauding their gallantry and good conduct on the occasion.

In March 1818 the following order was issued by Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm :—

“ Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm cannot allow the separation of so large a party of the Russell Brigade from his force as that ordered to march to-morrow without expressing his great satisfaction with the conduct of the corps since they were first placed under his orders.

“ The Russell Brigade have received the thanks of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the reward due to their discipline and gallantry on the 21st December.

“ It remains only for Brigadier-General Malcolm to state that since they formed part of his division he had uniform cause to observe that state of excellence which it has attained. He also offers his best thanks to Captains Larride and Currie, commanding the two battalions of the brigade, and to Lieutenant Sotheby in charge of the ordnance. He has in the course of the service had frequent occasions to observe and applaud the zeal and activity of these officers. The Brigadier-General must also express his particular thanks to Surgeon Mickle of the brigade for his great attention to the sick and wounded. He also begs that Brigade-Major Tucker and the other officers of the brigade will accept his best acknowledgments for their officer-like behaviour throughout the campaign, and begs that his thanks may be conveyed to the native commissioned, non-commissioned, and privates for the cheerful alacrity with which they have uniformly performed their duty as soldiers during a period of trying service.”

As we ought not to deprive the Russell Brigade of any of its justly earned laurels, we must add to that of others the high testimony of the Most Noble the Governor-General to its efficiency and good conduct.

“ The return of the Russell Brigade,” writes Mr. Secretary Adam in addressing the Resident, “ to the dominions of His Highness the Nizam affords the Governor-General an opportunity, of which he gladly avails himself, to express his entire approbation of the services of that valuable corps during the operations of the late campaign, and the cordial gratification His Lordship has derived from the honourable testimony borne to the merits of Captain Hare and the officers and troops under his command by His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hyslop, and by Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm, under whose orders the Russell Brigade has been acting since the return of Sir Thomas Hyslop to the Dekhan.”

“ You are requested to bring to the particular notice of His Highness the Nizam’s Government the just and favourable sense entertained by the Governor-General, and by the officers under whose immediate command it has acted, of the gallantry, conduct, and efficiency of the Russell Brigade, and communicate these sentiments to Captain Hare and the officers and men composing the Russell Brigade.”

During this year (1818) Captain Pedlar had the satisfaction of adding to the reputation of the reformed horse by bringing to notice the individual gallantry of the native officers of his risalah in an affair at Nagpore. Each native officer was rewarded by being addressed on the part of Government by a title one degree superior to that which he had hitherto held. The services on another occasion of Shaik Zulfikar Alli were distinguished by the approbation of the Governor-General, and rewarded by his being promoted to the rank and pay of first jamadar.

The conduct of Lieutenant John Sutherland was again conspicuous against a party of rebels, upon which occasion the Resident recorded his sense of Lieutenant Sutherland’s intelligence, promptitude, and gallantry, and of the fidelity and courage



of Jamadar Shadhi Khan and the brave men under his command. The Resident at the same time brought to the notice of the Supreme Government the merits of Captain Davis, to whom the first formation of the reformed horse had been entrusted, and to whose judgment, temper, and personal exertions the utility of their service was chiefly to be ascribed.

During this year Major Fraser and Major Elliot, by relinquishing the Nizam's service, made room for officers from the Company's service.

The employment of the troops in the field, although in a great measure retarding the advancement of reform, and preventing the improvements which had been in contemplation, was in its result highly beneficial to the soldier, as giving him a practical knowledge of the business of war, and the opportunity of performing real service in the face of an enemy : for the experience of actual warfare, undoubtedly the best school for officers and men, must ever be superior to the tame discipline of the cantonment. The officers gaining confidence in their troops were themselves confided in by their men, and although the service was new and the inexperience of the troops great their zeal and willingness overcame all difficulties ; and their good conduct, aided on all occasions by their successes, gave them that confidence in themselves belonging to older and more experienced soldiers. Untried soldiers they took the field. They returned improved in discipline, and raised in character and spirit, for they had earned the soldier's best reward, the approbation of Government.

After the termination of the Mahratta war in 1819 Mr. Russell continued to pursue the system of assimilating the several portions of the force with one another, and the organization of the Nizam's army began in consequence to assume a more regular and consistent form. The benefits of the pension establishment, which had for some time past been enjoyed by the Russell Brigade, were in March 1818 extended to the regular infantry in Berar. The whole system up to this period appears to have been anomalous in the extreme, especially in regard to the pay of the European officers, which was fixed by no rule, but dependent apparently on the degree of interest which the individual possessed at head-quarters,—though with reference to the class of officers in the service it was probably found necessary on the introduction of officers from the King's and Company's army to fix their pay with reference more to their qualifications than to the position and rank they individually held in the service.

The Resident in reply to Major Pitman's suggestions in regard to the pay of the European officers and an increase to the men belonging to the force draws a curious distinction between the two classes. "The pay of a Lieutenant," says Mr. Russell, "ought not to be less than 350 rupees per mensem, and that of Ensign not less than 250 rupees per mensem ; but the increase of pay both to the European and native commissioned officers ought to be conditional and not absolute, the addition being granted to such an extent and in such instances only as the commanding officer may think proper to recommend. The increase of pay to the non-commissioned officers and sepoys is absolute, and is to be granted to them immediately."

Towards the end of the year Major Pitman was summoned to the Residency to aid with his advice and experience in the completion of certain arrangements which the Resident was desirous of making for the improvement of the Contingent ; for the whole system from various causes was found to be so defective as to render it necessary to remodel the whole.

In the Russell Brigade, which was under the immediate supervision of the Resident and regularly paid from his treasury, the system had been assimilated in a great measure with that in force among our regular troops. But in Berar the troops had to a certain extent been considered as a separate body under the control of Rajah Govind Bukhsh, the Governor of the province, with whom it rested to provide funds for their payment, and to whom all questions of a general nature, such as the pensioning of officers, accepting their resignation, and other matters connected with the general duties and concerns of the establishment, were referred. The conduct of Rajah Govind Bukhsh had for some time past been a constant source of complaint on the part of the Minister ; and in the changes now about to be made an opportunity was taken to lessen the Rajah's power by withdrawing the troops in



a great measure from under his control, and dispossessing him of the districts which had been made over to his management for their payment.

On the 1st of January 1819 the orders for the reorganization of the force were promulgated. The principal alterations in the existing system were as follows :—

The force was divided into two commands, north and south of the Godavery. Major Pitman was retained in command of the Nizam's troops north of the Godavery, which included the whole service—cavalry, artillery and infantry—with the exception of the Russell Brigade.

To the command of the Russell Brigade Major Doveton, of the Madras Army, was appointed. It consisted of Captain Hare's brigade of infantry, a small regiment of regular cavalry maintained by an European officer on a contract (including the pay of native officers) of 50 rupees a month for man and horse, a company of artillery, and a small corps of engineers.

The increasing magnitude and importance of the Nizam's military establishments is supposed to have been the cause of the appointment of two field officers from the Company's army to the general command of the two principal branches of it; but as in these two nominations two brigadiers were given to one brigade, Major Doveton's appointment was thought superfluous, and, as it cost the Nizam's Government some sixty thousand rupees a year, might have been dispensed with. His nomination moreover was viewed as a direct supersession of Major Hare, who had long exercised the command, and who was perfectly competent to do so. But both Majors Doveton and Pitman were officers of a superior stamp, whose employment communicated a high professional tone, calculated to elevate the character and the respectability of the service.

Major Doveton's appointment may therefore be considered a job, and, although the first, was not the last. And as the creation of other superfluous offices began at length to be observed, "Poor Nizzy! Nizzy pays for all," became proverbial expressions. We are afraid that in the course of this article we shall often have occasion to exclaim "Poor Nizzy,"—though the exclamation is, fortunately, not so applicable to the present day.

A new system was at the same time established for the payment of the troops in Berar. The funds, instead of being provided by Rajah Govind Bukhsh, were to be thenceforward furnished by the Minister under a special engagement entered into with parties at the capital. The Berar establishment therefore, like that of Hyderabad, though still employed in the same portion of the Nizam's territories, as before, were in future to be dependent immediately upon the Minister, instead of being subject, as heretofore, to the control and authority of Rajah Govind Bukhsh.

Major Pitman was directed to exercise his command on the same principles on which the general command of a collective body of troops would be exercised in the Company's service. Regular reports and returns were to be made to the Resident, from whom the officers commanding the two divisions would, from time to time, receive their instructions. They were likewise to correspond with the Resident on all points connected with the general duties and concerns of their respective commands. And, to prevent the possibility of any inconvenience to the public service, the officer commanding in Berar was directed to comply with any requisitions he might receive from the Political Agent at Aurungabad in cases which would not conveniently admit of the delay of a reference to Hyderabad.

All communications with the local Government were to be conducted, as before, through the Political Agent, who was also to be kept regularly acquainted with the distribution and movements of the troops.

Leave of absence to the native officers and men was to be granted, as before, at the discretion of the officer commanding, but all applications for leave of absence to the European officers was required to be forwarded to the Resident, who would refer the same to the consideration of the Minister.

The regular troops were to be governed as heretofore by the code of laws then in force. With regard to the reformed horse Mr. Russell makes the following remark in conveying his instructions to Major Pitman :—"In cases relating to these men a different course must necessarily be pursued. Troops which are

irregular in their constitution cannot be governed by the same rules of discipline to which regular troops are subjected. Towards this part of the establishment, therefore, the same course which has hitherto prevailed must be pursued in future. In ordinary cases the personal authority of the officer commanding the horse, or of the commandant of risalahs under him, will be sufficient for the apprehension of the offenders; on more serious occasions he may be discharged, and in the instance of any flagrant crime the criminal must be delivered up to the officers of the Nizam's Government to be judged according to their own laws."

The two irregular battalions under Major Freeman, which were then considered as invalid corps for the rest of the establishment, although generally employed on miscellaneous duties under the local officers of the Nizam's Government, were now withdrawn from under their control, and transferred, under the new arrangement, to Major Pitman's authority.

The Ellichpur brigade, forming the contingent of Salabut Khan, had hitherto been considered separate from the rest of the regular force, and little interference had in consequence been exercised in any of its details.

On the death of Mr. Drew, a local officer in the immediate service of Salabut Khan, Captain Lyne, of the Madras Army, was, at that Chief's particular request, nominated in 1815 to the command of the brigade; but on the decease of that officer the practice of consulting Salabut Khan seems to have been discontinued, as Major James Grant, of the Madras Army, a distinguished cavalry officer, was appointed direct by the Governor-General. He commenced a reform, but with rather a sparing hand. He had not the heart in time of peace to deprive old soldiers of their bread; but still the reform was in progress, when on the death of that lamented officer it was in a very short period of time carried into complete effect by Captain Seyer, who succeeded him.

The troops were not destined to remain idle. In the beginning of this year (1819) a force under the personal command of Major Pitman, but totally unconnected with the late war, was directed to assemble to the northward of Nandair, with the design of taking possession of the late Peishwa's district of Umurkhair, to suppress the insurgent naiks in the neighbourhood, and generally to establish the authority of the Nizam's Government over the unsettled districts in that quarter.

The force consisted of two battalions of the Russell Brigade, a field battery and small battering train, the 3rd battalion of Berar regular infantry, and a party of the reformed horse.

Of the insurgents the most important was Nousaji Naik, whose principal hold was Nowah, a place of some strength about 20 miles from Nandair. Under the apprehension of an attack he had collected a large Arab force. From him therefore some resistance was anticipated, and preparations for a siege were made accordingly.

A short detail of the operations may not be uninteresting, as showing what may be achieved by talent and perseverance.

Nowah, although small in size, was strong of works. In shape an oblong square with a bastion at each angle, and one on each side of the gateway. The outworks were a faussebray, covered way, ditch and glacis. The principal gateway was protected by an outwork in which guns were mounted. It was altogether an excellent specimen of fortification, as strong perhaps as a square fort of its size could under any system be made; and the arrangement of the traverses, the glacis, and the clear esplanade around the fort, indicated that the skill of others than natives of India had been employed in its construction.

The only mode of reducing the fort was by regular approaches.

The force took up a position before Nowah on the 8th January. On the 10th a mortar battery was commenced, about six hundred yards from the north face of the fort, when the enemy advanced and fired upon our working party. He was immediately driven back into the fort by Captain Hare, with two companies of the Russell Brigade. This battery and one for our eighteen-pounders, one hundred paces in advance of it, were completed during the night. Both began to play at sunrise the following day, with considerable effect, silencing the enemy's guns, and knocking off the defences.

On the evening of the 11th positions were established to the right and left of our batteries and within three hundred yards of the place ; and a six-pounder and a mortar-battery were constructed in front of the east face, distant three hundred and fifty yards.

On the night of the 13th the enemy made a sortie, and attempted to pass our post on the right. He was quickly driven back by three companies of Berar infantry, under Lieutenant George Hampton, a high-spirited young officer, who had only joined the service two years before.

During the night of the 14th an eighteen-pounder battery was advanced to within two hundred and fifty yards of the fort, and lines of communication were formed between our several advanced positions.

On the 15th, the enemy being very troublesome a few shells were thrown with considerable effect. From this time up to the 18th the besieged attempted no annoyance, seeming not to understand or to care for our operations.

On the 19th the garrison kept blue-lights burning nearly the whole night, and occasionally threw stones from a mortar. About ten o'clock an attempt was made by the rebel chief Howaji, with a party of horse, to surprise our camp from the rear, but the sentries being on the alert the piquets soon turned out, and after a little firing he retired, and was pursued some miles by Lieutenant Sutherland and a party of reformed horse, but owing to the darkness of the night he effected a safe retreat.

On the 20th a party from the garrison made a sortie, driving in the working party and destroying a little of our work, but the guard of the trenches obliged them to retire. The fire from the garrison was exceedingly hot, and some loss was sustained.

On the 21st the enemy made a desperate sortie, and sword in hand attacked our working party at the head of the sap, but was very soon driven back to the fort.

On the 23rd one of the three Europeans attached to the Engineer was mortally wounded.

On the 25th the sap had reached the crest of the glacis, where a six-pounder battery was established and two mortars were brought into it. On that night the Engineer commenced his mine, which was completed on the 29th. The day of the 30th was employed in battering, and in the evening the breaches assumed a very respectable appearance. Shells and grape were thrown into them during the night.

On the 31st, the breaches being reported practicable, orders were issued for the assault. At two o'clock in the afternoon the mine was sprung. Under cover of the smoke and dust Ensign Oliphant rushed forward and planted the ladders. The next instant Captain Hare with the Grenadiers, supported by Captain Currie and his light infantry, mounted the breach, fortunately before the garrison had recovered from their consternation,—for there were preparations on the top indicating determined resistance ; while George Hampton, in all the pride of youthful strength and courage, bounding so far ahead of his men as to be nearly cut off, carried with his flank companies the enemy's works to the right. In a few minutes the inner fort was carried, and in the course of an hour the whole of the enemy's works were in our possession, with a loss on our side of 4 killed and 71 wounded.

The Arabs continued to defend themselves for a considerable time between the two walls, with the exception of about two hundred, who fled from the gate of the fort. They were immediately attacked by Lieutenant Ivie Campbell, who commanded a party of infantry posted for the purpose of intercepting them ; and nearly at the same time they were charged by Captains Davis and Smith, and Lieutenant Sutherland, with different parties of the reformed horse, so that not a man of the enemy escaped.

The garrison consisted of more than five hundred Arabs ; of these one hundred were taken prisoners, more than eighty of whom were dreadfully wounded, and upwards of four hundred dead bodies were counted.

The severe example made of the garrison, although much to be deplored, was not only necessary but unavoidable, and was the means perhaps in the end of lessening the effusion of blood, as deterring the rebel garrisons of other places from offering similar resistance.

Our loss during the whole siege was 24 killed and 180 wounded, among the latter were six European officers.

"Major Pitman," so runs the brigade order of the day, "congratulates the detachments on the fall of the fort, and, although he feels obliged to every officer and soldier for their exertions during the siege, his thanks are particularly due to Captain Hare, of the Bombay Establishment, and the gallant men who stormed the breach.

"It having been an object of primary importance to prevent the escape of the garrison, the services of the reformed horse were of the greatest use for that purpose; and to their watchfulness and zeal during so many successive nights the commanding officer attributes the failure of the many attempts made by the enemy to leave the fort.

"Major Pitman therefore requests Captain Davis to make known these his sentiments to the officers and men under his command.

"Major Pitman cannot conclude without offering to Ensign Oliphant, of the Madras Engineers, the expression of his unqualified approbation for the skilful display of his professional abilities in the siege of Nowah. To his zealous and indefatigable exertions Major Pitman considers himself chiefly indebted for the opportunity which has been this day given to the gallant troops under his command to make such an example of the enemy."

Nor was the approbation of the Government of India withheld.

"Your despatch of the 5th February," says the Secretary to Government in addressing the Resident, "relating to the capture of Nowah and other operations, has been submitted to His Excellency the Governor-General in Council. His Lordship in Council has noticed with the highest satisfaction the distinguished conduct of Major Pitman and the force under his command.

"His Lordship in Council especially applauds the patience and scientific management of the siege of Nowah, which is exceedingly creditable to the judgment of Major Pitman; it has excited His Lordship's most marked commendation from its being an instance in which we have availed ourselves of superiority of skill to avoid unnecessary exposure of brave men.

"The merits of Captains Seyer, Davis, Hare, and Ensign Oliphant have also attracted the particular approbation of His Excellency in Council, and the conduct of the storming party and all the troops engaged in the operations reported in your despatch is considered to be highly honourable to themselves and the corps to which they belong."

The siege and capture of Nowah deserve some special reflections. Nowah was perhaps the only instance during the Mahratta war of a siege being artfully prosecuted, and when examined closely deserves to be held forth as a model of universal practice. It was a bold design on the part of the engineer; for, with only three Europeans and a small working party of seventy men, all more or less ignorant of siege operations, few, with such inadequate means, would have undertaken a regular siege. But the talents of the engineer were of a nature that rose with his difficulties, and the result fully justified his daring mode of proceeding: for, notwithstanding the obstacles opposed by the strength of the place and the obstinacy of the garrison, the reduction of the fort was effected according to the rules of art and science, without a single instance of failure or disaster. Ensign James Oliphant,\* of the Madras Engineers, a bold and daring young officer of great skill and enterprise, who conducted the siege, possessed military knowledge extensive both from experience and study, having completed his education at Chatham, where Colonel Pasley had early discovered talents indicating future distinction.

The siege of Nowah belongs especially to the history of the Nizam's Contingent, and this must be our excuse for bringing it so prominently forward. Nor would we in the present day withhold from the youthful military aspirant an example so prolific of instruction; for although to create anything from nothing is what has been, and always will be, impossible to man, yet to obtain great results

\* Now Major Oliphant (Retired List), a Director of the East India Company.

with small means is what may be done with much talent, zeal and perseverance ; and the siege of Nowah is an example of it.

The complete success at Nowah was attended ultimately with all the beneficial consequences which were anticipated, and the authority of the Nizam's Government was restored in a tract of country which, against every effort of His Highness's irregular troops, had maintained a successful rebellion for twenty years previous. Tranquillity was restored, but there have been no rewards for those whose courage and exertions produced it. It is true that "Mehidpore" and "Nowah" are displayed upon the colours and appointments of the regiments which had the good fortune to be employed on those occasions, but there has been no decoration, commemorating these services, bestowed upon the officers and men of the Nizam's Contingent.

In April of this year (1819) Mr. Russell, ever mindful of the interests of the troops, obtained for them, in consideration of their "exemplary conduct in the field," further indulgence from the Nizam's Government. The soldier was to receive, when rice became dearer than ten seers for the rupee, compensation in money equal to the difference between that rate and the market price,—the calculation to be made on that rice called the third sort in the bazaar of the cantonment, and at the rate of one seer a day for each fighting man.

The attention of the Resident was directed at this period to the state of affairs at Ellichpur, where the proceedings of Futteh Jung Khan, before referred to as a connection of Salabut Khan, were of so extraordinary a nature as clearly to prove a systematic design on his part to subvert the authority of Salabut Khan, and usurp the whole rights and possessions of the family. As the troops were the servants of Salabut Khan, and as he had always been encouraged to look to us for support, it became necessary that we should give him and his family our active and efficient protection, and not allow the troops, in a case where they could not remain neutral, to become an instrument in the hands of Futteh Jung Khan for the perpetration of his nefarious designs. The force of Futteh Jung's authority alone enabled him to carry his measures to the extent he had done, and as that authority rested principally upon the belief that he could command our support, it was peculiarly incumbent upon us to remove that impression and vindicate the rights which we were bound to protect. The first thing to be done, therefore, was to extricate Salabut Khan from the degrading state of thralldom into which he had been betrayed, and to secure him and his family against the imminent danger with which they were threatened.

The execution of the necessary measures was confided to Captain Seyer, through whose admirable address, unaided by military force, though troops were placed at his disposal, Salabut Khan's affairs, together with the general political arrangements of Ellichpur, were brought to a satisfactory conclusion, Futteh Jung Khan being removed from Ellichpur, and Salabut Khan restored ultimately to his legitimate authority.

An opportunity was now taken of extending our interference to Salabut Khan's Contingent, and placing the troops of which it was composed under our more immediate control.

In January 1820 the Ellichpur brigade was accordingly constituted a portion of the Berar division under Major Pitman, to whom Captain Seyer was directed to address his reports and returns on all points connected with his brigade. But on subjects not military he was to correspond, as heretofore, direct with the Resident.

The whole of Salabut Khan's troops, according to Captain Seyer's representation, were in such an inefficient state as to render it necessary to remodel the whole establishment. European officers were accordingly appointed, and parties of volunteers from the six infantry corps were transferred to the brigade for promotion in the newly organized battalions. A small party was at the same time sent from the reformed horse to serve as a basis for the formation of the new risalah.

The infantry were formed into two battalions of 650 rank and file each. The pay of the private soldier was increased, and fixed at from seven to eight rupees per mensem when first entertained, and nine rupees after four years' service. Clothing

and knapsacks were to be furnished by Salabut Khan. The benefit of rice money and of the invalid and pension establishments were in like manner extended to the brigade, in order to place them on the same footing as the regular troops.

In regard to the cavalry of the Ellichpur Contingent an arrangement was made by which Salabut Khan was to maintain a new risalah of 600 men at 40 Hyderabad rupees for each man and horse per mensem, in consideration of which a tacit acknowledgment would appear to have been conveyed that in resigning to us the brigade as newly constituted all interference on our part was to cease over the remainder of his quota, which was to be left solely under his own personal control, without so much as inquiry being made as to the mode in which it was maintained.

Among the European officers transferred to the Ellichpur Brigade was Lieutenant Tomkyns, who was appointed to the command of the 2nd Battalion, a young officer of the Bengal Establishment, since tried in many important situations and found equal to all.\*

A reduction of useless establishments in the Nizam's own army was effected during this year to the annual extent, it was stated, of between twenty-two and twenty-three lakhs of rupees. Among these reductions were included 305 horse and 500 foot on Rajah Chundu Lall's own personal establishment, and 237 horse and 250 foot on that of his brother Rajah Govind Bukhsh. All recruiting was suspended except in the regular and reformed troops, which were to be kept up at their full strength. The annual charge of the Contingent was at that time computed at thirty-six lakhs, not including the establishment of Salabut Khan, which was maintained by a jaghir estimated at fourteen lakhs of rupees.

This year was productive of numerous benefits to the officers of the service. A table allowance of 500 Hyderabad rupees a month was authorized to each of the commandants of the Hyderabad and Berar divisions, and an additional monthly allowance of two hundred rupees to each of the following officers:—The commandant of the Russell Cavalry, the commandant of each battalion of the Russell Brigade, the commandant of Artillery, the brigade major of the Russell Brigade, and the surgeon of the Russell Brigade. Commandants of battalions and risalahs throughout the service having under their orders two or more complete corps were authorized to draw superior batta at the rate of 200 Hyderabad rupees a month, and officers exercising the temporary command of divisions were to draw an additional allowance of 500 rupees a month.

A new and superior rank of native commissioned officer was established for the Russell Brigade, denominated Subadar Major. The number in the division was limited to four—one to the regular cavalry, one to the artillery, and one to each battalion of infantry,—with a brevet pay of twenty-five Hyderabad rupees a month in addition to the ordinary allowances of the Subadar of a company.

In October Lieutenant Twemlow, of the Bengal Artillery, was appointed to the command of the artillery with the Berar division—an officer of deserved reputation, who had early distinguished himself in the Nepal campaign, and from his military acquirements has since succeeded to the command of the Aurungabad brigade.

Towards the latter end of the year a new organization of the irregular brigade at Aurungabad took place. The two battalions composing it were brought on the strength of the Berar division, in order that they might be improved in their condition and rendered fit for the performance of useful duty as veteran corps. Such of the native officers and men as were found capable of doing duty were formed into a garrison battalion and employed in the protection of the districts on the north-west frontier against the Bhils. The other, an invalid battalion, was to consist of men who having been invalided from the regular corps were still capable of light and easy duty. Their services were to be limited to the furnishing of guards in the Aurungabad city and the neighbouring villages. Such men also as by age or infirmity were incapable of doing any duty whatever were to be transferred to this battalion as pensioners.

\* On the death of Major Cameron in 1838, and until the arrival of a successor, Brigadier Tomkyns was appointed by Lord Auckland to the charge of the Hyderabad Residency.

On the 1st December Mr. Russell, on relinquishing the duties of the Residency, took leave of the troops in the following letter to the address of Colonel Doveton :—

“On the occasion of my taking leave of the Hyderabad division of the Nizam's troops, with which I have been so long and so intimately connected by the sentiments of private friendship as well as by the duties of my public station, I request you will yourself accept my cordial thanks, and that you will express to the officers and men under your command the deep sense I entertain of their zeal, exertions, and spirited discharge of their duty on all occasions. The distance at which I am about to be placed from you will in no degree lessen my interest in your welfare, and you will always retain individually and collectively my warmest solicitude for your honour and prosperity.”

Nor were the officers of the Nizam's service backward in the expression of their sentiments, for Mr. Russell had brought many of them into the service, and conferred benefits on all. They felt grateful, and expressed their gratitude.

They presented him with a service of silver plate, a handsome vase, and requested him to sit to Chantrey for his bust. The bust is now at Hyderabad, and the old native officers of the service never enter the room without making their obeisance to it—a strong testimony of the feelings with which he is still regarded by the natives, and forcibly reminding us of the days when the Madras sepoy paid a similar mark of respect to the portrait of their favourite and distinguished leader, Sir Eyre Coote.

We now take leave of Mr. Russell, and introduce the reader to another statesman, Sir Charles Metcalfe, who, it is well known, succeeded Mr. Russell as Resident of Hyderabad.

One of the first measures of Sir Charles Metcalfe was an act of justice to the Nizam's local officers. We have referred as yet but incidentally to this question ; we will now revert to it and endeavour to give the reader some idea of the anomalous system as it then existed, and the difficulties which the Resident had to contend with in adjusting the relative rank of the European officers of the Nizam's service.

In the improvement so evidently necessary, the first step was to place all classes of European officers upon an equal footing in respect to promotion. Hitherto rank in the British army had been the principle which regulated promotion in the Nizam's army. The Nizam's local commission was not recognized. No rank was acknowledged unless supported by a commission from the King or Company. This distinction operated most disadvantageously on the local officers, and the benefit which it was now proposed to extend to this latter class was an act of justice which had long been called for. Necessity alone could have induced officers to remain in a service where supersession was the rule, and where preferment was impossible. The service, it was true, had gradually improved under the system, but the improvement had been effected at a considerable sacrifice of private feeling and happiness very much to be lamented. At the same time no liberal-minded man could murmur at the reasonable extension of favour to officers of experience and talent of the British army, whose presence gave a tone and spirit to the Nizam's service, which in those days it much required.

It must ever be a principle in all services to give rank in proportion to the importance and extent of the command : for a certain command as much indicates a certain rank as a certain rank does a certain command. This would appear to have been lost sight of in all previous arrangements. Officers commanding brigades, because Lieutenants only in their own service, were superseded by every Captain who entered the Nizam's service. This, to say the least of it, was a source of considerable embarrassment. It was, moreover, considered a grievance that rank in the British service should give a preference to individuals entering that of a foreign Prince at their own option, and for the promotion of their own private views, over officers who might be considered to have established claims of a strong nature for services rendered to the Native Government. Again, the officer commanding the Russell Brigade was liable to be commanded by a Captain of the same brigade who held no command. It was not that the rank of one was too high, but that the rank of the other was too low. And on one occasion it became a question

whether an officer in command of a company was not entitled to assume the command of a brigade with which he was serving.

This anomalous state of things arose in a great measure from the peculiar composition of the service. In those days there were to be found in it officers of the British army, navy, French army, Company's army, and even the militia, besides a large proportion who held no commission except from the Nizam's Government.

One party claimed the full benefit of his navy rank; another the benefit of his service in the royal army of France; a third required that his rank should be regulated by his militia service; in short, each party advanced his own claims according to his own particular views, and the difficulty, as may be supposed, was in adjusting so many discordant interests so as to render equal justice to all.

Up to the period we are now treating of, servitude in the Nizam's army alone was considered as nothing. A commission in the King's or Company's army, supposed everything, was a substitute for everything—was, in short, the measure of an individual's merit. The want of a commission in the British Army supposed a disqualification which no amount of professional talent could remove. The continuance of such a system would have doomed the Nizam's Captains to the perpetual superiority of King's or Company's Lieutenants and Ensigns of time present or to come.

To remove at once this defect in promotion, the Resident publicly announced "that in the Nizam's army all situations are open to officers of merit, and that when the requisite qualifications exist the want of a commission from the King or Company will not be a ground of exclusion."

Concurrently with this announcement the following regulations for the better adjustment of the rank of the European officers were published in General Orders:—

"The European officers in the Nizam's regular army, including the reformed horse, will rank in the following order:—

"1st Class.—Commanders of divisions.

"2nd Class.—Commanders of brigade, and general or division staff, being field officers in the King's or Company's service.

"3rd Class.—Commanders of corps, and general, division, or brigade staff, being Captains in the King's or Company's service.

"4th Class.—Captains and officers of any higher rank in the King's or Company's service not included in the preceding classes.

"5th Class.—Captains in the Nizam's service.

"6th Class.—Lieutenants in the King's or Company's service.

"7th Class.—Lieutenants in the Nizam's service.

"8th Class.—Ensigns in the King's or Company's service.

"9th Class.—Ensigns in the Nizam's service."

The Resident, sensibly alive to the imperfections of this arrangement, was not so visionary as to expect that every one would be pleased with the place assigned to him; wherefore, in anticipation of the feeling which subsequently manifested itself, he made an appeal to the officers of the service in the following terms:—

"It is feared and deeply lamented that this arrangement must in some measure wound the feelings of several officers, by placing above them others who have been hitherto below them in rank; but it has been found impossible to reconcile the claims of all, or to devise any scheme wholly free from objections of a similar nature. The plan now promulgated has been adopted in a belief of its general justice and expediency. It is hoped that even to those on whom it may have in some respects a disadvantageous effect it will also be found otherwise to operate with eventual benefit, and that those who in the first instance suffer by it will see that the general good has been the object in view, and, repressing the feelings of dissatisfaction to which any unfavourable change may naturally give rise, will accept the assurance, which is hereby freely and cordially tendered, that their present unavoidable disappointment will not be forgotten in future arrangements, and will be acknowledged to constitute an additional claim to consideration on all proper occasions."

The arrangement, as was anticipated, did not give general satisfaction, nor was



it perhaps to be expected that the conflicting claims of one hundred individuals could be adjusted in a manner to satisfy all parties. No one could have considered the subject with more anxious attention than did Sir Charles Metcalfe; and if it were any satisfaction to be abused by all parties concerned in it he was not without that enjoyment.

The same generous feeling which had been so visible throughout the arrangement was extended still further, and, whenever it could be done, measures were devised for relieving parties from all unpleasant feelings on account of relative rank. For some, new appointments were created. Others were transferred to civil employ. For all there was a soothing word; and whenever private feelings were thought to be injured an anxious desire was manifested to find relief for them. But even these generous concessions did not satisfy all parties, for in one instance where an arrangement had been proposed for the benefit of a particular individual "it was not deemed by him," to use an observation of that day, "worthy of acceptance, deliberation, acknowledgment or notice."

These regulations remained in force until 1823, when they were partially modified. They again underwent various changes and modifications at a subsequent period, and to them we shall take occasion to refer as we proceed.

We have referred in late arrangements to the employment of officers in the civil department. It may not be amiss therefore to take a hasty glance at the system pursued on the occasion, and at the success or otherwise which attended our first direct interference in the internal affairs of the Nizam's country.

Upon Sir Charles Metcalfe's arrival he found the affairs of the Nizam's Government in the same disorganized state by which they have ever been characterized. It is unnecessary to cite instances of the evils of the system which then prevailed. Sufficient to say that the country is described as being at that time in the possession of organized bands of plunderers, and life and property everywhere insecure.

The objects to which the attention of his predecessor had been directed were "a salutary control over the internal administration of the country, accurate accounts of all establishments, receipts, and expenditure, the correction of abuses, a proper distribution of justice, the reduction of expense, the amelioration of the revenue system, including the customs and duties levied on commerce, the improvement of the resources, the extinction of the debt, the efficiency of troops retained, and the discharge of such as were useless." Acting upon the principle of these instructions, and as a remedy for the existing disorders, the Resident proceeded to make a village settlement throughout the country, by appointing British officers belonging to the Contingent to superintend the Native authorities both in the assessment of the revenue, and, what was very much blended with it, the administration of justice, "from a conviction that the requisite zeal and integrity could not be found in Native agents."

"The Nizam's Government," reports Sir Charles Metcalfe, "has entered into the scheme with the greatest readiness and seeming conviction of its expediency. There is a facility of assent on the part of the Minister to whatever is proposed, and a practical counteraction of whatever is right, arising out of the inveteracy of bad habits, which both together form a singular character."

The general instructions to the several superintendents were "to save the people from oppression, maintain good order, promote prosperity, and at the same time uphold the Nizam's Government;" for although the British officers were vested with the general supervision of the revenue assessments and police, the executive authority was still left with the subordinate officers of the Native Government.

Into the subordinate arrangements of the scheme we need not enter. It is only necessary to say that the measure, after an eight years' experiment, was not attended with all the beneficial effects which were expected from it. Our interference in the revenue of the country was unwise. It was moreover unpalatable to the Prince, to his Minister, and to the native authorities. Those who played the game were satisfied. By one party the system was extravagantly praised, by another equally condemned. We will adopt a medium course: for while we believe

much good to have resulted through our healing influence the process caused considerable irritation to the Nizam, and dislike throughout the higher classes of his subjects. To the Minister, who liked neither the matter nor the manner of our interference, the exercise of it, with all its concomitant arrangements, was felt to be so humiliating and galling as to force him to the extreme measure of appealing direct to the Governor-General, when Lord Hastings recorded that "a zeal prompted by the purest humanity has led Mr. Metcalfe considerably beyond the line which I had proposed for our relations with the Hyderabad State;" and in another despatch the Resident "is required to hold a vigilant eye over those very young and unexperienced individuals to whom that important superintendence is delegated. You must be sensible," adds Lord Hastings, "that the possession of a power large in proportion as it is undefined may readily lead to a flippant parade of it, than which nothing could be more revolting to natives of consequence: you must, therefore, check austere any unnecessary exhibition of superiority."

Nor did the cultivating classes in every instance benefit by our protection. The power of the superintendents being limited, they could give no orders, neither could they redress grievances. So it often happened that the aggrieved party, instead of obtaining redress, suffered punishment from the local authority against whom he complained. The plan wanted unity. At one time a struggle arose between the Resident and the Minister; latterly between the Resident and the Superintendents, thereby establishing a divided authority, than which nothing can be more injurious to a people. A change was introduced in 1829. For on the present Nizam's succeeding to the musnud the right of being sovereign of his own country was conceded to him, and British interference in the civil affairs of his Government ceased.

We now return to the subject of the Contingent. In 1821 the corps of Russell cavalry was disbanded. The Ellichpur brigade was again made a distinct command, Captain Sir John Gordon appointed to the command of the Ellichpur horse, and his prior office of quarter-master abolished. The quarter-master of brigade of the Hyderabad Division was also abolished. A judge advocate was appointed to the Nizam's army in the person of Captain Godley, and, as several circumstances pointed out the indispensable necessity of an increase of officers to the cavalry, a second officer, for there had been only one before, was nominated to each of the cavalry corps.

In the following year the pioneers serving with the several divisions were formed into a corps of Engineers, and placed under the command of Captain Oliphant. It consisted of two jemadars, four havildars, six naiks, and seventy-five privates. Their uniform was green with black facings, subsequently changed to scarlet. This corps has proved itself eminently useful on many occasions, particularly in improving the irrigation of the country, and in the construction of public works, of which the bridge over the Mussi river need only be named. An European adjutant was subsequently appointed to the corps. In 1837, its designation being changed, it was placed under an officer of the infantry branch, and formed into a pioneer corps, for employment on the roads, construction of travellers' bungalows, and for other useful purposes. In 1846 the corps was disbanded.

About this time the following notification from the Supreme Government was published for general information:—

"His Lordship in Council observes that the employment of a regimental Major in any subordinate situation or command with the troops of a foreign Prince is contrary to the principle of the regulations in force for the better discipline and efficiency of the Bengal army, and consequently incompatible with the interests of the public service."

This rule still obtains, and every officer on promotion to a regimental majority is obliged to relinquish the service, unless in command of a brigade, which he may continue to hold until he arrive at the benefit of the off-reckoning fund in his own service.

In 1823 the Court of Directors objected to the employment in the Nizam's service of officers belonging to His Majesty's army. The difficulty of obtaining officers

from our regular regiments had induced the residents to look to King's officers belonging to corps ordered home, many of whom from long service in the country had acquired a sufficient knowledge of the language and of the habits of the people. This was thought a wise measure, as securing from a good school well qualified individuals to officer the disciplined troops of our native ally; but a different view was taken of it in a higher quarter, and they were ordered to be withdrawn, which order was subsequently modified to the extent of allowing those in the service, to the number of ten or twelve, to remain, but prohibiting the employment thenceforward of King's officers in the Nizam's service.

In June of this year an ordnance driver company was established for the Hyderabad division, and a new organization made in the cattle establishment and in the detail of gun and store lascars.

In July, the office of medical storekeeper was abolished, and the duties transferred to the Residency surgeon, the salary of the office reverting to the State.

In 1824 several officers were temporarily withdrawn, consequent on the Burmese war. At the end of this year the station of Hingoli was separated from the Aurungabad division and formed into a distinct and independent command, to which Captain Hare was appointed with the rank of Major. In the following year the office of the superintending surgeon was established; and the benefit of furlough to Hindustan conceded to the native soldier in the proportion of ten to every hundred men.

The several corps which hitherto had remained stationary were now ordered to be relieved by one another, and a new designation was given to them. The cavalry corps were numbered from one to five respectively, the companies of artillery from one to four respectively, and the infantry regiments, instead of being designated as before, according to the division or brigade with which they were serving, were numbered respectively from one to eight.

In arranging numerically the order of the infantry regiments, the Resident considered it due as a just tribute of his respect for the "brilliant services" of the Russell brigade to assign to the two regiments composing it priority of numbers: they were accordingly designated the 1st and 2nd regiment Nizam's infantry, or 1st and 2nd *Russell's* respectively; while the other regiments took their numbers with reference to the periods at which they had been respectively raised.

In August of this year Sir Charles Metcalfe took leave of the service in the following terms, and was succeeded by Mr. Martin:—

"The Resident cannot take leave of the Nizam's army without offering the expression of his most cordial wishes for its future welfare and prosperity. He is confident that it will ever maintain the high reputation which it has established by its brilliant services in the field, and its excellent conduct in all situations. He relinquishes the connection which he has had the honour of holding with the Nizam's army with great regret, and shall ever look back to it with pride and pleasure."

By the gradual course of improvement which we have detailed the service had undergone a visible change. Ten years of reform had effected a great deal, but there were still imperfections in the system, and to correct these Mr. Martin gave his early attention.

A code of "regulations for the guidance of the Nizam's army" was published under his authority. Among the rules were the following relative to the rank and appointment of European officers:—

"The existing rules and regulations regarding rank in the Nizam's army appearing to be injurious to the just rights of certain individuals, and it being obviously expedient that when officers are employed in the military establishment of a native Government the nature of their respective appointments, and consequently their several pretensions to command, should be at the pleasure of that Government, without reference to the date of commissions held by such individuals in a foreign service, the Resident has thought fit to introduce the operation of this principle into the Nizam's army, and he will accordingly, on the part of the Government, confer rank in His Highness the Nizam's service, which will be of full effect in the interior discipline and management of the corps on all occasions of employment

separate from the troops, but when acting with the forces of the British Government the respective rank and command of officers holding King's or Company's commissions must necessarily be regulated by the date and tenor of those commissions in the British service."

"It has been before remarked, and is now repeated, that in the Nizam's army all situations are open to officers of merit; and that where the requisite qualifications exist the want of a commission from the King or Company will not be a ground of exclusion; but the Resident will reserve to himself the power of selection for all vacancies, &c., that may occur, as well as transfers from one branch of the service to the other.

"The gradation list will remain as it now stands, as it would be unjust to deprive individuals of the rank they actually hold; but no further supersessions will take place, otherwise than what may be warranted by the following rules and regulations, which are now promulgated for general information with prospective effect from this date:—

"There will be four classes in the Nizam's army.

"1st Class.—Commanders of divisions or brigades, being field officers in the King's, Company's, or Nizam's army.

"2nd Class.—Commandants of corps, being Captains in the King's, Company's, or Nizam's army.

"3rd Class.—Captains in the King's, Company's, or Nizam's army.

"4th Class.—Lieutenants in the King's, Company's, or Nizam's army.

"All officers on joining the Nizam's army will go in as junior of their rank in the class they may respectively belong to.

"All Lieutenants in the King's or Company's army who may obtain the rank of Captain in their own service will be entitled in consequence to promotion to the 3rd class, in which they will go in as junior.

"All Lieutenants in the King's, Company's, or Nizam's army whose period of service exceeds twelve years will also be entitled to promotion to the 3rd class.

"Assistant Surgeons after ten years' service will be entitled to the rank of Surgeon."

Since these rules have obtained there has been little or no cause for complaint on the head of unfair promotion.

Another improvement was the publication throughout the Contingent of "General Orders by the Resident on the part of the Nizam's Government," instead of, as heretofore, carrying on public duty by means of official memoranda which had but limited publication.

In 1826 the designation of "Military Assistant" to the Resident was changed to "Military Secretary." The office of "Commissary of Stores" was created and given to Captain Sotheby, together with the charge of the "General Depôt" which had recently been formed.

In February of the same year the Resident's approbation was conveyed to the Engineer corps in the following terms:—

"Captain Oliphant having reported the completion of the canal which has been excavated for the purpose of opening a communication between the river Masi and the tank at Hussain Sanger, and having brought to the Resident's notice the meritorious conduct of the officers and men of the corps under his command, the Resident deems it incumbent on him to express in the most public and formal manner the sense which he entertains of the benefit which has been derived to the public service both from the professional skill, ability, and unremitting exertion which have been manifested by Captain Oliphant in the progress and completion of this important work, and also from the spirit of zeal and alacrity with which the officers and men of the corps under his command have been animated, and which have uniformly characterized their exertions during the period of sixteen months in which they have been employed in the prosecution of it.

"As a mark of his distinguished approbation of their services on this occasion, the Resident is pleased to authorize a donation of 300 rupees to be presented to the

corps, and, as a further testimony of his satisfaction, the Subadar is promoted to the rank of Subadar Major."

In the following year the medical dépôt was again removed from the Residency to Bolarum, and the office of Storekeeper re-established. The designation of the several commands which had heretofore been "Brigades" was changed to "Divisions," and commanders promoted from the rank of Major to that of Lieutenant-Colonel, which it was determined was thenceforward to be the rank of officers in that position.

In February of this year a third officer, under the designation of Adjutant, was appointed to the several cavalry corps, and a few months afterwards regulations having for their object the change of costume from the native to European were established for the officers and men of the cavalry brigade.

Numerous other innovations, opposed and unsuited to the habits and customs of the men, proceeding from a spirit of intemperate zeal for the improvement of the brigade, together with an over-anxious desire to transform the native horseman into a regular disciplined soldier, had taken place in the cavalry during the two preceding years, producing serious discontent, which, operating with other exciting causes, burst into open mutiny, and led to an event of a painful and outrageous character.

The real motives to mutiny are not always discoverable. In this instance they were to be traced to a series of acts, some of them tyrannical, others imprudent, all of them opposed to the spirit of the engagement under which the men entered into the service.

One of the most prominent was the mode and severity of punishment, another the harsh and harassing system of drill and discipline: these, combined with other causes of dissatisfaction, proceeding from disproportionate stoppages from their pay on account of various articles of equipment provided at their expense, and which had frequently undergone capricious alterations, together with innovations in dress, distasteful both on account of the expense as well as from the nature of some of the materials, produced a feeling of irritation which was inflamed into open mutiny by the violent and indefensible conduct of an European officer in ordering two men to be forcibly shaved, and publicly declaring that all who did not voluntarily remove their beards should suffer the same treatment.

On the following morning a party of one regiment were found drawn up in a state of mutiny, demanding with arms in their hands their immediate discharge from a service in which they had been exposed to such indignities. Colonel Davies rode to the spot. The mutineers signalled him off, advising him not to approach them in their then exasperated state. With that fearless confidence which characterized him on every occasion of danger, he heeded not their advice, but rode up to the party alone and unattended, when, while in the act of endeavouring to reclaim his deluded men to a sense of their duty, the gallant Davies was shot through the body by the ringleader, when the rest followed up the outrage by cutting him almost to pieces. The mutineers were instantly charged by a party of their own comrades who had been drawn up near the spot, and most of them put to instant death, for the mutinous spirit was confined to the few only who were immediately concerned in the perpetration of the outrage.

Such was the amiable private character of Colonel Davies, and so much was he beloved by his men generally, that his death had it happened under ordinary circumstances would have been a cause of general sorrow. As it was, it was met with a general burst of horror, as honourable to the unhappy victim as it was indicative of the feelings of the men, for not only had his gallant bearing won for him their admiration, but his conciliatory disposition, his justice, and his attention to their wants on all occasions, had ensured him also their affection.

Events like these should never be forgotten. They impart a serious lesson not only to the Government in regard to the selection of persons for responsible and important offices, but also to the European officer in respect to the principle that should regulate his conduct towards the native soldier. But do we benefit by these lessons of experience?

It has been stated on the best authority, and on a subject like this authority is useful, "that some of the officers had not been selected with sufficient care, and that they had risen too rapidly to command in a service where none but men of temper and discretion should be entrusted with authority."

The first requisite in a service like the Nizam's cavalry is smart and active European officers qualified by temperament and acquirements, who understand the character of respectable natives, will treat them with justice and consideration, and who will consider it an essential part of their duty to make themselves acquainted with the language, the habits, and the prejudices of those among whom they ought to establish an influence. As few are required it is the more essential to attend to the quality than the quantity of officers. We are not so unreasonable as to expect perfection, which the writer of "hints" would seem to require; but we do think there would be advantage were fitness for their several duties made the sole criterion, instead of the efficiency of the service being impaired by the appointment, through interest, of unqualified persons. The service, from its peculiar nature, requires delicate handling: a spring is easily loosened, and the whole machine put out of order.

The unhappy and fatal termination of Colonel Davies' command is a melancholy instance of this, yet on the late Colonel (then Major) John Sutherland's succeeding to the command of the brigade (and it would have been impossible to have made a better selection) he found no difficulty in restoring confidence and order. For some few years after, the Nizam's cavalry was famed for the superior qualification of its European officers, for in those days the Resident being held responsible for the condition and efficiency of the service in all its branches the selection of officers was, very wisely, left exclusively to him.

We have witnessed many changes and alterations, some of which we think might have been dispensed with. We are by no means unfriendly to the introduction of necessary change, nor would we reject any rational measure having improvement for its object, but as any material change tends to unsettle the mind of the natives, and, if it have no worse consequence, results too often in making them unhappy, we think that none should ever be permitted "except for a certain and evident good."

On this subject we will quote another authority, one who knew the native character well:—"There is nothing so distasteful to the majority of natives as change of any sort, above all any change affecting their purse or their prejudices. I have known more harm done by silly alterations and changes regarding dress or accoutrements, or in the petty details of the interior economy of a troop, introduced with the best intention by some injudicious European officer, than those not conversant with the peculiar temper of native horsemen would conceive possible to arise from such causes."

It only remains to be added that the Resident was not held "entirely blameless." It was considered by the Government, every allowance being made for Mr. Martin as a civil servant, that proceedings which had led to such serious results ought not to have taken place under his official authority for a considerable length of time without his interference, and that he was both entitled and bound to exercise a surveillance over all the acts of British officers in the Nizam's service.

Immediately after this the whole system of the cavalry was reorganized, all objectionable regulations were rescinded, and the several corps remodelled, when the brigade, under the able and judicious management of Major Sutherland, soon regained its former credit and reputation.

To turn from punishment to reward is always a pleasing task. At the end of the year a gold medal bearing a suitable device and inscription was presented to Subedar Major Chyte Sing and Subedar Major Chota Sing, of the 1st Regiment of Infantry, in consideration of their long services and uniform meritorious conduct, the latter having gained his promotion for planting the colours of his regiment on the bastion of Nowah.

In 1828 the Court of Directors prohibited the employment of any more local officers in the Nizam's service. In the same year the establishment of privates of

corps of infantry was fixed at 700, and no man under five feet five inches was allowed to be entertained. In the following year the establishment was again reduced to 640 privates.

Up to this period the Contingent had been virtually a sort of plaything for the Resident and a source of patronage to his friends. Things were now to take another direction and a few simple regulations laid the axe to the root of every sort of abuse.

In 1829 several privileges heretofore exercised by the Resident in connection with the service were withdrawn by the Governor-General, who directed that no original appointment to the service, or promotion in it, was thenceforward to take place except under the authority of the Supreme Government. A new scale of pay and allowances was at the same time established for the European officers, on the principle of assimilating their rate of emoluments with that of corresponding situations in the Company's army, and, in order that there might be no mistake, the pay tables common to the three presidencies were directed to be taken as the guide, and in cases of difference the rates in use in the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force were to be adopted.

Since then the European officers have received from the Nizam's Government the pay and allowances of their rank according to the rates of pay and allowances assigned to the same rank in the Company's service, together with the staff or command allowance as in corresponding situations in the Company's service—and no more!

For instance, an officer commanding a division receives the regimental pay and allowances of his rank in the Nizam's service, and the staff allowance of 1,070 or 800 sonat rupees according as it may be a first or second class division.

Officers commanding regiments of irregular horse receive a consolidated allowance of 1,000 sonat rupees in lieu of pay and allowances, such being the rule with respect to those who hold similar situations in the Company's service.

To the command of a regiment of regular infantry the command allowance of 400 sonat rupees is attached in addition to the regimental pay and allowances of the officer's rank in the Nizam's army.

The commanders of artillery attached to each division, who in addition to their artillery duties have those of the ordnance and engineer department, are placed on the same footing as officers commanding regiments of infantry.

Regimental officers and regimental staff have the same pay and allowances as in corresponding ranks and offices in the Company's service.

Other staff officers, military and medical, brigade majors, paymasters, &c., have the same allowances as are drawn in corresponding offices in the Company's service. These several allowances are converted into the local currency at the rate of 121 Hyderabad rupees for 100 Company's rupees. This latter arrangement should be borne in mind, in order that those who look only at figures may not be misled by the apparent larger *figure* exhibited by the inferior currency.

After this, who will hold up the Nizam's service as being 'extravagantly paid'? Who will regard the allowances of the European officers as excessive, which are in no respect greater than those assigned to similar situations in the Company's army? We hope to hear no more of the "extravagantly paid" Nizam's service.

The only other pecuniary advantage remaining, and that of but partial operation, is that all Company's officers who entered the Nizam's service prior to 1840 received also from their own Government the pay proper of their regimental rank. But this which was once the rule has now become the exception, since those who have joined the service subsequent to that year are debarred the privilege except in name, for though considerations render it necessary that the stipend should be actually drawn from the Company its equivalent is subsequently deducted from the Nizam's pay of the individual and repaid to the Company's Government.

Retrenchment did not stop with the reduction of pay and allowances. Its operation was extended throughout the service, and in January 1830 the appointments of superintending surgeon, medical storekeeper and surgeon to the durbar, principal commissary of ordnance, and judge advocate-general were abolished, and the offices of brigade major and paymaster of the Ellichpur and Hingoli divisions

united. Officers whose appointments were abolished were allowed to resume the situations which they previously held, their successors in those situations making way for them, and returning in like manner to the situations which they before occupied, and so on downwards.

By the abolition of these appointments, and by the reduction of the allowances of others in the civil as well as military department, an annual saving of nearly three lacs of rupees was effected in the two following years.

In August of this year Mr. Martin resigned his office and was succeeded by Colonel Stewart. The following is Mr. Martin's farewell address :—

"The Resident cannot relinquish the performance of the duties which he has so long exercised in relation to the Nizam's army without recording his testimony to the value of its services, and expressing the cordial interest which he feels in its prosperity and honour.

"The endeavour to promote those objects has been unremitting and sincere, and he entertains a confident persuasion that he leaves it considerably improved in discipline, and in all the qualities which are necessary to its success.

"To each of the officers commanding divisions the Resident's acknowledgments are due, for their support of his authority, and for the temper, zeal, and judgment with which the duties of their several commands have been administered; but he should be insensible to the claims of superior merit if he failed to acknowledge his particular obligations to Lieutenant Colonel Seyer, for the benefit which he has derived from that officer's professional experience and knowledge, and for the cordiality and promptitude with which their points have been applied to the purpose of aiding the Resident's judgment in the plan and execution of such arrangements as have been deemed conducive to the efficiency of the public service.

"To Major Sutherland, commanding the cavalry division, and to Major Crossley, commanding the Hyderabad division of the army, the Resident's thanks are likewise due, for their active and able conduct in the exercise of their respective commands.

"The circumstances of peculiar difficulty under which Major Sutherland assumed his command, the address with which that difficulty has been surmounted, and the conciliatory and judicious measures which he has successfully pursued for the purpose of reviving the confidence and of restoring the discipline of the troops composing his division, are claims on public approbation, which the Resident cordially acknowledges, and for which he is entitled to this assurance of the Resident's warmest thanks.

"That the Nizam's army may continue to serve the State with the same credit and success which has hitherto distinguished its exertions is a wish which the Resident cordially entertains, and which is dictated equally by his anxious interest in its welfare, and by his conviction of the importance of its services to the stability and prosperity of the Nizam's Government."

It has already been shown that prior to Colonel Stewart's arrival a general review of the state of the contingent had taken place by the Supreme Government, and that measures of economy having been prescribed for the guidance of his predecessor reductions of expenditure had been carried into effect in consequence. The necessity of continuing this spirit of reform and retrenchment was still further pressed upon Colonel Stewart, who, at a very early period, signified his determination of immediately effecting a saving wherever it could be made, and of incurring no additional expense without the sanction of the Supreme Government. As this was the principle by which the Resident was guided from 1831 to 1838, and as this was the most prominent feature of his rule, we shall have very little to notice relating to changes in the constitution of the service during that period.

In 1832, in consequence of the repeated failure of Nawab Namdar Khan to pay the troops of the Ellichpur division, for which he held a Jaghire, having been confirmed on the death of his father in 1824 in all the family privileges, the Jaghire for the payment of the troops was resumed by the Nizam's Government, and the payment of the Ellichpur division transferred to the Minister's own authority; thus placing the Ellichpur force, which had by degrees become assimilated in other respects, precisely on the same footing as the rest of the Nizam's regular cavalry.



In 1833 the office of bazar master in the several brigades was discontinued.

In the same year the Nizam's service lost one of its oldest and best officers. The late Lieutenant Colonel Seyer was an irreparable loss to the Nizam's army. His acquaintance with the history of the Indian army and the character of the soldiers of whom it is composed, his extensive military research and acquaintance with the armies of other countries, rendered him a fit person to be consulted in the management of the Nizam's, and an officer to whose sound judgment and discretion its direction might safely be left.

In 1834 a warrant officer under the designation of quartermaster was authorized for each field battery—a measure highly expedient and useful, and which has tended much to the benefit of the artillery branch of the service. This class of warrant officers should be allowed to draw horse allowance. They cannot do their duty either on parade or on the march without being mounted. As it is, their duty is always performed on horseback, but as no allowance is granted for the purpose they virtually keep a horse at their own expense for the performance of their public duty. This we conceive only requires to be brought to notice to be rectified. There being moreover only four of this class, we cannot suppose that so small an addition to the public expenditure would be any obstacle to the adoption of so just a measure.

During this year the Minister was very importunate to get rid of the expense of the garrison and invalid corps. Among other schemes, he proposed to commute the money payment to the invalids by a grant of land in perpetuity to each man, but it was found impracticable, for on proposing the arrangement to the men themselves they with one accord declined the offer, so the proposal fell to the ground.

In the same year the Nizam's service lost another of its oldest officers. Captain Commandant Currie commanded a corps at the battle of Mehidpore, was wounded at the storm of Nowah, and was again wounded in the campaign of Ava while serving with H. M. 89th Regiment. He was a most zealous and enterprising officer, and his death was a severe loss to the Nizam's service.

In consequence of the abolition of the appointment of Judge Advocate General in 1830, the Resident had frequently had occasion to solicit the opinion of the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the subsidiary force on points connected with the proceedings of courts martial, as well as on other matters connected with the character and discipline of the Nizam's army. Under a conviction of the importance of his legal advice, and from the same considerations which have given rise to this appointment in other armies, and to enable the Resident to call officially for advice in cases of difficulty, the Judge Advocate General of the subsidiary force was, under the sanction of the Supreme Government, appointed in 1835 legal adviser to the Resident on such questions as he might find it necessary to refer to him. This arrangement has continued ever since, and in its effect has fully realized the expectations which were anticipated.

In 1836 the much-desired boon of furlough to Europe was conceded to the local officers with permission to return to their several appointments. When it is considered that this class of officers are deprived of the benefit both of a pension and retiring fund, of Lord Clive's fund, of the military funds, together with other advantages possessed by the Company's officer, and that they have only the Nizam's service to depend upon for their support and maintenance, the extension of this indulgence to them cannot be viewed as unreasonable.

In September of this year the following notification was published by the Government of India :—

“The Governor General of India in Council is pleased to direct that British officers serving on military establishments of native powers shall, as regards such native service and when doing duty with one another, take rank and command according to the priority of their respective appointments in the rank which they hold in that service ; but when acting with the forces of the British Government the relative rank and command of such British officers shall be regulated by the date and tenor of their actual or effective commissions in the British service respectively.”

At the end of this year Scindiah's Government being then about to form an infantry contingent upon principles similar to the Nizam's, the Resident at that Court applied for volunteers from the Nizam's army to form the nucleus of the new force. The volunteers were transferred with their period of service, and assured that they would take precedence of all others of the same rank in the new contingent, and receive from the Gwalior Government an equivalent for the pay, pension and other emoluments which they then received, or might hereafter become entitled to, from the Nizam's Government.

In 1837 a question was referred to the Supreme Government in respect to the promotion by brevet of a commandant in the service, when it was decided that the brevet rank of major conferred upon an officer "does not warrant his supersession of the commandants who are senior to him in the Nizam's service, except when acting with the forces of the British Government."

In November of this year it was notified to the Nizam's army that henceforth Company's officers would only be entitled to promotion to the rank of Captain in the Nizam's army (unless previously promoted in their own service) in twelve years from the date of their being admitted on the strength of the establishment to which they may belong, and not, as heretofore, in twelve years from the date of their nomination by the Court of Directors or first commission as Cornet or Ensign.

In September 1838 Colonel (now Major General) Fraser succeeded to the Residency. From that moment a new life was infused into the Nizam's service, at that period very susceptible of improvement from the spirit of economy which had been so long prevailing. Its efficiency immediately engaged his warmest attention. He applied his vigorous mind to correct negligences and to remove imperfections. The senior officers of the service, it is but justice to them to say, seconded his zeal, and the gratifying result of their exertions is to be found in the present efficient state of the contingent, which gives promise of the most satisfactory results whenever the several arms composing the force may have the good fortune to be called into active service.

General Fraser's first care was to make himself acquainted with the character and qualifications of the several European officers, and in all matters, great and small, to examine and judge for himself. In this way the merits of individuals became better known; for his own penetration soon enabled him to form a just estimate of each officer in the service. Greater advantages were given to the native officer and soldier, as he was anxious to raise the men in their own estimation, and to make the hope of reward rather than the dread of punishment the incentive to good conduct. A better description of clothing was ordered to be furnished. Incapables were removed on suitable pensions. A better class of European subordinates has since been admitted into the service. The few necessary establishments have been placed on an efficient footing. In short, everything has been and is being done, as we shall proceed to show, that an energetic officer at the head of an army, interested in its character and welfare, can do to add to the efficiency of the service and to the comfort of the soldier.

Acting upon the above principles, an increased rate of pay was in January 1839, authorized to the native commissioned officers in consideration of the exemplary conduct which for a series of years had marked the career of that respectable class in the Nizam's service.

An indulgence was about this time conceded to the private soldier, in extending the annual leave of absence to men to visit Hindustan from six to eight months—no trifling boon, when the distance is taken into consideration, as well as the unhealthy season of the year at which the men were before obliged to return.

In July the warrant and non-commissioned officers of the service were stimulated to greater exertions by the increased promotion held out to them in the following General Order:—

"In order to hold out still greater encouragement to the warrant and non-commissioned officers of His Highness the Nizam's army to display that zeal in the performance of their duties which must ever lead to promotion and to the approbation of their superiors, General Fraser has been pleased to direct that there be a

Deputy Assistant Commissary at each of the undermentioned stations of the army, viz., Hyderabad and Ellichpur, independently of Aurungabad.

"Though General Fraser is happy on this occasion to find that no objection exists to the nomination of the two senior Conductors to the rank of Deputy Assistant Commissary, he desires that it may be distinctly understood that in no case will he consider seniority alone to constitute a sufficient claim for promotion unless it be when the claim of merit may be equal between the candidates."

At the end of this year the office of superintending surgeon was revived, and a senior surgeon authorized at each division of the army in the person of the senior medical officer of the division.

The history of the Nizam's Contingent would be incomplete without the mention of one who filled the high and important office of military secretary to the Resident for fourteen years. Major Moore\* possessed merits of no common order, and so useful and gracious did he at all times render his office, to which may be added his personal kindness and liberality to the service generally; as to cause his resignation to be felt and regretted throughout the Nizam's army. His public services were duly appreciated and recorded in General Orders :—

"On the departure of Major Moore for Bombay preparatory to his resignation of the office of military secretary and return to England, Major General Fraser considers it but an act of justice to this officer to express in General Orders his entire and unqualified approbation of the manner in which he has executed the arduous and important duties of the several situations he has filled during a period of nearly 22 years.

"Every former Resident, without exception, has felt upon record the most marked encomium on the eminent ability of Major Moore, and Major General Fraser at once cordially assents to the justness of these honourable memorials, and requests Major Moore to accept his special thanks for the assistance he has individually received from him during the time he has officiated as Resident at Hyderabad.

"Major General Fraser has had an opportunity of personally observing the zeal and impartiality with which Major Moore has during this period considered every duty connected with the Nizam's service, and the correct judgment he has displayed in bringing to a successful termination certain delicate and important transactions, which required not only an acquaintance with the peculiar duties of the military department, but also the combined exercise of a political knowledge of the country and of the views and habits of the durbar.

"But an opinion in regard to the merits of Major Moore has emanated from a higher authority than that of the Officiating Resident, and in publishing the subjoined extract of a letter recently received from the Secretary to the Government of India expressive of the sentiments of the Right Honourable the Governor-General on the occasion of the proposed retirement of Major Moore, Major General Fraser feels assured that the officers of the Nizam's army will be gratified to learn that their friend and brother-officer has been deemed worthy of receiving the highest and most honourable testimony that could have been offered in his favour."

"*Extract.*—'His Lordship cannot allow the retirement of so excellent an officer as Major Moore to pass unnoticed, and while he regrets the loss thereby inflicted on the service he has satisfaction in being able to bear testimony to the worth, zeal, and intelligence of so old and so distinguished a servant of Government.'"

In 1839 a medical school was established at Bolarum for the education of pupils intended for the subordinate medical grades of the Nizam's army. The object of the school was to give a high tone and more scientific character to the professional education of the medical subordinates than had previously obtained. This institution continued for seven years, when, as its advantages did not correspond with the expectations under which it was originally established, it was, in 1846, superseded by a similar institution at the Residency, but totally unconnected with the Nizam's service.

\* Now, we believe, a candidate for the East India direction.

The object of the present institution is the diffusion of sound medical knowledge among the respectable natives of the country generally, but more particularly those residing in and about the city. The benevolent views of the Resident were seconded by the Nizam's Government, who cheerfully placed the means of accomplishing them at his disposal. Under the zealous and able instruction of Dr. Maclean, the Residency Surgeon, this excellent and useful institution is improving every day, and there is every reason to believe that in its result it will be most beneficial to the people, as rendering them independent of European aid, and in time removing their prejudices against European practice. The cost of maintaining such an institution must be small compared with the large amount of good which from its locality, it is calculated to produce among the native population.

In June 1840 the garrison and invalid battalions were disbanded.

The battalions had for a long time previous ceased to answer the ends for which they were originally formed, while the expense of keeping them up had been a constant source of complaint with the Minister. The abolition of them was therefore of advantage in every point of view. The European officers and such of the native officers and others as were entitled to pension by the regulations of the service were transferred to the pension establishment; and such men as were considered fit for duty were transferred to a new company, designated the Hill Rangers, then authorized to be formed, and to be located in the hill districts between the Nizam's and the Company's territories for the preservation of the peace, and for reducing to order those amongst the Bhils and other inhabitants of the hill country who were found to be constantly plundering their more peaceful neighbours. By these arrangements a considerable saving was effected.

Towards the end of 1841 it was notified that all European commissioned, warrant, and non-commissioned officers serving with the Nizam's army shall be ruled and governed by the Mutiny Act and Articles of War in force for the East India Company's European troops subject to certain modification and alterations.

At the close of this year the appointment of superintending surgeon was continued in the person of Dr. Turnbull, an old and deserving medical officer. We have always considered this to be one of the most important and useful situations in the service: it is calculated to improve the efficiency of the medical department, by establishing an uniformity of system in the management of the several hospitals, and by stimulating the officers in charge of them, and their subordinates, to a greater activity in the execution of their duties. It moreover prepares the hospital establishment for the time of need; for experience can teach us that in the field even professional skill is of secondary consideration to medical arrangement. Dr. Turnbull's long service, great experience, and strict impartiality conspire to render him not only acceptable to the several ranks of the service, but also a suitable instrument for carrying out the views of the Resident.

In the beginning of 1842 the Bolarum force was ordered into the neighbouring cantonment of Secunderabad, in consequence of the insubordinate proceedings of a portion of the native troops composing the subsidiary force. A detail of these proceedings is unnecessary in this place, nor is it our wish to dwell upon events of so discreditable a character. It is a much more gratifying duty to record praise than censure. And the exemplary conduct of the Madras artillery, European and native, and of the 1st Madras European Regiment, on that occasion was most conspicuous, and drew forth from the Government the expression of the highest praise. The admirable conduct and soldier-like behaviour of the native artillery cannot be too highly extolled, nor too often recorded, for not only did the F troop horse artillery and B Company Golundauze "stand forward in the most prompt and praiseworthy manner to maintain subordination," but their comrades at the headquarters of the regiment, on hearing that a disturbance was likely to occur, wrote up to them to maintain the honour of the corps by obeying their officers and submitting to the orders of Government. The Madras Government marked its sense of their good conduct by permitting the whole of the men composing those two detachments to reckon three years' additional service. Both officers and men may well be proud of each other, proud also of belonging to so distinguished a corps.

Order and discipline were at length restored without any actual outbreak, when the Nizam's troops returned to their own cantonment, but it is undoubted that the result might have been different if one less firm or less able had been employed, for the crisis demanded promptness and energy, and he who assumed the command on and for the occasion fortunately possessed those qualities, and knew besides how to create them in others.

In the early part of this year a reference was made to the Supreme Government on the subject of a portion of their staff pay being granted to officers of the Company's service serving in the Nizam's army who were temporarily withdrawn for the service of their own Government, when it was decided—

“His Lordship in Council does not propose to cancel any orders which may have been issued in favour of officers who have recently been withdrawn from the Nizam's military force, but he would for the future invariably enforce the rule that when recalled to the service of their own Government such officers will cease to derive any emolument from His Highness's Government, and that the established pay and allowances of the situations which they filled in the Nizam's army shall be drawn by the officers by whom the duties are actually discharged.”

In April of this year, consequent on the formation of the new cantonment of Lingsugur, a revision of the establishments of the artillery and ordnance department took place. The field batteries were reduced from six to four guns each, and the Golundauze from a hundred to eighty men a company. The field batteries were ordered to be maintained in a state of the most perfect efficiency, ready to move at the shortest notice.

In 1843 some modifications were made in the cavalry branch of the service. The 5th Regiment, which had been maintained on the principle of regular cavalry, was formed into an irregular corps, transferred to the cavalry division, and rendered subject in every respect to the same rules and usages as the other four regiments.

During this year some modifications were made in the ordnance department. A new set of rules and regulations were established for its guidance, and the whole department placed under the control and authority of the commissary of ordnance at Bolarum. The effect of this arrangement has been to introduce a principle of economy, regularity and order into this part of the public expenditure, which, instead of as heretofore being committed to the discretion of several individuals, has now been brought under the immediate revision and control of one authority. The result has been a great saving to Government without any increase of salary to any individual.

In the beginning of 1846 the men of the infantry regiments were ordered to be instructed in the gun drill. We are at a loss to discover how this system can have found such favour with high authorities both in England and in India. An artilleryman is not made in a day. His professional duties are of too complicated a nature to be readily or lightly acquired, and consist in something more than the ordinary sponge exercise of a field gun. In the just sentiments of the *Quarterly Reviewer* we have stated our full concurrence in a previous article.\*

In April of this year the comfort of the native soldier was further attended to by the abolition of the knapsack, and by the substitution in its place of a larger haversack. This was a great boon, as removing a cumbersome appendage which had always been a source of annoyance to the soldier. Lightly and simply equipped as he now is with the haversack, the soldier is enabled to march with comfort to himself, besides having with him, on his arriving at his ground, all that he requires for duty, rest, or food. This was undoubtedly a move in the right direction, for, as the Government furnished the knapsacks, this article alone had cost the State in the five preceding years 20,000 rupees.

In 1847 a new cantonment was established at Warungul.

Towards the close of this year the numerical strength of the privates of the several infantry corps were reduced from 640 to 600.

In the beginning of 1848 an alteration was made in the dress of the European

and native officers of the cavalry. The ulkhaluq and mundil turban were substituted for the European dress of the European officers. We have no doubt that there were good and sufficient reasons for this change; but as it involved young officers in debt, by rendering useless to them their previous dress and appointments, which some of them had only recently, and at great expense, furnished themselves with, it would certainly have been more to their interests had the change not taken place. Let us never forget that changes, and even advantages, may be purchased at too high a price.

We have now arrived at the end of 1848, having traced the Contingent step by step from its origin to the present time. It now consists of five regiments of cavalry, eight regiments of infantry, four companies of artillery, with field batteries attached, and a corps of hill rangers, together with an efficient medical department, and arsenals at the principal military stations equipped with siege ordnance, ammunition, and stores of every description. In numbers the force may be thus detailed:—

Cavalry .....	2,750	fighting men.
Artillery .....	725	ditto.
Infantry .....	5,752	ditto.
Hill Rangers.....	170	ditto.

Total of all native ranks. 9,897

The European officers, of whom there are eighty-four, are distributed as follows:—

	<i>Lieutenant-Colonels.</i>	<i>Majors.</i>	<i>Captain-Comdts.</i>	<i>Captains.</i>	<i>Lieutenants.</i>	<i>Surgeons.</i>	<i>Assistant-Surgeons.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Military Secretary .....	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Officers Commanding Divisions .....	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	5
Superintending Surgeon .....	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Brigade Majors .....	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Pay Masters (in course of absorption) ..	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Cavalry .....	0	0	1	8	6	4	1	20
Artillery .....	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	5
Infantry .....	0	0	8	22	7	8	0	45
Total.....	2	4	10	41	13	13	1	84

There are, besides, thirty-seven European warrant and non-commissioned officers and a medical staff of fifty-five subordinates.

The Nizam's cavalry are too well known to require any description in this place. Their superiority over all other irregular cavalry is, we believe, admitted: for, their pay being handsome, a higher degree of efficiency, both in horses and accoutrements, is required, which makes the service better and more efficient than the irregular cavalry of the presidencies. The native horsemen themselves are everywhere much the same, and, when they are well treated, devoted to their officers. The great difference observable in the conduct and behaviour of these men will generally be found to arise from the character of their commander, and from his mode of treatment. The Nizam's regiments are at all times in a condition fit for immediate service, complete in horses, arms, appointments, bazaars, &c., ready to take the field at the shortest notice, without requiring aid from the Government, or any further assistance than that furnished from their own bazaars.

It is to be regretted, we think, that greater encouragement is not given to the men of the Dekhan to enter this branch of the service. We have always understood that the Nizam's cavalry were originally formed with a view to give employment to a large number of men, generally of good birth and respectability but of

reduced circumstances, who were roaming about the country in idleness, ready for any sort of mischief, and who might be thus converted, from being a source of trouble and annoyance to the Government, into cheerful and useful subjects. If, therefore, only as an outlet for the discontented, we would venture to suggest that every inducement should be held out to the men of the Dekhan, of character and respectability, to enter the Nizam's cavalry, in preference to the present system of recruiting indiscriminately. The cost of this branch of the service is nearly one-half of the entire Contingent. But that its real utility to the State compensates the Nizam's Government for the immense outlay we may perhaps be allowed to doubt.

We are constrained, therefore, while admitting their efficiency and even their superiority, to express our opinion that so large a body of cavalry are nearly thrown away in the Dekhan. For all useful purposes one-half of the present force would be amply sufficient. It is out of all proportion to the other arms. For the last thirty years the regiments have never taken the field together, and we have it on the best authority that they cannot participate, where they might be made very useful, in the stirring scenes on the distant frontier, in consequence of their superiority of pay over the Bengal irregular cavalry—a distinction, however, warranted by the state of the two countries. In the Dekhan almost all articles of consumption are dearer than in Hindustan, and a proportionate difference in the pay of the military has consequently always existed. At the time when the Mahratta armies traversed India from the Tumbuddra to the Indus it was at all times usual to reduce the pay of the military on the day on which they crossed the Nurbudda, proceeding to the northward; and in the same manner the pay was always increased on the armies crossing the same river to the southward. We have, then, a large efficient force of cavalry, part of which might well be spared from the Dekhan, but which cannot from circumstances be employed elsewhere, at a cost to the Nizam's Government of nearly eighteen lakhs of rupees per annum. To this we have but one answer, as to other questions of similar import. The Nizam cannot afford it. This is the language of necessity, which cannot be spoken too often. Two regiments might certainly be spared from the Contingent, but as these are not times for disbanding troops they might be transferred under some suitable arrangement to the Bengal Presidency.

The field artillery is considered as efficient as it can be under the present system of draught. The equipments are complete and in high order. The Golumdanze are well trained and instructed. We have witnessed them with a battery of six guns fire, dismount the guns, sit down, mount the guns, and fire again, in less than *one minute and five seconds*, and we doubt if this can be surpassed. We are not partial to such displays, inasmuch as it fatigues the men unnecessarily, and too often injures them, though when a thing is to be done we like to see it well done. There is little to object to in the Nizam's artillery except in the draught cattle, but field artillery drawn by bullocks, however excellent in other respects, *must* become under difficulties an incumbrance instead of an assistance to an army.

We are not at this time of day going to insult the understanding of the reader by detailing with tiresome repetition all that has been written on this question. Enough that the superiority of horse draught is acknowledged, and is now being practically manifested in the Madras army, as it has long been in that of Bengal. We would rather see two horse than four bullock batteries, on the principle that whatever portion of artillery is kept up should be made efficient in every respect. The quality rather than the quantity should be attended to—the guns drawn by horses to *clear* the way, instead of being drawn by bullocks to *stop* the way.

The infantry corps are considered in every respect equal to the regiments of either of the Presidencies, with this exception that they have not the same number of European officers. The men are chiefly from Hindustan. The Nizam's army has always been a favourite service with the Hindustanis, for although removed to a greater distance from their houses they have a corresponding advantage in respect to furlough. From their frugal habits they often save money enough to enable them to return to their families after eight or ten years' service, thus giving the State the benefit of the best years of their life. This we conceive cannot be too



much encouraged, for the expense of drilling and training a recruit for the ranks is incomparably less than that which is inflicted on the State by an extension of the pension list. The comfort of the soldier is besides consulted, and no man is made unhappy by being forced to remain in a situation against his inclination. The men are admirably drilled and disciplined. The arms and accoutrements are supplied from the Government arsenals; the clothing, which is of a superior description, from the Presidency; and two companies of each regiment have percussion muskets. In their internal arrangements they are regulated by the same principles which prevail in the Company's army.

This, although a good deal, is not saying everything. There is nothing of the *real* business of the soldier in all this. It is not the appearance at parade, nor being expert in certain exercises, that can make a man a soldier. It is but a very small proportion of the force that can boast of the experience of field service. Their real utility remains therefore to be tested, though we have no doubt that when the day of fighting shall arrive every branch of the force will perform the same valuable service as did the Russell Brigade in its early days.

We have always been of opinion that in a staff service like this the principle of selection, and not of seniority, should influence the nomination to the higher commands. The importance of having for these responsible posts only men of temper and understanding must be so obvious that no considerations of seniority or length of service should lead to the advancement of those who are wanting in these essentials. In these remarks we claim to be understood as having no desire to exalt one class at the expense of another. We are not unmindful that there are some individuals among the old officers of the service whose zeal and worth it would be difficult to over-estimate. Than the first and 2nd "Russell's" under their old and zealous commandants there are not perhaps two finer native regiments in the Indian army. But it is of systems that we are treating, not of individual cases. At present there is no safeguard of sufficient efficacy to prevent the higher ranks being officered by persons who shall be wanting in the qualifications for command. We have known more than one officer in command of a regiment, and on staff employ, not only deficient, but illiterate. These allusions can no longer wound the feelings of the living. They were promoted not for their qualifications, but because they were senior. To have passed them over would have been an invidious task.

The first and only consideration for the higher commands, we conceive, should be fitness. The qualifications to be sought for should consist in something more than the mechanical operations of the parade. Men qualified in every respect should be selected, of decided mental ability, of at least respectable general acquirements, and of a temperament capable of producing and preserving harmony *with* discipline, for every one knows how freaks of power, always the growth of a little mind, tend to irritate, and to destroy unanimity. Such are the men we would see advanced to the higher ranks of the Nizam's army. The service should be one of selection. Qualifications should be sought for, and, *wherever* found, cherished; and, instead of conferring appointments merely on account of seniority, *merit* should have its true place; for, constituted as that army is, we conceive it to be neither safe nor consistent with a just regard to the interests of the public service to regulate the nomination to the higher ranks by any other principle.

Much has been written in regard to the staff of the Contingent. We are not of those who think it too large. Concentrate the force and one brigadier might suffice as in the neighbouring cantonment of Secunderabad; but dispersed as the troops now are supervision is not only necessary, but indispensable. These commands, moreover, involve peculiar important political duties unknown to officers in similar positions in the Company's army. The Nizam's army is at present cantoned as follows:—Ellichpur, Aurungabad, Mominabad, Gulburgah, Hingoli, Bolarum, Wurungul, Muctul, and Lingsugur, with the hill rangers at Buldanah to protect that part of the hill country. A glance at the map will show that from one or other of these positions each portion of the Nizam's dominions is within a few days' march of the control of the regular troops, and it may be observed that the Contingent, although prepared to act against external enemies, is chiefly required to



check the various tributaries and powerful zemindars who are subject to the Nizam, and who, in the absence of regular troops, would not only in many instances resist the orders of Government, but would constantly be resorting to arms to decide quarrels among themselves, to the great injury of the Nizam's subjects and to the detriment of the revenue.

Much has also been written from time to time of the expense of the Nizam's Contingent. The cost may appear large, but so satisfied are we of the expense being well directed that we should view with concern any attempt to reduce unnecessarily the only efficient force belonging to the Nizam in his own dominions—fully assured that any sums thereby saved would only be wasted in some objectionable expenditure. But if the expense have been great it has not been without its advantages. Besides rendering important service to our own Government, the Contingent has aided in saving the Dekhan State, amidst the wreck of all others around it. The best guarantee we can have for the permanence of this force is its continued utility to the State, but we conceive it will be an additional guarantee if we can show that it is maintained on the most economical principles. If the cost, then, of the cavalry be deducted, it will be seen that the remaining portion is on a more economical scale than any force of similar strength and condition in India. But even with this large and expensive establishment of cavalry the cost of the Nizam's Contingent will bear comparison with that of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force. We have not the means of giving in regular detail the difference on every point of the several items of expenditure of the two forces; but from the several calculations before us we are satisfied that it would be found, on a fair investigation, that the Subsidiary Force—including the expense of its military stores, establishments of every description, and every other item of expenditure, although consisting of 2,000 fighting men *less*—costs as much as the Nizam's Contingent.

The staff of the Contingent will in like manner sustain a comparison with that of the Subsidiary Force, and in making this comparison let it be remembered that one force is divided between Secunderabad and Jaulnah, while the Contingent, as before observed, is distributed throughout the Nizam's dominions into ten separate and distinct cantonments.

The military staff of the Contingent consists of five brigadiers, five brigade majors and two paymasters—the latter in course of absorption, and therefore supernumerary to the establishment.

The military staff of the Subsidiary Force consists of two brigadiers, one assistant adjutant general, one engineer, one paymaster, one deputy judge advocate general, one assistant quartermaster general, one commissary of ordnance, three commissariat officers, and one cantonment adjutant, to which may be added the charges arising out of the numerous establishments attached to these several offices.

In the Contingent there is no commissariat. There are no contracts. There are no large establishments. There are no indirect advantages.\* That there is no wasteful or improvident expenditure the who controls this department is a sufficient guarantee. These and other considerations make us hesitate a good deal about the expediency of any measure that may deprive us of so efficient a force, that has been provided at a great expense both of money and of time, and which might on any occasion take its place in the field either with or without the Company's troops. It is, besides, an accession to our own strength without any cost to ourselves, and these are not times to diminish our military resources. The Nizam too is so sensible of the real utility of the force that, instead of complaining of its cost we believe him to be strongly opposed to any diminution of it. The fidelity of the men to our cause may of course, from the nature of the organization of the service, be as implicitly depended upon as that of the Company's own troops. They may be said to belong to the Nizam in name only. They consider themselves as Company's troops, and for all practical purposes might be made as useful: for

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\* The following anecdote will amuse the reader:—A friend of ours was seriously told by a person in England that the officers of the Nizam's service never kept horses, that when they wanted any they borrowed them from the Nizam.

were the Subsidiary Force entirely withdrawn, they would be amply sufficient to ensure the tranquillity of the Nizam's country, unless indeed we can suppose, which we will not, His Highness entering the lists against us and able to command a national movement.

But if it were thought desirable, on account of the Government finances, *apart from every other consideration*, to reduce expenditure, perhaps the cavalry brigadiership and one infantry brigadiership might be dispensed with, due regard being of course given to present incumbents. On the first organization of the Nizam's cavalry, at a crisis of great political importance, an officer to reform and command the whole was indispensable, in order to render the then useless and undisciplined horse capable of acting as auxiliaries with our own army. This arrangement, which originated from necessity, has become sanctioned by dint of time, without reference to the altered state of affairs. With the eighteen corps of irregular cavalry in Bengal a brigadier is not deemed necessary. Dispersed as the Nizam's cavalry regiments are, we conceive that the supervision of them might very well be entrusted to the divisional authorities, without, of course, making any change in the system of discipline, for it must be obvious that an officer of long standing in the Nizam's service who has risen to the command of a brigade must have a better acquaintance with the native officers and men, their habits and customs, than one newly brought into the service.

The only other division which it is thought by some might possibly bear reduction—and this we think very doubtful—is that of Hingoli, a second class division with a staff salary of 800 Company's rupees a month. The station of Hingoli was originally established from a conviction of the necessity of keeping in check the inhabitants of the western districts of the Nizam's dominions, a part of the country abounding in jungles and strong positions. The frequent employment of the Hingoli force sufficiently evidences its utility; the only point for consideration is whether the advantage is so great as to counterbalance the expense. We think it is: for, as a proof of the injury to which the Government and the country may be subjected by the absence of regular troops, it may be mentioned that in the course of an investigation some years ago it was ascertained that the mutual depredations and plunderings of two zemindars in one part of the country had amounted in a short space of time to upwards of three and a half lakhs of rupees. Now as these two zemindars were by no means men of great importance this example will suffice to show the advantages of so locating the Nizam's regular troops that portions of them may be speedily made available in any given quarter. But without an officer to command them their efficiency must be impaired, and their utility be in a great measure destroyed. We therefore think that the Hingoli division may be continued with advantage.

The infantry corps now consist of 600 privates each. Out of the several cantonments there are but two with more than one regiment. Ten per cent. or sixty men of each corps are during eight months of the year on furlough. Add to this the number necessary to leave behind to take care of a station, together with the sick and other absentees, and it will be seen how small a proportion can be made available for service in any one cantonment. As it is, the men, from being so scattered, are sufficiently employed upon local and escort duties, and to decrease their number will be only harassing the remainder, to an extent perhaps which might be very destructive to their present high state of discipline. We therefore think the reduction of infantry corps to be a measure of very doubtful expediency.

We are aware that it is thought by some that the number of European officers might be reduced. If European officers are required only for drill and parade purposes, then perhaps the Nizam's army may be considered to have too many; but if, as we believe, European officers are given for duties of field service, then, instead of having too many, the regiments may be considered deficient in this respect.

To say nothing of the local officers would appear as if we were unmindful of their interests. Rumours have not been wanting in regard to the whole of this class being pensioned. A melancholy picture might be drawn of the results of a measure involving such serious consequences to the prospects of so many deserving individuals. This step, we may be assured, will not be taken without extreme

caution, nor exercised without due consideration as well to the interests as to the feelings of those concerned.

It is but of late years that the local officers have enjoyed the sweets of the service. Many have served faithfully and well : some have done, as their fathers did before them, good service to the Native State ; few, it is to be feared, have lived for the day of adversity, having always looked upon the Nizam's service as possessing the same permanency as the Company's army. All these considerations, it is devoutly to be hoped, may plead in their behalf ; and their withdrawal, should it ever be determined upon, [be] accompanied by an arrangement consistent with the views of a benevolent Government. As the Nizam's Contingent has always been under the authority and control of the British Government, it is but just and reasonable that the interests of those belonging to it should, in the day of need, be protected by that Government. Besides, whatever the local officers may be in theory, they have always been made in practice to belong as much to the Company as if they were Company's officers holding—like their more fortunate, though perhaps not more deserving, brother-officers—Company's commissions.

There are some few of an advanced age and long standing in the service, who naturally look for retirement to their native country, and where such is the desire of parties we think they might be pensioned with benefit to the State, particularly in those instances where an actual saving will be effected.

This brings us to the consideration of the native pension establishment. It has already been shown that this establishment was originally instituted in 1816, and two years afterwards extended to the whole of the Contingent. We know that every endeavour has been made, particularly of late years, to check the growth of this establishment, and so to diminish the expense of it, and that the most stringent rules have been laid down for the guidance of committees, notwithstanding which the annual cost of it cannot now be less than one and a half lacs of rupees. This is a heavy burden upon the Government, and in the present state of the Nizam's finances every *straw* that can by possibility be taken off this load should forthwith be taken off. We would not, from motives of humanity and from other considerations, wish to see this indulgence entirely withdrawn, but we think that every individual of the native ranks that receives a pension should receive it in the Dekhan, where he may be occasionally seen, or in lieu of it a money compensation with permission to return to Hindustan ; for the present system of allowing men to draw their stipend at so great a distance is not only inconvenient, but, for obvious reasons, must be highly objectionable.

The next best plan perhaps would be to enlist a greater proportion of Dekhan men, and to grant them, on being pensioned, portions of land in perpetuity, with greater advantages for bringing waste land into cultivation. This we conceive might be made acceptable to men of this part of the country, although the arrangement when proposed on a former occasion failed with Hindustan men. It would at any rate be an improvement on the existing state of things, for at the present time there must be some hundreds of pensioners in different parts of Hindustan, drawing in the aggregate half a lakh of rupees in the year, without any authority responsible to the Nizam's Government either for the actual existence of the men or for a just and proper disbursement of its funds.

In nothing has improvement been more visible of late years than in the non-commissioned ranks of the service. The Nizam's army can now boast of some among the warrant and non-commissioned class who from their education and respectability of character would do credit to any situation. The rank of deputy assistant commissary of ordnance or quartermaster of artillery is the highest that can be attained. We are not aware of any sufficient reason why the commissioned ranks should be entirely closed against them, and we should be truly glad to see the Indian Government look in this direction when requiring adjutants or other officers for the numerous local corps in Bengal.

Before taking leave of the subject we must devote a small space in order to make more generally known the comparative advantages afforded by employment in the Nizam's service.

We have already shown that the rate of pay and allowances of the European officers was in 1830 assimilated with that of corresponding ranks and situations in the Company's army. It must not be supposed, therefore, that the advantages of the service consist in the salaries being higher, or the emoluments of office greater. The benefit to individuals arises from the circumstance of persons being enabled to hold situations in the Nizam's service to which from their rank they are not eligible in their own.

The advantages are that a Captain or Field Officer in the Company's army may have the command of a brigade in the Nizam's army.

A Captain or even a Lieutenant in the Company's army may command a regiment in the Nizam's army.

A Lieutenant if he pass the required examination is almost sure to have an adjutantcy, besides the charge of two or even three companies.

An Ensign if appointed would have the rank and pay of Lieutenant, and every officer after twelve years' service in India, no matter what his grade may be in his own service, becomes entitled to the rank and pay of Captain in the Nizam's service.

An Assistant Surgeon would have medical charge of a regiment, and after ten years' service in India would become entitled to the rank and emoluments of a Surgeon.

A nomination to the artillery is desirable as a stepping to the command of a battery, though the immediate pecuniary advantages are very limited.

The nomination of a young officer to the Nizam's cavalry is considered very advantageous, but not so to the infantry. It may indeed be a question whether it is not injuring a young men's prospects to remove him from his own regiment to the infantry branch of the Nizam's Contingent. In some respects it may be considered disadvantageous, and in a pecuniary point of view the benefits are small, and prospects no better. As in the present day every officer enters at the bottom of the list, and as all the commandants of infantry and most of the cavalry corps are local officers, and therefore not, as in the case of Company's officers, removable on promotion, no officer now entering the service can ever expect to rise to the command of a regiment.

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *September 18, 1855*.—The following is from our own correspondent, dated Hyderabad, 11th instant :—

"We had become almost hopeless of seeing the Ughrubees expelled, and of Sultan Ghalib's withdrawal from the country. We had no expectation whatever. We hear now that these parties leave this capital for Arabia after the celebration of the Mohurram. A day has often been before fixed for the departure of the former, but its advent has disappointed expectation. We now have an earnest of their intention to depart being sincere, in the circumstance that Sultan Ghalib has discharged 270 of his Arabs, and that both are selling off their property. This is so far good that it shows the Government to be regaining a portion of its lost influence over the leaders of the Arabs. A few more deportations, especially if following speedily upon offence, and we may have order reintroduced among the Arabs, and the Government exercising some sort of control over them, at least so far as to repress crime among them and to command their services on its occasions.

"It is miserable to think that the Rohillas the incessant (?) Santals of the Nizam's dominions, are now plundering in the vicinity of the Contingent Cantonments of Hingolee and Wurrungul. Detachments from both these places have either marched or are about to march against them.

"The Jemadar of Toopran, a notorious malefactor, dacoit and murderer, has been apprehended by a party of Arabs sent against him, and has been brought a prisoner to the city. We shall probably hear nothing more of him."

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *February 8, 1856*.—General Order by the Most Noble the Governor-General of India in Council, dated Fort William, 23rd January :—

No. 132 of 1856.—It appears from the Report of a Court of Inquiry held at Bolarum, the proceedings of which have been laid before Government, that on the

evening of the 21st of September 1855 a very serious outrage was perpetrated on the person of Brigadier Colin Mackenzie, commanding the Southern Division of the Hyderabad Contingent, by certain sowars and followers of the 3rd Regiment of Cavalry of the Contingent, during the celebration of the festival of the Mohurram at Bolarum.

The Most Noble the Governor-General of India in Council, having maturely considered the circumstances under which this lamentable occurrence took place, and having directed that the persons concerned in committing the deadly outrage upon the person of Brigadier Mackenzie shall be tried for the offence in the usual form, is pleased to promulgate for general information the conclusions to which he has come, and the measures which he considers it necessary to adopt, on the present occasion.

It appears that on the 20th of September a Cantonment order was issued at Bolarum by Brigadier Mackenzie regulating the arrangements for conducting the processions of the different regiments at the station, so as not to interfere with one another; and the order declared that no procession, music, or noise would be allowed on any account whatever from 12 o'clock on Saturday night the 22nd to 12 o'clock on Sunday night the 23rd of September. On the 21st a subsidiary order was issued modifying this declaration, it having been ascertained that Sunday, the 23rd, was a day of the festival, on which processions were indispensable to its due celebration.

The orders thus issued were, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, in their general tenor, unusually stringent. The first order was not only unusual, but objectionable, in that it put forward the Mohurram in direct conflict with the Christian Sabbath, and so introduced a religious element into the prohibition. But this order was withdrawn.

It further appears that on the evening of the 21st of September a procession was observed by Brigadier Mackenzie proceeding along one of the roads by which the passage of processions had just been prohibited in orders. As the party approached his own residence Brigadier Mackenzie sent word to them to be silent and to proceed to their own lines; but the messengers, of whom several were sent, were unsuccessful. Upon this disregard of his orders the Brigadier himself went up to the procession to enforce compliance, and finding no obedience paid to him, and being met with shouts of defiance, he seized two standards after struggling with the bearers, and wresting a sheathed sword from the hand of one of the parties the Brigadier struck the man with it. One or two followers who were of the procession were taken up, and the rest then dispersed. The standards and sword were quietly retained by the Brigadier.

Shortly afterwards an armed mob issuing from the Cavalry Lines, and having among them, as it appears, many sowars, broke into Brigadier Mackenzie's garden, murderously assaulted him, and followed him into his house threatening his life. By the same mob, Lieutenant Murray, second in command of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, was wounded and knocked down, and violence was offered to several gentlemen and ladies who happened to pass along the road where they were collected.

Some of the ringleaders have been arrested, and with them the law of the land will deal.

It is with sincere regret that the Governor-General in Council finds himself bound to say that in his opinion the immediate and the real cause of the outrage by which Brigadier Mackenzie has so severely suffered was the act of the Brigadier himself in rushing from his compound into the midst of a Mussulman rabble roused by the excitement of the Mohurram, and there seizing their standards and coming into personal conflict with them.

The Governor-General in Council entertains a high respect for Brigadier Mackenzie as a good and distinguished soldier, and as honourable, conscientious and gallant a gentleman as the ranks of the army can show. His Lordship in Council therefore looks with not less regret than disapprobation on the intemperate act which has produced so much evil, and has brought down such grievous suffering

upon the Brigadier himself. This officer will be compelled by the severity of his wounds to quit Bolarum, and proceed on leave to England.

But the act of the Brigadier did not justify the murderous violence of those with whom he interfered.

Neither did it justify the mutinous conduct of the sowars of the 3rd Regiment of Cavalry.

It is clear to the Governor-General in Council, from the evidence before him, that the greater part of the regiment in the lines was in a state of open mutiny; some rushed into the streets, cutting and hacking at the passers-by, and brutally assailing even women in their course.

Their European Officers were not allowed to approach them. They paraded without orders from their European Officers, and without any of the usual calls to parade, but by the direction of their Rissaldar. They were armed, mounted, and equipped. They sent out videttes to watch the approach of other troops sent for from Secunderabad, and acted as a military body guided by other orders than those of their regular European superiors.

Such proceedings are manifestly destructive of all discipline, and tend not less to destroy all confidence in the fidelity of troops that serve the Government. They appear to the Governor-General in Council to call for grave animadversion and for severe punishment.

They appear to His Lordship in Council to call the louder for animadversion and punishment that this is not the first time that the Hyderabad Cavalry have been guilty of violence towards their European Officers.

The Governor-General in Council is convinced that he would be perfectly warranted in disbanding the whole regiment, if he so pleased; but it is not his intention to have recourse to so sweeping a measure.

His Lordship in Council holds that in every such case as this it is to the Native Officers that the Government has a right to look for the maintenance of order and fidelity in the corps. Native Officers have long been in the habit of thinking that if they only keep themselves clear from any manifest participation in the disaffection of their corps, if they abstain themselves from any overt act of disobedience or mutiny, no blame will be imputed to them, and they will be allowed to escape with impunity.

The Governor-General in Council regards this as a most pernicious feeling, which Government should lose no opportunity of eradicating.

The Native Officers of the 3rd Cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent will accordingly now be dealt with as responsible for its conduct.

That they could have exercised a control over their men is clear, for when one of their number, Jemadar Shah Mirza Beg, loyally refused to join their tumultuous parade, and ordered the fifth troop to remain in their quarters, though a very few men had in the first instance paraded, after the Jemadar's orders not a man of the troop appears to have quitted the lines.

That with the exception of Jemadars Shah Mirza Beg and Mozuffur Khan the Native Officers did not control their men is shown by the whole tenor of the evidence. They tolerated, if they did not abet, the mutiny; they did all they could to screen their men from blame or punishment; and they lent no assistance whatever to the authorities in their attempts to discover the men of the regiment who were accused of having committed the murderous assault on the life of Brigadier Mackenzie.

Having regard to these considerations, the Governor-General in Council has resolved on, and hereby directs, the dismissal from the service of the Native Commissioned Officers of the 3rd Cavalry, as a fitting and an effectual measure of punishment.

There will be several exceptions to it.

Jemadar Shah Mirza Beg, whose conduct was loyal and obedient, will of course be excepted. Officers who were on detachment, or were absent from the lines, or were confined by sickness, will also in justice be excepted. Jemadar Mozuffur Khan is also excepted, he having invited the interposition of the European Officers.

Jemadar Shah Mirza Beg is appointed Rissaldar in the regiment, in the room of Rissaldar Meer Bundah Hussun, now dismissed.

In making the necessary promotions in succession to the Native Officers dismissed, it is the desire of the Governor-General in Council that no man of the corps who was present in the lines during the days of the tumult and mutiny shall receive advancement, unless he belonged to the fifth troop.

The Orderly Sowar attached to Brigadier Mackenzie on the 21st of September, Guffoor Khan, Bargeer, is advanced to the rank of Naib Duffadar.

The Governor-General in Council considers it necessary to note the conduct of the Infantry Guard at the Brigadier's house on the 21st of September.

It is proved that the permanent havildar's guard made no attempt whatever to resist the mob, or defend the person of the Brigadier.

The Jemadar who came subsequently with another infantry guard refused to seize the rioters who were pointed out to him.

Brigadier Mackenzie, it appears, had enjoined the havildar's guard not to load when he first saw the mob coming; but that injunction was, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, no justification to the guard for not resisting when it saw the mob actually cutting down its officer before its eyes.

The plea of the Jemadar, that he would not take orders from the man who pointed out the culprits, is, in the judgment of the Governor-General in Council, perfectly worthless.

Cowardice in a soldier is as much to be condemned as mutiny. To defend his officer is certainly not less his duty than to obey him.

For some men of the two Infantry guards there appears to be the palliation that they were placed where possibly they might not have distinctly seen what was passing; some were posted as sentinels; one had in charge a prisoner. But the Governor-General in Council can see no palliation or excuse for the conduct of the leaders of these guards; and His Lordship in Council holding the commanders as mainly responsible, accordingly directs that Havildar Bhowanee Uppadiah, of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, and Jemadar Sumjawun, of the 3rd Infantry Regiment of the Hyderabad Contingent, who commanded the two guards, be dismissed the service.

The Governor-General in Council in closing this statement of his views of the lamentable occurrences at Bolarum above detailed feels constrained to observe that the evidence before the Court of Inquiry has not left a favourable impression on his mind in regard to Captain Sutherland G. G. Orr, commanding the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, nor satisfied His Lordship in Council that that Officer exhibited as much vigour, resolution, or determination to expose and punish the mutinous conduct of his corps, as Government would have expected to see in the European Commandant of the Regiment.

The Governor-General in Council embraces the present occasion to reiterate in the strongest manner the injunction so repeatedly given to Officers in the service of Government never to interfere with the religious observance of the natives of India under their control further than is actually necessary for the preservation of the public peace and the maintenance of discipline and order.

In conclusion, the Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct, that this General Order, pointing out as it does the duties, responsibilities and liabilities of Native Officers, in cases of mutiny, shall be not only issued to the Hyderabad Contingent, but communicated to all other Forces and Contingents also under the immediate orders of the Government of India.

ENGLISHMAN, *October 27, 1860.*—The following is from Hyderabad, dated 15th October:—

"Some changes in the military dispositions of the English troops in the Nizam's dominions are about to take place, the motive for which is not clearly understood. Jaulnah, once upon a time the head-quarters of the Subsidiary Force, is now occupied by a European regiment, a regiment of Native Infantry, and one of Native Cavalry from the Madras side. It is under contemplation to relieve



this force by one of greater strength, which is all right from Bombay, consisting of one regiment of Europeans, two of Native Infantry, one of Cavalry, and two brigades of guns, with European artillerymen,—an essential point,—and to canton them at aurungabad, instead of Jaulnah, which is to be occupied by a wing of a regiment of Native Infantry, one squadron of horse, and two guns from the Hyderabad Contingent. It is not intelligible why the British Government has decided upon removing troops from Jaulnah to Aurungabad. The country requires to be protected from marauders overrunning it, and we require to be on our guard against a disaffected Mahomedan population ; but why Aurungabad should be preferred to Jaulnah, the localities being distant only forty miles, is inconceivable. Jaulnah is healthy, Aurungabad the reverse ; and Jaulnah having been, as I have before said, at one time the head-quarters of the Subsidiary Force, possesses the necessary accommodations for cantoning a force—barracks, arsenals, &c.,—which would save the Government from incurring additional expense for these—I presume no small object at the present time,—as well as bungalows for officers. It can hardly have been deemed necessary, though there is not much against the probability, by having a force at Aurungabad, to keep in subjection the Mahomedan inhabitants of a large frontier town and the Arabs forming its garrison, though at present they are quite enough. To counterbalance this, which I consider a right move, there is the objection of bringing our native Bombay troops, who did not show themselves over-faithful to the Government in the late rebellion, into close contact with persons who by this very movement, we assume, are not well affected towards us. But nothing can well counterbalance the objection of sending European troops to a station considered unhealthy.”

ENGLISHMAN, *August 29, 1861.*—Our own correspondent writes us from Hyderabad, Deccan, dated 15th August :—

“Mr. Temple left us on the evening of the 12th instant. I do not hear anything stated authentically of his proceedings, but I do not fail to give you the reports prevailing here, as to all appearance they seem probable. It is said that the two great projects of Mr. Temple were, the one to disband the Hyderabad contingent, substituting for it Madras troops. This would have brought a saving to the English Government of the amount of the pay of the Madras troops so transferred. The second was to reduce the numerical strength of the subsidiary force. This possibly was an adjunct well devised to the former scheme, as relieving a certain number of troops from the subsidiary force to replace the disbanded contingent. Mr. Temple found himself wholly obstructed in the accomplishment of his views by the treaties of 1800 and 1853. The former enumerates in figures the strength of the subsidiary force—eight thousand firelocks and five hundred sabres. The latter provides specifically for a contingent such as the present. In regard to the former, as we have now two regiments of cavalry, it is said (the whole is a mere report) that Mr. Temple has recommended the withdrawal of the regiment of native cavalry ; and has, besides, recommended, as a garrison is restored to Aurungabad, the removal of the English troops from Jaulnah, as no longer required for the security of that part of the Nizam's territories ; and the extinction of the Public Works Department, which perhaps has terminated its labours. It is also said that half of the public cattle, as it is not likely that more than a half of the subsidiary force will ever be detached, is to be reduced. It has been observed here that had the treaties of 1800 and 1853 been shown to Mr. Temple at Calcutta he would have been saved a useless errand to this place.”

TIMES OF INDIA, *May 29, 1866.*—*The “Lungur” Procession at Hyderabad.*—The following is from our Secunderabad correspondent, dated 21st instant :—

“The annual procession of the troops of H. H. the Nizam, called the ‘Lungur,’ and which takes place on the fifth day of the Mohurram, occurred yesterday. Through the urbanity of H. E. the Minister, Salar Jung, the visitors from the cantonments, who, owing to its being Sunday, and on account of the untimely decease of Captain Hartle, paymaster of the 21st Fusiliers, did not



number more than a dozen, were accommodated with seats in the balcony of the school endowed by His Excellency, overlooking the main street along which the procession was to pass. The scene was particularly exciting, arousing emotions of strange interest. The streets were thronged with spectators, stately elephants with gay trappings, whose trunks and foreheads were gilded and painted in a curious fashion, stalked solemnly along, conscious of their imposing appearance; horsemen armed to the teeth and dressed in every variety of colour and costume dashed about regardless of pedestrians and their horses' hoofs, while troops of sleek-looking vicious-eyed camels meandered through the crowd.

"At this season of the year the Moslem mind is excited, as Macaulay graphically describes it, by the fiercest and saddest emotions at the recollection how twelve centuries ago Husein the son of Ali, chief of the Fatimites, when all his brave followers had perished round him, drank his latest draught of water, and uttered his latest prayer; how the assassins carried his head in triumph; how the tyrant smote his lifeless lips with the staff; and how a few old men recollected with tears that they had seen those lips pressed to the lips of the Prophet of God. The crowd below now seemed fully to participate in these feelings, and to have given themselves up to that rage and lamentation under the excitement of which many have been known to give up the ghost.

"With these reflections passing through the mind, the scene was rendered doubly interesting by the knowledge that it was in that city of Hyderabad alone—filled with the most fanatical population in India, and sole remaining stronghold of the power which we have displaced—where these last signs, as it were, of the ancient martial spirit of the Mahomedans remained, and where the merciless hand of the British had not been stretched out to efface the remnants of feudal power, and those romantic ideas connected with the East so indelibly fixed in the memory of all who have read Moore's *Lalla Rookh*. The signal having been given, the procession began to defile from the palace of His Excellency, being led by an enormous elephant carrying the flag of the Nawab, immediately after which came the city police, armed with matchlocks and commanded by Jorawur Jung, the city Kotwal. Next followed the Inspector of Police, Hyder Beg, with his mounted constables, and Mahomed Khan, a Jamadar of Police, with a number of fierce-looking sowars armed with lances. After them came an Arab chief named Omer bin Aooz, who shares with Abdoolah bin Ali the chief power over the lawless Arab population in the city. He was preceded by a cavalcade of led horses gaily caparisoned and of great beauty, bedecked profusely with satin ornaments. His retainers were armed with matchlocks, daggers, and swords, and went past chanting some war song which had a very good effect. After this followed Raja Rai Rayan, Recorder of jaghirs and troops, with a large number of armed retainers, after whom came Jemadars Gool Mahomed Khan, Nawab Ravat Ali Khan, a man of affable manners, Raja Rajishere Rao, Jemadar Hoosein Khan Mundajee, a Pathan, and dressed completely in armour, with battle-axe in hand, like a knight of old. In strange and ludicrous contrast with these were several warlike-looking chiefs armed to the teeth and shading their delicate complexions with ladies' parasols of the latest Paris fashion. Next followed Jemadar Junnaid Khan Budun Khan, Nawab Bikoomca, Jemadar Fouzdar Khan, and Russuldar Buchud Khan, whose troops were composed of Sindees and Sikhs. This potentate had also a regular army on a small scale, consisting of a decrepit serjeant-major, 6 drummers and fifers, and 25 sepoy, than whom it would be impossible to conceive a more ragged crew. Next followed Nizam Yar Jung and Meer Bahadur Ali, H. E. Salar Jung's brothers-in-law, and Jemadar Bobbur Ali, with Peshkar Nirundah Persad, whose troops were all Sikhs. After these came the Chownee Rajah, who has now command over the remainder of the French contingent raised by Monsieur Raymond in the last century, and whom we ejected. They still retain the hideously grotesque helmet worn in those times, though the rest of their costume is an attempt at an imitation of the British. They were armed with flint muskets, and went past with drums and fifes, their native officers absurdly decked out in cast-away general officers' costume, and principally without boots. One of these worthies held a white umbrella in one

hand, and was engaged, instead of saluting, in threatening with his sword in the other a refractory sepoy who was shading his face from the afternoon sun with a fan. After these followed Abdoola bin Ali, the rival Arab chief in the city of the above-mentioned individual, with a confused mass of Arabs, Rohillas, Sikhs, and Sindees, some of whom performed a species of war dance as they went past, waving their swords over their heads and chanting a monotonous song extolling their prowess and power. Immediately following these came the Reformed Troops, consisting of two regiments of Cavalry, two of Infantry and a Battery of Artillery, commanded by Major Rocke, formerly in H. M.'s 1st Royals. The Body Guard of H. E. Salar Jung, composed of Africans, looked particularly well, mounted on fine Arabs and dressed in blue with sheep-skin saddles. They were about 50 in number, and are reckoned the best troops in the city. The Hyderabad Lancers, dressed in blue tunics with white facings, red skull caps with blue tassels, and long boots, were armed with the lance, sword, and pistol, and to all appearance were as fine and effective a body of men as any Native Cavalry in the British service. The Wunoopty Lancers also looked clean and well, and were dressed in green frock-coats, being armed with lance and sword, and rivalled in appearance the far-famed Cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent. The Artillery marched past without guns and on foot, as the Nizam has an aversion to guns being taken through the city. The Infantry, who were clothed in the red tunic similar to the sepoys in the British service, were armed with the Brown Bess, and marched along with firm and measured tread; in fact the whole of these troops offered a striking contrast in appearance and discipline to the rabble that preceded them. Next came Rajah Shur Rao and Wuzer Ali Khan, with their followers, who were followed by the troops of John Finglass, a Captain of trained bands, somewhat like John Gilpin, whose regiments were evidently trained upon the British model, but had not succeeded in attaining its perfection. They were all armed with old flint muskets. Last of all came a large body of decidedly irregular troops belonging to Gholub Jung,—who is particularly in the confidence of H. E. the Minister,—who furnish the guards over the Minister's palace and may be called his household troops. One of the regiments composing this force particularly struck me as affording in dress an excellent model for our native army. They were clothed in a loose red tunic buckled in by a waist-belt *à la Zouave*, with green leggings or gaiters and shoes, and on their heads they wore a red fez cap with blue tassels. They were a fine body of men, and appropriately closed the procession. On the conclusion of the march past we adjourned to luncheon, and then bid adieu to our kind host, after receiving the usual gift of two bottles of rosewater each. Altogether not less than 9,000 or 10,000 armed men must have passed; but the impression conveyed to the mind was that, after all deduction had been made for Oriental pomp and display of pageant, not much apprehension need be felt by Government at the existence in close proximity to the cantonments of so large a body of armed men, composed though they are of the most warlike races in India; for the wretched manner in which they are armed, combined with the absence of all discipline, can never render them dangerous antagonists to the splendidly equipped and highly disciplined Subsidiary Force at Secunderabad. The only really disciplined and well-armed troops which passed yesterday were the Reformed Troops, who are purposely maintained to overawe the Arab element in the city, and from whom therefore there is nothing to fear, for in case of an *éméute* they would be ranged on the side of the British. It was rather with a feeling akin to compassion for the finances of the Nizam that I viewed so large a body of armed men retained solely to foster the pride of the only independent Mahomedan prince in Hindostan. In former days the invasions of the Mahrattas necessitated the maintenance of these feudal retainers; but now when the whole of the country that surrounds the Nizam's dominions is under the British rule, and he has nothing to fear from internal or foreign aggression, it appears, and indeed is, but sheer waste of money (which would be far better applied to public works, such as improvements of roads, erection of bridges, agricultural and other objects of public utility), squandered in maintaining in idleness a large body of bloodthirsty mercenaries,

who prove often to be violently oppressive and tyrannical in their dealings with the people, and who can never be but a curse to the country which they are eating up."

**TIMES OF INDIA, June 23, 1868.**—*The Troops of "our Faithful Ally."*—The army of the Nizam is certainly large and well-appointed enough to give rise to surmises as to the object with which it is maintained. Our Bombay contemporary asked very reasonably the other day what possible motive can induce the Nizam to entertain so costly an array of regular troops, when the integrity of his dominions is guaranteed by the British Government, when there is no possibility of his being attacked from without, or of his authority being defied within. To put down disturbances in any part of the Nizamate the Hyderabad Contingent is surely strong enough. We maintain that force for the very purpose, and are bound by treaty to set it in motion whenever its services are required by the Nizam's Government. The treaty of 1853 enacts in clause 3—

"That in lieu of His Highness's present contingent the Honourable East India Company shall maintain for His Highness, his heirs and successors, an auxiliary force, which shall be styled the 'Hyderabad Contingent,' according to the provisions of the maintenance of that force which are detailed in the 6th article of this treaty. It shall consist of not less than 5,000 Infantry and 2,000 Cavalry, with four field batteries of Artillery. It shall be commanded by British officers fully disciplined, and controlled by the British Government, through its representative, the Resident at Hyderabad. Whenever the services of the said contingent may be required they shall be afforded at all times to His Highness the Nizam, fully and promptly, throughout his whole dominions. If rebellion or disturbance shall be excited, or if the just claims and authority of His Highness shall be resisted, the said contingent, after the reality of the offence shall have been duly ascertained, shall be employed to reduce the offenders to submission. As the interests of the two States have long been identified, it is further mutually agreed that if disturbances shall break out in districts belonging to the Honourable E. I. Company His Highness the Nizam shall permit such portions of the subsidiary force as may be requisite to be employed in quelling the same within the said districts. In like manner if disturbances shall break out in any part of His Highness's dominions contiguous to the territories of the Hon. E. I. Company, to which it might be inconvenient, owing to the distance from Hyderabad, to detach any portion of the subsidiary force, the British Government, if required by His Highness the Nizam, shall direct such portions of its troops as may be most available to assist in quelling the disturbances within His Highness's dominions. In the event of war His Highness the Nizam engages that the subsidiary force, joined by the Hyderabad Contingent, shall be employed in such manner as the British Government may consider best calculated for the purpose of opposing the enemy; provided that two battalions of sepoys shall always remain, as settled by former treaties, near to the capital of Hyderabad; and it is also agreed hereby that excepting the said subsidiary and contingent forces, His Highness shall not, under any circumstances, be called upon to furnish other troops whatsoever."

The supplemental treaty of 1860 ratified these engagements, from which it is tolerably clear that we are bound, on the Nizam's requisition, to put down any domestic disturbance by the employment of the Hyderabad Contingent, or, in the event of the disturbances taking place in districts contiguous to the British territories, by the assistance of any other of our troops that happen to be available. This is tantamount to an agreement on our part to maintain the Nizam's authority in his own dominions so completely that he would be safe upon his throne even if he had not a single soldier in his private employ. The Contingent is distributed into detachments, quartered in various parts of his dominions. It is in first-rate order, and is more than adequate for the suppression of any disturbance that undisciplined men could stir up. Where, then, is the necessity of the Nizam's maintaining, over and above this splendid force, a regular army of his own? Necessity there is, of course, none; and such being the case one is naturally driven to conjecture that there must be some political object in organizing it, which is known only

to the Nizam and his advisers. It can hardly be a *tôy* ; if it were so, one would have good reason to doubt the sincerity of the complaints which were once made on the score of our compelling the Nizam to maintain the Contingent. If he could not afford to pay for the Contingent, he certainly could not justly afford to keep up a force of his own nearly as large as the Contingent on the revenue of a dwarfed Nizamate. One's sympathy with him on account of the hard measure meted out to him by the British Government formerly would be thrown away. We dismiss the idea that the 'Reformed Troops,' as they are designated, are kept up for mere show and pageantry, at once, as untenable, and we are strengthened in our conviction that they are intended for some real military purpose, from our knowledge of their admirable workman-like equipment, and the high state of efficiency that they have attained. They are improving every day, and among them may be seen some troops which in point of dress, &c., might furnish our authorities with useful hints on the matter of clothing sepoys. The artillery, which has hitherto been drawn by bullocks, is at this moment being horsed, and will soon make a very respectable show in the field. Can it be that the Nizam intends, at some future period, when this force is complete in all its details, and its muster roll possibly more formidable than it is now, to suggest to the British Government that he is able to keep order in his dominions without troubling us for soldiers for that purpose, that so far as he is concerned there is no further occasion for keeping up the Contingent, and that he would feel obliged, such being the case, by our handing back the Berars, which we administer in his name for the payment of the said Contingent? We merely ask the question ; it is impossible for us to answer it. Unless some such scheme be entertained, we confess that the maintenance of the Reformed Troops is a riddle to us.

TIMES OF INDIA, *July 21, 1868.*—*The Reformed Troops of H. H. the Nizam.*—The following is from a correspondent who signs "Enigma":—

"I saw in your paper lately an article on 'The Troops of our Faithful Ally' putting some conjectures as to the real cause for the organization of the 'reformed troops,' which seems a riddle to the writer. If, Sir, I be allowed a space, my humble efforts to solve the riddle may tend to satisfy conjecturing minds.

"First, and foremost, it would be well here to remark that the Nizam's Government has no such idea fostered as 'to suggest to the British Government that the Nizam is able to keep order in his dominions without troubling the British for soldiers for that purpose,' and in consequence that 'he would wish the Hyderabad Contingent to be dissolved, so that the transfer of Berar may be effected.' For when, in 1861, Mr. Temple was 'specially charged by the Governor-General to reduce that force,' or, if possible, to do away with it, suggesting that the Nizam *could* look after minor disturbances in his dominions by means of his 'reformed troops' (which organization was then in embryo, the treaty of 1853 was pointed out by Sir Salar Jung, the able Minister of His Highness, and the suggestion objected to, which tends to prove that the ambition to gain back Berar would not be by the Nizam's Government urging the suggestion of doing away with the said troops. But undoubtedly the transfer of the Berars *must* take place at some not distant day ; some nobler action, however, of the Prime Minister will achieve it, which must just now be a riddle, to be solved by Sir Salar Jung alone.

"Second, to answer your question, 'Where then is the necessity of the Nizam's maintaining a *regular* army of his own?' I can point the answer, by two means, from your own conjectures : 1st, because he does not wish to have an *irregular* army of 'tag-rag and bobtail,' seeing that the newly-organized troops are no other than the undisciplined corps of old, new-disciplined and commanded by European officers under the designation of the well-chosen name 'reformed troops.' 2ndly, that when an army is organized with 'workman-like equipment,' disciplined by European officers, and an ample amount of specie spent on them, that they *must* be intended for 'military purposes' (though not for '*some particular one*'), and *not* as a 'mere toy,' and certainly you may well say that 'they are improving daily' under the steady guidance and able management of their chiefs, to whom much credit is due, and of whom the Nizam's Government may well be proud."

*TIMES OF INDIA, March 2, 1869.—Presentation of new colours to the 2nd Regiment Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.*—On Tuesday morning last, the 23rd February, the whole of the Bolarum force, under the command of Major Adey, paraded on the brigade ground, to witness the presentation of new colours to the 2nd Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent, by the British Resident at the Court of Hyderabad, Mr. Saunders, C.B. The Infantry were in line in centre, with 4th Company H. C. under Major Hill in column on the right, and Captain Pritchard's Battery H. C. on the left. There was a large and brilliant assemblage gathered round the flagstaff to witness the ceremony. Amongst others we noticed General Briggs, Colonels Selby and Molesworth, R.A., Colonels Burton, Murdall, &c., &c. The Resident was punctuality itself, and on his arrival, accompanied by a large staff, was received with a salute of thirteen guns, the whole of the troops presenting arms. The old colours were at once trooped, and farewell taken of them to the tune of "Auld lang syne." The 2nd Infantry then formed three sides of a square, with the Cavalry and Artillery on the flanks. The new colours were brought to the front, when the Resident approached, and, presenting the colours, addressed the regiment in the following well-delivered and spirited speech :—

"Major Adey,—I have accepted with much pleasure the highly flattering and honourable duty you have assigned to me, *viz.*, that of presenting to your Regiment their new colours. Your Regiment, the 2nd Hyderabad Infantry, was originally raised in the year 1812, under the immediate auspices and through the influence of one of the most eminent of my official predecessors, Mr. (afterwards Sir) Henry Russell, and formed the 2nd Battalion of what was then known, out of compliment to the Resident, as the Russell Brigade. The latter force was subsequently considerably augmented, and thenceforth bore the name of the Nizam's Contingent, which designation was, some fourteen years since, changed into that of the Hyderabad Contingent.

"On the appointments of the Regiment, and upon its colours which are now unfurled, are inscribed the honourable names of 'Mahidpore' and 'Nowah.' The former battle was fought in the year 1817, during the second Mahratta war. Your Regiment and the rest of the Russell Brigade composed part of Sir John Malcolm's Division, and their conduct on the occasion not only elicited the thanks of that distinguished officer, but His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, Sir Thomas Hislop, who had assumed the general control of political and military affairs in the Deccan, and commanded in person at the above battle, noticed in the highest terms of praise their steadiness, courage, and discipline. The name of Mahidpore is also most honourably associated with that of the Hyderabad Contingent by an episode in which the Cavalry portion of the force greatly distinguished itself, *viz.*, the rescue during the Mutinies of 1857-58 of a European lady, Mrs. Timmins, and her family, and by the pursuit of the mutinous Mahidpore Contingent, and the capture from them of their battery of guns.

"The siege and capture of Nowah in the year 1818 belong specially and exclusively to the history of the Nizam's Contingent, and had an important effect in restoring [? restoring] the authority of His Highness the Nizam over a considerable tract of country, the people of which had for nearly twenty years maintained a successful rebellion against his authority. The siege was carried out by regular approaches, and was most skilfully conducted to a successful termination. Notwithstanding the most strenuous resistance on the part of the garrison, the fort was at length duly assaulted, and fell into the hands of the Nizam's Contingent.

"To show that the place did not succumb without a hard fight I need only mention that our loss amounted to 24 killed and 180 wounded, of whom six were European officers, and among them Captain Currie, who was then in command of this Regiment. The garrison consisted of more than 500 Arabs; 100 of these were taken prisoners, of whom more than 80 were severely wounded, while upwards of 400 dead bodies were counted in the fort.

"The Regiment has since been engaged, and always with credit, in several minor affairs in the Deccan, such as Rajumpett in 1824, Murchair in 1842, Koelkoondah in 1844, and Gowree in 1847.

"During the disturbed times of 1857 and 1858 the Regiment conducted itself with steadiness and fidelity, and served beyond the frontiers of His Highness's dominions during the Central India campaign, being chiefly employed in garrisoning Mhow, an important cantonment, and a post of danger and of horror in those days. Several of the native officers were rewarded for good conduct during these trying times.

"At a more recent period again, the Regiment, being anxious to display its loyalty and soldierly spirit in a fitting field, volunteered for service in Abyssinia in 1867. Although their offer was not accepted, they received for their praiseworthy zeal on the occasion the thanks of the Government of India.

"The records of the Resident's office in the Military Department show that the 2nd Regiment of Hyderabad Infantry have ever borne a good character as a steady, well-disciplined corps, animated with a soldier-like and becoming spirit at all times, whether in the field or in cantonments.

"It is under these circumstances that I have the greatest satisfaction in consigning to your care and guardianship these colours, being well assured that those[? you] to whom I have the honour of delivering them are good and loyal soldiers, who will guard and defend them with your lives, should occasion require you, in behalf of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen and of Her faithful ally His Highness the Nizam, to take them into battle, when you will, I doubt not, with God's blessing and a righteous cause, carry them forward to victory.

"Under no circumstances will they ever, I feel assured, have their purity tarnished, or their honour in any respect sullied or assailed, while they remain entrusted to your keeping."

Major Adey replied in a few soldier-like words to the effect that he would translate and make known to the men the sentiments expressed by Mr. Saunders and added :—

"I have to thank you, Mr. Saunders, on behalf of the Regiment and of myself, for the honour you have done us in presenting these colours, and for the very flattering terms in which you have referred to the previous services of the corps. You may depend upon it, Sir, that if opportunity occur of carrying these colours before an enemy they shall be carried forward in the same line as those of other Regiments in Her Majesty's service, and that we, serving under them, will ever uphold the honour of our Regiment and Service, the integrity of the Empire, and dignity of the British Crown."

The Regiment then re-formed line, formed open columns, saluted, and marched past in quick time. The Cavalry and Artillery followed at the trot and repassed again at the gallop in beautiful style. The whole then formed in column fronting the flagstaff, advanced in review order, and saluted.

The steadiness and correct marching of the Infantry were particularly admired, and the general appearance of the troops was highly commended. We have seldom witnessed a parade carried on with such steadiness and silence, and the whole arrangements reflect great credit on all concerned.

After the parade, the officers of the corps entertained Mr. Saunders and a distinguished company of upwards of sixty, ladies included, at the mess house. We have often heard the Bolarum mess spoken of as one of the pleasantest and most hospitable messes in India; and certainly on this occasion it well supported its renown, for it has never been our good fortune to assist at a more *recherché* and elegant entertainment or one in better taste. The Resident was received at the mess house by a guard of honour. The excellent band of the 2nd amused the guests during breakfast, and the party broke at about 10 o'clock after passing a most enjoyable morning, the Resident leaving under the usual salute.

**TIMES OF INDIA, February 7, 1876.**—*The Lungur Procession at Hyderabad.*—The following is from our own correspondent, dated Secunderabad, 2nd February:—

"The great Lungur procession—the annual review of the Hyderabad troops, regular and irregular—of 1876 is now a thing of the past. It was for some time a matter of considerable doubt whether it would be celebrated this year as usual or

not. The reason, of course, for its proposed omission was not far to seek. As all the world already knows, there have lately been disturbances of a serious nature in the city of Hyderabad, arising out of that most fertile source of quarrelling and bloodshed, which, by-the-bye, to the best of my recollection, was originally introduced by the *Homoiousian* and the *Homoousian* Christians, and subsequently copied by the proselytizing Mahomedans—to wit, difference of religious opinion. It was feared, and not without good reason, that to collect in one spot bodies of armed men all hating each other with that cordial detestation which distinguishes the rival Mussulman sects of Sunnis and Shias would be equivalent to placing an open cask of gunpowder in the close proximity of a smithy fire. A single spark from the anvil might fly out and cause a terrible destructive explosion. However, at the eleventh hour, His Excellency Sir Salar Jung and his co-advisers came to the conclusion that all danger of disturbance had, by the exercise of extraordinary forethought, been removed. The Pathans—Shias like their Persian neighbours, followers of Ali and Hoossein,—the originators of the late *imbroglio*,—were banished to a locality twenty miles north of Hyderabad, where they were kept under strict surveillance. Besides this happy removal of 1,600 fierce fanatics, local precautions of a stringent character were adopted to ensure against any collision between such of the embittered sectaries as remained behind. These prudent arrangements turned out, as the event proved, to be perfectly successful. The procession took place as usual, though of course less numerously attended than in former years, and not the slightest *contre-temps* of any kind occurred to cause uneasiness to the anxious guardians of the public peace.

“When the annual return of the Lungur draws near, it is the custom of the Minister to invite, through the Resident and his Assistants, a certain number of English spectators, who are largely composed of officers and ladies belonging to the garrison at Secunderabad. The suburb known as Chudderghaut also, which has a considerable non-official European and Eurasian population, contributes its ever-present contingent. The number of persons so invited is necessarily confined within narrow limits, because the balcony whence the spectacle is viewed is of very contracted dimensions. A general impression prevailed in this quarter that the Lungur, if it took place at all this year, would be held on Wednesday the 2nd instant—to-day—and persons who had applied for invitations in the usual course looked forward to being invited on that date. But, from some cause or other which I am not competent to discuss, the day was suddenly altered from Wednesday the 2nd to Tuesday the 1st instant, and it was only the previous—that is, Monday—night that the Minister communicated to the Residency people his tardy permission that they might invite a few of their friends for the occasion. Consequently this year the number of European spectators was unusually small, and was composed chiefly of residents at Chudderghaut, who from their proximity to the city had means of receiving prompt and speedy information.

“Last year I gave you a very full and detailed description of the pageant, a spectacle unique of its kind throughout the length and breadth of India. I recounted the different bands of Arabs that defiled past, with those horrible hand drums of theirs rattling in a deafening manner, and the men themselves shouting what we may suppose to be either an invocation to the Prophet, or their war-cry, if they have a war-cry, apart from the everlasting Allah-l'il-lahu. I described to you also the wild bodies of Rohillas clad in cotton quilted armour, with iron gauntlets and headpieces. I noted the different nationalities of Beloochees, Sikhs, Pathans and other mercenaries on whom the Paramount Power has imposed the irksome necessity of refraining from indiscriminate plunder, together with its natural and invariable concomitant of indiscriminate throat-cutting. I told you of the prancing steeds, led and ridden, covered over with gold-embroidered saddle cloths and bedizened with necklets of jingling silver plates. Nor did I omit to notice the gaily caparisoned and fantastically painted elephants, from the pigmy of 7 feet high covered with nothing but an enveloping red cloth to the monster of 12 feet high surmounted with a splendid canopied howdah of crimson velvet. I discussed also the general appearance and equipment of the so-called reformed troops. Such being the case it



is unnecessary for me to go over in detail the same ground again. But, to show that I am not forgetful of my duty towards you and the public, I shall briefly record—briefly because I am terribly pressed for time just at present—the reflections which passed through my mind as I sat watching the fighting force at the disposal of Our Faithful Ally the Nizam.

“ The Arab companies are by no means the formidable bands of redoubtable warriors that popular imagination has depicted them to be. They contain a large admixture of old men and young boys, who could be nothing but a source of weakness in the shock of conflict. Individually and collectively the Arabs are utterly destitute of either drill or discipline, and a common nationality alone must supply the place of the latter as a bond of union in times of mutual danger. The only fire-arm with which they are provided is a clumsy matchlock, but they carry besides on their persons a whole museum of cutting and stabbing implements. They are small, wiry fellows, moving with a cat-like motion. They are full of pluck and energy, and might prove troublesome customers when fighting behind the shelter of stone walls, an attitude in which most Orientals fight with a fair amount of courage and tenacity. But should they come to be pitted against regular troops in the open field, where they would be exposed to the action of cavalry or the still more demoralizing fire of the breechloader, they would be simply worthless—they would melt away ‘like snaw aff a fail dyke,’ as my old Scotch servant used to say. These remarks *à propos* of drill, discipline and equipment and efficiency apply with equal force to the other tumultuous bands of mercenaries in the service of the Hyderabad State. Employed *against* regular troops in the open such a rabble would be anything but formidable enemies. Employed *with* regular troops they would be nothing but so many impediments to free action in the field. They might be useful as scouts or foragers, but their value as a fighting force in modern civilized warfare would be appropriately represented by the expressive little monosyllable *nil*. The leaders of these free companies sat perched aloft on tall elephants, seemingly absorbed in the pleasing contemplation of their own mightiness, and displaying alongside them on the edge of the howdah a regular battery of heavy muzzle-loading rifles. One chief seemed especially proud in the possession of a gilded cross bow and a handful of arrows : I thought of the grin of satisfaction with which a skirmishing Tommy Atkins would settle down on his stomach to take a steady pot at ‘that there fellow on the top of the bullifant, Jim.’

The regular regiments, foot and horse, the reformed troops as they are usually designated, contained a goodly proportion of fine strapping fellows who offered ready to hand the materials for the making of thoroughly efficient soldiers. The cavalry were, naturally enough, much better off in this respect than the infantry. In the latter arm the number of decrepit old men was ludicrously great. Some of them were positively bent double as they struggled along, oppressed by the double weight of years and their muskets. The arming of the different infantry regiments presented a sufficiently whimsical variety of weapons. The non-commissioned officers carried halberds or short spears, while the rank and file bore old muskets with flint-locks, the usual adjunct of the flint, however, being evidently not considered a *sine quâ non* in Hyderabad. The bayonets were of various patterns—some long, some short; some broad, some narrow; some sharp-pointed, some obtuse-pointed as if a few inches of the blade had been broken off, lest the weapon should be used for purposes of violence. Then, again, men of the same regiments never seemed to know whether they should march with their arms at the slope or at the shoulder. There was the usual display of antique uniforms, the cast-off clothes of British and French soldiers of 150 years ago—the coal-scuttle hat, the Dutch butter-tub hat, with varieties of coats and trousers innumerable. As is the case in the organization of our own sepoy regiments, so with those of the reformed troops, the weakest point seemed to be in the defective physical qualities of the subordinate officers. The great majority of the purely native officers who passed in review had arrived at an age which fitted them more for a sedentary life surrounded by home comforts than for going on service or attempting to perform the active duties of a soldier. Most of them were dressed in a marvellously eccentric fashion, each man



wearing what seemed most alluring or most warlike in his own eyes. I admit that some of them attempted to effect an approximation to the uniform worn by the men supposed to be under their immediate command. Some of them wore English boots, others sported native slippers, while certain malcontents, rising superior to all sutorial prejudice, dispensed with either the one or the other. Some valiantly wielded English blades, some brandished the naked *tulwar* of the country, while others carried their sheathed swords closely tucked up under their armpits. One peaceably-disposed warrior bore as his only weapon a faded gingham umbrella. And so they hobbled or shuffled along like so many Madras Subadar Majors, or senile British Field Marshals. I heard very few words of command given, and such as reached my ear could not have been heard beyond the first few files of each regiment; and I observed that in no case did any responsive action ever succeed. On one thing the cavalry trumpeters seem to have arrived at some sort of agreement. As they passed before the Minister they invariably performed a royal salute with more or less of executive skill and ability. Of the regimental band the less said the better. One of them—the Nizam's own private band, I believe—played very well, but most of the others produced nothing but hideously discordant sounds, 'enough to make a cat sick,' as a discontented neighbour of mine remarked with symptoms of disgust and coming sickness impressed on every lineament of his face.

"One battery of field artillery was paraded. The gunners and drivers were attired like the heroes of *Ubique*, in blue. In fact they wore cast-off uniforms that had once belonged to various brigades and batteries of the R. A. A little tailoring applied to the shoulder straps would have given them an appearance of greater uniformity, and could have been effected at little cost or trouble. Though the teams were brought out harnessed ready for hooking on, the guns and wagons were not submitted for inspection. Doubtless the officers in charge of the Nizam's Artillery had sufficient reason for keeping their old smooth-bores at home.

"What, I asked myself as I left the *tumasha* and adjourned to His Excellency's banquetting hall, is the true value of all these fellows as a fighting force in the present days of weapons of precision and scientific warfare? A Madras contemporary, in discussing Hyderabad affairs the other day, wrote as if he believed that Sir Salar Jung was impressed with the notion that he had a sufficiently strong force at his command to overawe the British power. Never was there a greater delusion than to ascribe such an absurd sentiment to the 'cutest Minister in India. His Excellency knows exactly how little worth his swarming ragamuffins would be against the steady front of the British line of battle. I can't give you Sir Salar Jung's spoken ideas on the subject, for the very excellent reason that I never heard them, but in default perhaps you will listen to mine, which assuredly are not those of an authority, but which I flatter myself are at least those of an intelligent observer. The question, then, I asked myself above I succeeded in answering before threading the extended labyrinth of lanes and courtyards which leads to His Excellency's hospitable dining-room; and it was to this effect:—place in the open field the whole armed force I have just seen, splendid as they are in their 'barbaric' night, and placed opposite them, 'with hostile thoughts intent,' one-half of the British garrison of Secunderabad, and then—why, in twenty minutes from the opening of the ball, Arabs, Rohillas, reformed troops, cavalry and infantry, would be in headlong rout, skedaddling with more than Bull-Run impetuosity for the nearest shelter among the boulder-covered hills. It would be a serious thing, of course, for a British or any force to enter a crowded city with narrow streets, such as Hyderabad is, because a matchlock or an old flint musket aimed at twenty yards will kill as effectually as the finest breechloader ever turned out of an English workshop. If it were necessary, however, to reduce Hyderabad, the thing could be done in a couple of days by our heavy artillery. The walls of the Nizam's capital are fearfully rickety constructions, tottering to their fall, and there is not a presentable piece of ordnance mounted anywhere upon them. The guns placed in position on the fortifications of Golconda, distant four miles, are ancient pieces of artillery, infinitely more likely to prove destructive to the gunners behind them than to the enemy in front of them. But it is foolish to talk of a possible quarrel with Our

**Faithful Ally.** If the Nizam must have an army at all—and perhaps it is necessary for his sovereign dignity that he should have one, which may also act as police when required—I do not see why he should not have a force small in numbers but thoroughly well drilled, disciplined and equipped. At present he has not a single regiment fit to come to line with our troops. My advice, which has at least the merit of being disinterested, to Sir Salar Jung would be as follows :—Your Excellency, issue an edict forbidding any one to carry arms except your soldiers, your police, and certain civilians of rank. If resistance is made put it down by force. Next, in due time, deport those scoundrelly Arabs to their own country. A few of them might be formed into regular companies, subject to strict discipline. Should they prove unmanageable, then without further parley despatch the whole blessed crew after their late comrades to Arabistan. Disband the Rohillas, Sikhs, Beloochees, &c., and carefully pass every ruffian of them over your border. Weed your regular troops of the too old and too young, and you will thereby effect a great saving in cash, to say nothing of the enhanced efficiency you will secure. Reduce your troops to a few regiments of cavalry with two or three batteries of artillery, all properly equipped and drilled. *Quibus factis* I make bold to observe that the Hyderabad State will enter on a new and unexampled lease of prosperity.”

**TIMES OF INDIA, July 18, 1879.**—It is not generally known that some fifty officers and men of the 3rd Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent, were at the outset of the Afghan War attached to one of the Bengal Cavalry Regiments serving in the Khyber Column under General Sir Sam Browne. One or two of the Hyderabad nobles offered the services of their vassals and themselves to the Government of India. But as the Native Contingent, commanded by General Watson, was drawn entirely from the Punjaub and North-West their offers could not be accepted. The Nizam's troops have so few chances of military service that it is interesting to learn that very favourable reports have been received of the dash and *élan* of this little representative contingent. Several of their horses were shot under them, and they have all behaved gallantly throughout. The plucky little Arabs on which the Contingent troops are mounted are said to have stood the hard work, short rations, and general fatigue far better than the large horses of the Bengal Cavalry. The men are now on their way home, and are expected to join their comrades in Auringabad in about a fortnight. The 3rd Cavalry H. C. are commanded by Major Oswald FitzGerald, who was present at many of the most important actions in the Franco-Prussian War.

**DECCAN TIMES, April 21, 1880.**—*The Nizam's Army.*—The *Pioneer* in his issue of the 17th instant has published a leading article referring to the Army Commission Report, and, quoting the reference made by the Commission to the military position of the Nizam of Hyderabad as his text, proceeds to notice the present strength of the army of the Nizam.

Our Allahabad contemporary has evidently not read up his subject, and in consequence he has in ignorance put forth a series of erroneous statements and deductions which, considering the influence which the *Pioneer* carries, are likely to do harm to the interests of the Hyderabad State both at home and in India. Our contemporary speaks of “the needlessly-inflated army of the Nizam,” and goes on to say “It is necessary to keep up an extravagantly powerful garrison at Secunderabad simply because the Hyderabad Government will go on strengthening its military force by all means in its power.” Such in the *Pioneer's* opinion being the state of things, he goes on, most absurdly, to say that a feeling of delicacy prevents the Government of India from opening negotiations with the Hyderabad Court regarding certain “antiquated obligations” under which “British India was bound to keep up a larger force at Secunderabad than the actual condition of the country would now really require ;” that, on the contrary, “we are obliged to go beyond the treaty stipulations and keep a greater force than the treaties

‘required ;’ and so according to the *Pioneer’s* reasoning the Hyderabad Government being bent on increasing its army is quietly doing so year after year, and the Government of India, on the other hand, is, as quietly, yearly adding to the strength of the Subsidiary Force, being ashamed to question the Hyderabad Government in the matter, *through a feeling of delicacy*. We are surprised that a paper of the *Pioneer’s* standing should have lent its columns to such silly and absurd utterances ; while at the same time the statements made regarding the respective strengths of the Nizam’s army and the force at Secunderabad are simply not true. We shall endeavour to set our contemporary and the public aright by briefly giving the facts of the case and the present strength of the Nizam’s and Secunderabad forces.

Ten years ago Mr. C. B. Saunders, Resident at Hyderabad, in his Administration Report for 1869-70, thus refers to H. H. the Nizam’s army :—“Sir R. Temple, in his Confidential Report already adverted to, computed its (Nizam’s army) ‘grand total at 43,704 men ; but it is not to be supposed that this enormous force ‘represents an *army* in our sense of the word \* \* \* If we exclude one important ‘body of troops to be afterwards noted, not more than 8,000 or 10,000 of the whole ‘number possess what we regard as *military organization*,” and even these 8,000 or 10,000 men Mr. Saunders says are in such a state that they afford an example of what sepoys will become who have once been set up according to British method and then have been left for years without care.” It must be also borne in mind that the greater portion of the 43,000 men given by Sir R. Temple are the armed retainers of noblemen and others who in a manner are feudatories of the Nizam and hold certain *jaghirs* from ancient times, on the condition of entertaining a certain number of armed men for the service of the State, and in many instances the number of these retainers is a mere nominal one. A large number of these *irregular* troops are utilized as police in jaghirs to which the general police system has not yet extended, and, as Mr. Saunders says, “they fairly earn ‘their pay by doing police duty in the districts.” Where, then, is the *needlessly inflated army* of 45,000 quoted by the *Pioneer* ?

The *important body of troops* referred to by Mr. Saunders, and which is the only *real army* of Hyderabad, consists of three batteries of Artillery, four regiments of Cavalry and four of Infantry, under the command of a European officer of the rank of Major. The commissioned regimental officers are mostly natives, with a sprinkling of Europeans and Eurasians. The total strength of this *corps d’armée* is about 8,000 men. The *reformed troops*, as they are called, are fairly well drilled, but the arms provided for them are next to useless. The guns of the Artillery, presented to the Nizam years and years ago by the British, as is too well known, are old and worn out, and are dangerous for firing even blank charges, and ball, we believe, is never allowed to be fired out of them. As regards the Infantry it will be sufficient to mention that during the Rumpa rebellion when a regiment was ordered for field service the officer commanding represented that the muskets would probably do more harm to the men than to the rebels, and an application was made to the Resident for a supply of Enfield rifles, which was accordingly given from the Secunderabad arsenal.

We next refer to the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force. According to the treaty of 1800 this force for the security of the Nizam against foreign aggression was fixed at

Infantry .....	8,000
Cavalry .....	1,000
Artillery in proportion.	

Again, according to the treaty of 1853 the strength of the Subsidiary Force is stated as

Sepoy Infantry.....	8 Battalions.
Cavalry.....	2 Regiments.
Artillery in proportion.	

Since 1853 the strength of the Subsidiary Force has been *decreasing*,—not

increasing, as the *Pioneer* would have it—till in 1870, to quote Mr. Saunders again, the strength of the force at Secunderabad was

Europeans of all arms.....	2,423
Natives do. ....	2,747
	<hr/> 5,170

and at the present time, the number of troops, European and native, at Secunderabad (on the 1st April 1880) is

Europeans.....	2,433
Natives.....	2,404
	<hr/> 4,837

These are briefly the true facts of the case, and it will be clearly seen how entirely erroneous are the statements of the *Pioneer*, and how utterly groundless are the alarming views which our Allahabad contemporary has been publishing, owing to the absence of correct information regarding the actual conditions of His Highness the Nizam's army and the strength of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

DECCAN TIMES, April 28, 1880.—*The Nizam's Army*.—The announcement of the desires, rather than intentions, of the Indian Government in regard to the armies of the great native Indian States, such as Gwalior and Hyderabad, must, says the *Army and Navy Gazette*, be regarded as unadvisable and impolitic. But Scindia, and Sir Salar Jung, representing the ruler of the Hyderabad State, will probably be informed that there is no reason to apprehend any violent infraction of their treaty rights. It is very likely that if Scindia got back the Rock of Gwalior, and Sir Salar Jung could secure the restitution of the Berars, they would gladly enter into an arrangement for a large reduction of their objectionable military establishments.

DECCAN TIMES, May 5, 1880.—*Reductions in H. H. the Nizam's Reformed Troops*.—In recent articles we referred to the reductions that have been effected in the strength and expenditure on account of His Highness the Nizam's army during the past 25 years. We now hear that some further reductions are shortly to be made in expenditure on account of the *Reformed Troops*. The Clothing Department is to be abolished, and the practice hitherto in force of giving out on contracts the feeding of the horses and supply of horse gear, is to be done away with, and, in future, Commanding Officers will be held responsible for the proper supply of these things. Other reductions are also said to be under contemplation. It is clear that His Excellency the Minister having taken the shears in hand for the purpose of curtailing expenditure in all departments is determined not to let the Military Department alone, but, as above stated, is resolved on pruning down still further the charges under this branch of the service.

DECCAN TIMES, May 12, 1880.—*The Nizamate*.—With regard to the much-debated though still sequestered report of the Simla Army Commission (we accept with reserve the telegram about its having been published at home), it is well known that in the evidence appended to it there is a good deal of portentous gossip relating to that stock subject of internal alarmists the armaments of Native States. One or other of the official possessors of this "confidential" blue-book has been plying the *Pioneer* with a medley of incorrect figures and misdirected reflections drawn therefrom. But there is a certain method therein which indicates "marks of design." The notes in our Allahabad contemporary to which we refer are only one amongst many instances cropping up during the last two or three years intended to support the thesis that the overgrown military expenditure of British India—which affords invaluable scope to certain influential classes in pay, patronage, and promotion at the expense of Indian resources—is due to the growth and modern efficiency of armaments in "the India of the Rajahs." The writer tries to support this sedulously cultivated misapprehension by special

reference to the case of the Nizamate. All this is done in such a vague and random fashion that it is difficult—without covering twice as much space—to show how misleading are the *Pioneer's* half-statements and delusive figures, which necessarily impose on ill-informed readers whose minds are impregnated with the sinister thesis mentioned above. To begin with—the querulous assertion that “the Hyderabad Government will go on strengthening military force by all the means in its power” is a reckless misstatement—pure and simple. The figure 45,000 given as the total number of the “force maintained by the Hyderabad Government” may possibly find support in one or other tabular statement of the report ; but, even so, it must include every man, from drummer boy and camp follower to broken-down pensioners, as well as irregulars and matchlock-men of sorts. This view of the matter has a bearing on the more circumstantial statement of the writer that “the improved troops had already four years ago obtained a total of some 7,500 men with three batteries of artillery.” The writer avers that there was an “understanding”—such “inspired” writers are apt to make much of “understandings”—that “only a certain number of troops should be thus improved in their efficiency.” When writing on political matters of this kind some evidence much more definite is required. The *Pioneer* would seem to imply some sinister meaning in “the fact that Sir Salar Jung has taken much interest in reorganizing a portion of this force.” It may be so ; but to us the obvious explanation is, that the Nizam's Minister regards the reduction or the effectual reformation of the very “irregular” soldiery that used to encumber Hyderabad as a very necessary condition in that general course of rescuing the whole State from disorder which will for ever be associated with his name. Surely the sub-official writer we have quoted does not wish to imply that the British Government could be desirous of seeing the prolonged maintenance of the undisciplined Arabs and other disorderly *Purdasis* that used to abound amongst the retainers of the Nizam ? As to the complaint that because of the protection of disorderly elements in the Nizam's forces having been largely reduced the Government of India is compelled “to keep up a greater force at Secunderabad than the treaties require,” the journal must be in its dotage that can parade such an absurd argument. The impulse and motive for keeping up “a far greater force” than is really required in the southern Deccan comes from within, from that constant pressure on Indian resources, for sake of pay and patronage, which, under one excuse or another, persists through every change of administration. No one pretending to any military knowledge could affect to believe that the British garrison at Secunderabad or anywhere else would incur the slightest risk from the Nizam's forces, even if the paper number quoted 45,000 represented as many effectives, instead of barely one-third of that figure, as must be the case. Nor would any responsible administrator publicly display such political imbecility as to avow such wretched suspicions as these, which hint at Native Statesmen being very likely to use their motley battalions against any of our British Indian forces.

But the writer in the *Pioneer* speaks of “treaties” and “obligations.” This is so far well, because there seems to be a tacit understanding amongst sub-official scribes of this class to steadily ignore these tittle-deeds of the British Empire in India. For such writers *Aitchison's Treaties* have been published in vain. Only last month a series of articles appeared in one of the Madras papers coolly and pertinaciously opposing the rendition of Mysore, though that measure was finally settled by Her Majesty's representatives fourteen years ago, pursuant to treaties solemnly made and ratified in past generations, and by virtue of which we hold considerable portions of the Madras Presidency. If some of these writers who so superciliously, perhaps ignorantly, disregard the political rights of Native States were compelled, in some sudden fit of enlightenment and frankness, to “try it the other way, they would soon see the matter in another light. Even to take this writer in the *Pioneer*” who is so grieved about “squandering a quantity of money at Secunderabad,” we fancy he would see “old treaties” and “antiquated obligations” in a very different aspect if it were proposed that the Subsidiary Force should be disbanded on condition of the Ceded Districts the revenues of which far more than

support that force—being restored to H. H. the Nizam. Notwithstanding the alleged “proneness of the Nizam’s Government to unnecessary military activity”—a statement that reads rather like a bad joke—and the supposed interest taken by Sir Salar Jung in “the reorganizing process,” we presume the Government of India will think twice before proposing to that Minister to reduce the “extravagantly powerful garrison at Secunderabad” on the basis of the treaties by which that garrison is provided for. Another matter possibly the Nizam’s Ministers would not object to surrender in return for the enormous sum it cost—the extravagant Military Railway which we forced on the Hyderabad State.

That allusion in the *Pioneer* to “the alleged coolness between the British authorities and Sir Salar Jung,” when coupled with the hypocritical complaint about the Government of India having to keep up “an extravagantly powerful garrison at Secunderabad,” indicates either *mala fides* or political ignorance on the part of the writer. The emissaries of the Foreign Office, great or small, have left no room for doubt why it is deemed the correct thing amongst the time-servers of the day, from Lord Lytton downwards, to disparage and discredit, if possible, the Native statesman who raised the Nizamate from turbulence and semi-barbarism into a condition of modern civilization. His offence was this very one of relying too much on treaty rights. In his noble simplicity, he counted on British honour to give effect to those rights in favour of his youthful sovereign. This, it would seem, is the unpardonable sin in modern Anglo-Indian politics. For although, as is well known, Sir Salar Jung, yielding to moral compulsion of the most inexorable order, has definitively suspended the claim for rendition of his prince’s alienated province, he is never to be forgiven for holding to his simple and obvious duty in that great matter of state. We have on previous occasions referred to the darker forms in which the cold shade has been made to fall on this Native statesman. Now, it seems, any frivolous writer in an occasionally “inspired” paper is at liberty to add absurd reproach to graver injury, by insinuating that the Minister of the Nizam is responsible for our keeping up an “extravagantly powerful garrison at Secunderabad.” Let us trust that the evil counsels from which such ebullitions arise are now to be restrained, and, we would hope, extinguished.

[It is only fair to ourselves to mention that the above was written last week, and before noting mention in the telegram that the Army Commission’s Report had been published at home. It was excluded by that pitiless ogre whom we have to face every week—Circumscribed Space. The *Deccan Times* gives some of the figures of the Nizam’s Reformed Troops and the (British) Subsidiary Force, of which, though not complete, we give this summary—the former number at present 8,000, and the latter (this very month) are 4,837, whereas by the stipulations of the treaty of 1799 (misprinted 1800) the strength of that force was to be 9,000, with artillery besides. These figures alone are sufficient to smash the mischievous misrepresentations of the *Pioneer*. The *Bombay Gazette* of yesterday had an article on the general question, which is well worthy of notice by the official patrons, both in England and India, of the fussy and ignorant alarmists whose growth under the departing *régime* has been so rank.]

TIMES OF INDIA, *May* 13, 1880.—We have heard a good deal lately about the military power of our great feudatories, and this interesting subject will be found to be discussed at length in the Army Commission Report whenever it comes to be published. In the mean time we may state that the remarks of the Army Commission are admirably calculated to reassure those nervous people who are always scenting all manner of unseen dangers. The Commission state frankly that the armies of the Native States are more of a safeguard than a source of danger to the Empire, and that no particular measures are necessary in this direction, though if need be they would see no harm in inducing the Native States to reduce their armies. But, so far as we can gather, the Commission do not see any need of reductions in general. It was unanimously recommended that Scindia’s army, about which so much had been said in a certain section of the press, should remain “uninterfered with.” It was also recommended that it would be well to make

efforts to induce the Nizam's Government to gradually reduce the Hyderabad troops to the minimum required for the service and protection of the State. Treating of it, it was agreed that the contingents of the different Native States should, as far as possible, be kept apart, and not be allowed to exercise together, that the use of weapons of precision should be strictly prohibited, that siege and field and horse artillery should be kept within the smallest possible limits. The adoption of these suggestions would, they thought, amply suffice to settle the question. Virtually, however, all these precautions are in force already, with the exception of the recommendation referring to the Nizam's forces, and the Report when it appears must do much to reassure the public mind on a question which, if we may believe one or two of the public prints at home, rumoured to be sometimes inspired from the India Office, was considered a pressing one four or five months ago. Still much mischief may yet be done if public opinion is influenced by reckless, untrustworthy, and even untrue statistics, and we are sorry to see that the *Pioneer* has laid hold of the passage referring to Hyderabad, and, by way of showing a reason for what it terms the "alleged coolness between the British authorities and Sir Salar Jung," has presented its readers with a most alarming account of the sudden increase of "the needlessly inflated army of the Nizam of Hyderabad." Unfortunately, as the figures accepted as accurate at Allahabad are altogether wrong, erring always on the side of gross exaggeration, the argument sought to be derived from them falls entirely to the ground. A year or two since there was a similar scare about the Gwalior force, and the *Pioneer* has done good service to the Government by showing there had been no increase, and that there was no possible cause for anxiety in that direction. If we are not mistaken, the stories about the way in which Scindia passed his whole population through the ranks, on the German principle, first appeared in the columns in which they are now formally contradicted, and we are glad to be able to afford the Allahabad journal the means of setting itself right also in reference to Hyderabad. The force maintained by the Hyderabad Government is estimated by our contemporary at 45,000 men. We are further told that a portion of these troops, amounting to 7,500 men, have been improved in their efficiency, and that three batteries of artillery have been added, without a corresponding reduction having been effected in the magnitude of the irregular levies. Not content with this, a policy of working the efficiency of the irregular levies up to the standard of the improved troops has regularly been carried on, and as a consequence the Indian Government are obliged to squander money in keeping up forces of corresponding strength in the neighbouring British garrisons. Reckless statements of this kind are far more dangerous than imaginary armies, and we have taken some pains in ascertaining from various unimpeachable sources of information the actual condition and composition of the Nizam's army as it stands at present.

We can scarcely dignify the Irregular Force, as motley an assemblage of men as ever came together, by the name of an army. It is composed partly of regiments that have descended from corps armed and disciplined by the French, and partly of contingents under various military commanders who hold hereditary rank and are supposed to supply a certain complement of troops in return for the pay they receive from the State either in cash or in lands. These men are neither properly dressed nor armed, and have never gone through any sort of drill. A great number of them might be readily returned as pensioners were it not that their absence from the list of effectives would give umbrage to their jemadars or leaders, whose pride it is to be able to boast of having a large command. Ragged coats out at elbows, worn trowsers out at knees, old French shakos or big dirty turbans on their heads—such is their costume; old French muskets of the time of Bussy and Raymond, or degenerate representatives of the blunderbusses that were used a century since at home to frighten poachers, sometimes exchanged for sticks hardly more destructive than the muskets and blunderbusses—such is the equipment of the troops composing these levies. But, such as they are, the most effective of them, amounting to about 7,000 men, are employed by the Revenue authorities as guards on kutcheries, treasuries, and jails. About 12,000 are employed in the city,



mostly as complimentary guards. To a certain extent these 20,000 men supply a want, and the native grantees accustomed to have parties of these Irregulars detailed to mount guard at their "sowari" would be mortally offended if they were withdrawn. But it would be impossible to disband them suddenly without flooding the country with robbers and dacoits. Their gradual reduction must be a work of time; but the advice of the Commission has already been anticipated, and during the last twenty years they have, we believe, been gradually reduced by some 3,000 men.

If we turn to the Regular Troops, so called, which have been reorganized and drilled by the permission of the Indian Government, we find that they number 6,000, instead of "7,500 with three batteries of artillery," as stated by our contemporary. But the following are, we believe, the exact figures:—artillery 350, cavalry 1,250, infantry 3,500, besides a regiment of Rohillas, Arabs and Seedee-boys, numbering 900 rank and file. All these troops are armed with muskets made in Hyderabad itself, and when they were ordered out to assist in quelling the Rumpa disturbances it was found necessary to equip them with muskets from the arsenal at Secunderabad. In the same way the guns of the three batteries are fit for nothing but firing salutes, and anyone who has seen them in his travels would rather not be too near when they are used for this harmless purpose. These are facts and figures on which reliance can be placed, and we need not go into what we are told of the "unnecessary military activity" that prevails in Hyderabad. But another statement can be so easily disproved without the trouble of any formal inquiries that it may well be taken as a test of the accuracy of the others. The Government, says the *Pioneer*, are "obliged to go beyond their stipulation, and keep up a greater force at Secunderabad than the treaties require, because of the manner in which the military administration within the Hyderabad State is carried on." Owing to the Afghan war the strength of the forces at Secunderabad and Bolarum happens to be under—not over—the number stipulated for in the treaties. With interested exaggerations like this drifting about and finding shelter in respectable places, it would be well if the Government of India would issue an authoritative account of the condition and composition, so far as they can be ascertained, of all the native armies, in the same way as we have now done for Hyderabad. The question could then be discussed upon its merits, and the opinion of the public, as represented in the press, would be of real assistance. But it is idle to reason from false data.

*TIMES OF INDIA, August 21, 1882.—The Hyderabad Contingent.*—The following is from a correspondent who signs himself "Cincinnatus":—

"Many of your readers may have noticed an article which appeared in a recent issue of the *Standard* on Hyderabad affairs, as also a letter signed "Hyderabad" on the same subject. We must all concur in the estimate formed by the writer of the article in question as to the eminent services rendered to his country and to the British Government in India by the present Minister, Sir Salar Jung; but in both these contributions the writers make it appear that the Nizam's Contingent, a local force kept up by treaty to protect the Nizam's country, is "antiquated and useless" and costs "half a million sterling yearly."

The statements made in these articles are so misleading, that in justice to both Governments, the public should know that the force is a creation of the Nizam's Government, some of the present regiments having actually served in the siege of Seringapatam; and although it did cost nearly half a million sterling in its earlier days, when it was totally undeserving of the name of a force, being utterly unable to afford that protection to the country that was required of it, yet it is

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annually for the maintenance of the force. The information communicated to the *Standard* is so far correct as to the original cost of the Contingent. On a reference to a work published some years ago, "Our Faithful Ally the Nizam," by Captain



Hastings Fraser, I see it stated that the average annual cost of the Nizam's force, extending over a period of nearly 35 years, or to be exact, from 1817 to 1852, was about £350,000. Again, on reference to the published records of the administration of the Berars, the average cost has been reduced to £270,000.

From the above figures it will be seen that the annual cost of the Nizam's army was about half a million sterling, but the expenditure has been reduced by about half. The Contingent is now armed with Snider rifles, is a well disciplined force, and able to hold its own with any native force in India : it has rendered good service, and has been the means of maintaining the authority of the Nizam.

The assertion made in the *Standard* to the effect that the Hyderabad Contingent is "antiquated and useless" simply shows that such writers know nothing of the subject into which they have blindly plunged. The war services of this efficient but abused force are too long to be inserted in the columns of a newspaper ; suffice, therefore, to say that from its earliest time up to the year 1861, scarcely a year passed without its having to take the field for the protection of the Nizam's country, or on service beyond his frontier ; and the following extract from a despatch from Sir Hugh Rose, K.C.B., Commanding the Central India Field Force, in regard to that part of the Contingent which served under him in the Central India Campaign, certainly shows that one of England's greatest generals did not think the Contingent antiquated and useless :—

EXTRACT FROM THE GWALIOR DESPATCH.

"So much of the success of the operations is due to the portion of the Hyderabad Contingent which forms part of my force, that I ought not to fail to express my best thanks to Colonel Davidson, Resident at Hyderabad, for the proof of confidence which he placed in me by placing at my disposal troops whose organization in the three arms, light equipment, knowledge of the Indian language and country, combined with their high military qualities, enabled them to act as wings of my operations."

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# THE BERARS.

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# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

## THE BERARS.

ENGLISHMAN, *July 22, 1853.*—The following letter from Hyderabad, dated the 8th, portrays the arrangements entered into for the civil administration of Berar, and the changes necessitated consequent on the reduction of the Nizam's Contingent :—

"I shall be anticipated if I withhold the information longer ; that, however, would be nothing, but I fear lest you should be disappointed by not hearing from any of your correspondents at this place : I therefore proceed to give you such information as I possess.

"The country ceded by the Nizam has been portioned out into five parts, and assigned to the charge of as many Deputy Commissioners. One portion of Berar, called the Northern, is placed under the management of Captain Bullock and two Assistants, who are designated senior and junior, Lieutenant Hamilton and Mr. W. A. Palmer ; Brigadier Johnston, with Captain Page for Assistant, has charge of Southern Berar ; Captain Taylor, removed from Shorapoor, from whence his Agency is withdrawn in consequence of the Rajah having reached the legal age of maturity, has for Assistant Lieutenant Cadell and the charge of the districts ceded on the Western frontier ; to Brigadier Hampton is assigned, with Mr. Campbell for Assistant, the charge of the Eastern ; and to Captain Balmain, Western Raichoor, with Lieutenant Taylor as Assistant.

"Five of the abovenamed officers—namely, Brigadiers Hampton and Johnston, Captains Bullock, Taylor, and Page—are local officers. In the instance of three of these the transfer from military to civil employment is no gain in a pecuniary point of view. Brigadier Hampton loses about Rs. 900 per month, and Johnston about Rs. 400. But all these appointments are made with no unfriendly view, they are believed to be forerunners of the intention of Government to pension the local officers : in such case an equal fate would have been shared by all, and those who are selected for the civil appointments can understand their selection not otherwise than as a boon, the reward of their character and services.

"Taking the view that I do, that the intention is to reduce the local officers, there can be no ground for the complaint that has been put forth elsewhere, regarding the reduction of the two local Brigadiers, in preference to the Company's officers, their juniors, holding brigades in the Contingent. In regard to these two officers especially, whose reputation and services have been all along acknowledged, it can only be understood that their displacement is the result of a system, and bears no taint of dishonour towards them.

"The nomenclator of these appointments is Colonel Low, being Chief Commissioner. The five managers of districts are to be designated Deputy Commissioners, and to receive 1,200 Company's rupees each per month. The Assistants are to receive 600 and 400 Company's rupees each. I cannot help adverting to the misery which the displacement of the locals will occasion to them. It has come upon them unexpectedly ; more than thirty years' service had ensured them, as it was believed, permanency in their situations, and they have generally lived as if vicissitude, unless produced by their own misconduct, could not overtake them. They have considered their situations as little precarious as those of the Company's service. The saving will not much exceed a lakh of rupees a year, scarcely worth the consideration of Government when put into the scale against the misery it will occasion."

ENGLISHMAN, *August 12, 1853.*—All sudden changes in the government of a country necessarily entail a certain degree of individual hardship and perhaps individual injustice, and we doubt not that the intended arrangements connected with the government of the territory lately acquired in Berar, will not prove exceptions to the general rule, but will weigh severely on some who deserve well of the English authorities ; and a case in point has already come before us, on which we propose to say a few words.

The transfer of an extensive country by the Nizam to the Company's Government could not have been made without dislodging a number of Jageerdars from their jageers, the only subsistence they had. As regards the military jageerdars generally sympathy is but little felt, they were ordinarily rapacious and tyrannical men, but the loss of his position and of his all to one person among these, is very much to be regretted : we allude to the Jageerdar of Ellichpore, whose family have been in possession of their jageers for ninety-one years, and have maintained themselves in them with unblemished reputation. Their troops have been good and orderly, and their jageers in a flourishing condition, insomuch that the common expression has been to call their country a garden. Their sunnuds run as far back as Rujeeb 1178 Hejira, 91 years ago, when the estate was bestowed on Ismael Khan, and possession of it has remained unbroken in his line since that period. This family have claims for consideration on the Company's Government. In the war of 1803, when the Nizam's auxiliary so little contributed towards the purposes of the alliance that Lord Wellesley hesitated after its termination as to whether he should not declare the Nizam an enemy, Salabut Khan, the descendant of Ismael Khan, on whom the jageers by the Nizam was bestowed in succession to his father, alone served the cause of the two States with fidelity and with vigour. General Wellesley's letters manifest that his fidelity was reckoned upon for serving the cause of the allies and co-operating zealously with the English army, and prove also that these expectations were not disappointed. We quote from some of them to show what the general expectations were from Salabut Khan. It would appear from the first extract we shall make that General Wellesley's dependence for moving to the north was on the supplies which Salabut Khan could furnish, and it is to be observed that he depended in this instance not upon the commander of the Nizam's army, but upon a chief serving in it.

General Wellesley's letter to General Stuart under date 4th September, 1802, vol. III., p. 476 :—

"I am endeavouring to arrange an expedition into that country (Berar) ; whether I shall be able to effect it or not will depend much upon the state of Col. Stevenson's equipments, and upon the assistance of grain and provisions which he is to receive from Salabut Khan, the Jageerdar of Ellichpore."

Here it is obvious that had Salabut Khan failed to supply Genl. Wellesley, and thus impeded the movement towards the north, the enemy would have had an open passage to the capital of the Nizam. We refer to a second extract to show that Genl. Wellesley's reliance for a supply of ammunition was again on Salabut Khan :

Genl. Wellesley's letter to Colonel Stevenson, dated 6th September, 1803, vol. III., pp. 279 and 280 :—

"I should also wish you to ascertain from Salabut Khan whether he can give you any assistance in eighteen pound shot or gunpowder at Ellichpore. If you should not be able to get any assistance at Ellichpore, to part with them, (the guns) will cripple my force materially, and may have unpleasant consequences in the course of the campaign. It may be well to say that the services rendered by Salabut Khan were the fortuitous results of his position ; but his merit does not become the less in having rendered them. His zeal and fidelity were essentially his own property.

"We would remark that were there no other circumstances to give the Jageerdar of Ellichpore claim to the consideration of the British Government, the reliance which Genl. Wellesley placed upon his fidelity, when all others in the Nizam's army were disaffected was sufficient to entitle him to it. That he was enabled to render the services required of him to the British army was perhaps

a casual circumstance, but must be taken at the least as a proof of his zeal—of zeal which was unremitted throughout the war. In support of the above allegation we make another extract from Genl. Wellesley's letters :

Genl. Wellesley's letter to Major Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad, under date 23rd April 1804, vol. III., p. 520 :—

"I have the honour to enclose a despatch for His Excellency the Governor-General : I request you to notice in a particular manner to the Durbar the fresh instance of good conduct of Salabut Khan, as stated in the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Lang."

It may be inferred here that other instances of good conduct had been before acknowledged, and it is to be regretted that the family have no trace of them left in their possession. What is known of Salabut Khan's services at the present day is extracted from printed papers. He was attached as part of the Nizam's auxiliary to the Subsidiary Force commended by Colonel Stevenson. If Colonel Stevenson's correspondence had been published, as General Wellesley's have been, a larger record of his services might have been obtained, for we observe in Mr. Prinsep's book that he affirms the British Government was pledged to the maintenance of his family in their jageers :

Prinsep's *Military Transactions of the Marquis of Hastings in India*, chapter 13, vol. II. :—

"Besides the above there were six battalions of the Nizam's reformed Infantry, and 4,000 Silladar horse raised for the campaign by the Rajah of Mysore under the stipulations of the treaty contracted with him, and the troops of Salabut Khan, a powerful Jagheerdar of the Nizam, settled under our guarantee at Ellichpore in Berar."

It is presumable that Mr. Prinsep did not make the assertion of the pledge upon uncertain information. The Jagheerdar of Ellichpore by the cession of his jageer to the British Government loses his all. The dependence upon the Nizam's Government for restitution in some other part of his dominions of what is taken from him is worse than uncertain. Promises will be continued to be made to him : his hopes will lead him to keep up his military establishment, till he becomes impoverished by its maintenance and involved in debt, only to find himself at last deceived and ruined. It is scarcely to be expected that the arrangements now made with the Nizam's Government can admit of change. If they can, it would be an act of beneficence, and perhaps of a just and wise policy, in the British Government, to restore his possessions, at least his personal jageer, to the Jagheerdar of Ellichpore. But if this cannot be done, it is for the consideration of that Government whether it is not due to the Jagheerdar that the Resident shall be empowered to use his utmost influence to procure an equivalent, at least, of his personal jageers. It is an unhappy position for this Jagheerdar that he cannot use the same appliances which others employ, nor has the same connections which others possess, to enable him to succeed with his own Government. The Jagheerdars of this family have not visited the capital for more than half a century. Their position has been too commanding to admit of their being under subjection to the Dufturdars, and they have stood in the Government too nearly as rivals,—at least as above the influence of its Ministers and principal personages. They have no friends ; they have to make a new position for themselves, not among strangers but unfriendly parties, and we fear they will gain nothing by their efforts. Whatever good comes to them must proceed from the intervention of the English Government. Without it they will be reduced to abject poverty, to accumulated debt, to distress and misery. Revolutions do come to States and individuals, but they need not be unnecessarily forced upon either.

We would also remark that the Nizam has repeatedly directed the Minister to give the English Government other territory in exchange for Ellichpore, which he desires might remain in the possession of the Jagheerdar. He is now seventy years of age, and as he has no heirs the inheritance will become extinct. The obstruction to the Nizam's desire to reinstate him rests, we believe, in the present Ministry, for we do not hear that the Nizam's wishes have been proposed to the

Resident. This would not have been if an older and wiser head administered to the affairs of the State, and we yet hope the British Government will interpose its authority or extend its justice to benefit and protect the family of an old and faithful servant.

ENGLISHMAN, *August 29, 1853.*—The following is from Hyderabad, dated 13th instant :—

“The country assigned to the English Government for the pay of the Contingent has been quietly given up to the Commissioners by the Talookdars who held it. It has so happened, however, that the Commissioners have been obliged to take certain districts and villages which, though not mentioned in the schedule prepared by the Nizam’s Government, came within the limits prescribed for the cession. This has necessarily brought a somewhat larger revenue to the management of the English than the Nizam had agreed to assign. The difference, however, is so small that it will not be worth the trouble of a rearrangement. The Nizam will lose nothing by it but the right to exercise authority over an extent of country yielding five or six lakhs of revenue. In every other respect he and his subjects will be benefited. The English management will improve his revenues, and his subjects be secured in their lives and property.

“The Nizam’s Government is about to send native commissioners to examine, by comparison with the Zemindars, the accounts of the collections of several years submitted to it by the Talookdars ; this has occasioned some commotion amongst this body. They pretend to believe that the object of the Government in this commission is to produce, right or wrong, charges of fraud and embezzlement against them, with a view to despoiling them of their wealth. There would have been something in this imputation—for the Government is less honest than individuals—if the conduct of the Talookdars had not taken away every inch of ground from it ; their frauds, it is universally reported and believed, are of so considerable an amount that the commissioners may be satisfied, and the Government too, if one-fourth only of what has been embezzled can be proved and recovered. But I take it that the fears of the Talookdars are only assumed ; they know very well that their influence with the commissioners employed to take their accounts will be greater than that of the Government. The English commissioners would be the proper persons to examine these accounts, but only if they gave them a personal examination. An audit upon the reports of the native commissioners would leave matters nearly as they are at present.”

MADRAS SPECTATOR, *August 2, 1856.*—*Lord Dalhousie’s Minute on his Indian Administration.—Hyderabad.*—“Equally happy results have attended the assignment which the Nizam was persuaded to make of the districts belonging to the State of Hyderabad.

“In the possession of Berar and the neighbouring districts of Nagpore the British Government, it deserves to be remembered, has secured the finest cotton tracts which are known to exist in all the Continent of India, and thus has opened up a great additional channel of supply, through which to make good a felt deficiency in the staple of one great branch of its manufacturing industry.

“Since the assignment was made all disputes with the Nizam have ceased.

“Though the districts assigned were covered with places of defence,—the famous fortress of Gawilghur among the rest,—and although they were garrisoned by Arabs or Rohillas, yet all were delivered over submissively and at once, and not a single shot was fired in anger.

“There also the civil administration has been introduced. Crime, especially the violent crime of dacoity, has already much diminished. The revenue is already rapidly increasing. The public tranquillity has not been disturbed by even a single popular tumult ; and the admirable little army which was formerly the Nizam’s Contingent, but which is now a British force, is available for any service for which it may be required.”

**FRIEND OF INDIA, January 18, 1866.**—First of all our feudatory nobles, in importance, wealth, and influence for good or evil, is the Nizam of Hyderabad. Our rival, with French assistance, a century ago, we subsequently saved him from the Mahrattas, who would have extinguished him; we delivered him from Tippoo, with much of whose territory we endowed him; and by insisting on his administering his large territory through such able men as Meer Alum, Chundoo Lall in his earlier days, and Salar Jung we have saved his family from annihilation by his own people. A more striking instance than this of the conservative power of England in India in relation to the Native Chiefs, and a more unanswerable argument against the charge of reckless annexation, it would be difficult to find. He is a feudatory in the heart of our territories, has a great feudatory—in some sense—subject to himself, draws a revenue from eleven millions of the Queen's subjects, and administers the government of a larger area than that of Great Britain. We give him a Resident like Mr. Yule, and insist on his retaining a Minister like Salar Jung, yet such is the power of Mussulman hate and such the character of Mussulman anarchy that no unarmed foreigner dare enter the city of Hyderabad. These two authorities, working together with a harmony which we ought to see in other states, such as Indore, Gwalior, and Baroda, have abolished transit duties, making internal trade as free as in the provinces we directly govern, have improved the courts of justice both in the city and the districts, and are likely to substitute cash rents for the Buttai or half-crop system. The Minister has given land free for the advancing railway, and since 1861 European British subjects there have been amenable only to their own courts. But still Mr. Yule's last Report, for 1864-65, does not permit us to say more than this, that the only use of the Nizam to the Empire is that of a running sore to a diseased patient. Since Delhi and Lucknow have been cleansed, Hyderabad is the focus of, and the only scape-vent for, the scoundrelism of India.

Since the sale of Cashmere nothing has been so disgraceful to our diplomacy—unless, perchance, our relations with Bhootan—as the deliberate failure of Colonel Davidson to remove the fiction which still calls Berar “the assigned districts,” and gives the Nizam an imaginary power over the province, because he could not see it administered from Nagpore, once the seat of his Mahratta superiors. So Berar must continue to be the most badly governed of our territories till the fiction is obliterated. Yet in spite of the serious drawback, the province is making as much progress as the somewhat similarly situated territory of Mysore. We have so redistributed its area and reorganised its administration that since the beginning of 1864 there have been four manageable districts of 4,500 square miles each instead of two. Berar now consists of Akola, Oomrawuttee, Mekhur, and Woon, with a population of upwards of a million and a half managed by twenty-six civil officers. When “assigned” for the payment of the Contingent in 1860-61, their revenue was estimated at 32 lakhs of rupees, but last year it was Rs. 46,40,113 or an increase of 14½ lakhs in four years, while in two years the cultivated area has risen from three and a quarter to upwards of four millions of acres. The neighbouring tenantry of the Nizam look with envious eyes on the peasantry of Berar, who enjoy the security of our administration and the fruits of the prevailing high prices. In the past fifteen years the price of wheat has risen from 31 to 11 seers a rupee, and of other grains in an even greater proportion, cotton having dislodged cereals so much, for it rose from a penny to a shilling a pound. The great prosperity showed itself in the increase of the excise revenue, but not in the growth of education, for there were only 1,360 boys in 26 Mahratta schools. Thanks to Major Younghusband, and his reforms in the police, the Rhatores, Brinjaries, and pauperized Mussulmans of the old families, whose robberies used to keep the capitalists and traders of Berar in a state of terror, have been put down, and the silver of the merchants is now conveyed by a body of camel sowars in perfect safety and at a trifling charge. We would direct the Governor-General's attention to the administration of Berar. The province yields close on half a million a year of revenue, yet we devoted to its civil administration last year only £81,050, and there was the large surplus of £382,961 for the pay of the Contingent and public works. It is



time that this annually increasing surplus was spent more freely for the good of the people who pay it. The railway has now been completed to Budnaira along its northern border, yet the account given by the Public Works officials of the progress made on roads is most beggarly. Only £2,568 was spent on the education of a million and a half of people, or less than in the previous year. Were Mr. Yule directly at the head of the Berar administration, this state of things, we are sure, would not continue. Captain Cadell, the Commissioner, must bestir himself, and see that schools and roads, above all things, are provided for, in at least the same proportion to revenue and population as in the similarly situated province of Mysore. Let him suggest plans, press for expenditure, organize departments, and ask for more officials, and leave the responsibility of refusal to the Government of India, whose only interest it is in this case to return to the people the surplus they are enabled to pay.

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TIMES OF INDIA, *March* 22, 1867.—Our readers are no doubt already aware that the Nizam has demanded the restoration of Berar and the acknowledgment by the Viceroy of his reversionary right in the kingdom of Mysore. We quote from the *Madras Athenæum* the despatch of the Nizam's Government in which these claims are put forward :—

“From His Excellency Salar Jung Bahadoor, &c., to Sir George U. Yule, K.C.S.I., Resident of the Government of British India at Hyderabad.

“SIR,—The Government of His Highness the Nizam has learned with the deepest sorrow and the most poignant regret the miseries which have recently been endured by the inhabitants of the province of Orissa, and of other provinces subject to the Government of British India. The Government of Bengal admits that six lacs of people have perished slowly of hunger in Orissa; but the British Commissioner, Mr. Ravenshaw, places the number at the enormous figure of ten lacs. Numbers also have met a similarly wretched fate in other territories under the sway of the British Government. The gross number of deaths from famine is computed at fifteen lacs or one million and a half of souls. Incalculable suffering, short of death, has also been endured.

“It is not possible for the Government of His Highness the Nizam to view these sad events without the gravest concern, or to abstain from calling the attention of the British Government to them. It is indeed not reasonable to suppose that the Government of His Highness can remain silent while neglect and misrule prevail in territories in such close proximity to those of His Highness. It is the anxious wish of the Government of His Highness that peace and prosperity should reign, not only in His Highness's own dominions, but also throughout India: but it is clearly impossible that these great blessings can be secured unless the Government of British India possesses a more active and earnest sense of duty than it has recently displayed.

“The Government of His Highness the Nizam conceives that the first duty of a ruler is to preserve the lives and minister to the happiness of his people; and it is with unspeakable pain that the Government of His Highness feels compelled to observe that this duty has lately been grievously lost sight of by the Government of British India. The care of numerous people is an awful trust derived from God, the abuse of which by so old and firm an ally as the Government of British India His Highness cannot contemplate without the most gloomy forebodings.

“This is by no means the first time that the condition of the British provinces and the acts of the British Government in India have engaged the serious attention of His Highness's Government. But a few years have passed since His Highness was induced by feelings of ancient friendship to interpose his beneficent authority to shield the Government of British India from the fatal consequences of unjust wars and usurpations and prolonged maladministration. Peace was then preserved in Southern India through the benign influence of His Highness; the coast army in the service of the British Government continued faithful to its salt, and other Native Sovereigns and Chiefs, following the example of His Highness, preserved tranquillity in the territories subject to their sway, and thus rescued the Government

of British India from the most fearful disasters. But, while peace reigned in the South, war and all its attendant evils prevailed throughout Upper and Central India, lacs of human lives were lost, property to a vast amount was destroyed, and permanent ill-will and distrust were sown between the people of India and their British rules.

“Nor has it escaped the notice of the Government of His Highness that only a few months previous to this dreadful outbreak, which for years kept all India in a state of excitement and dismay, the Governor-General of British India had informed his august Sovereign Victoria (whose shadow be extended!) that peace, justice, and prosperity prevailed in her Indian territories, and that there was no reason to suppose that this happy condition of affairs would undergo any interruption. Through the merciful dispensation of Providence (whose name be exalted!) that high functionary escaped the punishment which otherwise would surely have overtaken him; for how can so august a Sovereign learn the condition of her subjects in this distant country save by the truthful reports of her Governors? and what crime can exceed that of misleading so great and benign a Princess, whose head is the abode of wisdom, and whose heart is the dwelling-place of compassion! But for many years previous to the late rebellion against the authority of the British Government in India the Government of His Highness had viewed the proceedings of the Government of British India with regret and apprehension. Engaged in continual and unnecessary wars with surrounding powers, the Government of British India thought less of the happiness of the people committed to its care than of the extension of its territorial dominion. The inability of the Government of British India to govern well the countries subject to its sway was nevertheless always painfully conspicuous to the Government of His Highness, and the Government of His Highness long observed with unmitigated pain the frequent attempts of the Government of British India to save itself from financial and other embarrassments by the conquest or annexation of its unoffending neighbours. Events only too fully justified the apprehensions of His Highness's government: an enormous debt, a deficient revenue, and widespread disaffection were the natural consequences of an encroaching policy abroad and a negligent administration at home.

“In the year 1859 the most august Queen Victoria (whose name be revered!) issued a proclamation deposing the East India Company Bahadoor for misgovernment, and commanding the Government of British India to cease from war and from usurpation, to govern her subjects with wisdom and justice, and to preserve amity and good faith towards neighbouring powers. Thus compelled to discontinue its warlike operations, and debarred from making violent acquisitions from peaceful and virtuous Princes, the Government of British India has subsided into apathy and slothfulness, and has been totally unprepared to provide for the wants of the people in the recent famine. Fifteen lacs of souls have perished of hunger through the negligence of the Government of British India. Yet it is possible that the Governor-General, as on a former occasion, may have written to that august Sovereign Victoria (whose name be magnified!) that owing to his wisdom and energy, and to the exertions of all his subordinate Governors, who hastened to the assistance of the people, the famine was turned into plenty, and that prosperity and content now prevail in British India, and that the people are made glad by the paternal care of the Governor-General and the Governors of his several provinces.

“The Government of his Highness, however, prefers to believe that the Government of British India, after the fearful misery to which so vast a multitude of its people have been subjected, will recognize its inability to govern with the necessary care and diligence the enormous possessions it has acquired. The Government of His Highness has accordingly no hesitation in requesting the Government of British India to enter into negotiations for the restoration of the administration of His Highness's province of Berar to the Government of His Highness. It is true that His Highness assigned the administration of that province to the Government of British India some years ago; but His Highness feels that his first duty is towards his people, whose interest must take precedence of engagements however valid; and His Highness is filled with apprehension for his people, subject as they are to the

administration of a Government which has allowed nearly one-half the inhabitants of a great province to die of hunger while crores of rupees lay idle in its treasury.

"But though the Government of His Highness conceives that the interests of his people in Berar fully entitle His Highness to require their restoration to the protecting care of His Highness's Government, His Highness's Government desires further to bring to the notice of the Government of British India that the treaty assigning the administration of Berar to the Government of British India expired in 1859 on the termination of the raj of the English Company Bahadoor. That treaty was obviously made with the English Company Bahadoor alone, and ceased to have any binding effect on the demise of that honourable body. The august Queen Victoria (whose name be revered!) by a proclamation accepted all the treaties and engagements made with the English Company Bahadoor, but His Highness the Nizam gave no corresponding undertaking on his part to the Government of that Most Gracious Sovereign in India. Accordingly the administration of the province of Berar lapsed to His Highness the Nizam in 1859, and has remained in the hands of the Government of British India as a matter of grace and favour on the part of His Highness, and liable to be resumed at His Highness's pleasure.

"The Government of His Highness also proposes that a Commission from both Governments should be appointed to investigate the claims of His Highness on the Government of British India in relation to the districts of Kurnool and Goomsoor.

"The Government of His Highness the Nizam desires to be made acquainted with the intentions of the Government of British India regarding the kingdom of Mysore. If it is the intention of the Government of British India, as has been officially declared, not to sanction the succession of the son by adoption of His Highness the Maharajah of Mysore, the Government of His Highness the Nizam would suggest that Commissioners be appointed by both Governments to arrange for the equal partition of the territory of Mysore on the demise of its present Sovereign. It is obviously for the advantage of both Governments that this partition should be made in a manner most convenient for the Government of His Highness the Nizam and the Government of British India; and the Government of His Highness is prepared to give its best consideration to any suggestions for carrying into effect this desirable purpose.

"But the Government of His Highness desires to express its firm conviction of the necessity of a radical and complete reform in the administration of the Government of British India, by which means alone can such fearful disasters as that to which the Government of His Highness has drawn the attention of the Government of British India be avoided in the future. The Government of His Highness would suggest that this reform should assume the character of a contraction of boundaries, which are clearly too extensive for the control of the Government of British India. His Highness would be willing to assume the administration of Orissa with a view to placing the affairs of that afflicted province on a sound footing: His Highness would not object to pay any surplus revenues of the province into the treasury of the Government of British India.

"The Government of His Highness the Nizam makes these representations to the Government of British India in the purest spirit of amity and regard, anxious that the friendship and alliance which has so long subsisted between the two Governments should continue without interruption so long as the sun and moon endure. But the Government of His Highness desires to observe that by extending the countenance and support of His Highness to the Government of British India in 1857 His Highness has incurred responsibilities towards all the people of India which His Highness finds it utterly impossible to neglect, and which a sense of duty and humanity forbids His Highness to repudiate.

"The Government of His Highness requests that you will have the goodness to communicate the contents of this despatch to the Government of British India, and to the Principal Secretary of State for India of her august Majesty Queen Victoria, whose shadow be extended!"

(Signed) SALAR JUNG, &c.

TIMES OF INDIA, August 7, 1867.—From our own correspondent, 5th August:—

“The addition of another district, and increase of salaries to the officers of the several grades in the commission, has at last been sanctioned; but still much remains to be done to make service popular in this province. Among other causes is the appointment of a number of young officers as Assistant Commissioners, whilst there are so many much older men in the uncovenanted branch who might have been appointed, and no wonder the extra assistants complain bitterly, and not without good cause. There are a number of young men who were induced to enter the commission on the understanding that they would in a few years have a good chance of becoming Assistant Commissioners. Many of them have waited patiently and worked hard for years, and now they are told that their promotion is impossible, being against the express wishes of the Home Government and the Supreme Government, that they knew what a poor service it was, and that they have only themselves to thank for the pass to which they are reduced. The Government, in fact, declared that none but civilians were to be appointed, and that the only high gate to the higher appointments of the administration was the competition examination in London. Yet after all this the Government proceeded to appoint young men from the army who, as far as known, are quite new to work, and have far less claim to the appointments than the uncovenanted officers who have toiled for years in the hope of obtaining them. It seems they have toiled in vain. The fact is to them no dream, and now they are brought face to face with the realities of their position, which is really a deplorable one. Much has been said of the hard work which Sir John Lawrence underwent when Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, and no doubt still undergoes as Governor-General, and of the effect this had in making everybody else work hard too. All were obliged to do so, as they served a ruler who had a sympathy with the trials and difficulties of ordinary men, but they cannot in all cases have worked cheerfully. Why? There is the difference that either by force of character which overcomes all obstacles and imprints a confidence sure to lead to success, or by accidents of position, connection or occupation, there are some who feel they have a career before them; they have only to do their duty like other people and they all keep their place; they have only to do it a little better and they will rush to the front. It is not mere ability, it is more generally hard-headedness, ambition, and brass which win the race. Our Resident, Sir Richard Temple, is another example. From the first moment he saw a chance of making a reputation he worked hard, and reputation once obtained will never allow him to relax his efforts. It is a thing more difficult to keep than to get: my meaning is that the ordinary run of mortals have not the same incentive to work hard as those who are in special positions have; even were they all equally deserving of distinction it is impossible they could all get it. There is only a limited amount of accommodation in the Temple of Fame. Therefore the large majority of men will see no such certain prospect of reward as to induce them to work their lives out. It may be said that men should not work for reward. But it is a good thing if they work at all, and that working they do not work for worse objects than reward. In fact the very men who insist on their subordinates working hardest are those who have obtained the reward for which they worked. Look out a class of schoolboys: does not each boy work less and less as he sees the prospect of being among the prizemen grow more and more unlikely, while those who have really a good chance, are working their very lives out? Be facts and theories what they may, there is no doubt that if you take away from a man all possibility of a career you destroy his energies and render him almost worthless. This is being done to uncovenanted officers just now by way of an experiment *in corpore vili*. Of course the Government may do what they like. It is very hard for the deluded young men, but every sane man will admit that the result will turn out very hard for the State. All hope which ‘springs eternal in the human heart,’ and extracts consolation from even the gloomiest events, will be gone; all honourable ambition will cease; and the despised class for whom no place is found, who are not even allowed to cut one out for themselves, will become mere machines with scarcely mind or soul. It is

said that natives are always polite to each other, whatever the difference in their stations may be, because no one can tell but what the man who is a barber or water-carrier to-day may not be a vizier or an emperor next year. There will be no necessity for similar politeness in India between the different classes of the administration, because there will be no such ultimate possibility. I think it is a great gain to Government to have gentlemen in the uncovenanted service, and that it would be a still greater gain to have no distinction between the services as in England, so as to allow all talent to come to the front. As matters now stand, I do not see what prospects uncovenanted officers have, nor how any gentlemen can remain in the service, or enter it."

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TIMES OF INDIA, *July 25, 1868*.—It was simply the result of coincidence that in our Tuesday's issue in three several places—in the letter of a chance correspondent, in the editorial, and in a news-letter—special reference was made to the affairs of the Nizam and the political position of His Highness's assigned districts of the Berars.

But it is at once interesting and significant to point to these references, especially to an item in the last sentence of the news-letter, namely, the statement that during the present year (? 1867-68) the amount of Berars' surplus revenues that will be credited to the Nizam, in faithful discharge of our treaty obligations, is twelve lacs more than twice as much in the previous year.

We are not content to allow this statement to pass without drawing attention to it as significant of the altered policy now pursued by the Government of India towards the Nizam. It is only within the last two or three years that our former grossly unfair treatment of the Nizam (the sinister origin of which was casually pointed out in our Tuesday's article) has been honestly reversed. Possibly an advocate of the Nizam might point out that we still absorb in costly works at Secunderabad and Trimulgherry, and by our expensive administration of the Berars, a larger proportion of the revenues of those provinces than is warranted under an equitable interpretation of Lord Canning's righteous despatch of July 1860 ; but this is a question of degree, not one of intention and national good faith. The plain right of the Nizam to any surplus that may accrue, after management at our own discretion be it noted, is no longer evaded as had been the case until 1865-6, under the lingering Dalhousian policy cherished by the Calcutta Foreign Office, prompted thereto by the sinister counsels of Sir Charles Wood and the Whigs. Hence we consider the actual transfer of the Berars' surplus to the Nizam as a fact, in our very recent political history, which is scarcely less significant of British good faith to the Native Princes than was the confirmation of the Mysore adoption. Frank and equitable statesmanship like this, while it costs nothing, "strengthens the stakes and lengthens the cords" of our imperial power in India, more than all the material precautions and semi-coercive measures that can be devised. For this healthy change in our political policy the present Viceroy merits considerable credit, though for long his influence was understood to lean towards the destructive policy of Lord Dalhousie.

TIMES OF INDIA, *August 3, 1868*.—We explained at some length a few days ago the nature of our relations with the Nizam in respect to the assigned districts from a *legal* point of view. The *moral* side of the question is another thing altogether. The history of the diplomatic transactions which terminated in the signature of the treaty of 1860 examined by the light of political morality does not redound to our honour so much as to our acute perception of the side on which our political bread is buttered. There it is, upon parliamentary record, that we induced the Nizam to assign to us what he considered the fairest portion of his dominions, for a specific purpose, on the distinct understanding that it might some day or other be restored to him, well knowing all the while that its restoration would never be consented to by us. "I announced formerly," says Colonel Low, if we may re-quote his words, "that if His Highness wished it the districts might 'be made over *merely for a time*, to maintain the Contingent *as long as he might require it*.'" He laid the flattering unction to his soul, and consented to sign the

treaty that we should prepare to give effect to this understanding. The treaty was prepared, but it did not, as we have shown above, embody the points which our representative had led the Nizam to suppose it would. There was now, however, no room for retraction on the part of the Nizam. He had been humbugged into consenting to sign a treaty at all. He was now bullied into signing the treaty that was laid before him. "If His Highness (the Nizam) should not comply with the requirements of the Government," wrote Lord Dalhousie in his minute of 1851 upon this momentous question, "within the time which may be specified by the Resident, that officer will request a final audience for the purpose of receiving a definite reply. If His Highness should either refuse compliance on that occasion, or should fail to complete the arrangements which are requisite, the Resident will be so good as to report the result to the Governor-General. On receiving such an intimation instructions will be forthwith addressed to the Resident, *directing him to take possession of the districts* named, on behalf of the Government of India, and for the purpose set forth." The italics are ours. "In expectation of such instructions the Resident will state whether he will require any troops in addition to the Subsidiary and *Contingent* Forces for the purpose of enforcing the determination that has been announced."

In other words, this very Contingent, for the punctual pay of which we demanded territorial security, and which we proposed to maintain for the good of the Nizam, was to be employed in arms against himself. We are expecting a Native Prince to hand over to us a portion of his hereditary dominions, for the support of a body of troops that we contemplated actually at that time using against himself! The Resident replied to the effect that he did not expect serious armed resistance, and that he thought that the Subsidiary Force and the Contingent would be fully equal to the duty of coercing the Nizam, but that in case of accidents it would be as well to give him authority to call in the troops at Bellary and Nagpore to his assistance. This leaves little doubt that the Nizam was forced to sign the treaty, which he had only been induced by misrepresentation in the first instance to allow to be mentioned in his presence.. Colonel Davidson's letter to the Indian Government dated 12th August 1860 put the finishing touch to the picture we have drawn. "We have now, however," he says, "obtained the material guarantee for the pay of the Contingent, &c., the fundamental principle of the treaty of 1853; and I cannot think, reviewing all the circumstances under which that treaty was forced on the Hyderabad Government," &c.—This is the testimony of the Resident who succeeded Colonel Low, and who was present at all the negotiations that his predecessor conducted. Does it need comment?

Although, therefore, the Nizam has no treaty right to demand the restoration of the Berars, although according to the strict letter of the law he cannot call upon us to show cause why we hold them in despite of his desire, should he so desire it, to put an end to the Contingent, still it will appear to many that '*in foro conscientiæ*' he has a particularly good right. It is hard, such will say, that he should be bound for ever by an engagement which he contracted under the influence of misrepresentation and threats of positive violence. Does it follow then that we, of the present generation, ought to forego the loyal right which we have to retain the Berars, and to yield to the moral claim of the Nizam should he think fit to press it? Is our legal claim less legitimate than his moral claim? Supposing the Nizam were to say, "Colonel Low, in the course of the negotiations that led to the signature of the treaty of 1853, stated that the Berars were to be made over to you merely for a time, and would be restored to me whenever I thought fit to require the reduction of the Contingent. Well, I do not want it any longer. I have another well-disciplined force (my 'reformed troops' as they are usually called), which I have been organizing and drilling for years, which is quite capable of maintaining order in my dominions, and which I am now quite able to pay for. In short, I should like it to take the place of the Contingent. I beg you, therefore, to act upon the moral obligation that you are under, by virtue of the representations of your predecessor, to dismiss the Contingent, and, as a natural sequel to that step, to hand me back my districts of Berar." What would be our reply to an

application of this description? It would probably be to the effect that we should stand by our legal right, and decline to recognize his moral claim. We should argue that in matters of this kind we cannot go back to the past and enter into casuistical discussions as to whether we came by what we now possess rightly or wrongly. The fact remains that we have got possession of the Berars, and that restitution by the present Government is not necessarily a moral duty because a former Government did not believe quite virtuously in the original act of acquisition.

"After all," we might say, "we should have taken the Berars by physical force, but we preferred to effect our purpose by a little diplomatic dodging. Although we did not actually employ physical force, we gave you pretty clearly to understand that we should employ it unless you submitted to our demands quietly, although, for the sake of avoiding an open rupture, we gave way so far as to allow you to indulge in the pleasing fiction that the districts were temporarily assigned, and not regularly ceded; yet you know as well as we do, that we got the substance of what we wanted, and that all the talk about eventual restitution was mere palaver. Had it not been so, you would never have signed a treaty whose very terms virtually converted that eventuality into a practical impossibility," &c.

We are not here advocating the restoration of the Berars, although we feel that such an act would be graceful in itself, and strictly in accordance with principles of justice and honour, as contrasted with the more selfish interpretation of the letter of the law, of which it is in our power to avail ourselves. We are quite conscious that the fact of our possession, with its creation of new interests, has complicated matters immensely, and given a totally different complexion to the case. But we venture to think that the history of the transaction teaches us this lesson—that it would be well to throw off the mask that we have been wearing. If we do not intend to restore the Berars, do not let us try to persuade the world and the Nizam that we are holding them temporarily in trust. Let us make some fresh arrangement, more worthy of our character as an honourable nation and the paramount power in India. We ought not to be other people's agents, cultivating their acres, managing their property, and handing them the balance. Our position is a false one. Let us restore the Berars or keep them only as our own. It would be much better to have the whole business placed upon an honest, straightforward footing, than to allow it to drag on from year to year, giving colour to hopes that are doomed to disappointment, and causing manifold unpleasantnesses from time to time. The payment of the surplus is an obligation which is inconsistent with our political position in India, which causes considerable annoyance to both sides, and might lead to complications. Last year we paid the Nizam for the first time something by way of surplus, £50,000 in fact. But this does not appear to have been the whole of the surplus that we netted. We give the Government credit for a more genuine desire to act up to its engagements in its relations with the Nizam than distinguished previous administrations. But is not our attitude inconsistent? If we choose to administer the Berars more extravagantly than we do at present, and spend what would otherwise be a surplus upon the country itself, we should have nothing to pay the Nizam at all, and should yet be acting up to the terms of our agreement. By the treaty of 1860 it is stipulated, Article 4, that "the British Government will pay to His Highness any surplus that may hereafter accrue after defraying all charges under Article 6, and all future expenses of administration, the amount of such expenses being entirely at the discretion of the British Government." So that we are not legally bound to pay the Nizam one farthing if we like to increase the expenses of the administration, believing that the money would be better spent upon the improvements of the Berars than if thrown into the coffers of the Nizam. In short, our relations with His Highness in the matter of these districts are anything but satisfactory, and the sooner some alteration is effected the better both for us and the Nizam. The attention of our administrators might with advantage be directed to this subject, and we hope that the day is not far distant when a wiser arrangement will be made, and the treaties which are now a blot upon our official records be erased for ever.



**TIMES OF INDIA, March 1869.**—From a correspondent at Hyderabad, dated 28th February :—

“And now for a few words on the subject of many recent attacks on the Government of India at the paying to the Hyderabad Government the surplus revenues of Berar. Many correspondents to the papers, apparently at a loss in numerous communications for a practicable grievance, have adroitly manufactured one out of the not too precipitate justice meted to one of the native princes in the surplus revenues of Berar being handed over to the Nizam’s Government. In this just and praiseworthy discharge of a plain treaty obligation, the not well-wishers to native independence affect to discern a flagrant plunder of His late Highness’s subjects, with a view to conciliate their Sovereign, begrudging him the new-found joy, much in the spirit of Iago’s amiable advice to Roderigo :—

‘Poison his delight,  
And though he in a fertile climate dwell,  
Plague him with flies,’

or, now that the Nizam at last ‘enjoys his own again,’ worry him with carping and detraction.

“‘The farmers of Berar are being robbed,’ clamour the *disinterested* in some instances ; ‘the entire surplus should be spent in Berar!’ Cynically careless are they, it would seem, of the fate of the poorer provinces were the involved principle of their contention impartially applied. It really seems a pity that this act of justice to a native Government on the part of Sir John Lawrence cannot be frankly and gracefully accepted by defeated opponents. But, perhaps, it is considered that too ready a surrender of a pet irritant might be, in some places, regarded as craven and unfriendly. At any rate the *disinterested* and their abettors may be assured that the set policy manifest in more considerate treatment of our old and staunch ally is based upon facts and rights unassailable by pointless and intemperate invective.”

- **TIMES OF INDIA, March 17, 1869.**—When the ryots in Ondh will not rise at the bidding of the *Friend*, when oracular statements are repeatedly proved to be utterly devoid of truth, and when solemn and pretentious protests against the adoption of some course which no one ever dreamt of adopting have held their author up to ridicule, Serampore journalism must needs seek something upon which to vent its feelings. It would have been vain to heap invectives upon the unconscious ryots for refusing to rescue their calumniator, nor would any advantage have been gained by roundly rating the Viceroy for having been so inconsiderate as not to contemplate the introduction of knee-breeches and buckled shoes ; but the corruption rampant at Hyderabad, and what *might* be made of the Berars, always form stock subjects of declamation when the *Friend* having been repeatedly and unanswerably silenced on one subject feels that for very spite it must cry aloud on another. And, as it happened, the death of the Nizam displayed, as it were, the red rag which of all others most excites the *Friend*’s fury. “One tyrant less in the East,” and a grand opportunity for trampling upon treaties during the minority of his successor, these are indeed events “pregnant with hope for eleven millions of Her Majesty’s subjects.” That the Nizam’s dominions will make rapid progress under the enlightened rule of Sir Salar Jung we do not doubt, and those eleven millions are to be congratulated on having one so well fitted as the Dewan to take the conduct of affairs for the present, and to train their youthful ruler for the future.

But it is not so much this consideration which has excited excessive joy at Serampore as that “the position of Berar should now be capable of further improvement ;” it is this which must be a source “of satisfaction to every philanthropic and just person, be he Asiatic or European.” Wherein the late Nizam retarded the march of improvement in Berar, or how that province is to gain so notably by His Highness’s death, the *Friend*, very wisely, does not stop to inquire. Unscrupulous statements and unmeaning generalities, all suggesting false conclusions, these are what the *Friend of India* delights in following up with



true pharisaical hypocrisy, with an invocation to justice and philanthropy. The Serampore journal cares not one whit for the progress of Berar or Hyderabad either, so far as the eleven millions of these territories are concerned ; but it rejoices in the opportunity now presented to the Foreign Office of robbing the boy prince, whose guardians the British nation are, and of reducing him, if possible, from the independent position of his fathers to that of a mere pensioner of Government. This, in unvarnished language, is the consummation to which all the *Friend's* wishes tend. It cannot of course preach the plain doctrine of annexation now, but it can and does advise the infraction of treaty rights and direct breaches of national faith, by removing provinces which are the Nizam's from under the administration of the Resident at Hyderabad, and placing them under the Commissioner of the Central Provinces. It is nothing to those who prate of justice and philanthropy that treaties specially forbid this transfer, and that a Viceroy of India repeatedly and solemnly assured the Nizam that it should never be made. They also quite ignore the fact that the day for such doctrine as theirs has long gone by. Indian affairs do not yet command that attention in Parliament which it were well they did command ; but of this we are sure, that never will the violation of treaty obligations towards any Native Prince be tolerated by that assembly, where justice and philanthropy are not words devoid of all meaning, and where British honour is esteemed before even the Nizam's fairest provinces.

To show how strongly opposed the rulers of Hyderabad have ever been to the administration of the Berars from Nagpore it is only necessary to refer to the Parliamentary papers published in 1867. In 1853, when General Low was Resident, a desperate effort was made to obtain unconditional surrender of the Berars, to make them "red" in fact, and oburgations and threats were then used to compel the Nizam's acquiescence. But so averse was His Highness to the one-sided and humiliating arrangement, and so ungenerous and unjust was the demand, that it had to be abandoned. Again, however, the subject was reopened in 1860, with the same result ; Afzul-ood-Dowlah inherited all his father's aversion to the step, and would not part with his vineyard except on certain clearly stipulated conditions, that it should be administered from Hyderabad and not from Nagpore, and that he should receive the surplus revenues. The first condition has been kept with good faith if not with a good grace ; the second was long ignored. In October 1860, the Nizam, in a long letter written by himself to Colonel Davidson, C.B., Resident at his Court, regarding the interchange of territory consequent on the cession of Berar in trust, says :—"My Government accepts the whole of the propositions. The first is that the British Government should restore to me the Raichore Doab and the districts of Daraseo. My Government will be happy to take back these districts.

"The second proposition is that the British Government should cancel the debt for 50 lakhs of rupees and forego all further demand on account of interest. This is accepted by my Government.

"The third proposition is that I should dispense with the accounts of the receipts and expenditure of the assigned districts for the past, present, and future. Although in your letter dated 21st July 1860 it was intimated that the accounts for the future only were to be dispensed with, and which was accepted, yet, agreeably to the wishes of the British Government, the accounts for the past will not be called for.

"The fourth proposition is that I should assign to the British Government *in trust* all the Surfi-i-Khas districts included within the limits of East and West Berars, and so much additional territory adjoining thereto as shall make up in all a present gross annual revenue of 32 lakhs of rupees. This also is accepted by my Government.

"My Government has accepted all the propositions made by the Supreme Government, and two points only are submitted to His Lordship. One of these relates to the payment of the surplus revenues of the districts, which has no connection with any demand for accounts or discussion of any kind, and the other relative to the administration of the assigned districts being placed under the Resident at my Court."

In reply to this, in November of the same year, Lord Canning expressed his consent "to forego exemption from the obligation of paying to the Nizam's Government any surplus revenue that may hereafter accrue from the two Berars, and the administration of those districts through the agency of the Nagpore establishments." How, in the face of engagements so explicit, and in relation with a dynasty to whom the British in India owe nothing but gratitude, any change could be thought of in the administration of the Berars, passes our comprehension. But old men in their dotage are given to harping upon the fancies of their youth, and the *Friend* is no exception to the rule.

Though, however, the present Nizam is a child, and unable as yet to guard his own interests, it need not be thought that the conduct of the Government of India will not be jealously watched. Yea, it will be even more jealously watched—and very properly so—by Sir Salar Jung and the nobles of Hyderabad than it has ever been before. These men cannot have it said that they betrayed their Sovereign's interests, even if the *Friend* should succeed in persuading the Foreign Office to betray its country's. And more jealously than ever will other Native Princes, and the people who yet cling to their ancient dynasties, watch the action of the Government of India at Hyderabad during the minority of the present ruler. In everything that Government does, princes and people, far and near, will see either a proof of good faith on the part of the British, or receive a confirmation of those suspicions which many entertain, and not without cause, that treaties with England may be made to mean anything, and that Queen's proclamations may be a mere blind under which to sap the independence and position of every noble in the land. But, with such explicit assurances that Berar shall be under the Resident at Hyderabad for ever, and with increasing faith in the honesty of British policy in India, we are more surprised and amused than alarmed at the *Friend's* extravagant delight at the fancied opportunity for aggrandizement, and its unblushing advice to turn that opportunity to account at once. We have expressed our conviction that no Viceroy will ever dream of infringing the treaty from which we have quoted, and that no less propitious time for attempting any such injustice could be selected than during this regency or this reign.

There are many points in the article under notice which might be commented upon, were it worth while to do so. There are, of course, indications of the *Friend's* violent dislike of Colonel Davidson, one of the most honest and independent officers England ever had to represent her in India. We are told that "it was unfortunate for both His Highness (the late Nizam) and the British Government that on his assumption of power he had to deal with a Resident like Colonel Davidson. English prestige was not maintained, English honour was not upheld, as they ought to have been." Grosser calumnies than these were never uttered. So far was it from being unfortunate that the Nizam had to deal with a Resident like Colonel Davidson that it was very fortunate both for His Highness and for England. Colonel Davidson was an officer of independent character, who would not lend himself to carrying out a policy which would have proved dishonourable in the extreme towards a faithful ally, and which would have reflected disgrace upon the British nation. Where is the Political section of Colonel Davidson's Administration Report? It is well known that such a section was written, it is also well known who suppressed it, nor is it difficult to guess the reason why. Let it be made public, and then we shall see of whom the nation has most reason to be proud, the politicals at Hyderabad, or the Foreign Office of the day at Calcutta.

BOMBAY GAZETTE, June 22, 1874.—An authoritative contradiction has been given at Calcutta to the rumour that the Hyderabad assigned districts, consisting of the rich cotton fields of Berar, were likely to be soon withdrawn from British management and restored to His Highness the Nizam. The story ran that a banker at Baroda had offered the Nizam a loan of nine crores of rupees to redeem Berar; and it was assumed that the British Government would have no choice but to accept this money and give back territory which for the last fifteen years has been regarded as an integral part of British India. It was natural that the

Foreign Office should take alarm at the prospect of being called upon to surrender the very productive districts which not only yield a valuable crop of cotton, but fill up an awkward gap between the territories of the British Government in the Bombay Presidency and those belonging to the same Government in the Central Provinces. No great landlord who had been allowed to complete his estate by taking under his own management land belonging to a debtor who seemed to be hopelessly embarrassed would like to be suddenly confronted with the repentant prodigal jingling a bag of ready money in his face and demanding to have his own again. We are not surprised, therefore, that it has been considered necessary to send a *communiqué* to the semi-official papers on the other side of India, declaring that Berar is held by a permanent tenure in trust for the payment of the Nizam's auxiliary force, and that the treaties confirming the cession of the country by the Nizam for this purpose cannot be abrogated on payment of a sum of money, or without the consent of the British Government. It may, however, be fairly doubted if this reasoning is correct. The Nizam's obligation to maintain a Subsidiary Force was created by the treaty of 1800, which bound the State of Hyderabad to put in motion immediately in time of war, for the purpose of opposing the enemies of the British Government, "an army of twelve thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, with their requisite train of artillery, and "warlike stores of every kind." To enable the Nizam to fulfil this engagement the British Government organized a sufficient force and kept it ready for war, only requiring the Hyderabad Government to pay its annual cost. Of course the payment of the troops continually fell into arrears, and at last in 1853, when the debt owing to the Company for these arrears was about fifty lacs, Lord Dalhousie insisted on having a material guarantee for the regular payment of the troops in future years. The Nizam, accordingly, made over Berar in the north, and the districts in the south of his kingdom between the Tumboodra and the Kistna, "to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at "Hyderabad." The British Government undertook on its part to maintain out of the revenues of these districts an auxiliary force of 5,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry with the requisite complement of guns, and also to pay the expenses of the Hyderabad Contingent, which is a separate force of about the same strength; and the Nizam was released from the obligation to assist our Government with any other troops than these in time of war. In 1860, as a reward for his loyalty during the Mutiny, the Nizam had the southern assigned districts restored to him, and the old debt of fifty lacs was cancelled; but the British Government not only retained possession of Berar, it also secured the Nizam's consent to a clause providing that "no demand for accounts of the receipts or expenditure of the "assigned districts should be made." The treaty of 1853 had provided that annual accounts should be rendered to the Nizam and any surplus revenue paid to him; but that of 1860 left the British Government at liberty to do what it liked with any excess of revenue over necessary expenditure.

This cession would have been complete but for the resolute refusal of the Nizam to resign his claim to the sovereignty of Berar. Lord Dalhousie in 1853 put the utmost pressure on the ruler of Hyderabad to induce him to transfer the ceded districts absolutely to the British Government; but all in vain. The Nizam was far too jealous of his honour to agree to terms which he probably thought should only have been imposed on a conquered enemy, not on a faithful ally. He yielded everything else, but he reserved what has been supposed to be a barren title to the dominion of the assigned districts; and this reservation would certainly justify the present Nizam's Government in reclaiming Berar on payment of such a sum of money as would suffice to maintain the auxiliary forces. The districts were only alienated to provide the necessary funds for this purpose; and if these funds were provided by the Nizam's Government from some other source the equitable claim which the Hyderabad State might urge to have the treaty of 1853 abrogated could not, we should think, in honour be disputed by the British Government. It would probably be a serious misfortune for the people of Berar to be placed once more under the rule of the Nizam's officers; but the wishes of

the people were not consulted when the territory was taken over, and cannot honestly be brought forward now to excuse the non-fulfilment by the British nation of a distinct bargain with a prince whom it has chosen to treat with as if he really were an independent sovereign. As Captain Hastings Fraser puts it, in his book about the Nizam, "He has only assigned Berar to us for a special purpose, namely, as a national guarantee to ensure the regular payment of the Contingent, and in the event of that purpose no longer existing His Highness would at once be entitled to claim his country, or that material guarantee might at once be furnished by a deposit of cash in the British treasury." The sum of nine crores of rupees would be a sufficient guarantee, for if it were invested in four per cent. paper it would produce an annual revenue of thirty-six lacs, and the annual payments for which the revenues of Berar have been pledged only amount to thirty-one lacs.

It is reasonable to suppose that there must be something in the story of the proposed loan, or the sum named would not have tallied so nearly with that which would be required for the recovery of Berar. It is, too, by no means improbable that the recollection of the weakness of a former Conservative Government in restoring Mysore to the Hindoo dynasty may have encouraged intriguers to lay their plots for cutting off Berar also from British territory. Nor would it be strange if there were a strong desire on the part of the legitimate prince of Berar to get back so valuable a province. The revenue, which was less than forty lacs in 1853, has increased under British management to, we believe, over fifty lacs, so that it would not only pay interest on nine crores, but would leave a handsome surplus for the Nizam. But, as the present Nizam is still only a boy, it is extremely improbable that so staunch a friend of the British Government as Sir Salar Jung, the actual ruler of Hyderabad, will raise a disagreeable question of this kind during his Sovereign's minority. The question, however, will assuredly be raised before many years are over; and if the Nizam can only find the money it seems to us that the Government of India will be compelled to give him back his territory.

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*TIMES OF INDIA, June 23, 1874.*—The question of the restoration of the Berars to the Nizam's Government is likely to come very prominently before the public one of these days. Paragraphs have already begun to make their appearance, indicating the way the wind is blowing in the upper air of high diplomacy, but not of much value in themselves. Thus one week we are told that Sir Salar Jung has made arrangements with a Baroda banker, who will advance nine crores of rupees, which being invested in the funds in trust will yield more than sufficient to pay the Hyderabad Contingent and the other claims the districts were originally assigned to provide for, and it is assumed that, this financial transaction having been arranged for, all is done. Then follows a paragraph on the other side, which gives a glimpse of the state of mind of the officials in the Foreign Office, who find themselves threatened with gold which they do not ask for, and asked for territory which they mean to keep, if they can, honestly. This paragraph states in tones of authority which ill disguise a secret trepidation that "there is no prospect whatever of British administration ceasing in Berar." And this very explicit statement is followed up by another which deals with matters which it would have been better to leave out of sight:—"The province is held under reiterated treaties which assign it to the Government of India in order to secure the punctual payment of the Contingent money, and those treaties cannot be abrogated without the consent of both parties." Now these "reiterated" treaties are composed wholly of the "me and another" to which the excitable school-boy's "thousands" dwindled down upon sober investigation. They number two only, and the sixth clause of each deals with the territories assigned. When, in 1853, Lord Dalhousie availed himself of the fact that the pay of the Hyderabad Contingent was in arrears, and insisted upon important districts being assigned to meet the claim for money due, some fifty lacs, and to secure the pay of the Contingent for the future, the following clause was

inserted in a treaty signed on the 21st May of that year :—"For the purpose of providing the regular monthly payment to the said Contingent troops, and payment of Appa Dessaye's chout, and the allowances to Mahiput Ram's family, and to certain Mahratta pensioners as guaranteed in 10th article of the Treaty of 1822, and also for payment of the interest at six per cent. per annum of the debt due to the Honourable Company, so long as the principal of that debt shall remain unpaid, which debt now amounts to about fifty lakhs of Hyderabad rupees, the Nizam hereby agrees to assign the districts mentioned in the accompanying schedule marked A, yielding an annual gross revenue of about fifty lacs of rupees, to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at Hyderabad, and to such other officers, acting under his orders, as may from time to time be appointed by the Government of India to the charge of those districts." In "schedule A" we find the districts carefully specified as in an auctioneer's catalogue, but they may be more briefly described as the Berars on the north and Raichore Doab on the south, with certain lesser territories on the west. The wording of this clause makes it sufficiently clear that no cession of territory was contemplated, at least on one side; the object is stated plainly enough to be simply the providing of the monthly pay of certain troops and dependants, and the interest on fifty lacs of rupees, "so long as the principal shall remain unpaid;" while the stipulation that the districts are to be managed by the Resident at Hyderabad, or by officers acting under his orders, also shows that the connection between the assigned provinces and the State of which they formed part was not to be severed.

Hyderabad having resisted temptation during the Mutiny, the Raichore Doab was restored, and the old debt of fifty lakhs was forgiven. If the Nizam had not been required to agree to forego all demand for accounts relative to the receipts and expenditure of the assigned districts "for the past, present, or future," a just man might take a real pleasure in perusing the treaty which was signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad on the 26th December 1860, so admirable is the spirit of equity and generous consideration for the happiness of the Nizam which breathes through it. Article five having restored to His Highness all the assigned districts on the south and west, Article 6 thus deals with the Berars :—"The districts in Berar already assigned to the British Government under the Treaty of 1853, together with all the Surf-i-Khas talooks comprised therein, and such additional districts adjoining thereto as will suffice to make up a present annual gross revenue of thirty-two (32) lakhs of rupees currency of the British Government, shall be held by the British Government, in trust for the payment of the troops of the Hyderabad Contingent, Appa Dessaye's chout, the allowance to Mahiput Ram's family and certain pensions mentioned in Article 6 of the said Treaty." The words used in this "reiterated" treaty are still more clear in avoiding any foundation for a plea that a cession of the Berars was effected or contemplated. It is expressly laid down that the territory "shall be held in trust for the payment" of the Contingent and certain other claims specified. The moment the payment of the money for those purposes is assured, all claims upon the assigned districts of course cease. The need of a guarantee for the payment of money ceases when the money itself is handed over.

Such are the words of the clauses, which will no doubt be very eagerly canvassed before long, not only in India but in England. A contemporary in touching on this subject yesterday stated that it considers it to be extremely improbable that Sir Salar Jung will raise a disagreeable subject of this kind during the Nizam's minority, and gives as a reason for this incredulity that Sir Salar is a staunch friend of the British Government. That which was improbable has, however, come to pass. Sir Salar Jung has been for some months past very steadily raising this "disagreeable" question, and he is resolved to urge it with energy. The very fact that he is known to be a staunch friend of the British Government imposes this line of policy on him, for if he were found weak or vacillating on the point the anti-British element among the great families of Hyderabad would make his position untenable. His British leanings, we regret to say, are

not set down to his credit amongst the more conservative of the Hyderabadees, who view his reforming and civilizing tendencies with a strong aversion. The desire for the recovery of the assigned districts is universal, and Sir Salar's enemies are not likely to let him forget, even if his own sensitiveness allowed him to forget, that it was his uncle whose faulty administration paved the way to the assignment originally. The Minister who now rules Hyderabad has not only a patriotic and a political, but a strong personal motive to urge him to effect the restoration of the Berars to his Sovereign, if any possible combination of diplomatic skill and financial boldness can achieve it. With a view to the arrangement of the monetary part of the difficulty, the great Baroda banking firm known by the name of Gopalrao Myral, a banker of immense resources now deceased, but who was formerly Dewan to the Gaekwar, has been induced to open a branch bank at Hyderabad, and we believe the money required to meet the liabilities due to the British Government can be produced when necessary through that house. The obstacle now to be surmounted is the formidable one of the unwillingness of the officials of the Foreign Office to relax their hold on what they have in their possession. Sir Salar Jung, however, does not deem even that obstacle insurmountable; he has a faith in the political justice of our Government which may remove mountains. If the question should by any accident fall from the upper regions of diplomatic intrigues into the vulgar arena of public discussion, we think we may promise the world some interesting revelations as to how the claims for the Hyderabad Contingent "grow'd" after the Nizam's Government bound itself in 1800 to maintain a force for the use of its ally, John Company. And coming to later times the cynical may find considerable amusement in some droll reasons for the insertion of a clause in a treaty that no accounts are to be asked for as to any moneys "in the past or in the future." This affair of the Berars will very possibly become "a burning question" before mankind hears the last of it.

BOMBAY GAZETTE, *June 24, 1874.*—Our article of Monday on the proposed redemption of the pledged districts of Berar by the Nizam of Hyderabad has had the intended effect of making the intriguers who are concerned in this little plot avow what is the real meaning of the rumours to which the press has lately given active circulation. A contemporary who is evidently in the secrets of the conspirators, and who gleefully anticipates the surrender of Berar to its legitimate Sovereign, assures us that the money required to compensate our Government for the loss of revenues assigned to pay the Hyderabad auxiliary forces has already been provided. "The great Baroda banking firm known by the name of Gopalrao Myral, a banker of immense resources now deceased, but who was formerly Dewan to the Gaekwar, has been induced to open a branch bank at Hyderabad, and the money can be produced when necessary through that house." We will not go so far as to affirm that there are not nine crores of ready money available for investment in all Hyderabad; but it is absurd to suppose that the firm of Gopalrao Myral has the command of such a sum, or that it could obtain nine crores for the Nizam's Government at a lower rate of interest than would far more than suffice to swallow up the whole revenue of Berar. This is, in fact, the great security the British Government has for the permanent retention of the coveted territory—that no capitalist will advance money to the Hyderabad State, except at a ruinous rate of interest, to enable it to pick a quarrel with the paramount power. Not very long ago there was a question of forming a company to work the coal and iron mines in the Nizam's territory; but as soon as it became apparent that such a company would be obliged to content itself with the Nizam's guarantee for the payment of interest on the capital subscribed the shareholders one and all withdrew from the adventure. Without the support of the British Government the Nizam has no credit in the money market; and if he tried to raise money to recover his assigned estate he would be forced to have recourse to some of the expedients which were used in the manufacture of Tichborne bonds. We are told, however, that Sir Salar Jung, believing he can produce the money,

and being anxious to conciliate his enemies in Hyderabad by showing that he does not prize the English connection too highly, "has been for some months past "very steadily raising this disagreeable question, and is resolved to urge it with "energy." But we take the liberty to doubt the correctness of this intelligence. If it were true, we should esteem it an advantage to have as Minister at Hyderabad a declared enemy of the British Government, whose every movement would be watched and who would be afraid to attempt any overt act of defiance, rather than a friend whose dread of losing office made him guide his conduct by the counsels of the foes of England. But we do not believe that Sir Salar Jung has even tried to bring on a discussion about the recovery of the province of Berar. That able Minister has far too much sagacity not to be aware that if he raises "burning" questions during the minority of his Sovereign he will only burn his own fingers, and that the best rule he can follow is *quieta non movere*. Besides, we do not understand how a Minister, supported by the British Government, could negotiate before his Prince comes of age for the abrogation of treaties entered into by former rulers of Hyderabad. If Sir Salar Jung can buy back the territory of Berar he must also have power to sell other districts belonging to the Nizam; and we doubt if the "patriots" of Hyderabad would like him to make over the mineral districts on the Wurdah and Godavery to the British Government. There is, therefore, we take it, no immediate danger of a serious debate as to the terms on which Berar was ceded to the English. Our Government has nothing to fear in this matter till the Nizam comes of age; and we can only hope that it will turn the remaining years of its lease to advantage by dotting Berar with English colonies, instead of making it a close preserve of officialism. If the territory be once brought under subjection to English enterprise, capital, and skilled labour, it can never be reclaimed to barbarism, even by a legitimate Sovereign.

MADRAS MAIL, July 29, 1874.—*The Future of Berar.*—The "future" of the Berars is a question not entirely without general interest to India, and even England. Although the 17,000 (odd) square miles which are contained in the Berars bear a small proportion to the 78,000 of the Nizam's Dominions proper, and although the population bears to that of "Hyderabad" the proportion of about 1 to 5, the cession of this country was no ill choice for the Indian Government of the day to make, though the anticipations of the then Resident at Hyderabad, Major-General J. S. Fraser, have been more than realized. On the 4th February 1851 we find him writing to the Secretary to Government, "These districts produce nearly the amount of revenue desired by the Government, and I consider them equally advantageous in a revenue and political point of view. Berar Pain Ghaut is, without exception, the richest and most fertile part of the Nizam's dominions, and the Raichore Doab is the next to it in this respect. These two districts hold out great prospect of improvement in regard to revenue and commerce from an extended culture of the two articles of cotton and opium. . . . They give us the whole frontier from the N. E. angle of the Nizam's country, where the Nagpore and British territories unite, along the northern and western boundaries." . . . This letter was written in reply to a minute requesting the aid of General Fraser's long experience in choosing territory to be made over in discharge of the debt, "amounting perhaps to three crores of rupees," due by the Nizam's Government on account of payments made to the Hyderabad Contingent, and for securing its due payment in future. General Fraser, however, went beyond his instructions in recommending "the cession of the whole of the Nizam's country to our sole and exclusive management and authority for a definite number of years, with the allotment of such portion of its revenue as might be considered suitable for the honourable support of His Highness and family, and a guarantee for the maintenance of the nobles and inhabitants generally in all their just rights and privileges." In these days of non-interference we can only wonder in what General Fraser's idea of just rights and privileges consisted. Lord Dalhousie, however, took a more clear view in his reply, dated 27th May, and disclaiming on the part of his Government any right to decide authoritatively on the existence of Native



independent sovereigns whenever their administration may not accord with its own views, "and denying that he was justified in disregarding the positive obligation of international contracts," administers a very decided snub to the Resident for making a proposal which the Nizam was not likely to accept, and which was "reasonably open to misconstruction," and which would tend to the establishment of a mixed Government in Hyderabad, and finally refuses to entertain the proposal, regarding—could he do otherwise?—the Nizam as an independent prince. Luckily for General Fraser, the member for Hackney, late Brighton, was not then in the House. Lord Dalhousie moreover, in para. 21 of the same letter, distinctly recognizes the probability, or at least possibility, of the Nizam's Government being one day in a position to demand the return of the assigned districts. He speaks of their occupation as for a temporary purpose only, and directs that as little change as possible is to be introduced into their administration. Not to dwell too long upon the past, the upshot was that the Nizam very shortly paid an instalment of more than half the sum due, and promised to pay the balance to the end of October in the same year. By the end of December it had, however, only been paid in part, and the pay of the Contingent was again in arrears. About this time we find the despatches addressed to a new Resident, Colonel Low, who in his first interview with the Nizam explained how necessary the Contingent was as a counter-balance against the hordes of Arabs and other mercenaries of Hyderabad. Pay was advanced by Colonel Low to the Contingent, and the British Government was in the position by turns of an unfortunate creditor and a bailiff in execution. The Nizam, however, appears to have been always anxious for the Contingent to be kept up, though he never could have had external enemies to fear. The cession of districts was no new idea to Hyderabad, the payment of the Subsidiary (British) Force being so secured, while similar cessions had been made by Scindiah in 1803, and the King of Oudh in 1801. The dead-lock on this occasion was to be met in a similar way by the cession of territory worth Hyderabad Rs. 36,82,000 annually as security for annual payments of Rs 42,88,000, the Nizam being excused from the payment of the balance of the debt due by him, *viz.*, 46 lacs. Not that the Indian Government were reckoning without their host; they looked forward to reducing the working expenses of the Contingent, and to the development of the wealth of the districts, predicting, however, no such increase if the districts remained in the hands of their real owner: while they also hoped to gain a more free use of their own troops by the revision of the conditions on which the Subsidiary Force was kept up. One cannot but sympathize with the Nizam when he feels so keenly the disgrace involved in this cession of territory, even though it was always understood that he should retain the 'sovereignty' of those districts. "Gentlemen like you," he says to Colonel Low, who seems rather puzzled by his 'strange character,' "who are sometimes in Europe, and at other times in India; sometimes employed in Government business, at other times soldiers; sometimes sailors, and at other times even engaged in commerce,—at least I have heard that some great men of your tribe have been merchants,—you cannot understand the nature of my feelings in this matter. I am a sovereign prince, born to live and die in this kingdom, which has belonged to my family for seven generations; you think I could be happy if I were to give up a portion of my kingdom to your Government in perpetuity; it is totally impossible that I should be happy; I should feel that I was disgraced." However, after negotiations and "interviews," in which we find Suraj-ool-Moolk, the then Minister, and "his nephew Salar Jung," the present Minister, taking part, and acting on the advice of a confidential valet, one Booran-ood-Deen, the Nizam signs the treaty of 1853, ceding the Berars to Colonel Low, as Resident, who, however, engages "to render true and faithful accounts every year to the Nizam of the receipts and disbursements, and to make over any surplus revenue"; in forwarding which treaty Colonel Low observes that "we do not obtain any territory as our own property."

We may thus state the case. The Nizam's Government, unable to pay certain monthly payments, fell into the debt of the Indian Government, who, however, for purposes of their own, chose to renounce part of the sum due, but secured a deposit



of security, the Berars, for the due payment of this force in future. But, if it be true that the Nizam's Government are now enabled, by the strength of their credit and from other causes, to substitute for the Berars a deposit in coin, it is not only a great eulogy on the present administration of the country under Sir Salar Jung, who would probably feel especial satisfaction in the restoration of these districts, ceded at the advice of his uncle, Suraj-ool-Moolk, but it is also a question whether the Indian Government can find an excuse for non-compliance in a fear that the restoration would not be for the welfare of the inhabitants. If only for his conduct in the crisis of 1857, any request of the Nizam's Minister should meet with the utmost consideration. There is moreover every guarantee for the continued good government of the Nizam's dominions in the steps which Sir Salar Jung has for some time been taking, in the education of a "governing class;" and the young Nizam himself is to receive a thoroughly English education. The people of Berar are not altogether without grievances even under their present Government. Appeals to the High Court at Hyderabad are said to be dreaded on account of the delay and expense involved, while the expense of working the Government is far more than it would be under the Nizam. If it came to a poll of those with interests at stake in the country, they would probably vote for the change, or rather return, to the original Government. At all events if the Nizam presses for his rights, we do not see how justice can be perverted in this matter. The House of Commons, if it could be induced to listen to an Indian subject, might fairly be expected to take a similar view of the case to Lord Dalhousie's.

BOMBAY GAZETTE, August 1, 1874.—The following is a letter signed B.A. to the editor of the *Pioneer*:—

"SIR,—As public attention is at present so largely attracted to the arguments for and against the restoration of Berar to His Highness the Nizam's Government, I may perhaps be pardoned for endeavouring to lay the matter before your readers in a manner which, if not original, may at all events induce some to regard it from a new and more impartial point of view. It is far from being my intention to discuss in full His Highness's claim, if claim there be, for our information on the subject is confined to mere rumour and casual newspaper paragraphs. But coming events cast their shadows before, and judging by the amount of notice given to the subject in all Indian papers, and particularly in those which, rightly or wrongly, are supposed to be 'specially favoured,' we may fairly presume that a movement is on foot. Should such be the case, and should the claim be disposed of on its merits, as is not unlikely under the existing foreign policy and with the Marquis of Salisbury as Secretary of State for India, no impartial mind can doubt the result. In the present vague stage of public information it appears to me that your leader of the 7th July headed the 'Status of Berar' treats the subject in a manner likely to mislead such as have not specially studied the question. Instead of boldly facing the main argument, you slide off to the minor points of the advisability of allowing His Highness's Government to contract a loan, and wax strangely bilious over the rumoured nine crores. Now, if one must discuss this particular consideration, why should the Hyderabad State be debarred from borrowing? There is a certain revenue, there is no public debt, and the credit of the Government is far from standing low. If therefore capitalists, whether English or Indian, should be inclined to lend at their own risk, is it fair or reasonable to oppose the acceptance of their offers, provided those offers are made on fair and reasonable terms? This is no place for discussing at length the politico-economical advantage or disadvantage of a public debt; but the fact remains that the most prosperous state of Europe has both relatively and actually the largest public debt. And this too is the Government which is to interpose to prevent a younger and less developed country from attempting a similar policy. Yet how otherwise is Hyderabad or any other Native State to bring out its latent resources, a consummation apparently so devoutly wished for by the British Government. In this I am simply alluding to the abstract question,—should the Nizam borrow or not? For, as concerns the Berars, what necessity after all is there for a loan?

Is there no middle course for the Nizam between abandoning his claim and plunging into debt. Can any one tell me how the Nizam's Government profits by the large force maintained out of the assigned revenues? It is undoubtedly a mistake to suppose that Berar is to be considered under a mortgage. The phrase does not describe the transaction. Were Berar mortgaged, His Highness the Nizam would be governing it, and transmitting a certain sum yearly as interest to the treasury of the British Government. The opposite is the case, though the money is paid, not as interest, but as a surplus, and into the particulars of this surplus His Highness is by treaty precluded from inquiring. With reference to the 'status of Berar' it may be found profitable to quit the question of the nine crores (which are beginning to remind us somewhat of Joe Miller's three black crows), and to adduce one or two established historical transactions which may throw some light on the subject. It will be remembered that in the last war against Tippoo, in 1799, the Nizam contributed to the army of invasion under General Harris a force estimated at 16,000 fighting men in infantry and cavalry, whose efficiency has been unanimously applauded by Wilks, Grant Duff, and others. To a weak Asiatic power the bringing of such a force into the field means a much larger amount of initial expense than would be incurred by a powerful and wary ruler, who keeps a large and well-appointed standing army always ready for action. But when success crowned the efforts of the allies, and with it came the fruits which might have recouped the Nizam for his outlay, the portion of territory which fell to him in the treaty of partition was ceded to the British in perpetuity, even before he had fairly taken possession, by a subsidiary treaty. The force thus created, however, proved almost useless to the Nizam in practice, and its service was so hampered with conditions and reservations that he was obliged to continue in his pay a very large body of mercenaries. Nor was this all; his treasury had hardly recovered from the embarrassment consequent on these events, when a new force, the Contingent, was called into existence by a series of skilful manœuvres, and forced upon his acceptance. That with such a drain on his resources, his money claims against the East India Company remaining disregarded, his dominions devastated by the reckless policy of Chandu Lall and his supporters, and the credit of his Government sunk to zero, the Nizam should have been saved from either bankruptcy and ruin, is indeed wonderful. In this respect His Highness's Government contrasts favourably with our own. With us every extraordinary expense is made the pretext for a fresh loan or a new tax. His Highness's Government has steered clear of all its debts, staved off threatening ruin, and attained a high degree of prosperity, without opening a loan or imposing a tax. But, after all, the debt incurred by the Nizam (the peg whereon your contributor hangs his argument), taking Palmer and Co., Puran Mal, Pestonjee, and all, did not exceed three crores. Now if you will set this off against the forty lakhs per annum exacted by our Government for more than fifty years, and work out a schoolboy's sum of simple interest at 8 or even 10 per cent., you will be able to answer the question whether the Nizam was solvent at the time of the first Contingent Treaty. The argument from the prosperity of Berar under the British administration, and of course the implication that it would return to its pristine condition if restored to native rule, is not worthy of a moment's consideration. In the first place, to arrive at a true estimate of what Berar was before it passed from under native control we must refer to the contemporaneous history of adjacent British provinces. I have not the necessary books of reference by my side as I write, nor have I space in this already lengthy letter for quotations: enough that if it were necessary I could prove by indubitable authority that Berar was no worse than the British districts by which it was surrounded. Secondly, we have to consider that the unprecedented prosperity which you vaunt is in great part purely fortuitous, a strange political phenomenon. The other hemisphere suddenly and completely stopped the springs from which the resources of one of the most important of English manufactures were drawn, and the result was that the cotton mart of Berar received an impetus which pitchforked the province into a state of truly 'unprecedented prosperity.' Over these events no Government could have had any

control; none could have predicted them, and none can ever by a fiat of its own bring about the same conditions. Lastly, I have to remind you that Raichore and Dharaseo were once British districts, and a somewhat similar cry was raised when we proposed to make them over to the Nizam. Has any complaint of oppression or decline of prosperity reached the public since? The fact is that the cry about 'unprecedented prosperity' and a *plébiscite* is mere clap-trap. The Nizam's dominions are not a whit worse governed than many a British province, and the people are perhaps more contented. It behoves us first to look well at home. Should the Government of Oudh or the Punjab, or even that of the N.W. Provinces (with the exception of permanently settled mehals), offer to abide by a *plébiscite*, I for one would not stake a shilling upon the result. It is in the nature of things impossible, or at least highly improbable, that a good Native Government should not be welcomed by the native people. Therefore let us take care how we insist upon this argument.

"In old days, old days when the Company was weak and the Nizam strong, common interests and common enemies made them fast friends. Has the Nizam ever swerved from his fidelity since? The British Government has many friends, but who so staunch as the Nizam? Wittingly or unwittingly, never has he offered any provocation, never wavered in his loyalty. In the memorable year 1857, a time of sore trial and tribulation for the Company's Government, the Nizam kept his faith right loyally with his friends, and stood by them with heart and soul. It is difficult at this distance of time to estimate rightly the service then rendered by him. Had he declared himself against us, all the minor States in Peninsular India would have risen *en masse*, and at least for a time the whole of the Deccan and Southern India would have been lost in a blaze of rebellion. The southern presidency towns would probably have been drawn into the vortex of this dire struggle. Indeed I am not quite sure if the old warlike princes of the north would have been able to resist the example of the greatest Native State of India. And yet what was the reward His Highness received for this signal service? Decorations, forsooth! rendered ungraciously, a demand for concession, and the gift of a district which had all the time been his own! In England an Indian Secretary excused him for his loyalty by attributing it to cowardice!

"Is it too late for a just act? or too soon for a generous? Can it be possible for the British nation to argue:—We have a rich province in our grasp. The owner does not, cannot, dare not ask for the account of our stewardship; let us therefore provide for as many of our own servants as may be, out of its revenues. Govern it more expensively than any country in the world, and remit the smallest possible surplus to that very accommodating person its owner. Was Napoleon right? Are we really such a nation of shopkeepers? I know we are not. Let the question be once set before the people the Parliament of England and in its true light, and I am much mistaken if an act of justice will not be done. And such an act, in which generosity will stand side by side with justice, will enthrone the name of England in a people's heart. What an effect will not such a concession have on the temper and fidelity of other Native States? On them and all the Indian nationalities its influence for good will remain perhaps for ages to come, and generations of His Highness's subjects will tell their children how the all-powerful English who could crush the Nizam at any moment had nevertheless kept their word scrupulously with him as an old and faithful friend."

TIMES OF INDIA, August 4, 1874.—Those demure little paragraphs which a short time since went the rounds relative to the state of affairs in the Assigned Districts of Hyderabad have ceased to disfigure the columns of our contemporaries since we drew attention to the real state of affairs in that quarter. The air of inspiration assumed by the little impostors might have misled the public with reference to a very important imperial question; and we were therefore at the pains to show their worthlessness. The silence which has succeeded is not to be taken as a sign that the *status quo* in Berar is acquiesced in by those more immediately concerned. Very strong efforts are at the present moment being put

forth for the recovery of the Assigned Districts ; and the basis of the claims of the Hyderabad Government is certainly worthy of the gravest consideration. It is urged that a crying wrong was committed in forcing Berar from the Nizam in 1853 for a purpose and on grounds wholly untenable in law and in morals : untenable in law because the sole ground alleged was a pecuniary debt which it is asserted can be arithmetically proved to have had no existence, a large credit being, on the contrary, the true state of the account between the two Governments. From this point of view the taking of money from Hyderabad for the support of the Contingent was little better than a fraud upon that State from first to last, for until the signature to the treaty of 1853 was forced from our ally by a threat that his continued refusal would be followed by the military occupation of his capital the maintenance of the force in question was not provided for by any treaty. Indeed, the provisions of the treaty of 1800 would appear to have excluded any possible legitimate object for such a force. The districts south of the Toongaboodra were ceded on the express condition that in return the British Government would, without any further charge, furnish to the Nizam all military assistance which he might require.

The words of Article XVII. of the Treaty of 1800 leave no doubt whatever upon this point. It expressly states that should any of the Nizam's subjects withhold taxes or create a rebellion, the Subsidiary Force should reduce all offenders to obedience, and in any part of His Highness's dominions contiguous to the Company's frontier, if it should be found inconvenient to send a detachment of the subsidiary troops, the British Government, if requested by His Highness, should send its own troops to quell disturbances. Article VIII. stipulated that "no demand shall ever be made by the Honourable Company upon the treasury of His Highness on account of the Subsidiary Force," an ample equivalent being secured to the British for its maintenance by the cession to the Company of the territories conquered by the Nizam from Tippoo Sahib. Nevertheless the "Contingent" came into existence, and the Nizam's Government was obliged to find the money to pay it. When the money could not be found the arrears were duly debited to the Nizam, until in 1851 he was responsible for a sum of three millions sterling, more or less. Lord Dalhousie then saw his way to a transaction which he hoped would give him the most fertile provinces of Hyderabad by way of a set-off to the arrears of pay due to the Contingent for doing the work which the Subsidiary Force had been paid to do. General Fraser, who was the Resident at Hyderabad, proposed to go further and procure the cession of the whole of the Nizam's territory "to our sole and exclusive management and authority for a definite number of years," a proposal not at all less moral than that of the Governor-General. But the latter thought it might be liable to "misconstruction," and determined to content himself with three provinces—Berar, the Raichore Doab, and Nuldroog. The cession was not made in perpetuity. The Nizam firmly refused to part with the sovereignty of the districts. He would not have parted with them even as temporary security had not threats been held out that if he did not sign the treaty a British force would be instantly moved upon his capital, and he was informed that the troops at Poona had received orders to march.

As we have said, the representations which are now being urged by the Hyderabad Regency for the re-cession of Berar are largely based upon the circumstances of fraud and force under which the treaty of 1853 was imposed upon the Nizam. The case for re-cession is in this respect grounded of course upon moral considerations. We will express no opinion as to the practical value of considerations of this class when brought into antagonism with the legal right acquired by the words of a treaty, no matter how that treaty may have been obtained. If the Foreign Office resolve to take its stand upon the letter of the existing engagements, it will be still open to the Nizam to offer to pay the Contingent in coin and keep it up if his districts are restored to him. We have the word of Colonel Low, quoted in the Parliamentary Papers on Mr. Hume's motion of 1854 (page 18, para. 28), that he informed the Nizam that the districts were

ceded "merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as the Nizam might require that force." It is therefore quite natural that the claim now being preferred on the part of the Nizam should be brought forward ; and those publicists who hold up their hands in horror at the phenomenon of a Native Prince asking the paramount power to give up territory which it had come to look upon as its own are sadly ignorant of the real facts of the case. There is no disloyalty in making the application. What the Government has to do is to see that justice is not pushed to the wall in any apparent collision of interests between itself and its ally. Berar is very valuable, no doubt, but its retention would be dear at the price of a tarnished name.

*TIMES OF INDIA, August 12, 1874.*—The following is a letter signed M. W. to the editor of the *Times of India* :—

"SIR,—In your article of the 4th, which had for its subject the 'basis of the 'claims of the Hyderabad Government,' for 'the recovery of the Assigned 'Districts,' amongst other statements worthy of close consideration is one which, as it stands, is adapted to leave a wrong and very unfair impression regarding that estimable political officer of the last decade, General Fraser. In order to make plain the rectification I have to offer, it is needful to quote two sentences from your article, thus:—'Lord Dalhousie then saw his way to a transaction 'which he hoped would give him the most fertile provinces of Hyderabad by 'way of a set-off to the arrears of pay due to the Contingent for doing the work 'which the Subsidiary Force had been paid to do. General Fraser, who was the 'Resident at Hyderabad, proposed to go further and procure the cession of the 'whole of the Nizam's territory "to our sole and exclusive management and "authority for a definite number of years," a proposal not at all less moral than 'that of the Governor-General.'

"Few persons on reading this will perceive the vital significance, in the quotation you give, of the term 'definite number of years ;' but let that pass for a moment while I point out that the other phrase (wherever it comes from) 'our 'sole and exclusive management and authority' amounts to an entire misrepresentation of General Fraser's attitude at that time. The gallant Resident's position was this : he did propose to manage the entire administration of the Nizamate, but for a definite purpose and a brief period, and *jointly with the Minister* of the Nizam. The term of this joint administration was to be the period within which the pecuniary difficulties of the Hyderabad exchequer might be overcome, difficulties which, as you rightly state, were forced on the Nizam by the Calcutta policy of the day. This, as careful readers will perceive, is a totally different thing from the 'transaction' contemplated by Lord Dalhousie, with his customary avidity,—the entire, unconditional, and irrevocable absorption of three of the Nizam's provinces, including Berar, the latter of which only is now administered by us, conditionally and for a special temporary purpose.

"But, in the attempted 'transaction' referred to, the part taken by the late General Fraser might be still more strongly stated in his favour. When he became fully aware of the Governor-General's intention to absorb territory, instead of managing it in order to ensure the Nizam's ultimate relief, did he say, 'Ah, well, the responsibility is theirs, not mine, but I must carry out instructions'? Nothing of the kind : General Fraser belonged to a different order of men ; he retired. How many of our politicals in this day would do likewise? Not many perhaps, but still we may hope there are a few who would be content to 'retire, and in themselves possess their own desire,' rather than become the instruments of injustice, and the passive promoters of policy which they condemn. References might readily be given from the well-known book 'Our Faithful 'Ally,' and elsewhere, to support the version of General Fraser's conduct which I have given here ; but his high character is still sufficiently well remembered to render more special proof unnecessary. Yet it may be well to ask your readers who are interested in political affairs, and who take pride in the good 'men 'whom India has known,' to turn to your columns about October 1869, where,

in an obituary notice of General Fraser, some of these circumstances are explained."

\* \* We readily give publicity to the above, and are happy to learn that General Fraser never intended to recommend the Government of Lord Dalhousie to insist on the "cession of the whole of the Nizam's country to our sole and exclusive management and authority for a definite number of years." Our correspondent wonders where that quotation, which certainly might easily give rise to the impression which he is anxious to remove, "may have come from." It comes from a letter of General Fraser's written on the 4th Feb. 1851, in response to a minute directing him to supply information as to the fittest provinces to be made over by the Nizam in satisfaction of a debt at that time estimated at some three millions sterling.—*Ed. T. of I.*

PIONEER, September 15, 1874.—The recent attempt to organize an agitation for the restoration of Berar to the Government of the Nizam may interest our readers in a retrospect of the circumstances under which the province came into British possession. Secunder Jah, the great-grandfather of the present Nizam, suffered the affairs of the State to fall into a condition of serious embarrassment. The Dewan, Rajah Chundoo Lall (acting conjointly with Mooneer-ool-Moolk, the nominal Prime Minister), usurped all executive authority, squandered vast sums, and eventually brought the Government to the brink of bankruptcy. Secunder Jah found himself powerless to resent the conduct of his Minister. Chundoo Lall even consigned Moobaruz-ood-Dowlah (Secunder Jah's youngest son) to captivity, in the fort of Golconda, in spite of the pressing remonstrances of his eldest brother, Nawab Nasir-ood-Dowlah, who succeeded to the *musnud* by the death of his father. The circumstances connected with this curious episode in Hyderabad affairs did not redound much to the credit of the British Government, as the Resident of the day, Mr. Byam Martin, was misled into giving the measure his official consent, even to the extent of supporting it by British arms. This caused great indignation at the Nizam's Durbar, besides creating discontent among the people, and nearly ended in an insurrection. Retribution, however, ultimately overtook Chundoo Lall. For his misdeeds and misdemeanours he was cast into prison, and would probably have ended his days in captivity but for his son Bala Pershad, who, it is said, ransomed him by paying down thirty lakhs of rupees out of the wealth he had amassed when he and his father were in the zenith of their power.

Nasir-ood-Dowlah, on succeeding to the sovereignty of the Deccan, tried to improve the general administration of his dominions, but without much success, and the hostility between the Nizam and the Prime Minister was continued in the reign of his eldest son, Afzul-ood-Dowlah. Some salutary reforms were introduced, but the income of the State frequently fell short of the expenditure, especially in seasons of drought and famine. Under all these disadvantages it was not surprising that the sums owed by the Nizam's Government for the maintenance of the Subsidiary Force at Secunderabad, and the Nizam's Contingent at Bolarum and elsewhere, fell into heavy arrears. These deficits were made up from the British treasury, and ultimately exceeded in the aggregate the large sum of eighty lakhs of rupees. For the recovery of this amount, polite requests and pressing demands sometimes culminated in severe remonstrances; and in the Nizam's archives might probably be found an extraordinary State document addressed in the vernacular to the Nizam's Government, implying that it might any day be extinguished by an authoritative mandate. Eventually negotiations were set on foot for a cession of territory, as the only safe guarantee for the future. Unpalatable as the measure appeared to be, it was one of mutual expediency. If there was any pressure, moral or material, brought to bear on the transfer of territory, it was caused chiefly by the continued recusancy of the Nizam's Government. Anyhow, it was a measure sanctioned by the Nizam's consent. It was doubtless felt as derogatory to the dignity of both Court and Government to cede a slice of territory, however small, even under special circumstances and for a specific purpose, but in a pecuniary if not in a political point of view they were gainers by the arrangement.

Under British management the condition of the peasantry in the ceded

districts has been ameliorated, and the revenues of Berar have been materially improved—so much that the large debt above alluded to has been “wiped off,” and the troops regularly paid, while an annual surplus in excess of ten lakhs of rupees, on a rough calculation, is remitted to assist in replenishing the Nizam’s coffers. In the face of these facts the restoration of the ceded districts to the tender mercies of the officers of the Nizam’s Government would be of more than doubtful expediency. Their retention by us does not involve an injustice when the legitimate object for which they are retained is duly considered, that object being the payment of troops who ought to be paid out of the Nizam’s revenues, according to treaty obligation. If the Berar country is ever to be restored this could only be done when the present successor to the *musnud* of Hyderabad attains his majority. The present Nizam is a minor, who for some years to come will be quite incapable of managing his affairs, or undertaking the task of government. If it is contended that during his minority the Nizam’s authority is vested in a double regency, composed of two delegates, the one his kinsman, Nawab Shums-ool-Oomrah, and the other his Dewan, Sir Salar Jung, the argument resolves itself into this, that because the rights of sovereignty are held in trust by a responsible agent we are bound to make over to him what, in the exercise of those rights by the predecessors of the minor, was made over in trust to the British; for in trust are the “ceded districts” held, and not in mortgage as is wrongly assumed. To restore them now would also be disregarding the possibility of the minor dying without leaving issue, or dying before he arrives at years of discretion, a possible contingency everywhere, but nowhere more so than in a Native State. Such an occurrence would prolong the interregnum, and elevate the Regent into the position of an absolute ruler, exercising all the powers and enjoying all the privileges of a sovereign, to an indefinite extent and perhaps for an indefinite period. The obvious course for the British Government to adopt, therefore, is to retain this portion of the Nizam’s territory till the minor is old enough to assert a tangible claim for direct possession under some good guarantee. It will then, and not till then, be time to reopen the question lately broached.

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TIMES OF INDIA, *September 28, 1874*.—A peculiar function is fulfilled by the Allahabad journal in regard to those claims of the Nizam’s Government for the restoration of Berar which, as we have already informed our readers, are being strongly and steadily urged upon the Government of India. Whenever a fresh stage of the negotiation has been reached, curious *communiqués* appear in the columns of the *Pioneer*, which endeavour to show that the possession of the districts was not acquired by any uncanonical means. The paragraphs, of no doubtful origin, which appeared in his columns some three months ago, were timed to follow upon an official step that had then been taken. In a recent article upon the same subject there are unmistakeable signs that it is intended to soothe public opinion in case the last act of the Foreign Office, about which singular rumours are in the air, should become generally known. The skill with which our able contemporary’s inspirations are put forth deserves a word of recognition. The *communiqués* are always carefully disguised by the open insertion of a glaring historical blunder or two, so as to make the confiding reader believe that no one intimately acquainted with the subject could have had any hand in concocting them. The general result is of course only the more misleading, but that could hardly be regarded as a disadvantage from the point of view of those whose diplomacy requires, above all things, that the facts should be obscured. On the present occasion our mofussil friend has treated us to what he considers a fragment of history, which he philosophically considers a full justification of the appropriation of Berar. It may be worth while to follow his example, and to indulge in the luxury of a “retrospect,” with a view to ascertaining what was the real character of some at least of the “circumstances under which the province came into British possession.”

And first we will note that neither Secunder Jah, who succeeded to the



Nizamate three years after the treaty of 1800 was made, nor his successor, was in the least degree the cause of the serious financial confusion which overtook the State. Those embarrassments, which Lord Dalhousie so remorselessly punished when they reached a crisis in 1853, were directly caused by the British Government itself. As early as 1803 the provisions of the treaty of 1800, which guaranteed the Nizam from all interference with his internal affairs, in consideration of a large cession of territory, had been already completely broken through. The Nizam was practically deposed, and all his authority usurped by his friend and ally. The English authorities set up a Minister of their own choosing, and actually paid him a salary from the British treasury, with the avowed object of securing his obedience. The Duke of Wellington, in his despatches, noticed that fact, and mentioned with respect to it that the political authorities told the Nizam (who had heard about the pension) that it was the salary which the Minister would have received for administering the Southern or Ceded Districts had they not been ceded to the Company! Such discreditable expedients, thus early begun, have formed the staple of all our diplomatic relations with the Hyderabad Durbar during the principal part of this century. With respect to the assertion that the Dewan, Rajah Chundoo Lall, "acted conjointly with Mooneer-ool-Moolk," it is necessary to observe that so far was that from being the case that the British authorities had made it a condition of the latter's holding, nominally, the office of Minister that he should have nothing to do with the Government. Rajah Chundoo Lall never "usurped all executive authority," though it is true enough that he "squandered vast sums, and eventually brought the Government to the brink of bankruptcy." He did not usurp the executive authority; he was forced on the Nizam, as his predecessors had been, by the British Government, which insisted that in his hands should be left the disposal of all the revenues of the State, of course under the orders of his real masters. The resources of the country were, under this arrangement, shamefully squandered, and, as our contemporary truly states, "the Nizam found himself powerless to resent" the usurpation and its consequences. Why does the Allahabad paper studiously conceal the responsibility of our Government in the whole of Rajah Chundoo Lall's proceedings? It is absurd to pretend to discuss the Berar claims while trying to hide that responsibility. It changes the whole aspect of the financial difficulties which, by preventing the payment of the Contingent, constituted a pretext for the forced cession of that province. The accumulation of arrears of the pay of the Contingent our contemporary, singularly enough, attributes to the recurrence of seasons of drought and famine. We will quote Mr. H. T. Prinsep, no friendly authority by the way, who will show our readers how directly it was the British Government, and not "drought and famine," that was the real cause of the ruin in which Rajah Chundoo Lall plunged the Hyderabad State. In Mr. Prinsep's "History of the Political and Military Transactions in India" it is broadly stated that "Chundoo Lall *felt himself essentially a British Minister*"; and the following passage will sufficiently indicate who should bear the blame of the embarrassments produced by him:—"Owing his appointment wholly to the British Government, and needing its daily support, he (Chundoo Lall) *avowedly yielded to the influence and suggestions of the Resident* in the management and appropriation of the immense resources which thus came to his disposal; but this, instead of tending to the establishment of a frugal and economical system, produced a ruinous accumulation of debt." This testimony is clear enough, and it is above all suspicion.

It was for the pay of this Hyderabad Contingent that, as our readers are of course aware, Berar was taken, and is still kept, in trust. Now it is a fact which is worth keeping steadily in view that this very Contingent was maintained under no treaty stipulation whatever—rather, indeed, in defiance of express treaty stipulations! It was kept up out of the Nizam's revenues, and against his will, in total disregard of the fact that by the treaty of 1800 territory had been made over to the British Government in consideration of their undertaking to furnish him with whatever aid his State required, without further charge upon his revenues. Yet he was forced to keep up the Contingent to do that which we were



bound to do, and when the arrears of that Contingent accumulated he was obliged to part with more territory to pay for that force. He was thus in effect forced to pay twice over for the same commodity, military aid. For what consideration was the southern territory ceded? For such military aid as he might require. If he got that aid it was clear he did not need the British Contingent, and therefore Berar should never have been taken from him: if he did not get it, the southern districts ought in all honesty to be restored to him.

We have so far only glanced at some of the more salient points connected with this delicate question. Should the matter force itself, as seems not unlikely, more prominently upon public attention, it may be our duty to deal with it again, and to give a systematic summary and analysis of the claims which are being urged upon the Foreign Office. At present we do not propose to discuss the exhibition of "prevarication backed by force," that resulted in the forced signature of the treaty of 1853, upon which our up-country contemporary relies with such touching confidence as an indefeasible title to Berar. But we may give that writer one piece of information which may possibly surprise him, but which he can verify by his own independent inquiries. We think it is advisable that he should know that taking the facts of the case at their best, and throwing bodily into the scale the treaties of 1853 and 1861, which he believes the best scriptures that ever gave hope to a wicked generation, no competent judicial authority will be found to decide that under either municipal or international law the British Government has any valid title to the continued possession of Berar. It will decide, on the contrary, that the province is at present held without a tittle of legal right, and solely by an act of arbitrary force, founded upon the untenable pretext of a debt that had no existence.

We have more than a suspicion that gentlemen of the Foreign Office at Calcutta have already discovered from legal authority the unsatisfactory nature of the tenure under which they now hold Berar, and that nothing short of the anxiety inspired by that knowledge can have dictated their more recent measures with regard to this case. We are not prepared as yet to lay before our readers a description of what those measures were, for we desire to verify the information that has reached us. But, if there be any truth in the reports which are flying about Hyderabad, it would appear that the Government of India have just made a desperate effort to defeat the Nizam's claims by an act which, if rumour is to be believed, is not only highly reprehensible in itself, but involves nothing short of a complete confession of the injustice of their cause. The action which they are understood to have taken is such as to lay them open to the allegation that they are not unwilling to stimulate to their own profit that spirit of local intrigue which it has been so frequently the duty of the British Government to censure as one of the worst of the elements of corruption that taint the atmosphere of Native Courts.

We need hardly allude to our contemporary's attempt to put forward the fact of the present minority of the Nizam as a ground for refusing to consider his claims to the ceded districts. The argument simply amounts to a suggestion that the comparative helplessness of a child should be made available for the denial of claims which could not be resisted if they were pressed by a man. The consideration as to the minority or majority of a ruler is, as our contemporary ought to know, absolutely non-existent in international law, in so far as the relations and obligations of one State to another are concerned.

*TIMES OF INDIA, October 15, 1874.*—The political complications at Hyderabad are grave. When speaking of them at the close of last month we intimated that we were in possession of information of a very startling character relative to the action of the British authorities. We decided, however, not to publish the facts in detail until they had been fully verified, for we were unwilling to attach a stigma to those compromised, so long as a hope remained that it might possibly be undeserved. We were also, we confess, influenced by the consideration that premature publicity might precipitate a crisis which it was highly desirable to avoid, or at least to adjourn. But the motives

which induced us to preserve silence hitherto have ceased to operate. The last faint doubt as to the literal correctness of the details of the unworthy intrigue to which we referred has been dissipated, and a partial publicity having been given to some of the facts it becomes our duty to disclose them all in their entirety. As our readers are aware, the claims of the Nizam's Government for the restoration of Berar have been the subject of repeated representation to the Foreign Office at Calcutta. It was, of course, open to the representatives of the British Government to reply to those representations, and, if they were not based upon treaty rights or upon justice, to show that they were without foundation. But the course adopted has practically admitted the validity of the claims. It has been decided not to reply to them at all, and to keep Berar just as if no claims had been put forward for its restitution. It is not, we freely concede, an easy matter for civilian virtue to restore a province for the retention of which no reason of any kind can be given, when such resignation would not only involve the loss of dearly-loved patronage, but, worse still, interfere with promotion among the covenanted generally by necessitating the absorption of the present Berar Commission into the ranks of the Service. Such a catastrophe could not be contemplated with calmness by the Indian official mind, and it seems quite natural to men who value patronage more than the honour and highest interests of the Empire to avow plainly that, while they cannot say that the claims to Berar which have been officially put forward by the Nizam's Government are otherwise than well-founded, they simply will not give him his districts, and will keep them without reason assigned. They have not only done this, but they have told the Government of the greatest Native State in India that they will not receive any remonstrance relative to the injustice of that decision; a more discreditable position for the Government of India than that thus assumed could not easily be imagined. Having practically admitted the justice of the claims by refusing to discuss them, or to say that they are ill-founded, it has declined to restore to the Nizam a province to which his right is not even contested. Never before has the Government of India placed itself in such a false and undignified position with regard to a Native State. If a blunder be worse than a crime, the next step of the British Government in this miserable affair was worse than the first, for it was in itself both a blunder and a crime of the most serious character. The obligations under which the administration of Sir Salar Jung has laid the British Government in a time of great danger and the utmost alarm are known to all the world. During the Mutiny he, and he alone, prevented the flame of insurrection from spreading across the Deccan to Madras and Bombay. The author of the "Topics for Indian Statesmen" wrote in 1858 of the crisis which had just been passed through—"In Hyderabad, the young Minister, Salar Jung, is thoroughly English in his ideas and predilections. Hyderabad has been a constant subject of uneasy apprehension, and it is not too much to say that nothing but the English feeling of Salar Jung has prevented an outbreak in that city. It is well known that treasonable correspondence was carried on between the people of the city and the troops of the cantonment. The Resident actually warned a cavalry regiment on parade that he knew of their disloyalty; an attack was made upon the Residency, though weak and ill-organized, and *Salar Jung has exposed himself not only to much suspicion and hatred among the Hyderabad population, but has succeeded in keeping down insurrection at great personal risk.* Had Hyderabad gone, it is impossible to say what might have been the consequences. The discovery of the plot at Nagpore at the eleventh hour shows how ripe the neighbouring State was for revolt. It is well known that the Mussulmen of Triplicane were only waiting the signal of a rising at Hyderabad to put their hands to the harvest, and there is not a military man with whom I have conversed on the subject who has not expressed a decided opinion that if Hyderabad had risen we could not have escaped insurrection at Kurnool, Nagpore, Bellary, Cuddapah, Bangalore, Madras, Trichinopoly, and other cities; while it is scarcely possible that the Bombay Presidency, so much more uneasy as it has proved itself than Madras, could have escaped the spread of such contagion." Sir Richard Temple also bears testimony that the

value of the services rendered by the Nizam and his Minister were "simply priceless."

In rendering us those services Sir Salar Jung earned for himself the mortal enmity of the worst opponents of British influence in Hyderabad. They have never ceased to pursue him with plots, and they have even made him the mark for the bullets of hired assassins. Will it be believed that British officials have degraded themselves by appealing to these anti-British factionaries as allies against him who had become obnoxious to them solely through his fidelity to us? That is, however, what they have actually done. The principal nobles of Hyderabad, many of whom were known to be disaffected not only to Sir Salar Jung, but to ourselves, were, contrary to all usage, summoned to the Residency, and the Resident, in the presence of the two Regents, addressed them in language the meaning of which could not be mistaken, and has been but too clearly understood by all concerned. Pointing his finger at Sir Salar Jung and the Nawab Shuns-ool-Oomrah, the co-Regent, the Resident stated that they had been repeatedly urging the claims of the Nizam to Berar, but that the Government of India was displeased at the prosecution of those claims. The British Government was determined, said the Resident, not to discuss the question during the minority of the Nizam, and he called upon the nobles present to use all their influence to prevent the claims from being further urged. And, as if to lower the authority of Sir Salar and his co-Regent in the eyes of the nobles, he added that if further remonstrances were submitted by the Regents they would not be received by the British Government. The real character of this proceeding will be understood when we call to mind the fact that the Resident's Administration Report for 1869-70 expressly stated that the rancour and suspicion of the nobles with regard to Sir Salar Jung and the co-Regent formed "an element in the political atmosphere of Hyderabad," and that "it was not thought just to the Minister, or safe to the stability of his administration, that anything approaching "to freedom of intercourse should take place between the Resident and the other nobles." And so necessary was circumspection "that it had come to pass that "for whole years at a time the only members of the Hyderabad Durbar who were "ever received at the Residency were the Minister himself and one or two of his "own near relations or dependants." This thwarting of the Minister's policy by intrigues, the Resident showed, made "his (the Minister's) office doubly difficult to "fill," and "his burden a doubly heavy one to bear," so much so that, to the Resident's knowledge, Sir Salar Jung "felt at times inclined to withdraw from the "struggle altogether; only there was no one at Hyderabad who was fitted to "relieve him of duties which he performed so admirably."

We may judge what the effect was likely to be when these very intriguers were specially summoned to the Residency to witness the humiliation of those whom they had for years regarded with "rancour and suspicion," and to hear the representative of the British Government appeal to them to use their influence against Sir Salar Jung and his colleague. It is impossible to believe that the Resident would have ventured upon so desperate an attempt to set aside the authority of the Minister, and array against him the whole strength of the anti-British factions, if he had not received instructions from the Foreign Office at Calcutta. What were the terms of those instructions? Were they formal and precise, or were they conveyed in semi-official hints? From whom did they emanate? From some Secretary, doubtless, who is incapable of estimating the political consequences of allowing the people and princes of India to see that the most loyal amongst them would be sacrificed by the help and for the profit of the disloyal, the moment some dishonest and temporary advantage could be gained by doing so. For there can be no misconception as to the nature of the manœuvre which has been so shamelessly resorted to. It was an open invitation to the enemies of Sir Salar Jung—who were his enemies because he was our friend—to combine against him, and, in concert with our official representatives, render his position untenable.

It does not, of course, follow that the suggestion will be acted upon in the sense intended. The fanatical elements of the Hyderabad world may combine to render it impossible for the Regent to manifest his British sympathies, but they

may—we think it highly probable that they will—proffer him energetic co-operation in prosecuting those claims in respect to Berar which even the Foreign Office does not venture to say are unfounded. The crooked diplomacy so wantonly resorted to would thus give heart and courage to our enemies, and neutralize the influence of a tried friend.

*TIMES OF INDIA, October 27, 1874.*—The following letter was addressed to the *Pioneer*, but as that journal has refused to insert it the writer asks us to give it publicity in our columns :—

“SIR,—Under the heading ‘Hyderabad Affairs’ an article appeared in your issue of September 15 on which I trust you will allow me to pass a few remarks. Your retrospect of the circumstances under which the province (Berar) came into British possession does not appear to me to be strictly in accordance with historical facts. ‘Secunder Jah,’ we are told, ‘the great grandfather of the present Nizam, suffered the affairs of the State to fall into the greatest embarrassment.’ This is true enough, so far as also is the statement that ‘Chandu Lall usurped all executive authority, squandered vast sums, and eventually brought the Government to the brink of bankruptcy.’ Nor will any one demur to the assertion that ‘Secunder Jah found himself powerless to resent the conduct of his Minister.’ But you couple with the Hindoo as his ally in usurpation Munir-ool-Mulk, the nominal Prime Minister. A strange collocation truly, as the briefest reference to Sir Henry Russell’s letters from Hyderabad cannot fail to show. So far from acting conjointly with Chandu Lall, the Mussalman Dewan notoriously carried on a constant system of intrigue against the real Prime Minister. For a graphic if unfavourable delineation of the character and actions of Munir-ool-Mulk I would recommend to your readers a perusal of Briggs’s ‘Nizam,’ vol. I., pp. 143-4. The description there given by a contemporary will show what likelihood there was of a combination between these two. But Chandu Lall, a man of low birth, and deficient in strength of will, could not single-handed have maintained his almost subjugation of his royal master. He needed a backer, and a strong one. Where was such to be found if not in the very party which had enforced with a high hand his appointment to duties and powers inconsistent with the office which he nominally held? The British Government had forced Mir Alam on the Nizam. But Mir Alam was obnoxious to his master, who made it felt more than once that he considered the nominee and client of the stronger Government to be an enemy and a rival rather than a servant. On the death of this Minister, therefore, it was thought advisable to offer Secunder Jah the choice of a successor. Two candidates were in the field—Shums-ool-Oomrah, whom he held in high esteem, and Munir-ool-Mulk, whom he detested. With a curious mixture of cunning and folly (which to a certain extent justifies the theory of his insanity maintained by some) he abstained from declaring his decision till he discovered the leaning of the British Government, and on eliciting the fact that the Governor-General, Lord Minto, was inclined to support his own favourite, Shums-ool-Oomrah, he immediately announced the appointment of Munir-ool-Mulk. Now this latter nobleman, though not ill-disposed towards the English, was not considered by the Resident to be wholly trustworthy, and his active tenure of office it was thought might produce unwelcome complications. Chandu Lall, therefore, the Peshkar, who had served in that capacity under Mir Alam since 1806, was brought forward, and after much pressure the Nizam was induced to agree to the provisions that Munir-ool-Mulk should be Minister only in name, while all the authority and responsibility of the office should be vested in the Peshkar. As a make-weight, a considerable monthly payment (some say fifteen thousand rupees) was to be diverted from the ministerial revenues to the nominal holder of the office. From this time forward Secunder Jah withdrew himself almost entirely from public affairs. An attempt some few years afterwards to assert his authority, by calling upon Chandu Lall to furnish certain accounts of his administration, was treated by the then Resident, Mr. Russell, as an act of undue interference, and the Nizam

promptly cancelled the demand. Then and thereafter Chandu Lall reigned supreme by British influence alone. Though popular with the poorer classes from his easy manners, but more especially on account of his profuse charity, he had few, if any, genuine adherents among the nobility, and it was not long before he evoked the unbounded hatred of the military order. The British Government, therefore, was wholly responsible for that 'usurpation of all executive authority' from which such untoward results to the Nizam and his subjects accrued. Any who doubt the Hindu Minister's utter and complete subserviency to his real masters, who had placed him in office, and on whose good-will he now depended for maintenance therein, have only to consult the correspondence carried on from 1808 to 1823 by Sir Henry Temple and Lord Metcalfe with the Governments of the day.

"In recounting the iniquities of this Minister, you narrate the imprisonment of Mubariz-ud-Dowlah (Secunder Jah's youngest son), 'in spite of the pressing remonstrances of his brother, Nasir-ood-Dowlah, who succeeded to the musnud on the death of his father.' It is on record that Mubariz-ood-Dowlah was captured, and immured in Golconda within a year after his brother's accession in 1829. But it would have been stranger indeed had the latter remonstrated, inasmuch as it was because of detection in dangerous intrigue against himself that the younger Prince was seized. Nor was this the first or last time that Mubariz-ood-Dowlah saw the inside of a prison. He was a notoriously turbulent character. Fourteen years before, he, with his brother Shums-ood-Dowlah and his cousin Imptray-ood-Dowlah, had seized an attendant of the British Resident, with a view to extort money from him. At the request of Mr. Russell the Nizam sent a party of his reformed infantry (so the Contingent were then humbly styled) to arrest the young men at their houses. Resistance was made, but on reinforcements arriving, while others were known to be on the march, the recalcitrant princes surrendered at discretion, and with the Nizam's full consent were imprisoned in the fort of Golconda. Again in 1839, in consequence of discoveries made by Sir V. Stonehouse with respect to the Wahabi conspiracy, evidence touching Mubariz-ood-Dowlah was brought before a mixed commission of natives of rank and European officers, which, after a protracted investigation, recorded its opinion, that he and several of his adherents had engaged in treasonable plans against the British and the Nizam's Governments. The Nizam accordingly ordered that Mubariz-ood-Dowlah and ten of his partizans should be detained in durance till such time as the Government might think fit. In the first instance, therefore, his father imprisoned him without reluctance at the Resident's request; in the second it was for conspiring against his brother that he was incarcerated; and in the third Nasir-ood-Dowlah willingly aided the British representative in his trial and punishment for offences committed against the two Governments. As to the disturbances caused by his arrest in 1829 I think you are mistaken. On the entry of the troops to seize his person in 1815 there was great uproar, walls were lined and shots were fired, by one of which Captain Darby, an officer of the Resident's escort, was mortally wounded. But neither in 1829 nor in 1839 was any similar resistance made.

"Carrying however this parable, which you have taken up about this powerful but wicked Minister, you tell us how, like all wicked men and naughty boys (in goody books), he met with the reward of his misdeeds. 'He was cast into prison, and would probably have ended his days in captivity but for his son, Bala Persad, who, it is said, ransomed him by paying down 30 lakhs of rupees out of the wealth he had amassed when he and his father were at the zenith of their power.' Now in no book on the subject can I find any mention of this piece of poetical justice. Briggs tells us (vol. I., p. 3) that on his resignation (September 6th, 1803) Chandu Lall received a pension of Rs. 1,000 per diem (? mensem). Elsewhere we are informed that he died in April 1845, but no allusion is made to the intervening time, which surely would not have been passed over in silence had so important an event occurred.

"Major Hastings Fraser, in 'Our Faithful Ally the Nizam,' simply states the

time of resignation and no more. It is sad to lose so fine an illustration of the maxim—

‘Raro antecedentem scelestum  
Deseruit pede poena claudo.’

“The retribution of the father’s misdeeds, followed by the noble act of (pecuniary) self-sacrifice on the part of the son, ‘all unworthy of such a sire,’ forms too pleasing a picture of the poetry of life to be given up without a pang. Let us hope, Sir, that you will in your next issue reconstitute it and place it on a firm pedestal of facts, to be held up to the gaze of an admiring world.

“This letter has already extended to so unreasonable a length that I must cut short the remainder of the comments which I had intended to make. I must not omit, however, to notice your mention of ‘sums owed by the Nizam’s Government for the maintenance of the Subsidiary Force.’ I thought every student of Indian history knew that in 1800 the British Government, in return for the cession in perpetuity of all the territory acquired by H. H. the Nizam under the treaties of Mysore and Seringapatam, guaranteed to maintain the Subsidiary Force free of all cost to the Government of Hyderabad, whether or not the revenues thus acquired should suffice to defray the whole cost of the troops stipulated for. I fancy this must have been a more slip of the pen, but it should be corrected nevertheless. It is also inaccurate to say that the debt due by the Nizam to the Government has been ‘wiped off.’ It was remitted by the latter in 1860.

“Finally, with regard to the concluding portion of your article. Why these conscientious scruples about handing our trust property to the guardians of a minor? Do they not seem somewhat hypercritical when we recall the dealings of the British Government with the Rajah of Mysore and Dhuleep Singh, both minors? In the case, if not of the former, certainly of the latter, the strong did not give, but took away, which alters the question from one point of view. But is that point of view a just one?”

BOMBAY GAZETTE, October 28, 1874.—*The Berar question*.—The following is a letter from “Xanthidion”:—

“SIR,—Why this silence on the Berar question? Is it the result of deep meditation? Do you ‘discuss the claims, arrange the chances’ à la Tennyson, with some trusty friend Maurice, before delivering an opinion? Or do you think that the question is too one-sided to admit of argument? Surely this would be disrespectful when your *civil* contemporary at Allahabad, and, nearer still, the somewhat blatant *Times of India* and—save the mark—the *Indian Statesman* (?) have already written yards upon the subject. Can it be that the two rivals of Bombay are in unison for once in their lives? At least you have not had the bad taste to insinuate that the present attitude of the Government of India on this subject is due to ‘jobbery,’ and you have not assumed that the Viceroy in Council has been influenced in so weighty a matter by the idea that some stagnation would be caused in the lower ranks of the services were the present officers of the Berar Commission thrown out of employment on the restoration of the country to the Nizam. The notion is too ridiculous. Firstly, the Government of India are *not* celebrated for their consideration of their junior officers; secondly, if they were, there are almost thirty officers, civil and military, employed in Berar, and the difference that number would make to either service would be in a way cancelled by the extra troops which would probably be stationed at Nagpore and other neighbouring garrisons, to say nothing of the chance of the Nizam probably offering to such officers the option of remaining in their present posts. I think that were you fully informed as to the rights of the case you would assume, as does your correspondent, that neither this consideration nor, unfortunately, that of the justice of the Nizam’s claims has had any influence upon the deliberations of the Viceroy in Council, or upon Lord Salisbury, if indeed the matter has ever been referred fully to him. The *justice* of the claim has never been impugned by any authoritative writer, even the semi-official *Pioneer* having not felt itself able to do *that*. And while it has not been impugned, many of your readers would be surprised to find

by whom it has been allowed. I would merely refer the curious to the blue-book on the cession of Berar, where they will find in black and white the word 'temporary' occurring in rather awkward places. But it has been said that the justice of the claim is invalidated by the minority of the Nizam, and the consequent incapacity of the Regents to act as they consider best for their master's interests, for this is what this argument comes to. Precedents for important acts of Regents are not uncommon in English history. A friend has suggested to me the case of Edward VI. and the important Church legislation in that minority. A second precedent may be found in the restoration of Boulogne in the same reign by Warwick in return for a sum of 400,000 crowns. The Magna Charta was confirmed during the minority of Henry III. These, it is true, were cases in which the minor was injured by the act of his Regents. But in the last Regency in England (from 1811-1820) by the Treaty of Paris in 1814 we secured only Malta, the Cape, Mauritius, Ceylon, and a few West Indian Islands. Now the insanity of George III. can quite well be taken as a parallel case to the minority of the Nizam. There may be more precedents in European history which have not occurred to me; and perhaps you, or some of your readers, will kindly supply them.

"But it has never been supposed by any one possessed of the smallest particle of common sense that if the Nizam had been a minor in '53 the Government of India would have considered that an obstacle to the *cession* of these districts.

"I have ventured to apply to your contemporary the epithet 'blatant.' I think he is wrong for trying to enforce what is right *in principle* by arguments such as those I have alluded to. They are excusable for native editorials; but the *Times of India* might know from his experience of, and acquaintance with, officials generally that as gentlemen they are bound to judge a case like this from the outside entirely; and I believe most of them do lay aside self in forming their own opinion, but to express such an opinion in the face of their own Government and Chiefs would be a dereliction from duty. The Governor General in Council can only be acting in this matter from a sense of (1) policy and (2) duty to the districts in question as *at present* part of his charge. And it is this policy that I think may be called in question. Policy to be good must be consistent. Now non-annexation has for some time been our policy in India. Is it consistent with this policy to refuse the Nizam's demands (they are none the less his demands because made by his Ministers) for the restoration of the temporary cession of territory which we obtained from him in so *questionable* (the word is used advisedly) a manner? It can be proved that severe pressure was put upon the late Nizam *unofficially* to secure this cession. It would no doubt be as easy for a Governor General to secure popularity of one kind as it is to fill a balloon with gas. But this reflection does not justify the Government of India in treating with *hauteur* the reasonable demands of a 'faithful ally' at such a time as this. If Russia has any designs on India—and who can say she has not?—how she must be laughing in her sleeve at the sight of the British Government alienating its oldest, and truest, and most powerful ally! Again, is internal policy strengthened by punishment for failure (*vide* Baroda) when success like that at Hyderabad is unrewarded? The most difficult of rôles has been played to incredible perfection by Sir Salar Jung, but we must not forget that, though he is a man in a thousand, nay in a million, *the dynasty of Hyderabad produced him, not he the dynasty*. Nor, by all accounts, is he likely to leave the administration of Hyderabad unprovided for. There are young men here formed entirely by him into men of business, and into politicians. And those who know Hyderabad and its affairs under his administration are staggered to learn, through the columns of the *Times of India*, that the Residency people have been weakening his hand by coquetting with the opposition party. This statement has remained uncontradicted for a week. Can it be true? Policy which requires such support as this is a criticism on itself.

"It is possible that the Government may feel it a duty not to hand over Berar, the garden of the Nizam's dominions, to the native administration, because it knows little or nothing of its working. It is true that no 'Administration Reports' are published for the unassigned territories of the Nizam, but if you wish it I will endeavour



to procure reliable statistics on the point. But a better, at least a more practical, proof of success is financial credit, and, as you know, the crore of rupees for the State Railway was raised chiefly at 5, partly at 6 per cent., on the sole guarantee of the Nizam's Government. There may be a few sceptics ready to say, 'Oh! we admit the justice of the claim, but it is barred by time, by a kind of statute of limitations. The Nizam should have claimed it before.' To these possible objections it is easy to say that until the last two or three years the Nizam was not, partly from his out-of-the-way position, partly from a certain natural feeling of modest distrust in his own success, able to see his way to raising the question. But the objection is worthless to start with. Had the British Government of the day ever dreamt that the Nizam, who was then very much involved in every kind of difficulty, would now be in a position to say 'Give me back my temporary cession,' they would no doubt have protected themselves by some limitation. This fact, however, remains—they did not do so.

"It is possible that had the Government felt more confident of their own position they might have shown a little more courtesy in their bearing to the Nizam's Minister. At present their stolidity is somewhat suggestive of the London policeman, possessed but of one idea, bullying any one who is likely to be easily intimidated, cringing to a superior, but above all not a man who will ever listen to argument.

"I had forgotten to say that if it were supposed that the restoration of Berar were likely to injure the young Nizam in any way the Government of India would be justified in opposing the Regents. It cannot be that their motive in delay is a hope that with English education the baby-King may acquire very English notions, almost Irish in fact, as to *meum* and *tuum*."

TIMES OF INDIA, *November 4, 1874*.—We have waited patiently for any reply, formal or informal, to the well-considered statement relative to the intrigues of which Hyderabad has been the centre that we deemed it our duty to publish on the 15th of last month. The charges set forth were so serious that not even the knowledge that they were well within the limits of the facts precluded the hope that some attempt would be made to break their force by a colourable evasion which would at least testify to some lingering regard for political character on the part of those chiefly concerned. But our expectations have been deceived. Those implicated have resolved to act upon the principle that the least said in a bad cause the better, and they have allowed judgment to go by default. The little *communiqués* which used to appear in such out-of-the-way places a few months ago for the purpose of misleading the unvary respecting the different phases of Deccan politics have disappeared for good, and the elaborate essays which superseded them in a certain confiding journal have been discontinued. A brute silence has succeeded. The faintest attempt has not been made to deny any one of the facts which we have specified; it is not even alleged that we have been guilty of exaggeration upon any single point. We have given ample time for the preparation and publication of a defence or explanation if either were possible. But neither was possible, for, as we have said, we designedly understated the turpitude of the case, and we will not affect any surprise at neither being offered. None could be offered. It was impossible to deny that the Foreign Office, having decided to keep Berar as if it had been ceded in perpetuity, without so much as discussing the claims put forward by the Nizam's Government to its restoration, thought it seemly to refuse even to receive a remonstrance relative to the injustice of that decision. And it is equally undeniable that the Resident—manifestly acting under instructions emanating, either officially or unofficially, from Calcutta—assembled the nobles of Hyderabad, including those who were notoriously hostile to the Regents, and in the most distinct terms informed them that the British Government was dissatisfied with the conduct of the Government of Hyderabad, and called upon them to use their influence to prevent the Regents from prosecuting the claims to the restoration of the assigned districts. That was a virtual invitation to the factions to renew the cabals and conspiracies which had, as the Resident himself has placed on record, rendered the position of Sir Salar Jung almost untenable



during the time his steadfast friendship for the British power had earned for him the hostility of every fanatic in Hyderabad. We need not stop to point out the baseness of the policy that compelled a resort to such a manœuvre to stifle claims which we must assume it was found impossible honestly to rebut. Even those who are responsible for it are unable to say a word in its defence. As to the nobles, they put but one interpretation on the whole transaction. They looked upon it as an intimation from the Foreign Office that the position of Regent was practically open to any one of them who would make a bid for British support by guaranteeing that if he were helped into Sir Salar Jung's place nothing more should be heard of the claims of the Nizam to Berar. And this view was not confined to the native mind. Hyderabad has since that time teemed with reports, to which even intelligent Europeans have given credence, that the British Government had resolved to stir up the nobility to paralyze the efforts of the Regents to recover Berar; and some go so far as to say that a design was actually ripe for changing by British interference the *personnel* of the Regency and directly displacing Sir Salar Jung himself. If this *coup d'état* was actually meditated, the fact of the attention of the public being diverted to the existence and danger of these disgraceful intrigues will, we may feel confident, render the design abortive.

But we do not believe that the Foreign Office can really entertain such projects in their full extent. Even a Calcutta Secretary would feel conscious that they were twenty years too late. To stir up the factious nobles, and frighten the Regents by the prospect of an infinity of humiliations at the hands of the British officials, and of endless conspiracies hatched by the disaffected with impunity, if not with something like protection from the paramount power—such is no doubt the extent of the design really entertained. And it is quite bad enough in all conscience. It is humiliating that such unprincipled manœuvres should be possible under the direct government of India by the Crown. It is disastrous that a Native Prince should be told, in defiance of the spirit of the Queen's proclamation, that his claims to the administration of a province of which he is admittedly the Sovereign should not even be discussed, and that his remonstrances against the injustice would not be received. It is disastrous, for what must be the moral effect not only throughout the population of the Deccan, but amongst the Native Princes throughout India? The Nizam being the leading Native Sovereign in India, all the other Native Princes watch our proceedings at his Court with Argus eyes. On one occasion a Parliamentary blue-book on Hyderabad affairs was read at an important Durbar in Central India before a copy reached the Resident of Hyderabad himself. There is not a single Native Prince who does not feel that our conduct to the Nizam is the measure of what he has himself to expect at our hands. An act of overt injustice at Hyderabad spreads uneasiness and alarm in the Durbars at Cashmere, Indore, Gwalior, Puttiala, and lesser States, most of which have been already furnished with grievances of their own by Foreign Office diplomacy. The Queen's Proclamation when issued, and for some time after, was regarded as the Charter of Indian Princes; but the faith originally placed in it has been rudely shaken by the action of the Political Department. Two of the most solemn promises in that Proclamation were, "We shall respect the rights, the dignity, and honour of Native Princes as our own;" and, "We announce that all treaties and engagements made with Native Princes are by us accepted and will be scrupulously maintained." We believe it is now no secret in Calcutta that in the very face of these solemn pledges the Foreign Department has since had the temerity to place on record an official resolution that it holds treaties made half a century ago to be no longer binding, because India is now possessed of Legislative Councils! How is it possible that Native Princes can be expected to have confidence in a department avowedly conducted on such principles? To forfeit our character for good faith with the Native Princes, and more especially with the Government of the Nizam, is a political blunder of the most serious kind. "I would sacrifice," said the Duke of Wellington when serving in the Nizam's territories, "I would sacrifice every frontier of India ten times over in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith. What is it has brought me through many difficulties

both in war and peace? The British good faith, and nothing else!" The Foreign Office has forgotten the value of good faith in its recent dealings with the Hyderabad Government. It is a question whether a "Foreign" Department is the best adapted to the altered circumstances of the time for dealing with the great feudatories of the Empire. By the very nature of the case it is both party and judge in every issue that arises between itself and a Native Prince. If it refuses even to discuss claims which are of obvious gravity, and resorts to the most reprehensible intrigues, to silence, remonstrance, the propriety of transferring controversies between the Supreme Government and its feudatories to a tribunal to which all can appeal with equal confidence, will have to be considered.

MADRAS MAIL, November 4, 1874.—*The Berar Question*.—The *Indu Prakash*, in a long article devoted to the latest phase of the Berar question, says:—

"Our readers can now judge how far the British Government has any right to refuse to return the districts of Berar at any time when demanded, if provision is made for the payment of Rs. 32,00,000 annually. That it holds the districts 'in trust' it is unequivocally stated. Who can doubt the right of the Nizam's Government to revoke the trust after fulfilling this condition? That there may be no doubt of their being assigned in trust only, and not in sovereignty, we may quote a few lines from Mr. Aitchison:—'It was the object of the British Government to obtain the sovereignty of the Assigned Districts, so as to administer them through any agency it pleased; but to this the Nizam could not be prevailed on to consent. Notwithstanding such undisputed facts tending to show that the Nizam had only temporarily placed the management only of the districts in the hands of the British Government, how could it possibly refuse conscientiously to return them to their rightful Sovereign? The Government would not, it is however now said, discuss the question so long as the Nizam was a minor. But is there any reason why it should not now be discussed? Have the Regents no power to revoke the trust given, not on account of the minority of the Nizam, but for a different purpose? We can conceive the British Government interfering with the action of the Regents when it is supposed to injure the interests of the Nizam permanently. But in the present instance is there any such plea applicable? On the contrary, in constructing the State Railway the Government itself did not scruple to advise, and even compel, the Regents to take the line through Secunderabad at the loss of a million to the Nizam. The Government of India is now simply trying to postpone the re-cession of the districts which they have always coveted, and which have provided many an Englishman with a high salary. But has conscience and all sense of justice left the British Government in India, and with Lord Northbrook at its head? The whole affair, however, seems to have been conducted by a set of officials of very doubtful morals."

BOMBAY GAZETTE, November 14, 1874.—*The Berar Question*.—The following is a letter from "Xanthidion," dated 10th instant, to the Editor of the *Bombay Gazette*:—

"SIR,—I trust that you will again allow me space in your columns for a few words on the above subject. Since I last wrote to you the *Times of India* has again attacked the Resident at Hyderabad in language worthy of a second-rate Parisian journalist. In Paris such language is used at the risk of suspension, in India the press are, in a way, on honour. Fair criticism is open to all; unrestrained 'demagoguism' can only defeat its object, and must, moreover, incur contempt. The real danger is that many, judging the question solely by the remarks of your contemporary, are by each such utterance becoming more and more prejudiced against the Nizam's claims.

"Striving, therefore, to be dispassionate, though admitting myself a supporter of the claim, I beg to append to my former letter—in which, as you may remember, I ventured to criticize the policy of the present Government on the subject—a sketch from nature of the past transactions between the Nizam and the British. The Nizam, it is true, stands now in much the same position with regard to territory as he did at the end of the last century. But turn to the other side of the account,

and we find that not once, not twice only, have the British Government had to thank the Nizam for support. And they rewarded him too, in one instance by the present of a part of the country taken from Tippoo, in another by the districts taken from the Rajah of Berar, and where are these rewards now? It must be confessed with shame that we went hat in hand to the Nizam in our days of difficulty, that while with one hand we rewarded we soon after held out the other to take back our gifts, and that, having obtained our point about the dismissal of the French, we 'let in 'poor Nizzy' (as he was then called by the officers at Hyderabad) for the maintenance of a force which was never contemplated nor agreed to by him. A 'magnificent job' is Marshman's verdict on the establishment of the Hyderabad Contingent, and more than one writer (I will mention only Briggs, and Arnold on Lord Dalhousie's policy) has seen through and stigmatized the 'lowering' treatment which has been applied to the unfortunate patient by his English physician.

"When I last wrote I had not had the advantage of looking over the *second* blue book (published on the motion again of Sir Fitzroy Kelly on the subject of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts). In it we find Hyderabad letters from the pen of the late Colonel Davidson, a much less pliant tool than Colonel Low. In his very first letter (6th July '59) he mentions that Colonel Low had allowed the Nizam's Ministers to believe that the districts would be administered at a cost of *two annas in the rupee*, whereas in point of fact the *revenues did not cover the expenditure*. Colonel Low had cajoled the Nizam by such promises in *Colonel Davidson's hearing*. In No. 2518 of 1860, Foreign Department, the revenue is stated at 45, the expenditure at 47½ lacs, and it is therein admitted that the civil payments (12¼ lacs) are much higher than they would have been under native rule. 4½ lacs had been spent on public works, but the Governor-General did not feel 'disposed to charge the Nizam for 'administering a country which really belongs to him (!) more than he would 'himself have incurred.' In para. 6 of the same letter the Governor-General had defined the 'fundamental principle' of the treaty of 1853 to be that 'so long as 'the Contingent is maintained' (by these words admitting the possibility of its abolition, which is now denied) the British Government shall hold a material guarantee for its punctual payment. Now on these two pegs hangs the whole question, which is briefly—Can the Contingent be dispensed with?—Can a *territorial* be the *only material* guarantee for its punctual payment? Lord Salisbury, it may be observed, has overlooked this in rashly stating that a 'territorial 'guarantee was the main object of the treaty of 1853.' This 'material guarantee' is again alluded to by Lord Canning to the Secretary of State, 5th January '51, and in No. 3889 of Foreign Department, 1860, in still plainer language, 'The 'object of the Government of India in retaining in its hands a part even of the 'Assigned Districts' being therein stated to be 'simply that it may hold a material 'guarantee for the performance of article VI. of the treaty of 1853' (referring to the Hyderabad Contingent), and it is added that the Government of India desires to hold this territory, as it has hitherto held the whole of the Assigned Districts, not in sovereignty, but in trust for His Highness, *so long as the Contingent is kept up and no longer* (the italics are my own). This was distinctly explained to the Nizam on 23rd July 1860, on which day certain proposals were laid before him as the reward of his behaviour at the time of the Mutiny. Now some stupid persons had put about a story that it was intended to incorporate the Berar districts with the province of Nagpore, in consequence of which Colonel Davidson naïvely admits that he failed to obtain 'the entire possession of' or 'a more complete cession of 'these districts.' The story, as is frequently the case, was not far wrong, for Colonel Davidson had been instructed to 'feel' the Nizam on this very transference of the management of the districts to Nagpore, and it is worthy of notice that he so far sympathized with the Nizam as to speak of the treaty of '53 as having been forced on him, and to tell the Governor-General that in his opinion no more was to be got of our faithful ally. He had, we must remember, witnessed the objurgations and threats then (1853) used in order to induce the late Nizam 'to make a permanent cession, and he was satisfied that his son had inherited all his father's aversion 'to part with the Berars, except under certain stipulations,' and this son did carry

his point, which was that the surplus revenue, if any, should be paid over to his treasury. Poor Colonel Davidson went out of his way (in his 91 of 1860) to express his opinion of the relative position of the two Governments. The debt claimed by the Government was 43 lacs, and there was an awkward counter-claim amounting to a lac per annum (for arrears for 41 years, 1812-1853) for the surplus abkaree funds of Secunderabad and Jaulnah. Not satisfied with this defence of the Nizam, he proceeded to point out the excessive expenditure on the Contingent, taking as his text that '11, 12, or 13 lacs had been charged annually to the Nizam as the pay alone of European officers of a Contingent that now, when nearly as strong numerically, we find we can efficiently maintain at a cost altogether of 26 lacs per annum. The wonder,' he adds, 'is that, instead of owing only 43 lacs at the end of 50 years of such a system, our claim did not render the Nizam hopelessly insolvent.' Nor was Colonel Davidson a blind admirer or worse of the Nizam; he had fears, and expressed them in the same letter, of the result of the retransference of the Raichore Doab to the Nizam, and he modestly compared the condition of the people under British, and under native rule. Of course he shared the fate of those who give unasked-for opinions, and was duly snubbed, partly for saying what he did, partly for not saying so before (letter of Government of India No. 5576). The fears, however, for the Raichore Doab have been since admitted groundless.

"Such, then, is the case for the Nizam. Not that I am content with my advocacy of it, but I feel sure that his only chance lies in obtaining the support of the unofficial Indian and English public (the official portion being tongue-tied), and as his country offers such a field to the merchant, as well as to the miner and iron-founder, I am not without hopes that a statement of facts may carry conviction with it. I have not made one statement which cannot be supported by fact.

"The one obstacle to the Nizam's emancipation is a statute of 37 George III., which prevents his raising money from British subjects or Europeans. By this he is debarred even from allowing a joint stock company to work his mines. The statute, Lord Salisbury has announced, will be 'rigorously enforced' in the case of the Nizam trying to redeem Berar by raising a loan in the English market. It was *not* enforced when it was our policy to let the Nizam get deeper into the mire in the transactions with William Palmer and Co., and in the words of a writer in the *Englishman*, 4th November 1851, 'to go to the devil his own way.' It seems as if the support of public opinion alone could help the Nizam to gain, not an independent, but a just, position. As for his Minister, Sir Salar Jung, while devoting his life to the amelioration of the country, and having been always ready to accept sound suggestions from the Government of India, he is viewed with suspicion on account of his British tendency by nine-tenths of the population. Success in this suit would clear himself and his name (his uncle Suraj-ool-Moolk was Minister in 1853) from this unpopularity, by strengthening his hand, would give him much more liberty in carrying out reforms, and, what is more important, in providing for the future administration of Hyderabad.

"The late Nizam was a very *absolute* monarch. Education, the natural course of events during a long minority, the development of trade, and the growth of a class whose interests are involved in peace, order, and good government, must surely combine to render His present Highness's reign a monarchy *limited*, if not constitutionally, by consideration for the welfare of the country."

MADRAS MAIL, November 16, 1874.—The "*Times of India*" and the Berar Question.—A well-informed correspondent at Secunderabad writes as follows:—

"A considerable amount of amusement to the more intelligent portion of the community of this part of the country has been found in the fuss and fury your respected contemporary the *Times of India* has been making over some kind of 'mare's nest' it has discovered somewhere between Hyderabad and Berar and the Foreign Office, Calcutta. On one or two occasions lately the public have been favoured with leading articles regarding this discovery, and it is really difficult to determine whether the amusement so caused is to be accounted for by a kind of

temporary insanity on the part of your contemporary, or to a total ignorance of the natural history of the animal whose 'nest' he imagines he has discovered. If it is the former I sincerely regret the malady that has overtaken him, and trust that in a short time, by judicious treatment, the present mental aberration will be cured and your contemporary restored to his sound mind and sober senses. If it be the latter, *viz.*, a total ignorance of the true facts of the case of which he is speaking, we will continue to enjoy the joke, and trust he will favour us with a few more articles like those we have been treated to of late regarding 'the British Government and the Berar question.' But it is a very serious thing when a journal like the *Times of India* lays itself open to either of the above suspicions, and when a paper which professes to be the guide of public opinion misrepresents facts and contorts history to suit its own purposes.

"The first article worth notice appeared as far back as the 28th September, and it was intended to be partly a reply to some statements of the *Pioneer* on the Berar question, and partly an attempt to prove that the 'financial embarrassments in which the Hyderabad State was at one time involved' were not at all owing to the maladministration and wasteful extravagance of the Nizam and his ministers and advisers for the time being, but 'were directly caused by the British Government itself.' It would be simply showing the same kind of mental aberration as your contemporary is suffering from to attempt to discuss this point with him, as it is known to every schoolboy who has progressed in his education beyond the third form that according to all history the very reverse is the case. The second article, which appeared on the 15th October, commences with two or three startling sentences about 'grave political complications at Hyderabad,' 'information of a very startling character relative to the action of the British authorities,' and such-like sensational announcements, which it appears from the writer's own statement he had been 'corking up' and keeping hid from the public until such time as he could prepare a sufficiently sensational misrepresentation of the true facts of the case, and cast them as a kind of firebrand into the midst of the city of Hyderabad through the columns of the *Times of India*. But, fortunately enough, this little game of his had much of the blaze taken out of it by the straightforward action of the editor of the rival paper, the *Bombay Gazette*, who, while visiting Hyderabad at the opening of the State Railway, learned, I have no doubt on the very best authority, that 'the Government of India had definitely refused to discuss the Berar question during the minority of the Nizam,' and he at once telegraphed this information to his own journal, and it became public news the very next morning. Before making the decision of the Government of India known to the public it was necessary to announce the same officially and openly to the Hyderabad Court, and a durbar having been called, the decision of the Supreme Government was, in the usual way, communicated to the regents and other nobles present. But this open and straightforward way of announcing a fact which in a short time the whole world would know is represented by the *Times of India* as follows:—'Pointing his finger at Sir Salar Jung and the Nawab Shums-ool-Oomrah, the co-regent, the Resident stated that they had been repeatedly urging the claims of the Nizam to the Berars, but that the British Government was displeased at the prosecution of these claims. . . . And as if to lower the authority of Sir Salar Jung and his co-regent in the eyes of the nobles, he added, if further remonstrances were submitted by the regents they would not be received by the British Government.' A more ingenious 'mosaic' of fact and fiction has seldom been seen. And it is the small portion of fact side by side with the greater amount of fiction which gives the sentences quoted above an appearance of truthfulness to the unwary public, who have not the opportunity of knowing the true facts of the case. But for one moment to imagine that the British Resident would deliberately seek 'to lower the authority of Sir Salar Jung and his co-regent in the eyes of the nobles' is a statement not only false in itself, but too absurd to be believed; and the editor of the *Times of India*, if he expects the public to have any confidence in his judgment and discrimination, should have been more cautious and made fuller inquiries before admitting it into his columns. But the last article, which appeared on the 4th

instant, is worse than the first, and second too. At its commencement it is a kind of *pibroch* over the melancholy fact that no notice either 'formal or informal had been taken of the well-considered statement relative to the intrigues of which Hyderabad has been the centre that we deemed it our duty to publish on the 15th of last month.' If the writer had only confined himself to this mourning and lamentation over his own insignificance, and the wisdom of the public press in giving no heed to his rash, injudicious, and garbled statements, he might still have been left to himself and his 'miserable comforters.' But before the close of the article statements are made so utterly opposed to truth that they are suggestive of nothing but sedition, insurrection, and anarchy amongst the nobles of the Hyderabad State. Thus, for instance, we read, 'As to the nobles, they put but one interpretation on the whole transaction. They look upon it as an intimation from the Foreign Office that the position of regent was practically open to any one of them who would make a bid for British support by guaranteeing that if he was helped into Sir Salar Jung's place nothing more should be heard of the claims of the Nizam to Berar.' Again, almost the very next sentence or so, we read, 'Hyderabad has since that time teemed with reports, to which even intelligent Europeans have given credence that the British Government had resolved to stir up the nobility to paralyze the efforts of the regents to recover Berar; and some go so far as to say that a design was actually rife for changing by British interference the *personnel* of the regency, and directly displacing Sir Salar Jung himself.' Again we read, 'To stir up the factious nobles and frighten the regents by the prospect of an infinity of humiliations at the hands of British officials, and endless conspiracies hatched by the disaffected with impunity, if not with something like protection from the paramount power, such is no doubt the extent of the design really entertained.' When statements like these occur in the leading columns of a hitherto trustworthy and popular journal, the public naturally conclude the editor would be careful before passing such assertions, and, reasonably enough in the absence of more correct information, they imagine they must be true. But I think I can testify that *not one* of the above statements is true, and that such base designs never entered the head of one of the nobles till they were put there when the articles in question were translated to them by their moonshees for their information. If the Berar question is to be discussed by the *Times of India* in this wild, insane way, speaking of 'factions,' 'intrigues of the British Government,' 'conspiracies,' 'stirring up the nobles to paralyze the efforts of the regents,' and such-like choice expressions, without even once entering into the true merits of the case, the public will soon come to estimate the statements, on this subject at least, at their true worth. The several articles on this matter that have appeared in that journal have been so bitter, partial, and ill-judged that a discriminating public have naturally enough inquired what could have produced the ill-feeling and blind, bitter animosity toward the British Government in that hitherto loyal and patriotic paper. And it turns out that 'Hyderabad is teeming with reports' (more trustworthy in this case than in others already referred to) that the editor's pen never touched the paper on which the articles in question were written except to make the necessary corrections before sending the MS. to the press; and the real author is suspected to be a person now living in the suburbs of Hyderabad, who formerly held a prominent position here, though in a private capacity, but was summarily dismissed from his appointment for reasons that must have been *very* satisfactory to his employers before they took so decided a step. Subsequently to this a cause occurred for his bitterest animosity being stirred up against the British Government. Such being the antecedents of the reported author of the articles under notice, 'hence these tears.' The writer of the articles has not scrupled to avail himself of all the rumours about Hyderabad, real or imagined, that suited his own purpose, and I think it is well the public should be put in possession of one at least of the rumours on the other side, that they may be better able to determine for themselves whether the 'conspiracies,' 'intrigues,' 'disaffection of the nobles,' 'lowering of Sir Salar Jung's influence and character,' have their origin in the action of the British Government or in the writer's own fertile brain.

And if many more articles of a like character are allowed to appear both Sir Salar Jung and the *Times of India* will have reason to cry, 'Save me from my friends.'

"Into the merits of the Berar question it would be altogether out of place to enter fully in a letter like this. But, to my thinking, for the British Government in present circumstances to make over the Berars in the way the *Times of India* suggests would be simply tantamount to a breach of faith and trust on their part. As your readers are all aware, the Berars are held by the British Government in trust for the Nizam for certain specific purposes, and chiefly for the purpose of securing regular payment of that body of troops known as the 'Hyderabad Contingent;' and when these claims have been met, and the expense of managing the district has been covered, the surplus amount is handed over to the Nizam's treasury. The British Government are not enriched one rupee by the possession of the Berars, and in no way whatever are they directly benefited by them; but the Berar districts have been benefited and vastly improved by our administration, and the Hyderabad treasury has been enriched by lakhs upon lakhs of rupees, which have been handed over to the Nizam after paying the Contingent and other claims and covering the expense of administration. The British Government undertook this trust from the predecessor of the present Nizam, who is now a minor, and it would show a total want of fidelity to that trust were they to renounce their obligation until such time as the person on whose behalf they now administer these districts is of age, when he will be legally qualified to relieve them from their obligations. In such circumstances it is not sufficient to declare that Sir Salar Jung is prepared to deposit an amount of money in the hands of Government the interest of which sum would be sufficient to secure the regular payment of the Contingent. As the paramount power we are bound to have the welfare of all the protected States at heart, and to promote their interests as far as possible. So that even supposing the British Government could at this moment honourably resile from the trust committed to them, there is still another question behind that, which is—would it be for the benefit of the districts, the welfare of the Hyderabad State, and the interest of the young Nizam, that they should do anything of the kind? No doubt the paramount power has perfect confidence in Sir Salar Jung, and they appreciate highly the wise, judicious, and enlightened administrative abilities he has shown during the long period he has held the office of Minister. But Sir Salar Jung is not immortal, and were he removed, or in any way disabled from performing the active duties of his office, who is there about the Court of Hyderabad who could administer the affairs of the Berars with as much profit and benefit to the Nizam as is now done under British management? There is not one. And were the British Government now to withdraw from their trust, without doubt, in a very short time, the districts would be back to the condition they were in before they came under our care. And surely it would be not only a grave political blunder, but a heinous breach of trust, if we had to confess to the Nizam when he came of age that we had wilfully resiled from a trust we voluntarily entered into with his predecessor, that the depreciation of the Berar revenue was owing altogether to our withdrawing from that trust, and that we had no better reason to offer for our withdrawing from that trust than a weak, sentimental kind of feeling of gratitude for the loyalty of Sir Salar Jung at a period so far back as about the year 1874. In matters of this kind I have not the slightest doubt the public will realize that right and duty and common sense must have the precedence of sentiment."

**TIMES OF INDIA, November 19, 1874.**—In an article in our issue of the 4th inst. relative to the action of the Foreign Office in the case of Hyderabad we mentioned, as a fact illustrative of the existing policy of that department towards Native States in general, that it had placed on record an official resolution that treaties made with Native Princes half a century ago were no longer binding, because India now has Legislative Councils! That official resolution was, we declared, a direct contravention of the Queen's Proclamation issued in 1858, and we asked how it was possible that Native Princes could have confidence in a department avowedly



conducted on such principles. We are not at all surprised to find that both our Allahabad and Calcutta semi-official contemporaries have taken the liberty to doubt the correctness of that statement. An incredulity which does credit to their sense of political morality has even urged them to assert that in making the allegation in question we were simply writing "an absurdity." We accord them full credit for the sense of justice and instinctive appreciation of the limits that honourable dealing should impose on the Foreign Office, which prompted them to doubt our declaration rather than believe that the department which they love had been guilty of the conduct imputed to it. Nevertheless—and we say it with regret—the fact will be found to be as we have stated it. Will either of the contemporaries to which we refer try a little experiment? They know the way—unless they are greatly belied—to the closet as well as to the heart of the Foreign Office; will they ascertain whether they can elicit a denial of this fact, that about the time when the Government of India was exerting itself to get the Secretary of State's sanction to the appropriation of Mysore a resolution of the exact substance we have stated was formally recorded? Our contemporaries find it impossible to believe that such a resolution exists. It is not our fault if the Foreign Office is capable of going to greater lengths in its dealings with Native Princes than even the most case-hardened members of the semi-official press deem possible.

TIMES OF INDIA, November 24, 1874.—The silence which suddenly fell upon the semi-official apologists of the manœuvres at Hyderabad after our first references to the subject has at length been broken. The policy of saying nothing when nothing satisfactory could be said had its advantages, but it also had its inconveniences and it has been abandoned. The *Madras Mail* has been favoured with a *communiqué*, nearly two columns long, devoted to the "*Times of India* and the Berar question." It is disappointing indeed to find that the *Times of India* occupies so much of the writer's thoughts that he throws no new light whatever on the Berar question; but we must not be too exacting upon an opponent who is making his first attempt at amendment. The silence hitherto maintained was discreditable, and we are glad that it has come to an end—no matter how. The yard and a half of big type in our Madras contemporary might have been put to better use, yet we are charitable enough to acknowledge that the resolution to discuss the matter, however violently or hysterically, is indicative of a growing sense of the claims of public opinion, hitherto somewhat impudently ignored. We are glad, too, that the journal to whose generosity the official scribe has had recourse in the emergency has volunteered two statements—in two lines—vouching for his respectability and the fact that he belongs to an unsuspected neighbourhood. He is, says our contemporary, "a well-informed correspondent at Secunderabad." If we had not this assurance we might have been induced by the internal evidence presented in the letter itself to believe that he was not well informed and did not write from Secunderabad. But we will not look too closely. This statement, rightly understood is a parable, conveying to the wise the information that the semi-official writer is never much further from the truth than Secunderabad is from Hyderabad.

Turning, then, from the question of who the writer is, to the more important one of what he says, we find that apart from the most marvellous abuse of ourselves he really has nothing whatever to say. In the couple of columns which he nearly fills he never even by chance adds to the stock of public information upon Hyderabad politics. But he assaults us with wonderful *élan*. He asserts that we prepared a sensational misrepresentation of facts and then cast them as a firebrand into the midst of the city of Hyderabad. In connection with this singular statement we are given another which enables us to judge of the *bona fides* of the writer—provided he be indeed "well informed." He says that the straightforward action of the editor of another Bombay paper fortunately destroyed the effect of the firebrand we had so wantonly prepared, by telegraphing the fact—"learned on the very best authority"—that "the Government of India had definitely refused to discuss the Berar question during the minority of the Nizam." Now the editor of the paper in



question did not telegraph the all-important words which we have italicized, and which the semi-official writer deliberately inserts in his version of the telegram sent "on the best authority." Why were they not included in it when originally sent? Why are they included in it now when it is the object of our anonymous critic to make out a case in favour of the official coterie? Is he "well-informed" enough to understand the importance and significance of the first omission? We need not stop to inquire. But when charging us with a desire to cast a firebrand into Hyderabad he might well have been induced to pause, if he had observed that it was we who gave full prominence to the fact that the discussion of the Berar question was alleged to be closed "during the minority of the Nizam," and not definitively. We actually were in advance of the Residency officials themselves in the desire to minimise the effect of the false step they had been so unfortunate as to make. We were fully aware of all the facts long before the telegram sent "on the best authority" made mention of any part of them. But we were determined that no ground should be given for the accusation, now so rashly made, that we contributed to the complications for which the tortuous policy of the Foreign Office was clearly responsible.

Our readers will recollect the statement which we published on the 15th ult. as to what actually occurred when the Resident, acting on instructions of which we can only guess the source and the nature, summoned to the Residency, contrary to all usage, nobles hitherto never consulted in affairs of state, and made known to them what he declared to be the final decision of the British Government on the Berar question. Here is the semi-official gloze on that statement, in which we kept well within the limit of the facts, as we can make clear if the necessity should arise: "Before making the decision of the Government of India known to the public," says the writer in the *Madras Mail*, "it was necessary to announce the same officially and openly to the Hyderabad Court, and a Durbar having been called, the decision of the Supreme Government was, *in the usual way*, communicated to the regents and other nobles present. But this open and straightforward way of announcing a fact, which in a short time the whole world would know, is represented by the *Times of India* as follows:—'Pointing his finger at Sir Salar Jung and the Nawab Shums-ool-Oomrah, the co-regent, the Resident stated that they had been repeatedly urging the claims of the Nizam to the Berars, but that the British Government was displeased at the prosecution of these claims. . . . And, as if to lower the authority of Sir Salar Jung and his co-regent in the eyes of the nobles, he added, if further remonstrances were submitted by the regents, they would not be received by the British Government.' A more ingenious 'mosaic' of fact and fiction has seldom been seen. And it is the small portion of fact side by side with the greater amount of fiction which gives the sentences quoted above an appearance of truthfulness to the unwary public, who have not the opportunity of knowing the true facts of the case." The writer quotes two sentences only of our *résumé* of what took place, and then affects to find in them a "mosaic" of fact and fiction. Will he leave off diplomatic fencing and state categorically—in another two columns, or even in four—whether it is true, yes or no, that the Resident summoned nobles to the Residency who were notoriously hostile to the Regent Sir Salar Jung because of his well-known sympathy with the British Power; whether the Resident did not do this in the face of his own recorded opinion that if these nobles were invited to the Residency, or seen by the Resident, their cabals against Sir Salar Jung would render his position as Minister and Regent untenable; whether, having got those disaffected nobles to the Residency, without giving the slightest intimation to the Regents that anything more than an ordinary breakfast was to be discussed, he did not in the most marked and formal manner state to the nobles assembled that the British Government was dissatisfied with the conduct of the Regents in urging the claims of the Nizam to Berar; that the Government would look to those nobles to use their influence to prevent the Regents from continuing to press those claims; and, finally, whether he did not state that if the Regents wrote to the British Government again on the subject the letters would not be received? Did the Resident assemble the nobles as we have stated? Did he address to them a locution even more humiliating to the Regents than the words we have set

down ? If he did, let not a presumptuous apologist by stringing together a multitude of abusive epithets seek to mislead public opinion as to the fact. It may not be safe to push us to the proof. We reassert the literal correctness of our original statement ; we never made any with such plenitude and variety of evidence. So anxious were we to remain well within the boundary of the truth that wherever it appeared to us that two constructions were possible, the one more and the other less favourable to the officials, we always preferred the former and passed over the latter. Thus it was we stated that the " decision," the announcement of which was made the occasion of a manœuvre derogatory to the British character, had reference only to the period of the Nizam's minority, though we knew that a different interpretation might have been put upon the words employed—as " the best authority" itself conceived when dictating the telegram to which our critic refers, and to which he so significantly adds.

The ingenious writer—before going on to give his own view of the right ground to take in justification of the refusal to discuss the Berar claims, namely, that the re-cession of the Berars to the Nizam would seriously compromise His Highness's interests !—stops to assign the authorship of our articles on this subject, and to state his conviction that they are prompted by a blind, bitter animosity toward the British Government. He is as egregiously mistaken on the first point as he is upon the second. We are not in the habit of allowing subjects of the first importance to be dealt with by amateurs, and we have not done so in this case. The good sense of the rule is rendered only the more apparent by the proof which this " well-informed correspondent at Secunderabad" gives us of the mischief that flows from letting persons without special training, and with nothing but wild political excitement to direct them, meddle with pen and ink. We need not say that in commenting on the discreditable features of this Hyderabad imbroglio we have not been influenced by feelings of hostility to the British Government. We have been grieved that it should have suffered itself to be entrapped into a policy the dark shades of which were not perceived, and we desired to warn it, while there was yet time, that the tortuous path on which it had entered unawares could lead to no good or honourable end. We have the same confidence in the value of the British reputation for good faith that the Duke of Wellington had ; and just as he would have sacrificed every frontier of India to preserve that good name untarnished, so would we be willing, if necessary, to restore Berar, so that our honour might remain unsullied. But our " Secunderabad" critic is in error as to the real point of our contention when he writes that " to make over the Berars in the way the *Times of India* suggests would be simply tantamount to a breach of faith and trust on our part"—a declaration unmatched for effrontery since Tartuffe maintained that it would be against the interests of religion for him, a saint, to restore the property out of which he had cheated the rightful owner. We never suggested that Berar should be made over to the Nizam. All we have said is that it appears on the fact of the matter that the Nizam has a claim to its restitution, and that such claim should be discussed, and not stifled. The question of right we have never prejudged ; we have only demanded that it should be fairly heard.

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BOMBAY GAZETTE, November 26, 1874.—We have delayed for a long time accepting the friendly challenge thrown out to us by our able correspondent " Xanthidiou" to discuss with him the merits of the Berar question. But it seemed to us that we need not be in a hurry in the matter. We do not indeed believe that the discussion of an important political question of this kind can be stopped by an arbitrary decree of Lord Salisbury, who forgets occasionally the awful warning M. Rouher's example gives to politicians who think public opinion can be stamped out. It was but a year before the outbreak of the German war when Napoleon the Third's all-powerful Minister met the prayer of Italy to be allowed to take possession of Rome with an imperious *jamais* !—and the war had not lasted two months before M. Rouher was in exile and Victor Emanuel was in Rome ; although, therefore, putting one's foot down in the resolute way Lord

Salisbury has done, in the despatch in which he peremptorily refuses to listen to arguments in favour of the restoration of Berar to the Nizam, may carry with it an appearance of strength, we cannot accept such an answer as final, or suppose that the India Office will not ultimately be compelled to let the question be fairly argued out. But it is doubtful if anything can be settled with regard to the fate of the disputed districts till the young Nizam comes of age, as much will depend on that prince's character; so that we did not consider it indispensable to write on the subject without a day's delay. We propose, however, now to state briefly and temperately the conclusion we have come after to an attentive study of the literature bearing upon the relation between the British Government and the State of Hyderabad during the last hundred years.

We would remark, first of all, that the partizans of the Nizam have, almost without exception, misconceived completely the position occupied by His Highness under the treaties of 1853 and 1860. Even "Xanthidion" cannot have read those treaties carefully, or he would not have fallen into the common error of asserting that the maintenance of the Hyderabad Contingent—for the payment of which force Berar was assigned to the British Government—is optional with the Nizam. We have heard it said that Sir Salar Jung could, if he chose, require the British Government to disband the Contingent at a day's notice, and so do away with the only valid excuse for the retention of Berar. But the Nizam's Government possesses no such power. In Article 7 of the treaty of 1853 we read these words :—"The present Hyderabad Contingent, *which is to be maintained at all times (whether in peace or war)*, is accepted as an equivalent for the larger body of troops specified in the treaty of 1800 to be furnished by the Nizam's Government in time of war." It may be said that the phrase "*at all times*" in the clause we have italicized does not mean *for all time to come*, but is, when taken along with the explanatory gloss in brackets, open to the construction that it merely provides for the maintenance of the Contingent at a uniform strength in peace as well as in war. Such a stipulation, it may be contended, does not impair the Nizam's right to do away with the Contingent altogether. But let us see what this Contingent is. "Xanthidion" describes it, after Mr. Marshman, as a magnificent job; and other writers have accused the British Government of creating the force for the mere purpose of plundering the Nizam and bringing him down to a state of helpless dependence on his powerful ally. But the origin of the force is perfectly clear to any one who takes the trouble to read the text of the treaties between the two Governments. When, towards the close of last century, Lord Wellesley, in the execution of his grand design for driving the French out of India, took under his protection the Nizam, then reduced by the Mahrattas to the lowest state of wretchedness, what is known as the Subsidiary Force was formed under British officers to keep the State of Hyderabad in order. To pay for this force the Nizam ceded the districts allotted him out of the spoils of Tippoo Sultan. His Highness, however, did not feel himself safe from his enemies without an absolute and perpetual guarantee of his independence from the British Government; and this Lord Wellesley, by the treaty of 1800, granted him, exacting from him, however, in return a pledge that whenever war broke out His Highness should send into the field not only the Subsidiary Force, but also "6,000 infantry and 9,000 horse of His Highness's own troops," with artillery and stores, and should likewise "employ every further effort in his power for the purpose of bringing into the field as speedily as possible the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions." Here, then, was a distinct and perpetual obligation imposed upon the Nizam to have always in readiness for war a Contingent (in addition to the Subsidiary Force) of 15,000 men, and also to place all the military resources of his State at the disposal of the British Government. The opportunity soon arose for giving effect to this treaty. War was declared in 1803 against Seindia and the Raja of Berar, and Sir Arthur Wellesley began the campaign which was to be rendered memorable by the victories of Assaye and Argaum. In conformity with the treaty of 1800, the whole of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, consisting of 8,300 men, accompanied

by a contingent of 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry, under Colonel Stevenson, marched to co-operate with Sir A. Wellesley. This force, though it had no part in the battle of Assaye, did good service in the campaign ; but the Nizam could not be persuaded to increase it as the treaty bound him to do, and his Government behaved on the whole very badly, showing an indifference which drew from the British General the remark that "no sooner has a native prince concluded a treaty with us than he thinks all he has to do is to go to sleep while we fight his battles for him." Nevertheless, as the reward of his half-hearted co-operation, the Nizam obtained from the victors the gift of Berar ; and it was thus that only seventy years ago what some writers are pleased to call the Nizam's ancestral domain came into the possession of the ruler of Hyderabad. The same writers are virtuously indignant with the British Government for compelling the Nizam to keep up in one form or another, after he had won Berar, the Contingent by means of which he had won it. They do not allege that the British Government ever violated its pledge to give the Nizam perfect security against all enemies, foreign or domestic ; but they think it very hard that a prince, thus guaranteed against conquest and rebellion, and with his dominion enlarged by the annexation of some of the richest districts in India, should be expected to contribute, by the regular payment of a Contingent, towards the general defence of the Indian Empire. The British Government thought differently ; and when the Nizam could not pay the troops regularly it forced him to assign territory out of the revenues of which it could pay them itself. It took over, therefore, in 1853, the management of that province of Berar which it had presented to the Nizam half a century before. At the same time, the British Government accepted the Contingent (of 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and four field batteries of artillery) "as an equivalent for the larger body of troops specified in the treaty of 1800," and formally released the Nizam from the still more extensive military obligations imposed upon him by that treaty. This historical summary must convince any impartial reader that the Nizam cannot do away with the Contingent. The engagement to maintain it, contracted in 1853, and reaffirmed in 1860, was accepted in lieu of a far more onerous engagement which was to be binding in perpetuity on the State of Hyderabad ; and the new engagement, therefore, must be perpetual also, or must last at all events as long as the British guarantee for the independence of Hyderabad. But the Nizam might revert to the obligations of the treaty of 1800 ? He might ; but what security would our Government have for the performance of those obligations unless he always kept on foot a perfectly disciplined and equipped army ready to take the field ? This, however, would only be the Contingent under another name ; and the old round of difficulties would have to be again faced and overcome.

We take it, then, that the Contingent must be maintained, and that the Nizam's Government must provide substantial security for its punctual payment. The treaty of 1853 gives the British Government such security in the form of an assignment of territory ; and Lord Salisbury now insists that none but a territorial guarantee can be accepted as satisfactory. We agree with "Xanthidion" in the opinion that the text of the treaty only describes the assignment as made in default of other means of paying the troops ; and that, if these means be now forthcoming, the Nizam, who has never parted with the sovereignty of Berar, may be justified in asking the British Government to accept a payment in cash and let him have his land back again. But, as the British Government cannot throw off its responsibility to preserve peace and order in the Nizam's dominions, it is bound to inquire how His Highness can have obtained possession of the eight millions sterling or so required as the redemption money of Berar. It cannot take the money and cry quits, resolving to have nothing more to do with its improvident debtor, and not troubling itself what may become of him. The two States are indissolubly connected, and the relationship is of such a kind that the British Government could not suffer its ally to mortgage the revenues of Berar to private speculators in order that the Nizam's Government might enjoy the gratification of calling the country its own again. Our Government must, for its own sake, look to

consequences. It had to step in once before to rescue a Nizam from the embarrassments brought on by his dealings with William Palmer & Co., and one or two of the wirepullers who have been most busily engaged in agitating the Berar question are notoriously eager to play over again the great game of speculation in Hyderabad. Before consenting to the revision of the treaty of 1853 the British Government ought therefore to be satisfied that there is no danger of the revenues being farmed, and the ryots rendered miserable and discontented, in order to satisfy the greed of enterprising capitalists. Sir Salar Jung is perhaps persuaded that he can repay the loan gradually out of surplus revenue without oppressing the people; but how can he answer for the future conduct of the boy who will some day be his Sovereign? It is probably considerations of this sort which have led the Government of India and the Secretary of State to say they will not discuss with Sir Salar Jung the question of restoring Berar to the Nizam. Perhaps the Nizam's Minister may have been justified in taking offence at the way in which the Resident, Mr. Saunders, communicated this decision to him, in the presence of a number of the nobility of Hyderabad; but is it not fair to assume that the Resident invited these nobles to attend on the occasion not for the sake of wounding the pride of Sir Salar Jung, but because it had been supposed that the Minister would never have preferred the claim to Berar with such earnestness but for being constantly assailed with the taunts and remonstrances of nobles who dislike the English alliance? To tell these malcontents that Sir Salar Jung had used his utmost efforts to get Berar back, even at the risk of quarrelling with the British Government, was one mode of silencing their clamour.

TIMES OF INDIA, *December 3, 1874*.—A Bombay contemporary, when dealing the other day for the first time with the Berar question, which has been so prominently before the public for some time past, very candidly avowed that the attempt of the Foreign Office to stifle discussion on the subject was quite indefensible. As that has been the main point which we have sought to establish throughout the controversy, we accept with pleasure this declaration from a quarter usually so hostile. But it is quite evident that, with the best will in the world to state impartially the position of the different parties interested in the past and future of Berar, the writer in the journal in question labours under serious misconceptions which have led him unwittingly to distort the whole aspect of the case. We are far from insinuating that this unfortunate result of a surfeit of Blue Book ill digested was due in the slightest degree to any desire to misrepresent the matters in dispute. The same writer, when incidentally alluding, in October last, to the conduct pursued towards Sir Salar Jung at the celebrated breakfast durbar in the Hyderabad Residency, anticipated our strictures by denouncing the whole proceeding as an insult to the Regent. The indignation which he expressed on that occasion may be accepted as a sufficient guarantee of his good faith, and it is but due to him to give prominence to a paragraph which in the middle of a special correspondent's letter *de omnibus rebus* easily escaped the public eye. Here it is:—"This is not the place for me to discuss the policy of the line of action recently adopted, by order of Lord Salisbury, towards Sir Salar Jung, in consequence of that Minister's expressed desire to pay off the mortgage on Berar, and recover for his Sovereign freedom of action in the government of his own dominions. But it ought to be generally known that the British Government has come to the brink of an absolute rupture with Salar Jung; and the extraordinary conduct of the Resident, who recently invited a number of Hyderabad nobles to breakfast and asked them to use their influence with the Minister to induce him not to press the demand for Berar, can hardly be regarded as anything but a direct insult to the Minister, who, whatever may be said about the merits of the Berar case, has certainly deserved better of the Paramount Power than any other native of India." The writer of this very emphatic condemnation of the conduct which so shocked every impartial mind in India cannot be lightly supposed to wish to make out a case against its victims, and in favour of those who were guilty of it. But some of the statements put forward certainly have that tendency, and

it is as well to frankly set our new-found ally right before he gets too far advanced on the wrong tack to turn back to the shelter of the sober facts.

We do not attach an exaggerated importance to the stress which our contemporary lays upon "the resolute way Lord Salisbury has put his foot down in the despatch in which he peremptorily refuses to listen to argument in favour of the restoration of Berar to the Nizam." The Secretary of State did no doubt pen a despatch which if he had simply consulted his own good sense he doubtless would have left unpenning. But it is an error to ascribe to that despatch, or to the writer of it, the idea that public opinion could be stamped out by an arrogant exertion of authority. This absurd notion had its origin not at the India Office, but at the Foreign Office in Calcutta. There the responsibility must lie. We do not imagine it possible that Lord Salisbury would ever have taken so indefensible a step if his judgment had not been surprised by some diplomatic *coup* on the part of his own subordinates. We refuse to believe that His Lordship, if fully informed of all the facts, would accord even a hesitating and provisional sanction to the course urged upon him by those in whom he has unfortunately in this instance placed a confidence so little justified. It is to our mind hardly just to censure Lord Salisbury as the source of the questionable proceedings at Hyderabad. But inasmuch as he allowed himself to become the victim of something very like an intrigue he cannot hope to escape criticism. The misconceptions on the part of our contemporary which it is more essential to correct are those relating to the tenure by which Berar belongs to the Sovereign of Hyderabad, and to the footing upon which the Contingent is really maintained. The sketch of the manner in which Berar was made over in 1803 to the Nizam is full of error, and is wholly misleading, and the assertion that it was then presented to him as "a gift" by the British Government is simply not true. The British Government did not "give" it to the Nizam. It was his share of the territory won from the common enemy, and secured to him under the third secret article of the treaty of 1800, which provided for the equal distribution of the conquests of the allies. Berar was specifically allotted to the Nizam as his half of the joint conquest because it had belonged to him previously, and had been partially wrested from him by the Mahrattas. It had, however, never ceased to be considered, even by the Mahrattas themselves, as part of the Nizam's territories. The Nizam's share in the revenues was always admitted. The Bhonsla family, from whom it was won back in 1803, always professed to keep regular accounts with the Nizam's officers, who were never actually ejected from their posts as from a conquered territory. To talk of this revindication of the full sovereignty of the province as "a gift" from the British Government to the Nizam is an abuse of language.

With respect to the Contingent, our contemporary has equally misapprehended the real principles on which alone the matter can be fairly discussed. It is idle to assert that because Article VII. of the treaty of 1853 declares that "the Contingent is to be maintained at all times (whether in peace or war)" that it must therefore be maintained for all time to come, whether the Nizam requires it or not. Before the Nizam signed the treaty of 1853 on which this strange construction is now so lightly put, he received a formal assurance—recorded at page 118 of the Blue Book issued in 1854—that the Contingent would only be maintained from the proceeds of Berar "as long as the Nizam required it." So well understood has it been that the Contingent is kept up for the Nizam's service, and not for our own, that Lord Dalhousie himself offered to allow it to be disbanded if the Nizam chose to dispense with it. It is then an extraordinary assertion to hazard that the Contingent is kept up in the interests of the British Government. To talk of "releasing" the Nizam from the obligation to keep up a force of 15,000 men in time of peace because he was bound to place that number of men in the field *in war* also shows a misconception of the real facts. Sir John Low, a member of Lord Dalhousie's Government, boasted in a minute dated the 31st May 1853, on the treaty then just signed, that "while retaining our principal demand against the Nizam we relinquish nothing substantial except a right of calling for troops which never by any possibility could have been of use." The British Government

had bound itself by treaty in the beginning of the century to maintain the Subsidiary Force to defend the Nizam's Government against all internal enemies, in consideration of a cession of valuable territory in perpetuity. It was to perform this identical function that the Contingent was kept up by the Nizam's Government at an expense which certain agents of our Government found means to make ruinous. The financial difficulties thus created formed the pretext urged by Lord Dalhousie for the assignment of territory in 1853. These facts should not be lost sight of in discussing the Berar question.

*TIMES OF INDIA, December 8, 1874.*—From a home correspondent :—"The policy of the Governor-General towards the Nizam's Government is regarded by those who have not an interest in the Berar preserves as a flagrant breach of good faith, and Sir Salar Jung has only to have the matter brought before Parliament to have it not only discussed, but decided on its merits. The article on this subject in your last 'Overland Summary' represents the flagrant piece of bullying in its true light. 'Might is right,' says the Viceroy, 'and what you did for England in 1857 is forgotten. We don't want your nine millions, and you shall not have back your Berars.' But both Lords and Commons love honest, straightforward dealings, and will not have the Queen's proclamation disregarded."

*TIMES OF INDIA, December 17, 1874.*—The following is an extract from a London letter dated 20th ultimo :—

"The announcement in your 'Overland Summary' that secret instructions have been issued from the Foreign Office at Calcutta for the preparation of private reports on the state of the dominions of His Highness the Nizam has startled old Indians here, and is not favourably commented on. The instructions must surely be consequent on a request from Sir Salar Jung to do away with the Hyderabad Contingent as being now no longer necessary in that well-governed country. There is too much conservatism amongst us at present to brook undue interference with the interior economy of an independent State like that of Hyderabad, especially when so ably and loyally governed by the present Regent. If the princes of the country will permit Sir Salar Jung to invest a sufficient sum of money in Government securities, the interest of which would suffice to guarantee the payment of the Contingent, then the Viceroy could hardly refuse not only to discuss the question of the Berars, but would have to restore them to their rightful owner, the Nizam. Public opinion is stronger than Lord Northbrook and the Calcutta Foreign Office. It will be unpleasant to be forced to resign so much patronage, but nevertheless it must be endured."

*TIMES OF INDIA, January 14, 1875.*—Sir Salar Jung's brief visit to Calcutta has drawn to a close, and he returns to Hyderabad and to politics. It is amongst the things not generally known that the journey of the Nizam's Prime Minister to Bengal had no reference to the one matter which has been occupying his thoughts, and the thoughts of all who take an interest in the affairs of the Deccan—the question of the restitution of Berar. The discussion of that delicate topic was, as we all know, put an end to, some months ago, by the simple yet ingenious device of sending back to Sir Salar the letters which he had given himself the trouble of writing upon it. No needless politeness was wasted by those who resorted to this expedient for avoiding the embarrassment of answering claims which only a very skilful casuist could have answered with satisfaction to his employers. The obvious, indeed almost the declared, intention was to make the Minister "know his place," to show him that he was not to speak till he was spoken to, and that he would find it to his advantage to let burning political questions alone. The lesson it is to be hoped was not lost upon its recipient. At all events he has taken care to prove that if silenced he has not sulked, and by his now acting upon the invitation given to him some time back to visit Lord Northbrook at Calcutta he has shown that his friendly feelings towards the Government have not been chilled by the uncouth diplomacy of our Foreign Office.



Current events have given prominence to questions affecting the status and the rights of Native States, and the policy which the British Government should observe in its dealings with the "feudatories" of the Empire. It is the fashion to speak of all Native States as feudatories, but the term is a loose one, and is apt to mislead none so much as those that use it. A Calcutta contemporary actually stated, what is implied by many writers on these difficult questions, that international law does not apply between a paramount power and its "feudatories," and that therefore treaties between them may be dealt with without any reference to the law of nations. If that flagitious doctrine were to hold good in law, sound policy would forbid our acting upon it. Native States are necessary elements of the grandeur and stability of the Empire, and their rights should be as jealously guarded as those of the dominant power. The Queen's proclamation has solemnly affirmed to all the Princes of India that Her Majesty will defend their privileges as her own. That declaration of the imperial policy which is henceforth to prevail in India has hitherto been faithfully adhered to, and we may be quite certain that it will not lightly be departed from. It gives security not only to the Princes to whom it is addressed, but to the throne from which it emanated. What is now taking place at Baroda is a crowning proof of the entire good faith with which the British Government repudiates any policy inconsistent with the maintenance of the integrity of the Native States. Not even the monstrous crime of which Mulharrao stands accused has been allowed to hurry us into a course inconsistent with the spirit of the proclamation. The offence which calls for punishment being that of the Gaekwar, and not of Baroda, the Prince, if proved to be guilty, will be deposed, but the State will not be annexed. The wisdom of thus refusing under any pretext to revert to practices which were useful, if not very honourable, in the past, but which would be now neither useful nor honourable, is obvious. When the Native Princes are once satisfied that the era of annexations is definitively closed, they will feel that the existence of the British power in India sustains their own; having nothing to fear from us, they will have leisure to reflect on the security, from internal and external enemies alike, which we enable them to enjoy. They will be our firmest allies, because they will be as much interested as ourselves in resisting rebels or invaders, who would be their enemies as well as ours. The British power in this country is now, and has been for years past, a conservative power, and the Princes have too much to lose not to be conservative likewise. The fact that a Conservative majority was returned at the last election in England has been strangely represented as an indication that England would now cast to the winds the policy which has for sixteen years guided her, and it has been hinted that she would embark on a wild career of adventure and spoliation because the Liberals are no longer in power. But a conservative government would belie its name if it did not respect the guaranteed rights of all; the result of the last general election—in so far as it is likely to have any practical influence on Indian affairs, will have a moderating and reassuring, because conservative, influence.

Those who advocate the recommencement of a system of annexation might very well stop to consider why we have not, during the last ten or fifteen years, annexed every Native State in India. There was no force in the country that would have prevented us: as a mere matter of military achievement we could have disposed of the retainers of every Prince in a single campaign. But we have not done so, and no madman proposed that we should do so. We have abstained from taking that course, actuated not merely by respect for treaties, but influenced by the same class of considerations which should have induced the first Napoleon to be satisfied with the friendship and alliance of the King of Spain, instead of perilling, and ultimately losing, his whole Empire by grasping at more than he could hold. While the map of India is broken up as it is at present by Native States, all isolated from one another geographically, and not bound together morally by the one thing that could unite them, a common fear, we are secure. We can never have all India in a blaze at once. There may be partial conflagrations, but none that we cannot subdue. That is well understood by those who



have given the problem of the future any thought, and all the incitements to tear up treaties and proclamations, and go in for general loot, will receive as much attention from statesmen as would a proposal to replenish the treasury by drawing the teeth or plucking out the eyes of Jewish capitalists. We have got beyond all that, and we must now maintain our political as we do our financial credit, not by violence, but by good faith.

It is, therefore, very desirable that journalists, when writing on Native States, should avoid using language which is disquieting, and propounding doctrines which are immoral. When treaties have been made with the Princes of India they should be carried out ; and to describe a Prince by a figure of speech as a feudatory, and then to argue that international law could not help him because he is a feudatory, is both disquieting and immoral. Let us take the case of the Nizam to see what foundation there is for this sort of logic. A reference to an English dictionary shows us that the word "feudatory" means "one who derives or holds tenure from another." From whom does the Nizam derive his title to his dominions ? Certainly not from the British Government, which, so far from having conferred any right on the Nizam, would have to confess that it was from the Nizam that they derived their own title to the fine districts on the Masulipatam coast known as the Northern Circars. Those districts the British Government actually held as *his* feudatories for many years, at an annual quit-rent of nine lakhs. We would have been paying him that tribute to this day had not steps been taken to manœuvre him out of it through the instrumentality of the puppet Chundoo Lall. The Nizam pathetically recounted to Colonel Low in 1853 how he had been despoiled by the Honourable Company in this matter. But that is by the way : the incident is worth remembering only to show that if either side was ever a "feudatory" to the other, in the proper sense of the word, it certainly was not the Nizam. Hyderabad was the weaker, but not the feudatory, State. That point does not admit of controversy. A Resident at Hyderabad, having unfortunately used the misleading term in a despatch to Lord Hastings, drew from that Governor-General (Act II., 1822) the following exposition of the real facts with regard to any fancied feudal rights :—"The assumption of our possessing an universal supremacy in India involving such rights (of interference in the Nizam's affairs) as you have described is a mistake. Over States which have by particular engagements rendered themselves professedly feudatory the British Government does exercise supremacy ; but it never has been claimed, and certainly never has been acknowledged, in the case of native powers standing within the denomination of allies. Although a virtual supremacy may undoubtedly be said to exist in the British Government, from the inability of other States to contend with its strength, the making such a superiority a principle singly sufficient for any exertion of our will would be to misapply that strength, and to pervert it to tyrannical purposes. The argument of supremacy having been set aside, nothing but the tenor of some special engagement could render us liable to the call or allot to us the title for interposition. Our treaties, characterizing the Nizam as an independent Sovereign, authorize no such "latitude." If that should not be thought conclusive, we must bear in mind that the Nizam was formally recognized as the independent sovereign of the Deccan by the Treaty of Paris of 1763, a fact which the Court of Directors wrote about in great jubilation as follows, on the 9th March in the same year :—"A further advantage we hope to derive from the recognition of Salabut Jung (the Nizam), whose title, you will see, is also acknowledged, is that it is a confirmation of our title to those territories we hold under grants from that Prince, leaving the French no colour to interpose hereafter in favour of any other pretender to the Sovereignty of the Deccan." Will any one enlighten us as to when the Nizam forfeited this title to the Sovereignty of the Deccan, and when and how he became "our feudatory"?

It may be said, it is often said, that the Nizam is our feudatory because with some ten thousand British troops in his territories it would be absurd to call him independent. But it is forgotten by those who make use of this argument that the Nizam paid in territory for the services of those troops to secure his

independence ! The treaties signed in 1798 and 1800 prove that conclusively. If we take advantage of the fact of the troops being at our orders to coerce him, that is not an exercise of right, but a misuse of force. For any power to arrogate to itself the right to dispense with treaties because it happens to have the power to do so would greatly simplify politics not only in India but in Europe, and indeed all over the world ; but the question is one of principles, and not of strength. And we are not, as some helpless people would imagine, forced to disregard the legal rights of weak States, and to treat their independence, much against our will, as if it did not exist. Instead of the political situation of these Native States being such as to render it difficult for us to preserve ourselves from encroaching on their independence, nothing could be more thoroughly defined, or more easy to maintain, than our relations with them under the subsidiary alliances, provided we but administered the trust reposed in us with the commonest honesty. And in this connection, if in no other, honesty is beyond all question the best policy.

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**TIMES OF INDIA, January 18, 1875.**—The attempt to suppress arbitrarily even the discussion of the claims of the Nizam's Government to the full sovereignty of his Berar territory has, we learn by the last mail, begun to attract the attention of politicians at home. The exposure in these columns of the manœuvres by which that not very creditable attempt to evade the duty of answering claims properly urged, and assigning reasons for their rejection if they were not well founded, has naturally excited considerable surprise, not unmingled with indignation, amongst members of Parliament and others who are accustomed to a very different procedure in reference to political questions in England, and it is by no means unlikely that the whole matter may be brought before the House of Commons during the session which will shortly open. To enable the public to form a sound opinion on a case simple enough in itself, but hitherto obscured by the multitude of sophistries and side-issues so ingeniously resorted to by those who have no particular interest in confining their attention to the real facts, it will not be amiss to give a succinct account of the nature of the claims which the Nizam's Government desire to have discussed, if not admitted. The steps which have been taken to advance those claims, and the reasons which the Foreign Office put forward, or rather affect to hold in reserve, as a justification for refusing to concede or even to answer them, are not without interest, and may deserve examination at a future time. But to-day we will, for the sake of clearness and brevity, confine ourselves to a *résumé* of the Nizam's claims for the restitution of the Assigned Districts.

The claims urged, so far as diplomatic secrecy has allowed them to transpire, may be summed up, we believe, in general terms as being founded on the fact that the Hyderabad Contingent, for the expenses of which alone Berar was taken and is still held, was an unjustifiable imposition on the Hyderabad State from first to last. It was an imposition which had no treaty foundation, but which was maintained nevertheless during half a century at an enormous cost, and having become, as an official writer has called it, "an incubus on the Nizam's finances," eventually reduced his country to financial ruin. The treaty of 1853, which gave the first legal pretext for our maintaining the Contingent, and by which the assignment of Berar was achieved, was extorted from the Nizam by force, and upon such untenable grounds that the document does not constitute a title which a Government like ours, that professes to act on broad principles of honour and justice, should interpret without regard to the broad merits of the question. The treaty was one which should never have been made, and its exaction from the Nizam was a cruel and unjust incident in the prosecution of that high-handed policy of annexation which our Government has now distinctly repudiated. There were circumstances connected with this case which rendered the action of Lord Dalhousie's administration respecting Berar exceptionally and flagrantly unjust. We were under a treaty obligation to defend and preserve the integrity of the Nizam's territory without the Contingent at all, and by means of our own troops,

whose services had been paid for in advance by a cession of valuable territory. The country south of the Kristna was made over to us in consideration of our maintaining the Subsidiary Force to be, according to the 17th article, at his orders for the maintenance of his just rights for all time, and it was expressly stipulated in the 8th article that the payment then made "shall be considered as a final close and termination of accounts between the contracting parties with respect to the charges of the said Subsidiary Force."

It is quite clear that if this contract had been carried out, and the Nizam's part of it was fulfilled by the transference of the territory in question, there could have been no room for charging the Hyderabad State with enormous sums for the maintenance of another force for the Nizam's internal military defence—the especial duty of the Subsidiary Force. Nevertheless the Contingent was created and maintained at an enormous cost, and when the amount debited against the Nizam for its pay had assumed colossal proportions Berar was clutched as lawful prize. This is not a new or fanciful view of the transaction. Major Moore, one of the Court of Directors, in a minute published in a Blue Book in 1851, stated that in charging the Nizam with the Contingent we were simply charging him for the maintenance of troops kept up by us "to perform duties which we have contracted to perform ourselves and been paid for;" and, worse still, he showed that, having got the Nizam to pay us once for all for the British Subsidiary Force, which, it was stipulated, should perform the military duties for the Nizam, we actually omitted to keep this latter force up to anything like the strength of 10,000 men, for which we had been paid, while we made the Nizam pay in hard cash for this Contingent, that actually did the duties. This dissent was, it is true, lodged only after the mischief was done, but then there are equally strong and clearly worded protests in the same Blue Book from Colonel Sykes and several others, dated in 1851.

The fact, we apprehend, can hardly be disputed that the Nizam, in handing over to us one-third of his dominions, purchased from us a perpetual guarantee of the remainder together with the right to the services of our troops to protect that remainder, the said cession of territory in consideration of our troops becoming his defenders being only agreed to by the Nizam subject to the condition that his absolute independence was to remain intact. Nevertheless it soon became the duty of a historian, not in the least unfriendly or disposed to take a sour view of our dealings in the matter, to chronicle that the Nizam Secunder Jah "deeply felt the loss of his independence." Now Secunder Jah succeeded to the throne of his fathers only three years after the signature of the treaty of 1800, and while all its provisions were yet fresh in people's minds. But our first act on his accession was to intimate to him plainly that he was not to remove the then Minister, Aristo Jah, a man who suited us, but whose public character was so odious to the people of the Hyderabad State that on the occasion of his death Mr. (afterwards Sir H.) Russell, the Resident, relates that "though the natives of India are the least of all nations prone to indecent acts, yet nevertheless the multitude of Hyderabad followed his corpse to the grave with hoots and execrations." Aristo Jah was no sooner dead than we forced another Minister, Mir Allum, on the Nizam, a man who had certainly been useful to us, but was most objectionable to the Nizam, and whose character as Minister the same high authority sums up in the statement that "he aggravated many abuses, and never redressed one." He specially raised the land revenue assessment by one anna per rupee for the purpose of providing a monstrous salary for himself. As Sir Henry Russell goes on to tell us, Mir Allum's term of office was passed in a series of struggles to make the Nizam a mere cipher, a task in which he succeeded through our full influence and power being put forth in his support. He in his turn simply did our bidding and ignored his Sovereign, until at last as Sir Henry Russell's successor, Sir Charles Metcalfe, informs us, "the Nizam retired from the unequal contest in disgust, and has since led a life of gloomy retirement and sullen discontent." Being reduced to this pleasant state by his faithful ally, it was hinted that he was of "doubtful sanity," and that plea was suggested as a reason for our doing what we liked with his own. But

he was not mad. Sir C. Metcalfe, the best authority upon the point, describes him as having a mind "not perhaps naturally incapable of fulfilling the duties of his station," but having been "affected by long depression and seclusion;" and Metcalfe adds a sentence which cannot be read without painful reflections—"I can hardly imagine a situation more entitled to pity, or more calculated to disarm censure, than that of a Prince so held in subjection by his servant under the support of an irresistible foreign power." Mir Allum died, and the Nizam took the opportunity to urge us to revert to our status under the treaty and allow him at least to choose the next Minister. We met this request with a storm of threats before which the unhapy Sovereign retired discomfited. But one concession was made to him, the Minister of his choice was allowed to draw the salary attached to the office, twelve lakhs a year, on condition that he did nothing! A low-caste rascal named Chundoo Lall, with no single qualification for the office—unless his absolute subservience to our Government constituted a qualification—was made "the efficient Minister," as the official records of the time phrased it, and the Nizam had soon reason to regret Mir Allum.

Now began in terrible earnest the frightful misrule that steadily sapped the Hyderabad State. It went on under our direct and immediate support for twenty-five long years, and made the Government of Hyderabad synonymous with all that was reckless and oppressive to the inhabitants, a bye-word in fact, the memory of which is yet far from extinct in India. It directly eventuated in financial ruin and in the seizure of Berar in 1853. During this period the Contingent was invented. By refusing the use of the Subsidiary Force which we were bound to furnish to the Nizam we forced him to undertake to pay another force to keep the territory in order. History proves beyond cavil that this most ingenious device was the origin of the Contingent. Thus, our treaty of 1800 undertook that the Subsidiary Force would exact, if necessary, the Nizam's tribute from the Zemindars of Shorapore and Gudwall, whom it actually mentioned by name. But yet Lord Hastings unblushingly told the Court of Directors in 1820 that he had managed to get the Contingent saddled on the Nizam "by making him to see how he would be enabled by such a force to subdue his refractory Zemindars (of Shorapore and Gudwall)." Worse still, history records that the doubled payment even was not sufficient. The Contingent, in its turn, was quietly diverted from the Nizam's use, and, as one of the dissenting members of the Court of Directors told us in 1851, the Nizam was obliged to employ, after all, a *third* army, under his own control, to effect the object. Yet with all the three forces eating up his revenues the work was not done. It is almost as good as anything in Gil Blas to read in Captain Meadows Taylor's Report in January 1851 on the territories which would be most eligible for us to seize for the pay of the Contingent the statement that "We could enforce regular payment of the tribute of Gudwall, *which the Nizam's Government is unable to obtain regularly at present.*" Three armies imposed on the bankrupt resources of the Nizam's State to do the treaty work of one, and after all the work not done! We sustained Chundoo Lall as our avowed agent during a quarter of a century of despotic rule over Hyderabad. There was no misapprehension possible; Chundoo Lall simply meant the British Government. The Court of Directors wrote to the Government of India distinctly acknowledging this. "For a Government," wrote they, "thus created and sustained by British influence and obedient to British counsels, it appears to us that *none* can be held responsible *but those who have constructed, supported, and advised that Government.*" And subsequently the Directors communicated to the Governor-General their opinion that "the British Government's constant and active interference for a series of years in the management of the affairs of the Nizam has to a considerable extent staked its honour and character on the result." Well, the "consent" of this worthy Chundoo Lall having been obtained to the institution and extravagant payment of the Contingent, the finances of the country were eventually brought to ruin. The accumulated arrears of pay were pressed for, and, oh horror, were partially paid off! But the final payment could not be made to the day and so Berar was demanded. The Nizam firmly refused to cede the province,

which was the garden of his territory. Its assignment was then insisted upon ; he still refused, but upon the threat that troops had been ordered to march upon Hyderabad he agreed to sign the treaty of 1853, which reserved his right to the sovereignty of the districts assigned, but gave over a certain portion of their revenues for the payment of the Contingent, whose history we have just glanced at. Such is an outline of the case which the Foreign Office practically confesses its inability to meet, by declining to discuss it.

TIMES OF INDIA, *January 25, 1875.*—We have already adverted to the claims of the Nizam's Government to the exercise of the full rights of sovereignty over the province of Berar, but the steps taken to procure the recognition of these claims have not as yet, we believe, been described accurately or in their proper order. The Regents refrained, as long as it was possible to do so, from entering upon any controversy regarding the origin of the Contingent, which resulted in the enforced assignment of the district in question for the pay of that body. The discussion of a not very creditable transaction, involving, as it naturally might be expected to do, an examination into a chapter of history of which no Englishman could be proud, was courteously waived until the Regents were compelled to enter upon it through the rejection of their offers based on the *status quo*. They had no desire to reopen an old wound ; their sole desire was to recover, even at the cost of an immense sacrifice, the administration of a province of which the Nizam is indisputably the Sovereign. Accepting then the fact of the existence of the Contingent, and recognizing the desire of the British Government that it should be kept on as at present, they offered to provide a capitalized sum which at four per cent. would suffice for the payment of the whole force as long as we choose maintain it. The money offered amounted to eight millions sterling, an immense sum which would tempt any Government less plethoric than our own. The cash would have been lodged with Government in four per cent. paper, and the interest accruing year by year would, as we have said, have met the whole charges of the Contingent as fixed by the treaty of 1853. It was a munificent offer, and the fact that it was made while the Regents were convinced of their equitable right the restoration of the province pure and simple, without payment, does not diminish its munificence. But the Government refused the offer. The province was held for the payment of the Contingent ; the eight millions would have secured that payment ; but the province was worth more than eight millions, and the redemption of the former by the latter was refused, with scant courtesy.

The awkwardness of the refusal was indeed fully present to the diplomatists of the Foreign Office in Calcutta, and even the anticipation, that the offer of redemption would be made, seriously exercised their minds some years before the dreadful moment came. Sir Salar Jung has the reputation of being open to a fault, and it would appear that he talked quite frankly with our Politicals of his intention of providing a capital sum for the payment of the Contingent, and thus getting back the districts. If we mistake not, something like a hint of that intention was published to the world in the preface to Captain Hastings Fraser's work, "The Nizam." The chief result of this disclosure of the Minister's intention was that obstacles were persistently heaped up in the way of any financial operation of any kind which it was conceived might contribute directly or indirectly to the accumulation of the dreaded eight millions. There appears to be only too much reason to fear that the general belief in Hyderabad is not altogether without foundation, that the desire to render the production of that sum impossible led to a studied opposition to every measure that could develop the resources of the country or strengthen its finances. The gentlemen of the Foreign Office are credited with resorting to every expedient to stave off the day when Sir Salar Jung would be able to collect the £8,000,000 which he had so frankly declared his desire to get together. Every new act that he did, or proposal that he made, was deemed to have some connection, open or occult, with the production of the money to capitalize the pay of the Contingent and redeem Berar. Projects the most innocent and laudable were met with a cold shoulder at the Foreign Office,

from a fear that under their smooth exterior lurked some design to acquire and to offer a money substitute for Berar. Let political officers themselves say if this fear has not constituted the very atmosphere through which Hyderabad affairs have been contemplated by the Foreign Department for years past. The feeling became so all-absorbing shortly before the offer actually came, and when it was suspected that the Nizam's Government must have its plans pretty nearly perfected, that it almost amounted to a craze. Every appointment of a European to the Nizam's ordinary executive departments was regarded as a matter of imperial moment. If there was any one who appeared to possess a financial connection, strenuous efforts were made to prevent his employment. For this purpose the Foreign Office did not hesitate to unearth a treaty of last century, and to wrest a clause in it, which was framed for a very different purpose, to veto an appointment that Sir Salar Jung had made to the executive of his Railway Department.

The final issue of this crooked diplomacy is deserving of being chronicled, for it involves a joke framed on the model of Box and Cox. If any of our readers will take the trouble to refer to our issue of 10th June 1872 they will find the details of a wonderful transaction. Our Government had in 1870 strongly urged the Nizam's Regents to guarantee the production of the whole of the capital of over a million sterling for the State Railway, and to guarantee 5 per cent. interest on that sum, while at the same time insisting that they should neither be allowed to construct it, or work it themselves. The Regents had been induced, after much snubbing and after unseemly haggling, to acquiesce in this arrangement, and they had also been compelled to abandon their contention for the cheap metre gauge, and the proposed line fell entirely under British management. But the capital had still to be got. The Nizam guaranteed the shares, and most of the capital was quickly subscribed in Hyderabad. But for the details of this arrangement some efficient and regularly organized management was needed, so as to secure the confidence of the native subscribers. The natural step was therefore taken of employing a competent European official to answer, so to speak, to the shareholders for the business-like conduct of an operation so familiar to European finance, but so little understood as yet by natives of India. The officer chosen was strongly recommended to the Supreme Government for the post. But Berar, the Contingent, and the proposed offer of £8,000,000 occupied the Foreign Office field of vision. "Berar—£8,000,000" seemed written all round the horizon, everywhere on every object, and no other question could be considered on its own merits. The clause in the treaty of 1798, framed by Lord Wellesley and signed by the Nizam, for the declared object of excluding French military adventurers from his service was unblushingly used by the Indian Foreign Office in 1872 in order to prevent the Nizam from employing an Englishman, strongly recommended by the British Resident, for the peaceful duty of managing the capital accounts of an undertaking which the same Calcutta Foreign Office had vehemently urged him to undertake. In vain the Minister showed the wholly innocent and harmless nature of the duties that his nominee had to perform. He pointed out that the nominee had come under a clear obligation not to enter on any scheme which had not the sanction of the Resident himself. The Resident warned the Supreme Government that to attempt to oppose an appointment made under such circumstances was to incur obloquy. He intimated that the overthrowing of the appointment would probably cast a blight on the financial success of the undertaking, might cause the calls on the shareholders not to be properly responded to, might in fact derange the whole fiscal machinery of the Hyderabad State, and plunge it into irretrievable difficulty and distress. The Foreign Office, with the jingle of the £8,000,000 for ever ringing in their ears, allowed themselves to be swayed by their fears that the official in question might somehow aid the Nizam at some future period in getting the £8,000,000. They pushed their veto under the treaty of 1798 for the first time in the whole history of the two Governments, and pushed it not once only, but a second time when the first veto produced strong remonstrances from the Nizam's Government. They sent a special acting Resident all the way from Simla, primed with Foreign Office instructions,—all strictly demi-official of course. But now

comes the cream of the matter. The new officiating Resident communicated the veto that he had brought in his pocket, and the Nizam's Government, having no alternative, cancelled the appointment which they had made. The railway finances were thus left to take care of themselves, which they are no doubt still doing as best they can. The retired officer left Hyderabad, and no doubt the Foreign Office, always with their eyes fixed on the £8,000,000, fancied they had staved off, perhaps indefinitely, the offer of the terrible sum. Imagine, then, their feelings when they found that the officer in question had barely left Hyderabad when a letter was received from the Nizam officially tendering the £8,000,000 and asking back Berar! While the Foreign Department had been bringing their whole forces to bear on the annihilation of this individual officer, the Nizam's Minister was busily engaged perfecting his plan through another agency altogether, and the chagrin of the Machiavellian plotters can be better imagined than described when it flashed on them all of a sudden that *they had turned out the wrong man!*

Well, the £8,000,000 were tendered. The sole condition of the Berar trust provision, for the pay of the Contingent, was fulfilled, but it was determined not to accept the money. Here a device was put into execution which is far too frequently exercised when the Government of India wish to carry the Secretary of State along with them, and fear to allow him the free and untrammelled exercise of his own judgment. The Government of India first took it upon themselves to decide *against* Sir Salar Jung's offer of the £8,000,000, and announced that adverse decision to the Native State, and then when they had thus committed the British Government to that policy they reported the matter to the Secretary of State as a *fait accompli*. However, even in the prejudged form in which the question came before the India Office, we have reason to believe that the Government of India's decision did not pass through the Council without indications very disquieting to the Calcutta bureau, and the subsequent action of the Government of India gives strong additional colouring to that surmise. As calculated on, however, the protests of the dissenting members of the Home Council did not prove strong enough to induce the present Secretary of State (who could not have been long in office when this carefully prejudged case went home from India to the Council Board) to signalize his first coming into office by upsetting a decision which had been officially communicated to the Nizam. So the Secretary of State endorsed the Government of India's refusal to receive the £8,000,000, and the Calcutta Foreign Office succeeded so far.

The success, however, of this questionable policy was short-lived; for Lord Salisbury has not yet been a year in office, and the claim for Berar is known to have advanced several stages since that decision. The Nizam's Government returned to the charge. The reason given for the refusal of the £8,000,000 was one that breathed nothing but solicitude for the Nizam's welfare. We feared he would involve himself deeply in debt if we allowed him thus to make a superhuman effort to redeem Berar. The Nizam's Government therefore made a second offer—not of eight millions, but of one million, three years' pay of the Contingent, to be paid down, and that cash advance to be always kept up by renewed payments from Hyderabad to the Government of India. The sole fault which was found with the offer of the eight millions was obviated by the smaller offer; and, as the justice of the claim *per se* to Berar can hardly be gravely disputed, our Foreign Office, it may readily be believed, was once again thrown into a difficulty. Here was another application for Berar which would, or at least should, have to run the gauntlet again of the Political Departments of the India Office, that *bête noire* of politicals in this country. The case called for a desperate remedy. It was determined to evade the demand and all objectionable minutes on its refusal which might form the worst features of possible Blue Books in the future. There is a Secret Department to the India Office, and though such questions as an open claim preferred by a Native Prince for recovery of his territory, are not fit subjects for submission to it, perchance with special efforts it could be managed. The special efforts were made. First of all, the second application was kept *perdue* for months, till the Secretary of State was committed to a certain extent by his answer



confirmatory of their decision on the first, and then the Foreign Secretary takes the bundles of papers under his arm and goes off to England. The reasons that he urged on Lord Salisbury for rejecting the second application, as he had rejected the first, are of course unknown. But Lord Salisbury, it can easily be imagined, is at a great disadvantage when thus set upon by a direct deputation from the Government of India, especially if rumour be right that the gentlemen of the Calcutta Foreign Office at present have very special facilities for engrafting their opinions on those of certain individuals at the India Office, who necessarily, from their position, have the ear of Lord Salisbury. Efforts at coaching are, however, far from certain of a successful result in the case of a statesman of Lord Salisbury's calibre, and the Envoy apparently returned to Calcutta without carrying away the desired decision, or any decision whatever, along with him. The Nizam's Government was meanwhile made acquainted with the old decision of the Secretary of State, which had been got from him in the way we have mentioned, and on hearing this they naturally began to despair, more or less, of inducing us to relax our hold on Berar by means of liberal offers. They then resolved to set forth the nature and extent of their claim to Berar, showing that the Contingent was an unjustifiable imposition on the Nizam, and that the seizure of Berar was the result of the maintenance of that force. In this third application they did not offer any money for the Contingent, for it was part of their case that the force in question should never have been called into existence. This new style of application, so different from the others, it may be well imagined fell on the Foreign Office like a thunderbolt from a clear sky. How was it to be dealt with? Could the facts set forth be denied? No, but a device remained. The decision of Lord Salisbury refusing the second and smaller money offer, to secure which so much anxious arrangement and personal coaching of the India Office had taken place, was at last received, though we fear that if a Blue Book faithfully recording the facts be ever written, it will be made clear that means were used to secure this of a nature which scarcely left Lord Salisbury in the position of a free agent, to decide either in favour of or against this second application. But the decision against it—no matter how procured—came to hand at the lucky moment. The Foreign Office could use Lord Salisbury's decision on the second application as if it applied to the third, could serve it on the Nizam as if it was Lord Salisbury's decision on the whole case; and then, if it were necessary to send home the papers at all, they would go as the records of a thing already done, which neither Lord Salisbury would like to disturb, nor his Council to minute upon, if it could be made by any means to appear that the Nizam himself had accepted the decision. This programme, and the consequent necessity that the Nizam should be got so to accept the decision, at least in appearance, was the origin of the now famous invitation to the Residency described by us on the 19th October last. The disaffected were invited as well as the loyal, that the Regents might be intimidated in their presence by the plain intimation that the Government of India was determined to suppress these Berar claims, and that they looked to those present to use their influence to procure their complete suppression—an intimation which was, under the peculiar circumstances of the Hyderabad Durbar, equivalent to a declaration that the place of Sir Salar Jung as Minister was practically open to any one who would make a bid for office by guaranteeing that no more should be heard of the Berar question. There the matter rests at present, as far as has transpired. We have no doubt that the Regents remonstrated at this attempt to force them into silence without attempting to answer claims properly put forward and presumably just. But the question of the Berars has not been stifled. It will be fully discussed, and whatever decision may be ultimately arrived at must be founded on right.

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TIMES OF INDIA, *February 2, 1875*.—We have given, as well as our limits would allow, a faithful history of the transactions which eventuated in the assignment of Berar to our Government, and of the steps taken by the Government of the Nizam to procure the restitution of that province. We have seen how the Foreign Office has refused even to discuss the claims preferred by His



Highness, and we have seen, too, how completely that refusal has failed to stifle discussion. It is morally certain that the whole case will form the subject of debate in Parliament. Will the policy of silence avail in the House of Commons? It will not even be tried. The Calcutta Foreign Office has an answer in reserve, and it is but right that the singular merits of that answer should no longer be concealed from the public. The Nizam's case is this:—"By the treaty of 1800 I handed over to you a third of my territories to pay you for the complete military defence of the remaining two-thirds; and it was solemnly contracted that you would guarantee my independence, and would not charge me anything further for military service for all time to come. That treaty—that contract—is still in full force. Nevertheless in defiance of its provisions, you availed yourself of the presence near my capital of your forces—placed there for my *defence*—to practically depose me and carry on the government as seemed best to you by a creature of your own. You withheld my treaty right to the services of the Subsidiary Force, though you retained the territory you got as a consideration for those services, and you cause your nominee to raise a new force at a frightful cost to my treasury, to perform the military duty which the Subsidiary Force was bound to perform. That superfluous and illegal force is the Hyderabad Contingent, the profligate expenditure on which brought the finances of the country to the brink of ruin, and it was for the balance of arrears due to it, for which alone you compelled me—under threat of invasion and deposition—to sign the treaty of 1853, assigning Berar, and it is for the continued maintenance of that force alone that you hold Berar to this day. The alleged balance of debt for the arrears of the Contingent was fictitious, for common arithmetic would have shown that you owed me money on a general account in excess of that due to you for the arrears of pay, and I should have been credited with that sum. Nevertheless the treaty of 1853 was prepared by you and I signed it simply because I was plainly told that my State, instead of being defended by your soldiers according to the treaty of 1800, was to be invaded by them in spite of that treaty, and against every principle of right. It was an act of coercion effected against your own ally in a time of profound peace, and the sole object of it was to make me alienate a part of my ancestral dominions to pay a debt that had no existence, and to furnish provision to keep up a force which the treaty of 1800 prohibited the British Government from requiring me to maintain."

To this overwhelming statement what will the gentlemen of the Foreign Office reply? They will take their stand on the faith of treaties! The Nizam complains of being despoiled by the treaty of 1853; they will affect to show that having been despoiled by it he can have no redress. Lord Dalhousie drafted that treaty, and of course wrote a grandiloquent preamble to it, stating that it was made to settle pending differences—which it did by depriving the Nizam of what he not only desired, but had a right, to keep. But that treaty after all was more or less tainted by an element of undisguised intimidation; the invasion of Hyderabad was openly threatened if the Nizam's signature was refused, and refusal became impossible. Therefore so much stress will not be laid upon that document as upon the treaty of 1860, which was a very different affair, and was indeed quite a boon to the Nizam, for which he can never be sufficiently grateful.

Let us see what the treaty of 1860 really was. Berar having been once fairly secured by the treaty of 1853, we found ourselves somewhat embarrassed by the pledges that we had made to the Nizam with regard to the administration of it. Before we could get him to sign that treaty, even under the threat of invasion, we had to promise him that our administration of the districts would not cost him more than did that of his own Talookdars, or twelve and a half per cent. of the gross collections. But ignoring this pledge, when we had managed to extort the treaty and get possession, we at once swelled out the cost of administration to about four times the stipulated amount. We were bound, however, by the same treaty to furnish the Nizam with annual accounts, and being fully conscious that the Nizam would challenge the scale of expenditure whenever he heard of it, what did we do? Reduce the scale of expenditure, and so bring

ourselves back within the range of our treaty sanctions ? No ; we withheld the annual accounts. The excessive expenditure, of course, annihilated the annual surplus that a third stipulation of the treaty had provided for, and as this had gone on nearly seven long years, no wonder that the position of the Government of India became somewhat compromising. The strait they were in was not disguised from them by their own officer, the Resident at Hyderabad, who wrote them on 6th July 1859 :—"I am prepared to expect the Minister will object to the extravagance of our management. There is no doubt General Low, C.B., allowed the former Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, and the present one, Sir Salar Jung, to suppose that our management would cost about two annas in the rupee, or about twelve and a half per cent. on the revenue, and I distinctly remember its being used as an argument to induce compliance in signing the treaty by General Low." And again, on the 6th August 1860, the Resident informed his Government that "the delay [of seven years!] in placing the results of our administration before the Nizam, naturally tended to engender disappointment which it was difficult to appease, and to elicit remonstrances which it daily became more perplexing to reply to satisfactorily." The Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood, also frankly said in his despatch to the Government of India of 18th June 1861, that "the omission to render accounts to His Highness" had been made on purpose to avoid "giving him the opportunity of urging objections to the heads of your expenditure." An embarrassing position it must be admitted ! And to add to the difficulties of the situation, we had chosen to expend considerable sums of money on the river Godavery without consulting the Nizam, through a corner of whose territory that river ran, and we wished him to cede the odd corner of territory to us and to forego his right to levy duties on the passage of the river. What was to be done ? Diplomacy was equal to the occasion, and proposed a spick and span new treaty, "to offer His Highness a public mark of the acknowledgments of the British Government" for "his zeal and constancy" to us during the terrible days of the mutinies ! A treaty providing for these munificent acknowledgments was prepared, in which the following points were provided for :—(1). That the whole of the Nizam's coveted possessions on the left bank of the Godavery should be ceded in perpetuity to the British Government. (2). That the Nizam should relinquish his right to levy transit duties on goods passing up and down the river. (3). That the Nizam should extricate the British Government from its dilemma in having spent in administration all the surplus which they were bound by the treaty of 1853 to pay over, by cancelling its right to any accounts from the assigned districts whatever, for both past and future. (4). That the British Government were to have in future unlimited latitude of expenditure of the revenues of the districts retained. (5). That the Nizam should give up all his crown lands in Berar, which were interspersed with those assigned in 1853, and so caused inconvenience to the British Government.

It was of course necessary to make a show of giving some off-set for these extraordinary concessions, if the new treaty were to have even a pretence of equality of advantage, much more of being "a public mark of acknowledgment for loyalty ;" so there was added :—(1). The restoration to the Nizam of the territories which, it was clearly seen, would furnish revenue utterly in excess of the payments due under the treaty of 1853. All surplus revenue was due to the Nizam's coffers, and of course should be paid over sooner or later. The Resident told his Government, on the 12th August 1860, that in restoring these surplus districts "he thought it clear that they make no pecuniary sacrifice." "My greatest difficulty in this negotiation," he states, "has been to counteract the impression in the Nizam's mind that we were merely giving him back what is his own." (2). The writing off the alleged debt of fifty lakhs of rupees with which the treaty of 1853 originally began, but which the Resident states, in his letter to Government of the 12th October 1860, he had "acknowledged by the treaty of 1853 under pressure, but never considered he justly owed," was paraded to the Nizam and to the world as a "cancelment ;" but nevertheless Lord Canning admitted in his letter to the Resident, dated 7th July 1860, that it really did

not need cancelment at all, but had been liquidated by "the excessive civil expenditure of past years being set off" against it. (3). The so-called cession to the Nizam by the British Government of the zemindaree or principality of Shorapore, the zemindar of which had been deposed for rebellion and disturbance. The zemindar of Shorapore was a feudatory of the Nizam and as such his territory of course rightfully lapsed to him. Under the 17th article of the treaty of 1800 the Shorapore zemindar is specially mentioned by name, and secured to the Nizam as a feudatory, and the services of the British Subsidiary Force were specially pledged to His Highness in all future time for checking all "rebellion or disturbance" on the part of the said feudatory, and even for coercing him, if required, into paying the tribute which it was by that treaty recognised due to the Nizam by him. Such, then, were the terms of the treaty of 1860. Let any one just take the pains to add up the stipulations on either side, and see to which side the balance leans, or rather whether alongside of undoubted sacrifices by the Nizam, there is a vestige of real sacrifice of anything that was our own, made by us to the Nizam at all.

Viewed as a reward to the Nizam the treaty of 1860 was a mere pretence. The real nature of the transaction is sufficiently manifest from the analysis of the document we have given, but to place the matter beyond any doubt we have only to refer to page 26 of the parliamentary papers of 1867 on the subject, from which it appears that Mr. Secretary Beadon having endeavoured to coerce the Nizam into the virtual cession of Berar and a relinquishment of his right to its surplus revenues, the Resident wrote back : "It has come to this, the Nizam will not, unless frightened or intimidated, agree to anything but his former terms." That portion of "the public mark of acknowledgment of the Nizam's zeal and constancy" which consisted of his cession to use of the slip of territory on the Godavery was a real diplomatic triumph. It was assumed that the Nizam had agreed to the cession, while he imagined he had only been discussing the question, and he was written to in these terms, "The British Government will not allow His Highness the Nizam to *retract* from the cession of the Godavery talooks," and he was significantly informed that any attempt to do so "will assuredly lead to *an unfriendly and angry feeling* between the two Governments." The Nizam had been favoured with a letter a week before, requesting "that His Highness would *take into his serious and earnest consideration the Governor-General's proposals*"—a form of speech which in the vernacular implied a distinct threat. Our readers can now decide for themselves how well justified was the preamble of the treaty that it was entered into "to give all possible solemnity to certain acts marking the high esteem in which His Highness the Nizam is held by Her Majesty the Queen." It certainly was a masterpiece of diplomatic art to lead the Nizam on to such negotiations under the assurance that the main object of the whole was "to offer His Highness a public mark of the acknowledgments of the British Government!" Yet such is the principle of the two treaties on which the Foreign Office will rest its case. The Nizam appeals to the treaty of 1800, and says that in the face of it he has been despoiled by two other treaties—or so-called treaties—for he alleges that the essential element of free consent was wanting to them—and it is his chief grievance that he was forced to sign them. The Foreign Office will reply, "Treaties are sacred things and can never be set aside!" If that be so, what shall we say to their behaviour in respect to the treaty of 1800? Is a treaty of value only when a Native Prince gives up something by it, and of no value when he is entitled to anything under it? This is practically what the contention of the Foreign Office comes to, but fortunately very different principles prevail amongst the British people, by whom in the last resort such questions are decided.

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STANDARD (LONDON), 1875.—*An Indian Grievance*.—The following letter, signed "Traveller," has been addressed to us, dated 17th March :—

"SIR,—I should like to call public attention to a most important Indian case, now, as I am given to understand, under the consideration of the India Office,

on the right solution of which our future relations with the independent princes of India must very materially depend.

"Stated in plain language the matter seems simple enough. The Chief, or as they call him, the Nizam of the Hyderabad State in the Deccan, once a Viceroy of the Delhi Moguls, entertained, many years ago, a force of natives officered by Europeans, and called the Hyderabad Contingent. This little force, like the troops of most native states, was not over regularly paid. The British came to the rescue and advanced some 300,000*l.* which, with interest, was made to amount to about half a million sterling.

"Conveniently forgetting, that by the admission of their own officers they owed the Nizam *per contra*, some six or seven hundred thousand pounds, they demanded from him payment of the money they had from time to time advanced to the troops, together with the interest, and forced him under threat of a military occupation, which would probably have brought about his instant dethronement, to make over his best provinces, 'the Berars,' as security for the debt, and for the future regular payment of the troops.

"The Nizam yielded at the bayonet's point, and even then, only on the assurance, which our representative, General Low, was explicitly empowered by his Government to give, that the transfer was temporary, and solely for the objects named. A reference to General Sir John Low, now residing in honoured retirement in this country, would irrefragably establish this point.

"The fictitious debt of half a million has since been cancelled, and the Nizam's Minister, Sir Salar Jung, to whom alone we owe the tenure of Southern India in 1857, asks for the restoration of the Berars to the Government of the Nizam, and offers to provide amply for any claim on his Government arising out of the Contingent Force (which with minor charges costs about 300,000*l.* a year), by placing in the hands of the Governor-General a capital sum the interest of which shall be sufficient to meet these charges.

"This offer has been refused at Calcutta.

"The rulers and people of India alike look on the Queen's proclamation of 1858 as a charter of their rights, and habitually express their hope and belief that under its protection their just claims will be conceded. Let us hope that the Nizam's case, now that it has been referred home, will be considered in the spirit of justice which inspired that proclamation."

MADRAS MAIL, *July 13, 1875.*—*Native Opinion in India.*—The following letter has been addressed to the editor of the *Spectator* by Colonel G. U. Yule, dated Beech Hill, Haddington, N. B., May 27 :—

"SIR,—Allow me to tell you of the gratification with which I read your article on 'Native opinion' in the last number of the *Spectator*. Views such as those you express seldom appear in the papers, and nowhere have I seen a clearer exposition of what I believe to be truth regarding the feelings of the natives of India towards us, an exposition very necessary, I think, because the general idea on this subject is so very far from the truth.

"Look at any Indian article in our leading papers, look at our legislation in India itself. Do not all proceed on the same assumption that wisdom and justice of our rule are perfect, and that the natives of India, though they may object to some parts of our system, nevertheless prefer our rule to that of their own princes; that in fact they are totally wanting in that pride common to all other nations of the world,—pride in their country, in their fore-fathers, and in themselves?

"If an opposite opinion is expressed the speaker is stared at in amazement, 'What prefer oppression, cruelty, disorder, misrule, to their opposites!' We harp upon our own justice, and lose sight of the fact that there may be and are considerations involving deep sentiment which to the native mind compensate largely for the said oppression, cruelty, &c., and far outweigh all substantial advantages of an equitable foreign rule. Did justice alone ever yet win affection? Would the Almighty Himself be loved for His justice alone? Then, again, how does our justice exhibit itself in India? In cases between man and man, so far at any rate as honest intentions go, we are perhaps blameless; but as between ourselves and

those who stand in our way—in the way of our extension of territory or predominance of influence—where is our justice ? I do not now refer to conquests won by the sword, but rather to our generally successful attempts to obtain cessions of land and the other peaceful modes of acquisition.

“Look, for instance, at the case of the Nizam. We take an enormous slice from him (the ceded territories) on condition of keeping up a force to protect him from foreign attack and domestic disorder. We do neither, but simply make use of the force to keep him in order. We were bound by treaty to assist *him* in asserting his authority in his own dominions, but as soon as that treaty was executed we refused to do so, and the Nizam was consequently obliged to keep up an irregular force of his own for the purpose. We grudged him that, took it, kept it at his expense—at a cost far exceeding that of a similar strength in our own armies—ran him into debt, and compelled him by actual threats of force to assign us certain districts (the Berars) to pay for the keep of this force, so long as he should wish it to be kept up.

“Now, when by good administration the Nizam’s Minister is able himself to pay the force, and offers to do so—or can do without it, and says so—we refuse to give up the districts assigned for its maintenance. ‘What!’ say we, ‘thrust back an unwilling people under the feet of their oppressors?’

“But are they an unwilling people ; do they think the Nizam’s Government oppressive ? Are we to do certain wrong for our own immediate gain on pretence of preventing conjectured hardship to others ? The result of our constant ill-treatment of the Nizam, from almost our first connection with him until now, has been to increase and strengthen the sentiment of his subjects in his favour. In no country of the world, so far as I am competent to form an opinion, does a more reverential and affectionate regard for the ruler prevail. They may cheat him, and in many ways oppose him, but at the same time they would, high and low, sooner be governed by him than by us.

“Is it very different, by the by, with the Gaekwar ? Did his subjects complain of him ? What was the nature of the oppression proved against him ? Was his conduct towards his subjects criminal, or was it merely that his administration—in fact, his revenue collection—had got into a state of confusion ? It would appear to have been the latter only, otherwise the Viceroy would not have given him time to reform. A period of grace was allowed him. The agent of our own Government, Sir Lewis Pelly, reported that reform was progressing. Yet before the period has expired our Government, not punishing him for an offence for which he has been tried, dethrone and banish him for misrule. In other words, they by one act break their word and being, from some cause or other unable to sentence the man for the offence for which he has been tried they punish him for another which they had previously temporarily condoned ! Yet hear the press chorus, ‘Substantial justice has been done.’ What does that very vague phrase mean ? Does it not mean simply that an act of gross injustice has been perpetrated in order to arrive at a conclusion which the speaker approves ? After such examples what must the natives of India think of the justice of our rule ? Mind, I am not upholding the Gaekwar ; my own personal conviction is that he was guilty ; nor did I blame the Government for appointing the Commission. I took it for granted (like most other people, I suppose) that before doing so they had carefully examined the evidence, and were convinced of its absolute strength. I merely speak with reference to the general principles of justice, which it seems to me have been violated in this case.”

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BOMBAY GAZETTE, *January 1, 1876*.—Since 1858 there has been no more eventful year in the annals of India than that which has just expired. The new era of peace and consolidation which began with the assumption by the Crown of the direct Government of India had up to 1875 supplied no more exciting topics for discussion than purely administrative questions about the incidence of the income-tax, the proper dimensions of barracks for European troops, the merits of different gauges for Indian railways, and the extent to which reproductive

public works should be constructed out of borrowed capital. The Government of India had had one or two little frontier wars to amuse itself with in addition to the usual squabbles with refractory Native Princes ; and the hidden fires of discontent, beneath the surface of general tranquillity, had revealed their existence in the formidable Wahabee conspiracy and assassinations of Justice Norman and Lord Mayo ; but the ordinary condition of the country was one of perfect order and entire submission to the unquestioned authority of the British Government. Lord Northbrook must be held responsible for the revival of political controversy in 1875, and for having exposed to damaging criticism the whole system of British rule in this country, and more especially the relations between the paramount power and its principal feudatories. Early in January 1875 the Viceroy, having summoned to Calcutta Mr. Souter, the Police Commissioner of Bombay, and gone over with him anxiously and deliberately the evidence he had gathered at Baroda regarding the attempt to poison the Resident, Colonel Phayre, satisfied himself that the Gaekwar Mulharrao had been an accomplice in the plot. A wing of a European regiment and a battery of artillery were forthwith despatched from Poona by way of Bombay to Baroda ; the Gaekwar's reforming Minister, Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji and his friends, seeing that matters were getting serious, prudently resigned office and made themselves scarce ; and on the 14th of January Sir Lewis Pelly, the Governor-General's Agent at Baroda, arrested Mulharrao and assumed the administration of the State. To conciliate native opinion, which might be startled at this act of vigour, the Government of India at the same time promised, in a proclamation, to have Mulharrao fairly tried, and, whatever might be the issue of the trial, to refrain from annexing Baroda to the British dominions. On this hint the Mahrattas of Poona and Bombay, whose sentimental feelings were outraged by the arrest of a Mahratta Sovereign, and who besides had material interests involved, as many Sirdars and Brahmins of the Deccan were maintained by the bounty of Mulharrao, commenced an agitation which, while nominally confined to the approval of Lord Northbrook's policy, was really intended to convey the impression that the sympathies of natives generally were with that Prince. An attempt made to hold a public meeting in Bombay was defeated by the refusal of the Parsees to make common cause with the Mahrattas, who did not feel themselves strong enough to act alone ; but at Poona popular gatherings and prayer meetings were held, and a well-written memorial on the duties of the paramount power and the privileges of Native Princes was drawn up and sent to the Viceroy. Alarmed, apparently, at these hostile demonstrations, and eager to make matters smooth, Lord Northbrook came to the extraordinary resolution to appoint a Commission consisting of three European and three native members, not to try the Gaekwar, but to inquire into the case and report upon it, the right to pronounce the final verdict being reserved to the Government of India. The distinction between an inquiry and a trial was, of course, at once overlooked by the public ; for it was considered out of the question that the Government of India, after appointing a solemn tribunal to hear evidence in open court, could refuse to abide by the report of its own Commissioners. The Commissioners nominated were Sir. R. Couch, Chief Justice of Bengal, Sir R. Meade, Mr. P. S. Melvill, the Maharaja Scindia, the Maharaja of Jeypore, and Sir Dinkur Rao. On what precedent Lord Northbrook acted in thus asking Native Princes to sit in judgment on one of their own order it is hard to say. Mr. Hunter mentions in his *Life of Lord Mayo* that the Viceroy proposed at one time to employ the Maharaja of Jeypore as an arbitrator to inquire into the grievances of the Chief of Ulwar's discontented subjects, with a view to their remedy. " If," Lord Mayo wrote, " I can find an officer of sufficient rank and experience to go down and arbitrate in this matter, I would be inclined to ask the Maharaja of Jeypore to assist in the arbitration. He is a member of our Legislative Council, though a Rajpoot of Rajpoots, he is an enlightened Prince, and I cannot but think that it would have a great effect in Rajpootana were we to call in, for the settlement of a very dangerous dispute, the assistance of one of the oldest and most respected of their own Chiefs." The march of events in Ulwar was

too rapid to allow this experiment to be tried ; but if Lord Northbrook was guided in the Baroda case by the example of what his predecessor had wished to do in Rajpootana, he evidently forgot that in Ulwar the dispute was between the Chief and his subjects, while in Baroda the Native Prince was accused of trying to murder the representative of the British Government. No doubt Lord Northbrook considered that it would immensely strengthen the moral position of the British Government if such Chiefs as Scindia and Jeypore, and such a Brahmin of Brahmins as Dinkur Rao, concurred in the expediency of deposing the Gaekwar ; but to expect them to forego all prejudices of race, religion, and self-interest, and to decree the deposition of one of the chief Native Sovereigns of India even if he had plotted against the life of the British Resident at his Court, was to give them credit for a power of self-abnegation in excess of human nature. The result of the inquiry justified the fear that the appointment of a mixed Commission would turn out to be a grave political mistake. The Court sat at Baroda and heard evidence publicly, observing all the forms of a regular criminal trial. Mr. Serjeant Ballantine, who had been retained as chief counsel for the defence, and who was allowed to cross-examine witnesses, took from the first the line of representing the prosecution as a conspiracy against his unhappy client organized by the police, and to which perhaps Colonel Phayre himself might have been a party. Reports of the proceedings were published from day to day by the Bombay newspapers, which had established branch printing offices at Baroda for the occasion, and the Serjeant's outspoken criticisms were welcomed with wild delight by the whole Mahratta population of Western India. The trial lasted for three weeks, and day by day the popular excitement increased. The native press became insolent and even mutinous in language, openly proclaiming the belief of the people in Mulharrao's innocence, and demanding that he should be released and restored to his throne. After Serjeant Ballantine's closing speech for the defence, in which he declared that the evidence was not sufficient to convict the veriest pickpocket, the champions of Mulharrao felt assured of a victory ; and their confidence seemed to be well founded, when, early in March, one or two of the leading English papers, and notably the *Times* and *Pall Mall Gazette*, without even having the decency to wait for the report of the Commissioners, asserted, on the strength of what was brought out by Serjeant Ballantine in cross-examination, that the prosecution had completely broken down and that Mulharrao ought to be acquitted. It soon leaked out, moreover, that the Commission was equally divided in opinion about the Gaekwar's guilt, the European Commissioners regarding the evidence for the prosecution as conclusive, while the Native Commissioners considered it insufficient and refused to convict the Gaekwar. Lord Salisbury, having the English press on his side, thought that the inquiry should be treated as null and void ; but the Government of India, perceiving, when too late, into what a scrape it had thrust itself, and understanding that the acquittal and restoration of Mulharrao would be fatal to its authority in India, pleaded its right, according to the terms of the proclamation appointing the Commissioners, to act on the opinion of Sir Richard Couch and his European colleagues. The controversy was prolonged for a fortnight, and it was not till the 19th of April that the Viceroy in Council decreed the deposition of Mulharrao, and issued a proclamation in the name of " Her Majesty's Government " stating that the whole case against the Gaekwar for the attempted murder of Colonel Phayre had been set aside, and that he had been deposed on account of his general misgovernment. *Immediately afterwards* a resolution by the Government of India was published emphatically affirming the guilt of Mulharrao in the poisoning case ; and the puzzled public was inclined to admire the firmness of Lord Northbrook, believing that he had been overruled by the Secretary of State, and that he had only not sent in his resignation of the Governor-Generalship for fear of giving the malcontents in India cause to triumph. The deposition of Mulharrao was effected easily enough, and there was no disturbance except an insignificant riot by the partizans of Luxmeebae, his latest wife, and their infant child. The people of Baroda, who had every reason to hate their ruler, readily acquiesced in the transfer of the sovereignty to a distant



branch of the Gaekwar family ; and the Viceroy got the credit of having redeemed his reputation by acting at last with vigour and promptness. Some time afterwards, however, a minute by Lord Northbrook was published, from which it appeared that His Lordship had accommodated himself with the Secretary of State and saved his appointment by abandoning the firm ground on which he had stood, and actually condescending to express his concurrence in Lord Salisbury's argument for deposing Mulharrao. Now, the Government of India had deprived the Government of Bombay of the control over Baroda affairs, because the latter Government advocated interference in Baroda to secure to the people of that State a decent form of administration, and because it insisted on supporting Colonel Playre in his efforts to show the real character of Mulharrao's rule. It could not, therefore, without the grossest inconsistency and meanness, fall back, after it had given up the poisoning case, on the reports of the Bombay Government and Colonel Playre, and punish Mulharrao for misgovernment which it had explicitly condoned. The Government of India was also well aware that, according to the terms of Lord Canning's sunnud, the right of succession to the throne could not be legally taken away from Mulharrao's family unless that Prince had been disloyal to the British Government ; yet it deliberately ousted Mulharrao's child. It seemed impossible to combine greater weakness of conduct with greater arbitrariness of disposition ; and Lord Northbrook's character as a statesman was destroyed by his own minute. The Viceroy, however, reaped his reward. The influence of Lord Salisbury secured him the support of an obsequious Parliament ; and the degeneracy of Parliamentary Government was marked by the silence maintained throughout the Session in the Houses of Lords and Commons on a subject which had been fiercely discussed by the press, which had engaged the attention of the civilized world, and which touched the very vitals of British rule in India. It is understood that Lord Northbrook has learnt only one lesson from the Baroda blunder ; he has been casting about ever since for means of silencing the native press. He does not see that any measures he might invent for this purpose would be ineffectual unless he could at the same time gag the English papers published in India and in England. It shows how lacking he is in intelligence and foresight when he wishes to protect himself by effacing public opinion. Can he not understand that his only safety is in acting wisely and making himself respected, and that however tightly he shuts down the safety valve, and however resolutely he sits upon it, he and the ship and ship's crew are sure some day to be blown into the air ?

Scarcely had Lord Northbrook been saved out of the Baroda scrape than he began to make a mess of things in Burma. In February Mr. Margary, who had travelled across China from the east coast to Bhamo, and had been requested to accompany back to the capital of Yunnan a Mission under Colonel Browne despatched by the Government of India to explore the routes between Burma and Western China, was murdered by the Chinese, while at the same time the Mission was attacked and driven back by an overpowering force. Several intercepted letters suggested the inference that the King of Burma had been privy to the hostile designs of the Chinese, and this suspicion was confirmed by his ostentatious reception with the utmost honours of the Governor of Yunnan, who was supposed to have sanctioned the murder of Mr. Margary and the attack on the British Mission. When, therefore, it became known that Sir Douglas Forsyth, the Viceroy's most trusted Political Officer, had been sent as Envoy to Mandalay to demand explanations on this subject as well as to arrange a trifling frontier difficulty, great hopes were entertained that the King would at last be called to account. It was even rumoured that Sir Douglas had been instructed not to take his shoes off on entering the royal presence, and that if remonstrated with he would serve the barbarian Monarch much as the Norman noble did the King of France, when being sent to do homage for Duke Rollo by kissing the royal foot he seized it and upset the King in the presence of all his courtiers. Sir Douglas, however, only stipulated that the dirty approach to the King's audience room should be covered with a carpet, so that when he took his boots off he might be able to keep



his stockings clean ; and the ridicule excited by this incident was changed into disgust when it was found that the King's disclaimer of opposition to the British Mission was at once accepted, though with a little trouble his guilt might probably have been made as clear as the Gaekwar's, and that the Envoy came away satisfied in spite of the King's distinct refusal to let another British Mission be escorted through his territory by an armed force. Sir Douglas Forsyth has since shown that he acted strictly according to instructions in all he did at Mandalay ; and the humiliation inflicted on the British name by his abortive Embassy must therefore be placed to the account of the Government of India. Lord Northbrook has not ventured openly to throw the blame on his Envoy ; he even published a resolution approving of all Sir Douglas had done. But it is nevertheless understood that this favourite has been sacrificed to exigencies of State, that is to say, he has been *made a scapegoat* for the Viceroy's sins, and that he will not be again employed on important missions. The Government of India has since feebly striven to regain its ascendancy at the Court of Mandalay by opening fresh negotiations through the Resident ; but the King evades the real question by consenting to let an armed escort pass through Burma, but making difficulties about what its strength shall be ; and meanwhile no Mission is sent, and the murder of Mr. Margary and the repulse of Colonel Browne remain unavenged and are well-nigh forgotten.

In the province of Finance, which was supposed to be peculiarly Lord Northbrook's own, the blunders of the year were as conspicuous as in politics. The changed values of goods, and the engagements made by Lord Salisbury with Manchester, rendered necessary a revision of the Indian Tariff. The Viceroy accordingly appointed a Committee which recommended some important alterations, most of which would be advantageous to trade. At a meeting of the Legislative Council held in Simla, the mercantile members being absent, the Viceroy passed the new Tariff, adding to the suggestions of the Committee the extraordinary provision, intended to gratify Manchester and yet not injure the Indian revenue, that an import duty should be levied on long-stapled cotton imported into India for the manufacture of the finer makes of goods, by way of compensation to the English manufacturers for the retention of the import duties on their cloth and yarn. Such an unprincipled "dodge—" for it was nothing better—roused the indignation of both India and Manchester. The Government of India had given up the principle that the import duties on English goods could be defended, and, after thus inviting renewed attacks on those duties, had had recourse to the foolish expedient of mocking the English manufacturers with a boon which the semi-official papers in India were careful to explain could be no boon at all. How shortsighted Lord Northbrook must be to suppose he can delude keen men of business in this way ! The result of his device is that Sir Louis Mallet has been sent out by Lord Salisbury to revise the Tariff anew ; and, though the Viceroy seems to be trying to keep Sir Louis at a distance as long as he can, he must see him at last and abandon his absurd double system of protection. Then will come the turn of Mr. T. C. Hope, of the Bombay Civil Service, who is at present Lord Northbrook's reigning favourite, but who, when his policy is perforce given up, will find himself discarded as remorselessly as Lord Northbrook was. But Mr. Hope's star is still in the ascendant, and the Viceroy has entrusted to him the congenial task of carrying through the Legislative Council a Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Bill, the object of which is to place all landholders in this Presidency at the mercy of zealous revenue officials by depriving them of the protection of the Civil Courts. With how little wisdom the Government of India must be conducted, when such a hateful Bill is thrust upon Bombay at the instance of the most dangerous adviser the Viceroy could have selected out of the whole Civil Service of this Presidency !

Public attention has, however, recently been diverted from the Viceroy's blunders by an event which will be memorable in the history of India. The English people are so jealous of any increase of the political influence of the Royal Family that the Prince of Wales, though he has now reached a time of

life when with reasonable men the love of pleasure yields to the nobler passion of ambition, is precluded from taking any active share in the government of England. It seems to have occurred to Mr. Disraeli, however, that His Royal Highness might have the satisfaction of becoming an important political personage, and of doing good service to the State, if he were to visit the greatest dependency of the British Crown, and to try the effect of his personal presence in quickening the loyalty of the people of India. But, to prevent disappointment, the political motive of the Prince's journey was carefully concealed. No stress was laid on the investment of the Khedive's heir by His Royal Highness with the Star of India, although this significant proof of the intimacy of England's relations with Egypt was soon to be followed by the master-stroke of the Suez Canal purchase, and the virtual transfer to English hands of the management of Egyptian finance. For a long time, too, the Prince's voyage to India was represented as undertaken chiefly for pleasure; and it was not till he had landed in Bombay, and been received with an enthusiasm which surprised and delighted the English people, that the political aspect of the tour began to be generally recognized. Since His Royal Highness left Bombay he has been borne from one triumph to another, and his progress through India will be completed, we may venture to hope, as satisfactorily as it has been begun. It is too soon to say if His Royal Highness's visit will make a lasting impression; but we believe it will, for, besides bringing out, in a marked manner the general contentment of the mass of the nation with British rule, it has undoubtedly had the effect of familiarizing the people, in a way previously unknown, with the fact of their immediate subjection to an Imperial dynasty to which the greatest Princes of India, Mussulman and Hindoo, alike owe allegiance. The only discordant note in the preparations for the Prince's reception was struck by the Nizam's Government, which refused, on the plea of his ill-health, to let the youthful Sovereign of Hyderabad come down to Bombay to pay his homage to the Heir to the British Crown. This difficulty might have been settled quietly if Lord Northbrook had not detected in it a splendid opportunity for making another blunder. The Government of India knows very well the change that has taken place in Sir Salar Jung's feelings owing to his disappointment about Berar, and it probably had good reasons for supposing that the reason alleged by the Hyderabad Court for keeping the Nizam at home was not the real one. But, instead of frankly expressing its sentiments, or else saying nothing about them, it stupidly began to wrangle with Sir Salar Jung, and to show that while professing confidence in him it really distrusted him. The Hyderabad Minister, profiting by Mulharrao's example, sent the correspondence to the English papers, which indignantly denounced the Government for insulting a man who in 1857-8 was one of the best friends the English had in India. Lord Northbrook, having recourse to his usual policy, affronted Mr. Saunders, the Resident at Hyderabad, who was going away on leave, by offering to transfer him to Mysore when he returned to India; and Mr. Saunders at once resigned the service. Mr. Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary, will, it is understood, be the next victim; for the Viceroy seems to care for no one but himself, and has already driven many able and independent men into retirement, and earned for himself the cordial dislike of the Indian services. Not gifted with a statesmanlike capacity, and yet insatiable in grasping at arbitrary power which he does not know how to use when he has got it, he leans on one favourite after another, and at each new breakdown some new man is sacrificed. If we may use a vulgar illustration to depict the character of so great a personage, we might say that he reminds us of Mr. Winkle on the ice. "These are very awkward skates, Mr. Weller," said Mr. Winkle. "I am afeard there's a very orkard gen'lman in 'em, Sir," said Sam.

STATESMAN, *January 13, 1876*.—There is certainly a very great change for the better in the present tone of the *Bombay Gazette* towards Sir Salar Jung, although it still professes to believe that the sickness of the young Nizam was a mere excuse. The paper now writes:—

"The Minister of the Nizam is an able and courteous gentleman and a man of honour, but he is a very ambitious man, and certainly not above an intrigue. His

one ambition is, and it is a right and fair one, to use his utmost endeavours to restore his country with integrity to his master on his becoming of age. This is a just ambition, and one to be respected, but the Minister errs in taking bye-paths to attain this in place of the direct one. Sir Salar Jung holds the opinion that one of the secrets of our power in India is our unanimity, and the honest support every Englishman gives to the other at the critical moment. He has apparently been induced to change this view from misreading a free press, and the opinions of a few adventurous Englishmen about him. The Minister never committed a greater blunder, for he may rest assured that Englishmen will take some time before they forget or overlook the error he has made."

"Now, to set this matter at rest, we shall publish, almost immediately, the correspondence that really took place between the Resident and the Nizam's Minister, and leave it to speak for itself. Parts of it we regret to be obliged to omit from motives of delicacy : their publication would only make the case stronger. When therefore the *Bombay Gazette* says that 'The Hyderabad blunder is a subject 'that cannot be too much ventilated, for really we cannot afford to have any more 'such blunders,' we agree cordially : only don't let him dishonestly say the blunder was Sir Salar Jung's, and that he requires forgiveness from Englishmen 'who will 'neither forget nor overlook the error he has made ;' for such writing is dishonest."

INDIAN DAILY NEWS, *May 3, 1876*.—If the Permanent Settlement cannot be laid aside, on what ground can the Government of India refuse to restore the Berars to the Hyderabad Court if that Court guarantees the payment of the salaries of the Contingent ? The answer that in accepting the charge of the Assigned Districts as a security for the payment of the salaries of the Contingent the Government did not bind itself to restore those districts at any future time is hardly less immoral than the conduct of a trustee who fails to use trust funds in the prescribed way. The plea that it is good for the people of the Berars that they should remain under British rule is, when fairly considered, scarcely more logical than that of the robber who holds that he would spend the contents of his victim's purse in a better way than would the victim himself. Who is to be the judge in a case of this kind ? And is might to be taken as involving right ? It will be seen that we do not really draw any contrast whatever between British rule and native rule : and it may be as well to point here, in passing, that absurd comparisons between trade profits under the two kinds of rule can have no bearing whatever on the question. But admitting even that British rule is better than native rule there is no reason for forcing the benefits of the former on a portion of Hyderabad that could not be advanced with equal force to support the English annexation of every misgoverned country in the universe. If it does not follow from all this that the Berars ought never to be annexed, it is because there may be other obvious considerations bearing on the case with which it is foreign to our present purpose to deal. In conclusion, we may invite attention once more to the forcible suppression by the Government of religious rites which the public morality of the day could not tolerate. In its action against these the Government placed itself above all law and all engagements ; and it is generally held to have done right. No doubt the public safety is the supreme law of all governments. But the application of that in detail is, as we have seen, attended with some difficulties.

WORLD, *May 31, 1876*.—*Sir Salar Jung's Mission*.—It is no secret that the visit of Sir Salar Jung to England is connected with the question of the Berars. Why that visit is necessary is not a pleasant story to tell ; for in all the history of our dealings with the Native Princes of India there is not one page more dark, more disgraceful, more humiliating than that which tells of our relations with the Nizam. Our statement is founded solely on official documents, on treaties, and on the letters of the highest officials in India, the great majority of which have appeared in Blue Books.

The Berars, the richest provinces of the Nizam, came into the possession of the British, by virtue of a treaty in the year 1853, as a security for the payment

of the force known as the Hyderabad Contingent. This treaty was supplemented by another in 1860, which altered some of the relations in which the contracting parties stood to each other. The contention of the Nizam is that this treaty of 1853 was unjustly forced upon him in defiance of right and of the treaty of 1800, which had up to that time governed the relations between the two countries ; and he demands that the treaties of 1853 and 1860 should therefore be cancelled, and that he should revert to the treaty of 1800.

A few words will explain the relations between the two powers prior to the treaty of 1800. The Government of the Nizam had from its earliest contact with us—that is to say, in 1747—been friendly to the British power in India. It had early sided with us in our struggle with the French, and with one or two exceptions the friendly connection had remained unbroken. The end of the century saw us bound together by common interests against common foes. Tippoo at Seringapatam and the Mahrattas on the Deccan threatened both powers alike, and the treaty, offensive and defensive, of 1798 testified to the closeness of the bond. Two years later the treaty of 1800 drew the tie still closer ; for by it the British Government guaranteed absolutely the integrity of the Nizam's dominions against all comers, while the Nizam on his part ceded to England in perpetuity a large portion of his territories—one-third, indeed, of the whole,—the revenue to be derived therefrom to be devoted to the maintenance of a Subsidiary Force, which was fixed at 8,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, with the requisite complement of guns. An article was inserted specifying expressly that no further demand should ever be made by the British on behalf of this force. This Subsidiary Force was, by the terms of the treaty, to be stationed in time of peace in the Nizam's dominion, and was to be at his disposal to put down insurrection and restrain the feudal rajahs. The English pledged themselves to abstain from all interference of any kind in the internal affairs of the Nizam's dominion. In case the two powers should take the field together against a common foe, the Nizam agreed to put 6,000 infantry and 9,000 horse with artillery in the field, and further to use every effort to bring the whole force of his kingdom into the field.

At first all went well. Seringapatam fell, and the kingdom of Tippoo was broken up ; the Hyderabad troops did their share of the work, and were honourably mentioned in despatches, and at the end of the fighting the territories acquired were divided as agreed upon by a secret article of the treaty. The Berars fell to the share of the Nizam because they had formerly been a portion of the Nizam's dominions and had been wrested from him by the Mahrattas. By 1803 peace was established, and from that period up to the date of the Mutiny the allied powers never took the field together against a common foe, nor was the Nizam ever called upon to furnish his Contingent of horsemen and infantry.

The Nizam might in 1803 reasonably look forward to a future of peace and prosperity. He had received from an all-powerful ally and protector a guarantee for the integrity of his dominions against all foes ; he had provided for the maintenance of a standing army, and military expenses would therefore form no item of his budget, and he had the solemn agreement that England would in no way interfere with the internal administration of his affairs. His future appeared in every way assured. Unhappily he counted on the good faith of the India Government, and upon a more rotten staff could no man lean.

Secunder Jah, however, who succeeded to the throne in 1803, was roughly undeceived. Our very first step was an absolute prohibition to him to remove his Chief Minister, a man hateful to the population but devoted to our interest. In vain the Nizam protested, in vain quoted Article 15 of the treaty, binding the Company “not to interfere with the Nizam's children, subjects, servants or concerns.” For nearly fifty years we ruled Hyderabad by Ministers appointed by ourselves, and maintained in power by our bayonets. The British Resident, Sir C. Metcalfe, writing of the utter breakdown of the Nizam under the troubles in which we had involved him, said, “I can hardly imagine a situation more entitled to pity, or more calculated to disarm criticism, than that of a Prince so held in subjection by his servant, under the support of an irrepressible foreign power.” For

even now the "Contingent" was draining the life-blood of Hyderabad. The exact date of the creation of this force is unknown ; but it certainly came into existence by the contrivance of Mr. (afterward Sir) H. Russell, the British Resident prior to Sir C. Metcalfe. Little pressure would have been needed on his part to induce the Minister kept in power by ourselves to agree, first, that a force should be raised and officered by British officers, and then that it should become, to all intents and purposes, a British force, paid by us, the Nizam's treasury handing over to us the necessary supplies. So it went on, unauthorized by treaty, in the face of the most earnest protests of the Nizam, until it became, no one knows how, a part of the regular establishment, and the Nizam's Minister agreed to pay us annually the sum of 420,000*l.* for its expenses ; and this when the whole revenue of the State only amounted to one million.

Mir Allum was our second nominee, and to him succeeded Chundoo Lall, another creature of our own, an even greater rascal than his predecessors, who was kept by British bayonets for twenty-five years as sole and absolute Minister of Hyderabad. During his time the administration of the Nizam's territories was utterly corrupt and vicious, and anarchy reigned throughout the country. Rajahs threw off their allegiance, and neither the Subsidiary Force, paid for the purpose, nor the "Contingent," paid also, but for what purpose no one knows, moved to put them down. Even Lord Dalhousie, when he was putting his hand on the Berars, had to confess over and over again, in his letters to the Resident, that "neither the letter nor the spirit of the treaty could be held to warrant such a construction of its obligation."

In spite of all the efforts of the Nizams this terrible annual demand of 420,000*l.* could not always be met, and in 1853 Lord Dalhousie, laying his hands on everything he could reach, thought that the time was come to eat up Hyderabad. A claim was made for instant payment of 430,000*l.* for arrears. This claim was acknowledged by the British Resident to be more than balanced by moneys due from us to the Nizam. Lord Dalhousie, however, refused even to take this set-off into consideration, and ordered the Nizam to cede the Berars under the threats "of Hyderabad being ground to powder." The Nizam refused absolutely. In the face of this unexpected resistance Lord Dalhousie hesitated. People at home were already disapproving of the high-handed policy which he was carrying out, and the truth of the Nizam's remonstrance was too indisputable for him to venture to proceed to the last extremities. Instructions were therefore given to the Resident to negotiate a treaty by which the Nizam should agree to the Contingent being maintained in future, and should hand over the Berars merely as a pledge for its payment ; the English Government agreeing to furnish accounts annually, and to hand over the balance. This, after a vain struggle, the Nizam consented to, under renewed threats of the occupation of Hyderabad ; this is the treaty which Sir Salar Jung now asks, in the name of the young Nizam, to have set aside, as obtained unfairly, unjustly, dishonourably, and by armed pressure. The arguments against the validity of the treaty on the ground of force and fraud appear incontestable ; and were the case placed before counsel with the words "a guardian and his ward" instead of those of "the British Government and the Nizam" there could not be a doubt as to their opinion. The protector administers the estate of the protected by his nominee, he plunges the estate into pecuniary difficulties by gross mismanagement and unnecessary expenses, and then takes advantage of the difficulties he has caused to put pressure upon the protected to sign a deed enormously for the benefit of the protector.

As to the relations between the Governments since the signature of the treaty of 1853 it is unnecessary to give details ; suffice that they are even more dishonouring to our reputation for integrity than those which have preceded that date. From the first we broke the treaty we had extorted ; we proved that the amount we had claimed for the annual expenses of the Contingent was uncalled for, by at once reducing the expense by 120,000*l.* a year ; we declined to fulfil our obligation of rendering an annual account of the receipts and expenditure of the provinces held in pledge, for the openly-confessed reason that we did not dare to do so,

because our expenses of administration had enormously exceeded the sum which we had promised that it should cost. For nine years we evaded the demand of the Nizam for accounts, and at last we got rid of them by a transaction which we decline to characterize. In the interval the Mutiny had swept over India, and the fidelity of the Nizam and of Sir Salar Jung, his Minister, had been acknowledged as beyond all price ; and so we proposed a new treaty, in order that we might recognize and reward those priceless services. After a preamble to this effect, the treaty restored to the Nizam some of the zemindarates which we, by our *lâches*, had permitted to slip from his hand ; and we pretended to cancel the outstanding debt, a debt already doubly cancelled by our extra expenses in the administration of the Berars, and by a counter-claim which was confessed by the British Resident, justly, to exceed that of his obligation to us. These great boons, however, were not without drawbacks, for the Nizam was called upon to surrender crown lands in the Berars, strips of territory in the south, right of toll on the Godavery, and, finally, to abandon all claim to any past or future accounts of our administration of the Berars. Naturally the Nizam felt that this grateful recognition of fidelity was in reality a fresh exaction, and therefore indignantly refused to sign the treaty ; nor would he consent until the old threat of force had to be brought forward again. Well indeed might a leading native statesman say, a short time since, " I have heard a good deal of English fair dealing, but I have never seen any of it." The counter case of the British Government may be summed up in a few words : " We really cannot argue on this matter ; but the Berars are very useful, and we cannot afford to give them up."

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TINSLEY'S MAGAZINE, —June 1876.—*Sir Salar Jung and the Berars.*—The question of the Berars is one which is at present perhaps of the most pressing interest in India : its intrinsic importance is considerable ; it is being urgently pushed forward by those interested in it, Sir Salar Jung, the greatest of Indian statesmen, having come over to endeavour to obtain a fair hearing ; the native population throughout the country are regarding with eager interest our action in the matter ; and, lastly, the honour and good name of England are very seriously concerned in the decision which may be arrived at. The general opinion among those to whom the writer spoke on the subject during a tour in India appeared to be that our position in holding the Berars was of very doubtful honesty, but that there was nevertheless but little chance of our giving them up. Being loath to believe the possibility of such policy as this, he took advantage, after reading all that had been written on the subject, of the Prince's shooting expedition to make a journey to Hyderabad, to examine as closely as possible, upon the spot, into the rights and wrongs of this question. The result of that examination he now gives, and although he fears that the history he has to tell must necessarily be a dry one, yet, remembering the interest which the treatment of the Guicowar of Baroda excited in England, he hopes that this story of our relations with a State many times more important than that of Baroda—indeed the largest and most populous of all the Indian semi-independent kingdoms—may be deemed worthy of careful perusal, especially when the inestimable service which the fidelity of the Nizam and Sir Salar Jung, his Minister, rendered to us in the Mutiny be recalled. Every item of the following statement is founded on treaties or official documents, which can be consulted by any one having an interest in the matter, or a respect for the good faith of England.

The Nizam's dominions are by far the largest and most important of any of the Native States of India. They comprise no less than 98,000 square miles, being three times as large as either Gwalior or Mysore, eight times as large as the dominions of Holkar. In the middle of the last century relations commenced between the British Company, then a mere struggling power, and the Nizam Ali. In 1766, and again in 1768, treaties were entered into between them, and the severity with which the Supreme Government rebuked the Madras Government for endeavouring to evade the payments due by that treaty shows how valuable they regarded the alliance. In 1790 the British army was largely reinforced and aided by the Nizam's troops. In 1795 the Nizam claimed the assistance—to which he considered

himself, and indeed was, entitled by treaty—of the British against the Mahrattas, and the help being refused he was defeated at Kundha. Finding that the British intended to accept his help in their wars and to refuse their help in his, he raised a force and officered it by French officers. The British, alarmed at this step, bid against the French, and offered their absolute protection against all enemies. The French were dismissed, and a new treaty made. This was of the greatest importance to the British, as they were at that time on the eve of their great war with Tippoo. The Nizam sent his subsidiary force of 6,500 men, as many infantry, and a body of irregular horse, to join the British at the siege of Seringapatam, where they behaved with much bravery, and gained special commendation by historians of that period.

In the year 1800 a fresh treaty was drawn up confirmatory of the one of 1798, and as this treaty may be considered the commencement of those relations which have cost the Nizam so dearly it is necessary to specify some of the more important clauses. In the first place, it established an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two powers. This alliance was of equal advantage to both parties, and was equally desired by them as a check to the power of the Peishwa and the Mahrattas, whose hostile attitude constituted a danger to each alike. By a secret article in the treaty it was agreed that all the territories won by the joint forces should be divided between the two powers. It was under this article that in 1803 the Berars were handed over to the Nizam as his share of the territory won from the Mahrattas. This district was specially assigned to him because the Berars had formerly belonged to the Nizam's dominions, but had been wrested from him by the Mahrattas. It is important to bear this in mind, because one of the excuses offered by Government partizans for the conduct pursued by us is that the Berars were originally a gift to the Nizam on our part. Had this been true it would be no argument, for one has no more right to resume a gift once bestowed than to seize any other property. However, as a matter of fact, it was no gift at all, but was handed over to the Nizam as his rightful share of the joint conquests by virtue of the secret article of the treaty of 1800. By the same treaty the Nizam ceded all his territory south of the Tongaboodra—comprising the districts he had received as his share of the spoil of Tippoo, and amounting in extent to about a third of his whole dominions—in perpetuity to the British for the support of a subsidiary force, to be commanded and disciplined by British officers. This force was to represent the Nizam's contingent to the joint forces, and was to be used at other times for the interior police of his dominions. By article 17 it is enacted that "should any of the Nizam's subjects withhold taxes or create a rebellion the subsidiary force should reduce all offenders to obedience ; and in any part of His Highness's dominions contiguous to the Company's frontiers, if it should be found inconvenient to send a detachment of the subsidiary troops, the British Government, if requested by His Highness, should send its own troops to quell disturbances." Article 8 stipulated that "no demand should ever be made by the Honourable Company upon the treasury of His Highness on account of the subsidiary force." Nothing could be more clear than this. The Nizam ceded large and valuable territories, in order that a force might be maintained without further expense or trouble to himself, which should at once form his principal Contingent to the allied forces in war time, and should in peace be at his command to enforce law and obedience throughout his dominions. This subsidiary force would even in peace time be kept up at its full strength, but in case of war the Nizam was to give further aid to the common cause. Article 12 is as follows : "If a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other power whatever, His Highness the Nizam engages that with the reserve of two battalions of sepoys—which are to remain near His Highness's person—the residue of the British subsidiary force (consisting of six battalions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry, with artillery), joined by 6,000 infantry and 9,000 horse of His Highness's own troops, and making altogether an army of 12,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, with their requisite train of artillery and warlike stores of every kind, shall be immediately put in motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy ; and His Highness likewise engages to employ every further



effort in his power for the purpose of bringing into the field, as speedily as possible, the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions."

This is an important article ; had the state of affairs in India remained unchanged, so that the Nizam might have been called upon frequently to take the field with 6,000 infantry and 9,000 horse, in addition to the Subsidiary Force, he would have been compelled to keep that force on a constant war footing. In point of fact, after 1803 he never was so called upon. The British power grew so rapidly that they had no longer occasion to call upon the Nizam to send his forces to join theirs in the field. Had they done so he would have been compensated handsomely for the expense to which his army put him, by his share of the conquered dominions. This would have been, as circumstances have turned out, an advantageous arrangement indeed for him, for at a comparatively slight expense his dominions would have increased *pari passu* with those of the British. I say at a comparatively slight expense, because the force which he was to furnish was not to be a force trained and disciplined by Europeans ; it was to be merely a native army. A native army in those days was an inexpensive affair. Like the Scotch clans, the horsemen of the Deccan lived at peace until called out by the fiery cross, and even in the field they looked principally to plunder for pay. That this was the kind of force which the Nizam was expected to furnish, in addition to his trained subsidiary troops, is evident from the overwhelming proportion of horsemen to the number of infantry. In point of fact, however, the Nizam, after 1803 never was called upon to furnish this native force, and we had not a shadow of right to demand his keeping up any standing army beyond the Subsidiary Force, whose expenses he had paid for by a cession of territory, in peace time.

The five years ending in 1803 had, however, completely altered the position of the British in India. From a weakly power anxious to secure allies against Tippoo and the French they had leapt into the first power of the peninsula, and they soon began to oppress the ally who had faithfully supported them in their need. From 1803 it may be said that the independence of the Nizam was altogether gone. When Secunder Jah succeeded to the throne in 1803, the Indian Government, in face of article 15 of the treaty of 1800, by which they bound themselves "not to interfere with the Nizam's children, subjects, servants, or concerns," refused to allow him to remove the then Minister, Aristo Jah, a man who suited us, but who was so odious to the people of Hyderabad that when he died Mr. Russell, the British Resident, wrote—"Though the natives of India are the least of all nations prone to indecent acts, yet nevertheless the multitude of Hyderabad followed his corpse to the grave with hoots and execrations." We then forced Mir Allum, another creature of our own, upon the Nizam. His character as a minister was summed up by Mr. Russell in the words—"He aggravated many abuses and never redressed one." This man, aided by our influence, wrested all power from the Nizam, who at last, soured and almost broken-hearted at the loss of his independence, gave up the struggle and retired into a life of gloomy seclusion. Sir Charles Metcalfe, who succeeded Mr. Russell as Resident, wrote of him—"I can hardly imagine a situation more entitled to pity or more calculated to disarm criticism than that of a prince so held in subjection by his servant, under the support of an irrepressible foreign power." At the death of Mir Allum the Nizam begged us to allow him to appoint his own ministers. The request was refused sternly. This independent prince, this ally, with whom we were bound by treaty not to interfere in any way, was, however, informed that he might appoint a minister and pay him a salary, provided he did nothing whatever. We appointed another creature of our own, a low-caste scoundrel, without a single qualification for office save his willingness to act as our tool. For nearly twenty-five years this man ruled Hyderabad, or rather tyrannized over it—for a more reckless, corrupt, oppressive, and inefficient Government the world has seldom seen. For all this ruinous expenditure, this wanton extravagance, which took place in the State of the Nizam, we were responsible : in the first place, because we really governed it through this agent of ours ; in the second place, because we obliged the Nizam to keep up and pay the Contingent. That the first



count was true was acknowledged by the Court of Directors, who wrote—"For a Government thus created and sustained by British influence, and obedient to British consuls, it appears to us that none can be held responsible but those who have constructed, supported, and advised that Government." Again, in a letter to the Governor-General they wrote—"The British Government's constant and active interference for a series of years in the management of the affairs of the Nizam has to a considerable extent staked its honour and character on the result." For the second cause of the ruin of Hyderabad the British are no less responsible. The origin of the Contingent is involved in mystery. How it began, how it grew, there is no evidence whatever; it is mentioned in no treaty, authorised by no agreement; was, in fact, merely an outcome of Residential pressure, a pressure but too frequently exercised upon Indian Princes with a force and power of which an English reader can form little idea. It probably began by one of the Residents suggesting to our creature, the Minister, that it would be a good thing to officer the Nizam's troops with British officers, and to give them regular sepoy discipline. A suggestion such as this would be as good as an order to such a Minister; and so the Contingent sprang into existence. The next step was to suggest that we should appoint the officers, and that, to save trouble and inconvenience, the pay of the force now called the Contingent should be handed over to us, and that we should pay them and provide all necessities. So the Contingent grew in importance. It attained considerable dimensions in Mr. Russell's time, and became to all intents and purposes a British force. One of the pretexts for this Contingent was that it would enable the Nizam to keep his unruly vassals in order, and to collect his taxes, the very thing which he had handed us over one-third of his territory to keep up the Subsidiary Force to do! The Subsidiary Force, paid for the work by the Nizam's concession, had become a British force, and now the British insisted on this new Contingent to do the work which they were paid for doing. The cost of this Contingent, which was raised without any treaty,—indeed, in defiance of treaty,—and by the sole authority of our creature, Chundoo Lall, was 420,000*l.* a year, while the whole resources of the Nizam's territory only amounted to a million. What wonder that the State became involved in debt? In 1819 Sir Henry Russell, the Resident, wrote to the Supreme Government—"This (the Contingent) is the sole and entire cause of the difficulties of the Nizam's Government, and the source of every oppression that is suffered by its subjects." In 1832 Lord Metcalfe spoke of the Contingent as "in reality a joint concern between Rajah Chundoo Lall and us." In 1842 General Fraser wrote to the Government that the Nizam would, if allowed any independence, forward a request "for the disbandment of the Contingent, to which he is known to be averse, and which is not provided for by any existing treaty." In 1848 Sir John Low, writing of the financial difficulties of the Nizam's Government, said—"It is still more grievous to reflect that a considerable portion of these pressing pecuniary difficulties of the Nizam's Government has been brought upon it indirectly by our own annual demand upon its revenues for the pay of the Contingent." Sir John Low would have spoken far more correctly had he said "directly" instead of "indirectly;" for the annual demand of 420,000*l.* from a little State was absolutely crushing it to ruin. Lord Dalhousie himself was forced to allow that the Contingent had been unjustly saddled upon the Nizam. He says—"The 12th article of 1800, the one by which the Nizam engaged to furnish a Contingent in case of war, has been made to justify our requiring of the Nizam that he should uphold a force of 5,000 infantry, 2,000 horse, and four field batteries, officered by British officers, controlled by the British Resident, trained on the British system, not in war only but permanently, at a very costly rate, and so as to be available for the use of the Nizam only when the British Resident has given his consent. I submit that neither the words nor the obligations of the treaty can be held to warrant such a construction of its obligations." He went on to draw a comparison between what was actually required of the Nizam and what was "the plain intention of the treaty." He then pointed out that the treaty of 1800 had in view the best troops the Nizam could offer, and never intended that he should be forced to keep under arms such an

expensive body as the Contingent. "Our right," he went on, "is to an occasional use of His Highness's troops ; our practice is to convert them permanently to our own. For thirty-five years the Nizam's troops could never have been asked for, in accordance with the spirit of the treaty, for within that period the Nizam and the Government of India have never taken the field together ; yet during all that time the Contingent has been maintained at its present strength." The Court of Directors were equally conscious of the illegality of the course taken in forcing the Nizam to support the Contingent, and remonstrated over and over again with the Governor Generals, but no heed was paid to their remonstrances. And yet even then, when keeping up two forces, the Subsidiary Force and the Contingent, at the expense of the Nizam, the British authorities declined altogether to allow him the use of either one or the other for the very purpose specifically stated in the treaty, namely, for the preservation of order and the suppression of unruly zemindars, and the Nizam was actually obliged to raise and pay a third army for this purpose.

At length the crash came. The Nizam's Government, after extorting as much as it could from its subjects and raising money in every possible manner, could not always pay the 420,000*l.* annually demanded by the Indian Government, and that Government kindly advanced the deficiency, until in 1853 it reached the sum of 460,000*l.* Lord Dalhousie, whose policy of annexation was laying the foundation of that flame which was so soon to burst out, now conceived that the time had come to strip Hyderabad of its fairest provinces, the Berars. In vain the Nizam protested against the injustice of the claim, against the illegality of the Contingent, against the British pressure which was alone responsible for all the financial difficulty ; the sword was held to his throat, and under a threat of the occupation of Hyderabad if he did not yield he signed the treaty of 1853, a treaty which has been well described "as obtained by an equal mixture of force and fraud." Even Lord Dalhousie was aware of the utter injustice of the British claims, for at the very time when he was urging upon Colonel Low, the Resident, "to contend to the uttermost for the cession" to support the Contingent, he wrote the admission quoted above.

In spite, however, of Lord Dalhousie informing the Nizam "that the British power could crush him under its foot, and leave no trace of him," the latter absolutely refused to cede the Berars permanently, or to hand them over in any way, except that they should be occupied by the British authorities, and that the surplus after paying the Contingent should go to the reduction of the debt, the British engaging by treaty to give a yearly statement of accounts, and promising verbally that the expenses of collection should not be more than 12½ per cent. It need scarcely be said that we observed neither of these conditions. Now, indeed, that we were to pay the Contingent out of the resources of a province held by ourselves instead of out of money coming from the Nizam, we found ourselves able at once to reduce its expenses from 420,000*l.* to 300,000*l.* a year, in itself an acknowledgment of the oppressiveness of our conduct to the Nizam. The expense, however, of administration increased enormously above the 12½ per cent. to which we had engaged to keep it down, and we altogether declined to furnish accounts to the Nizam, our officers confessing in their despatches to the Supreme Government that we could not do so because the Nizam would protest against the enormous costs of our administration.

So matters went on up to the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. Hyderabad, with its bigoted population, and its legitimate exasperation at the treatment it had met with, would have gone at once with the mutineers, and with it Southern India and the Deccan would also have risen. Sir Salar Jung, then recently appointed Minister to the Nizam, stood alone by our side. Threatened with assassination, the object of threats, execrations, and hatred upon the part of the whole population, he remained firm, and kept the city down, sending the Contingent and Subsidiary Force into the field. His services to the British rule were characterized by British officials as "simply priceless." At the end of the Mutiny we found ourselves in a very unpleasant position with regard to the Nizam. His attitude of friendship had been of immense benefit to us, and we were more bound

than ever to keep the engagements we had undertaken in the treaty forced by us at the point of the sword upon our ally. In 1860 the Resident informed his Government that "the delay (of seven years!) in placing the results of our administration before the Nizam naturally tended to engender disappointment which it was difficult to appease, and to elicit remonstrances which it daily became more perplexing to reply to satisfactorily." The Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood, in his despatch to the Government of India 18th June 1861, owned that "the omission to render accounts to His Highness" had been made on purpose, "to avoid giving him the opportunity of urging objections to the heads of your expenditure."

The position was a difficult one. To do justice and surrender the Berars was a thing which Indian statesmen never dreamt of, and a brand-new treaty was therefore proposed, "to offer His Highness a public mark of the acknowledgments of the British Government for his zeal and constancy to us" during the terrible days of the Mutinies. The great rewards thus offered were, first a restoration to the Nizam of certain territories which there could be little doubt belonged to him and not to us. The Resident told his Government that in so doing he "thought it clear they made no pecuniary sacrifice. My greatest difficulty in this negotiation has been to counteract the impression in the Nizam's mind that we were merely giving him back what is his own." So much for the first of our munificent rewards for fidelity. Secondly, the writing off the alleged debt with which the treaty of 1853 had originally begun. This debt Lord Canning admitted in his letter to the Resident, 7th July 1860, did not need cancelment at all, having been liquidated by the excessive civil expenditure of past years being set off against it. But even apart from this there was no money whatever owing by the Nizam to us. Colonel Davidson, the Resident, in a letter to the Government of India, October 12, 1860, after admitting that the former treaty had been forced upon the Nizam "with threats and oburgations," states that the son was as unwilling as his father had been to cede his provinces in perpetuity, and that in fact our claim for forty-three lacs of rupees was altogether unjust. He points out that the British payments on account of funds known as Abkaree funds of Secunderabad and Jaulnah had fallen into such arrears as to make, without interest, forty-one lacs, whereas the Nizam's arrears in the matter of the Contingent had been subjected to interest at the rate of six per cent. Thus the quittance of the debt was no quittance at all, the balance, even without the extra expenses of administration referred to by Lord Canning, being absolutely against us. Thirdly, we bestowed upon the Nizam the zemindarate of Sholapore. Now by the 17th article of the treaty of 1800 the Sholapore Zemindar is specially mentioned by name as a feudatory of the Nizam, and the services of the Subsidiary Force were specially pledged to check all rebellion on the part of the said Zemindar, and in coercing him, if necessary, to pay his tribute to the Nizam. If, therefore, the Zemindar had thrown off his allegiance to the Nizam he had done so solely by our lâches, and we were merely restoring to the Nizam what we ought never to have allowed to separate itself from his dominions.

So much for British acknowledgments of zeal and constancy ; little enough in themselves, as my readers would think, but in return for which the following sacrifices were required on the part of the Nizam. First, that he should cede in perpetuity to the British certain valuable territories on the river Godavery. In the next place, that the Nizam should relinquish his right to levy transit duties on goods passing up and down the river. Also, that the Nizam was to enable the British Government to retain all the surplus between the expense of the administration of the Berars and the revenues, which the British Government were by the treaty of 1853 bound to hand over to him, by relinquishing its right to any accounts, past or future, of the revenue and expenditure of that province, and by agreeing that in future the British Government should have unlimited latitude of expenditure there. Besides this, that the Nizam should give up his Crown lands in Berar, which, being interspersed with those assigned in 1853, caused inconvenience to the British Government.

Little wonder is it that the Nizam did not receive with deep gratitude this proof of the acknowledgment of the British Government of his fidelity and constancy, but that, upon the contrary, he looked on it as a fresh addition to his former injuries. Of course the old tactics were applied; the Resident argued, cajoled, and at last, as usual, threatened. "An unfriendly and angry feeling between the two Governments" would be caused unless the Nizam yielded every point; the Nizam was begged "to take into his earnest and serious consideration the Governor-General's proposals," and so on, until the Nizam was forced to accept this magnificent proof of the gratitude and good faith of the British Government.

Such is the history of the Berar question, and proof upon proof could be accumulated from the writings of Anglo-Indian statesmen of the exactness and truth of every word of this narrative; and any English reader can, if he choose, turn to the treaties, and read them by the light of the Blue-Book of 1851 and of the published correspondence on the subject.

The Berar question has now entered a new phase. Sir Salar Jung has, after twenty years of unremitting toil and care, completely changed the state of Hyderabad. Order and law are now thoroughly established; agriculture and trade are flourishing: a wealthy middle class, interested in the preservation of law and order, has sprung up; the revenues have greatly increased, while the burdens of the people have diminished. The change, in fact, is wonderful. All this has been accomplished at great risk to himself. He has incurred the hatred of the turbulent portion of the population, whose outbreaks he has repressed, and this feeling of hostility has been greatly aggravated by his British sympathies. Had Hyderabad gone against us in the Mutiny it is admitted that the flame would have spread over Southern and Western India. Sir Salar Jung kept down Hyderabad and saved India. He was to the south and west what Puttiala was to the north. Had these two men gone against us India would have been, for the time, lost. Therefore the fanatical Mahometan population love not Sir Salar Jung. Could he, however, obtain the restoration of the Berars he would so benefit his country that his way would for the future be plain and easy; and having received an offer of a loan he opened the subject of the Berars. He was answered by a simple *non possumus*. An old Act of George III., an Act absolutely older than the Treaty of 1800, was dragged to light, and this Act forbade British subjects lending money to Indian princes. But not only that, but a storm of indignation was poured upon his head; and the Resident absolutely went so far as to invite to breakfast a number of nobles notorious for their hostility to Sir Salar Jung, and who, for that reason, had not been invited to the Residency for some years, to express to them the extreme displeasure of the British Government at Sir Salar Jung for moving in the Berar question, and to beg them to use their influence with him to induce him not to press the question. On any other subject this interference of the Resident would have led to the overthrow of Sir Salar Jung. The Hyderabad nobles, hostile as they were to his policy upon most points, were yet patriotic enough to side with him in this, and it is probable that Sir Salar Jung was never so popular in Hyderabad as he is at the present time.

Such is the state of the Berar question as it now stands. The Indian Government fall back upon the treaty of 1853, and say that the Nizam agreed thereby that the Contingent should be kept up, and that we should hold the Berars as security for their pay. Sir Salar Jung's argument is this. The treaty of 1853 was wrung from the Nizam at the sword's point, and under a threat of invasion. At that time the Indian Government forced a faithful ally to sign a treaty which could only have been wrung from a beaten foe. The circumstances which rendered the Nizam a debtor to the Indian Government were, as admitted by all Indian authorities, circumstances for which the British, and the British alone, were responsible. They had, in defiance of the Nizam's wishes, ruled his territory by means of their creatures; they had, without the smallest right under treaty or otherwise, imposed the maintenance of a force wholly useless to the Nizam at an annual expense of nearly half a million. Then, taking advantage of the ruin caused by themselves, the Indian Government forced this treaty at the point of

the sword upon the Nizam. It is better, indeed, for a country to be a foe of England than a friend. None of the other States in India have to keep up a Contingent ; why, then, should Hyderabad be called upon to do so only because her forces once fought side by side with those of Britain ? In the time of the Mutiny the Nizam proved his fidelity at the darkest hour, and his services were pronounced to have been priceless ; why should he alone of all the Indian princes be bound to pay a portion of the British army ?—for that is what it really comes to. Surely justice and gratitude alike demand that we should abandon the rights obtained by this treaty extorted “by force and fraud.” The Indian Government have but three answers to the demand of Sir Salar Jung. First, that we obtained our present *status* by the treaty of 1853, and that we mean to keep it. Secondly, that it is a very valuable province, and to give it up would be to unsettle our financial balance. Thirdly, that we should not know what to do with all the civil servants who, at magnificent salaries, are scattered over the Berars. These arguments are, after all, merely those of a person who having fraudulently obtained large sums of money should reply upon being ordered to disgorge, “I cannot do that, for how could I keep up my carriage, how can I maintain my wife and family, if you take all this money from me ?”

The retention of the Berars, besides being unfair and unprincipled as between ourselves and the Nizam, has the worst possible effect throughout India. It more than anything else unsettles the minds of the Native Chiefs, and causes them to lose all confidence in the British faith and British justice. It shows them that when we choose we force destructive treaties at the sword's point upon our most faithful allies, and that, again, when we choose we ignore all treaties, and govern simply by the law of might.

If the home authorities insist upon holding fast to their rights under these ill-won treaties, Sir Salar Jung will then, it is believed, endeavour to obtain the repeal of the Act of George III. which prevents him from borrowing money in England. This done, he would have no difficulty—for Hyderabad is rich in mineral resources as well as in agricultural production—in raising a sum of money sufficient, when invested in Government securities, to pay the expenses of the Contingent for ever. The pretext under which the Indian Government hold the Berars as security for the pay of the Contingent would then be cut from under their feet, and they will have no shadow of an excuse for holding to the possessions which they wrung from an ally under circumstances of distress for which they alone are accountable. It cannot, however, come to this ; for surely the facts have only to be known for the British public to insist that justice, however tardy, should be done, that the Nizam should be at once released from the burden of a Contingent which there is no shadow of reason for ever having been thrust upon him, and that the Berars, as a necessary accompaniment, should be restored to him. The words of the Duke of Wellington when in India are well worthy of remembrance. “I would sacrifice,” he said, “every frontier in India ten times over in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith. What is it which has brought us through so many difficulties both in war and peace ? The British good faith, and nothing else.”—G. A. HENTY.

*TIMES OF INDIA, June 14, 1876.—The Berars and the Nizam.*—In a paper advocating the establishment of a Privy Council for India, read before the East India Association last month, Major Evans Bell made the following allusion to the Berar question :—

“Twenty-four years ago I was induced to alter my plans and return from home to India, mainly by the extreme probability, as it was represented to me, of my regiment, then stationed at Hyderabad in the Deccan, being engaged in active service. As it proved, we had no active service about there in 1852 or 1853 ; but all who were at the Cantonment of Secunderabad in those days must remember very well the rumours that prevailed, and the state of expectation and excitement in which we lived for some time. Thanks to the tact and diplomatic skill of Colonel (now General Sir John) Low, the Resident,

and to the good sense, patience, and prudence of the Hyderabad Court, the crisis was got over without any collision or any resistance to the mandate of our Government, which was nevertheless most repugnant to the Nizam's feelings and wishes, which he opposed as long as he could, and to which he only submitted at last, in the words of Colonel Davidson, then Assistant (afterwards Resident) at Hyderabad, under the influence of 'objurgations and threats.\* That mandate was that he should resign the administration of some of his richest provinces into the hands of our officers, in order to provide for the regular payment of a force—the Hyderabad Contingent, previously called the Nizam's Army—which he had been erroneously told by Lord Dalhousie he was bound by treaty to maintain, and for the liquidation of a debt always disputed by him, and officially, though not authoritatively, acknowledged since not to have been owing. 'I have always been of opinion,' wrote Colonel Davidson, then Resident at Hyderabad, in 1860, to our Government, 'that had the pecuniary demands of the two Governments been impartially dealt with we had no just claim against the Nizam.' 'In 1853,' he repeats, 'we had little or no claim against the Nizam.† In 1853 there was, in fact, a disputed balance-sheet. The balance of 430,000*l.* which was demanded was made out by debiting the Nizam with cash payments from our Treasury for the Hyderabad Contingent, while refusing to credit him with sums due to him by our Government on other accounts. Interest, first at 12 and afterwards at 6 per cent., on all our advances, formed nearly a quarter of the claim. The principal of the Nizam's counter-claim, without any calculation of interest, was more than the whole charge against him. But no set-off, or inquiry as to a set-off, was tolerated by Lord Dalhousie's administration; though subsequently, under Lord Canning's Government, the chief item—the *abkaree*, or excise collections of Secunderabad and Jaulnah—'was prospectively allowed to be a portion of the legitimate revenue of the Hyderabad State.‡

"No plea of set-off was listened to, and a distress was put in, embittered by terms of menace and insult. Lord Dalhousie, in the process of enforcing this most questionable pecuniary claim—most questionable even if the Nizam's large counter-claims were excluded—had written personally to the Nizam telling him that the Hyderabad State was bound to maintain the Contingent 'by the stipulations of existing treaties;' reminding him that it was dangerous 'to provoke the resentment of the British Government,' 'whose power can crush you at its will,' § and warning him that 'the independence of his sovereignty' stood in imminent danger. In the same letter the Nizam was advised, as an indispensable measure of economy, to disband 'the Arab soldiery,' those 'turbulent mercenaries' who consumed so large a portion of his revenues, and to rouse himself to make a great effort for 'the early liquidation of the accumulated debt.' If the Nizam were unable to meet the call on his treasury, he must 'forthwith make over' to the British Government certain frontier districts of his territory enumerated in a schedule annexed to this letter.¶

"It was a ready-money question entirely. In 1851, when the unpleasant letter from which I have quoted was addressed to him, the Nizam staved off the difficulty by paying a large sum on account. If he had produced the cash that was demanded in 1853, when similar pressure was applied, he would have avoided the sequestration of his districts. But his resources and his credit were exhausted, and the Governor-General would wait no longer. The Nizam's vain endeavours to gain time were cut short by an intimation that unless he at once consented to sign the new treaty, orders would be given for the advance of British troops, not merely into the districts that were wanted, but also into his capital. Then the Nizam and his advisers saw that he had before him the choice of signing the treaty or being dethroned. They understood perfectly, if every one else was ignorant of it,—which is not likely,—that it must come to that. The Nizam's Government

\* Papers, "The Deccan" (338 of 1867), p. 26.

† Papers, "The Deccan" (338 of 1867), pp. 27, 28.

‡ Papers, "The Deccan" (338 of 1867), p. 27.

§ The Persian words, "*paamal kardao*," that were used in the letter mean "trample into dust."

¶ Papers, "Nizam's Debts" (418 of 1854), pp. 40, 43.

was not as strong in 1853, nor was Hyderabad as orderly, as they have become during the twenty years' administration of the Nawab Salar Jung. Without counting the armed men in a fortified city of 200,000 inhabitants, where almost every man was armed, Hyderabad was full of those turbulent mercenaries whom our Government, as they, of course, were well aware, was urging the Nizam to disband. They knew that military occupation meant not only the loss of their bread, but the loss of their hard-earned savings. For the Arab soldiery were the greatest money-lenders in Hyderabad, and after their expulsion by British power they would obviously have had great difficulty in collecting their little accounts. Their leaders would certainly have taken every advantage of Mussulman fanaticism and general excitement to have one last despairing struggle before they submitted to the loss of their homes and of all that they possessed. Although the city could not have resisted a British force for six hours, it would not have been occupied without a contest. But the first shot fired from the walls, the first drop of blood shed, would in those days, so far as we can argue from the general tone and temper of Lord Dalhousie's administration, have cost the Nizam his throne. It would certainly have been worse than useless for him to plead that he could not control the unruly rabble of his capital. If, as might easily have been the case, a great number of the combatants had been proved to be in his own pay, his conduct would have been stigmatized as gross and infamous treachery. It would have gone hard with him.

"We have seen Lord Dalhousie representing to the Nizam that the Hyderabad State was bound to maintain the Contingent 'by the stipulations of existing treaties,' and I have said that this representation was erroneous. That it was so I shall prove from Lord Dalhousie's own mouth, and this will afford a very striking illustration of the iniquitous manner in which the actual system of secret correspondence and consultation affects the weaker party. In 1851 the Governor-General insists that 'the efficient maintenance of the Force is a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of existing treaties;' and again, that it is 'necessary to fulfil the obligation of treaties.' In 1853—having in the mean while, we may suppose, examined more carefully the documents bearing on the case—he arrived at a very different result. 'I have found myself forced,' he says, 'to the conclusion that the Government of India has no right whatever, either by the spirit or by the letter of the Treaty of 1800, to require the Nizam to maintain the Contingent in its present form.' And, again, in the same minute he says: 'I, for my part, can never consent, as an honest man, to instruct the Resident to reply that the Contingent has been maintained by the Nizam from the end of the war in 1817 till now because the Treaty of 1800 obliges His Highness so to maintain it.' 'Neither the words nor the intention of the Treaty can be held to warrant such a construction of its obligations.' In another passage he admits that the Contingent 'exists only by sufferance.'†

"But although Lord Dalhousie felt himself called upon, 'as an honest man,' to place this altered opinion on record in the secret conclave of Calcutta, he did not feel himself called upon, 'as an honest man,' to give any intimation of his modified views to the Nizam at Hyderabad. In the course of the renewed pressure of 1853 the bold assertions and threatening language of 1851 were allowed to operate unchanged.

"There can be no doubt that it was only under the influence of intimidation, produced by the announcement that military coercion, with all its manifest consequences, was imminent, that the Nizam consented to sign the treaty of 1853. Without pronouncing upon the merits of any one of the issues raised,—as to the origin of the principal debt, or as to the reality of the set-off,—there can hardly be any difference of opinion as to the comparative dignity and equity of the two methods for settling and deciding those issues—that which actually was, and that which might have been, and ought to have been, employed.

"A tribunal of high dignity recognized by both parties would have heard

\* Papers, "Nizam's Debts" (418 of 1854), p. 41.

† Papers, "Nizam's Debts" (418 of 1854), pp. 100, 103, 213.



them both, would have compared and adjusted both sides of the account, and would have struck a balance without expressing irritation or rousing animosity. Our secret executive only looked at its own side of the books, insisted on payment in full, and in default thereof exacted a sequestration of territory in the most offensive style, and turned a question of debt into one of invasion and dethronement. And I ask whether that was a just, a generous, or a decent proceeding against a submissive and faithful ally."

PIONEER, July 1, 1876.—*The Inevitable Berar Agitation*—Sir Salar Jung seems to be succeeding beyond what must have been his wildest hopes in organizing a newspaper agitation in England in favour of restoring Berar to the Nizam. The *Times* seems likely to be won over; the *World* has flung itself prostrate at the Eastern Prince's feet, rolling in dust and ashes, and declaring Englishmen in general, and those who have wickedly despoiled the Deccan in particular, to be miserable sinners. The *Saturday Review*, with cooler judgment, not to say a clearer conscience, surveys our relations with the Nizam in what is designed to be an impartial spirit. But, without caricaturing the whole subject in the ludicrous way this has been done by the *World*, it puts Sir Salar Jung's claims on our friendship well in the foreground, and barely notices the arguments in favour of not at present changing the existing arrangements in Berar. The drift of the *World's* article is that we are scoundrels and robbers; the *Saturday Review* merely represents us as coldly tenacious of our own interests, and singularly incapable of gratitude to the great native power in the south of India. By this time probably Sir Salar Jung looks upon his mission as all but accomplished; he must be thinking over the appointments he will make when the British officers now in Berar are withdrawn. However, sooner or later, he will be disappointed to find that the newspaper support so lightly gained will "softly and suddenly vanish away," that nothing will actually be done till substantial motives for action are advanced. The English publicist's keen zest for national self-abasement, under certain circumstances, which has rendered the London press Sir Salar's easy prey, is a psychological phenomenon he can hardly be expected to understand. The declamation of the *World* is mere sound and fury, and its grotesque perversion of history would not even stand the test of a debate in the House of Commons. In that great assembly no doubt Sir Salar will find champions as zealous and indiscreet as those he has secured in the press, but it is equally certain that these in their turn will meet antagonists capable of taking an imperial view of the question before them, and of putting the Home Government on its guard.

The Englishman at home loves to picture the Englishman in India as a brigand whom long habits of unbridled tyranny have rendered as callous to the dictates of conscience as to the cries of suffering humanity. Particular Englishmen in India will, it is true, be now and then selected, on principles which we in this country cannot altogether follow, as objects of hero-worship; but a belief in the utter depravity of Anglo-Indian policy and of Anglo-Indians *en masse* is generally established in Great Britain. We must therefore be prepared to find that when a newspaper like the *World* is unscrupulous enough to say, "Our tenure of Berar is founded on spoliation and injustice, and maintained in defiance of honour and treaties," or words to that effect, people in general will reply, "Nothing more likely, we fully believe the worst." The little group of Indian statesmen, therefore, on whom the task of resisting this impression will fall, have their work cut out before them, and this would be less embarrassing than it is if the true view to be established were simply the reverse of the popular view. If the case had been weaker even than it really is, Sir Salar Jung would as easily, no doubt, have won over newspaper support; but although the character of the whole problem has been absurdly misstated at home so far, there is one consideration connected with our tenure of Berar which must be recognized as having a certain force in the direction of Sir Salar's wishes. One can foresee that directly cool Indian statesmen admit that Berar has not been ceded to us in perpetuity, that at some time or other it is conceivable they might be disposed to talk



of restoration, there will be a wild cry to the effect that the whole case for keeping Berar has broken down at the outset. However, we make the admission at once, for what it may be worth, and merely claim a hearing from indignant English antagonists of English rule in India in order to analyze its value. Firstly, however, English people at home ought to be made to understand that every Indian politician entitled to the name will be aghast at the light and unreflective way in which this notion of giving up Berar is being talked of in the London papers. Evidently the serious nature of the contemplated operation is never dreamed of. Perhaps it would be unreasonable to ask a London writer on Indian affairs to look at a map of the country, but at any rate we may explain that the geographical position of Berar would render it, if restored to the Nizam, a considerable element of strength for his State, the only great Mahomedan State in India. Of course our modern obligations to the Nizam's Government are undeniable, though English writers at the moment are perhaps giving way to a tendency to overrate them. Every Native State that stood by us during the Mutiny saved precious English lives and simplified the work of restoring order, but it is the purest nonsense to talk as if the existence of the British Government in India at this day can be looked upon as resulting from any native alliance. Whatever might have happened at the time of the Mutiny had the Native States that helped us turned against us, it is childish to doubt that we should have succeeded in the long run in reconquering our empire. The frightful contingencies from which such alliances as that of the Nizam spared us were the slaughter of garrisons and isolated groups of Europeans, whom the slow reconquest of the country up from Bengal would not have been in time to rescue. However, we do not want to underrate the friendship of a minister like Sir Salar Jung, whatever nonsense may be spread by foolish depreciators of their own country's greatness. We recognize the value of that friendship fully, but all the more do we remain cognizant of the bad policy that would be involved in needlessly strengthening the State which, as we say, is the only great Mahomedan State in India. Certainly the position of the British Government in India is not one which need be written about in any spirit of apprehension, but to disregard the especial claims of the Mahomedans of India, as compared with any other element in the population, upon the attention of any Government paramount over all the elements alike, would be, to say the least, a very unstatesmanlike course of action. "But," the partisans of the Nizam will urge, "do you defend the retention of Berar on the ground merely that you want the province?" Not at all: we point to the importance of the province merely to show at the outset how little the English papers exhibit an appreciation of the problem before us, and then accept battle with them on the higher ground of abstract rights and treaty obligations. We recognize to the fullest extent the importance of keeping faith with native princes, and merely protest in passing against the unscrupulous and unfounded aspersions on the good faith of the British Government in dealing with native princes which English writers so recklessly throw about. But let us examine what it is which treaties in respect of Berar really oblige us to do. To-day we do not propose to deal with historical details, as they would merely confuse the broad outlines of that true policy as regards Berar which we are anxious to define, so that it is enough for the moment to repeat that we acknowledge our tenure of Berar as not in its nature absolutely permanent. The province was ceded to us in trust for a specific object,—the maintenance of the Hyderabad Contingent,—and it may be allowed that a time may arrive when in honour we might be obliged to give it back. But now we come to the gist of the question as it now stands. Sir Salar Jung wants to argue that this is a fit and proper time for abrogating the treaty of cession, while to the Government of India we imagine it will seem that the time is extremely inopportune. Why this is so we will consider directly, but another objection may be cleared away first. It may be argued that our right to Berar necessarily expires if other guarantees can be given for the maintenance of the Contingent. This *bunniah's* view of the subject is so far beneath statesmanship that we do not suppose Sir Salar Jung himself

would put it forward, but it has been put forward by some of his supporters who are more zealous than discreet, and will no doubt make its appearance again. The truth, however, of course, is that the original agreement provides a specific guarantee, and that this cannot be changed for another at the will of one only of the parties. As well might it be contended that we should be entitled under the treaty to devote the money now spent on the Contingent to some wholly different purpose, say the support of Christian missions. The existing bargain is that we shall hold Berar, and that we shall apply the revenue of that province to keeping up the Contingent. Only by mutual consent can the character of that bargain be properly changed. If it is contended that the original treaty is not a treaty at all, but a concession wrung from the Nizam by force, it is sufficient to answer we certainly do not acknowledge that to be a true version of history ; but we are spared all necessity of reviewing Lord Dalhousie's negotiations by the fact that the relations of the English Government and the Nizam, including our joint relationship to Berar, passed under revision after the Mutiny, and under the auspices of Lord Canning. At that time, at all events, no unfriendly feeling for the Nizam actuated the Government, nor was the action of Government controlled by a Viceroy inclined to domineer over native princes. Yet the engagements then made, which, by the bye, included some very considerable territorial concessions to the Nizam, re-established the existing status of Berar on the basis of perfectly free mutual consent. To talk about coercion in connection with this latest settlement of the matter in dispute would be utter nonsense.

So then we revert to the only question which Sir Salar Jung is really entitled to raise. He may represent to the Indian Government that from his point of view this is a fit and proper time to consider the restoration of Berar, and the provision of a new guarantee for the maintenance or the disbandment of the Contingent. Should he do this, it will become the duty of the Indian Government to explain why the time is in reality very inopportune. It is so, first, because the discussion of such a momentous question at all during a minority would be most imprudent and uncalled-for. True the Hyderabad State is at present tranquil and well governed, but this tranquillity and good government depends on the life of one man, Sir Salar Jung. The health of the young Nizam is precarious. It is altogether uncertain what his disposition will be when he grows up. Should he develop sympathies which are not favourable to the ascendancy of English ideas, nothing would be more certain than that at Sir Salar Jung's death the Hyderabad State would relapse into anarchy and bad government. Should all this occur, imagine the disgrace that would attach to the memory of the English Government, which had, in reckless disregard of such a contingency, made sacrifice of the safeguards it held for preventing anarchy in Hyderabad from becoming a source of danger to the rest of India. The notion that great national interests are to be tossed aside, to say nothing of good administrative work undone, and an orderly British province thrown back on the chances of native rule—not because any honourable consideration really claims the sacrifice, but merely because a distinguished foreigner of newspaper writers in London—is in fact altogether too preposterous to be discussed in an entirely patient tone.

PIONEER, *July 5, 1875.*—*The Facts of the Berar Question.*—The broad considerations which constrain the Government of India to resist the surrender of Berar for the present have already been set forth in these columns. But the agitation in England on the subject will no less certainly mislead public opinion for a time. Most newspaper-reading Englishmen will acquire the belief that the Nizam has for a long course of years been very much put upon by the tyrannical Government of India ; that the Berars have been wrested from him by a transaction closely repeating those incidents of early Anglo-Indian history for which Warren Hastings was brought to trial. The article in the *World*, for instance, is a lesson in history read backwards, which long before any exposure of its ludicrous misstatements can be put in circulation at home will have had its

effect. Before surveying the real facts that have led up to the present situation, we may take notice of a few points in this curious essay. We read, to begin with :—

The government of the Nizam had from its earliest contact with us—that is to say, in 1747—been friendly to the British Power in India. It had early sided with us in our struggle with the French, and with one or two exceptions the friendly connection had remained unbroken. The end of the century saw us bound together by common interest against common foes. Tippoo at Seringapatam, and the Mahrattas in the Deccan, threatened both powers alike, and the treaty, offensive and defensive, of 1798 testified to the closeness of the bond. Two years later the treaty of 1800 drew the tie still closer, for by it the British Government guaranteed absolutely the integrity of the Nizam's dominions against all comers, while the Nizam on his part ceded to England in perpetuity a large portion of his territories—one-third indeed of the whole—the revenue to be derived therefrom to be devoted to the maintenance of a subsidiary force, which was fixed at 8,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, with the requisite complement of guns.

It is amusing to contrast this passage with corresponding extracts from Marshman's *History of India*. There we read, going back to the earlier period above mentioned :—

From these schemes of conquest Hyder was recalled to Seringapatam to meet a confederacy which had been formed towards the close of 1766 by the Nizam and the Mahrattas for the entire conquest of his country. Into this league the Madras Presidency was unfortunately drawn by the treaty concluded with the Nizam on the 12th of November in that year, which stipulated that the English should assist him with an auxiliary force of undefined strength to settle the affairs of his Government in everything that was right and proper, though it was distinctly understood that the first service in which it was to be employed was the conquest or plunder of Mysore. It was this unfortunate treaty which involved the Presidency in a war with Hyder. Colonel Smith, who commanded the contingent of British troops, found on joining the Nizam's camp that this perfidious prince had already entered into negotiations with Hyder, and the Colonel advised the Presidency to be prepared for the invasion of the Carnatic by their ally as well as by their enemy. The bargain being now completed, the Nizam engaged to join in an attack on the English.

The engagement was duly carried out, and Colonel Smith had to confront the combination he foresaw, which he did with brilliant success in a battle at Trincomallee in 1767. Meanwhile, a force under Colonel Peach had been sent against Hyderabad from Bengal, and thus advancing through the Northern Circars, menaced the capital. The Nizam then came to terms, and concluded the treaty of 1768, in arranging which the English Government was so forbearing that modern historiographers, with a purpose in view, are actually enabled to ignore the character of the military operations which preceded it. Marshman says :—

The President (of Madras) was in a position to dictate his own terms, but he abandoned every advantage, and voluntarily placed his Government in the most humiliating position. Instead of insisting on the right to hold the Northern Circars on the strength of imperial *firmans*, he agreed to pay tribute for them, and to postpone the possession of the Guntoor Circars till the death of Basalut Jung, the brother of the Nizam, to whom he had assigned it. To crown their folly, the Madras Council again involved their masters in the labyrinth of Deccan politics by agreeing to assist the Nizam with two battalions of sepoy and six pieces of artillery, commanded by Europeans, whenever he should require them.

Passing on a few chapters, we find reference made to Lord Cornwallis's application to the Nizam for the Guntoor Circar, to which we were entitled by treaty. The Nizam agreed, but claimed that the English should "reduce and transfer to him the province of the Carnatic Balaghaut, then usurped by Hyder Naik. With his usual duplicity the Nizam sent an envoy at the same time to Tippoo to propose an alliance for the extirpation of the English." However,

circumstances rendered the Nizam our ally on this as on many other occasions, Mysore was conquered, and large portions of its territory were bestowed on the Nizam as his share of the booty. In great apprehension of the Mahrattas *he then proposed* to give up their newly acquired territories in consideration of a guarantee of his substantive dominions, and in extinction of his money subsidy due for the Subsidiary Force. Lord Wellesley agreed to the arrangement, thinking a territorial equivalent for the Subsidiary Force preferable to a constant series of payments in hard cash, which might engender irritation sooner or later.

Thus was the situation of affairs in force at the commencement of the century brought about, the drift of events being as unlike the *World's* version of what took place as history is unlike political advocacy. We need not weary the reader with an exposure in detail of all the falsehoods and misleading collocations of events through which this narrative advances, misconstructions far too numerous to have been the accidental result of honestly perverted sympathies. It will be enough to throw a little fresh light on one quotation which the writer evidently brings forward as his ace of trumps. After the succession of Sekunder Jah the Nizam's dominions fell into terrible disorder, and this is the *World's* account of the reason why :—

In vain the Nizam protested, in vain quoted Article 15 of the treaty, binding the Company not to interfere with the Nizam's children, subjects, servants or concerns. For nearly fifty years we ruled Hyderabad by ministers appointed by ourselves and maintained in power by our bayonets. The British Resident, Sir C. Metcalfe, writing of the utter breakdown of the Nizam under the troubles in which we had involved him, said : "I can hardly imagine a situation more entitled to pity, or more calculated to disarm criticism, than that of a prince so held in subjection by his servant under the support of an irresistible foreign power."

We do not know from what despatch—the general significance of which most assuredly had no resemblance to that which this single sentence taken alone might seem to convey—this passage is copied. But we may easily show how treacherously the *World* has acted in pretending to call Sir Charles Metcalfe as a witness in favour of its own distorted assertions. In Kaye's essay on Sir Charles Metcalfe—see his *Lives of Indian Officers*—we find the following passage, which sufficiently shows what the Resident really thought about Hyderabad :—

"The more I see of the Nizam's country," wrote Metcalfe after some six months' experience, "the more I am convinced that without our interposition it must have gone to utter ruin, and that the measures that have been adopted were indispensably necessary for its continued existence as an inhabited territory. As it is, the deterioration has been excessive, and the richest and most easily cultivated soil in the world has been nearly depopulated, chiefly by the oppressions of Government. . . . After the conclusion of the settlement one measure more, and I think only one, will be necessary, and to that I conceive our interference ought to be limited. We must preserve a check on the native officers of the Government to provide that they do not violate the settlement, otherwise they certainly will. . . . The officers should not have any peculiar official designation founded on their duties, lest it should be considered as a partial introduction of our rule."

So on through a long despatch we read the familiar story of high-minded and disinterested English effort to purify and reform the administration of a Native State reduced by domestic misgovernment to a condition of bankruptcy and rebellion. We need not go over the rest of the *World's* essay ; if faith in its *bona fides* can survive a perusal of these two extracts from Sir C. Metcalfe's writings we should be wasting trouble in doing so. For most readers, we fancy, we have said enough. We need only add that there is scarcely a sentence which any one familiar with Hyderabad diplomacy can read without detecting false suggestion or suppression of truth.

Turning away now from interested misstatements, and from the volumes in which we have so readily found their refutation, we propose to review the course of our relations with Hyderabad as exhibited lucidly and connectedly in the latest

edition of *Aitchison's Treaties*. To avoid reiterated references, we may explain that all quoted passages in the remainder of this article not otherwise acknowledged are taken from this valuable book. The earliest formally recorded arrangements having reference to the establishment of anything like a British Subsidiary Force in the treaty of 1766, by which, in return for the cession of certain Circars, the British Government agreed to furnish the Nizam with a Subsidiary Force "ready to settle the affairs of His Highness's Government in everything that is right and proper whenever required," provided that they were at liberty to withdraw it in emergencies affecting the safety of their own possessions. Any year when the troops were not required the Company's Government was to pay the Nizam nine lakhs in consideration of the cession of the Circars; and if the cost of the troops fell short of this amount in any year when their services were claimed the Company was to pay the Nizam the balance. No specified number of troops was provided for under this treaty, but the Company was left the judge of what might be necessary for any given service. The Nizam under the treaty agreed to assist the Company with his troops when required. This treaty, it may be explained, was entered into under the following circumstances:—In 1765 Nizam Ali devastated the Carnatic, but was driven back. "At the same time an English force took possession of the Carnatic in virtue of a firman from the Emperor of Delhi. The Nizam was making active preparations for the continuance of hostilities, but the Madras Government, then labouring under pecuniary difficulties, and alarmed at the prospect of a war, deputed General Colliard to Hyderabad to negotiate peace." These negotiations resulted in the treaty just described. "Under this treaty a corps of two battalions joined the Nizam for the reduction of the fort of Bangalore, in the possession of Hyder Ali, with whom the British Government was then on hostile terms, but it was soon withdrawn in consequence of the Nizam having treacherously deserted the British alliance, and invaded the Carnatic in conjunction with Hyder Ali." This act of bad faith naturally prepared the way later on, when the Nizam was compelled to separate from Hyder Ali, for a revision of the engagements between him and the British Government. A treaty was concluded in 1768, under which the Nizam ceded to the English "the Dewanee of the Carnatic above the ghauts, which had been seized by Hyder Ali on condition of their paying him seven lakhs of rupees a year." A reduced payment was at the same time agreed to in reference to the Northern Circars. Furthermore the British engagement to assist the Nizam when necessary with troops was altered to an agreement to furnish a specific force on requisition,—two battalions of sepoys with guns,—on condition that the Nizam should defray their expenses, and that they should not be employed against any person in alliance with the British.

The complications which next arose had reference to French attempts at acquiring influence in the Deccan. Basalut Jung had collected French troops at Guntoor. The Madras Government, after vainly calling on the Nizam to enforce their removal, made a treaty with Basalut Jung by which they were to rent Guntoor. However, this treaty was disallowed ultimately by the Supreme Government after an acrimonious correspondence with Madras, and Guntoor was restored to the Nizam's officers. Later on, in 1788, Guntoor was retransferred to the English. The next regular treaty with the Nizam was dated 1790. This was a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance entered into against Tippoo Sultan. At the conclusion of the war territories yielding an annual revenue of 13,16,600 pagodas were made over to the Nizam as his share of the conquests. Five years afterwards, however, the Nizam found himself at war with the Mahrattas. He claimed British aid, but treaties with the Mahrattas precluded Sir John Shore from giving this. The Nizam came badly out of the struggle, and had to cede the Mahrattas territory worth thirty-five lakhs a year, besides paying them three crores. He was much incensed against the English for not having supported him, and set on foot a body of troops commanded by French officers, at the same time dismissing the British Subsidiary Force. A rupture with the British Government was imminent, but the rebellion of his son Ali Jah induced him to request that the Subsidiary

Force might return. Ultimately, in 1798, a new treaty was concluded, by which the Subsidiary Force was made permanent, and raised to six battalions costing Rs. 24,17,100 a year. The Nizam's French corps was to be disbanded. It may here be worth while to quote the exact terms of the article in the treaty which defined the way in which the expenses of the Subsidiary Force were to be defrayed :—

“The yearly amount of subsidy for the aforesaid force of 6,000 men, with guns, artillerymen, and other necessary appurtenances, is Rs. 24,17,100. The said sum shall be completely discharged in the course of the year by four equal instalments, that is, at the expiration of every three English months the sum of Rs. 6,04,275 in silver of full currency shall be issued without hesitation from His Highness's treasury, and should the aforesaid instalment happen to fall at any time the least in arrears, such arrears shall be deducted, notwithstanding objections thereto, from the current *kist of peshcush* payable to His Highness on account of the Northern Circars. Should it at any time so happen, moreover, that delay were to occur in his issue of the instalments aforesaid in the stated periods, in such case assignments shall be granted on the collections of certain districts in the State, the real and actual revenue of which shall be adequate to the discharge of the yearly subsidy of the aforesaid force.”

The Subsidiary Force and the Nizam's army co-operated with the British troops in the second war with Tippoo Sultan, which broke out in 1799, and after the fall of Seringapatam the Nizam received, under the partition treaty of Mysore, districts yielding 6,07,332 pagodas. He afterwards received in addition two-thirds of the territories which were offered to, but rejected by, the Peishwa. The jealousy of the Mahrattas inducing the British Government in 1800 to strengthen its connection with the Nizam led to the conclusion of a new treaty, by which two battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry were added to the Subsidiary Force. The Nizam under this treaty ceded all the territories he had acquired from Mysore subject to some exchanges to secure a well-defined boundary. The revenues of these districts were to be taken as adequate to the payment of the Subsidiary Force, no claim being valid against the Nizam on that account if they should be found in any year to fall short of the required amount. In the event of war breaking out between the contracting parties and any other power, the Nizam engaged that, reserving two battalions near his person, the Subsidiary Force, accompanied by 6,000 infantry and 9,000 horse of his own troops, should be immediately put in the field against the enemy. A clause in this treaty requiring the contracting parties to admit each other's troops into their forts when admission might be claimed was inserted in consequence of the equivocal conduct of the Nizam in the first Mahratta war, and the refusal of his officers to receive the wounded in the battle of Assaye into the forts of Dowlutabad and Daroor.

Sikunder Jah succeeded Nizam Ali in 1803 ; existing treaties were confirmed, and in 1804 the Nizam received a cession of the Deccan territories conquered from Scindia and Nagpore. His minister, Meer Alum, died in 1808. Lord Minto recommended the appointment of Shums-ool-Omrah, but the Nizam disregarded this advice, and selected Mooner-ool-Moolk, stipulating, however, that the affairs of state should be conducted through Chundoo Lall. Aitchison says of this minister —“The most opposite views have been taken of Chundoo Lall's character. But, whatever may have been his faults, he was the only person that could be found at Hyderabad capable of carrying on the administration, and neither the Nizam himself nor successive Residents, who were not at all well disposed to Chundoo Lall, could find a better man to fill his place.” In the first Mahratta war the Nizam's troops had proved very inefficient. At length, in 1813, one of the corps at Hyderabad mutinied, and in their place Chundoo Lall raised two battalions, which were armed, clothed, and equipped like Company's troops. “It was in these reformed troops that the Contingent had its origin.” “The Nizam's army proved of much service in the Pindaree and Mahratta wars in 1817, and after the overthrow of the Peishwa these services were recognized by the treaty of 1822, whereby the Nizam received a considerable accession of territory, was released from all arrears of tribute which he owed to the Peishwa, and from all future demands of

it, and some exchanges of territory were effected to secure a well-defined frontier." These arrangements, however, did not avert the misgovernment of the Nizam's dominions during the latter part of Sikunder Jah's reign. The administration fell into great disorder, the Subsidiary Force was constantly called upon to repress local rebellion ensuing from the grossest oppression, and the State became deeply involved in debt both to merchants and to the British Government. To extricate the Nizam from these embarrassments the British Government paid him a sum of Rs. 1,66,66,666 in commutation of the annual payments on account of the Northern Circars. To assist, moreover, in restoring order, British settlement officers had been employed in various districts. Nusser-ood-Dowlah succeeded in 1829, and requested that the direct interference of British officers in the administration might be discontinued. His request was complied with, and misrule restored. The credit of the State declined so far that bankers refused to grant loans. Chundoo Lall, overcome by his financial embarrassments, resigned in 1843. At this time it was found necessary to make advances from the British treasury for the maintenance of the Contingent which the Nizam was bound by treaty to provide. Suraj-ool-Moolk, the son of Mooner-ool-Moolk, was appointed minister on Chundoo Lall's resignation, but he made no effort to pay off the debt that thus accrued. "In 1849 a demand was made for the payment of the debt by the end of 1850. No steps were taken for payment, and in 1851 a territorial cession was demanded to liquidate the debts, which now amounted to Rs. 78,00,000. A payment of Rs. 40,00,000 was at once made, and the appropriation of the revenues of certain districts was promised to meet the remainder. But no real improvement followed. The Resident was again obliged to make advances for the payment of the contingent, and in 1853 the debt had again risen to upwards of Rs. 45,00,000." It was then that the financial relations of the Nizam and the British Government were put upon the new footing that involved the assignment of Berar, "for the purpose of providing the regular monthly payment to the contingent troops, and also for payment of the interest at six per cent. per annum of the debt due to the Honourable Company so long as the principal of that debt shall remain unpaid." The contingent which the Nizam had been bound by the previous treaties to provide was now to be maintained by the British Government. Any surplus revenue accruing from the assigned districts was to be paid over to the Nizam's government. This proviso not unnaturally gave rise to inconvenience and embarrassing discussions after a time. After the Mutiny, therefore, when our relations with the Nizam's government once more came under revision, new arrangements were made. On the part of the Nizam the claim for Berar accounts was given up. None the less, however, was the treaty of 1860 designed as a reward to the Nizam for his services in 1857. The debt of 50 lakhs due by the Nizam was cancelled; the territory of Shorapore, which had been confiscated on account of the rebellion of the Rajah, was ceded to the Nizam, and the districts of Dharaseo and the Raichore Doab were restored to him. Finally, it must be understood that, although the Nizam surrendered his claim for accounts relating to Berar, he retained his right to the surplus revenues of Berar, which have greatly increased, and the Hyderabad State has since been paid a surplus amounting in the aggregate to Rs. 67,78,280. This little fact is studiously kept in the background by the present advocates of the restoration of Berar, who have the assurance to point to British economy in the management of the Contingent since it was taken out of native hands—the fruits of which economy go to swell the sums paid over to the Nizam—as in itself dishonourable evidence that we retain in Berar too valuable a pledge for the object we desire to guarantee.

Our survey of the Berar question in its historical aspects is now tolerably complete. We have shown how our earlier relations with the Nizam's involved none of that steadfast friendship on their part which recent writers, relying on popular ignorance of history, have impudently represented as animating their conduct. We have shown that the Nizams have been treated by the British Government with forbearance when they have been faithless and overcome; with generosity when they have, as our allies,—even when their actual services in the field have not been of much



value,—theoretically contributed to our victories. That the Nizams have gained more by our support in fact than we by theirs, during the confusion of the earlier Indian wars, is a conclusion which any attentive reader may easily pick out of the facts we have related. We have shown finally how that limited English intervention in the internal affairs of Hyderabad, which is absurdly represented as the cause of their confusion during the first half of the present century, was really the salvation of the country, and was due to the purely disinterested love of good government, for its own sake, which is the guiding principle of modern English relations with Native States. In short, we preserved Hyderabad for the Nizams by administrative help during Sikunder Jah's reign as undeniably as we formerly preserved it for them by our alliance against their native enemies in the field. That the British Government will eventually give back Berar, if the weighty considerations that originally led to their assumption of its administration lose their force in the future, we think very probable; but it is much more than probable—it is practically certain—that the current agitation for an immediate restoration will collapse whenever it comes in contact with the new considerations, which, as we have pointed out, would render any such lamentably retrogressive measure at this time inexpedient and uncalled for.

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BANGALORE EXAMINER, July 6, 1876.—*The English Press on the restoration of the Berars.*—If we were believers in the occult science of astrology we should say that the astute Native minister who rules the destinies of the Hyderabad State “was born under a lucky star.” Both here in his own land and in Europe he seems to be one of Fortune's prime favourites. Hardly any other chief adviser of a Native Court would have so successfully pulled through that awkward affair of the young Nizam's visit to Bombay to greet the Prince of Wales. Sir Salar Jung not only succeeded in getting over the unpleasant incident, and in throwing dust in the eyes of the British Resident and the British Government, but he was also cordially invited by the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Sutherland and other noble members of the royal suite, to come over to England. Readily accepting the invitation, Sir Salar proceeded on his tour by way of Italy. Thither his good genius accompanied him, and he was received by the King, welcomed by the Pope, greeted with royal salutes, and fêted as much as his young master would have been had he been the visitor. In Paris the same luck attended him (barring the accident on the staircase of his hotel), and now that he is in England the propitious goddess smiles on him more than ever. He has been feasted and welcomed everywhere. The freedom of the city of London has been presented to him; he has been presented to the Queen, and has had the honour of dining with Her Majesty. It is not to be supposed that a man of the political astuteness of Sir Salar Jung would be satisfied with all this outward show and circumstance of an honourable welcome. What to him must be of far higher importance and significance is the wonderful unanimity exhibited by some of the leading journals of the London press, not merely in their greeting of the honoured guest, but also in supporting the cause which Sir Salar Jung has most at heart, and which is the hidden but predominant motive that took him to England—to wit, the attempt to induce the Home Government to restore the Berars to the Hyderabad State. The *Times*, the *World* and the *Saturday Review* have all spoken out with no uncertain voice on the subject of the restoration of the Berars. The first and the third named journals can hardly find words of sufficient force to speak of the great services rendered to the British Government during the Mutiny by “our old and faithful ally” the Nizam, whose loyalty is attributed to the good offices of the Prime Minister. The *World* heaps the most excessive abuse on the British Government, and even goes to the length of asserting that that Government is not capable of any feeling of gratitude or justice towards those amongst the Native Princes who display loyalty and goodwill to the British Queen. Abuse of this kind, of course, will not do much harm, and will certainly not tend to strengthen the pretensions of Sir Salar Jung in the matter of the Berars; but the high-sounding and lofty periods about “justice” and “gratitude” and “services to the British Government,” and the ignorant or



audacious falsification of the history of the Berar transaction, are, on the other hand, unfortunately, calculated to go down with the ill-informed British public and equally ignorant members of Parliament. Now, we are quite prepared to admit that Sir Salar Jung has rendered the Government very great and valuable services; we are also prepared to concede that but for his firmness amid much opposition at the time of the Mutiny the country would have broken into a rebellion, which would have involved the whole of Southern India in that great catastrophe and postponed for a few years longer the re-establishment of British rule. But for these services Sir Salar Jung and others of his position amongst his countrymen who adopted a similar course of conduct at the time have been amply thanked and rewarded, and we do not see that the latter are called upon to do more at this time of day. We cannot conceive, for our part, how the services he has undoubtedly rendered the Indian Empire can be made an argument for the immediate restoration of the Berars to the Hyderabad State. That the Berars might have to be some day restored to the Nizam's Government is probable, but that depends entirely on the character of that Government and the state of the country at the time when the young Nizam comes of age. The history of the transaction about the Berars seems to be quite misunderstood by our English contemporaries. The British Government has not "annexed" the country, and does not hold it by right of conquest. It administers the government and collects the revenues as a matter of mutual arrangement between itself and the Nizam's State, for the payment of the contingent of British troops located in the Nizam's territories. At the time that an alliance was entered into between the British and the Nizam's Government, the former required, and the latter consented to give, a material guarantee in the shape of three provinces of the Deccan. In the course of a few years, owing to a vigorous and upright administration, it was found that the revenues were in excess of the cost of maintenance of the British contingent, and two provinces were restored, while the Berars alone were retained as a material guarantee for the payment of the subsidy. We do not see that the British Government has any call to give up this tract of country, or to agree to accept an annual money payment for the support of its troops in Hyderabad, as has been kindly suggested by our English contemporaries. The ruler of Hyderabad is but a lad of delicate and precarious health, according to the showing of his own people, and the peace, order, and good government of the State depends entirely on the life of one man, on whose demise the chances are that an attempt will be made, if not already going on, to sow the seeds of revolt against the British Government. Why, then, should that Government be called upon to anticipate so likely a contingency by prematurely giving up provinces which have thriven and prospered under its liberal and honest rule? When the young Nizam comes of age and proves himself a ruler able to administer the government rightly, so that there shall be no risk to the general peace, order, and prosperity, the Government may then give up the material guarantee it holds, and withdraw its troops, if the Nizam so wishes it. At present the proposition is premature on the face of it.

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TIMES OF INDIA, July 7, 1876.—*The Berars*.—It is a heavy charge, but it is unfortunately a true one, that there are public writers in India who do not know what justice or equitable dealing means when our own interests as Englishmen clash with those of the people. The *Bombay Gazette* has for nearly twenty years been the leader of this misguided class. There seems to be no sense of justice whatever towards the people in that journal. "In this God's world, where men and nations perish as if without law, and judgment for the unjust thing is strangely delayed, dost thou think that there is therefore no justice? It is what the fool only has said in his heart. It is what the wise in all times were wise because they denied and knew for ever not to be. One strong thing we find here below, the just thing, the true thing. My friend, if thou hadst all the artillery of Europe trundling at thy back in support of an unjust thing, I would advise thee to call halt, and say 'God's name: no!' Thy success! Poor devil, what will thy success amount to? If the thing is unjust thou hast not succeeded; no, not

though bonfires blazed, and bells rang, and able editors wrote leading articles, and the just thing lay trampled out of sight, to all mortal eyes an abolished and annihilated thing."

The simple fact as to the Berars is that we took them from the Nizam by an act of pure violence, without a pretext for the spoliation that would not be scouted by any International Court in the world. We coveted them, and were determined to have them, and we took them ; and it is a disloyal act, it seems, on the part of Salar Jung that he has been patiently striving for years to persuade us of the injustice of our course, and of the claims of the Nizam's Government upon us to restore the province to that prince. Why, the man merits nothing but our hearty respect for doing so, while we write about him as though he were a traitor, and bound to support our oppressive conduct towards the prince whose servant and Minister he is. The *Bombay Gazette* never loses an opportunity of vilifying the man to whom we can never pay the debt we owe him. As long as we have power to hold a pen we shall write what we think about the national conduct in these matters. There is not a parchment-skinned official in the whole Government that does not know the real character of our relations with the Nizam, and that the seizure of the Berars was an act of undisguised violence.—*Calcutta Statesman*.

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FRIEND OF INDIA, *July 8, 1876.*—*The restoration of Berar*—It has been repeatedly remarked of late that the new interest in India subjects that has sprung to life in England within the last few months, while it is to be warmly welcomed on many accounts, brings one or two disadvantages in its train. Among these, strange to say, is included the somewhat keener interest taken in India by the mass of members of Parliament fled from the House when India was introduced, (*Sic*) is superseded by a new complaint that Indian questions are likely in future to be discussed greatly influenced by the shallow superficiality which prides itself on a knowledge of India acquired in a few months from the most untrustworthy sources. The evil is perhaps an imaginary one. The debates on the Titles Bill did little to show us whether it was imaginary or real. But a subject of discussion is likely soon to occupy the attention of Parliament which will afford an excellent test of the fitness of that body to deal with questions of imperial moment connected with this country. We refer to the much-talked-of cession of the Berars to the Nizam of Hyderabad. It is perhaps somewhat anomalous that a question of this nature should fall to be discussed at all by an assembly which is not an assembly of the Empire to which the question belongs. The fact that every one feels that Parliament is the only place where such a question can be settled is proof that India is still a dependency of the United Kingdom in as full a sense as ever, and that the Imperial title is a delusive name ; whether it is destined to remain so for ever is another and a very doubtful question.

Be that as it may, it is generally understood that the distinguished Arab statesman who for nearly a quarter of a century has ruled at Hyderabad, and won himself one of the foremost reputations in India, is about to appeal to the judgment of the English Parliament on a question of right between the Nizam and the Indian Government. He is about to ask back the Berars from us in the name of his master, and his claim is already exciting profound interest both here and in England. The importance of the question that will thus demand solution from Parliament cannot well be exaggerated, and it would be difficult to raise one better fitted to test the qualifications of that body for dealing with vital India problems. To partizans on either side—and we do not pretend not to have taken our side—the question may not seem a difficult one, but when we attempt to divest ourselves of all fixed opinions and to approach it *de novo*, when we read contemporary writings on both sides and try from them what sort of judgment an uninformed student may be expected to form, we find it exceedingly difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. We may indeed comfort ourselves with the hope that papers will be laid before Parliament which will put the matter in a

clear and full light, and we wish we could also hope that members of Parliament will not in the mean time form their opinions, or bewilder their brains trying to form them, from the half-informed, often reckless, and sometimes dishonest writings that are now appearing on the subject. For our own part we are convinced of the substantial justice and reasonableness of the claim that Sir Salar Jung has gone to England to urge, but, for the very reason that we wish to carry our readers with us to the same conviction, we desire to treat the subject with as much calmness and as little dogmatism as possible. The discussion is but commencing, and there is ample time before us to treat it from every point of view.

At present we shall give some attention to two of the writers that are most staunchly opposed to the cession of the Berars,—the one a writer at home who speaks with some authority in India questions, the other a writer in the notable Anglo-Indian newspaper which is published at Allahabad. The home writer thus states—conscientiously no doubt—the claim of Sir Salar Jung:—"The claim of Sir Salar Jung is, in a word, that Berar was assigned to the Marquis of Dalhousie in 1853 in payment of the large and increasing sums due for the military contingent, that in 1860 Lord Canning agreed to pay the Nizam the surplus revenue if no accounts were asked, and that, ever since, that surplus has been annually paid. *The answer is that the assignment of Berar was a 'permanent' assignment*; that in 1860 Lord Canning arranged to acquire the full sovereignty, but was prevented only by the sentimental objection of the Nizam of that time to see the province doubled up with Nagpore, which had belonged to the ancient Mahratta foe," and so on. Before making any remarks of our own on this style of argument it may be well to hear the *Pioneer*, which is equally emphatic against the cession. After remarking that the problem has been absurdly misstated at home, our contemporary admits that "there is one consideration connected with our tenure of Berar which must be recognized as having a certain force in the direction of Sir Salar's wishes," and what does the reader think that consideration is? Why, that "*Berar has not been ceded to us in perpetuity*, that at some time or other it is conceivable that they (Indian statesmen) might be disposed to talk of restoration." Now here is a remarkable difference of opinion between two of the strongest opponents of restoration. The one declares that the answer to Sir Salar's claim is that the cession was "permanent," the other admits that the one consideration in favour of Sir Salar's claim is that the cession was not permanent. A division like this in the enemy's camp is a hopeful omen for Sir Salar's cause. If asked to decide between the two conflicting friends we should say that the home journalist is the more honest, and the *Pioneer* the more logical and dangerous. The Marquis of Dalhousie *meant* the cession to be permanent, and the supporters of Dalhousie's annexation policy have ever looked upon it as permanent, and one cannot read the treaties that were entered into with the Nizam without perceiving that the Indian Government of the day had quietly made up its mind that, possession once obtained, restoration would be out of the question. The imperial Dalhousie looked upon the absorption of all the States into the British dominion as only a matter of time, and every step in that direction was in his eyes a step never to be followed by retrogression. But it takes two parties to make a bargain, and it will hardly be contended by the most one-sided disputant that the Nizam looked upon the cession as permanent, or as anything but a temporary necessity forced upon him by the will of the stronger; nor will it be contended that the cession was formally made permanent. The *Pioneer* some time ago advised the Nizam's partizans to study Aitchison's Treaties. It has taken its own prescription, and the result is that it volunteers the admission that the cession was not made in perpetuity.

The other writer from whom we have quoted goes on to state that in 1860 Lord Canning arranged to acquire the full sovereignty, and was prevented by a sentimental objection on the part of the Nizam. Instead of "acquiring the full sovereignty," he admits that Lord Canning agreed to pay over to the Nizam the surplus revenue after defraying the cost of the Contingent, and that this surplus has been paid annually ever since. Here we are stranded in a glorious muddle.

The Nizam has assigned to us part of his territory in perpetuity ; from its revenues we are to pay the cost of an army to keep the peace in that part of India, and the surplus, after paying the necessary expenses of Government, belongs to the Nizam. It must, we think, be evident that the payment of the surplus was an admission that the assignment was not permanent ; it was certainly an admission that the territory belonged by right to the Nizam ; that all that we could claim from it was a certain sum of money to meet certain expenses, whatever it yielded beyond that belonging to its rightful sovereign. It seems ridiculous to talk of such an arrangement as permanent. The Nizam was forced against his will to mortgage part of his territory ; being insolvent and powerless he had no help for it but to submit ; he is now solvent and able to redeem the territory, and offers to do it on terms which are as safe as any guarantee can make them, and he is told that the assignment was permanent ! The answer is decisive on the principle that " he shall take who has the power, and he shall keep who can," and on no other.

We have said that the cession was made by the Nizam perforce. Lord Dalhousie represented to him that by existing treaties he was bound to defray the cost of the Contingent, and though he afterwards admitted in his minute of 1853 that that was a mistake, and that he could no longer, " as an honest man," say that the Nizam was so bound, he never thought that any reparation for the mistake was necessary. To compel the Nizam's consent to the assignment he had to threaten him with dethronement, and did so in the plainest terms. He told him that the British Government could crush him at its will, and that resistance would bring the independence of his sovereignty into " imminent danger." In short, the alternative put before the Nizam was temporary cession of the Berars or the annexation of all his dominions. A threat of that nature from the Marquis of Dalhousie was not meaningless, and the Nizam wisely yielded. The *Pioneer* meets with its usual dexterity the statement that the concession was wrung from the Nizam by force, and passes it with a hop, skip, and jump :—" We certainly do not acknowledge that to be a true version of history, but we are spared all necessity of reviewing Lord Dalhousie's negotiations by the fact that Lord Canning a few years later partly felt the injustice that had been done to the Nizam and made some concessions. These concessions were received willingly by the Nizam, and therefore to talk of coercion is utter nonsense."

Here we must pause for the present. It is admitted that the original concession was forced from the Nizam by threats of dethronement, and that the cession of Berar was not in perpetuity. Other arguments in favour of continuing to hold what is admittedly not our own will remain for future consideration.

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FRIEND OF INDIA, *July 8, 1876.*—It sometimes happens that a party to a discussion advances all imaginable arguments except the one which really influences him in forming and holding to his decision. In a case of this kind it is not surprising if the opposing party should find his logic unavailing, for a man with a concealed premiss is not easily driven from his conclusion, and when apparently vanquished can argue still, or at least keep to his opinion. The *Pioneer* with admirable audacity has determined to be frank in the discussion about our duty to the natives of India, and boldly advances the argument, usually kept in the background, which justifies us—in the opinion of many—in keeping the natives out of the higher posts in the public service, and which, if admitted, will justify us in treating them in all matters exactly as we see fit without regard to any claims of abstract justice. It is well that this argument should be put plainly. If it is valid it will greatly simplify discussion ; if not, its invalidity will inevitably become apparent when it is thus brought clearly forth to the light. It is not a new one, by any means, only we do not usually profess to base our actions in India upon it. Perhaps we do so oftener than we think, and accordingly we shall state it again. It is that *the natives of India, as a conquered people, have no rights.* The *jus belli* is in our hands, and our will is our law. It is idle to talk of any claims that the natives have on us ; they have no rights ; let us talk no more about doing them justice ! Justice to them means only what is expedient for us, and of that we

ourselves are the judges. The Queen's Proclamation was a great act of expediency. All concessions yielded to the people were yielded because it was expedient. We must throw aside for ever all cant about great acts of justice, and such things. We shall simply do what is most convenient for us, and our native friends, whom we have falsely called fellow-subjects, had better learn as soon as possible the wisdom of the maxim that "whatever is is right."

The same argument appears elsewhere in a less unequivocal form. A contemporary admits that the abstract justice of Sir Salar Jung's claim to receive back the Berars for his master is undeniable, but abstract justice, he says, would equally require us to abandon India. The conqueror's right which we assert over British India we can also assert over the Nizam, calling it in this case the will of the stronger. The restoration of Berar, like the employment of natives in high offices, is not a question of justice at all, but one of simple expediency. Whatever it may be elsewhere, here in India at all events might is right. Fortunately we are able to believe that the converse is true, that right is, and will in due time assert itself to be, might, and the time will come when the just thing will be declared to be the only expedient thing. Meantime it is becoming daily clearer that the concessions referred to are expedient as well as abstractly just—if that means anything.

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BOMBAY GAZETTE, *July 12, 1876.*—Our London correspondent mentioned last week that Lord Salisbury had not called upon Sir Salar Jung, and that the Hyderabad confederacy was very anxious to induce him to do so. We are sorry to hear that, worked upon by stories of Sir Salar's serious illness, the Secretary of State was prevailed upon, before the last mail left London, to call upon the Nizam's Minister. We regret that this act of kindness was committed, because it is sure to be misinterpreted at Hyderabad. If Sir Salar Jung was well enough to dine with the Prince of Wales, he was well enough to leave a card at Lord Salisbury's, and while it is right and proper that the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Sutherland, and other great personages who have little or nothing to do with politics should treat Sir Salar Jung with good-natured courtesy, the Secretary of State for India should stand on his dignity in all intercourse with the Minister of a Native Prince who is one of the feudatories of the Indian Government. It has been noticed that Sir Salar Jung has had the presumption to imitate royalty by having a book in his hall for visitors' names. No English nobleman would do a thing of this kind, and Sir Salar is not of a higher rank than any member of the English House of Peers. But, whatever social errors may have been made in the reception of Sir Salar, we are glad to know that not the slightest countenance will be given to his overtures for the restoration of Berar to the Nizam. The India Office emphatically refuses to discuss the question of giving back Berar at all.

MADRAS MAIL, *July 13, 1876.*—*The Berars Question.*—The *Indian Daily News* says that it may or may not be right for the British Government to give up the Berars—and we are far from asserting dogmatically that it ought not to do so—but before it can properly do so, it is bound to consider all the unwritten pledges which have grown up around its power in India; and we have no hesitation whatever in affirming that the dispassionate consideration of all these delicate questions is likely to be prejudiced by any excesses of sentimental enthusiasm that may be got up in London to celebrate the visit of Sir Salar Jung. The matter is important, not only by reason of all that it may involve for the people of the Berars, but also by reason of what it may involve hereafter for the millions who live in other Native States. The Hyderabad Contingent, as we pointed out a couple of months ago, was raised because no reliance could be placed on the old Hyderabad army; and the assigned districts are the source from which the salary of the Contingent is obtained. Those districts were taken in charge because in the confusion which obtained in Hyderabad it was not an easy matter to obtain any other sort of guarantee for the payment of the Contingent. The independent chiefs of the various Native States are virtually kept on their thrones by the British

bayonet, that is to say, their subjects are prevented from dethroning them if so minded ; and it may occur to those who weigh the whole matter with the care which it seems to invite, alike by its importance and by the probable consequences of any blunder in settling it, that the British Government is bound to satisfy itself, by far more searching investigation than any which it can now be said to make, as to the satisfactory character of the rule maintained in Native States. Even as regards Hyderabad, it is well enough understood that no Englishman dare walk unarmed in the native city ; while as regards other States reports of a very grave character have recently appeared in the press, which must have given rise to serious doubts as to the reality of the good government in which we persist in believing. And since the British Government will not permit the subjects of Native States to resort to rebellion, which is the natural remedy for bad government, it is bound to satisfy itself that justice is done to these peoples in whose lives it arbitrarily, if wisely, interferes.

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HINDOO PATRIOT, *July 17, 1876.*—*The Berar Question.*—The agitation of the Berar question has led some of our contemporaries to review the history of the relations between the Nizam of Hyderabad and the British Government. This is our pretext for casting a look backwards. In giving the historical facts we will follow Malcolm's History of India and reports of successive Residents at Hyderabad as summarized by Mr. Aitchison. The State of Hyderabad was founded by Kunrood-deen Assuf Jah, a distinguished soldier of the Emperor Aurungzeb, who in 1713 was appointed Nizam-ool-Moolk and Soubadar of the Deccan, but eventually threw off the control of the Delhi Court. Assuf Jah died in 1748, and was succeeded by his second son Naseer Jung, the eldest son Ghazee-ood-deen Khan holding high office at the Court of Delhi. The claims of Naseer Jung were disputed by Mozuffer Jung, his nephew, with the support of Dupleix, the Governor of the French settlements, who saw in the establishment through the influence of Mozuffer Jung, as Soubadar of the Deccan, and of Chunda Sahib, a claimant for the Nawabship of the Carnatic, a sure means of securing the ascendancy of the French in India. The English as a matter of course supported the rival, and were foiled in their attempts. Mozuffer Jung was succeeded by his son Salabut Jung. Although the latter was in favour of the French, still the success of the English induced him to conclude a treaty with them, the first of the series.

On the outbreak of the war between France and England in 1756, the French were driven out of the Northern Circars by an English force. Seeing the triumph of the English, Salabat Jung concluded a treaty granting Masulipatam and other districts to the English in inam, and binding himself to exclude the French from his dominions. The acquisitions of the British in the Northern Circars were confirmed by a firman of the Emperor of Delhi in 1765, at the same time that the Dewani of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa was obtained. His successor Nizam Ali attacked the Carnatic, but the English concluded a treaty of peace with him by which for the Circars of Ellore, Siccacole, Rajamundry, Moozuffurnuggur and Moortizanugger or Guntoor the British Government agreed to furnish the Nizam with a subsidiary force when required, and to pay nine lakhs a year when the assistance of their troops was not required. The Nizam on his part engaged to assist the British with his troops. Then came the war with Hyder Ali. The Nizam at first showed a disposition to support him, but eventually he sided with the English. A third treaty was concluded between the British Government and the Nawab of the Carnatic on the one part and the Nizam on the other, by which the Nizam revoked all sunnuds granted to Hyder Ali by the Soubadars of the Deccan, agreed to cede to the English the Dewani of the Carnatic above the ghats, which had been seized by Hyder Ali, on condition of their paying him seven lakhs of rupees a year ; not to interfere with the possessions of the Nawab of the Carnatic ; and to accept a reduced payment for the Northern Circars. The engagement between the English and the Nizam mutually to assist each other with troops was altered into an agreement to furnish the Nizam on requisition with two battalions of sepoys with guns, on condition of the Nizam defraying their expenses, it being understood

that the force was not to be employed against any person in alliance with the English. On the breaking out of the first war with Tippoo Sultan, Lord Cornwallis made every effort to secure the co-operation of the Nizam, by promising him full participation in the advantages which might result from the war. A treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was concluded with him on 4th July 1790. By this treaty, to which the Peishwa was made a party, it was stipulated that the Nizam and the Peishwa should invade Tippoo's territories, and should furnish a contingent of 10,000 horse to be paid for by the British Government, that an equal division should be made of the territories conquered, that certain polygars and zemindars who had formerly been dependent on the Nizam and Peishwa should be placed on their former footing, and that if, after the conclusion of peace, Tippoo should attack any of the contracting parties, the others should join and punish him. On the termination of the war, territories yielding an annual revenue of 13,16,000 pagodas were made over to the Nizam as his share of the conquests.

At about the end of the last century the Nizam was involved in a war with the Mahrattas, but the English did not assist him. The war, which broke out in 1795, terminated in the convention of Kurdla, by which the Nizam was compelled to cede to the Mahrattas territories yielding a revenue of thirty-five lakhs of rupees, to pay three crores of rupees, and to give his Minister Azim-ool-Oomrah as a hostage for the fulfilment of these terms. Three-fourths of the territory ceded by the Nizam was afterward recovered during the dissensions which followed the death of Madho Rao Peishwa. The resentment created in the mind of the Nizam by the refusal of the British Government to aid him in his extremities, or to permit the Subsidiary Force to accompany him in the war, led him to entertain in his service a body of troops commanded by French officers, and to dismiss the British Subsidiary Force. But matters were made up by Minister Azim-ool-Oomrah, who was favourable to British influence, as the threatening attitude of Tippoo made a closer connection with Hyderabad desirable for the English Government. Our Government entered into a treaty on 1st September 1798, by which the Subsidiary Force was made permanent and raised to six battalions costing Rs. 24,17,100 a year; the Nizam's French corps was to be disbanded; the British Government was to arbitrate between the Nizam and the Peishwa, or, in the event of the Peishwa not consenting to that arrangement, to protect the Nizam from any unjust and unreasonable demands of the Mahrattas. On the outbreak of the second war with Tippoo in 1799, the Subsidiary Force and the Nizam's army co-operated with the British troops, and after the fall of Seringapatam the Nizam received, by the partition treaty of Mysore, districts yielding 6,07,332 pagodas. To this were subsequently added two-thirds of the territories which were offered to, but rejected by, the Peishwa. The jealousy with which the Mahrattas viewed the operations against Tippoo, and the threatening attitude which they assumed, led the British Government to strengthen their connection with the Nizam, and a new treaty was concluded with him on 12th October 1800, by which two battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry were added to the Subsidiary Force, and for the payment of the force the Nizam ceded all the territories he had acquired by the Mysore treaties of 1792 and 1799, yielding about 17,58,000 pagodas, subject to some exchanges to secure a well-defined boundary. At the close of the Mahratta war the Nizam received by the partition treaty of Hyderabad, dated 28th April 1804, the cession of the Deccan territories conquered from Sindia and Nagpore. The Nizam's army proved of much service in the Pindaree and Mahratta wars in 1817, and after the overthrow of the Peishwa these services were recognized by the treaty of 12th December 1822, whereby the Nizam received a considerable accession of territory, was released from all arrears of tribute which he owed to the Peishwa, and from all future demands of it, and some exchanges of territory were effected to secure a well-defined frontier. At the close of the reign of Secunder Jah the maladministration of Chundoo Lall involved Hyderabad affairs in great confusion, which were extricated with the advice and help of British officers.

We now turn to the history of the Hyderabad contingent. The contingent force owes its origin to the 12th article of the treaty of 1800, by which the Nizam agreed in time of war to furnish 60,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry to co-operate



with the British army. Although the treaty gave the right only to an occasional use of the Nizam's troops, the practice was to require a certain portion to be maintained ready for service at all times, whether in peace or war. Part of the Nizam's army was commanded by European officers. It had been in various ways reformed at the request of successive Residents, and particularly by Mr. Henry Russell in 1814 and 1816, and it was made subject to the Articles of War. Still the contingent was essentially a part of the Nizam's army. No efforts were made to pay off the debt on account of the contingent either by Suraj-ool-Moolk or by his successors in office, Amjad-ool-Moolk and Shums-ool-Oomrah, who were appointed in 1848 and 1849 with the approval of the British Government. In 1848 a demand was made for the payment of the debt by 31st December 1850. No steps were taken for payment, and in 1851 a territorial cession was demanded to liquidate the debt, which now amounted to upwards of Rs. 78,00,000. A payment of Rs. 40,00,000 was at once made, and the appropriation of the revenues of certain districts was promised to meet the remainder. The demand of territorial cession was therefore withdrawn. But no real improvement followed. The Resident was again obliged to make advances for the payment of the contingent, and in 1853 the debt had again risen to upwards of Rs. 45,00,000. Some new arrangement was absolutely necessary. Therefore in 1853 a new treaty was concluded with the Nizam, by which the British Government agreed to maintain an auxiliary force of not less than 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and four field batteries of artillery; and to provide for its payment, and for certain pensions and the interest on the debt, the Nizam, ceded in trust districts yielding a gross revenue of fifty lakhs of rupees, it being agreed that accounts should be annually rendered to the Nizam, and that any surplus revenue which might accrue should be paid to him. By this treaty the Nizam, while retaining the full use of the subsidiary force and contingent, was released from the obligation of furnishing a large force in time of war, and the contingent ceased to be part of the Nizam's army, and became an auxiliary force kept up by the British Government for the Nizam's use. The provisions of the treaty of 1853, which required the submission of annual accounts of the assigned districts to the Nizam, were productive of much inconvenience and embarrassing discussions. Difficulties had also arisen regarding the levy of the 5 cent. duty on goods under the commercial treaty of 1802. To remove those difficulties and at the same time to reward the Nizam for his services in 1857, a new treaty was concluded in December 1860, by which the debt of fifty lakhs due by the Nizam was cancelled; the territory of Shorapore, which had been confiscated for the rebellion of the Rajah, was ceded to the Nizam; and the districts of Dharaseo and the Raichore Doab were restored to him. On the other hand the Nizam ceded certain districts on the left bank of the Godavery, traffic on which river was to be free from all duties; and agreed that the remaining assigned districts in Berar, together with other districts making up a gross revenue of Rs. 32,00,000, should be held in trust by the British Government for the purposes specified in the treaty of 1853; but that no demand for accounts of the receipts or expenditure of the assigned districts should be made. It was the object of the British Government to obtain the sovereignty of the assigned districts, so as to administer them through any agency it pleased; but to this the Nizam could not be prevailed on to consent.

Such is the history of British relations with Hyderabad and of the Berar question. It will be seen that in every important crisis in the history of British career in Southern India the Nizam rendered material assistance to our Government. It is too well known what signal services he rendered to it during the sepoy revolt. The Hyderabad contingent has no basis on treaty right. It was created by sufferance and our Government took advantage of it. The Nizam does not deny his liability to maintain it, but his affairs are now in good order, and his Government claims the restoration of the Berars on condition that the contingent force shall be maintained intact. Nothing could be more reasonable than this, and yet our Government resists his claim. Hyderabad was certainly indebted to our Government, but our Government has been still more indebted to it, and justice and gratitude alike demand that the Berars should be restored to the Nizam.



STATESMAN, *July 18, 1876*.—Many of our readers have probably read with surprise the account given by the *Pioneer* of our relations with the Nizam, after the very strong things said about those relations ourselves. We are now therefore going to show conclusively on which side the truth lies, and what the *Pioneer's* history is really worth. Every word we have said upon the subject—and we have said some very strong ones—has been true : and what the *Pioneer* has said in reply has been just as false. Let the reader be good enough in the first place to note carefully the following extract from its second article, which professed to be a reply to what the *World* has written upon the subject in London :—

“ We need not weary the reader with an exposure in detail of all the falsehoods and misleading collocations of events through which this narrative advances—misconstructions far too numerous to have been the accidental result of honestly perverted sympathies. It will be enough to throw a little fresh light on one quotation which the writer evidently brings forward as his ace of trumps. After the succession of Sekunder Jah the Nizam's dominions fell into terrible disorder, and this is the *World's* account of the reason why :—

“ ‘ In vain the Nizam protested, in vain quoted Article 15 of the treaty, binding the Company not to interfere with the Nizam's children, subjects, servants or concerns. For nearly fifty years we ruled Hyderabad by ministers appointed by ourselves and maintained in power by our bayonets. The British Resident, Sir C. Metcalfe, writing of the utter breakdown of the Nizam under the troubles in which we had involved him, said : “ I can hardly imagine a situation more entitled to pity, or more calculated to disarm criticism, than that of a prince so held in subjection by his servant under the support of an irresistible foreign power.” ’ ”

“ We do not know from what despatch—the general significance of which most assuredly had no resemblance to that which this single sentence taken alone might seem to convey—this passage is copied. But we may easily show how treacherously the *World* has acted in pretending to call Sir Charles Metcalfe as a witness in favour of its own distorted assertions. In Kaye's essay on Sir Charles Metcalfe—see his *Lives of Indian Officers*—we find the following passage, which sufficiently shows what the Resident really thought about Hyderabad :—

“ ‘ The more I see of the Nizam's country,’ wrote Metcalfe after some six months' experience, ‘ the more I am convinced that without our interposition it must have gone to utter ruin, and that the measures that have been adopted were indispensably necessary for its continued existence as an inhabited territory. As it is, the deterioration has been excessive, and the richest and most easily cultivated soil in the world has been nearly depopulated, chiefly by the oppressions of Government . . . . After the conclusion of the settlement one measure more, and I think only one, will be necessary, and to that I conceive our interference ought to be limited. We must preserve a check on the native officers of the Government to provide that they do not violate the settlement, otherwise they certainly will . . . . The officers should not have any peculiar official designation founded on their duties, lest it should be considered as a partial introduction of our rule.’ ”

“ So on through a long despatch we read the familiar story of high-minded and disinterested English effort to purify and reform the administration of a Native State reduced by domestic misgovernment to a condition of bankruptcy and rebellion. We need not go over the rest of the *World's* essay ; if faith in its *bona fides* can survive a perusal of these two extracts from Sir C. Metcalfe's writings we should be wasting trouble in doing so. For most readers, we fancy, we have said enough. We need only add that there is scarcely a sentence which any one familiar with Hyderabad diplomacy can read without detecting false suggestion or suppression of truth.”

Now if the writer of the article from which we make this extract really knows the history of our relations with Hyderabad, or if he is only affecting a knowledge that he does not possess, which we suspect is the case, it is difficult to express ourselves too strongly upon such writing. He tells us in this extract that Sir Charles Metcalfe's views concerning our relations with the Nizam were the very opposite of those which the *World* affirms them to have been ; and that

journal is accused of "treacherously pretending to call Sir Charles Metcalfe as a witness in its favour of its own distorted assertions" of our conduct towards that prince. In the plenitude of his self-sufficiency, the writer contemptuously asserts that he does not even know from what despatch of Metcalfe's the *World* has so treacherously copied "the single sentence" on the strength of which the views of that great man have been so daringly misrepresented by ourselves and others. Do we not read in the pages of Kaye how Metcalfe had but the same story to tell of the Nizam as we have had of every other Native Prince?—"The familiar story of high-minded and disinterested English effort to purify and reform the administration of a Native State, reduced by misgovernment to a condition of bankruptcy and rebellion." These were Metcalfe's views, if you like, and it would be more waste of trouble to go over the rest of the *World's* essay on the subject.

Now the very confident gentleman who writes thus does not seem apparently to know that Kaye edited in 1855 a volume of extracts from the papers and correspondence of Lord Metcalfe, and that the "single sentence" which the *World* quotes occurs in a despatch dated 14th August 1826. The most important minute, however, of Metcalfe's on the subject is that dated 13th May 1829; and that we may fully expose the charlatan who has dealt with this subject in the *Pioneer* we must inflict a long extract from it upon our readers. They must not pass it over on any account if they would understand what the merits of this quarrel really are.

13th May 1829.—"The Minister during whose administration our alliance with the Court of Hyderabad was formed and perfected was the celebrated Azim-ool-Oomra, Aristoo Jah. He, however, was the Minister of the Nizam's choice, and whatever power he exercised was granted to him by his master, of his own free will. Entire confidence and mutual attachment existed between them, and it was not during the life of that prince that our influence was banefully exercised in the selection or support of a Minister.

"From the time, however, of the completion of the subsidiary alliance (1800) it seems to have been considered as essential that the Minister should be in our interests, and that we should support him with our influence.

"The Nizam died before the Minister, to whom our support was continued, and then became efficacious. It does not seem to have been considered that the Nizam who succeeded could be allowed any option as to the continuance or removal of the Minister. Our Resident gave His Highness a clear understanding of what was intended, by observing to him, on his accession, that with such an ally as the British Government, and such a Minister as Aristoo Jah, His Highness's affairs could not fail to prosper.

"Aristoo Jah accordingly remained Minister until his death, keeping his master, the present Nizam, during the whole time, in thralldom and insignificance, totally devoid of power.

"On the death of that Minister the Nizam announced his intention of taking on himself personally the management of the affairs of his Government. He naturally wished to avoid being again placed under a Minister independent of his authority.

"The arrangement, however, which he contemplated for this purpose was objected to by our Government. We insisted on the nomination of a Minister with full powers. We asserted the right of having a Minister attached to our interests, and, consequently, of selecting one of our own choice, and, if requisite, of enforcing his nomination. This extremity, however, was not necessary. Meer Allum, whom we selected, was appointed by the Nizam, and was sole ruler for life of his master's dominions.

"The Nizam made some effort to obtain a share of power in his own Government; but this was unpalatable to the Minister, and the Resident gave decided support to the latter. The Nizam retired from the contest in disgust, and has never since taken any part in public affairs, but has led a life of gloomy retirement and sullen discontent.

"Our influence, therefore, established the Minister at Hyderabad as a despotic ruler, without the consent of his master. In all British interests he was sub-

servient to the British Resident, and also in all private interests which the latter chose to advocate. In the management of the country the Minister was absolute, and had the support of the British Government against any opposition that he could not subdue with the means at his own disposal. Opposition to him was treated as hostility to us, and disaffection to the English alliance; and as his interests were, by our system, identified with our own, and our utmost influence exerted in his support, it was scarcely possible that his enemies should not become ours, although the same might have been as willing as he to court our friendship, had we not made ourselves obnoxious to them by supporting this single individual against all competitors for power in the State.

"After the death of Meer Allum the Nizam again fruitlessly expressed an intention of placing himself at the head of affairs. He was pressed to nominate a Minister, and the following extraordinary arrangement took place. Mooneerool-Moolk, nominated by the Nizam, was made Prime Minister, but it was stipulated that he should exercise no power in the State. All the power was given to the Deputy Minister, Chundoo Lall, who was patronized by us. So that from that time, in addition to its sovereign prince excluded from all concern in the management of his affairs in consequence of our interference, the State of Hyderabad has had a Prime Minister in the same predicament, as another effect of the same cause. The subserviency of the real Minister to our will has since been more complete than before; the suppleness of his personal character, and the lowness of his birth, aiding the natural effect of the dependence of his situation.

"The next great step in the advancement of our influence and interference in the Nizam's affairs was the substitution, in lieu of portions of his own army, of troops of all arms—cavalry, artillery, and infantry—raised, disciplined, and commanded by British officers.

"Our interference in the Nizam's army arose from an article of treaty by which he is bound to furnish a certain amount of auxiliary force in the event of war with other powers. The force furnished in former wars was not sufficiently efficient in our estimation. We began by a general superintendence of it, with the view to improvement; but the result has been that above forty lakhs per annum out of the Nizam's revenues are appropriated to the maintenance of a force commanded entirely by British officers under the exclusive orders and control of the British Resident.

"This arrangement could only have been effected through the entire subserviency of the Minister, for it must have been quite revolting to the feelings of the Court and of the chiefs of the national army.

"But it increased the personal power of the Minister, made him more than ever independent of the Court and people, enabled him more and more to triumph over his adversaries, and rendered his extortions of revenue irresistible.

"The existence of a force paid by a Native State but commanded by our officers and entirely under our control is undoubtedly a great political advantage. It is an accession to our military strength at the expense of another power, and without cost to us: an accession of military strength in a conquered empire, where military strength is everything. The advance is immense. But I cannot say that I think the arrangement a just one towards the Native State. The same circumstances which make it so advantageous to us make it unjust to the State at whose expense it is upheld.

"The subserviency of the Minister at Hyderabad has rendered this kind of force in the Nizam's territories a sort of plaything for the Resident, and an extensive source of patronage at the Nizam's expense. The temptation is difficult to resist, and it is more to be regretted than wondered at that the expense is increasing. It appears from returns prepared in the Secretary's office that the military and civil allowances paid by the Nizam's Government to British officers amounted, according to the earliest report received from Hyderabad, under date 1st January 1824, to 11,11,098 Hyderabad rupees, the number of officers being 101; on the 28th January 1825 to 9,16,260 rupees for 83 officers; on the 1st March 1826 to 9,99,420 rupees for 101 officers; on the 31st December 1826 to 11,34,428

rupees for 116 persons; on the 31st December 1827 to 12,48,696 rupees for 119 persons; and on the 1st December 1828 to 13,49,880 rupees for 123 persons. The necessity for this increase in the last two years is by no means obvious. The intermediate decrease in 1824 and 1825 was no doubt owing principally, if not wholly, to the absence of officers during the Burman war, who must, however, have returned by the end of 1826.

"The subsequent history of the Nizam's country and of our further interference therein turns entirely on the character of the Minister, Chundoo Lall. His reign, for so it may be termed—his sovereign and his principal in office being mere pensioners—commenced in 1809, and continued absolute, and without any interference on our part in his management, until 1820.

"At that period, so bad had been his misrule, and so deteriorated had the state of the country become under his absolute government, that the Resident, Mr. Russell, although far from disposed to find fault with Chundoo Lall, was compelled to urge the Governor-General in Council to grant him authority to introduce a reform. The authority was granted.

"The causes which led to the admitted necessity for our interference in the Minister's management of the country are easily explained, and are such as would infallibly recur if the same absolute power without check were again left in the same hands.

"Chundoo Lall's main object, from the establishment of his power, was to retain it. The instrument most serviceable in his view for this purpose was money. He had money for any one whom he thought capable of aiding him. Besides his subserviency to the British Resident in all public measures, there was money in the shape of pension, salary or donation for any one whom the Resident recommended. Any gentleman supposed to have influence, directly or indirectly, with the British Government could command a share of the revenues of the Nizam's country. This was the origin of his lavish waste of public money on Sir William Rumbold and Mr. W. Palmer, and their connexions. Any native who was supposed to have influence with English gentlemen was also a fit object for bounty.

"Chundoo Lall's views were not, however, confined to English influence. Whoever could aid him at Hyderabad, whoever could injure him, all found access to the treasury. To make friends or to buy off enemies, was managed by the same process. All were in pay. And many who might have been active disturbers of his administration, seeing little or no hope of effecting his removal, were kept quiet by a share of the public money. Superadded to these sources of excessive expenditure was the indiscriminate distribution of immense sums to mobs of beggars, for the sake of popularity.

"The revenues were insufficient to meet such excesses; and the expenses of a year of war, added to the increasing cost of the force commanded by British officers, augmented the embarrassment. Extortion and borrowing were had recourse to unsparingly and to the utmost practicable extent. The former was augmented by the effects of the latter. Extortion and oppression went hand in hand; desolation followed.

"It is remarkable that our interference was then for the first time exercised with a benevolent view to the protection and happiness of the Nizam's subjects. Every former act of interference, however subversive of the independence of the Hyderabad State, was dictated solely by a regard for our own interests, without any care or thought for the welfare of the people whom we had delivered up to a ruler of our own selection.

"There is no other reason whatever for our interference than the total faithlessness of the Minister's character, and his incorrigible propensity to unbounded extortion. \* \* \*

"I nevertheless am satisfied that our intervention does prevent the universal and unlimited extortion that would otherwise prevail, and therefore I should extremely regret the discontinuance of our check during the rule of the present Minister, for whose acts, as his power was established and maintained by us, we are undoubtedly responsible."

14th August 1826.—“In the accounts, such as they are, it is impossible to avoid noticing the excessive proportion of the expenditure which passes through the hands of the Minister, his son, relatives, and dependants. In this Mahomedan State the holders of the public purse are almost entirely Hindoos. The Mahomedan nobles, possessing any considerable share of advantage, do not exceed three or four, including the nominal Chief Minister.

“This state of things is not unnatural under the circumstances which have produced the entire usurpation of the powers of Government by the Hindoo deputy.

“The Resident, in noticing the Nizam’s conduct regarding a loan from the privy purse for the service of the State, remarks that it indicates a separate view of his own interests, as distinct from those of his Government.

“His view could scarcely be otherwise, considering that he has so long been excluded from any share in his Government, that every attempt which he has made to assert his sovereign rights has been crushed, either by our direct interposition, or by the successful menace of it on the part of the usurping Minister, and that the Prince is merely a State prisoner in his own dominions.

“From this condition of thralldom he might now perhaps emancipate himself without opposition on our part; but it has been too long established to be easily cast off. His mind, although not naturally, perhaps, incapable of fulfilling the duties of his station, must have been affected by long depression and seclusion. Nevertheless ‘he is more sinned against than sinning,’ and I can hardly imagine a situation more entitled to pity, or more calculated to disarm censure, than that of a prince so held in subjection by a servant supported by an irresistible foreign power.”

And yet we have misrepresented Metcalfe altogether, it seems, and Metcalfe looked upon our relations with the Nizam as simply the old familiar story of “high-minded disinterested English effort to purify and reform” native misgovernment. We sometimes wonder who can be the writer of these disgraceful productions in this Allahabad paper. You cannot trust a word the journal says upon any subject. These articles about the Nizam, and Metcalfe’s view of our relations with him, have gone all over India, filling the public mind with an utterly false belief upon the subject, while the journal wipes its mouth and says “What evil have we done?”

STATESMAN, *July 19, 1876*.—We pointed out yesterday how grossly the *Pioneer* has misrepresented the views of Sir Charles Metcalfe on the subject of our relations with the Nizam. According to our contemporary the history of those relations in Sir Charles Metcalfe’s eyes was simply “the familiar story of “high-minded and disinterested English effort to purify and reform the administration of a Native State reduced by domestic misgovernment to a condition of “bankruptcy and rebellion.” Now Sir Charles Metcalfe went as Resident to Hyderabad in 1820, and in 1829 recorded the minute published by us yesterday. Chundoo Lall, he pointed out, was simply our own creature, and that we had forced him upon the Nizam, and maintained him in office simply by the strong hand of our power. In the vigorous lines of Malleson (p. 291) the misgovernment of this British Minister “resulted in universal disorganization and unimagined “tyranny; and the people, ground down to the earth under him, were forced “to become robbers, when the unseemly spectacle was presented of a regular “army under British officers hunting down the poor wretches who had only risen “under the most dire oppression.” All this, says Metcalfe, was the direct fruit of our own acts. The Nizam made repeated efforts to “obtain a share of power “in his own Government,” but at last retired from the contest in disgust under the tyranny in which we held him *for our own purely selfish purposes*.

Metcalfe has positively exhausted language in describing the reign of extortion, tyranny, extravagance, embezzlement, and profligacy that we, not the Nizam, maintained for nearly 30 years for our own intensely selfish purposes, and the enrichment of the gentlemen adventurers, high and low, who found Hyderabad a

very paradise under Chundoo Lall. This corruption went very near the Governor-General himself, through the excellent Sir William Rumbold—a story with which the student of Indian history is familiar enough. Lord Hastings barely escapes the suspicion of having been himself one of the plunderers who found this Chundoo Lall so amiable a fellow. His Lordship had an open quarrel with Metcalfe, because of the stern integrity of the latter, and eventually lost the pension he would otherwise have enjoyed, because of it. The scandal of our pecuniary transactions with the Nizam's Minister was known throughout the world. The private frauds committed by Englishmen under the protection of our Minister and the army we kept up for him found their way before the Home Law Courts, the Privy Council creditably upsetting the judgment of the Indian Courts, that had limited the interest upon the Nizam's debts to the Rumbold adventurers to 12 per cent. per annum, and considerably decreeing that any rate whatever which Chundoo Lall had agreed to pay these respectable gentlemen was to be enforced. The truth is Metcalfe links together two periods of our history separated in point of *morals* from each other by 500 years. The *Pioneer* would never have dared to refer to Metcalfe upon the subject of the Nizam had it really known the history of our rule. Metcalfe expressly declares that "every act of interference, however subversive of the independence of the Hyderabad State, was dictated solely by a regard for our own interests, without any care or thought for the welfare of the people whom we had delivered up to a ruler of our own selection ; that every attempt which the Nizam made to assert his sovereign rights had been crushed, either by our direct intervention, or by the successful menace of it on the part of the usurping Minister ; and that the Prince was merely a State pensioner in his own dominion ;" and he says, "I can hardly imagine a situation more entitled to pity, or more calculated to disarm censure, than that of a prince so held in subjection by a servant supported by an irresistible foreign power."

We appointed and maintained this man for our own profit, because we could do what we liked with him as to the contingent force, and as to every relation we had with his master ; and, still worse, that the private adventurers who found their way to Hyderabad under this system might share in the spoliation of the Nizam's treasury. Amongst these adventurers was a near connection of the Governor-General himself, and it was nothing but Metcalfe's reputation that prevented his falling a victim to Lord Hastings' resentment at the check he put upon these plunderers. And the *Pioneer* now dares tell the world that Metcalfe regarded our relations with the Prince simply as "the familiar story of high-minded and disinterested English effort to purify and reform the administration of a Native State reduced by domestic misgovernment to a condition of bankruptcy and rebellion." What Metcalfe really affirms is that the Nizam had been systematically plundered up to 1829 by ourselves and by our creatures, and the people subjected to every species of oppression. We, not the Nizam, were the doers of it all.

Our readers will, we trust, bear with us if they find our columns burdened with what are really the three "burning questions" of the day—the Exchange difficulty ; this Berars question ; and the exclusion of the people from all positions of influence under our rule. To the seeing eye they are the great burdens upon which the press is called to prophesy. They illustrate, when clearly seen into, the injustice of our rule in three great respects ; and either this injustice or our rule will at last come to an end. What is this Exchange difficulty at bottom, but the outcome of the radical injustice of the financial relations we have set up between the two countries, in compelling this dependency to pay a vast annual debt that it does not owe, under the name of the Home Charges ? What is this Berars question, but a great illustration of the injustice of our relations with the Native Princes ? And what the exclusion of the people from all positions of influence, but the injustice of our rule towards the millions of our own subjects ? No honest nation would force another people to pay its debts, as we are forcing India to pay ours, with the result of this silver difficulty. No honest nation would act towards an ally as we are acting towards the Nizam in the matter of the Berars ; and no honest nation would rule another as we are ruling this, upon the principle of excluding its own

children from all positions of influence and emolument therein. There is injustice in our financial treatment of India, radical injustice in our treatment of its Princes, and the same injustice in our treatment of its people. And, flatter ourselves as we may, the unjust thing cannot live in this universe. Sentence of condemnation has gone forth against it from of old, from the very birth of things, and we shall either have to let the unjust thing go, or see it torn from us by forces sure as gravitation in their working. If our rule of India is to last, we shall have to learn to be just towards it—just in our financial dealings with it, just in our treatment of its Princes, just in our treatment of its people. And what man at bottom really desires anything else? Where is the man who consciously means to be unjust? Our injustice springs from that self-love which, paralyzing the imagination, makes it impossible for us to place ourselves in the position of those against whom we thus offend. That we should be taking many millions of money away from India every year unjustly is hardly imaginable by us: or that we should be acting with bad faith and oppressiveness towards either the Princes or the people of the country. Certainly we do not mean it; indeed we cannot think that it is really so. If their faces were only white our imagination would be less dull; and still less dull would it be if our demands upon them meant disturbance in their enforcement. How readily we should discover that the Home Charges were unjust if their continued exaction meant a rebellion; or if our retention of the Berars meant a doubtful war with the Nizam; or the exclusion of the people from positions of influence meant an uprising amongst them. And because they are too feeble to threaten us, or too convinced of the general advantages of our rule to resist our injustice, we are to palliate it to ourselves and to perpetuate it! It is all too mournful for the man whose eyes are open steadily to look at it and to remember that he too is an Englishman.

FRIEND OF INDIA, *July 22, 1876.*—*The Berars and the Pioneer.*—After waiting several years for that statement of “the Government case for the retention of the Berars,” an indefinite promise of which was made in the *Bombay Gazette* some months ago, we are at last favoured in the columns of the *Pioneer* with the official view of the matter, which, whether expressly adopted by Lord Northbrook himself or not, was acted upon by him and his predecessors. The statement fills nearly eight columns of the paper, and as the writer himself tells us that he regards it as “a tolerably complete survey of the questions,” we are entitled to conclude that the case is rested here. It will not escape the attentive reader that, instead of giving any reply to the inquiry “Why do you not restore the Berars to their owner?” which is the only question in which we are really interested, the defence is simply a long glorification of our moderation and generosity towards the Nizam from our earliest relations with him, and of the very doubtful character of his conduct towards ourselves in those early days, in response thereto. “We have shown,” says the writer, “that the Nizams have been treated by the British Government with forbearance when they have been faithless and overcome; with generosity when they have as our allies—even when their actual services in the field have not been of much value—theoretically contributed to our victories. That the Nizams have gained more by our support in fact than we by theirs is a conclusion which any attentive reader may easily pick out of the facts we have related.” Now suppose we admit every word of this, and accept the writer’s statement of our generosity towards the Nizam, and sometimes of our forbearance, throughout the long period of nearly 80 years, 1740-1820, in which partly by intrigues with, or call it judicious management, if you please, of the native princes, and partly by the valour of our armies, we acquired the Indian Empire—let us admit every word of it, we say, to be true, and that the man’s portrait of the lion is so true to nature that though the lion were himself the artist the picture would be precisely the same. Let it be admitted, we say, that if the Nizam’s historian had been employed upon the story instead of our own, that there would have been no substantial difference between the two pictures, and that the Nizam would not have had one word to say in explanation or defence of the jealousy and the ter-



ror with which, in common with the other native princes of the country, he regarded the progress of the white-faced adventurers to universal empire. Let it be conceded that he was all faithlessness and treachery throughout, and guided by nothing whatever but his own selfish interests, and let it be conceded that we were all uprightness, integrity, and generosity throughout; that our conquests were all forced upon us; that we were all unselfishness in the administration of the provinces we had acquired; that in fact the 30 years' chapter of our history from 1756 to 1784 was such as to raise no blush in us at the memory, and that it was the inherent depravity of the people for instance that converted Bengal into jungle, and that for the Native Princes of India to attribute rapacity to us, or bad faith, or the prosecution of cruel and unprincipled wars for the consolidation and extension of our power would be false. In a word, let it be admitted that we were not foreign invaders of India, animated by a thirst of empire and gold, but a body of unselfish benefactors who had interfered in the quarrels and wars we found waging in the country, from unselfish consideration for the Nizam, and the Nawabs, and the Mahratta; that if we expelled the French and subverted native rule and set up our own over three-fourths of the Empire we did it all unselfishly, and can challenge the verdict of the world upon it, and that while the Nizam was behaving very badly to us there is no dark page of violence, bad faith, or rapacity to be recorded against ourselves during the period. The Nizam's jealousy and terror of us, and secret desire to see our rule subverted, were all unnatural, and merely the outcome of his depravity. Let us, we say, admit it all; what reply on earth is it to an impeachment of the honesty of certain things we are doing in these present days to the Nizam? Does the *Pioneer* really mean to defend the retention of the Berars on the ground that the Nizams were so ungrateful to us, and such doubtful allies three, four, and five generations ago, when we were struggling for empire, that the Nizams of to-day have no right to complain of any liberties we may take with their possessions? Bad as the Nizam's conduct may at times have been during the period in which as *invaders* of the country, we were driving out the French and subverting native rule in favour of our own, does the *Pioneer* really believe that it was one whit worse than the general tenor of our own conduct at the time? To be true to history it would be necessary to go a long way further, and to affirm that the rapacity, bad faith, and violent character of our own conduct during a great part of the period were a scandal to the civilized world. One would really imagine, from the self-complacency with which Englishmen dilate upon the bad faith of the Native Courts towards us during the process of their extinction, that we were a race of angels sent down from the skies on a mission of mercy to them, and that it was nothing but their own shocking depravity that led them to attribute to ourselves any share in the passions of human nature. If we say that we are tired of these stock references of our Foreign Office to the doubtful friendship of the Native Princes, and to the uninterested generosity of our Clives and Hastings towards them, there is no affectation in our saying so. It has been the stock device, as long as we can remember, to excuse or palliate our wrong-doing by insisting upon the undue generosity with which we treated the grandfathers and grandmothers of our present victims.

But we have not done with this device yet. It was impossible for the *Pioneer* altogether to conceal the fact that the period of our modern relations with the Nizam dates from less than three generations back. The period was opened by the Nizam's alliance with us in 1800 and in the wars with the Peshwa and the Pindarees in 1817-18, in the success of which operations "the Nizam's army proved of much service." The *Pioneer* notices the fact, but that is all, while the truth is that our modern relations with the Nizam date from that period. Now there is not a pretence that he did not show himself a faithful and most efficient ally throughout the period. He contributed largely to our success, and as a matter of fact we recognized these services in the treaty of 1822, which forms the starting point of our modern relations with him. No pretence is made that he has ever wavered in alliance since. For the long period of more than two generations of years—nearly 80 years—he has been our faithful ally, under strong



temptation to desert us, under the provocation of our oppressive and unjust conduct towards him, and the occurrence of the Mutiny. It is idle no doubt to magnify what we really owe to Sir Salar Jung for the fidelity of the Nizam's court to our cause during the Mutiny; but is it not, on the other hand, infinitely little not to recognize its full extent? As a fact it is very difficult to over-estimate the services rendered us by the Nizam in 1857-58. So inflamed and exasperated was the whole Deccan and Southern Mahratta Country at the time, and so shaken the Bombay Army, that had the Nizam gone against us it is morally certain that the whole of India south of the Vindhya down to Cape Comorin would have become one vast sea of rebellion. It was the fidelity of the Nizam that preserved Southern India to us. We could give the proof of this if necessary at length, but that it would be tedious. It is not most astonishing, then, in these circumstances, with these Princes our constant allies for three generations of years, and under great temptation and provocation, that we should have to listen to an apology for our present wrong-doing, that makes no answer to the inquiry? "Why do you withhold the Berars from a Prince who has such claims upon us" but treats us to eight columns of matter, mainly devoted to the proof that we were very magnanimous to the Nizams of old, and that they were anything but the same to us? Should we listen patiently to an apology of this order preferred anywhere else in the world? and yet it is the stock apology, and has been for years for any profitable wrong-doing that we are set upon. Would it not be the easiest possible thing to draw such a picture of our own conduct at this early period as would go far to justify any amount of bad conduct on the part of these Princes towards ourselves?

STATESMAN, *July 22, 1876*.—Having now shown what Lord Metcalfe, after nearly nine years' residence at Hyderabad, thought of our conduct towards the Nizam down to the year 1829, the way is paved for a history of the claim under which we wrested the two Berars from the Prince in 1853. We claimed from him then in that year 43 lacs of rupees for arrears of pay to the Contingent Force, which was kept up by him under the belief, impressed upon him by ourselves, that he was bound to do so by treaty. The troops were officered by ourselves and entirely under our own command, and we have seen the use made of this Contingent Force down to the year 1829. Metcalfe shows that it was used simply as an instrument for depriving the Nizam of all power in favour of the Minister, Chundoo Lall, whom we had set up and maintained in power purely in our own interests, and for the aggrandizement of the English adventurers who found their way to Hyderabad. One of the foremost of these adventurers was Sir William Rumbold, a near connection of the Governor-General; and when Metcalfe, whose righteous soul was vexed at the oppressions which the people suffered under this profligate tyranny, engaged in a death-grapple with it, he found Lord Hastings arrayed against him. Very few men would have had the courage to do as Metcalfe did, and it is to his undying honour that he braved the anger of the Governor-General, and finally wrung from him the admission that he had erred. Now this Contingent Force was probably the most extravagant army the world has ever seen. It was kept up on a scale of the utmost magnificence; and although consisting but of a few thousand men in all its cost was enormous, while that cost was regulated and determined wholly by ourselves. There were five brigadiers appointed to it and five brigade majors. The scandalous extravagance with which we officered it *when the Nizam paid the cost of it* is sufficiently illustrated by the fact that the pay of the European officers alone was 10 to 12 lakhs a year; while we managed to reduce it to 3½ lakhs when the amount had to come out of our own treasury, shortly after the assignment of the Berars.

Why was the Nizam made to pay ten or twelve lakhs a year for officering the force when we found that three or four were sufficient the moment we had to pay the money ourselves? Reviewing the matter in 1860, Colonel Davidson, at that time Resident at Hyderabad, wrote:—"The wonder clearly is that, instead of owing only forty-three lakhs of rupees at the end of fifty years of such a system, our claim did not render the Nizam hopelessly insolvent." Such was the

judgment, be it observed, of our own Resident on the matter one of the noblest men we ever had in India. Here, then, was a debt imposed by our own measureless extravagance, for our own selfish purposes, upon the Prince; and when his revenues broke down under the heavy exaction we seized the finest province in his possessions to secure payment of the arrears that we declared to be due to us under this system. But in the next place it turned out that we had been imposing the maintenance of this Contingent Force upon the Prince without any real treaty right of doing so. On the 27th May 1851, when coveting these Berars for their cotton we began to press heavily upon the Prince for payment of these arrears, Lord Dalhousie addressed him by letter in the following terms: "The debt already incurred consists chiefly of advances made for the payment of the Contingent Force. *The efficient maintenance of that force is a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of existing treaties.* Your Highness is well aware that the efficient maintenance of the force is not only necessary to fulfil the obligations of treaty, but it is essential for upholding your Highness's authority," &c. Now we ask the reader to note carefully the words we have italicized in this letter. The Nizam was here told that he was bound by treaty to maintain this force, the statement being made by Lord Dalhousie himself. Now the world has since seen a minute of Lord Dalhousie's upon this very point, dated 30th March 1853, in which he put on record, in the clearest possible terms, his full knowledge of the fact that the Nizam was bound by no such treaty obligation whatever. After reviewing the matter at length, he says:—"These are the reasons by which I have found myself forced to the conclusion that the Government of India has no right whatever, either by the spirit or the letter of the treaty of 1800, to require the Nizam to maintain the Contingent in its present form;" and lower down he says, "I for my part can never consent, as an honest man, to instruct the Resident to reply that the Contingent has been maintained because the treaty of 1800 obliges His Highness so to maintain it." But although this belief was thus secretly recorded by Lord Dalhousie no relaxation whatever was made in the pressure put upon the Nizam. He had maintained it under a construction of the treaty imposed upon him by ourselves, and distinctly enforced upon him by Lord Dalhousie himself, while it was now secretly admitted that it was an error on our own part. And was a debt imposed by ourselves on the Prince in this way, and so recklessly aggravated by our extravagance, a debt that any Court of Equity in the world would have acknowledged? Have we not said truly, that to exact it as we did—by violence and threats of an order so disgraceful that Lord Dalhousie's apologists have tried to discredit them as false—was an infamy? And what are we to say to *Pioneer* morality, that justifies our course by ignoring the baseness of what we did altogether? But there is more behind still. The Nizam's Ministers never allowed the correctness of the account. It was simply the account of the stronger, while the *per contra* claims of the weaker party were boldly struck out of the account altogether? The amount was computed by charging the Nizam with every item of arrears for the pay of the Contingent, while we omitted to credit him with amounts due by ourselves on the other side. Thus the Nizam's Ministers pointed out that we had given the State no credit for the abkaree revenues due to the Nizam for the towns of Secunderabad and Jaulnah, although we had been appropriating them for forty years. These revenues did not belong to us but to the Nizam, both towns belonging to him, while they were estimated at about a lakh of rupees yearly. The justice of the claim was undoubted, and has since, we believe, been allowed, while it swamped at a stroke the whole arrear demand for which we seized his territories. Again, the Nizam had an important claim upon us on the ground that he had ceded territory to us in 1800 for the express maintenance of a subsidiary force at a certain specified strength. We reduced the strength of the force for economy sake, but kept the territory and the revenue to ourselves, instead of crediting the Nizam with the difference.

Now we are not "romancing," as the *Pioneer* has done, but stating the sober facts of this quarrel. In a letter addressed by Colonel Davidson in October 1860 to the Government of India, that upright and just man avowed boldly that he had

always been of the opinion "that the British Government had little or no real claim on the Nizam" when it dismembered his territory and appropriated his richest provinces to itself. The truth is our conduct *was* an infamy; and when in view of what has occurred since, and the Nizam's loyal friendship to us during the Mutiny, the fact that any fancied claim we had upon him was long since satisfied, and that we may have what guarantee we please for the good government of these territories, our refusal to restore them deserves the strongest reprobation that honest men can pass upon it.

We seized them at the cost of the most painful scenes at Hyderabad between the Resident and the Nizam, in which the latter was insolently told that he was dust beneath Lord Dalhousie's feet, and that he would crush him if provoked to do so. So disgraceful was the affair that the apologists of this nobleman have sought to discredit the story of these scenes, but they are well enough known. We seized the Berars for a debt that was not really owing, and after a course of conduct towards the Nizams that has left an indelible stain on our history. It was all violence throughout. We wanted the Berars, and determined to have them. And now, when all pretence of any pecuniary claim has disappeared, and in face of the great services of the Nizam in the dangerous period of 1857, and of the facts having come to the light and knowledge of the world, we refuse to restore them, because they are a pleasant pasture for English officials. And we think such government can last. In some hour of extreme need we shall find ourselves *lamed*, and that we cannot even so much as fight. For to be unjust is to have the universe against us, and at last God and one's own-self for enemies. The religious hypocrisy, selfishness, and tyranny of our rule culminated from 1853 to 1857, when it went up in a blaze in the Mutiny. It has happily been growing in sincerity and unselfishness ever since, but to a section of the English press it is very distasteful, and they are "bastard Englishmen" who, like ourselves, believe in a future that will put the past to shame. But we shall win: of that we are very sure, in spite of *Pioneer* morality.

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STATESMAN, *July 23, 1876*.—We pointed out yesterday the true character of the claim we made upon the Nizam in 1853. We showed that Lord Dalhousie when pressing the claim with indecent threats of violence, and talking of the Prince "as the dust beneath his feet," knew well and was secretly minuting that he was not bound to keep up the force at all. We had ever told the Nizam that he was bound; while we were minuting in the secret of our own Council Chamber that he was not. We have shown further that with such scandalous extravagance did we officer the force when we were charging the Nizam with its cost that we at once reduced the annual charge of 10 to 12 lacs a year to 3½ when we had to find the money ourselves. We showed further that the account was a purely one-sided one, and that the offset justly claimed by the Nizam on account of the abkaree revenues of Secunderabad and Jaulnah, two of his own towns and not ours, was ignored by Lord Dalhousie altogether, although subsequently admitted to be well founded; and that the Nizam had further claims upon us that we refused, as the stronger party, to go into at all; and we might have added that ten lakhs of the claim we set up were for interest. We showed finally that our own Resident, Colonel Davidson, expressed his strong conviction in 1860 that we had little or no real claim on the Nizam when we wrested his provinces from him. Now in the face of these disclosures, and the claim which the Prince has upon us for his loyalty during the Mutiny, how can we, as honest men, retain these provinces in our hands? We have shown our readers the testimony we have to the excellence of the Nizam's rule, and the doubt there is whether any part of British territories is administered in a way so conducive to the well-being of the people as his own. What, then, prevents our redressing the wrong which keeps the Nizam at a distance from us, under a sense of injury that no time will efface? We have oppressed and wronged him throughout; and our sole embarrassment is the vested interests that have grown up in the Berars, in the shape of many highly-paid appointments of English officials therein. It is not their fault that they are there,

but it will be our shame if we allow a plea of this order to perpetuate the injustice of which we have been guilty. The case is a crucial one, and puts our professions of uprightness to the very test that is required to awaken us from the dreamy hypocrisy of such professions where they find no expression in our conduct.

The tendency of falsehood to become ever falser, until it decomposes altogether and men hurry it underground that it may no longer poison the atmosphere, is well exemplified in the discovery by the *Pioneer* that the Berars cannot be given back to the Nizam because they would make that potentate too strong for us. Is he not a Mahomedan Prince, and would not the Government cover itself with "deserved infamy" if by restoring to him what perhaps is his we should find him one day directing the resources of Hyderabad against us *plus* those of the Berars. Observe that this is a completely new discovery that has been made. Not a whisper of this danger was heard until the public conscience had become uneasy at the wrong which has been done, and imperative voices were telling us that our strength lies in the organization of the Empire in a way that will convert the Native Princes of the country from disaffected, because unjustly treated, tributaries, into firm and loyal allies. It is suddenly discovered that it is dangerous to be just to the Nizam, and that the restoration of the Berars would so increase his power as to make him a menace to our rule. It is impossible to suppress the scorn with which we notice this hollow falsehood. The Nizam is dangerous to us, and therefore we must retain the Berars in our own hands !

If this plea were really true, we need hardly say that, believing as we do the continuance of our rule to be of infinite consequence to the people, our counsel would be clear and definite and suited to the circumstances. We should say, "Then tell the Nizam himself so, frankly." Instead of putting this falsehood forward simply to mislead the uninformed English public, and to create doubt as to the safety of the step, tell Salar Jung the truth frankly, and place at the disposal of the Nizam such sum of money as may be fairly regarded as the worth of his provinces. Has the Nizam no need of money for railways, canals, and other public works in the territories we have left him ? You will never do this, because it is simply a fiction. You know well that there is no danger whatever in restoring the province to this Prince ; but that we may bind him fast to our rule for all time, by removing the grievance which embitters our relations with him ; and that nothing under heaven but reluctance to restore what we have stolen hinders our giving it back. Were the portfolio of the Foreign Office in our hands for a single week we would undertake to make the Nizam our fast friend for all time, by a manly and straightforward expression to him of our belief that he had been treated harshly, and that Her Majesty was desirous of showing to him, and to all the Princes of India, how sincerely she desired to rule the Indian Empire with just consideration for the rights of her feudatories and the claims of morality. It will, we believe, be found necessary in organizing the strange Empire that has come to our hands in India to modify the treaties and engagements we have with the Native Princes of the country in many very important respects ; and it is of the last importance that we should give these Princes proof of the single-mindedness of our purposes in the changes we shall have to propose to them, and in all reasonable ways gently to force upon them. *Pioneer* morality will set the country in a blaze ; and if our rule goes up in a general conflagration it will merit it if such morality be adopted and followed. Let the strong hand of the Paramount Power be but guided by transparent simplicity of purpose,—a single-minded desire to do the best we can for the welfare of the Princes and people of the country—and we may do anything with them we please. The people are quick as children to discern the temper and the motives with which we move. Our weakness lies in ourselves, not in them. We cannot make up our minds to do what is right, because it involves the sacrifice of our own interests. In the case of these Berars, utterly contemptible as the motive is, it is simply our selfish reluctance to let the monopoly of all administrative appointments therein out of our hands that makes the restoration of the province to native rule so distasteful to us. We may exact from Sir Salar Jung what guarantees we please for the character of the Nizam's

rule in the province. There is not a man in the Government that does not know this fact just as well as we do ; while political considerations of the utmost weight require the restoration of the province. It is simply impossible to over-estimate the importance of such an occasion as it furnishes for awakening the sympathies of the Native Courts, and attracting them to the Crown. It presents to us one of those rare opportunities that statesmanship seizes with both hands for the accomplishment of purposes that are not otherwise to be secured. It is emphatically one of those cases in which the wise thought conceived in the heart at once fills the mind with light, carrying captive with it the sympathies of the bystanders. There has been a mournful want in India of the higher qualities of statesmanship. The unhappy counsels of expediency, and the Machiavellian devices of selfishness, have blossomed at last into *Pioneer* morality, that does not know what love of the true and the just even means, and cannot believe in what it cannot understand.

FRIEND OF INDIA, *July 29, 1876.*—*The Facts of the Berars Question.*—We have already at considerable length set before our readers the leading facts of the Berars question, and have, we hope, made the flimsy and ill-informed character of the arguments commonly used against restoration sufficiently apparent. It is necessary to return to the subject, not simply to repeat our former arguments,—though the importance of the question might justify a good deal of iteration,—but to put the case in the form of a simple, unvarnished tale of facts, for the sake of supplying gaps in the narrative which may hinder some of our readers from travelling unhesitatingly to the same conclusion with ourselves. We fully believe that the great unwillingness of many Englishmen in India to admit the validity of the Nizam's claim, or the expediency of yielding to it, arises from nothing but defective knowledge of the history of those events which led to the assignment of the Berars, and seeing what travesties of history are put forward as authoritative statements of "the facts of the Berars question," we feel it our duty to go a little more into details than we have hitherto done.

As far back as the year 1766 a treaty was entered into between the East India Company and the Nizam's Government, by which, in return for a free gift of the five Circars of Ellore, Siccacole, Rajahmundry, Mustafanagur and Murtizanagur, the British engaged "to have a body of their troops ready to settle the affairs of His Highness's Government in everything that is right and proper whenever required." The engagement fell through by reason of the Nizam having allied himself with his neighbour, Hyder Ali, against the British ; but two years after, a new treaty was formed by which the British again became bound to supply a Subsidiary Force of two battalions of sepoys and six pieces of artillery, whenever the Nizam required them and the situation of their affairs allowed their troops to enter the Deccan. The engagement was again renewed in 1789. The Subsidiary Force was to be furnished "whenever His Highness shall apply for it," on condition that it was not to be employed against the allies of the Company nor against the Mahrattas. It is of the utmost importance to understand clearly the functions of this Subsidiary Force, and the terms on which it was kept up, in order that we may fully comprehend the injustice of the claim that was afterwards made for the expenses of the other force, called the Hyderabad Contingent, which did not come into existence till 1814. The Subsidiary Force was first proposed to be established in 1766. Its real establishment may be dated from 1768, after the Nizam's return to our alliance. At first the Company only undertook to furnish the troops on condition that they were able to spare them. In 1789 they undertook to furnish them whenever the Nizam should require them, under the restriction mentioned above. The force was increased and made permanent in 1798 by a new treaty. The number of sepoys was now to be 6,000 ; they were to be in the Nizam's pay from the moment of their crossing the frontier the British now undertook to arbitrate between the Nizam and the Mahrattas, and the duties of the Subsidiary Force were clearly set forth as follows :—"The said Subsidiary Force will be at all times ready to execute services of importance, such as the protection of the person of His Highness, his heirs and successors, from race to race (*sic*), and overawing and chastising

all rebels or excitors of disturbance in the dominions of this State, but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor, like Sebundy, to be stationed in the country to collect the revenues thereof." We must observe the one limitation of the duties of the force mentioned in the last clause of the foregoing—it was not to be used for services which belonged to Sebundy Corps, that is, for the purpose of coercing refractory subjects into paying their revenue. In all other respects it was bound to maintain internal tranquillity in the Nizam's dominions, and the reason for the limitation to its functions imposed by the treaty of 1798 was that some of the turbulent zemindars owned a mixed allegiance to the Mahrattas as well as to the Nizam, and the Mahrattas were at that time allies of the British. But in 1800 a fresh treaty was entered into by which this one limitation was withdrawn. This was a most important concession to the Nizam, and was looked upon as such by the then Governor-General, Lord Wellesley, who refused it in 1798, "because it was of too much importance to be granted gratuitously to His Highness, and because I wished to reserve so great a favour for an occasion when I might be able to derive from it a proper return of advantage to the Company." He therefore demanded and received in return the complete cession of the Bellary and Cuddapah districts, valued at sixty-three lakhs annually, and agreed to take upon the Government a general guarantee in perpetuity of the tranquillity Nizam's territories. He insisted that the cession should be made in the most unequivocal terms. "Whatever view," he wrote to the Resident, "may be taken of this subject by the Court of Hyderabad, it is my determination not to grant the Nizam the complete protection and support which he solicits on any conditions less advantageous to the Company than those comprehended in the new treaty. It is absolutely necessary to convince Azim-ool-Oomra and His Highness that I will not wantonly sacrifice the equivalent due to the Company in return for the new and important concession of the general guarantee." He went on to say that whatever might be the value of the districts to be ceded it was nothing more than the Company might justly claim "in return for the effectual protection afforded by the general guarantee of the Nizam's dominions." There was thus, it will be seen, a complete cession of territory on the one hand, and a complete guarantee on the other. It is necessary to observe carefully how complete this generally guarantee was, because it was by shamelessly disregarding it that the British Government afterwards held the Nizam responsible for the payment of another force, the Contingent, for which there would be no *raison d'être* had the guarantee been fulfilled. By the treaty of 1800, in return for the wide and wealthy districts ceded, the British Government guaranteed the Nizam's safety from foreign enemies. "The British Government," says the second article, "will never permit any Power or State whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights or territories of His Highness the Nizam, but will at all times maintain and defend the same, in the manner as the rights and territories of the Honourable Company are now maintained and defended." We have already seen how completely internal tranquillity was guaranteed, the only restriction imposed on the duties of the Subsidiary Force in 1798 being removed in 1800. We may further prove this statement by quoting part of the 17th article of the treaty:—"It is therefore hereby agreed that if in future the Shorapore or Gudwall zemindars or any other subjects or dependants of His Highness's Government should withhold the payment of the Circars' just claims upon them, or excite rebellion or disturbance, the Subsidiary Force, or such proportion thereof as may be requisite, after the reality of the offence shall be duly ascertained, shall be ready in concert with His Highness's own troops to reduce all such offenders to obedience." The Nizam being thus guaranteed against all external and internal danger, it is time to ask for what purpose the Contingent was afterwards raised and supported at a ruinous expense to the Nizam, to defray which expense we took from him, and now hold, his fairest provinces. It may be supposed that the Subsidiary Force was found insufficient, and that therefore the Contingent was a necessity. It is not denied that an additional force may have been necessary in time of war, though it cannot have been so in time of peace, and even in time of war the British Government

was bound by the treaty of 1800 to furnish such additional force without additional expense to the Nizam. In the event of war, the Nizam, besides providing the stipulated forces, was to do all he could to bring into the field "the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions." And "with a view to the effectual prosecution and speedy termination of the said war, the Honourable Company in the same manner engage on their part in this case to employ in active operations against the enemy the largest force which they may be able to furnish over and above the said Subsidiary Force." In the same manner, in the event of internal disturbances, if they were in any case beyond the reach of the Subsidiary Force, the British Government undertook to "direct such proportion of the troops of the Company as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose to assist in quelling the said disturbances within His Highness's dominions." And all this was undertaken in return for the perpetual cession of certain valuable districts, which have ever since remained in undisputed possession of the British. Does not the reader begin to wonder how it was that in 1853 the Marquis of Dalhousie was able to demand a fresh cession of territory to defray the expenses of a force *other than the Subsidiary Force* kept in the Nizam's territory for the purpose of maintaining internal tranquillity? We were bound without any such force to maintain internal tranquillity and ward off foreign danger, and we had come under this obligation on terms which the Marquis of Wellesley himself fixed, and considered "advantageous." And of all this the Marquis of Dalhousie was fully aware. In the 45th paragraph of his minute of 30th March 1853 he says; "Neither do I overlook the fact that if the Contingent were abolished our obligations to protect His Highness's person, and to repress important resistance to his authority, would remain in force, while our means of fulfilling the obligation would diminish." He seems to have held, honestly but mistakenly, that if in an emergency the British Government had to furnish any forces over and above the Subsidiary Force their expenses might be charged upon the Nizam, although it seems to be plain enough from the treaty of 1800 that the British Government was bound to supply such forces at its own cost. But no one knew better that the Government had no right to require the Nizam to maintain any such force as the Contingent in time of peace. In the minute already quoted from he says, "I have found myself forced to the conclusion that the Government of India has no right whatever, either by the spirit or by the letter of the treaty of 1800, to require the Nizam to maintain the Contingent in its present form." Again, "I for my part can never consent, as an honest man, to instruct the Resident to reply that the Contingent has been maintained by the Nizam, from the end of the war in 1817 until now because the 12th article of the treaty of 1800 obliges His Highness so to maintain it." Yet in the following May he wrote to the Nizam: "The debt already incurred consists chiefly of advances made for the payment of the Contingent Force. The efficient maintenance of the force is a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of existing treaties." There was no other treaty to which he could possibly have referred but that of 1800, which he himself admitted, in a minute unknown to the Nizam, imposed no such obligation on the Government of Hyderabad. The iniquity of the exactions made on the Nizam is thus apparent, for whatever reason there may have been for maintaining the Contingent from 1814, when its existence commenced, till 1817, there was no excuse for keeping it up after the close of the war in the latter year. How it was kept up in spite of the Nizam, by the forcibly excluding him from all share in the government of his own State, how we did so by appointing and upholding our creature Chundoo Lall as Minister, to the almost utter ruin of the State, we showed at length in our last issue. From what has already been said it is clear that it was maintained for the performance of duties which we were bound to perform by means of the Subsidiary Force.

It is necessary to add further that by keeping up the Contingent at the Nizam's expense to perform the duties of the Subsidiary Force, which we were bound by treaty to keep up, and had been fully paid for by the cession of territory, we were able to reduce the numbers of the Subsidiary Force by more than a fourth



under the stipulated number, and thus effected a dishonest saving of eight lakhs yearly for thirty years, according to the estimate of Major Moore. Yet we charged upon the Nizam the full cost of the Contingent which enabled us to effect this saving. We have besides already pointed out in our last week's issue that the Abkaree revenues of Secunderabad and Jaulna, amounting to a lakh of rupees annually, and forming part of the excise revenue of Hyderabad, had been appropriated for forty-one years by the British Government. If these sums had been honestly set off against our claims—admitting these to have been just—on the Nizam, the balance would have been largely in favour of the latter. Yet we compelled him to assign to us his most highly valued provinces as security for a debt which he did not owe, and while we were in reality vastly indebted to him.

We must close with a few brief words. The assignment in 1853 of the Berars was forced from the Nizam in this unjust manner under threats of invasion. Even then the cession was not in perpetuity, but the districts were to be "held in trust" for the payment of this fictitious debt; and now Sir Salar Jung comes forward with the offer of another guarantee, and claims the territory for his master. The character of that guarantee, and the wisdom of accepting it, we must leave for future discussion. Meanwhile it is satisfactory to know that the English papers have begun to advocate the Nizam's claim, and that there is reason to believe the Secretary of State is inclined to listen favourably. The restoration of the Berars, instead of being dangerous to our power, will go further than almost anything else we can do to establish it on a firmer basis.

STATESMAN, *July 29, 1876.*—The most careless observer, we think, can hardly fail to detect in our attitude on this Berars question the misgiving with which the Government itself views the propriety of retaining the province. The *Pioneer* unconsciously discloses this misgiving when it says "that the British Government will eventually give back Berar" is, it thinks, "very probable." But why should we give back the Berars if it is right to retain them? Is it in this doubtful way that men conscious of their rights are accustomed to speak of them? And in what way do these eight columns of weary talk about our magnanimity towards the Nizams of last century and their unworthy response justify our refusal to do what is right now? The *Friend of India* points out that it has been a stock device of the Foreign Department for many years to excuse or palliate conduct of doubtful honesty towards the Native Princes of the country by enlarging upon the magnanimity of our conduct towards their predecessors, and the ingratitude or the treachery with which this magnanimity was responded to. Suppose we were to the full as magnanimous towards these Princes as the writer of this *Pioneer* romance would have the world believe, and that they were as insensible to it all and ungrateful to us as he alleges, what possible bearing has this old history upon the inquiry whether we seized the Berars on fair and just grounds in 1854, and whether, supposing it was fair and just to seize them, it is right to hold them after what has occurred since. As a matter of fact it is a romance only that the *Pioneer* has given of the history of our relations with the Nizams. If the Nizams were to tell the story how differently would it run. It suits the journal to present one side of the shield only to us, while the other is ignored as though it had no existence. Were our treaties with the Nizams, and our conduct towards them, in the long and doubtful contests in which we were engaged first with the French, and then with Mysore, and finally with the Mahrattas, dictated by anything whatever but consideration for our own interest? If we showed magnanimity towards them, was it that we felt a generous interest in their fortunes, or that we sought to promote our own by detaching them from the host of enemies which the progress of our arms as foreign invaders had created for us in the country? And how idle and futile is it, remembering the terror with which our progress was regarded by the Native Princes of the country, to make it a reproach against any of them that their alliances with us were hollow and insincere. The wonder is not that they were often so, but that they were ever otherwise than so. What promise or guarantee, moreover, did the first thirty or forty years of



our rule give to either Prince or people that it would prove anything but an overwhelming calamity to them? Were our self-love not so profound as it is we should see at once how positively absurd it was to have expected anything like faithful alliance from a body of Princes who saw in us nothing but powerful enemies animated with boundless ambition, a rapacity that knew no limits, and who even in the operations of common trade showed a determination to monopolize its profits, and to exclude the people from all share therein, though their very industry were destroyed in the process.

It is with infinite impatience only that a just mind can listen to pleadings in defence of our own doubtful courses *now*, on the ground that the Native Princes of India were insincere in their relations with us 100 or 120 years ago. And yet it is pleading of this order that is the staple of the *Pioneer's* apology, while Englishmen in large numbers are thoughtless enough to listen with complacency to such pleadings, instead of dismissing them with scorn. We are at liberty to act badly now, it seems, because the Nizams acted very badly towards us in the last century. The Nizam has been a most important and most faithful ally to us for more than two generations of years. He has shown this fidelity under strong temptation to act otherwise; while we are at liberty, it seems, to regulate our conduct towards him not by what he is and has long been towards us, but by what the Nizams of the 18th century were. There is nothing so hateful in this world as ingratitude, nothing more beautiful than gratitude; and there are two names connected with the Mutiny that Englishmen should never recall but with hearty respect. They are those of Sir Salar Jung and Louis Napoleon. If Salar Jung in 1857 had resented, as he was under powerful temptation to do, Lord Dalhousie's tyrannous conduct but three years before, instead of throwing the whole weight of his influence into the scale with us, the continuance or otherwise of our Indian Empire would, humanly speaking, have depended upon the French Emperor. The defection of the Nizam was the danger that hung as a black cloud over the position, since it would have given Europe abundantly sufficient pretext to mediate in the matter. And we suppose every one knows what that would have meant. Instead of rewarding the fidelity of the Nizam with the magnanimity which the occasion demanded, we withhold from him to this hour the provinces we took from him in 1854, and hardly care what language we apply to his Minister because he has perseveringly been begging that they may be restored. And our attitude is—we would, and would not. We can make up our minds neither to annex the province boldly nor to restore it frankly; and when, tired of waiting, the Nizam's Minister carries his appeal to Parliament, he is denounced by one English journal in the country as a traitor, while the conduct of the Nizam's ancestors towards us is impeached by another.

The uncertainty of our attitude in the matter is a full and complete condemnation of our course, as every one can see. If the restoration of the Berars to the Nizam be not merely "inexpedient and uncalled for at the present time," but would be in itself "a lamentably retrogressive measure" at any time, as the *Pioneer* affects to believe, why does not the Government, why does not our official apologist, say so boldly and denounce the measure? It is worth while, we think, to recall the closing sentence of this apology. Let the reader look at it attentively: "That the British Government will eventually give back the Berars if the weighty considerations that originally led to their assumption of its administration lose their force in the future we think very probable; but it is much more than probable—it is practically certain—that the current agitation for an immediate restoration will collapse whenever it comes in contact with the new considerations, which, as we have pointed out, would render any such lamentably retrogressive measure at this time inexpedient and uncalled for."—*Pioneer*, July 5.

We are here told that it is very probable that the British Government will eventually give the provinces back, but that it would be inexpedient and uncalled for to do so at the present time, and that it will be a lamentably retrogressive measure at any time. Is this really the way in which men with convictions express themselves? If the measure is a lamentably retrogressive one, how dare

we contemplate it at all? Every one can see that it is cant, not conviction, that speaks in this uncertain tone. The writer knows as well as we do that no time could be more expedient than the present for this measure, and that, instead of being a lamentably retrogressive one, it would do more to confirm the loyalty of the Native Princes of India, to assure them of the complete sincerity of our professions towards them as a body, and to pave the way for the organization of the Empire, than any other step we could take.

ENGLISHMAN, *August 4, 1876*.—The visit to England of Sir Salar Jung, the eminent Minister of Hyderabad, whose diplomatic talents have gained for him a just tribute of respect and admiration from all who have come in contact with him, has, it need scarcely be said, been undertaken for the attainment of but one object, one cherished scheme which he has indulged in for years, undaunted by opposition, and undeterred by refusal. His journey has been undertaken in the hope of an immediate readjustment of a question of great political importance in the relations of the British Government and of the Nizam—the restoration to the latter of the Berar districts, assigned to the British Government, by the treaties of 1853 and 1860, for the maintenance of the Contingent, and in lieu of the payment of certain debts incurred by the Nizam towards the E. I. Company. This question has been again and again revived by Sir Salar Jung during the past ten years; has been the subject of protracted correspondence between him and the British authorities; and has now been once more reopened by the Minister with a fresh importunity, which he trusts will be materially aided by his own personal representations at head-quarters. That his case should have found partizans among our own countrymen, especially among that section—by no means a small one—who are only too ready to ignore all political considerations where the interests of Native Princes are concerned, cannot excite surprise. Sir Salar Jung's argument considered superficially only is no doubt plausible, and from his point of view deserves the fullest consideration on its own merits. The inaccuracy and violence of language of writers who, like the author of a late article in the *World*, denounce the action of the British Government as "having been carried out in defiance of all treaties, and founded on spoliation and injustice," are as discreditable as they are disingenuous, and likely to mislead many who are unacquainted with the true historical facts of the case.

The Hyderabad Contingent, which, according to Lord Dalhousie and others, was, from first to last, the principal, if not the sole, cause of discord between the Nizam and the British Government, has been in existence since the beginning of the century. Its history is briefly this. In 1801, soon after the treaty of Deogaon, by which the Nizam agreed to furnish the British Government in time of war with an army of 15,000 men, a force was substituted, at the joint suggestion of the Minister, Chundoo Lall, and the Resident, called the British Contingent, enlisted under the guarantee of the British Government, commanded by British officers, and maintained on the system of British military discipline. Why a force planned and organized on so large a scale should have been imposed on the Nizam, and accepted by him in the first instance, does not appear, nor does it seem to have been justified by the existence of any treaty or agreement; and Lord Dalhousie, in his masterly exposition of the question, states this most emphatically. But, as the Contingent was maintained, without reluctance, at Hyderabad for more than 40 years, on terms agreed to by the successive rulers of Hyderabad; as the English Government had never urged its support, or gained anything by its continuance, and had reluctantly, for years, made the Nizam large advances towards its maintenance, the Nizam was, by the obligations of the treaty, clearly called upon, in all equity, to pay the heavy debts, which in 1849 amounted to more than 50 lakhs, due for the maintenance of a force whose strength he had always declined to reduce, whose presence in his capital and territory he had never resented, and whose expenses he had never repudiated, unpunctual as were his payments. In 1851 Lord Dalhousie, after years of patient negotiation, and after having given ample time and opportunity to the Nizam and his Ministers to pay off the annually increasing debt, directed the

Resident at Hyderabad to demand, in liquidation of the debt, which the Nizam said he was unable to pay, the cession of certain districts, including the Berars, &c., and the assignment of part of their revenues for the future payment of the Contingent. The Nizam, impressed with the decisive language of the Governor-General, at once altered his tone, asserted that it was in his power to pay the debt, and personally pledged his word as a prince that the money should be paid off within a certain time. His Minister, Sooraj-ool-Mulk, uncle of the present Sir Salar Jung, engaged to discharge the debt at the close of the year. On their assurances, Lord Dalhousie, still anxious to show every consideration and indulgence to the Nizam, accepted his earnest pledge, and withdrew his former demands for the cession of territory to British rule, on the condition of the money being paid at the end of the year. These solemn promises, however, were, we need scarcely say, not observed; a portion only of the debt was paid, and the pay of the Contingent was allowed to fall more deeply and hopelessly into arrears. This unsatisfactory state of things, both for English honour and in the Nizam's own interests, could now no longer be allowed; and in 1852 the Governor-General directed Colonel Low to conclude a fresh treaty, by which all the Nizam's just debts and obligations to the E. I. Company would be cancelled, the Contingent placed on a satisfactory footing, and all future expenditure met by the assignment of the Berars and other districts to British rule as long as the Contingent was retained. The Nizam of that day was naturally unwilling to part with any portion of his territories, and especially objected to the words "in perpetuity," which had at first been inserted. But, as Sir George Yule clearly shows in a despatch on the subject, the ruler of Hyderabad was equally averse to parting with or lessening his Contingent, which he probably knew was necessary for the stability of his kingdom; and he was also well aware that, after so many broken promises, only the material guarantee or cession of territory would be sufficient to satisfy the British Government as to the liquidation of the debt. Two alternatives were, therefore, open to him—either to reduce or gradually disband his Contingent, or to assign certain districts for its support to the British Government. Of the two he decided on the latter arrangement, and the treaty was concluded which assigned the Berars, then misgoverned and their resources undeveloped, and now become the rich cotton field of the Deccan, to the management of English officers; their revenues, estimated at 36 lakhs, to meet the expenses of the Contingent, and the annual surplus, if any, to be given to the Nizam, who was also to be furnished with accounts of the expenditure and management of the provinces. By this scheme the Nizam profited by at least 6 lakhs. In 1860 the treaty concluded by Lord Dalhousie was revised and modified, though not, as Lord Canning distinctly wrote, abrogated; the confiscated State of Shorapur was ceded to the Nizam, as an acknowledgment of his services in the time of the Mutiny; and, as an atonement for the unavoidable delay in the fulfilment of the promise to render accounts annually, the English Government restored to the Nizam one-fourth of the districts ceded in 1853, and, by releasing him of his debt of over 30 lakhs, cancelled all its obligations, past, present, and to come, to render him any accounts in future, though his right to any surplus revenue after the expenses of the Contingent were met was fully agreed to, and has since then been strictly observed. The Nizam's services in the Mutiny, on which so much stress has been laid, and which were undoubted, were, therefore, amply rewarded by the treaty of 1860—a treaty as advantageous to his Government as it was attended with sacrifice to our own. But, not content with the benefit he had obtained, Sir Salar Jung in 1866 again addressed the English Government, in a despatch, to the substance of which he still holds, demanding once more the restitution of the Berars, and that the treaties of 1853 and 1860 should be set aside. The grounds of this demand were that the treaty of 1853 had been unwillingly forced on the Nizam's Government, "upon the strength of verbal assurances which had never been carried out" (for such was Sir Salar Jung's insinuation); that, owing to the expensive management of the Berars under English rule, the surplus was smaller than he had been led to expect; and, lastly, that no surplus had ever been received from the Berar revenues by the Nizam. These imputations on the good faith of the British Government were also accompanied by

an extravagant demand, the folly of which Lord Lawrence completely proved, for money due to his Government from the conquest of Gantur and Karnul in 1800, and the still more preposterous request for no less than half the revenues of Mysore, which he anticipated would be annexed by the British Government! This last demand reveals, in our opinion, the true character of the ambition by which Sir Salar Jung, with all his talents, is actuated; and Lord Lawrence, with characteristic decision, rebuked him severely for presuming to interfere in the dealings of the English Government with that of Mysore, and for dictating with respect to the interpretation of a treaty in which the Nizam was not, nor ever had been, concerned. So far from there being any truth in the assertion that no surplus had been paid from the revenues of the Berars, a considerable surplus had been paid over in 1866; and since the management of the Berars has been under British officers the Hyderabad State has profited by a surplus of altogether nearly 68 lakhs. That the expenses of administration were larger than Sir Salar Jung had expected was also a criticism wholly uncalled for from the Nizam, as, by the terms of the treaty of 1860, the amount of money to be spent on the expenses of management was to be left entirely to the discretion of the British Government. Sir Salar Jung also states, as a reason for the Berars being restored to the Nizam, that funds are required for improvements in the Hyderabad State, and that the Berars would be as well managed, and on a less expensive scale, under his rule. But because the present Minister is a man of superior ability, because his willingness to govern the province on the English method, and to introduce reforms and improvements of all kinds, is undoubted, these are not sufficient arguments for our restoring districts assigned to us by treaty, for excellent reasons, some years back—provinces which, under judicious administration, have become rich and fertile, settled and prosperous, instead of, as was the case some fifty years since, the stronghold of freebooters and marauding tribes. Sir Salar Jung is not privileged to live for ever; the present Nizam is a young child; and there is no reason to believe that either he or any of the other ministers now living would be superior to those of former days. Not a single member of the Nizam's family of Hyderabad since its founder has, it is said, produced a ruler of even ordinary capacity; and from historical and official records no Minister has been found of more than usual average ability. The restoration of the Berars might be justifiable on other grounds; but the present is, we think, a most inopportune moment for such an act. We hope we have said enough to prove that the Nizam has been treated with every indulgence, and that no spoliation or injustice can be imputed to the English Government.

FRIEND OF INDIA, August 5, 1876.—*Editorial Notes.*—On the 31st ultimo Sir Salar Jung and suite left England for Brindisi, and those who jumped to the conclusion that the Prime Minister of Hyderabad expected to bring home the restored Berars in his pocket are now jubilant because no public action in the matter was taken during his stay in London. They knew exactly what Sir Salar had gone to England to do, and as their sage predictions have not been visibly fulfilled they have now come to the equally sage conclusion that the visit has been a failure, and that he returns to India a disappointed man. As we were not in Sir Salar Jung's secrets, and have not that sublime faith in our own guesses that some of our contemporaries are happy in, we are not in a position to say whether he has accomplished by his journey all he premeditated or not. But we think it might have occurred to writers on this subject that, whatever Sir Salar Jung may have said or done privately in London, he, at least, had no thought of going direct to Parliament at present. The question, when opened, will be opened *pro formâ* by an application to His Excellency the Viceroy. But it is possible that Sir Salar Jung was sagacious enough to know that in these days Viceregal Councils are abnormally susceptible to sweet influences rained upon them from the stars of a higher sphere, and he may have concluded from his past experience of viceregal treatment that he had not much to hope from any Government of India unless the powers in England could first be made propitious. It is very observable to the student of this Hyderabad business that the Home authorities have all along been more favourably inclined to

the Nizam than the Government of India. This was especially the case in the time of Lord Wellesley, and again in Dalhousie's time, when the Court of Directors expressed very grave doubts as to the justice of the Nizam's treatment, and consented with great reluctance to the schemes of the Governor-General. All this is now under Lord Salisbury's consideration, and the fruit of his examination of the matter will doubtless be seen in good time. Meantime it is far too soon to jump at the conclusion that Sir Salar Jung's visit to England has failed because he has not brought back the Berars in his pocket.

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FRIEND OF INDIA, *August 5, 1876.*—*Editorial Notes.*—A London correspondent of the *Pioneer* repeats the information which we have had from other sources that the Marquis of Salisbury is inclined to give the Nizam's claim to the Berars a fair hearing. There is reason to suspect that the late Viceroy refused to give Sir Salar Jung a fair hearing, refused to receive his communications on the subject, refused to place Sir Salar's statement of the case fully before the Secretary of State. It is stated that a majority of the Council at the India Office are in like manner disinclined to give it consideration, but several powerful statesmen and politicians in England have been led to examine the facts of the case; and it is quite certain that any unprejudiced Englishman with the unvarnished facts before him must arrive at a conclusion favourable to the Nizam's claim. The matter will not go to rest. The English conscience once stirred cannot go to sleep again over such an injustice. It is noticeable that very few Anglo-Indian journals care to commit themselves on one side or other. The terrible muddle that the *Pioneer* has made may warn off some who would fain take that side; and the other side, the side that advocates restoration, is intensely unpopular among Anglo-Indians. Of this we are perfectly aware, but must, so far as we can see it, hold to the right.

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HINDOO PATRIOT, *August 7, 1876.*—It is said that the Berar question may be solved in a satisfactory way. Lord Salisbury seems to think that if the Nizam will capitalize the expenses of the Hyderabad Contingent the Berars may be restored to His Highness. This is practical.

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DECCAN HERALD, *August 9, 1876.*—*Vanity Fair* says:—"Sir Salar Jung is the bearer of a formal petition on behalf of H. H. the Nizam of Hyderabad for the restoration to that State of the Berars. We have reason to believe, however, that, acting upon a hint thrown out to that effect, this request has not been formally submitted to Her Majesty's Government, who have thus been relieved from the necessity of refusing it."

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ENGLISHMAN, *August 10, 1876.*—The writer of "Babylonian Bubbles" in the *Civil and Military Gazette* says:—"I hear on good authority that Sir Salar Jung has been courteously but decisively snubbed, so far as his demand for the Berars goes, by Lord Salisbury. This might have been expected. Be the claims of the Nizam ever so valid in a legal point of view, Government will never again surrender that magnificent province to the chances of native misrule. Of course, there are not wanting some well-born parasites to tell Sir Salar the contrary. English society is, unhappily, not altogether devoid of itching palms. But all the buck-sheesh in the world will not influence the Government of England to restore the Berars."

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DECCAN HERALD, *August 11, 1876.*—The *Pioneer* publishes news which if true is of great political importance. The Secretary of State, it is intimated, "will recommend the Viceroy to appoint a special commission on the Berar question, consisting of three military or civil officers named by the Supreme Government, three legal members of the High Court of Calcutta, and three Europeans or natives for the Nizam. The commission, it is asserted, will assemble at Hyderabad next cold season, and will report direct to the Viceroy." When the Government of Lord Northbrook, nearly two years ago, refused even to discuss the question of the claim of the Nizam to the

Berars, and returned unread the letters of Sir Salar Jung upon the subject, we stated that it was impossible that such tactics could succeed. We urged the Government if it had a satisfactory answer to the claim for the restoration of the Berars to make it known, for the *prima facie* case of the Nizam's Government was so strong that the judgment of the public would be given in the latter's favour if the attempt were made to burke the question by refusing to discuss it. The news which the *Pioneer* now publishes shows that Lord Salisbury holds upon that point the same opinion that we expressed two years ago. The claim of the Nizam to the Berars will be heard by a mixed commission, and the whole merits of the question will be fully ascertained before a decision is arrived at. This shows a distinct advance in political morality. But what if the mixed commission should disagree as to the facts, or as to the inferences to be drawn from them? With whom is the decision to rest in that not very improbable case?

FRIEND OF INDIA, *August 12, 1876.*—The "*Englishman*" on the *Berar Question*.—An ill-informed, inaccurate, or untruthful writer may in a single column advance perversions of the truth and positive misstatements which it would require a volume to correct and disprove. Yet a tissue of misstatements is often useful, either as showing the weakness of the case which they are meant to support, or as affording an opportunity, by the correction of them, to set the facts in a clear light, and give greater force to the arguments based upon them. Could we afford the space to examine in detail and expose with the requisite fullness the case for the retention by us of the districts of Berar, as recently stated by the *Englishman*, we should make out an unanswerable case for the restoration of these districts. Even by touching briefly, as we intend to do, on some of the statements and arguments of our contemporary, we shall show how the cause totters which rests on such support, and how defenceless it must be when so able and respectable a journal, after long deliberation, has spoken so.

Let us commence by clearing away one or two misconceptions. The case for the restoration of Berar does not stand or fall with the character of Sir Salar Jung, neither does it stand or fall with the character of his supporters. No one proposes to restore the districts to the Nizam because his Minister is able and amiable, and stood fast in troublous times to the British alliance. Sir Salar Jung's character and services may conciliate a more patient hearing from opponents, but do not affect the strength of his arguments. But it is alleged he is ambitious and therefore we must distrust his motives. It is not improbable that he is ambitious—able statesmen often are; but his ambition need not drive us to falsify history, or deny to established premises their just conclusion; nor, at least till it has been shown to be dangerous to the British Government, should it make us shrink from doing what we would otherwise allow to be just. But it is said the motives of some of Sir Salar Jung's partizans are open to suspicion. This is not improbable. But the question to be asked is not, What are the motives of this or that partizan? but, Is the cause just? The *World* has, it seems, written an offensive article in support of his claim, and the *World* stands convicted of tergiversation, if not of greater crimes. Its language is violent, and its statements are inaccurate. Suppose all this admitted: what then? The *World's* inaccuracy is certainly not more damaging to the case than the inaccuracy of the *Pioneer* and the *Englishman* are in its favour. But we have heard enough of the *World's* inaccuracy. In our issue of the 22nd ultimo we proved that on the only point on which the *Pioneer* condescended to contradict the *World* the *World* was right, and the Allahabad authority wrong and shockingly ignorant. We have no objections to sweeping assertions if they are, or can be, proved. But when an opponent's statements are declared to be false or inaccurate, at least some proof should follow the declaration.

But we must proceed. The *Englishman* sets out with the admission that "Sir Salar Jung's argument considered superficially only is no doubt plausible, and from his point of view deserves the fullest consideration on its own merits." This is so far satisfactory, and we shall not cavil at phrases though the phraseology is peculiar. The writer has looked at the question from Sir Salar Jung's point of view,

and is prepared to consider his argument on its own merits. He sees that it is superficially plausible, and we infer that he is about to take us below the fair-seeming surface, and show us, by the help of historical facts and sound arguments, how this Belial of Hyderabad contrives to make the worse appear the better reason. Premising that the principal cause of discord between the Nizam and the British Government has been the Hyderabad Contingent, the writer professes to give a brief history of the Contingent:—"In 1801, soon after the treaty of Deogaon, by which the Nizam agreed to furnish the British Government in time of war with an army of 15,000 men, a force was substituted, at the joint suggestion of the Minister, Chundoo Lall, and the Resident, called the British Contingent," &c. The treaty known in Indian history as the treaty of Deogaon was entered into between Major-General Wellesley and the Rajah of Nagpore on the 17th of December 1803. It has as much to do with the subject as the treaty of Paris. It was by the treaty of 1800 with the Nizam of Hyderabad that the latter became bound to furnish 15,000 men from his own army in time of war. It was not "soon after this in 1801" that the force known as the Contingent was substituted. The first nucleus of that force was organized in 1813 under the name of the Russell Brigade. Chundoo Lall did not become Minister till 1809, though as financial assistant to Meer Allum he had exercised an uncertain amount of power for four or five years previous to that date. These small inaccuracies have little to do with the main argument, but they cast some light on the character of the guide who is to take us below the plausible surface of Sir Salar Jung's argument. It is something to be even plausible. The writer who, proceeding to rectify the mistakes of others, begins by committing such a set of blunders is not even plausible. If proof is wanted—we observe that our contemporaries who oppose us on this question wisely abstain from calling evidence—we refer our readers to Lord Metcalfe's despatch of the 13th May 1829, quoted by us in our issue of the 22nd ultimo, in which, after stating the manner in which Mooneer-ool-Moolk was made nominal, and Chundoo Lall real Minister, which was in 1809, he says:—"The next great step in the advancement of our influence and interference in the Nizam's affairs was the substitution, in lieu of portions of his own army, of troops of all arms—cavalry, artillery and infantry—raised, disciplined, and commanded by British officers." The *Calcutta Review* of March 1849—"We need only point to the treaty of 1800 as one immediate cause of embarrassment, by the continued drain made on the revenues of the country for the maintenance of a Contingent Force, commencing from the formation of the first brigade in 1813." From the prominence given by our contemporary to the name of Chundoo Lall it would be inferred that the suggestion was at least partly his. In point of fact it was not his at all, but the Resident's solely, the Minister agreeing to the suggestion, of course, as he did to everything else the Resident insisted on. How completely he was our creature, and how absolutely powerless were the Nizam and his nominal Minister, Mooneer-ool-Moolk, is well known, and is clearly stated in Metcalfe's despatch already referred to. Some light on this point may be obtained from a minute by Mr. Stuart, a member of the Governor-General's Council, recorded on the 1st of January 1820. He says, "The plan was first proposed to the Minister by the Resident himself, and was evidently pressed in a manner not to be resisted," and afterwards adds, "The Resident had, with all the weight of the British influence, pressed this arrangement upon the Native State."

We again quote the *Englishman*:—"Why a force planted and organized on so large a scale should have been imposed on the Nizam, and accepted by him, in the first instance, does not appear, nor does it seem to have been justified by the existence or any treaty of agreement." Why it was accepted by the Nizam, or rather by Chundoo Lall, we have just seen; why we, without, as the *Englishman* admits, any treaty or agreement to justify us, imposed such a force on him will appear when we come to speak of the advantages we derived from it. Our contemporary proceeds:

"But, as the Contingent was maintained without reluctance at Hyderabad for more than forty years, on terms agreed to by the successive rulers of Hyderabad; as the English Government had never urged its support, or gained anything by its



continuance, and had reluctantly for years, made the Nizam large advances towards its maintenance, the Nizam was by the obligations of the treaty clearly called upon, in all equity, to pay the heavy debts, which in 1849 amounted to more than fifty lakhs, due for the maintenance of a force whose strength he had always declined to reduce, whose presence in his capital and territory he had never resented, and whose expenses he had never repudiated, unpunctual as were his payments."

We are now, we presume, below the surface. Let us examine for a little this comprehensive, and apparently conclusive, argument. Observe: The Contingent was maintained by the Nizam for forty years without reluctance; we never urged its support; we gained nothing by its continuance. We have seen how the force was imposed irresistibly upon the Nizam. We may further quote Metcalfe's minute: "This arrangement could only have been effected through the entire subserviency of the Minister, for it must have been quite revolting to the feelings of the Court and of the chiefs of the national army." In the Marquis of Hastings' letter of instructions to the Resident dated 26th October 1819 he says: "This invariable attention to the interests of Chundoo Lall (to which we are in honour bound) and the maintenance of the Reformed Troops" (that is, the Contingent) "are the essentials for us." Yet we are told that we never urged its support. The Resident, General Fraser, in his letter to Government dated 26th July 1842, says that if the Nizam be permitted to feel himself at all independent, "besides other evils which may arise, we shall experience one of great magnitude in a proposition on the part of His Highness for the disbandment of the Contingent, to which he is known to be averse, and of which neither the continued maintenance nor the original organization is provided for by any existing treaty." Yet we are told it was maintained by the Nizams without reluctance! On the 27th of May 1851 Lord Dalhousie wrote to the Nizam the following:—"The efficient maintenance of that force is a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of existing treaties." Yet we "never urged its support"! Dalhousie was afterwards, if not then, perfectly aware that no such treaty obligation rested on the Nizam,\* but not a hint of such knowledge was allowed to reach His Highness, who was always told that he must maintain the Contingent according to the stipulations of the treaty of 1800. We might fill columns with further citation of authorities from the days of Lord Hastings to the days of Dalhousie to prove that the Nizams were urged, and in fact coerced, to maintain the Contingent. The Marquis of Hastings told the Resident (letter of 26th October 1819 already quoted) that the maintenance of the Contingent was one of the "essentials" for us, and he went on to say that it "will have taken such root in the establishment of the country that there can now be little hazard, and shortly there will be none, of any endeavours to reduce it." Does that seem to show that it was held by the Indian Government to be the pure matter of indifference that the *Englishman* says it was? As to the assertion that the terms were agreed to by the successive rulers of Hyderabad, it is easy to see how that was brought about, and we may mention in passing that the quotations from Mr. Stuart already given have special reference to the arrangements made for the payment of the troops. The arrangement was pressed upon the Nizam "in a manner not to be resisted."

None of the assertions of our contemporary that we have already commented on are new; they have often been made, and as often disproved. But we believe the extraordinary statement that we never gained anything by the maintenance of the Contingent is as new as it is false and absurd. Who on earth did gain by it, then? The Nizam? We challenge any one to point out a single service it ever performed for the Nizam which the Subsidiary Force was not bound by the treaty of 1800 to perform. And for the support of the Subsidiary Force we had accepted as recompense the districts ceded in perpetuity by that treaty. It rendered services to the Nizam which we were paid for performing by other means, and the burden of its support brought his State into terrible financial disorder, which the genius of

\* We take the opportunity of correcting a misstatement in a former article, where Dalhousie's letter above mentioned was said to have been written in 1853 instead of 1851.



Dalhousie cured by amputation. But no one but the *Englishman* pretends that we gained nothing by the Contingent. Let us hear Metcalfe again :—

“The existence of a force” (he is speaking of the Contingent) “paid by a Native State but commanded by our officers and entirely under our control is undoubtedly a great political advantage. It is an accession to our military strength at the expense of another power, and without cost to us ; an accession of military strength in a conquered empire, where military strength is everything. The advantage is immense. But I cannot say that I think the arrangement a just one towards the Native State. The same circumstances which make it so advantageous to us make it unjust to the State at whose expense it is upheld.

“The subserviency of the Minister at Hyderabad has rendered this kind of force in the Nizam’s territories a sort of plaything for the Resident, and an extensive source of patronage at the Nizam’s expense.”

The *Calcutta Review* of March 1849, while supporting with all its ability the policy of the British Government, makes the following admission :—

“But instead of attempting to trace the source of the evil, or wasting time in unavailing regrets at what can never be recalled, we will at once make this concession, that the weakness and disorders of the Hyderabad Government, irrespectively of the evil administration common to all Native States, are in some degree the necessary consequences of the Nizam’s political situation, and that, from causes out of an alliance with us, the Nizam is as much the victim as the author of the abuses which we are now deploring.

“We need only point to the treaty of 1800 as one immediate cause of embarrassment, by the continual drain made on the revenues of the country for the maintenance of a Contingent Force, commencing from the formation of the first brigade in 1813. And however much this may have contributed to the advancement of our mutual interests, it has undoubtedly tended very materially to exhaust the treasury of one whom we professed to befriend. By the treaty in question the Nizam is bound to provide in time of war 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry. Out of this engagement has arisen in time of peace the present expensive force, at a sacrifice of nearly one-third of the revenue. The result is an empty treasury, heavy debts, large arrears to the city troops, and no credit.”

Such is the *Review’s* statement, and it might be far more highly coloured, of the advantages derived from the Contingent by the Nizam. In the same article we find the following paragraph, which is not worth less as evidence because it is taken almost *verbatim* from a report by Sir Henry Russell :—

“They” (the men of the Russell Brigade, the nucleus of the Contingent) “did no duty in the city, nor with any other troops in the Nizam’s service. In name alone did they belong to the Nizam. They were paid regularly every month from the Resident’s treasury” (the Nizam refunding the money), “and considered themselves as Company’s troops. For all practical purposes they were as much so as those on our own immediate establishment, and could be made quite as useful.”

As a special instance of useful service rendered by them it is mentioned that in 1817 they accompanied our army to Malwa, formed part of Sir John Malcolm’s division at the battle of Mehidpore, and their conduct received the special praise of the General and the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief. And, to quote the *Review* once more, the Contingent “might on any occasion take its place in the field, either with or without the Company’s troops. It is, besides, an accession to our own strength without any cost to ourselves, and these are not times (1849) to diminish our resources.” We need not stay to amass more evidence. The Hyderabad Contingent has always been looked upon as a most important part of our military resources, and it has been left for the *Englishman* to discover that we never derived any gain from its maintenance. Or if mere pecuniary gain be meant, we have in a former article shown how much the Contingent enabled us to save by reducing the strength of the Subsidiary Force. And the gains of British officers and subjects and the patronage enjoyed by the Resident are matters on which a good deal might be said, if need were. The *Englishman*, apparently acting on some such principle as that the greater the accumulation of misstatements the more nearly do they gain

the force of truth, goes on to say that the Nizam never resented the presence of the Contingent in his capital, and always declined to reduce its strength. Let the reader refer again to our quotation from General Fraser's letter for a just view of the Nizam's feeling towards the Contingent. As for the statement that he had always declined to reduce its strength, we have often come across it before, and now we think ourselves justified in asking for some proof of it. When, between 1813 and 1851, was he advised, or would he have been allowed, to reduce it? We should like a circumstantial answer to that question. And when it was suggested to him that he might reduce or disband the Contingent what conditions or consequences were expressed or implied? We have thus exposed the untruthfulness of the statements by which our contemporary seeks to establish the conclusion that "the Nizam was by the obligations of the treaty clearly called upon, in all equity, to pay the heavy debts, which in 1849 amounted to more than fifty lakhs," &c. No treaty obligations, no laws of equity, called upon him to pay those debts, but he was called upon by the Marquis of Dalhousie to pay them, *and did it*. What he could not pay in cash he paid for by the temporary assignment of his territories. The debt was finally cancelled by the treaty of 1860, and it is not alleged anywhere or by any one that the Nizam now owes the Government any pecuniary debt. It has been clearly proved that the claim on account of the Contingent was always and altogether unjust, and that the Nizam ought never on that account to have been asked to part with his districts. But the claim, such as it was, has no longer any existence, and Sir Salar Jung simply asks a fair hearing for the arguments by which he justifies his claim that the administration of the Berars should now be restored to the Nizam, who is still acknowledged to be their rightful sovereign.

We have said enough to show how absolutely unreliable are the statements and reasoning of our contemporary. But there are other parts of the article which, for the sake of truth and justice, we shall feel bound to deal with in a future issue.

ENGLISHMAN, *August 12, 1876*.—We have already traced with some care and, we believe, with strict accuracy the history of those relations of the Government of India with the Court of the Nizam of Hyderabad which led in 1853 to the assignment to the former of the administration of the coveted districts of Berar. If some have applied the name of spoliation to that act of the Marquis of Dalhousie we have given facts to show that the term is something more than rhetorical. We compelled the Nizam to support at a ruinous expense a military force for the performance of duties which we were bound by express treaty obligations to perform by other means. We were thus enabled to effect in the course of thirty years a saving which has been estimated at two hundred and forty lakhs of rupees, by reducing the Subsidiary Force below the strength at which we were bound by the treaty of 1800 to uphold it. For a long series of years we appropriated a part of the Nizam's excise revenues, amounting to about a lakh of rupees annually. When in 1851 the British Government became clamorous for the arrears due by the Nizam on account of the Contingent, his Minister presented a bill for these abkaree revenues showing an amount of itself sufficient to extinguish the arrears claimed from him; and, lest it should be supposed that his claim was merely fabricated for the purpose, we may remind our readers that its justice has since been acknowledged. But in Dalhousie's day the policy now advocated by the *Pioneer* of refusing to acknowledge that the natives of India have any rights was triumphant, and while our debt to the Nizam was ignored, his debt to us, which we had first forced him to contract, was made the ground for wrenching from him his best-prized districts. And so we got the Berars into our hands by the treaty of 1853.

Have any of our readers the simplicity to ask why, in these circumstances, the Nizam agreed to the treaty? Though we have no wish to use unnecessarily violent language, we are compelled to say that His Highness was led to give his consent by considerations similar to those which have led many a poor gentleman to put into alien hands his watch and purse. Dalhousie began by demanding the cession of Berar in perpetuity. The original draft of the sixth article was made to

declare that "for the regular payment of the expense of the said Hyderabad Contingent His Highness the Nizam hereby cedes and assigns to the Honourable East India Company in perpetuity," &c. Rejected by the Nizam. Then came a second proposal that "the revenues of the districts shall be permanently assigned to the Honourable East India Company," &c., the nominal sovereignty being reserved to the Nizam. Rejected like the first. The Nizam, reduced to the greatest straits as he was, would not take into consideration any proposal that involved parting with his territories or a part of his revenues in perpetuity. So strongly bent on acquiring them permanently was the Governor-General that he would doubtless have proceeded to extremities had he dared, but the attitude of the Court of Directors deterred him from openly intruding the Nizam's sovereign rights. A new article was accordingly framed by which the districts were temporarily assigned, and even to this arrangement the Nizam consented only under an express threat of a military occupation of his territories, and on an assurance that the assignment was "merely for a time," and that he might recover his districts at any time if he chose to have the Contingent disbanded. He was distinctly informed that certain regiments were under orders to march on Hyderabad, and that military operations would not be confined to the Berar districts. Having no alternative but to assign the districts or risk his sovereignty, he then consented to the assignment, and the treaty was signed.

The question to be decided now is whether we shall regard the temporary assignment of 1853 as such, and take into consideration Sir Salar Jung's proposals for restoration on our own terms, or whether we shall in 1876 declare it to be what Dalhousie desired it to be, simple annexation, and refuse to restore the territories on any terms. It is impossible to shirk the alternative. There can never come a more convenient time for restoration than the present, and a refusal to discuss the question will be tantamount to a declaration that we will never discuss it. Have we honestly repudiated the Marquis of Dalhousie's policy of annexation, or are we prepared to go further than even he dared to go, and petrify the temporary assignment into irrevocable cession? It is impossible to imagine a set of conditions to arise in the future under which it would be more expedient than it now is to accede to the oft-repeated, eager, but respectful petition of Sir Salar Jung for restoration.

"I hear on good authority that Sir Salar Jung has been courteously but decisively snubbed, so far as his demand for the Berars goes, by Lord Salisbury. This might have been expected. Be the claims of the Nizam ever so valid in a legal point of view, Government will never again surrender that magnificent province to the chances of native misrule. Of course there are not wanting some well-born parasites to tell Sir Salar the contrary. English society is, unhappily, not altogether devoid of itching palms. But all the bucksheesh in the world will not influence the Government of England to restore the Berars."

We make the above extract from the pages of a contemporary because, in spite of the questionable taste of the closing sentences, it contains a good specimen of the style of reasoning which really influences those who most strongly oppose the claim of the Nizam. We like it better than the insincere course adopted by less honest writers, who by concealing and perverting facts try to show that we have always treated the Nizam in the most fair and honourable manner, and that he has no shadow of claim to get back the Berars. Whether we resolve to restore the districts or not to restore them, let us at least tell the truth about the matter. "Be the claims of the Nizam ever so valid in a legal point of view, Government will never again surrender that magnificent province to the chances of native misrule." That is a way of putting the question which is at least intelligible, and it is fairly honest, though we shall soon have something to say about "the chances of native misrule."

PIONEER, *August 14, 1876*.—A strange belief is gaining ground in London. We are told that the Secretary of State for India has determined to recommend the Viceroy of India to appoint a special commission to inquire into the claims of the Nizam in the matter of the Berars. The commission, it is said, is to be composed of three officers, either military or civil, named by the Supreme Government, [three legal

members of] the High Court in Calcutta, and three gentlemen, Europeans or natives, named by the Nizam. The commission is to assemble at Hyderabad next cold season, and report direct to the India House through the Viceroy. Its decision on the case to be final. Under these conditions, the Duke of Sutherland, who had undertaken to bring the affair before the House of Lords, and Sir George Bowyer, who had consented to do the same in the Commons, have postponed indefinitely their respective motions.

Sir Salar Jung returned to London the night before last, having visited, in company with the Duke of Sutherland, Lord Tarbat, and two or three other gentlemen, all that was best worth seeing in Scotland and the northern counties of England. Last night he dined with the Duke of Cambridge, and afterwards went to a grand ball given by the Prince of Wales at Marlborough House, where all the rank, fashion, and beauty still left in London were present. At 9-30 A.M. yesterday there was a review of the three battalions of Grenadier Guards—a magnificent sight—by the Duke of Cambridge, who is Colonel-in-Chief of the regiment. Sir Salar was present at this military spectacle, and to-morrow, Saturday, the 22nd, he goes to a review of the troops at Aldershot, where the Prince of Wales will be present. After the review is over Sir Salar will lunch with His Royal Highness in the Royal Pavilion. Certainly few visitors to England, even those of royal blood, have had so much attention paid them as has His Excellency. On the subject of the Nizam's claims to the Berars the daily press has as yet been silent. But in last week's *All the Year Round* there was a paper on this topic, in which the cudgels are taken up with vigour for the Hyderabad Government, and it is said that a longer article on the same subject, and with similar views, will appear in *Macmillan's Magazine* for August.

PIONEER, August 16, 1876.—In spite of the London gossip on the subject, we are strongly disposed to disbelieve all stories which would represent Lord Salisbury as inclined to favour a restoration of the Berars to the Nizam. He cannot but be in possession of the true facts of the case as lately set forth at some length in these columns; and as for the Duke of Sutherland's action in Parliament, said to have been stayed in consideration of certain promises by the Secretary of State, what could the Secretary of State possibly care about the Duke of Sutherland's action in a matter of this kind? The established etiquette of Parliament in Indian matters would give him fifty opposition votes, or as many as he cared for, to swell the Government majority against any hostile motion by an independent peer or members. All we feared was that Lord Salisbury, whose eccentricities can never be completely foreseen, might have conceived a craze in favour of Sir Salar Jung's little intrigue; but since writing on the subject last we have seen reason to feel sure this is not so.

FRIEND OF INDIA, August 19, 1876.—The relations of the Supreme Government with the feudatory Princes of the Indian Empire have been drawn closer by the slow and almost imperceptible action of what we might call organic forces, as well as by recent legislation. In fact the legislation which has conferred on Her Majesty the right to be styled Empress of India is little more than the constitutional recognition of political relations which have grown up and been strengthened during the past years. And as on the one hand it will henceforth be incumbent on the British Government to watch more closely over the condition and administration of the subordinate States, so it becomes of more importance than ever that every act of the Supreme Government towards its feudatories should be characterized by the most unquestionable justice, and frank honesty which will bear the fullest criticism in the light of both English and native public opinion. The dangers and troubles that probably arise from an over-meddlesome policy are clearly enough recognized, and we would be far from advocating a policy which would make the British supremacy unnecessarily irksome to the Princes. But, without unfriendly or disagreeable aggressiveness, it might, we think, be possible to cultivate closer relations with them than heretofore,

so as to enable us to place a stronger restraint on misgovernment, and exercise a greater fostering influence on order and industry. That we may do so, it is essential that we should teach those Princes to place unwavering reliance on our friendship, our justice, and our honourable unselfishness. And we may say that for many years now most of the acts initiated by the Government of India have rested on motives the uprightness of which is beyond all question. But there is a weakness which runs through official life in India, and is powerful from the lowest ranks to the highest,—a vice which we believe to be mischievous and sometimes disastrous in its effects; it is one of the greatest hindrances to the removal of abuses and the redress of wrongs, and, having an amiable side to it, is not easily exposed or remedied—we mean the weakness which upholds a thing done simply because it has been done, and would fain act on the principle that Government, or an official acting with the weight of Governmental authority, can do no wrong. And the more closely we examine the relations of our Government with one of the most important of the native States—the State of Hyderabad—we are the more fully convinced that it is this vice that embitters our relations with that State, that prevents us from laying the vexed Berars question permanently to rest, and from getting at once upon an honest and cordial footing with the Nizam's Government. To get upon such a footing with respect to Hyderabad is absolutely necessary if we would win the confidence of the Princes and people of India, and acquire a healthier and more beneficial influence over the States with which we now hold imperial relations. If we have with some earnestness, and with what to some of our readers may at times have seemed unnecessary warmth of language, advocated the restoration of the Berars to the Nizam, or at least a full consideration and permanent settlement of his claim one way or the other, we have done so not simply in the interests of the Nizam, but in the broader interests of the Indian Empire. We have been compelled to enter far more minutely into the history of our relations with that Government, and to dwell far more on the injustice of those relations in past years than has been pleasant to us, because writers without conscience or common fairness have laid before the public a garbled account, which can only be called a complete misrepresentation of those relations. The unscrupulous falsifications of history seem to owe their origin in great measure to that strange belief, at which we have already hinted, that the stability of our rule in India requires us to defend and uphold at any cost of truth and justice whatever the British Government in India has done in its relations with native States. We hold, on the contrary, that the stability of our empire, and the effectiveness of our control over native administrations, demands on our part a greater readiness than we have ever yet shown to redress the just grievances of native Governments, and to remove as far as possible all causes of friction that exist in our relations with them. It is said that if we attempt to test our relations with them by the strict principles of justice the only course open for us is to leave the country. This is an argument which some writers are never weary of bringing forward, though it is difficult to see how it can impose on any one. The peace and prosperity of India are no less concerned in the stability of the British supremacy than are the interests of Great Britain. If Great Britain would suffer, as it undoubtedly would suffer, by the loss of our Indian empire, the disaster to India itself would be a thousand-fold greater. Our supremacy must be upheld for the sake of India no less than for our own sake. We would advocate no political measure in behalf of any Prince, or any class, in the empire, which would not rather tend to strengthen than to endanger that supremacy. And if any proposed measure can be shown to be necessarily injurious to British power in this country, we hold that the power is of such immense value to the country that no smaller considerations could justify us in advocating such a measure. In spite of occasional acts and incidental features that cannot be justified, we have so much confidence in the justice and beneficence of our Government in the main, that, without respect to our own interest at all, we could have no hesitation in holding that our first duty, even in the light of abstract justice, is firmly to secure the foundations of our empire in the land. We are guilty of no cant in saying so. We do not profess that disinterested motives brought us here, but we

protest that even were the benefits we derive for ourselves from India so much diminished that we should lose nothing by withdrawing from the country, the interests of the country itself would plead most powerfully against our withdrawal. Believing so, we must necessarily hold that lesser interests must yield to greater ones to which they happen to be inimical, and that, for instance, the Nizam's claim to the Berars must be set aside if it can be clearly shown that there are weighty imperial interests which would suffer if that claim were conceded.

We have hitherto, in writing on the Berars question, treated it chiefly as a question of right on the part of the Nizam. Of the Nizam's right to receive back his districts we cannot entertain the smallest doubt. But when that right has been clearly established we readily admit that the question of restoration must be viewed with reference to vaster rights and wider interests than those of any single potentate. We cannot rashly proceed to do what appears to be justice to A ; we cannot even know what is true justice to A until we have tried to ascertain what will be the effect of our action on B and others who we know will be affected by it. On the other hand, if A's right is clear, it is no answer to his claim to say that it is the opinion of some who are opposed to his claim that were justice done to him the interests of B or C or some other person would probably stand in some danger of future detriment. If A's right is clear, and the detriment to the other is future, problematical, and preventible, our plain duty is to proceed at once to do justice to A, adopting at the same time all available safeguards for the rights and interests of others that are supposed to be in any way threatened.

Now we think it has been clearly enough demonstrated that the Nizam of Hyderabad has a strong right to demand the restoration of the Berars. We have shown that during the first fifty years of the present century we persistently ignored his rights, which we had ourselves conceded to him by treaty in 1800 ; that for a long period we peremptorily shut out the Nizam and the Minister of his choice from all active participation in the administration of affairs ; that during that period we imposed on the State a Minister whose position was so anomalous that he was perfectly independent of the Nizam and entirely dependent on the British Government, though we all the time professed that we did not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the State ; that in the mean time we did interfere so effectively that everything in the State was done in accordance with the wishes of the British Government and Resident ; that it is on all hands acknowledged that the direct results of our action were fearful maladministration in all departments, oppression of the Nizam's subjects, and financial embarrassment really amounting to insolvency of the State ; that one great cause of this state of things was the forcible imposition by us on the State of a costly Contingent force whose existence was obnoxious to the Nizam, and not justified by any necessity of his State, or by any treaty agreement ; that when in consequence of these things the Nizam's Government was plunged into debt and unable to extricate itself, or to satisfy our demands on its treasury for the support of a force which was a benefit to us and an injury to him, we forced him into a new treaty with us, by which he placed some of his finest districts temporarily in our hands as security for the support of the Contingent and the payment of his debt to us ; that for services of the utmost value rendered to us during the Mutiny that treaty was revised and the debt cancelled, but that the assigned districts were still retained and are to the present day retained by us ; that at no time was the Nizam's consent freely given to the assignment of those districts, and for the past ten years his Government has assiduously endeavoured to obtain their restoration. It is not even pretended at the present day that the assignment of the districts was other than temporary. Those who oppose the Nizam's claim for their restoration admit that they may at some time or other, and on grounds which they do not condescend to define, be restored to him. But it is contended that the time for restoration has not yet come, that imperial interests are so involved that whatever be the Nizam's legal right his claim cannot now be conceded to him, and that to do a little right to him we must do a great wrong to the people who have been for more than twenty years under our protection. These are points which demand full consideration. Until they have

been fully considered we do not say that we have made out a complete case for the restoration of the Berars, but we do assert that we have made out an irrefragable case for giving Sir Salar Jung a fair and open hearing, for weighing the whole question in the clear light of public opinion, English as well as Indian, and for revising the treaties of 1853 and 1860 so as to put the matter on a clear and satisfactory basis, and to settle one way or other the vexed question of the Berars for ever.

FRIEND OF INDIA, *August 19, 1876.*—The argument most prominently put forward by those who say that whatever the legal rights of the Nizam may be we ought not to give him back the Berars is one of a character well calculated to impose on the Anglo-Indian mind which has not had time or opportunity to look beneath the surface of things in India. The people of those districts, it is said, have enjoyed the inestimable blessing of British rule for more than twenty years, and we have no right on merely sentimental considerations to give them back to native misgovernment. It is admitted that they would be in no danger of misgovernment under Sir Salar Jung, but then, we are reminded, Sir Salar Jung cannot live for ever, and the Nizam may misgovern them after his death. In the first place, we would remark that in matters of right and wrong, and in questions where the good faith and good name of a man or a government is concerned, the argument about "sentimental consideration" is an exceedingly dangerous one. Those who apply it here are not perhaps careful enough to distinguish between considerations that are sentimental and nothing more, and those that are founded on principles which lie at the basis of all morality, and can never by an individual or a government be safely or honourably set aside. There are men to be found who look upon respect for the sixth or seventh commandment as a sentimental and disagreeable feeling to be set at naught wherever it is possible to do so. As to the argument that we have no right to give over the people of the Berars to the chances of native misgovernment, we are tempted to reply to those who use it that the happiness of those natives under some future ruler is a mere sentimental consideration, not for a moment to be weighed against the legal rights of the Nizam. But their argument goes much too far. If we cannot restore the Berars now because Sir Salar is likely to die some day, we cannot of course restore them, after he is dead, to a new and untried ruler. And when we have waited till that ruler has had time to prove himself, even should he prove to be an abler ruler than Sir Salar Jung, which is unlikely, the old argument will still be as strong as ever, for he cannot live for ever any more than Sir Salar Jung. Indeed it is so unlikely that a ruler will ever arise in Hyderabad who is likely to live for ever that it is not difficult to see that the argument from the mortality of its present Prime Minister will hold good for all time, and really amounts to a declaration that the Berars should never be restored. If our Government finally arrives at that conclusion we shall have no more to say, but if not we should think it a more sensible policy to restore the districts now, while we may reasonably expect that Sir Salar Jung will retain power for several years, and when we may exact any treaty guarantee we please for their future good government.

We remarked last week that when we came to look into the condition of the people under our rule in some of the more recently annexed districts we had not, after all, very much reason to congratulate ourselves on our success, or the people on their new-found happiness and prosperity. We cited Oudh and Sindh as examples. We might have mentioned the Central Provinces, where Sir Richard Temple inaugurated the new golden age by the introduction of a land settlement which has plunged the cultivators into bankruptcy and the greatest distress. Their rights have been swept away in the most reckless and short-sighted manner, and as one consequence the present Chief Commissioner tells us that out of 155,000 cultivators with occupancy rights about 44,000 have already disappeared under their most fatal settlement. We hear simultaneously of the people emigrating to Gwalior on the one side and the Nizam's territories on the other. When we hear that the people in our own provinces are flocking into the Nizam's territories to escape from miserie



resulting from our rule, and are told at the same time that the people of the Berars are in terror lest we should hand them over to the Nizam, we cannot help suspecting there is more assumption than fact in the argument. We should like to know what evidence there is for the statement sometimes put forward that the inhabitants of Berar are really alarmed lest they should be transferred to the Nizam's Government. In the mean time we take leave to doubt its truth. But, to return to the state of matters in the Central Provinces, we shall quote a passage from Mr. Morris's review of the work of the Registration Department for 1875-76. Mr. Morris writes :

"It is a somewhat disheartening admission to make, but the Registration Act, like so much of the machinery of our civil administration, apparently lends itself with greater facility and readiness to the wily money-lender or astute landholder, versed in chicanery and sharp practice, than to the simple people for whom it was intended."

In other words, the mushroom landlord whom we have created under the settlement, and the money-lender, between them, are reducing the whole population of the provinces to be mere tenants-at-will ; and the people are emigrating to such an extent that the Supreme Government has been urged to colonize the provinces from the over-populated districts of Behar and Bengal.

TIMES OF INDIA, *August 23, 1876.*—(A letter signed "GUNPUT," and dated Secunderabad, 21st.)—*The Hyderabad Contingent.*—To the Editor of the *Times of India.*—In reviewing the subject of the restoration of the Berars the *Englishman* of the 4th instant has made some inaccurate statements, which I think should be corrected.

The writer observes with reference to the Hyderabad Contingent that "a force was substituted for that mentioned in the treaty of 1800 at the joint suggestion of the Minister, Chundoo Lall, and the Resident, called the British Contingent, enlisted under the guarantee of the British Government, and commanded by British officers."

I consider the whole of the above statement false and inaccurate.

In the first place there was no such thing as a "joint suggestion," and that that suggestion, joint or otherwise, was never made known to the Nizam is evident from the fact that when Colonel Low remarked to His Highness, with reference to the Contingent, "I suppose that your father thought it a good arrangement, and that we therefore consented to it," he was "interrupted" by the Nizam, who said, "Don't say 'my father,' say 'the Maharajah.'" The Resident, Mr. Russell, himself does not speak of it as a "joint suggestion."

When Mr. Russell visited Ellichpore and Aurungabad he found at the former place two regiments of infantry under Salabut Jung, the jageerdar of Ellichpore, and at the latter a regiment of cavalry under Rajah Govind Buksh. The troops were tolerably well equipped and drilled, but irregularly paid. They were even then commanded by a few European and Eurasian officers, all adventurers. I shall now quote Mr. Russell's own words on the subject :—

"These troops," he says in his speech before the Committee of the East India House, "were composed of a vast number of small parties, each under a separate command and receiving pay from its own immediate proprietor : but as many of them did not possess the funds necessary for the regular payment of the men, I therefore prevailed on the Nizam's Minister to take upon himself the immediate payment of the troops, and to settle with the several subordinate officers in the best manner he could."

There is no allusion here to the treaty of 1800. Mr. Russell's suggestion to Chundoo Lall to "take upon himself the immediate payment of the troops, and to settle with the subordinate officers in the best manner he could," conveyed no assurance of "British guarantee ;" and by no stretch of imagination can it be made out that Mr. Russell contemplated the substitution of this force for that mentioned in the treaty of 1800.

Chundoo Lall approved of the suggestion, not because it pleased his Government, but merely because it gave the Resident pleasure ; and when he formed the



two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry into a brigade "he baptized it in honour of the Resident," the "Russell Brigade."

I have, I trust, satisfactorily proved—first, that the suggestion was not "joint"; secondly, that the Nizam was not aware of the suggestion; thirdly, that the force thus brought into existence by the said "joint suggestion" was not called the "British Contingent"; fourthly, that the men were not "enlisted under the guarantee of the British Government"; and, fifthly and lastly, that Mr. Russell did not contemplate the "substitution of these troops for the force mentioned in the treaty of 1800"; and therefore the *Englishman's* statement is altogether a misrepresentation of facts.

The *Englishman* goes on to observe that "in 1860 the treaty (of 1853) concluded by Lord Dalhousie was revised and modified, the confiscated State of Shorapore was ceded to the Nizam as an acknowledgment of his services," &c.

But the British Government had no right to the disposal of the Sumasthan in any manner they pleased. The Rajah of Shorapore was a dependant and tributary of the Nizam, like the Chiefs of Gudwale, Woonpurtee, Narrainpet, &c., "with respect to whom His Highness is absolute." The XVIIth article of the treaty of 1800 distinctly states that, "If in future the Shorapore or Gudwale zemindars or any other subjects or dependants of His Highness's Government should withhold the payment of the Sircar's just claim upon them, or excite rebellion or disturbance," &c. It is evident then that the Shorapore Chief was viewed in the same light as the "other subjects and dependants of His Highness," and therefore his Sumasthan was forfeited to the Nizam's Government by his revolt.

The original cause which led to the interference of the British Government was this.

For some years previous to 1842 the Rajah failed to pay his *pesheush* or tribute; this sum, added to the *nuzzerana*, or succession fee, which was also due, made up a large amount. A good deal of correspondence had already passed between Chundoo Lall and the Shorapore State, and the former, finding it almost impossible to recover from the latter any portion of the claim, solicited the Resident's interference in accordance with the treaty above quoted. The Resident appointed Captain Meadows Taylor, an officer of the Nizam's Contingent, to inquire into the state of affairs at Shorapore. Captain Taylor's investigation revealed the following facts:—That the Sumasthan was nigh to bankruptcy; that payments to its servants and dependants were greatly in arrears; that it was largely indebted to certain sowkars at Shorapore; that it owed a considerable sum to the Arab Chiefs whose troops were in the service of the Sumasthan; and, lastly, that its revenues had been forestalled.

Under these circumstances Captain Taylor proposed the liquidation of the Nizam's claim by annual instalments, and in order to ensure the regularity of these instalments, and the release of the State from its difficulties, he suggested that it should be placed under the management of a European officer of the Nizam's Contingent. The suggestion was approved of both by the Resident and the Nizam's Government, and Captain Taylor, as the officer best acquainted with Shorapore affairs, was appointed "Special Agent."

Captain Taylor had scarcely commenced his reforms, when Rajah Kistnappah Naik died, and was succeeded by his son, Venkettuppah Naik, then a minor.

On this occasion Chundoo Lall demanded the usual *nuzzerana*; but on the representation of the Resident that the claim, though just, would involve the Sumasthan in greater difficulties and embarrassments, the Minister consented to waive the claim for the present.

The young Rajah was placed under the guardianship of Captain Taylor, and the administration of the Sumasthan was superintended by the same officer.

The Sumasthan was made over to the Rajah when he attained the age of maturity. Shortly after "coming into possession" the young Rajah thought proper to assume a defiant attitude against his suzerain, and notwithstanding all the advice and warnings of the Resident he remained fixed in his determination to oppose his master. The result of this piece of folly on the part of the Rajah was the immediate

march of a body of troops into his territory—not the Subsidiary Force, to whose services His Highness had a right, but the Nizam's own Contingent. Thus the Shorapore Rajah did not rebel against the British Government, or oppose the British troops, but the Nizam's force and the Nizam's Government, and therefore I consider that the Sumasthan escheated to His Highness, and not to the British Government.

DECCAN HERALD, *August 23, 1876.*—*A Strange Story.*—If the British public were actuated only by a grateful recollection of Sir Salar Jung's services in 1857, no one could blame dukes and commoners and deputations for making so much of the Nizam's Minister as they have done; but it is only too evident, from the style of entertainment and speeches to which Sir Salar Jung has been treated in England, that it is not so much as a friend as a novelty that he is fêted. The Duke of Sutherland is an extraordinary nobleman. He has patronized fire engines and wicker coffins ere now, and Sir Salar Jung may be happy in belonging to the category of distractions which His Grace from time to time takes up; but, whatever the Nizam's Minister may think in his heart on the matter, it cannot fail to be a feather in the Duke's cap that he was showman to so distinguished a foreigner as his guest. Under the ducal auspices Sir Salar Jung has appeared as the fashion of the hour, and, as might be expected from the tuition of one so powerful in the highest circles as is the Duke, the Nizam's Minister appears to have behaved himself, on the whole, with singular taste and discretion. Perhaps Sir Salar Jung might as well have left off parading that inapt title conferred by Colonel Hastings Fraser on his master—our “faithful ally,” the Nizam. The alliance is so much between the immense and the infinitesimal that it suggests the flea claiming equality with the lion because he lives in the noble beast's coat. Otherwise Sir Salar Jung's public speeches are graceful enough, and he is wise to make no ante- or post-prandial allusion to his mission—the Berars.

But a story reaches us which, much as we desire to think it incredible, has some appearance of truth on the face of it. This is nothing less than that Sir Salar Jung and his friends have succeeded in wringing from Lord Salisbury a reluctant consent to bring the Berar question before a mixed tribunal of Europeans and natives in India. Already oblivious of the Baroda Commission, we are to be treated, it is said, to another State inquiry as profitless as the last. Nothing could suit Sir Salar Jung better than the concession of a commission of that sort. If he carried the day he would get what he wanted, and if he lost it he would still enjoy the satisfaction of having *posed* his master, the Nizam, in the eyes of all India as a martyr of the first order. Sir Salar Jung himself could not fail to get distinction as the most conscientious of viziers, and the acutest of statesmen, whatever way the inquiry terminated. We always thought the Baroda Commission a bad precedent, but the new commission spoken of would be infinitely worse. If it were granted, we might expect some day to find the English right of occupation in any part of India disputed before a mixed commission of Europeans and natives, and argued for or against us by the first lawyers in London retained for the purpose. The troubles of the Government of India, already enhanced by Downing Street pretensions, would become nothing short of a grievous burden were they to be arraigned before commissions at the pleasure of every litigious Prince or Minister, and bound to find arguments in reply to those of Old Bailey lawyers. Nothing could be worse than the political effect of such a commission as is spoken of. It would convey the false and mischievous impression to the population of the country that the whole tenure of our occupancy of Indian territory was insecure, and our raj an encroachment on native rights. It is hardly worth disputing the fact here that England owns India by that possession which is nine points of the law, but it will be something more Quixotic than was ever heard of in the history of nations if Lord Salisbury should really consent to try before an Indian mixed commission the absurd question whether it is legal or not to hold lands taken from an enemy in conquest. Certainly conquest does not specially apply to the circumstances in which we occupy the Berars; but the one issue might easily give rise to the other, and no doubt a man like

Serjeant Ballantine could make out a strong case in court for the restoration of every rood of ground at present occupied by the English in India.

One reason that makes us fear there is some truth in this rumour is that an impartial (?) commission of Europeans and natives must naturally appeal to the sense, or the no-sense, of the British public as a popular and admirable way out of the Berar difficulty. The public at home seldom trouble themselves with the political weight of such an affair as this, but are content to take it on its philanthropic merits, and no more. This is what they are doing now with Sir Salar Jung. A man so honoured by the Duke of Sutherland, so fêted, so much the fashion, must to their mind have right on his side, and we dare say it does some of them good to exhibit their own high appreciation of the native character in distinction to what they suppose is the appreciation thereof out here. It is a comfortable sensation to the British public to feel itself the conscientious guardian of the oppressed and down-trodden Hindu, especially when it is called upon to listen to no Indian debates about him in the House of Commons ; and so Sir Salar Jung has made for himself the most powerful friend in the world, and at the cost of a dinner or two in the *Morning Post*, a turban, and a visit to Trentham and Dunrobin. Had His Excellency gone the old way to work with his grievance, and got Mr. Fawcett to bring it in all due form before the House, it is to be feared the British public would have returned him the only answer the needy knife-grinder got ; but Sir Salar Jung is no common man, and has had no common advantages. A commission of Europeans and natives in equal proportion is only "common justice" to the sense of such a guardian of Indian interests as this, but to Anglo-Indians it has rather the appearance of that vacillation and shuffling off a responsibility which in Oriental eyes can never appear strong government. There is a confession of weakness in the very thought of such a commission. Sir Salar Jung's claim to the Berars has been sifted and refused by Lord Northbrook's Government, and who should know better than the Government of India the right of the question ? Lord Northbrook, every one knows, was conscientious enough in such matters, and was so tender of native rights as to appoint the Baroda Commission in deference to them, and no one believes that either Lord Northbrook or any other British Viceroy would perpetrate, or continue, an act of injustice if he knew it as such. Why, then, attempt to throw a slur upon the reputation of the British Government in India by appointing a commission of natives and lawyers to give their opinion upon its acts ?

We don't think we ever heard of a more monstrous proposition, taking it altogether, than this of a mixed commission for the Berars, and the only consolation is that it is still a mere rumour. Perhaps the wish is father to the tale, and that some of Sir Salar Jung's journalistic friends have circulated this story as a hint to Lord Salisbury how to act in the matter. It is to be hoped that this is in fact the case, for it can scarcely be believed that an Indian statesman of Lord Salisbury's pretensions should, willingly or unwillingly, commit an act so calculated to reflect upon the high reputation of the Government in this country. — *Madras Times*.

HOME NEWS, August 25, 1876.—*The Nizam and his claims.*—We English have some good reasons for gratitude to the able statesman who in the hour of our utmost danger prevented the malcontents of Southern India from throwing the weight of their arms into the opposing scale. And it must be allowed that the debt thus due to Sir Salar Jung has been handsomely repaid by us all in the last few months, so far as spoken and written compliments can avail for that purpose. Some persons have also utilized the occasion of his visit to urge on his and the Nizam's behalf a claim which the Indian Government has steadily refused to reopen, and which, if we mistake not, Sir Salar Jung himself made no direct attempt to push during his stay in England. In the last number of *Macmillan* one of these well-meaning advocates, Mr. Laing-Meason, tries hard to enlist his readers' sympathy with the Nizam's Government against the policy so long pursued by the Paramount Power in the matter of the Berars. "From sources that are unimpeachable as to their authority," he professes to give a trustworthy account of "the whole affair," from the time when one Nizam bound himself to maintain a subsidiary force for our

benefit, to the present moment, when the Ministers of another Nizam are vainly pleading for the restitution of the fertile province which Dalhousie wrested under treaty from the State of Hyderabad in 1853. Without contesting the truth of many of his statements, we may observe that our relations with the Nizam began many years before the beginning of this century, and that the Berars themselves were very late additions to the kingdom of Hyderabad. We should like to know, too, on what kind of unimpeachable authority Mr. Laing-Meason asserts in effect that no part of the surplus revenues of the Berars has ever been repaid into the Hyderabad treasury. Our Resident at the Nizam's capital, in his report for 1870-71, distinctly stated that a sum of about £250,000 had been paid into the Nizam's treasury out of the surplus revenues of the assigned provinces between 1867 and 1871, "according to treaty arrangements." During the ten years ending in 1871 it appears that the entire surplus amounted to more than £460,000, a part of which was expended on the Khangaum State Railway and other public improvements, the remainder being duly credited to the Nizam's Government. And yet Mr. Laing-Meason declares that no accounts of the revenue of the Berars have been given from 1860 to 1876, nor has the Nizam reaped any benefit from the recent growth of revenue in those provinces.

As to the alleged injustice of the policy pursued by the Indian Government towards successive Nizams, it may be allowed that the writer in *Macmillan* makes out a strong case in favour of reconsidering the arrangement carried out by Lord Dalhousie. If it be true that the Berars are kept in pawn by us merely to defray the cost of a contingent which competent judges have pronounced unnecessary for our own interests, let the contingent be disbanded and the assigned provinces given back to their lawful owner. But the question at issue, if we are rightly informed, is by no means so simple as Mr. Laing-Meason would have us think it. There are claims and counterclaims which cannot be adjusted by a magazine article; and the reasons which have hitherto guided our relations with the Nizam are not to be lightly thrust aside by appeals, however earnest, to that love of justice and honest dealing which is popularly ascribed to every British tradesman and artizan, and of whose supposed existence ladies in a court of justice sometimes make excellent use. Nor is it wise to assume that "90 per cent." of the inhabitants of the Berars "would elect to return to their ancient allegiance under the Nizam." The bulk of the people in those districts being Marathas or Hindus of other castes, who have not yet forgotten the difference between their past and present rulers, it is not so very certain that they would care to see themselves handed over again to the Mohammedan Turks and Arabs who reign at Hyderabad.

DECCAN HERALD, August 30, 1876.—The claim for the restoration of the Berars, we are told, was not pressed during Sir Salar Jung's visit to England. We are not favoured with the reasons which led the prudent Minister of the Nizam to depart from his original intention of bringing the claim (which had been put aside, at least for the present, at Calcutta) before Lord Salisbury and the Indian Council. The history of how the Berars became British territory, even according to the accounts of those most hostile to the English Government, is that they were seized on account of arrears which had become due by the Nizam's Government for the support of the Hyderabad Contingent, the Nizam having by treaty with England undertaken the support of this contingent, to be ready in any time of emergency either to defend the Nizam's dominions or to help the British Government in time of war, the British Government having undertaken at the same time to maintain the throne and rule of the Nizam against all comers. The pay of the Contingent was a continual ground of quarrel between the two Governments; and, though the Nizam was repeatedly informed that if continual advances had to be made by the British Government territorial security would be taken for their repayment, no improvement took place. In 1849 the Nizam was finally called upon to pay off by the end of the year the debts due to the British Government. "In the following year," Aitchison tells us, "a territorial cession was demanded to liquidate the debt, which amounted to 78,00,000. A payment of 40,00,000 was

at once made ; and the appropriation of revenues of certain districts was promised to meet the remainder. The demand for a territorial cession was, therefore, withdrawn." But no real improvement followed. The Resident was again obliged to make advances for the payment of the Contingent, and in 1853 the debt had risen again to Rs. 45,00,000. It was in 1853 that the Earl of Dalhousie caused the Nizam to assign the Berars as security for the debt of fifty lakhs due by him to the British Government. A new treaty was drawn up in May 1853, whereby the British Government agreed to maintain in lieu of the Nizam's Contingent an auxiliary force to be called the Hyderabad Contingent, which remaineth unto this day. It consisted of 5,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, with four field batteries of artillery. It was ordered by an article embodied in the treaty that "For the purpose of providing the regular monthly payment to the said Contingent troops, and payment of Appa Dessaye's chout and the allowance of Muhiput Ram's family, and to certain Mahratta pensioners, as guaranteed in the 10th article of the treaty of 1822, and also for payment of the interest at six per cent. of the debt due to the Honourable Company so long as the principal of the debt shall remain unpaid, which debt now amounts to fifty lakhs of Hyderabad rupees, the Nizam hereby agrees to assign the districts mentioned in the accompanying schedule marked A, yielding an annual gross revenue of about fifty lakhs of rupees, to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at Hyderabad, and to such other officer, acting under his orders, as may from time to time be appointed by the Government of India to the charge of those districts." It was also provided "that the Resident at the Court of Hyderabad for the time being shall always render true and faithful accounts every year to the Nizam of the receipts and disbursements connected with the said districts, and make over any surplus revenue that may exist to His Highness, after the payment of the Contingent and the other items detailed in article 6 of this treaty." But there was another treaty made with the Nizam after the Mutiny, which, on the part of the British, cancelled the debt of Rs. 50,00,000,\* and His Highness at the same time agreed to forego all demand for an account of the receipts and disbursements of the assigned districts for the "*present, past, and future*," and the British Government undertook to pay out of the revenue of the Berars the dues as afore-mentioned, holding the Berars in trust for that purpose. We cannot see on what ground Sir Salar Jung can ask that the trust may be given back to the Nizam—a trust extending to the present, past, and future.

BOMBAY GAZETTE, *August 30, 1876*.—The courtly *Pioneer*, which has already declared itself a believer in "judicious profusion," mentions the somewhat startling fact that Sir Salar Jung has been distributing sums of money in England among people whom he imagined to be influential in the settlement of the Berars question. According to our contemporary, Sir Salar has by this means overshot his mark, for "the result is that no one can now open his lips in society to say anything in favour of restoration, nor any public writer put pen to paper with that object in view, without being suspected of venality." This would be all very sad if it were true, but we must say that we do not believe it. Sir Salar Jung is much too sharp to present his enemies with such a clumsy weapon as bribery wherewith to attack him. As, however, the statement has gone forth, we think that Sir Salar Jung should give it a distinct denial. If his claim to the Berars possesses any value in itself he need not resort to bribery ; and it would be advisable therefore for Sir Salar Jung, by giving the denial to which we allude, to show to the world that his claims are substantial enough to be able to exist without artificial and highly objectionable stimulants. Perhaps the *Pioneer* has more information on the subject than it cares to publish. Can it tell us *who* have been getting their palms rubbed with Hyderabad gold ?

STATESMAN, *October 27, 1876*.—"The *Morning Post* has fired off a short paragraph on Indian affairs that contains about as much inaccuracy as it is possible to crowd into half-a-dozen lines of print. The statement is as follows:—'The

India Office is already proceeding in a practical way to inaugurate the inquiry into the claims of the Nizam on the Berars, or annexed provinces, once belonging to Mysore. Captain C. Clerk, who lately retired from the Governorship of the military prison at Aldershot, is, we understand, going *out* on a special mission to the Court of the Nizam at Hyderabad.' Without discussing the historical allusion to the original status of the Berars, it is enough for us to say that there is no intention on the part either of the Government in India or the Secretary of State to institute any inquiry whatever on the subject of Berar."—*Pioneer*, Oct. 24.

And no inquiry whatever is needed. Every honest student of the question knows by this time that we took possession of the Berars without any just claim to them whatever. We have shown *ad nauseam* that the account presented by Lord Dalhousie to the Nizam would have been rejected by any court of equity in the world. A few months ago the *Pioneer* complained that the statements in the home press concerning our acquisition of these provinces were only slanders ; and it put forth a defence of the act that was a pure romance, falsifying Sir Charles Metcalfe's views of our relations with the Nizam, and every subsequent fact of the story. How is it that every other English journal that takes up this history and "inquires" into its facts finds itself forced to pass the same judgment upon it ? Are we all in a conspiracy against the Government, to load it with dishonour and reproach ? In defence of the Government we have simply an official hack romancing upon the subject, and on the other side a large body of independent men jealous of their country's honour, and imbued with the purer spirit of the age, insisting with one voice upon the equal injustice and impolicy of persevering in the heavy wrong that has been done to the Nizam. Are we really all venal in what we are saying ? Does any one really believe the statement of the *Pioneer* that Sir Salar Jung has spent £300,000 of secret service money to enlist the home and Indian press in the Nizam's cause ? The demand that the Empire should be inaugurated by an act of reparation to its first Prince, whom in less scrupulous but by no means distant times we so greatly wronged, is a demand honourable to the English press, and its rejection will but deepen the stain which our proceedings towards this Prince long since brought upon the imperial escutcheon. We are living in days that will no longer tolerate the low standard of political morality that prevailed twenty years ago. The people are everywhere insisting upon uprightness of conduct in their rulers, and it is the latter who are behind their age, and not the people. If we got possession of the Berars honestly—if our tenure thereof is *not* founded on spoliation, and *not* founded on injustice—where can be the difficulty of showing it ? What task could be easier than to dispel the mischievous and unhappy impression that prevails, by a truthful and simple narration of the circumstances under which we obtained them ? But the facts are fresh in almost every one's mind. It is no old historic dispute we have to deal with, clouded with prejudices and involved in doubt and contradictions through which no one can find his way. Lord Dalhousie declared that the Nizam owed us forty lakhs of rupees for arrears of pay due to the Contingent force ; and he insisted upon his surrendering the Berars in trust for the liquidation of the debt, and as a guarantee for the regular payment of the force in the future. Now we, who know the history of the whole story, put our foot down firmly and—following the lead of men like Metcalfe and Yule, our own Residents at the Nizam's Court—say that our financial relations with the Prince were such that the claim preferred by Lord Dalhousie was little short of an infamy ; that the Nizam did *not* equitably owe the money for which the Berars were seized, and that we seized them simply that we might get possession of what we believed to be the finest cotton field in India, under the prolonged pressure put upon us by Manchester. We say moreover that we dare not submit the claim we preferred on the Prince to any independent Court in the world. We say further that even admitting the claim to have been well founded it ceased with the liquidation of the debt, and that to refuse to restore the pledge when the debt has been redeemed is *Pioneer* morality, of which the age is, happily, pretty well sick. The writer is a moral leper who plays the advocate for injustice, and has no better reply to make

to the short and simple indictment that lies against us in this matter than to assure the bystanders that the judges are biassed against his client, and are all in a conspiracy against him. Are we really to believe that our own Residents, the Indian press, the *Times*, the *Saturday Review*, a host of other papers, and the universal conscience where this story is known are bound together in a conspiracy to find the Government guilty of a wrong that it has never committed? Are we really to understand that it has always dealt honourably with the Nizam, has not manufactured claims against him, and had no desire to get the Berars because they were the great cotton field of India, and that no threatenings were used to make the Prince cede the province? He himself recognized, we suppose, the justice of the claims we had upon him, and willingly entered into a treaty with us that the "trust" should be perpetual. It is with loathing that we ever touch the moral lepers who make use of God-given human speech to uphold the unjust thing, and dare to persuade their fellow-men that it is the just.

These gentlemen are terribly impatient, moreover, of hearing about what we owe to Salar Jung and the Nizam for their conduct during the Mutiny. "Whatever might have happened at the time of the Mutiny had the Native States turned against us, it is childish to doubt that we should have succeeded in the long run in reconquering our Empire. The frightful contingencies from which such alliances as that of the Nizam saved us were the slaughter of garrisons and isolated groups of Europeans, whom the slow reconquest of the country would not have been in time to rescue." The writer plainly does not know in the least what the Nizam's defection would have cost us. The whole Bombay Army would have gone to a man, and that of Madras. But were his statements as true as they are the reverse, how contemptible is such writing! But how can ingenuous, beautiful gratitude live in any human soul that is the deliberate apologist of what is false and unjust? It is to depreciate our own country's greatness, it seems, to hold ourselves indebted to any Native Prince who cast in his lot with us at the terrible hour of the Mutiny. There would only have been a few other "garrisons slaughtered," a few other "isolated groups of Europeans" massacred in the war, if they had all gone against us, and this tiresome Salar Jung amongst them. The cynicism of such writing is very base; and if any justification were wanted of the opinions expressed concerning us by the home press, the *Pioneer*, if it were really the representative of Anglo-Indian thought, would furnish it amply. The writer prudently abstains from all attempt to answer the charges that lie against our treatment of the Nizam. He tells us that we must retain the Berars on the following three grounds:—(1) that it would make the Nizam too strong if we were to return them; (2) that although a time may arrive when "in honour" we might be bound to restore them, we have a treaty right to determine when that shall be, if ever; (3) the present time is most inopportune, because the Nizam is a minor. It is a "bunneah's view" of the subject, we are told, to regard the liquidation of the debt as terminating the trust; and that if it is convenient to us still to hold the property to our own use, there is the bond to authorize our doing so. That these treaties were forced upon the Nizam with open threats is of no consequence in such morals.

" They should get who have the power,  
" And they should keep who can,"

we are accustomed to speak of as a morality "that was of old;" but it is the exact expression of what we have been doing in India down to this day; and public morality with too many of us is a question of latitude and longitude. What was turpitude in Europe, as the Austrian occupation of Italy, or in the French designs on Belgium, is quite permissible in India. As to the statement that the moment is inopportune because the Nizam is a minor, we ask in honest astonishment, why inopportune? Surely no time could be so opportune as when an able and experienced minister is at Hyderabad to receive charge of the province, and secure to it a continuance of what advantages it may have derived from our rule. As to the cession of the province making the Nizam too strong for us, the plea is inconsistent with the others put forward, and is an insult to



public intelligence. If the plea were honest, instead of being utterly false, the reply would be direct and simple. Pay the Nizam the money value of the province, and tell him frankly to reconcile himself to its loss, since the interests of the Empire forbid its being restored to him. It is a most distasteful task to have to reply to such writings at all. The morality of the *Pioneer* is of the lowest and most cynical type ; and were the journal really representative of Anglo-Indian thought on these grave questions of public policy the English press would be justified in regarding "the Englishman in India" as callous and dead to all honourable feeling. Were the *Pioneer* really our representative we should be the cads and snobs that the *World* insultingly declares we are.

BOMBAY GAZETTE, *June 12, 1878*.—Nothing has been heard lately about the question of restoring Berar to the Nizam's Government ; but we now learn that the English Cabinet has issued its final orders on this subject, and, in reply to the application sent in by Sir Salar Jung more than a year ago, has decided that the question cannot be entertained in any shape during the minority of the Nizam. We believe that this decision has already been communicated to the Nizam's Minister, and to his colleague in the Regency, and that it has been accepted unreservedly by Sir Salar Jung and Vikar-ool-Oomrah, though no doubt the shelving of the subject for some years must have been felt by Sir Salar personally as a bitter disappointment, as the recovery of the lost province has for some years been the chief desire of his heart, and his hopes had been most unwarrantably raised by the permission Lord Salisbury gave him when he was in England two years ago to submit to the India Office a fresh application in the matter. In coming to the conclusion not at present to enter into the merits of the case the English Government—for, as we have already said, we believe the Secretary of State for India brought the question before the Cabinet—has apparently acted on the principle that in politics sufficient for the day is the evil thereof, and that dexterous statesmanship consists in putting off to as distant a date as possible the settlement of disagreeable controversies. No doubt, as regards Sir Salar Jung himself, who is, we sincerely believe, the only person in Hyderabad who cares anything about Berar, the reply that he must not raise a question affecting the sovereignty of the Nizam and his relations with the Paramount Power till that Prince himself comes of age may be regarded as unanswerable. But at the same time such a reply admits by implication the right of the Nizam to raise the question himself as soon as he comes of age ; and we may be convinced that Sir Salar Jung, who constantly broods over this one idea of getting back the province which his uncle advised the late Nizam to alienate, will take care to instil into the mind of the young Chief that he must make it a point of honour never to rest till the British Government constitutes him the real and not merely the nominal ruler of Berar. This is a cheerful prospect for the Government of India of ten years hence. What a thorn the Nizam will be in their side !

TIMES OF INDIA, *April 28, 1880*.—The other day we received and repeated the rumour that Sir Salar Jung had "some thoughts" of going to England. We now learn that he has no intention whatever of leaving India. Hyderabad must be in a curious state when rumours of this kind are manufactured and promulgated under a show of authenticity at a moment's notice. It was probably the object of this rumour to suggest that Sir Salar was anxious to hasten to England and throw himself into the arms of the Liberal Government. But though a good deal has been lately revealed as to the way in which the co-Regent was thrust upon the Regent originally, and is now semi-officially supported, there is not the least chance of a direct appeal to the Home Government in the matter. But this, and the Hyderabad *cause célèbre*, in which the co-Regent is also concerned, and other urgent scandals will certainly demand the attention of the new Viceroy whenever he arrives.

DECCAN TIMES, *April 28, 1880*—*Sir Salar Jung and the Berars*.—Sir Salar Jung is, it is thought, about to revisit England. He is anxious to have the Berar



question settled in the Nizam's favour, and he is probably of opinion that a new Ministry will wish to show itself very virtuous. Justice (?) with a vengeance is going to be done to Mysore, and Sir Salar Jung is entitled to say that after such folly as is about to be consummated in Mysore the British Government cannot with decency retain possession of the Berars. He will probably find that they can blow both hot and cold at the India Office. The retention of the Berars after the rendition of Mysore will call a good deal of special pleading into requisition.

**TIMES OF INDIA, September 9, 1880.**—The following is from our Berar correspondent, dated the 7th instant:—

"The failure of the monsoon in this province has, for some weeks past, not only exercised the minds of the official classes, but has also alarmed the agriculturists. The grim spectre of a famine, which has fortunately spared Berar for upwards of forty years, has been haunting everybody. Frightful tales of the mortality caused by it when it last appeared during the *régime* of the Nizam's Government—of parents devouring their children, of children killing their parents—have been related second-hand by old men and women to hundreds of young people. These and the continued drought which has dried up wells and all vegetation have led the people to think that a dreadful calamity, which would spare neither age nor sex, was impending. To the immense relief of all, the gloomy forebodings have been dissipated. The long-wished-for rain made its appearance on Monday. At first it drizzled off and on during the day, as if it intended but to tantalize those who were so anxiously looking out for it. Towards evening, however, the aspect changed for the better. A high wind sprang up and brought with it a steady fall of light rain, which kept on the whole night and continued far on to the next day. Every drop that fell was licked up by the parched earth, and no water found its way to rivers or nullas. This timely fall has staved off a famine, and some "knowing ones" are so elated as to augur that the cotton harvest especially will be a bumper one. Jowari, which is the staple food of the poor, has in some parts of the province suffered so much that it is a moot question whether it will recover. But it may safely be said that in three-fourths of the district, at least, the yield will be an average one. The Kunbis of Berar may well be congratulated on having escaped the dreadful consequences of a scarcity."

**STATESMAN (London), July 1, 1880.**—*Restitution of the Berar Provinces.*—About the year 1851 the policy in the ascendant at Calcutta was that of "getting rid of intervening Principalities." Every Native State was considered merely "an exceptional jurisdiction," as in the United Kingdom had been the Palatinates of Chester and Lancaster, and the hereditary chieftainships in the Scottish Highlands. The ruling maxim declared that "the existence of so many Sovereignities and Chiefships interspersed with our own territory was in many ways inimical to good government, and to the welfare and prosperity of the people;" and that, "on every fair occasion, their number ought to be diminished." The plan of reforming the allied and protected States, advocated by some old officers of the school of Sir John Malcolm and Mountstuart Elphinstone, was put aside as retrogressive and ridiculous. Native States could not be reformed—they were incorrigible—and even if they could the task would not be a politic or profitable one for us to undertake. The two great Mussulman States, Hyderabad and Oude, were marked down for annexation, and the process of undermining them, as the Blue Books tell us, was only delayed by the wars in the Punjab and Burmah. When the time for business came Oude was annexed; Hyderabad was pushed on the road to ruin; and Lord Dalhousie waited for "the crash."

Sir William Sleeman, the Resident at Lucknow, had pledged his great reputation for the reform of Oude. General James Stuart Fraser, the accomplished Resident at Hyderabad, declared that the administrative reform of the Nizam's dominions was perfectly practicable. The proposals of these two distinguished officers were discouraged in every way except by honest argument. There was a conspiracy of silence against them; both of them felt it, and both of them retired before it.

"Lord Dalhousie and I," said Sir William Sleeman, "have different views, I fear. If he wishes anything that I do not think right and honest I resign, and leave it to be done by others. I desire a strict adherence to solemn engagements, whether made with white faces or black. We have no right to annex or confiscate Oude; we have a right, under the treaty of 1837, to take the management of it, but not to appropriate its revenues to ourselves. We can do this with honour to our Government and benefit to the people. To confiscate would be dishonest and dishonourable."\* To Lord Dalhousie himself he wrote as follows:—"Proofs enough of bad government and neglected duties were given in my diary. The duty of remedying the evils, and carrying out your Lordship's views in Oude, *whatever they may be*, must now devolve on another."†

General Fraser, at Hyderabad, had similar misgivings. In December 1852, having for a long time vainly pressed upon Lord Dalhousie measures for administrative reform in the Nizam's dominions, without eliciting any reply, the General remarked one evening at his own dinner table that "for all the use he had been in the fifteen years he had passed at the Hyderabad Residency he need not have been sent there at all." The remark appeared in one of the Madras newspapers a few days after it fell from his lips. It was greedily caught up at Calcutta. The General did not palter with his sense of honour or duty when a reference was made to him on the subject, and in January 1853 he resigned.

Two questions may now be asked:—Was reform practicable in Hyderabad? Was Oude incorrigible? The latest answer to the second of these questions comes to us from a gentleman whose eight years of official duty in the "Garden of India" have borne fruit in a lucid and conscientious work, replete with valuable facts and deductive reasoning that testify alike to his capacity and his candour. Referring to opinions expressed in a book that was published in 1868, Mr. Irwin, of the Bengal Civil Service, acknowledges it to have been demonstrated that "the treaty of 1837 had never been abrogated as a whole; that its provisions for administration by British officers on behalf of the King still held good, and should have been acted on; and that reform, without annexation, was practicable, and should have been aimed at."‡

As to the question whether administrative reform in Hyderabad was practicable or not, *solvitur ambulando*. Reforms in the administration of the Nizam's dominions were commenced by the eminent statesman still at the helm in Hyderabad, the Nawab Salar Jung, almost immediately after the severe trial to which that State was, as we shall see, subjected in 1853. Rapid improvements, attested even more by fiscal, economic, and social statistics than by the reports of successive British Residents, were made down to the year 1877, since which time the worst spirit of Anglo-Indian officialism seems to have been roused against the Nawab Salar Jung, and to have encouraged and organized obstruction against him, with no imaginable object but his personal discomfiture, and with no possible result but public scandal and mischief. The charges here suggested are serious, and shall be fully authenticated. In the mean time, as the cause of offence on the part of the Nawab Salar Jung has been a persistent appeal for the restitution of the Berar Provinces, it will be as well to commence by explaining what that appeal was, and on what grounds it was based.

It is a fact worthy of attention, and calling for sympathy, that all the difficulties of the Hyderabad State, that are so easily stigmatized as grievances, can be traced to the double refusal of Lord Dalhousie to respond to the call of two British Residents—the call of General Fraser for help in his plan of reform; the call of General Low, on behalf of the Nizam, for relief from an extravagant establishment.

In 1851, according to the Blue Book of 1854, Lord Dalhousie was urged by General J. S. Fraser, with all the weight of fifteen years' experience at the Hyderabad Residency, to undertake effectual measures for reforming the

\* Sleeman's "Oude," vol. I., pp. 21, 22.

† Ibid., vol. II., p. 423.

‡ "The Garden of India: Chapters on Oudh Affairs;" by H. C. Irwin, B.A., Oxon., B.C.S., (W. H. Allen and Co., 1880), p. 177.

administration of the Nizam's dominions. The Resident had suggested this policy "on many recent occasions,"—for the first time, as we learn from another authentic source, in February 1850,\* a year before the Governor-General took any notice of it. Lord Dalhousie recorded his entire disapproval of the Resident's plan, and, moreover, pronounced a general reprobation upon suggestions such as those made by General Fraser, declaring them to proceed, "in too many instances, not from sentiments of enlarged benevolence, but from the promptings of ambitious greed."† The despatch drafted, after the Governor-General's instructions, in the language of this minute, did not, however, contain this condemnatory sentence, and negatived the Resident's proposal without any explanation. It will be seen from the following letter that it was only by accidentally coming across a quotation from the Blue Book that General Fraser, after his retirement, became informed of the virtuous but misdirected indignation with which his proposal had been received:—

TWICKENHAM PARK, 15th August 1868.

DEAR SIR,—I have had the pleasure to receive your note, and accept with thankfulness the copy of your work on Indian Policy.‡ I have no doubt I shall be greatly interested in it, as I have already been with your former works on the subject of India. I shall now only notice an observation that I see on the 73rd page of your book, which has some reference to myself.

It is quite true that I submitted to Lord Dalhousie the suggestion therein alluded to, with regard to a proposal for our assuming the entire but temporary management of the Nizam's country. His Lordship dissented from this without giving me any special reasons for doing so, and I now learn for the first time from your book what his reasons were. One of them appears to have been that the Nizam's assent to such a proposal would never have been voluntarily given, coupled with an insinuation that such suggestions as that I had made proceeded "in too many instances from the promptings of ambitious greed."

With regard to the first of those objections I had much better means of judging how far my suggestion would have been adopted by the Nizam than Lord Dalhousie possessed; and if I had not been thoroughly sure of the ground on which I stood, and of the strong probability of success, the suggestion never would have been made. The Nizam was on very friendly terms with me, and the Dewan owed his office entirely and exclusively to myself, and would not, I was persuaded, in any way counteract my wishes. Under these circumstances, there was no sufficient reason to doubt our obtaining the Nizam's consent, until his friendly feelings were alienated, if not from myself, at least from the British Government, by the harsh and imperious language in which Lord Dalhousie thought proper to address His Highness in a direct despatch.

As to Lord Dalhousie's remark about "ambitious greed," I had, at all events, not contemplated any prolonged exercise of the functions of sovereignty at Hyderabad, such as we have exercised in Mysore for thirty years, since I intended in our agreement with the Nizam on this subject that the tenure of our control over his country should positively be limited to the maximum of five years, within which period I felt quite assured that the Nizam's debt to us would be repaid, and such administrative reforms effected as would then enable us to divest ourselves of our temporary power, without any probability of a recurrence of those evils from which we should have rescued the Nizam, and especially from what he so much dreaded and abhorred—the loss, perhaps to be permanent, of Berar, the finest part of his dominions.

Various evils existed in the Nizam's country, which I had long most strongly urged the Supreme Government to insist upon having repressed by more energy and determination on the part of the Nizam than he was willing to exert, but I was persistently baffled in these attempts by Lord Dalhousie. His real motives

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\* "Our Faithful Ally, the Nizam" by Capt. Hastings Fraser (Smith & Elder), 1865, p. 268.

† Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 38.

‡ "Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy," Trübner and Co., 1868.

for this conduct I never could divine, and I could only attribute it to his imperious and self-willed temper, which even in matters of mere opinion and suggestion could bear no rival near its throne.

Excuse the lengthened egotism of this note. I sensibly feel the injustice of that imputation which would fix upon me the glaring fault, I may say crime, of having been actuated by base, sordid and dishonourable motives in the conduct and discharge of a public duty.—Most truly yours,

J. S. FRASER.

The real causes of General Fraser's retirement in 1853 are now clear enough. The "real motive" of Lord Dalhousie's "conduct" in having "persistently baffled" the Resident's attempts to introduce reforms into the Nizam's administration was not dislike to "a system of subversive interference," but disbelief at once in the progressive capabilities of an Indian State, and in any advantage to be reaped for the Paramount Power even if such capabilities could be discovered and cultivated. Under the double delusion—false morally, and practically falsified—that the British Government was not interested in the reform of a protected State unless it could be made financially profitable, and that the conversion of protected States into British provinces would be financially profitable, Lord Dalhousie not only held back from promoting reform, but refused the Hyderabad State a measure of relief from certain extortionate charges for what was then called the "Nizam's Army," afterwards the Hyderabad Contingent, which were completely under his own control, and could have been greatly diminished almost by a stroke of the pen.

"The Nizam's Army" as it stood in 1848 was about the most preposterous example of our national nepotism that then existed, perhaps that ever has existed, in India. There is nothing quite so bad now. It was a positive *reductio ad absurdum* of an Anglo-Indian establishment. It consisted, in round numbers, of five regiments of cavalry, six batteries of artillery, and six infantry battalions; altogether about 8,000 men. This force was divided into five brigades—divisions as they were termed—each commanded by a Brigadier, with a salary of £2,500 a year, assisted in his arduous duties by a Brigade-Major and one or two more staff officers. There was a head-quarter staff, consisting of a Military Secretary, Commissary of Ordnance, and Superintending Surgeon. The annual pay of the officers attached to this force, about ninety in number, amounted to about £110,000, giving them each an average salary of £1,200 a year. The entire charges of this force were stated to be about 40 lakhs of rupees, or nearly £400,000 per annum, in a report from Colonel Low, the Officiating Resident, dated 20th July 1848. Colonel Low, who was then new to the place, declared it was "grievous to reflect" upon "that the pressing pecuniary difficulties of the Nizam's Government" were brought upon it by "our annual demand for the pay of the force," and that it was "really painful to mention all these facts and circumstances." Colonel Low considered it his "imperative duty" to recommend that "immediate steps should be taken to reduce the expenses of the Contingent to a sum not exceeding twenty lakhs of rupees per annum at the utmost"†—to reduce the expenses, in short, to one-half of what they were at the time of his recommendation.

Lord Dalhousie "on the 7th of October 1848 expressed the opinion that the British Government commits no injustice, and practises no extortion, in requiring that the Contingent Force, maintained by virtue of treaty" (which will be shown to be an untrue assertion), "be kept by the Nizam, and that his Lordship does not consider that we are called on in justice to reduce a man of that force." The Governor-General did, indeed, in that same Minute of 7th October 1848, express an intention of "diminishing the unnecessary expenses of the Staff as vacancies might occur," but he only talked about it. The patronage was not to be resigned so easily. Lord Dalhousie continued to fill up vacancies on the Staff for several years after making that profession, while the alleged debt, which was

\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 38; Papers, "Kerowlee," 1855, p. 9; "Punjab Papers" (1849), p. 663.

† Papers, "Nizam" (234 of 1859), p. 8.

afterwards to form the pretext for territorial sequestration, was growing.\* He appointed, for example, his own aide-de-camp, Captain William Maine, to be one of the "Brigadiers Commanding Divisions" in the Hyderabad Contingent, with a salary of £2,500 a year, payable by the Nizam, in December 1851. The debt summed up against the Hyderabad State in 1851, when a large sum was paid off, and again in 1853, had accumulated solely in consequence of Lord Dalhousie having refused in 1848, in spite of the earnest appeal of Colonel Low, and the expressed wishes of the Home Government, "to reduce a man" of the Contingent.

This Hyderabad Contingent, or Nizam's Army as it was commonly called until about 1851, grew into the monstrous form it ultimately assumed out of several bodies of the Nizam's irregular troops taken in hand by the Resident on various occasions between 1807 and 1819, while we were at war, in alliance with the Nizam, and "reformed" under the command of English adventurers not in the service of the East India Company. This force, raised in time of war, was, by the Resident's importunate and overbearing influence and the corrupt subserviency of the Nizam's Minister, maintained on the same footing in time of peace, at first without any direct sanction from Calcutta, which was, however, more decidedly extended, as the valuable patronage was gradually appropriated by the Governor-General. The "Nizam's Army" was turned into a great relief to our resources, and "a fertile source of patronage," affording, by its commands and staff appointments, rewards for our meritorious officers.† Originally a Resident's plaything and job, a joint concern of Mr. Russell, the Resident, and Rajah Chundoo Loll, it became by degrees an instrument of torture for the Nizam, a shield for his faithless Minister.

Rajah Chundoo Loll was upheld at the head of the Hyderabad administration by irresistible British power for more than thirty years, not in accordance with the judgment or wishes of the Nizam, not for the advantage of the people of the Prince's dominions, but for the promotion of what were asserted by the great majority of our Residents, our Secretaries, and our Councillors to be British interests, and which certainly were the interests of a great many English officers—to oblige the Hyderabad State to sustain from its revenues this Contingent Force, which no treaty recognized or justified. Thus we find the Governor-General, the Marquis of Hastings, expressing as follows his determination with reference to the Contingent :—

"It is perfectly true that those troops are in fact more ours than those of the Sovereign by whom they are maintained. Now would it be consonant to wisdom, or to the trust reposed in us by the Honourable Company, that we should sacrifice such a security to a casuistical point of equity?" And further on in the same minute he says that it would be "impolitic to let an over-refinement cause our open abrogation of such an inexpensive addition to our strength."‡

The "casuistical point of equity" and "over-refinement," to which Lord Hastings refused to sacrifice our "inexpensive" gains, would have been more properly called ordinary justice and common honesty. The "inexpensive addition to our strength" was very expensive to the Nizam. All the pecuniary difficulties of the Hyderabad State, all its differences with the British Government, "the perpetual wrestle with the Dewan," as Lord Dalhousie described it, "which transforms the British Resident by turns into an importunate creditor and a bailiff in execution,"§ arose out of the Contingent. And, somehow or other, every crisis in the long financial agony of the Nizam became an occasion of triumph and profit for his British ally, who, having imposed the burden for his own benefit, would grant no measure of relief except for a price. In 1823 the financial embarrassments of the Hyderabad State, arising chiefly out of the enormous claims of the house of William Palmer and Co., closely connected with the Residency, on account of the Contingent, so nearly approached bankruptcy that the Nizam had to submit to what he considered the deep humiliation of relinquishing in

\* Papers, "Nizam" (234 of 1859), pp. 8, 9.

† "Hyderabad Papers," 1824, pp. 31, 32.

‡ Papers, "Nizam" (234 of 1859), p. 4.

§ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 98.

perpetuity, for a sum of ready money equal to about sixteen years' purchase, the annual tribute for the Northern Circars due by the East India Company. This was at once a good pecuniary bargain and a political advance. By that payment the East India Company was emancipated from the legal relation of vassal to the Nizam.\*

In 1853 came the crowning affliction on the Hyderabad State caused by "this incubus," as it was called by Sir Frederick Currie, one of Lord Dalhousie's Councillors. In that year the Nizam was compelled to resign the administration of some of his richest provinces into the hands of English officers, in order to provide for the regular payment of the force which he had been improperly told by Lord Dalhousie he was bound by treaty to maintain, and for the liquidation of a debt always disputed by him, and officially acknowledged since not to have been owing. Sufficient light was not thrown upon this case of the Nizam's Berar Provinces by the partial communication of the papers to Parliament in 1854, which were calculated to persuade most readers that there really was a large balance against the Nizam; that the Hyderabad Contingent, for whose pay the debt had been incurred, was most valuable to the Nizam, and much valued by him; that the sequestration of the Berars was the only available plan for securing the debt, and the plan most advantageous for the debtor; that this was a case of consent, and not, as it really was, a case of coercion. Every one of these notions may be gathered from the Blue Book of 1854; and every one of them can be shown to be false by the best official testimony. I shall prove, in the first place, that there was no balance against the Nizam; secondly, that the Hyderabad Contingent was very valuable to the British Government, but not to the Nizam; and, thirdly, that there was no willing consent on the part of the Nizam, who was compelled to sign the new treaty by threats of the most formidable description.

In 1853 there was no balance against the Nizam. "I have always been of opinion," wrote Colonel Davidson, Resident at Hyderabad, in 1860, "that had the pecuniary demands of the two Governments been impartially dealt with we had no just claim against the Nizam." "In 1853," he repeats, "we had little or no claim against the Nizam."† In 1853 there was in fact a disputed balance-sheet. The balance of £430,000 which was demanded was made out by debiting the Nizam with cash payments from our treasury for the Hyderabad Contingent, while refusing to credit him with sums due by our Government on other accounts. Interest, first at 12 and afterwards at 6 per cent., on all our advances, formed nearly a quarter of the claim. The principal of the Nizam's counter-claim, without any calculation of interest, was more than the whole charge against him. At the time when the Nizam's Government was being pressed most severely for arrears on account of the Contingent, the Nawab Sooraj-ool-Moolk, then Minister, urged in a letter to the Resident, dated 19th August 1851, that the *abkaree*, or excise revenue, of the towns of Secunderabad and Jaulna, amounting to about one lakh of rupees yearly, which the British Government had arbitrarily appropriated for forty-one years, should be transferred to the Nizam's credit as a set-off against the demand that was then being so strongly pressed. The unpublished despatches referring to this considerable and confessedly well-founded claim appear to consist of the Resident's despatches to the Government of India No. 166 of 2nd September 1851 and No. 118 of 27th August 1853.‡ But no set-off, or inquiry as to a set-off, was tolerated by Lord Dalhousie; although subsequently, under Lord Canning's Government, the *abkaree*, or excise revenue, of Secunderabad and Jaulna "was prospectively allowed to be a portion of the legitimate revenue of the Hyderabad State."§

\* This relation was indicated in the forms of correspondence, the Governor-General addressing the Nizam as "your petitioner," and the Nizam replying as "our royal self." On the accession of the present Nizam's grandfather, in 1829, the Governor-General stipulated for the alteration of a style that had become quite inappropriate.

† Papers, "The Deccan" (338 of 1867), pp. 27, 28.

‡ See footnote to Colonel Davidson's letter to Government of India of 12th October 1860; Papers, "The Deccan" (338 of 1867), p. 67.

§ Papers, "The Deccan" (338 of 1867), p. 27.

The Hyderabad Contingent was valuable to the British Government, not to the Nizam. The services which the British Government, under Article 3 of the Treaty of 1853, undertook to perform by means of the Contingent it was already bound, under Article 17 of the Treaty of 1800, to perform by means of the Subsidiary Force.\*

It is a simple fact that the British Government used the Contingent, separately paid for by the Nizam, as the chief weapon to perform those military duties which were obligatory on the Subsidiary Force; and it was in consequence of this that the Subsidiary Force was for many years considerably reduced in strength, affording a large pecuniary saving to the British Government. This fact also was noticed by Major Moore in his minute of 7th November 1853, already quoted. He observed that, relying upon the Contingent for preserving tranquillity in this State, the British Government had "disregarded its own engagements," and that "the number of troops" (the Subsidiary Force) "kept up" by the British Government "within the Hyderabad territory for the last thirty years" was "more than one-fourth less than the number for which it had contracted, and received payment in advance," under the treaty of 1800.†

The force called until 1853 "the Nizam's Army," for which the Nizam up to that year had been expected to pay monthly in cash, and for which, under the treaty of that year, he was compelled to provide by a territorial assignment, had been maintained for thirty years, *with the corrupt connivance of the Nizam's Minister*, not for the benefit of the Hyderabad State, but for the benefit of the British Government. The fact that these troops were kept up solely for the relief of the British Government was decently veiled so long as they were supposed to be the Nizam's troops. But by their conversion into a British Contingent, for which the Nizam was made to pay, the services to be performed by the British Subsidiary Force, under Article 17 of the Treaty of 1800, in return for a valuable equivalent, were openly shifted to the shoulders of the Nizam. The unauthorized imposition for so many years of our own burden on our weak ally was revealed in the very words which authorized the imposition in the treaty of 1853. In summing up the beneficial results of the new treaty, as it appeared to him, to both parties, Lord Dalhousie makes this very clear. "The Nizam," he said, "obtains by the treaty a renewal of the obligations by which the British Government bound itself fifty years ago to protect him against all external enemies and all internal dangers."‡ What advantage to the Nizam could there be in a "renewal" of those obligations if they had been fairly and continuously fulfilled? The very word "renewal" betrays a sense of some default, suspension, or evasion.

"On the other hand," continues the Governor-General, "the Government of India, for its part," "obtains a formal recognition of the Contingent Force, and its establishment upon a definite footing, as an auxiliary body of troops supplied by the British Government, and wholly under its authority, instead of being, as heretofore, a foreign force, nominally belonging to His Highness the Nizam. It obtains by the assignment of districts positive security for the payment of the Contingent Force and other charges."§

The advantage of what Lord Dalhousie calls a "formal recognition of the Contingent," and its being placed "on a definite footing," was even more distinctly acknowledged in a minute by one of the Members of Council, Sir Frederick Currie. "I have always felt," he said, "the difficulty of the position in which we should be placed if the Nizam were to *fall back upon the treaties*, and call upon us to explain by what authority, and on what grounds, we had organized in his name this costly army, and imposed this incubus upon the revenues of this State."||

\* See the dissents of General Canfield, Major Moore, and Colonel Sykes, M.P., in the Court of Directors—Papers, "Nizam" (234 of 1859), pp. 5, 11, 13, 21. See also Lord Dalhousie's admissions—Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), pp. 112, 151.

† Papers, "Nizam" (234 of 1859), pp. 4, 5. The saving to the British Government in thirty years, by this "disregard of its engagements," at the Nizam's expense, must have exceeded 2,000,000 sterling, or about four times the pecuniary claim brought against the Nizam in 1853.

‡ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), pp. 151.

§ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 151.

|| Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 141.



The Nizam gave no willing consent to this Treaty of 1853, whereby the "authority" for this "costly incubus," which Sir Frederick Currie saw was wanting, was given, and whereby His Highness also resigned the administration of some of his finest provinces, including Berar, into the hands of British officers. He was coerced into signing the Treaty. Against the account of advances made for the pay of the Contingent the Hyderabad State desired to set, as I have just explained, an account of some of its legitimate revenue that had been collected and withheld for many years by the British Government. No plea of set-off was listened to, and a distress was put in, embittered by terms of menace and insult. Lord Dalhousie, in the process of enforcing this most inequitable pecuniary claim—most inequitable even if the Nizam's large counter-claims were excluded—had written personally to the Nizam, on the 6th June 1851, telling him, quite erroneously, that the Hyderabad State was bound to maintain the Contingent "by the stipulations of existing Treaties;" reminding him that it was dangerous "to provoke the resentment of the British Government," "whose power can crush you at its will," and warning him that "the independence of his sovereignty" stood in "imminent danger." The Persian words, "*pāemāl kardan*," that were used in the letter to represent "crush you," mean "trample into dust." It would have been difficult to choose a phrase more insulting and more exasperating. In the same letter the Nizam was advised to disband "those turbulent mercenaries the Arab soldiery," and to make a great effort for "the early liquidation of the accumulated debt." If the Nizam were unable to meet the call on his treasury, he must "forthwith make over" to the British Government certain frontier districts.\*

Thus the Governor-General's direct application to the Nizam, which was the origin and basis of all the subsequent proceedings, conveyed an assertion of Treaty rights as untruthful as it was absolute, and backed the inaccurate assertion by insult and intimidation. That erroneous assertion was never withdrawn by Lord Dalhousie, although he afterwards confidentially confessed its complete inaccuracy.

I have said that Lord Dalhousie erroneously represented to the Nizam that the Hyderabad State was bound to maintain the Contingent "by the stipulations of existing Treaties." That this representation was inaccurate can be proved from Lord Dalhousie's own mouth. In 1851, in his letter addressed personally to the Nizam, the Governor-General insists that "the efficient maintenance of the force is a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of existing Treaties;" and again that it is "necessary to fulfil the obligations of Treaties."† In 1853—having in the mean while, we may suppose, examined more carefully the documents bearing on the case—he arrived at a different result. "I have found myself forced," he says, "to the conclusion that the Government of India *has no right whatever, either by the spirit or by the letter of the Treaty of 1800*, to require the Nizam to maintain the Contingent in its present form." And again, in the same Minute he says: "I, for my part, can never consent, as an honest man, to instruct the Resident to reply that the Contingent has been maintained by the Nizam, from the end of the war in 1817 till now, because the treaty of 1800 obliges His Highness so to maintain it. Neither the words nor the intention of the Treaty can be held to warrant such a construction of its obligations."‡ But he had already forced "such a construction" upon the Nizam in terms of insult and menace. And although Lord Dalhousie felt himself called upon, "as an honest man," to place his altered opinion on record *in secret*, he did not feel himself called upon, "as an honest man," to give any hint of it to the Nizam at Hyderabad. In the course of the renewed pressure of 1853 the bold assertions and threatening language of 1851 were allowed to operate unchanged.

It was only under the influence of intimidation, produced by the announcement that military coercion, with all its manifest consequences, was imminent, that the Nizam consented to sign the Treaty of 1853. And yet in his despatches describing the negotiations of 1853 the Resident, Colonel Low, does not mention any

Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), pp. 40, 43. † Papers, "Nizam's Debts" (418 of 1854), p. 41.  
‡ "Nizam's Debts" (418 of 1854), pp. 100, 111.



menace of military coercion. In one of his Minutes on the subject, dated 30th March 1853, Lord Dalhousie said that in the event of the Nizam refusing to make the territorial assignment that was demanded it would be necessary "to enter upon military occupation of those districts."<sup>o</sup> But there is no official record of any such menace having been used by the Resident, while the menace that was actually used, though not recorded, was one of a much more alarming nature. Not officially, not openly, but in a private and familiar note, the Nizam was informed that unless he at once consented to sign the new Treaty orders would be given for the advance of British troops, not merely into the districts that were wanted, but also *into his capital*. In his despatch of the 19th of May 1853, announcing that the Nizam had at last consented to sign the Treaty, Colonel Low mentions a note, dated the 14th of that month, which was "sent in original to the Nizam by the Minister," when it was the Resident's object "to impress the mind of the Nizam with the belief that further unnecessary delays in settling the matter, one way or other, would not be permitted."<sup>†</sup> A careful perusal of the private note (hitherto unpublished) to which the Resident thus briefly alludes is, however, necessary in order to make its coercive efficacy fully intelligible. It is addressed by the Assistant Resident, Captain Davidson (afterwards Colonel and Resident) to the Nizam's Minister, the Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk, uncle of the present Minister, the Nawab Sir Salar Jung. It runs thus:—

MY DEAR NAWAB,—I believe the Resident requires your attendance this evening, to inform you his negotiations with the Nizam are at an end, and he applies to the Governor-General to move troops by to-day's post.

His Highness asked for four months' delay, which was refused, not even in that time positively stipulating to pay the troops. Had he, however, done so, this would have been refused, as contrary to the instructions of the Governor-General.

His Highness next offered to place forty lakhs of talooks<sup>‡</sup> in the hands of Shums-ool-Oomra for the pay of the Contingent. The Resident said, No, as he could not be assured that there would be no interference on the part of His Highness's Government, or his other officers; but if the talooks were made over to the Resident and Shums-ool-Oomra, or any other officer of the Hyderabad Government as Commissioners—they to have the entire management and control of these districts, only furnishing accounts yearly to His Highness—he would refer the proposition to Calcutta, but without the slightest expectation that the Governor-General would agree to it.

His Highness has refused to agree to the above, and therefore he has lost a chance of obtaining a remission of what was disagreeable to his ideas of dignity. The terms first proposed are now renewed, and with an unfriendly feeling that would, in my opinion, drive matters to extremities. Indeed, I have a letter from my nephew at Poona mentioning that the 78th Highlanders and H. M.'s 86th Regiment have received orders to be in readiness to march on Hyderabad. Don't suppose military operations will be confined to the districts; and if you are a friend of His Highness beg of him to save himself and his dignity by complying at once with what the Governor-General will most assuredly compel him to accede to.

(Signed) CURT. DAVIDSON.

*Hyderabad, May 14th, 1853.*

The meaning of "military operations" not being "confined to the districts" was that the city of Hyderabad would be occupied by British troops. Then the Nizam and his advisers saw that he had before him the choice of signing the Treaty or being dethroned. They understood perfectly, and so did the Resident, that it must come to that. Hence Captain Davidson's warning that only "by complying at once" can the Nizam "save himself and his dignity." The Nizam's Government was not as strong in 1853, nor was Hyderabad as orderly, as they have become during the twenty years' administration of the Nawab Salar Jung. Without counting the armed men in a fortified city of 200,000 inhabitants

Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 113.

† Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), pp. 132, 133.

‡ Meaning land producing revenue of about £400,000 per annum.

where almost every man was armed, Hyderabad was full of those "turbulent mercenaries"—a very much over-abused class—whom our Government, as they, of course, were well aware, was urging the Nizam to disband. They knew that military occupation meant not only the loss of their hard-earned savings. For the Arab soldiery—sober, steady men, whose great characteristics were faithfulness and thrift—were the greatest money-lenders in Hyderabad, and after their expulsion by British power they would obviously have had great difficulty in collecting their little accounts. Their leaders would certainly have taken every advantage of Mussulman fanaticism and general excitement to have one last despairing struggle before they submitted to the loss of their homes, and of all that they possessed. Although the city could not have resisted a British force for six hours it would not have been occupied without a contest. The first shot fired from the walls, the first drop of blood shed, would in those days, so far as we can argue from the general tone and temper of Lord Dalhousie's administration, have cost the Nizam his throne. It would certainly have been worse than useless for him to plead that he could not control the unruly rabble of his capital. If, as might easily have been the case, a great number of the combatants had been proved to be in his own pay, his conduct would have been stigmatized as gross and infamous treachery. It would have gone hard with him.

Thanks to the good sense, patience, and prudence of the Hyderabad Court, the crisis was got over without any collision, or any resistance to the mandate of our Government, which was nevertheless most repugnant to the Nizam's feelings, which he opposed as long as he could, and to which he only submitted at last, in the words of Colonel Davidson, when Resident at Hyderabad, under the influence of those "objurgations and threats,"\* the true nature and full extent of which are now, I believe, for the first time made public.

Although the Contingent was kept up on an excessively expensive scale, as every Governor-General and every Resident admitted,—although it was more valuable, both for service and patronage, to our Government than to that of Hyderabad,—still it may be urged, as it has been, that the Nizam believed the force to be valuable to him, that he acquiesced in its maintenance and objected to its disbandment. There are assumptions and suggestions to this effect scattered all through the Blue Books, all of which, however, are falsified and nullified if we trace the growth of this "inexpensive addition to our strength," as the Marquis of Hastings called it, this "joint concern between Rajah Chundoo Loll and us," according to Lord Metcalfe, in which the Nizam was never allowed to have any part or voice. In a despatch dated the 26th of July 1842, the Resident, General Fraser, warns our Government that, "besides other evils which may arise" if the Nizam be allowed to feel that he is really independent, "we shall experience one of great magnitude, in a proposition on the part of His Highness for the disbandment of the Contingent, to which he is known to be averse, and of which neither the continued maintenance nor the original organization are provided by any existing Treaty."†

We may be referred, however, to that alleged "expression of the Nizam's wishes," adduced with so much satisfaction by Lord Dalhousie in his minute of January 8th, 1852—a letter of the Dewan Sooraj-ool-Moolk to the Resident, dated 19th November 1851, communicating the Nizam's orders for the reduction of certain troops, "exclusive of the Sarfi-khass and the Contingent, which, in conformity with orders, are to remain fixed and determined as at present." This, according to Lord Dalhousie, represented the Nizam's "wishes," "formally stated," "without any solicitation."‡ That last word is quite true; there was nothing like "solicitation" on the part of Lord Dalhousie. There was no "solicitation" in his letter of the 6th June 1851, when he told the Nizam that the Hyderabad State was bound to maintain the Contingent "by the stipulations of existing Treaties;" that it was "necessary to fulfil the obligations of Treaties;" that "the efficient

Papers, "The Deccan" (388 of 1867), p. 26. † Papers, "Nizam" (234 of 1859), p. 7.

‡ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 92.

maintenance" of this force was "essential" as "the main support on which depended the stability of his throne," reminding His Highness at the same time that it was "dangerous to provoke the resentment of the British Government," "whose power could crush him," and warning him that "the independence of his sovereignty was exposed to imminent danger."\* This was not a "solicitation;" it was an irresistible command. His "wishes" were not consulted, it was "in conformity with orders" that the Nizam then, and throughout the subsequent coercive negotiations, made no dispute as to the maintenance of the Contingent.

It is very true that Lord Dalhousie, while withholding the knowledge of his altered views, "as an honest man," regarding the Treaty obligations, had anticipated the possibility of the Nizam venturing to ask that the Contingent should be disbanded, and had told Colonel (afterwards General Sir John) Low, the Resident, what he was in such a case to say. Therefore, in confirmation of the Governor-General's erroneous but very efficacious declaration, the Resident warned the Nizam that if the Contingent were disbanded, he would "be deprived of support against the Arabs, Sikhs, Rohillas, and other unruly tribes scattered through His Highness's territory," and that the Subsidiary Force would "not perform all these duties hitherto discharged by the Contingent.† Do you think," said Colonel Low to the Nizam, "that the Arabs and Rohillas, and Sikhs, and other plunderers, and many evil-disposed men in your country would let you collect your revenues quietly if they were not overawed by the presence in your territories of the Contingent?"‡ To give some body and weight to this argument, Lord Dalhousie made a distinction—totally unfounded and unwarranted under the terms of the Treaty of 1800, a figment entirely of his own ingenuity—between "occasions of importance" when the Subsidiary Force was to act and duties of less moment which it was not bound to perform.§ The Nizam was told that he was bound by treaty, which was untrue, to maintain the Contingent, and he was told, which was likewise untrue, that the duties performed by the Contingent were not such duties as devolved properly on the Subsidiary Force. Thus, the Nizam was given to understand, over and above Lord Dalhousie's intimidation, and irrespective of the military spur ultimately applied in Colonel Davidson's private note, that if he gave up the Contingent he would practically lose all military protection whatever, and all the benefits of the Treaty of 1800. The Nizam, therefore, did not venture to touch on the subject further than to put the case hypothetically, when pressed hard by Colonel Low, in the words, "Suppose I were to declare that I don't want the Contingent at all."|| This unguarded exclamation, "in an angry tone of voice," was, as Colonel Low narrates, answered by him "instantly" with the announcement that even disbandment would not obviate what the Nizam dreaded more than anything, the compulsory assignment of territory; while the Resident's previous discourses, following Lord Dalhousie's threatening diatribe, had convinced the Nizam that the choice by him of disbandment would be held as an abrogation of the general guarantee of complete protection under the Treaty of 1800. In a letter from the Government of India to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated 13th of February 1867, in reply to an argument submitted by Nawab Salar Jung, as Minister of Hyderabad, drawn from the compulsion to which the Nizam had been subjected, it is asserted that the British Government gave His Highness "the option either to see the Contingent disbanded, or to assign lands to cover its expenses," and that "of the two alternatives he voluntarily elected the assignment of lands."¶

But this is all wrong. The Nizam was allowed no such option. In any case the assignment of lands was made indispensable. The alternative offered him in 1853 was either to disband the Contingent and to assign lands for "some years" during the reduction, or to maintain the Contingent and to assign lands, "merely for a time," for its maintenance. Colonel Low told the Nizam that in reducing the Contingent, and providing for the soldiers who had been "disciplined and

\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), pp. 4, 43.

† Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 112.

‡ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 112.

§ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 112.

|| Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 125.

¶ Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 20.

commanded by British officers," "some years might elapse," and that "we must still have command temporarily of districts for their regular payment."<sup>\*</sup> This was, indeed, the very feature in the terms held out that Lord Dalhousie thought would be likely to induce the Nizam to accept the Treaty of 1853 in the form in which it was finally offered, without electing for the abolition of the Contingent. "I am not without hope," said the Governor-General, in his Minute of the 30th of March 1853, "that the prospect of the loss of the Contingent Force, hitherto upheld under the countenance of the British Government, *and the necessity of still making over districts temporarily into our hands*, may induce His Highness to consent to the engagement into which we have proposed to him to enter."<sup>†</sup>

Without a positive assurance that the districts were only to be made over "temporarily into our hands," not even the menace of military coercion would have induced the Nizam "to consent to the engagement." Lord Dalhousie's original design and primary object were to obtain the districts in full sovereignty, or in perpetual assignment ;<sup>‡</sup> but the aversion of the Nizam was found to be insurmountable. The termination of the struggle on this fundamental point is thus described by the British plenipotentiary, Colonel Low :—"Finding that the Nizam's dislike to the word 'in perpetuity' was extreme, and fearing that the whole negotiation might fail if I insisted on that word, I announced that that was a part of the scheme which my Government had allowed me the liberty to alter if necessary ; and I announced formally that, if His Highness wished it, the districts might be made over merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it."<sup>§</sup> This was the understanding on which the Nizam signed the Treaty of 1853. But for this understanding "the whole negotiation," as Colonel Low saw, would have failed, and although coercion might have been applied by Lord Dalhousie at any stage of the transaction it would not have been easy to give an aspect of equity or decency to it. To have taken military possession, without the sanction of a Treaty or Convention, without any declaration or ground of war, of provinces belonging to a protected and submissive ally would have raised an odious political scandal, of which even Lord Dalhousie probably was by no means unaware. Such a lawless proceeding might, indeed, have been disguised and covered up by the smoke and fire of a collision provoked by the occupation of the capital city, as threatened in Colonel Davidson's private note. Whether any calculation or speculation of that nature entered into the programme of 1853 or not, we may give credit to Lord Dalhousie for having been very anxious to avoid violent measures. manifold considerations led the Indian Government of those days to give way before the Nizam's persistent contention that there should be nothing of "perpetuity" or "permanence" in the letter or spirit of the documents assigning his provinces to British administration as security for the pay of the Contingent. There can be no excuse for the Indian Government of these days assuming or asserting that there is an inherent character of "perpetuity" or "permanence" in documents from which that character was expressly excluded.

Not merely were all words implying "permanence" kept out of the notes and treaties of 1853 and 1860, but the Nizam Nasir-ood-Dowla in 1853, and his successor, the Nizam Afzul-ood-Dowla, in 1860, firmly objected to any forms or instruments of administration that might suggest permanence or impede restitution. One of the Nizam's districts assigned in 1853 could most conveniently have been made over to the Bombay Government, but "an arrangement of that description would have the appearance," the Minister said, "of such districts having been made over in perpetuity." "In consequence of these feelings on the part of the native Government," says Colonel Low, "I wrote the concluding part of the 6th Article in the following terms—'to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at Hyderabad, and to such other officers, acting under

\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 125.

† Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 113.

‡ Paragraphs 25, 28, 33, 41, of the Minute of 30th March 1853--Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 105, 107, 110.

§ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 122.

his orders, as may, from time to time, be appointed by the Government of India to the charge of those districts.' " \*

Although strongly pressed by the British Government during the negotiation of the Treaty of 1860,—whereby some of the Assigned Districts were restored to him, and the debt, never due, was wiped out,—the Nizam was inflexibly opposed to any change in the peculiar tenure under which the Berar districts, still to be left under British management, were held and administered. The Government of India was desirous of placing them in charge of the Commissioner of Nagpore, but gave way "on the ground of an apprehension that the true and complete reservation of His Highness's sovereignty over the retained districts might by his acceptance of that part of the proposal become questionable." † The districts of Berar, therefore, were left in charge of the Resident at the Nizam's Court. The Government of India, during the negotiation of the new Treaty, emphatically declared, in a letter to the Resident dated the 5th of September 1860, that it would "hold this territory, as it has hitherto held the whole of the Assigned Districts, not in sovereignty, but in trust for His Highness, so long as the Contingent is kept up, and no longer," and that "the alienation of this portion of the dominions of His Highness is temporary only, and for a special purpose" (the pay of the Contingent) "*conducive chiefly to the security of the Hyderabad State, and to the preservation of tranquillity throughout its limits,*" ‡—for which objects, as already shown, the British force at Secunderabad had been provided and amply subsidized under the Treaty of 1800. These Assigned Districts of Berar "will still form," it was said in the same despatch, "an integral part of the Nizam's dominions, and will be restored to His Highness entire whenever it shall seem fit to the two Governments to terminate the engagement under which the Contingent is kept up." §

"Serving and suffering," says Bishop Hall, "are the best tutors to government." History tells us that a small and weak State is not necessarily ruined, or even subjected to permanent loss, by the oppression of a powerful neighbour or grasping suzerain. Prussia released herself from feudalism, and learned to organize her strength and her intelligence, under the cruel pressure of French conquest. The rebuke and the stimulus came at a happy crisis, and enabled Stein and Scharnhorst to effect fiscal and administrative reforms, that might have occupied generations, in five years.

There can, of course, be no comparison between the relation occupied by France under the Great Napoleon towards Prussia and the Confederation of the Rhine and that of the British Government towards the allied and protected States of India. France during the Napoleonic ascendancy was a conquering Power, with no superiority of intellect or culture, with no apparent object but that of drawing as deeply as possible on the resources of every State under its domination. In India the British Government, by the logic of facts, by common consent, and in a great measure by express compact, has acquired imperial supremacy over all the Indian States, and holds, with general acquiescence and great political advantage, the position of teacher among pupils. The lessons that our Government has given to the Native States, by precept, by example, by temporary management, and even by a supervision that may not have always been sufficiently tolerant, and by penalties not always equitable, have on the whole been beneficial. But it is one great qualification and duty of the teacher to know when a lesson has been effectual, to recognize the progress that has been made by the pupil, and to relax restraint that has ceased to be efficient because it has ceased to be just.

The administrative condition of the Hyderabad State was unquestionably most miserable in 1853, through our own conduct, and the severe mortification arising from the d restraint on the Berar provinces appears to have been most salutary. Almost immediately after the execution of the Treaty of 1853 the Nizam's Minister, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, died, and was succeeded by his nephew, the Nawab Salar Jung,

\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 135.

† Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 35.

‡ Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 20.

§ Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 21.

who at once entered upon a course of administrative reconstruction and regulation, that has produced beneficial results of the most remarkable nature. The effort necessary to replace by economy and new resources the revenue lost by the assignment of these provinces, and to provide for the higher class of public servants displaced by British administration, gave an extraordinary stimulus to reform in the Nizam's dominions. On the restoration of the districts of Nuldroog and Raichore, under the Treaty of 1860, it was obviously the policy of the Nawab Salar Jung to justify that concession, and to strengthen the claim to a complete restoration, by proving that the restored provinces would lose nothing by retransfer to the rule of their own Sovereign. Proof to that effect has been amply furnished. If the Berar districts have prospered under British management, the territories left in charge of the Nizam's Government have prospered in at least an equal degree. Whether tested by the spontaneous growth of revenue, by orderly conduct and absence of crime among the inhabitants, and by the general evidence of their well-being and contentment, the provinces administered by the Nawab Salar Jung have made quite as marked an advance as those under the Berar Commission, of which the British Resident at Hyderabad is the head. A great lesson has been learned; great progress has been made; and, apart from all consideration of the original grounds of restraint, the time has clearly arrived for a generous and politic relaxation.

The Nizam, as we have seen, was persuaded to avoid the open scandal of compulsion in 1853 by an understanding, without which, as Colonel Low said, "the whole negotiation would have failed," that the district might be made over "merely for a time," "to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it." "Some years" must elapse, Colonel Low told His Highness, before the provinces, the immediate possession of which Lord Dalhousie would not forego, could be released from sequestration, even if the Nizam insisted on the Contingent being broken up. In the same way, the Nizam knew very well that "some years" must elapse before the affairs of the Hyderabad State could be placed on so sound a footing as to enable him to say that he did not require the Contingent any longer, and to make any large payment, or offer any tangible security, in lieu of the districts, on account of the alleged debt of about half a million sterling. The situation, however, improved more rapidly than he had expected. A very few years of enlightened, firm, and conscientious rule not only sufficed "to avert the crash," and "to avert from the Nizam the fate which," according to Lord Dalhousie's benevolent anticipation, was pretty sure to "overtake him,"\* but sufficed to implant and spread abroad peaceful and orderly habits among every class of the population. By the year 1860 the internal condition of the Hyderabad territories had been very greatly changed for the better since Colonel Low reminded the Nizam of "the Arabs, Rohillas, Sikhs, and other evil-disposed men," who interfered with the quiet collection of the revenue. The country is no longer infested with any of those predatory bands. In the Annual Report of the Resident for 1869-70 the marvellous improvements effected even so far back as 1860 are thus described :—

"Not only was the public treasury full, but the annual income of the State exceeded the annual expenditure by about eight lakhs of rupees (£80,000), while the credit of the Government stood proportionately high. Owing chiefly to the abolition of the baneful system of former times by which the collection of the revenue was farmed out to contractors, disturbances in the interior of the country had become rare. The Hyderabad Contingent had not fired a shot, except on its own parade-grounds, since the suppression of the mutinies."

If ever there was a time when the stability of the Nizam's Government and the welfare of his people were mainly secured, as was pretended, by the Hyderabad Contingent, that time has gone by. Whatever doubt may have existed formerly, it is now manifest to all India that the Contingent is not of the slightest use to the Hyderabad State. By the coercive and arbitrary transactions of 1853 and 1860 that force has been converted, without disguise, without excuse, and without palliation,

\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), pp. 38, 40.

into what it was, under the deceptive form of "the Nizam's Army," proclaimed to be, by Lord Hastings, "an inexpensive addition to our military strength."

Relying on the understanding with Colonel Low that the districts were only made over "temporarily," "merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it," the two successive Nizams, and the Co-Regent and Minister during the minority of the reigning Prince, have made repeated applications for the restitution of the Berars, offering other securities of undoubted sufficiency for the performance of any engagements, and the payment of any charges, that might, after fair consideration, be imposed on the Hyderabad State. Those applications have not, it is understood, been graciously received, or even fairly met. And on that part of the subject, as already proposed, more will be said on a future occasion. The seizure of the provinces was an act of high-handed violence, and their retention has become a scandal to the British name, which the nation must remove, since the Indian bureaucracy never will.

STATESMAN (London), *October 1, 1880*.—The exigencies of space do not permit us this month to do full justice to the persecution of the most eminent of Indian statesmen, the Nawab Salar Jung. We have not, for example, as yet touched upon that singular episode the expulsion from Hyderabad in 1877 of the Minister's Private Secretary, Mr. Oliphant. We are anxious to explain that we have not taken up this deplorable case merely with a view to revive the Nizam's claim to the restoration of his Berar provinces, but with the more urgent object of calling public attention to the retrogressive and deteriorating influence over the administration of the Nizam's dominions that is now exercised by means of British domination, applied with the sole object of suppressing that claim, which cannot be justly refused, and cannot be truthfully disputed.

STATESMAN (London), *October 1, 1880*.—*Restitution of Berar. II.—The Nawab Sir Salar Jung*.—On a previous occasion\* I explained how, in 1853, by dint of "objurgations and threats" of military coercion, some of the richest provinces of the Nizam's dominions were assigned to British management, in pledge for a debt which, by official admission, the Nizam did not owe, and on the plea of treaty obligations which were acknowledged in secret conclave not to exist. I explained also that, according to Colonel Low, the British Plenipotentiary, "the whole negotiation," though backed by the most alarming menaces, would have failed unless he had consented to the exclusion from the Treaty of 1853 of every word involving or implying "permanence" in the territorial assignment. "Fearing that the whole negotiation might fail," Colonel Low "announced formally that, if His Highness wished it, the districts might be made over merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it."†

The same terms and conditions were claimed and conceded in the correspondence regarding the Treaty of 1860. No circumstance up to that year had in the least degree modified the position of protest and remonstrance which the Nizam Nasir-ood-Dowla took up against the sequestration of 1853, and which was kept up by his son, Afzul-ood-Dowla, who succeeded in 1857. The Viceroy in Council had before him a series of appeals for restitution when the negotiations were set on foot for the treaty of 1860, under which two districts were restored to the Nizam's administration, while certain cessions and indemnities were gained for the Government of India. Notwithstanding continued importunity and pressure, no phrase or form indicating "permanence" found its way into the new treaty. To remove the last misgivings of the Nizam, the Government of India again declared "the alienation of this portion of the dominions of His Highness to be temporary only," so that it "will still form an integral part of the Nizam's dominions, and will be restored to His Highness entire whenever it shall seem fit to the two Governments to terminate the engagement under which the Contingent is maintained."‡

\* "Restitution of the Berar Provinces," *Statesman*, No. 2, July 1880, pp. 162 to 185.

† Papers, "Nizam's Debts" (418 of 1854), p. 122.

‡ Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), pp. 20, 21.



The continuous appeal of two successive Nizams was thus partially met by the restitution of two districts in 1860, with a renewal of the original understanding that the assignment of the Berar provinces, still left "in trust," was temporary and terminable.

The aim and end of the Treaty of 1860 was partly, as declared in the preamble, to "mark the high esteem in which His Highness the Nizam is held by Her Majesty the Queen, in recognition of the services rendered by His Highness personally, and by the Government of Hyderabad, during the revolt of 1857-8,"\* and partly to afford reparation and obtain indemnity for the defective observance of the Treaty of 1853 by the stronger party, the British Government. Here are some official admissions on the subject. "The provisions of the Treaty of 1853," says Mr. Aitchison, Under-Secretary in the Indian Foreign Office, "which required the submission of annual accounts of the Assigned Districts to the Nizam, were productive of much inconvenience and embarrassing discussions."†

Under Article 8 of the Treaty of 1853, the British Resident was bound to "render true and faithful accounts to the Nizam every year of the receipts and disbursements, and to make over the surplus revenue to His Highness." No surplus revenue was paid, and no accounts were rendered for seven years—hence the "embarrassing discussions." "By the Treaty," wrote the Viceroy in Council on the 7th of July 1860, "we are bound to render these accounts every year, and it is not creditable that this should not have been done."‡ Under the Government of Lord Lawrence, in a despatch dated 13th February 1867, "the omission to furnish annual accounts" was "confessed to have been a dereliction from the letter of Article 8 of the Treaty of 1853."§

The cause of no surplus revenue being paid, though veiled by the absence of accounts, was well known to the Nizam, and fully admitted by the British Resident. It arose, in the words of the latter, from "the extravagance of our management," contrary to verbal assurances during the negotiation of the Treaty, the written provisions of which were actually broken by the annual accounts being withheld. "There is no doubt," wrote the Resident, Colonel Davidson, on the 6th of July 1859, "that General Low allowed the former Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, and the present one, Salar Jung, to suppose that our management would cost about two annas in the rupee, or about 12½ per cent. on the revenue;" "and I distinctly remember," he continues, "its being made use of as an argument to induce compliance in signing the Treaty by General Low."|| After much discussion at Hyderabad and much correspondence with the Resident, the equity of the case advanced by the Nizam's Minister was in substance acknowledged. The Viceroy in Council, in a despatch dated 7th July 1860, taking into consideration "the expectation of the Nizam, when the Treaty was signed, that the expense of managing the districts would not exceed two annas in the rupee, or 12½ per cent.," and also "the circumstances under which, and the objects for which, the Treaty was made," declared himself "not disposed to charge the Nizam, for administering a country which really belongs to him, more than he would himself have incurred, and more proportionally than he incurs in the rest of his dominions." The Government of India therefore agreed "to admit the excess civil expenditure "of past years as a set-off against the Nizam's debt of fifty lakhs of Hyderabad rupees."¶ "This debt, however," it must be remembered, in the subsequent words of Colonel Davidson, the Resident, "the present Nizam" (1862) "and his father equally refused to acknowledge. They brought counter-claims against the British Government, which, they justly complained, had been neither recognized nor refuted. It is not to

\* "Hyderabad Administration Report" for 1861-2, paragraph 151.

† "Collection of Treaties," Calcutta, 1864 (London: Longmans and Co.), vol. V., p. 10. Mr. C. U. Aitchison, who has been Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, is now one of the Viceroy's Councillors.

‡ Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 7.

§ Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 21.

|| Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), pp. 4, 5.

¶ Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 9.



be wondered at," continues the Resident, "that His Highness the Nizam fails to regard the remission as a spontaneous and unequivocal gift."<sup>\*</sup>

It is not, consequently, to be wondered at that the imperfect restitution of 1860, accompanied as it was by valuable concessions to the British Government, was not regarded by the Nizam as a satisfactory or final settlement. The negotiations of 1860 had been opened, in the words of the letter from the Resident to the Nawab Salar Jung, "in consequence of your having repeatedly requested, on the part of His Highness the Nizam, that I would submit to the Governor-General that the whole of the Assigned Districts should be restored to His Highness."<sup>†</sup> That request was from time to time renewed, as occasion offered, after the conclusion of the Treaty of 1860, until in 1866, in a letter from the Minister dated the 27th of October, when the Government of India was bent on the annexation of Mysore, the Nizam offered to give up his reversionary right to share in the lapse of that State, with some minor claims, in return for the restoration of the Assigned Districts. This offer was rejected by the Governor-General in Council "*with censure.*"<sup>‡</sup> The Nawab Salar Jung was personally rebuked, in a despatch dated the 13th of February 1867, for what was called his "erroneous statement"—really one of perfect accuracy—"that the anticipated lapse of the Mysore State arises only and exclusively from the want of an heir, or the refusal of the British Government to permit the Rajah to adopt one. Sir Salar Jung," says the Governor-General in Council, "takes too much upon himself when he attempts to instruct the Government of India in the interpretation of treaties to which the Hyderabad Durbar is not a party."<sup>§</sup> The intended rebuke was equally unmannerly and unfair. Sir Salar Jung did not "take too much upon himself;" he took nothing upon himself; he represented the Nizam's Government, and spoke in the name of his Sovereign. Sir Salar Jung's letter was, moreover, pronounced to be "unworthy alike of his princely master's dignity, and of his own reputation for enlightened statesmanship," to be pervaded by "a spirit of extravagant assertion," and to leave the Governor-General in Council "no alternative but to require that the future communications of the Hyderabad Durbar shall be framed in a tone more serious and circumspect."<sup>||</sup>

The style of this ineffectual scolding is, it will be observed, rather departmental than diplomatic. The words are more suitable for a refractory subordinate than for the duly authorized Minister of an allied and protected State. It is a standing device of Anglo-Indian "Political Agency" to evade the merits of a troublesome appeal by a personal challenge, to meet importunity by intimidation. But in this instance the extreme irritation is intelligible, and was unquestionably genuine. The Nawab Salar Jung, quite unconsciously, had touched the very heart of the matter. His real offence was not that he had presumed to interpret the Subsidiary Treaty between the East India Company and the Rajah of Mysore, "to which the Nizam was not a party," but that in a solitary allusion to that treaty he had impugned the main argument by which the Calcutta Secretariat was attempting to justify the annexation of Mysore. The authorities at Calcutta were arguing that by that misgovernment of his territories which led to their sequestration the Rajah had "infringed," or failed to fulfil, the "conditions" of his treaty. They were arguing also that the Rajah's rights were "personal," not "heritable."<sup>¶</sup>

Both these positions were most innocently assailed, at a momentous crisis of the controversy, by the Nawab Salar Jung. In his despatch of the 27th of October 1866, he stated, quite correctly, that the British Government had resolved "to annex the Mysore territory on the death of the aged Rajah."<sup>\*\*</sup> He could not have anticipated that this resolution of Lord Palmerston's Cabinet would

\* Administration Report of the "Hyderabad Assigned Districts for 1861-62" (despatch No. 26 dated 26th June 1862), paragraph 150.

† Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 17.

‡ Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 23.

§ Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 19.

|| Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 11.

¶ "Mysore Papers" (112 of 1866), pp. 6, 48, 59, 60, &c.

\*\* Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 8.

be reversed by that of Lord Derby, which had just succeeded to power. He could not have known that his despatch would come up for consideration just as the fate of Mysore was trembling in the balance. "Soon after Lord Cranborne" (now Marquis of Salisbury) "took office, he wrote a despatch in the Secret Department ordering that on the death of the Maharajah no steps should be taken towards the annexation of Mysore without communication with the Home Government." \* Then commenced the last struggle for annexation, and the interference of the Nizam was peculiarly inopportune. It might just turn the scale. Salar Jung must be silenced or put down. Not being a Deputy Collector, or an Assistant Commissioner, he was not to be so easily silenced or put down; but even if the appeal of 1867 had not been dismissed "with censure" its basis and the offered consideration had alike disappeared when the project of annexing Mysore was finally renounced by Her Majesty's Ministers.

The two successive Nizams with whom the Treaties of 1853 and 1860 were concluded never ceased to maintain a position of dissent and remonstrance against the sequestration of their provinces, which they looked upon as a heavy loss and bitter humiliation unjustly forced upon them by threats of military coercion. The hope of complete restitution formed the guiding principle of their policy, and each of them, to his latest breath, made it a subject of reproach against the Nawab Salar Jung that his uncle had lost the Berars, and that he had not sufficient zeal or ability to regain them.

The Nizam Afzul-ood-Dowlah died, somewhat suddenly, on the 26th of February 1869, and was succeeded by his infant son, the present Nizam. It was at once arranged, with the approval of the Government of India—the Minister, the Resident, and the chief nobles of Hyderabad concurring almost by acclamation—that while Salar Jung should remain at the head of the administration the Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra should be associated with him as Co-Regent to represent the Hyderabad State and to have charge of the Sovereign's person. It was admitted by the Viceroy in Council that the absolute independence in all its internal affairs secured to the State of Hyderabad by treaty had suffered no diminution in consequence of the Prince being a minor. This was officially notified in the despatch from the Government of India, No. 394A, dated the 22nd of March 1869, written on the occasion of His Highness's accession, in which this passage occurs: "It is not the wish of His Excellency that the representative of the British Government should, for the future, possess more direct control over the internal affairs of the State than has lately been exercised." Furthermore, the Governor-General expresses himself anxious "to maintain the independence of the administration," and intimates his "great satisfaction that the future administration of affairs will be placed entirely in the hands of Sir Salar Jung and of the Ameer-i-Kabeer," and his desire that "care should be taken that no interference should be exercised on the part of any person whatever with the power of the two noblemen who are the chiefs of the administration." It was, in short, completely recognized by the British Government as consonant with the existing treaties, and with the usages of all States, that the Regents were to have the fullest powers in every way to act for their youthful Sovereign.

The Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra, more usually designated by his higher title of Ameer-i-Kabeer, or "the Great Lord," was unquestionably the chief of all the Hyderabad nobles, the head of a family closely connected with that of the Nizam by many intermarriages. As hereditary Commander of the Pagah, or household troops, he held a large *jaghir* on military tenure, besides a considerable estate for the maintenance of his personal dignity. He was not particularly enamoured of the reforms that had signalized the whole course of the Nawab Salar Jung's administration. He stood on the old ways, and was naturally inclined to sympathize with the Munsubdars, or chieftains, whose military fields and hereditary jurisdiction were being gradually resumed and reduced, as occasion offered, under the Minister's process of judicial reform, administrative uniformity, and universal subjection to the law. Still, he was an honest, well-meaning man, open to conviction,

\* "Mysore Papers" (271 of 1867), p. 11.

and by no means inclined to perverse and vexatious opposition. An understanding, more or less definite, was established between the Regents that executive details were to be left, as before, in the hands of the Nawab Salar Jung, who would consult his colleague in such matters of weight as had hitherto been submitted for the sanction or confirmation of the Nizam, and in all affairs affecting the relations of Hyderabad with the Imperial Government of India.

On one matter of great moment the Regents were completely of one accord. They considered it a sacred duty not to relax during the Nizam's minority those efforts to restore the territorial integrity of the State, to which His Highness's father and grandfather had attached supreme importance, and which had formed the subject of their latest injunctions. The history of that "costly incubus" the Contingent was always before their eyes to prove that when once the screw had been put on it became rivetted and rusted into its place simply by being left alone. The Nizam, in the person of a corrupt Minister, had acquiesced in the Contingent until his finances were brought to ruin; and in 1853 that ruin was made the excuse for seizing the Berars. The claim for restitution had never been relinquished or closed in the two preceding reigns, and they must not allow a long interval of acquiescence during the Nizam's minority to give scope for a pretext by which the seizure might be made permanent.

In a letter dated the 19th of September 1872, in which, after many verbal and informal communications, the case was once more submitted by the Regents for the consideration of the Viceroy, the Nawab Salar Jung observed to the Resident, Colonel Lumsden,—"The assignment of the districts, effected during the last hours of my uncle's life, has left a reproach on my family in the eyes of both the Sovereign and the people of this country. The late Nizam," he continued, "often urged me to strain every nerve to have the districts restored, and I told him I would do my best to have the stigma removed from our family. When I made an application with this object, some time ago, in connection with the expected lapse of Mysore at that time, and failed, His Highness observed to me that the reproach on my family had not been removed."

Fully aware of the great value attached by the Government of India to the Contingent, that "*inexpensive* addition to our strength," the illicit nature of which was disguised by the coercive Treaties of 1853 and 1860, the proposal of the Regents in 1872 was based on the maintenance of that force, and limited to the substitution for the territorial assignment of the Berars of a security in cash, to be deposited with the British Government. Just a year had expired, when the reply came in a letter, No. 2271 P., dated Simla, 24th of September 1873, from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Hyderabad, briefly declining the proposal, because the Governor-General in Council could not "admit that the maintenance" of the Treaties of 1853 and 1860 "depends, as the Ministers appear to contend, upon the pleasure of the Nizam," and "because the provision of a territorial guarantee was one of the fundamental principles of both Treaties."

The Regents, not satisfied with the treatment their carefully mitigated appeal had received, addressed the Government of India again in a letter to the Resident dated the 24th of November 1873, the purport of which was that while it was their "desire to make every effort in their power to meet the wishes of the British Government," they considered their proposed cash deposit for securing the pay of the Contingent to be a most liberal offer, the Nizam's Government being under *no obligation to maintain the Contingent at all*, but only bound, under an extorted Treaty, to pay the British Government for maintaining it. This distinction they held to be of very great consequence. Lord Dalhousie, they said, intending to get a permanent cession of territory, originally suggested that such an obligation should be pressed on the Nizam, as appears from the wording of the draft article of the Treaty in his Minute of 30th March 1853: "His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk, &c., &c., agrees for himself, his heirs and successors, to maintain ~~an~~ auxiliary force."\* But this wording was never proposed to the Nizam, because at every step of the discussion it was clear that no coercion would make him agree

\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 110.

to it. All notion of the Nizam binding "himself, his heirs and successors," to maintain the Contingent, was excluded by his inflexible refusal to give more than a temporary assignment of territory for its support. They did not at all deny that the Nizam was bound by the Treaties of 1853 and 1860; they did not deny that the consent of the British Government was necessary for their modification; but they argued that their request for such a modification as included the restitution of the Berar provinces ought, in justice, to meet with compliance, by virtue of the fundamental principles of the Treaties themselves, and of the conditions under which they were framed.

In June 1874 the copy of a despatch from the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, dated London, 19th March 1874, was given to the Regents, confirming the refusal of the Government of India to entertain their proposal of 1872, but written without knowledge of their last letter of 24th November 1873, which, although transmitted seven months previously, had as yet extracted no sign from Calcutta. The Secretary of State, following the example of the Viceroy, left the real merits of the appeal unnoticed, rejected "the unsound assumption that the duration of the territorial assignment wholly depends on the pleasure of the Nizam," and declared that "a territorial guarantee was the main object of the Treaties of 1853 and 1860," and was "an object equally paramount at the present day." No attention, in short, was given either in London or Calcutta to the distinct claims to restoration preferred by the Nizam's Government. The Regents maintained that their case must by no means be considered as hinging upon the acceptability of the security in cash which they offered instead of the territorial guarantee. As their letter of the 24th of November 1873, still before the Viceroy and not yet in the hands of the Secretary of State, closed, like that of 1872, with a proposal for furnishing funds for paying the Contingent, they deemed it incumbent on them to submit a supplementary letter asserting the full claims of the Hyderabad State to the restoration of its provinces, irrespective altogether of the provision for the Contingent. In this letter, dated 6th July 1874, and extending to 124 paragraphs, they argued truthfully, though with every deference and courtesy, that the Treaty of 1853 was the coercive climax of a long course of unjust exaction. The territorial assignment under that Treaty was extorted by compulsion, on grounds and pretexts of acknowledged inaccuracy. They reiterated the recorded fact that at the crisis of the discussion in 1853 the British Plenipotentiary, Colonel Low, expressly invoking the authority of his Government, "announced formally that, if His Highness wished it, the districts might be made over merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it."\* On this basis only, even under threats of the military occupation of his capital, was the territorial assignment conceded by the Nizam.

The Regents emphatically declared that the Hyderabad Contingent was not required for the defence of the Nizam's dominions. Official documents, which they cited, proved that this force had never been anything but a relief to the British Government in performing services already pledged and subsidized. The Administration Reports of the Resident certified that "it had not fired a shot except on its own parade grounds" since it aided the British Government in the suppression of the Mutinies.

"Nevertheless," they said, "in the belief that the continued maintenance of this force would be an object agreeable to the British Government, we have hitherto coupled our claims to the restoration of the provinces with a suggestion for a separate provision of some kind for its pay." They referred to the specific proposal made in their letter of the 24th of November 1873, and still declared "the cordial desire of the" (Hyderabad) "State to offer the most liberal terms within its power." But they continued, "if we cannot succeed in getting such a proposal received with favour, there will remain nothing for this State except to fall back on the letter of the British Government's pledge given through Colonel Low, which forms the very basis on which the Treaty of 1853 was negotiated, viz., that the

assignment ceases whenever this State ceases to require the Contingent Force. We would in such an event be necessitated to embrace the single alternative of disbandment thus left available.”\*

“In conclusion,” they said, “we trust that by the full explanations that we have now submitted the reason will have become apparent wherefore we have always viewed, and now beseech His Lordship in Council to view, the Treaty of 1853 as occupying a very different footing from the other treaties in force between the two Governments, and the assignment under it as simply a concession exacted from this State, of such a nature as could only last till such time as, the true nature of the case becoming recognized, the assignment would be gladly and spontaneously revoked by the sense of justice of the British Government.”†

The case for the restitution of the Berars as preferred by the Nizam's Government being simply unanswerable, the magnanimous plan adopted by the stronger party was to persist in leaving it unanswered, to treat it as an irregular and unauthorized proceeding, and to try to intimidate the weaker party. We have already remarked on the very strong language applied to the Nawab Salar Jung personally in 1867, because, in simple obedience to his duty as Minister to the reigning Nizam, he had tried to make the threatened annexation of Mysore conducive to the object of regaining the Berars. He was told that he “took much upon himself,” because, in truth, his argument was too much for the Calcutta Secretariat. His despatch was pronounced to be “unworthy of his princely master's dignity, and of his own reputation,” and its “tone” was condemned as not sufficiently “serious and circumspect.”‡ In words more measured, the Resident, Mr. C. B. Saunders, in a letter dated the 9th of March 1874, made the same supercilious objection to “the tone” of the appeal made by the Regents, complaining that it was “novel and unusual, and perhaps hardly consistent with the relative position occupied by the Ministers of His Highness the youthful Nizam and the Representative of Her Majesty the Queen in India.” Unless it was intended to forbid the weaker party to employ argument at all, these strictures were entirely unmeaning. Nothing could have been more serious, nothing more circumspect, than the style to which the Nizam's Ministers adhered in preferring their appeal. The true and sole offence of “tone” and tenor in their despatches was that they were unanswerable. The sternest remonstrances and the stiffest reasoning on the side of the Nizam were now publicly recorded in quotations from British authorities. The most conclusive admissions now lay revealed in the Minutes of Council and of the Court of Directors. The whole of the Nizam's case was in fact, now presented in English official statements. All these must be answered before a rejoinder could be given to the Nawab Salar Jung. The Calcutta Foreign Office could no longer contend that the Nizam had been in debt in 1853, after the denial by Colonel Davidson, the Resident, of there having been any debt at all, and after Lord Canning's tardy relinquishment of the usurped Excise revenues of Secunderabad and Jaulnah. After the deliberate and impartial statements of General Caulfield, Major Moore, Colonel Sykes, and Sir Frederick Currie, it was no longer possible to deny that the Contingent was a costly and oppressive incubus, imposed on the Nizam for the benefit of the British Government.§ Unquestionably the Co-Regents felt their strength. Our own Blue-books proved that even in 1853 the balance was against the East India Company, and reparation due to the Nizam. In the light of subsequent disclosures and admissions—to say nothing of subsequent services—reparation was far more clearly due.

In this provoking situation, the plan adopted by the Resident at Hyderabad—of course in private communication with Calcutta—was that of refusing to receive for transmission to the Government of India the despatches from the Regents on the subject of the Berars that had been written after the reception of the letter from the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, dated

\* Paragraph 113 of letter dated 6th July 1874 from the Co-Regents of Hyderabad to the British Resident.

† Paragraph 123.

‡ *Ante*, p. 451.

§ *Statesman*, July, pp. 170, 171, 172.

the 19th of March 1874.\* By that letter, so the Resident declared, "the discussion"—on which the stronger party had carefully avoided entering—was "finally closed." There had been really no discussion at all. It was very hard, the Regents urged on the Resident, in a letter dated 29th September 1874, that this process of suppression should be applied to them, when "you know that the claims put forward have not yet been answered at all on their merits, or even discussed, by the British Government, the chief of them not having, in fact, been perused by the Right Honourable the Secretary of State."

At this crisis—for the date can be fixed very nearly with certainty—the negative method of declining to answer, and refusing to forward letters, was coupled by the Resident, Mr. C. B. Saunders,—not, we may be sure, without a confidential hint from head-quarters,—with a positive plan for checking the Regents by encouraging local opposition. It was no easy matter—it was, indeed, impossible—to find an honourable opponent for the Nawab Salar Jung. "We cannot suppose," the Regents wrote on the 29th of September 1874, when the Resident's plan of attack had been unfolded, "that any loyal subject of this State if as fully cognizant of the strength and justice of the claim as we are, and acting under the like responsibilities, could deem it consistent with the duties he owes to His Highness to advise that the claim should be foregone." But as no loyal or honourable opponent for the Nawab Salar Jung could be found in Hyderabad it was necessary to secure for the purpose one that was disloyal and dishonourable. Such a person was found in the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra.

Before going more fully into particulars, let it be clearly premised that this is no piece of loose invective or partizan abuse. The words come very close to a brief paraphrase of an official report from the Residency at Hyderabad. In 1861 the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra was detected, described, and denounced by the British authorities as a disloyal and dishonourable person, the chief contriver and agent in a fraudulent and corrupt conspiracy, whereof the Nawab Salar Jung was to have been the principal victim, and the Nizam the principal dupe. The secondary victim—who would merely have been slandered behind his back, probably without its ever coming to his knowledge—was to have been the British Resident. The British Government, also, would have been grossly deceived, and in the person of its representative, the Resident, insulted and maligned.

The Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra was the younger brother of the Co-Regent, the Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra, Ameer-i-Kabeer. During the lifetime of his father—the first of the family who bore the title of Ameer-i-Kabeer—he was usually called Ikhtidar-ool-Moolk, under which designation he appears several times in the Blue-book as being present when the Resident, Colonel Low, was conferring with the Nizam regarding the Treaty of 1853. In one place Colonel Low speaks of him as "Ikhtidar-ool-Moolk, the youngest son, who is believed to be ambitious of being the Prime Minister."† On another occasion he is mentioned as "Ikhtidar-ool-Moolk, Shums-ool-Oomra's youngest son, who is the keeper of the Nizam's great seal."‡ He was married to one of the Nizam's daughters, and was very wealthy. He thus possessed two great qualifications as an opponent to the Nawab Salar Jung—high rank and access to the palace. His rank was higher than that of the Minister, who, although belonging to a noble and ancient family, held his position at Court and in the State chiefly by virtue of his office. Wikar-ool-Oomra had other qualifications that fitted him for the sinister purpose of our Foreign Office—his notorious enmity to Salar Jung, his restless ambition, and his personal disgrace. In 1874, though he had been leniently treated by the British Government, and generously by the Minister, he was still under a cloud; and the British Resident might have been considered to be the very last person who was likely to take any step to recall him to public life.

For several generations there had been something like a competition for political power and influence at Hyderabad between the orthodox house of Shums-

\* *Ante*, p. 456.

† *Papers*, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 128.

‡ *Papers*, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 41.

ool-Oomra and the distinguished family at the head of the Shiah sectaries, now represented by the Nawab Salar Jung. A very fair understanding for all public objects had, however, been established and maintained for more than twenty years by the father and brother of Wikar-ool-Oomra, himself quite irreconcilable. The Residency diaries contain many references to his personal ambition and pretensions, and to intrigues and cabals at Court, traceable more or less to his disappointed rivalry.

On the 15th of March 1859, as Colonel Davidson, the Resident, was leaving the Nizam's durbar arm-in-arm with the Nawab Salar Jung, a Rohilla, named Jehangeer Khan, discharged a carbine loaded with slugs at one of them—fortunately without effect on either the one or the other, though one of the Minister's retinue was wounded—and then rushed forward with a drawn sword. Captain (now Colonel) Hastings Fraser, one of the Resident's Assistants, drew his sword and threw himself in front of Colonel Davidson, but the assassin was almost immediately cut down by the Nizam's guards. As he was killed on the spot his secret perished with him. All that was known about him was that he was a retainer of the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra. In this case, nothing more can be said than was expressed by the Viceroy, Lord Canning, in the message of serious admonition which he conveyed to the Nizam in a letter to the Resident dated the 2nd of April 1859, No. 1511: "The criminal is beyond the reach of justice. It may be that he was a single fanatic, without instigators or accomplices." It may be so.

The reforming measures of the Nawab Salar Jung have never been popular either with the Prince or with the nobles of Hyderabad, however much their benefits may have been appreciated by the trading and agricultural classes. His great support and stay during the most active and useful period of his administration was undoubtedly the belief at Court, and throughout the city of Hyderabad, that he had the confidence and good-will of the British Government and its local representative. To shake or destroy that belief was the first indispensable step towards displacing the Minister. In May 1861 the Nizam Afzul-ood-Dowla requested that the Resident would pay him a visit, and at the interview expressed his intention of removing Salar Jung from office. The Resident was astonished at this intimation, but the Nizam's astonishment at finding the Resident apparently quite unprepared to acquiesce in the proposed change was unfeigned and undisguised. Almost as if he imagined that Colonel Davidson was dissembling his real wishes, in order that he might not seem too eager in seizing a proffered opportunity, the Nizam turned to the officers in attendance on the Resident, and requested them to bear witness to his decided intention of dismissing Salar Jung. Colonel Davidson, still much surprised, and as much in the dark as the Nizam, positively refused to carry on business with any other Minister but Salar Jung until he had reported the circumstances to his own Government and was in full possession of its views on the subject. Both verbally and in writing, after his return to the Residency, Colonel Davidson exhorted His Highness to reconsider the question very seriously, and to explain more clearly the grounds on which he was proceeding.

On perusing the official note from the Resident the Nizam became so much alarmed that he at once entered on a partial explanation of the circumstances under which he had been led to propose the Nawab Salar Jung's dismissal, stating that he was under the impression that the Resident himself was anxious to nominate another person to the office—a member of the family of the Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra. In the mean time Colonel Davidson had forwarded an account of the interview to the Viceroy, and on the arrival of His Excellency's expression of surprise and regret at the announcement the Nizam was so annoyed and irritated at the utter failure of a movement which he had been told would be instantly successful that he became still more communicative, and insisted on steps being taken to facilitate an inquiry. An investigation followed, which proved, beyond all doubt and question, that the Nizam had been misled by a base conspiracy concocted and conducted by the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra. Assisted by an accomplice, who was held almost equally in favour by the Nizam and the Resident, Yakoob Ali Khan, the jaghirdar of Tickapilly, the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra persuaded the Nizam, to whom as a



near relative he had constant access, that the Resident, like others, had his price, and that if that were handed over with due and decent form the Nizam could have his own way entirely as to the choice of a Minister. To give full satisfaction to the Nizam, and to save the Resident's dignity, the actual recipient was to be Mrs. Davidson, who would in person convey to His Highness the desired assurance that neither the Resident nor the Viceroy would give any support or countenance to Salar Jung if His Highness desired his removal. The next scene of the drama consisted in the private introduction of a lady calling herself Mrs. Davidson, wife of the Resident, into the Nizam's presence at the palace, where she gave the requisite pledge that Colonel Davidson would put no obstacle in the way of Salar Jung's dismissal, and whence the lady departed with a handsome parcel of gold mohurs in her carriage. But in the subsequent investigation it appeared that the supposed Mrs. Davidson was the wife of an apothecary, dressed up and tutored for the occasion, who soon afterwards disappeared from Hyderabad, not, however, without having been identified and examined.

The immediate result to the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra of having been detected as the prime mover in this disgraceful conspiracy is briefly described in the Administration Report for 1869-70 by Mr. C. B. Saunders, C.B., then Resident at Hyderabad. He says that the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra, brother of the Ameer-i-Kabeer, "having been pronounced guilty, some eight years ago, of lending himself to an intrigue the object of which, it was believed, was to procure for himself the office of Minister, had been prohibited, under the orders of the Supreme Government, from appearing on any public occasion, the Nizam's own durbar not excepted, when the British representative was present. This sentence amounted to one of complete political extinction."

But everything will come, it is said, to him who can wait. Wikar-ool-Oomra waited. The first measure for his relief from "complete political extinction," accorded, of necessity, by no hands but those of the British Resident, seems to have been open to little or no exception. At the installation of the present Nizam in succession to his father the Nizam Afzul-ood-Dowla, early in 1869, the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra was allowed to occupy his former place in the durbar. This was, it may be admitted, a politic and considerate step, if it had stopped there. It might have been a subject of reproach against the Nawab Salar Jung, as an affair of evil omen, if the person second in rank after the Sovereign, and allied to him by blood, had been forbidden to pay his homage at the commencement of a new reign. At the instance of the Minister himself, the Resident consented that the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra, having suffered an eight years' exclusion, should be restored to his ordinary privileges, and his former offences covered with charitable oblivion. "But still," adds Mr. Saunders, the Resident, in his remarks on this act of grace, "he was not officially connected with the Government."

Wikar-ool-Oomra waited five years longer, and then at last he was wanted. It struck Mr. Saunders that this was the very man to be put forward as a counterpoise to the Co-Regents, when they could neither be answered nor silenced in their appeal for the restitution of the Berars. About a month after the Regents had submitted their comprehensive despatch of the 6th of July 1874 the Resident addressed a note to the Nawab Salar Jung inviting him and the principal nobles to breakfast on the 21st of August 1874, to take leave of them, according to custom, on going for a visit during the hot season to the Resident's country house at Bolarum. Not a hint was given that this was to be anything more than an ordinary entertainment, or that any business would be transacted or discussed. After the breakfast, however, the Resident addressed the nobles of Hyderabad on the subject of the error of judgment committed by the Regents in asking for the Berar districts after it had been "finally" declared by Her Majesty's Government that "the application could not be favourably considered." A special allusion was made to the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra as one of a "noble family which had always evinced so great a desire to maintain the most friendly relations between the British Government and that of His Highness the Nizam." This was putting the best construction certainly on the little affair of 1861. The object of this complimentary



allusion was rather too obvious, and a somewhat ostentatious and quite unusual visit paid to the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra by the Resident at this time was equally undignified and ineffective. The address to the Ameers fell perfectly flat, and produced no result whatever, because, as the Regents pointed out on the evening of the same day to the Resident, "those present could not fail to notice that the claims were neither declared by you to be invalid, nor any reason given why, if valid, they should be foregone." No loyal or honourable subject of the Nizam could be expected to exercise any influence he might possess to assist in the suppression of these claims; and even the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra, though singularly qualified, and particularly well disposed also, to take up a position of antagonism to the Nawab Salar Jung, was quite powerless and devoid of authority so long as his elder brother, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, was there as the other Co-Regent. He had to wait a little longer before he became an available weapon of offence, fitted to the hand of the Resident for the restraint and chastisement of the Nawab Salar Jung.

The Ameer-i-Kabeer, Co-Regent of the Nizam's dominions, died on the 5th of April 1877. He had no son, and recorded his wishes, in a last will and testament, that his estates should be divided between his two nephews, the sons of a deceased brother older than Wikar-ool-Oomra, and that the titles of Shums-ool-Oomra and Ameer-i-Kabeer should be conferred upon one of them. Such a document, however, was of questionable validity. It seems natural to us that a grandson, the child of a deceased elder son, should be his grandfather's heir, in preference to his uncle; but by a rule of Mussulman law, known as *mahjub-ul-îrs*, peculiarly applicable to regalities or indivisible estates, a surviving son succeeds as principal heir before a grandson. It is true that the titles of Ameer-i-Kabeer and Shums-ool-Oomra, the command of the Pagah, and the administration of the large estates charged with the pay of those troops, were not strictly hereditary, and might have been allotted by a Nizam exercising the functions of sovereignty to the most worthy member of the house. But the suppression of the legal head of the family would have been a great stretch of prerogative during a minority, and if the advice and influence of the British Resident were applied—though I have not heard that the Minister had any doubt on the point—in favour of the usual course of inheritance they were properly so applied.

As to the Co-Regency, there could be no claim of inheritance. The late Ameer-i-Kabeer, though his position as premier noble and commander of the household troops marked him out as the most eligible colleague for the Minister, was not selected merely by virtue of his high rank, but also on account of his high character, and more especially because it was known that he could co-operate harmoniously with the upright and enlightened statesman who had then conducted the Government of Hyderabad for fifteen years—a period equally distinguished for the administrative reform of the protected State, and for the inestimable aid given to the Imperial Power. For eight years more the Nawab Salar Jung had continued in the same course; but that course was now to be interrupted. Administrative progress must go to the winds in 1877, in order that the Nawab Salar Jung, of whose fidelity to Imperial compacts there was no question, *should be humiliated and hampered*, checked, and perhaps checkmated, in his persistent appeal for the restitution of Berar. It was notorious that the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra, henceforth to be known as Shums-ool-Oomra Ameer-i-Kabeer, could not and would not co-operate harmoniously with the Minister. His character was bad. He had robbed and deceived his master; he had insulted the British Government, and slandered its representative. But he was now fully available *for the discomfiture of Salar Jung*, and the infamy of his antecedents only made him the more subservient. As he was now to be raised to the highest position in the State by the same influence, that of the British Resident, which eight years before had relieved him from "complete political extinction," he well knew that nothing but that dominating influence could sustain him for a day, and that one word from the British Resident could consign him once more to "political extinction" at a moment's notice.

When the pretensions of the present Ameer-i-Kabeer to succeed his brother as Co-Regent in 1877 were supported by the Resident, Sir Richard Meade, and by

the Government of Lord Lytton, the Nawab Salar Jung protested against the appointment on grounds which it is needless now to recapitulate or enlarge upon. His remonstrances were disregarded, and in a grand durbar appropriately held by the youthful Nizam in our military cantonment of Secunderabad, surrounded by British troops, on the 29th of September 1877, the Resident read a letter from the Viceroy nominating the present Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra Ameer-i-Kabeer, formerly called Wikar-ool-Oomra, as Co-Regent of the Hyderabad State.

The economical and administrative results to the Hyderabad State of this compulsory and scandalous union have been as disastrous as every one could have predicted. The Ameer-i-Kabeer has claimed a much more direct share in executive government than his brother, and has grasped at every occasion of opposing his colleague's policy and obstructing his measures. Judicial reform is blocked by his maintenance of hereditary jurisdictions and privileged exemptions from the ordinary course of law.

The political results have been still more damaging to the honour, dignity, and reputation of the Imperial Government and its local representatives. Very bad rumours are current at Hyderabad. How could it be otherwise? When the Bayard of India, the late Colonel Outram, was carrying on, as Resident at Baroda, that contest against "khutput" in Bombay, which he ultimately won, at great personal loss to himself, against all the efforts of the Bombay Government, he did not accuse English officers of corruption, but he proved that "not only the servants, but members of the Government, were considered by the natives of Baroda to be accessible to corrupt considerations;" and in advising certain precautions to be taken to avoid the grounds of such belief he particularly warned the Government against the appointment, promotion, or favourable notice of "persons known or suspected to have been corrupt."\* He urged that "all, whether Princes or their subjects, who dared to contemplate bribing British officials, must be considered hostile to the Government."† What is thought at Hyderabad of the appointment, promotion, and ostentatious patronage of Wikar-ool-Oomra, a man found guilty of conspiracy, corruption, and calumny, to the discredit of British officials, may easily be conceived. If a notion is prevalent in Hyderabad that such proceedings are not now considered "hostile to the Government," and that the spirit of Outram does not animate the present generation of Political Agents, no one ought to be surprised. Moreover, if Wikar-ool-Oomra, having once at least compassed and imagined the bribing of a Resident's wife, should be generally suspected of having recently resorted to some analogous devices, and if aspersions against British officers are consequently current in the streets of Hyderabad, let indignation fall where it is due—not upon the miserable engine of all this mischief, but upon the unscrupulous workmen who drew it from its dark corner, when they could have had no reasonable hope of applying it to any good purpose. We charge Lord Lytton's Foreign Office with this crime, and demand an inquiry into the facts.

STATESMAN (London), *January 1, 1881*.—"HABET."—"If every form of official propriety is to be stripped off, every restraint of literary decency cast aside, and open attacks on the policy and proceedings of Government—such as have appeared in *The Statesman* regarding the affairs of Mysore and Hyderabad—are to be circulated in India, embellished by extracts from papers that ought always to have been considered as private and confidential, one of two things will be inevitable—either Imperial supremacy must be given up, or the semi-independence of our feudatory States must be put down. It will be impossible for any Resident or Political Agent to maintain his proper position at a Native Court, or to make sure of gaining attention and acquiescence to the views of our Government, if all the details of discussion and negotiation are to be dragged before the public eye, worked up into a sensational story by means of highly-coloured misrepresentation."

Saving our own judgment as to "literary decency," and setting aside the charge of "misrepresentation," which we challenge as absolutely unfounded, the apprehensions of the eminent "Political" officer from whose recent letter we quote

\* "Guicowar Papers" (560 of 1852), p. 1280.

† "Guicowar Papers," (560 of 1852), p. 1301.

the above extract by permission are by no means visionary. It has been our aim and hope, from the outset, to make the present system and course of Calcutta bureaucracy and "Political Agency" impossible for the future, and to rouse the conscience of the nation to the deeds that are done in its name. We are equally convinced that the ordinary practice of the Anglo-Indian Resident, and of the "Foreign" department which instructs him, cannot endure "the public eye," and that it is not really consistent with "the views of our Government." The Home Government is, in fact, kept in the dark, and our cry is for "more light."

And while our cry is for more light, we claim to have ourselves thrown some light into several obscure passages—to have, at least, pointed out some dark places, from which the contents must be dragged before the Imperial Government can know the whole truth about them. We have published facts on more than one subject that are still officially withheld from the India Office, and have placed others in orderly array that have been officially disarranged and distorted. It has been part of our mission to explain, and to illustrate by instances, how the decisions and orders of the Secretary of State, and even of the Viceroy, are evaded and impeded by the passive and systematic disobedience of a chartered bureaucracy—how the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers, and the principles approved by the Parliament, are made of no effect by private understandings between local authorities and their "covenanted" brethren at head-quarters, carried out by "office-notes" and a nice derangement of papers. A strict inquiry into some past workings of the system we deprecate would reveal its extent and its mischievous efficacy. If, from some special cause, a Secretary of State and a Viceroy, harmoniously combined, should become intent on enforcing a measure which the covenanted guild abhor, it may, by unremitting vigilance and firmness, be done at last; but in many cases it will be too late, will be done in form only and conducted to predetermined failure.

Of course, this is just the sort of imputation that will be indignantly denied and repudiated in every grade of the official hierarchy. How could it be otherwise? Contrition and confession in such matters are quite inconceivable. Moreover, we can well understand that the indignation might not all be simulated, but even have a sort of sincerity in it. The malpractice of a class, a department, or a corporation, consecrated by routine and precedent, does not easily touch the conscience of an individual. Every official who has ever written a private letter on public affairs is probably under the firm conviction that he never did so in his life except for the purpose of facilitating business. Something, also, that has been stretched into a general sanction, is to be found in the not unfrequent *demi-official correspondence*, under orders, between Secretaries or heads of departments and local Governments. But all such letters ought to be filed. Nothing should be reserved from the supreme and responsible authorities by their ministerial subalterns or their consultative colleagues. Private correspondence on public affairs between the Viceroy, the Secretary of State, and the Premier is admissible, and indeed indispensable; but in every other range of the public service, with the doubtful exception of personal requests for promotion, leave, and so forth, private communications ought to be absolutely forbidden. The discretion to be used in the construction of *précis* and "office-notes," and in the selection of papers for the settlement of important cases, ought to be carefully regulated and restricted, and, for some time at least, jealously watched.

The practice of misleading the counsels and setting aside the instructions of the Home Government by indirect agency, and by means ostensibly subordinate, more particularly and more frequently prevails in what is called the Foreign and Political Department, where professional prejudices against anything like the pretence or display of administrative success in a Native State, or the assertion of any originality or independence of mind by a Native statesman are too likely to meet with sympathy, even in the Viceregal closet, more especially if the Viceroy has had a few years to become infected by the influences and atmosphere around him. It was the decided expression of public opinion at home, pronounced on all sides in Parliament, and authoritatively formulated in Her Majesty's Proclama-

tion of 1858, that put an end to the policy of annexation ; but the contemptuous and arrogant spirit of that policy, fostered and fortified by the interests of "the Service," has never died out in the Foreign Office of Calcutta.

There is a plan very familiar in the mouths of Anglo-Indian Councillors and Secretaries, when trying to dispose of some troublesome political appeal, which, in secret minute or a confidential despatch, open to no challenge or contradiction, has proved extremely effective. It is the plan of discrediting the cause, by boldly asserting the acquiescence or indifference of the principal party, who is represented as a poor passive creature or a good-natured imbecile, of whom turbulent agitators or interested intriguers have made a tool and a prey. Thus in the Parliamentary Papers printed in April 1860, which revealed to him the preposterous prevarications by which he was deprived of his inheritance, Prince Azeem Jah, the rightful Nawab of the Carnatic, found himself represented to Parliament and the public as "perfectly understanding and acquiescing in his new position," as having "abandoned the chimerical idea of the restoration of the Nawabship, and accepted his position as the first Native nobleman of Madras."\*

Two years later the Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood, in a despatch to the Government of Madras of the 8th of April 1862, writes as follows : "I learn with regret from these papers that the Prince has not, as I had been led to believe, 'accepted his position as the first Native nobleman of Madras,' but is still seeking the restoration in his person of the Nawabship of the Carnatic." In this case, the Government of Madras professed to have attached some importance to Prince Azeem Jah having "cordially responded" to an invitation to a ball given by the Governor "in celebration of Her Majesty's birthday." Far from acquiescing or submitting, the Nawab continued pressing his appeal until it had been six times brought before the House of Commons, and kept it up until he obtained moderate compensation by his annual stipend of £15,000 being raised to £30,000, and half of it settled in perpetuity on his descendants, while, to the great perturbation of Heralds' College, the hereditary title of Prince of Arcot was conferred on him by an unprecedented and unique patent, and a sum of £150,000 was granted for the payment of his debts.

Again, the favourite argument of the "acquiescence" of his ancestors was brought against the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, when he was protesting against the disendowment of his family, in a despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State dated the 29th of July 1870. It is therein argued that the Nawab Nazim must have quite "overlooked" a certain "inference" when he adduced documentary proof of the princely rank and prerogative of his ancestors, "and that is that the higher he raises their position the more weight does he attach to the acquiescence of himself and his ancestors to the arrangement under which they lived." As a matter of fact, the Nawab Nazim's ancestors never did acquiesce in the diminution of their privileges and revenues. Their acquiescence is officially asserted in defiance of the truth. Referring to the reduction of the stipend promised to the Nawab Nazim Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah under the treaty of 1770, the following statements are made in paragraph 8 of the despatch above mentioned : "The Company, having reduced the Nawab Nizam's stipend during his minority, continued to pay the reduced amount for the rest of his life, and long after his minority ceased." "The Nawab Nazim, on his part, quietly accepted his altered position, and the present Nawab Nazim's father, his grandfather, his grand-uncle, and his great-grandfather received the reduced payment for a period of forty-five years, apparently without complaint."† It is really painful to have to say it, but all this is utterly untrue. All the persons mentioned did complain. They had no means of resistance, hardly any means of remonstrance, especially during minorities, when peculation and petticoat influence were content to be left alone ; but they never acquiesced, and constantly complained. There is ample written evidence in the archives of the Foreign Office of the annoyance and embarrassment

\* "Carnatic Papers" (1860), p. 50.

† "Nawab Nazim" (116 of 1871), p. 4.

that was caused by the inquiries and requisitions of the Nizamut, and of the intermittent efforts made by more than one Governor-General to come to a final understanding.

We have lately ascertained that this miserable plea of acquiescence and indifference has been employed to cast a dark shade over the efforts of the Nawab Salar Jung and his Co-Regent, the late Ameer-i-Kabeer, to obtain the restitution of the Berar Provinces, a case of which we have discussed the merits at some length.\* We have explained in a previous article how in 1877, in order to harass and hamper the eminent statesman at the head of the Administration of Hyderabad, he was unevenly yoked with a colleague with whom it was known to be impossible that he should work harmoniously. With such a partner as a thorn in his side, and with the help of minor and incidental acts of petty annoyance, such as deporting his Private Secretary, and paying him marked inattention at the Delhi Assemblage, it was calculated that, even if not intimidated, he would for some time be impeded in his importunate appeal. But it was also desirable, in order to give a finished appearance and a more equitable aspect to this grand political success, to throw doubt and discredit over the past history of the protest. The Nawab Salar Jung, since the death of the late Nizam, and during the minority of his son, the present reigning Prince, had always, as we have described in previous articles, represented, with the cordial support of his colleague, the Ameer-i-Kabeer Shums-ool-Oomra, that it was the sacred duty of the Co-Regents to endeavour to restore the territorial integrity of the State, in accordance with the latest injunctions of their deceased Sovereign.

This is all stuff, argue the Resident and his Assistants,—knowing what will please the Secretariat at Calcutta,—the restitution of Berar is a mere fancy of Salar Jung's, a fancy of his, with a great foundation of self-interest. He has known all along that he was not the chosen Minister of the Nizam; he knows that his reforms and his whole scheme of administration render him unpopular with the nobles and higher classes, and that but for the countenance and support of the British Government he would long ago have been driven from power. He has always, therefore, felt the want of some apparent aim and object that would seem desirable in the eyes of the Prince and the Court, and which should appear more likely of attainment through his mediation than any other's. And this he saw in the appeal for the Berars. He knows very well himself that the request will never be granted, but he sees his own advantage in maintaining an agitation. He thus upholds his own credit not only as a true and loyal servant of the Nizam, but as an indispensable agent for regaining the lost provinces. And if, by any happy change of policy on the part of the Imperial Government, the provinces should be restored, he would then have secured all the honour and glory of the restitution, and would be secured for life in the post of Minister, and probably be enabled to establish his son as his successor. Of any such improbable result, however, neither Salar Jung nor any one of the nobles or high functionaries of the Hyderabad Court has ever had any real hope. The agitation on the subject is almost entirely factitious and factious. Such has been the line of argument, partly urged in official despatches, partly in demi-official and private communications, that has emanated from the Hyderabad Residency, for the solace and comfort of the Calcutta Foreign Office. It is a line of argument based entirely on imaginary assumptions, and utterly destitute of any reasonable justification. But we are very much misinformed if there is not now in the Foreign Office at Calcutta, and perhaps in the India Office here, a secret and confidential despatch very much to the above effect, written since the death of the late Co-Regent, and embellished by a posthumous pretence of his having acknowledged his personal indifference. "These are Imperial arts, and worthy thee!"

But a justification has been sought for it. So long as the late Ameer-i-Kabeer lived, he co-operated with the Nawab Salar Jung in pressing for the restitution

\* "Restitution of Berar," *Statesman*, No. 2, July 1880, pp. 162 to 185, and No. 5, October 1880, pp. 448 to 460.

of the Berar Provinces. He joined in every application that was made ; he signed every despatch as Co-Regent. But he is dead ; he died in 1877 ; he can no longer speak for himself. He is now represented by his brother, formerly known as Wikar-ool-Oomra, who, on account of his intrigues against the honour of the British Resident, was consigned for eight years to "complete political extinction," and was only pulled out of obscurity to be set up in opposition to the Nawab Salar Jung. This creature, backed by another corrupt person, whose name we will not mention at present, is brought forward to calumniate his honourable and respected brother, and to declare that the late Ameer-i-Kabeer did not seriously or willingly join with the Nawab Salar Jung in pressing the restitution of the Berars on the consideration of the British Government ; that he merely signed the despatches as a matter of form, and to avoid a rupture with his colleague, but that he neither believed in the practicability and advisability of the restitution, nor cared about it at all. It was merely a pet grievance of the Nawab Salar Jung, who had his own object in it. The late Ameer-i-Kabeer was really indifferent about the Berars, and in his heart acquiesced in their retention under the charge of a British Commissioner.

If there should be in the Foreign Office at Calcutta, and perhaps in the India Office in London, a secret and confidential despatch containing some such unworthy misrepresentations as those we have here shadowed forth,—even though a Resident and an Assistant Resident were to add their testimony to alleged admissions wrung out of the deceased Ameer-i-Kabeer at a private interview,—we should still denounce the moral worthlessness and the argumentative nullity of such allegations. The man is dead ; the witnesses cannot be cross-examined. Conversations may be misrepresented, but the written despatches are on record. This is but one specimen of the sort of secret and confidential gossip, made to order, or made for a purpose, that too often passes current between the Calcutta Secretariat and its Political Agencies, and by which, in a revised and finished condition, the counsels of the empire are darkened.

STATESMAN (London), *July 1, 1881.*—*Restitution of Berar.*—III.—*A Tale of Shame.*—The faith of treaties is basely prostituted by studying to overreach those with whom we treat, and to out-do them in cunning and duplicity. Let the man who excels in these arts boast of his happy talents, and esteem himself a keen negotiator ; but reason and the sacred law of nature will class him as far beneath a vulgar cheat as the majesty of kings is exalted above private persons.—*Vattel on International Law.*

The attention that has been attracted to our previous articles\* on this subject, in consequence of the criminal suit instituted against the Editor, in the Court of Queen's Bench, on a charge of libelling the Ameer-i-Kabeer of Hyderabad, a suit which has just been quashed by a writ of *nolle prosequi*, issued by the Attorney-General, makes it desirable, we believe, in the public interests, that we should state, as succinctly and as clearly as we can, the circumstances out of which our burning quarrel with the Nizam concerning his Berar Provinces arose. The truth is that the question is simply the outcome of a long course of fraud and violence ; and the man is no lover of his country who knowing the facts would keep them from the knowledge of the nation. Nothing could be more satisfactory than our professions as to our rule in India, nothing more disgraceful than our conduct. If our own actions towards the Princes and people of India were not hidden from us by a thick veil, we should not dare to open our mouths in this country concerning Russian diplomacy, or French aggression in Tunis.

#### PART I.

##### THE HYDERABAD SUBSIDIARY FORCE, THE HYDERABAD CONTINGENT, AND THE TAKING OF THE BERAR DISTRICTS.

In the early years of last century the Mogul Emperor Aurungzebe found it necessary, as is well known, to convert the more distant provinces of his overgrown

\* *The Statesman*, No. 2, July 1880, pp. 162—185 ; and No. 5, October 1880, pp. 412—466.

dominion into semi-independent Lieutenants-Governorship. Of these provinces, the Deccan, Carnatic, and Coromandel—territories about as large as France, Prussia, and Austria—were assigned to Asuf Jah, a distinguished soldier of the Mogul Empire. Eleven years later, in the break-up of the Empire, Asuf Jah achieved his independence in a succession of victories over the Imperial forces. Dying in 1748, he left his vast kingdom, with his title of “Nizam of the Deccan,” to Nassir Jung, his second son. Our war with France in Europe had extended to India, where a fierce struggle was maintained for the mastery. The French had captured Madras from us, and by their ascendancy in the Deccan had succeeded in placing their own nominees, Mozuffer Jung and Salabut Jung, successively upon the throne of the Nizam. Salabut Jung by way of return conferred large privileges on them, and assigned to them five important districts, about as large as Ireland, for the support of their forces. So real a factor had the Nizam become in the relations between the two European Powers that an acknowledgment of his independent sovereignty over the Deccan stands as Article XI. of the Treaty of Paris, signed by Great Britain, conjointly with France, in 1763. On the renewed outbreak of the war in India the French were driven out of the five districts, and in 1766 we induced the Nizam to sign a treaty under which he assigned these districts to ourselves under the name of the five Northern Circars. In return we bound ourselves to pay to the Nizam a *peishcush*, or quit-rent, of £90,000 a year for the districts. But the Nizam sought to secure from us by the treaty something of more importance than a money payment. He wanted a pledge from us which would be to him a most valuable right. The pledge was given in these words :—

The Honourable East India Company do hereby promise and engage to have a body of their troops ready to settle the affairs of His Highness's Government in everything that is right and proper, whenever required.

“Such, in return for five broad and fertile districts,” says the Resident of Hyderabad,\* “was the origin of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force in its present form.” The proviso was most satisfactory to the Nizam, as it clearly pledged the British Subsidiary Force to uphold his power, and to preserve internal tranquillity in his provinces, thus supplying the most pressing want of his administration.

A breach occurred between the two Governments in the next year ; but in 1768 a fresh treaty of “perpetual friendship and alliance,” declaring “the enemies of either to be the enemies of both Powers,” was executed between them. Under it the Company retained the five districts, and renewed, with trifling modifications, the engagement to furnish to the Nizam a Subsidiary Force whenever he required it, the expense of which he was to defray. The quit-rent of the districts was reduced by the new treaty from £90,000 to £70,000 a year.

Twenty-one years passed away, during which the Company's possessions were threatened with no formidable danger, and the importance of the Nizam's alliance was less keenly felt. During this long period he does not seem ever once to have received the assistance of the Subsidiary Force for the preservation of the internal tranquillity of his State, although he had applied for it. On the other hand, the quit-rent for four out of the five districts in possession of the Company had been paid with extreme irregularity, and had fallen greatly into arrears by 1789. The execution of the treaty had thus proved to be entirely one-sided ; but no attempt probably would have been made to rectify it had it not been for the rising of a serious danger on the horizon of the Company. Tippoo Sultan of Mysore was ostentatiously preparing for that fierce war with the Company which broke out in the following year. The assistance of the Nizam now became a matter of vital moment to us, and the Governor-General promptly undertook the settlement of his two grievances. He had been denied the services of the Subsidiary Force when he had urgently required them ; and the quit-rent of the Ceded districts, the Northern Circars, had been withheld from him. Finding that both charges were established against the Company, Lord Cornwallis wrote the Nizam a letter, dated 7th of July 1789, which was to be “deemed of equal force with a treaty,” in which His Lord-

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\* Hyderabad Administration Report, 1869-70, p. 124.



ship declared it to be his "firm intention to discharge the balances" of the quit-rent, and gave a distinct pledge that in future the aid of the Subsidiary Force should be granted, without reservation, "whenever His Highness should apply for it." The Nizam congratulated himself that his three several treaties of alliance were at last, after much trouble and delay, beginning to operate for his benefit, as he would now be able to command the very moderate amount of military aid which he required for regulating the internal affairs of his Government.

Tippoo invaded Travancore. The Nizam responded to our call, and a new "tripartite treaty of offensive and defensive alliance" was entered into in 1790, between the Company, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas, by which the previous treaties were confirmed, and the war against Tippoo provided for. The Company's and the Nizam's troops fought side by side in the war for two years, the Mahrattas rendering dubious assistance. Tippoo was vanquished, and, in terms of Article VI., the territory conquered from him was "equally divided" between the Allies in 1792.

But the Nizam's resources had been severely strained by the war, and his prostration in 1795 tempted the third party to the alliance, the Mahrattas, to invade and plunder his dominions. The Nizam now pleaded urgently his general rights under the Treaty of Alliance with us dated only five years before, and also his right to the aid of the British Subsidiary Force, which was at that moment within his dominions, drawing its pay from his treasury. He demanded, justly, that this force should help him to repel the invasion of the Peishwa's plundering hordes. But he pleaded in vain. The Mahrattas disastrously defeated the Nizam's forces at Kurdla, while, consulting our own interests only, we stood by while he had to cede a third of his dominions, pay an enormous indemnity, and even give his Minister as hostage for the fulfilment of other conditions so humiliating that they were kept secret. The Mahrattas, with a touch of real humour, ended by binding the unhappy Nizam to dismiss from his service and dominions the British Subsidiary Force, that had played the part of a disinterested bystander when he was in his extremity.\*

They were troublous times, and the Nizam was quickly wanted by us once more as an ally—this time under the most serious circumstances. Tippoo Sultan was again preparing for war, and he now announced that his intention was nothing less than to drive the English into the sea. He had sent ambassadors to the Isle of France, and French auxiliaries had landed at Mangalore with the avowed object of helping him to drive us out of India. The Nizam meanwhile had fulfilled his pledge to the Mahrattas, and dismissed our Subsidiary Force. He had substituted a body of troops under French officers in its place; and Lord Wellesley feared, with reason, that this force would join their countrymen in Tippoo's service. The resources of the Company were, moreover, at the lowest ebb. The prospect of fighting Tippoo single-handed led Lord Clive, Governor of Madras, to write in September 1798, to the Governor-General and to the Court of Directors simultaneously, as follows:—

"The prospect of a war with Tippoo Sultan, when contrasted with the means this country possesses of meeting such an event, is the point which has chiefly absorbed my attention since my arrival, and which, indeed, presses with the greatest urgency. . . . The finances of this settlement are in a far more distressing condition than I had any conception of—our credit nearly gone and our Treasury empty."

The Governor-General minuted regarding a previous despatch of Lord Clive on the same subject, in the Secret Department at Calcutta (12th August 1798), as follows:—

"The letter of the Governor of Fort St. George of the 10th July proceeds far beyond the limits of any opinion which I had ever formed or heard with respect to the difficulty of restraining the hostility of Tippoo. It is difficult to describe the pain and regret which that letter occasioned in my mind, nor could it occasion

\* See Malcolm's "Political History of India," Vol. I., Chap. 3; also Duke of Wellington's Memorandum on the Treaty of Bassein, dated October 1804.



any other emotions in the mind of any friend to the British interests, or to the honour of the British name in India. If the facts and arguments of that letter be correct, it must now be admitted that the glorious successes of the last war have terminated in no better result than to render Tippoo's power absolutely invincible, *and to place the disposal of our fate in his hands.*"

The very men who had told the Nizam in *his* extremity that the Treaty of 1790 had ceased with the peace of 1792 at once proceeded, in their own distress, in 1798, to urge this very treaty on the Prince as an engagement in full force. The Mahrattas' co-operation was asked and refused. The Nizam's assistance was invoked, and again given.

It is important to observe, and to remember, that it was to enable the Nizam to give us efficient aid in the approaching war with Tippoo that the new Treaty of 1st September 1798 was pressed upon him. The dismissal of his French Subsidiary Force was a life-and-death necessity to us. He had established it because of our own failure to aid him to withstand the Peishwa's exactions. We were compelled, therefore, in our own interest, to promise him a force that would discharge the same duties as the French one which we asked him to dismiss. It was to be a force that would fulfil, and not evade, its obligations; that would render him real, and not mock, military service, in maintaining internal tranquillity in his dominions, and defending them against unprovoked outside aggression. The Nizam accepted the new treaty. He dismissed his French auxiliaries, and received into his service once more a British Subsidiary Force, consisting of 6,000 Sepoys, besides European Artillery. And the whole cost of this force, £240,000 a year, he agreed to defray from his own treasury. This new alliance was far more urgently needed by ourselves than by the Native Prince, and yet we contrived to make him purchase it at its full money value. However, he did not consider that he was altogether a loser; for he had secured pledges (Articles II. and III.) that the Subsidiary Force should be permanently stationed in his dominions, that its strength should never be diminished below the above-named figures, and (Article V.) that its duty should be paramount to defend his State against outside aggression and internal disturbance. It was to "be ready at all times to execute services of importance, such as the protection of the person of His Highness, his heirs and successors, from race to race, and overawing and chastising all rebels or excitors of disturbance in the dominions of the State." The anticipated war with Tippoo broke out in February 1799, five months after the Nizam's alliance and co-operation had been secured. The Nizam's troops, "consisting of 12,000 infantry and a large body of cavalry, actually arrived at Chittoor in a state of preparation for the field before General Harris (the British commander) was ready to proceed on his march from Vellore." By the united arms of the Company and the Nizam the forces of Tippoo and his French auxiliaries were routed at Seringapatam, where Tippoo himself fell, fighting bravely, on the 4th of May.

The Subsidiary Force had hardly returned to the Nizam's capital from the war, when a secret design was formed to abuse its power. The Nizam fell ill in October 1799, when orders were at once issued to the Resident† to prepare another treaty altogether, containing most important concessions to ourselves, for the acceptance of the eldest son when his father's life should be despaired of. If the eldest son refused to sign it the Resident was to *change the succession*, relying on the bayonets of the Subsidiary Force (which, it was suggested, should be placed reasonably near the Nizam's palace on the occasion), and to place upon the throne whichever of the Nizam's younger sons would agree to sign the new and onerous document. This nice scheme was spoiled by the recovery of the Nizam, who consequently never knew of this indication of the Punic character of his ally's faith, though he lived to see from other instances how little we cared for his treaty rights when his aid was no longer needed by us.

The two great and dangerous enemies of our power in India—Tippoo and the

\* Governor-General to Court of Directors, 20th March 1799.

† Lord Wellesley to Resident, 6th November 1799.

French—were thus at last destroyed. The Nizam's sword had turned the scale, and decided that a British and not a French Empire was to arise in Hindostan. Lord Wellesley gladly proclaimed this ten months after the conclusion of the war, when he wrote to the Court of Directors that the Treaty of 1798 with the Nizam "was, indeed, the source of all our recent success in India."<sup>\*</sup>

The Nizam's "equal share" in the spoils of the war, to which he was entitled by the treaty, was, however, to be denied him. On his side, he had shown no unworthy fear or jealousy that the ruin of Tippoo and the removal of the French would make the Honourable Company too powerful; but the Company did not reciprocate the feeling. They feared that the new acquisitions of territory to which the Prince was entitled would unduly aggrandize him. The plan was therefore hit upon of creating a new and independent principality of Mysore, under a Hindu prince, to deprive the Nizam of one-half the acquisitions he would otherwise receive; while he was required to surrender to the Company his remaining share in the spoils, as well as the districts which had fallen to his share after the previous war of 1792. The Company had resolved to take them to itself, upon a valuation of £630,000 a year, which sum (after defraying the costs of collection) it was estimated, would suffice to pay the British Subsidiary Force in the service of the Nizam, which was to be augmented from 6,500 to 9,500 men. The Nizam was not blind as to the extortionate nature of this bargain; but he submitted, as the force was at last to be charged with the undisputed duty of providing for the tranquillity of his State against all foes, external and internal, without any reservation whatever.† He

\* Letter to the Right Hon'ble Henry Dundas, 5th March 1800.

† The following quotations show the absolute nature of our guarantee of the tranquillity of the Hyderabad State by means of this Subsidiary Force, thus to be paid for in advance under the treaty of 1800:—

*Lord Wellesley to Resident, 15th June 1800.*

"It is my determination not to grant the Nizam the complete protection and support which he solicits on any conditions less advantageous to the Company than those comprehended in the new treaty."

"The augmented revenue" (of the districts to be ceded) "might justly be claimed by the Company on various grounds.

"Because an acknowledgment is due to the Company for the inestimable advantages of protection and security acquired by the Nizam under the general guarantee.

"Because this treaty grants to the Nizam, without any specified equivalent, the new and extraordinary benefit of the Company's aid in repressing the refractory spirit of such tributaries and dependants as owe a mixed allegiance to him and to the Mahrattas. In this view it may justly be expected that the resources of the territories retained in His Highness's hands may be improved to an amount proportioned to any excess in the produce of the countries to be ceded to the Company."

"The British Government is entitled to require such an equivalent as shall not only preclude any pecuniary loss on account of subsidy, but in some degree defray the extraordinary charges of defending His Highness's country against all enemies."

"He" (the Nizam) "will be enabled, without any pressure upon his finances, to command the services of a large British force."

*Memorandum of Conversations between Meer Allum (the Nizam's Minister) and Colonel Wellesley on 26th September 1800 (Wellington Supplementary Despatches, Vol. II., page 180).*

"Colonel Wellesley then asked Meer Allum what was the strength of the Nizam's army. Meer Allum said, after the territory would be ceded, and the Jaghirdars would have discharged their troops, the Nizam would have no infantry and only about five thousand horse; that he would depend upon us for protection, not only against his foreign enemies, but against the host of discontented and idle people created by the late treaty" (of 1798), "and by his having already disbanded nearly all his troops.

"He said that he had always looked upon a treaty such as that about to be concluded as very impolitic for both parties; that it deprived the Nizam of territory, reputation, and power, and gave the English nothing but the burden of defending their ally against the Mahrattas, and against his own discontented subjects."

*Article XVII. of the Treaty of 1800.*

"If in future the Shorapur or Gudwall zemindars, or any other subjects or dependants of His Highness's Government, should withhold the payment of the Circar's just claims upon them, or excite rebellion or disturbance, the Subsidiary Force, or such proportion thereof as may be requisite, after the reality of the offence shall be duly ascertained, shall be ready, in concert with His Highness's own troops, to reduce all such offenders to obedience. If disturbances shall at any time break out in any part of His Highness's dominions contiguous to the Company's frontier to which it might be inconvenient to detach any proportion of the Subsidiary troops, the British Government in like manner, if required by his Highness the Nawab Ausaph Jah, shall direct such proportion of the troops of the Company as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose to assist in quelling the said disturbances within His Highness's dominions."

congratulated himself on being at last in possession of an efficient British force of 9,500 men, even at the cost of his ceding to the Company all his conquests. He had borne his full share of the charges in both wars; and now their recompensing spoils, the districts of Bellary and Cuddapah, on his southern boundary, went, in 1800, in payment of the Subsidiary Force, just as the Northern Circars, on his eastern frontier, had gone for a similar purpose in 1766. Yet if the Subsidiary Force should but fulfil its promises the Nizam would not regret the sacrifice. The solitary reward which the Prince had received for his steady adherence to our alliance, and for the cost of the wars in which he had assisted us, was the guarantee by the British Government, under treaty, of perpetual and complete military support against outside aggression and internal rebellion. There could be no further claim on his treasury for this service, as the pay of the Subsidiary Force had been provided in perpetuity by the revenues of the ceded provinces. He had got what he so much desired and needed, and he had paid in advance for all.

The Subsidiary Force was stationed in cantonment at Hyderabad. As events turned out, it might as well have been 5,000 miles away for any adequate service it rendered to the Prince who had paid so heavily for its presence. The Calcutta Government, in a recent despatch on the subject (1875), admit that after the first two years of its residence at the capital it was so completely withdrawn from the service for which it was stationed there that the Nizam could not make his authority respected even in the precincts of his own palace. Our Calcutta officials began to explain away their obligations, or to evade them, almost instantly; and in reply to his repeated and urgent applications for the assistance of the Force the Prince was at last unblushingly told that it was stationed at his capital merely "to contribute to his influence, by the imposing effect which its presence alone was calculated to produce," but that "it never was the intention that it should be employed in reducing his refractory zemindars, or quelling partial insurrections," and that "the British Government were not responsible for the security of His Highness's dominions against the evils of internal commotion."

Nothing, however, was better known at Calcutta than that some efficient military Force was urgently needed by the Nizam at that period to reduce his refractory zemindars and feudatories to obedience; and the purpose that dictated the keeping of the Subsidiary Force idle was soon revealed. He was told that he must allow a fresh Force to be raised, commanded by British officers, and paid from his own treasury, to do the work. This was the origin of the now notorious Hyderabad Contingent Force, that was about to be bound upon the Nizam's shoulders—a force that became an utter scandal for the extravagance of the pay of its officers and of every arrangement connected therewith. The world never before saw a body of armed men paid with such extravagance. The long future of agony that awaited the Hyderabad State from the imposition of this incubus upon it had no higher object than to furnish appointments to British officers. No delicacy was observed in indicating that this new Force was to be provided at the Nizam's expense to relieve ourselves of the duties of the Subsidiary Force. The Calcutta Government had determined to call this new and rich field of patronage into existence, and that the Nizam should pay for it. That it was a fraud upon the Prince Lord Hastings unconsciously admitted in his Minute of 19th November 1819, when he affirmed that it was imposed upon the Nizam "to subdue his refractory zemindars,"—an obligation of our own, expressly specified in the 17th Article of the Treaty of 1800 as incumbent on the Subsidiary Force. The British Resident himself, in a recorded letter to the Government of India dated 22nd June 1810, in which he proposed the creation of the Contingent at the Nizam's cost, recommended it on the ground that it would "save the British Subsidiary Force the labour" of preserving the tranquillity of the Nizam's country; and, minuting in the Secret Department in 1822, Lord Hastings threw off the mask altogether, and deemed it consistent with British honour to write to the Resident (25th October 1822) as follows, regarding what he conceived to be the functions of the Subsidiary Force:—

"When, for our private views, the Nizam was constrained to support a body of our troops to be stationed near his capital, the then Government disguised the

interested oppressiveness of making him pay a portion of our army for holding him in thralldom by a sturdy declaration that His Highness had spontaneously sought the aid of a Subsidiary Force to secure his person and territories. The measure, however, really placed him at our mercy. It was hardly to be imagined that our advantage would not be abused ; and it was abused. The independence which the very conditions of the compact recognized and pledged us to respect was set at naught."

Against the imposition of this fresh force upon him, in flagrant breach of treaty and of the laws of common honesty, the Nizam protested as much as he dared. He flatly refused in 1803 to sanction our first insidious proposal to raise a body of Silladar Horse for him. He pointed to the huge Subsidiary Force idling in its camp, except when employed in the Company's own wars, and naturally demanded that it should be used to maintain the tranquillity of his State, for which it had been already paid by him in advance. We had no answer to give, but we had a weapon ready that would effect our purpose. We could reduce the Nizam to a cipher, exclude him from all share in the rule of his own kingdom, and set up a creature of our own as his Minister, to pay us out of the public treasury what he himself had refused to pay. Two advantages would thereby result. We should get from his treasury all the funds we wanted ; while he would be ostensibly responsible for whatever misery might follow. The scheme was carried out in the same year. During the first few years of its operation it was thought advisable to pay the Minister we had ourselves set up, a salary from our own treasury, in addition to what he got from the Nizam's Government, the better to ensure his fidelity to ourselves against his nominal master.\* The Nizam vigorously remonstrated against the spoliation of his State for the support of the new and extravagant force we were imposing upon him, and he was thereupon solemnly declared to be hostile to the British Government. For the Calcutta officials construed "the maintenance of the alliance" to mean that we had free liberty to reduce the Nizam to beggary by our exactions.

The first of our creature-Ministers died in 1808. The Nizam was again set aside, and a noble called Mooneer-ool-Moolk was next appointed ; but as the new incumbent, in common with all other respectable nobles, refused to make his master drink to its very dregs the cup of humiliation prepared for him, this Minister was in his turn reduced to a cipher, and a person named Chundoo Loll, a clerk in a Revenue Office, was appointed by us "Deputy Minister," with the full powers of office ; "so that," as Metcalfe described the position on 13th May 1829, "in addition to its sovereign Prince being excluded from all concern in the management of his affairs, in consequence of our interference, the State of Hyderabad now had a Prime Minister in the same predicament, as another effect of the same cause."

The device of thus getting access to the Nizam's treasury to furnish salaries for British officers having been once hit upon, all idea of moderation soon disappeared. A general extravagance was indulged at the Nizam's expense, that in private life would be called by no other names than fraud and shameless breach of trust. The new force, this Hyderabad Contingent, consisted of 8,000 men, the strength of an ordinary brigade in our own army ; while no less than five brigadiers and five brigade-majors were appointed to it, with other staff and regimental officers in proportion, for no other purpose than their own enrichment. And this preposterous staff was kept up throughout the thirty-six years of profound peace that followed. The British officers alone of this small force received £130,000 a year, which is £95,000 a year more than the officers of the very same force are allowed at this moment. Even our own creature-Minister (Chundoo Loll) at last winced at what we were expecting of him. He even wailed to the Assistant Resident of our exactions, during certain reported conferences in April 1842, the perusal of which records occasioned the late Colonel Sykes, a member of the Court of Directors, such "painful feelings."† For forty years did the

\* See Sir Arthur Wellesley's letter to Colonel Close, dated 5th August 1803.

† Minute by Colonel Sykes, dated 19th November 1851.

Calcutta officials keep up these extortions, simply for the sake of the provision which the force made for their friends and relations. One-third of the whole amount of the Nizam's revenues was taken every year from his treasury to pay this force. So utterly out of proportion was the expense of it, compared with the means of the State, that Colonel Low, when acting as Resident in 1848, warned the Government of India (20th July) that if this "constant drain" was not at once reduced from £400,000 to £200,000 per annum, "it would bring the whole machinery of the administration to a standstill." A paper published in the *Calcutta Review* in 1849, based on a history of the Contingent written by Sir John Malcolm, tells us that the expenditure of the British Government on the Contingent was so flagitious that it had become a proverb to explain it by pointing out that "Poor Nizzy pays for all."

As if to show how high Calcutta consciences could pile the wrongs heaped on this miserable State and its Prince, others were added. On the one hand, our Subsidiary Force of 9,500 men—the force already paid for in perpetuity—was not only relieved of its obligations, but was reduced one-fourth in numbers, without any part of the consideration money for its services being returned to the Nizam. On this subject, Major Moore pertinently inquired in the Court of Directors on the 7th of November 1853, "By what right have we received payment for troops we did not furnish?" And, alluding to a sophistical defence of the reduction which had been put forward at Calcutta, he added: "Is it becoming on our part to endeavour by specious arguments to show that 'eight regiments of 1,000 firelocks' meant in spirit eight regiments of 750?" On the other hand, the second force (the Contingent), raised and paid directly from the Nizam's treasury, ostensibly to discharge the duties which really devolved by treaty upon our own Subsidiary Force, was, in its turn, set aside from doing the Nizam's work, just as the Subsidiary Force itself had been. The *pro humanitatis causâ* argument was at hand as a cover for this further act of dishonesty. It was promulgated at a very early date, as a "rule of the service, that the Nizam's army" (the Contingent), "so long as it shall be officered by British subjects, is not to obey the requisition of the Minister until the Resident has first satisfied himself that its services are to be required in a just cause."\* Colonel Sykes recounts† how under the operation of this rule, the services of the Contingent were refused "when the Nizam's interests demanded their employment." He instances five separate and at the time recent occasions when its services were so refused, at the very time when the insatiable demands for its pay, by ruining the Nizam's people, were causing the very disturbances which the Government of India refused to quell, and when the arrears of its pay, charged against the Nizam, were building up the very alleged debt to us for which the Berar districts were taken shortly afterwards.

In 1851 Captain Meadows Taylor was deputed by Lord Dalhousie to report on the districts most eligible to be taken from the Nizam for the support of this Contingent.‡ That officer reported that the Nizam was unable to obtain the tribute due to him from the Gudwal Rajah, as neither the Subsidiary Force nor the Contingent troops were allowed him for the purpose, and his own irregular levies were unequal to the task. The Nizam's country thus furnished the edifying spectacle of three armies maintained to do the work of one, and yet the work not done!

Strong means were meanwhile taken to prevent the Nizam making his voice heard, while British officials were engaged in fastening this vampire Contingent on the throat of his unhappy State. Sir Charles Metcalfe, when Resident, writing on the 14th of August 1826, explained the Nizam's position, and why he had refused to make advances from his privy purse for the pay of the force when the treasury was dry:—

"His view [the Nizam's] could scarcely be otherwise, considering that he has so long been excluded from any share in his Government; that every attempt which he has made to assert his sovereign rights has been crushed; and that

\* Sir H. Willock's Minute, dated 19th November 1851.

† Minute of 19th November 1851.

‡ Papers "The Nizam," 1854, p. 26.

the Prince is merely a State pensioner in his own dominions. His mind, although not naturally, perhaps, incapable of fulfilling the duties of his station, must have been affected by long depression and seclusion. Nevertheless he is more 'sinned against than sinning;' and I can hardly imagine a situation more entitled to pity, or more calculated to disarm censure, than that of a Prince so held in subjection by a servant supported by an irresistible foreign Power.

"The subserviency of the Minister at Hyderabad has rendered this kind of force [the Contingent] in the Nizam's territories a sort of plaything for the Resident, and an extensive source of patronage at the Nizam's expense."

The Governor-General virtually confessed that this breach of solemn treaty, and this inhuman conduct to an old and faithful ally, had only the sordid object of securing access to the State treasury, for the support of the Contingent against the will of the Sovereign, when he wrote to the Resident, on 26th October 1819, instructing him that "the maintenance of the Contingent is the essential for us," and that the Resident was to support Chundoo Loll (our creature-Minister) "until these troops, which we owe to Chundoo Loll, shall have *taken such root* in the establishments of the country that eventually there will be no hazard of any endeavours to reduce them." The Court of Directors had protested against the force from the beginning, had refused to sanction its existence, and resolutely insisted on its disbandment,<sup>2</sup> averring their conviction that it was unjust, contrary to express treaty provisions, and certain to become an intolerable burden to the Hyderabad State. But the bureaucratic authorities in Calcutta were all the more resolute in their determination to maintain the Contingent. So nervous were they lest this, the very cream and efflorescence of their patronage, should, somehow, slip from their grasp, that they feared the Nizam even in his enforced seclusion; while they steadily supported Chundoo Loll in his long series of crimes against the Nizam and his subjects. On 25th October 1822 Sir Charles Metcalfe, as Resident, was officially informed that it would be "the deepest stain on British honour were Chundoo Loll left to the ruin which must follow the discontinuance of our plighted support" of him against his own master! Surely the men who dared thus talk of British honour being pledged to the betrayal and pillage of an ally, and to the ruin of a State with a population of 12,000,000, should have been made to stand at the bar of Parliament to answer for the outraged honour of the nation. Twenty years later (26th July 1842) General Fraser, as Resident, reported that the Nizam, being treated more mildly about that time, was showing symptoms of desiring to act for himself, and he warned the Calcutta Government that the first thing he would probably do, "if allowed to feel that he is really independent," would be to demand "the disbandment of the Contingent, to which he is known to be averse, and neither the original creation nor maintenance of which is provided by any existing treaty." General Fraser's letter awakened great alarm in Calcutta, and on 1st October 1842, under colour of communicating the news of the success of the expedition to Afghanistan, the Nizam was solemnly warned that he and the Minister must "act according to the counsels of the Resident, as it would be a great pity if anything contrary to friendship between the two Governments should occur."

Of course it was known to be impossible that a clear third of the gross revenues of the country could be appropriated to an utterly useless object for a long series of years without ruin and misery to the unfortunate inhabitants. On 24th November 1819 the Resident at Hyderabad, Mr. Russell, describing the effects upon the whole country of the extraordinary expenses incurred, had written to the Calcutta officials:—

"Extraordinary expenses must be met by extraordinary exactions. This is the sole and entire cause of the difficulties of the Nizam's Government, and the source of every oppression that is suffered by its subjects. The officers of the revenue being required to pay to the Government more than their districts can afford are obliged, in their turn, to oppress the inhabitants by plunder and confiscation."

Ten years later (13th May 1829) Metcalfe indignantly denounced our creature-Minister, after twenty years' experience of his rule :—

"Chundoo Loll's main object, from the establishment of his power, was to retain it. The instrument most serviceable in his view for this purpose was money. He had money for any one whom he thought capable of aiding him. Chundoo Loll's views were not confined to English influence. Whoever could aid him at Hyderabad, whoever could injure him, all found access to the treasury. To make friends or to buy off enemies was managed by the same process. All were in pay. And many who might have been active disturbers of his administration, seeing little or no hope of effecting his removal, were kept quiet by a share of the public money.

"The revenues were insufficient to meet such excesses ; and the expenses of a year of war, added to the increasing cost of the force commanded by British officers, augmented embarrassment. Extortion and borrowing were had recourse to unsparingly, and to the utmost practicable extent. The former was augmented by the effects of the latter. Extortion and oppression went hand in hand. Desolation followed."

On the 20th June and 31st August 1822 Metcalfe wrote from the Hyderabad Residency to Lord Hastings :—

"There never, I suppose, was elsewhere a territory so entirely abandoned to the pillage of extortioners, seeking no end but their own illicit gain. There never can have been an administration of Government less paternal, or more careless of the good of the people and the interests of the sovereign. . . .

"The power remained in his [Chundoo Loll's] own hands without check, and he had continued to abuse it without remorse. The revenues had greatly fallen, from excess of exaction ; the population in considerable numbers had emigrated ; no confidence existed. The very resources of extortion were nearly exhausted."

Sixteen years later this creature, nominated by ourselves, forced upon the Nizam by ourselves, and supported by ourselves, still retained the helm of affairs, when the Court of Directors, commenting on the position at Hyderabad, felt themselves forced to confess (letter to India 28th March 1838) that Chundoo Loll's administration might "be said to exist only by plunder."

Chundoo Loll retained his office, under the determined support of the Indian bureaucracy, five years after the above verdict had been passed on the character of his administration ; and he only resigned it in 1843, after he had depleted the State by every conceivable expedient, to sustain the exactions of his British masters. It is recorded that he plainly told the Resident, "I have not tendered my resignation in consequence of the infirmities of age, but solely in consequence of the want of money"—money to carry on the Government anyhow, and at the same time to meet the inexorable demand of £35,000 monthly for the pay of the Contingent. If any evidence can heighten the picture we have thus traced, let it be supplied by the following passage from the Minute, already quoted, written by Major Moore, a member of the Court of Directors, who had been an eye-witness at Hyderabad of the occurrences of which he speaks, as Military Secretary to this very Contingent, and who ascribes all the evils in the State to this single cause. Writing on 7th November 1853 Major Moore says :—

"I well know to what shifts the Nizam's Ministers have had to resort to meet our inevitable demand for the monthly pay of the Contingent, what evils it has been the cause of—loans from money-dealers at exorbitant interests ; farming of districts at ruinous loss ; forestalling of revenues, and a host of attendant miseries !"

Upon the final break-down and retirement of Chundoo Loll the Calcutta officials, to evade the responsibility of the position which their own exactions had produced, solemnly transferred to the Nizam the privilege, so long withheld from him, of choosing a Minister—a privilege which now meant nothing else than the finding of an agent to accomplish the impossible feat of paying the Contingent without money. The Prince was himself to make the bricks, now that there was no straw. One after another of his nominees resigned, because of the impossibility of the task the Indian Government was itself shirking. One of these unhappy Ministers told the Resident (2nd November 1849), after attempting the duties of



the office, that, in the condition to which everything was reduced, "an angel from heaven could do nothing."

An attempt was now made to induce the Nizam to find money for the force by dismissing his own levies, on whom—as neither the Subsidiary Force nor the Contingent were allowed to assist him—really devolved all the detailed military duties of his State. He was reminded that although the Contingent *did* consume a full third of his revenues there were still two-thirds left, so he had better dismiss his Irregulars, which formed the only force at his disposal. The experiment was tried. Three thousand men were thrown on the country, destitute and homeless. An alarming mutiny was the result, and the scheme had to be abandoned.

The orange of the Hyderabad State was now sucked nearly dry. The treasury was empty. Loans from the native bankers, for which 24 per cent. interest was paid, were then suggested. The last of these was for the sum of £340,000, the whole of which was paid over to the Resident on 18th July 1851. And now the credit of the State, as well as its funds, was exhausted. The Prince had, however, some private funds. He was next pressed to give up the money reserved in his palace, to furnish pay for this Contingent. All else had gone. Only the last resources of his family remained. In the extremity to which we had reduced him, he finally threw these also into the gulf. Goaded early and late by the Resident, the Minister, having repeatedly and urgently pleaded with his master, was at last able to write to the Resident on 1st November 1851 as follows: "Praise and thanks to God for his goodness! the amount of 30 lacs of rupees (£300,000) from His Highness the Nizam's private property, for the debt due to the British Government, has to-day been received by me."

The inexorable claim might, however, still be met for a little while, if the Prince could only be induced to pawn his household valuables. He was accordingly encouraged (as the Resident tells our Calcutta officials on the 5th December 1851) to give up the "jewels and gold and silver articles" in the recesses of the palace, "accumulated by his ancestors during the course of nearly a century past," which were to be pledged to local money-lenders for £80,000, to supply the pay of the Contingent for about two months longer! And he gave them up.

From necessity, the Nizam must, it was now feared, make a desperate appeal for the disbandment of this force. No argument would now be strong enough to prevent his doing so, unless, indeed, he were to be told that the British Government held that the maintenance of the Contingent was a treaty obligation! Accordingly, in this crisis of his embarrassments, a very offensive letter was addressed to him personally by Lord Dalhousie, dated 6th June 1851, in which, among much else that was very irritating and threatening, the falsehood was directly proffered in these words: "The efficient maintenance of this force is a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of existing treaties." Lord Dalhousie no doubt believed what he at the time said; but the character of the entire system is shown by the fact that when he afterwards himself discovered the untruthfulness of the statement and recorded in the Minutes of the Council Chamber (30th March 1853) that the averment was one which, "as an honest man," he could not instruct the Resident to make, even verbally, to the Nizam, he took no steps to withdraw the letter in which he had himself urged it on the Nizam in 1851.

The next step in the Nizam's long agony was one that ended his Job-like patience, and at last brought him to bay. It takes much to surprise an Indian potentate out of the calm courtesies of ceremonial intercourse. The Resident may hector; the Governor-General may threaten; but the Prince will cling fast to that amenity of tone and control of temper which he considers indispensably becoming to his own dignity. When Lord Dalhousie wrote the famous letter of 6th June 1851, which became a scandal in this country for its indecently telling the Prince "that the Government of India could crush him under its feet, so that neither name nor trace of him should remain," the Nizam, in replying to the cruel and abusive document, conventionally acknowledged it as a "letter filled with kind expressions," and "completely fragrant with joy." But his equanimity was to be more



severely tried. His treasury was bankrupt, his credit gone, his private purse emptied, his jewels pawned to satisfy our demands ; but his kingdom still remained, although his subjects were in beggary. The Calcutta Government now voluntarily proceeded to pay the Contingent for a while from their own treasury, to make the Nizam ostensibly their debtor. They advanced about £400,000 in this way, meanwhile purposely avoiding giving credit to the Nizam for *much larger counter-claims*, in respect of certain excise revenues of his of which they had the collection as trustees, and which they had quietly paid into their own treasury. Then, upon the strength of this alleged debt, they peremptorily demanded the Berar Provinces and the Raichore and Dharaseo districts from the Prince, for the arrears and for the future support of the Contingent.

As the unhappy Prince ran over, one by one, the items of the account between himself and his ally it became impossible for him to control his emotion. The broad lands of his feudatory, the Nawab of the Carnatic, had been taken from him without even the courtesy of an acknowledgment. The kingdom of Mysore had been created for no other purpose than to deprive him of his share in the spoils of an expensive war. The Northern Circars, on his eastern boundary, £1,666,000 in redemption of their quit-rent,<sup>\*</sup> and then the Bellary and Cuddapah districts on his southern frontier, had been taken, all on the same plea of providing for the internal tranquillity of his State. Fourteen millions sterling had been directly appropriated from his State treasury. The loans that had been taken up at 24 per cent. interest from the native bankers had also gone. Lastly, he had parted with his own private treasure, and even his household valuables. And a demand was now made upon him for his remaining frontier provinces on the north and on the west, under the selfsame plea of providing for the tranquillity of his State ; a tranquillity that for forty years had never even been seriously threatened, despite the extortionate exactions of our creature-Ministers. At the interview in which this final demand was made upon him the Nizam turned upon the Resident, and cried "in a tone that indicated anger in no ordinary degree":—

"God forbid that I should suffer this disgrace ! Gentlemen like you cannot understand my feelings in this matter. I am a sovereign Prince, born to live and die in this kingdom, which has belonged to my family for seven generations. I have heard that one gentlemen of your nation considered that I ought to be quite contented and happy if I were put on the same footing as you have put my feudatory Prince, the Nawab of the Carnatic, to have a pension paid to me like an old servant, and have nothing to do but to eat, and sleep, and say my prayers. But I tell you I should lose my honour by parting with my territory."

The firmness of the Prince, and his passionate refusal to cede the provinces, led to the modified proposition that the districts should be "assigned" to the British Government "merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as the Nizam should require that force."<sup>†</sup> Even to this modified proposal he could not be induced to agree by any fair means. To assign territory at all, with even a temporary object, would, he held justly, be a disgrace to him ; while for his oppressors to demand it for such a purpose as to provide the pay of the Contingent he felt to be a scandalous injustice. The injustice was the more obvious inasmuch as while requiring him to maintain the Contingent, and even to assign new provinces to pay for its support, the treaty that was now demanded from him positively provided that one-half the Subsidiary Force, which he had paid for already in perpetuity to do the same duties, was to be withdrawn from his dominions, the consideration he had paid for it, namely, the lands of Bellary and Cuddapah, being retained by ourselves !<sup>‡</sup>

A mock offer to disband the Contingent was now made to the unhappy Prince, the offer being coupled with the threat that his country would then be allowed to become the theatre of "scenes of lawlessness," the Resident proceeding to

<sup>\*</sup> See *The Statesman*, July 1880, p. 169.

<sup>†</sup> Resident to Government of India, No. 71, of 4th May 1853, para. 28 : Papers, "The Nizam," 1854, p. 118.

<sup>‡</sup> These lands now yield the British Government £812,000 yearly.

prevaricate with him as to the treaty obligation resting upon the Subsidiary Force to maintain his rule, and plainly intimating to him that this British force, 9,500 strong, would stand idle and refuse to put down disturbances if the Contingent were disbanded.\* It was well known (and it was anticipated by Lord Dalhousie†) that it would be impossible for the Nizam to accept the offer of disbandment made on such terms, particularly in the condition to which the country had been reduced. There was no real risk of the force—the cost of which had dragged the Hyderabad State down to ruin—being disbanded under such conditions; and yet the Nizam was now made to appear as its voluntary supporter. The Machiavellian proposal was, however, deemed a master-stroke by the diplomatists at Calcutta. By such thinkers, the words of the great international jurist, Vattel, with which we have headed this essay, might be profitably studied: “The faith of treaties is basely prostituted by studying to overreach those with whom we treat, and to outdo them in cunning and duplicity. Let the man who excels in these arts boast of his happy talents, and esteem himself a keen negotiator, but reason and the sacred law of nature will class him as far beneath a vulgar cheat as the majesty of kings is exalted above private persons.”

The Nizam steadfastly and honestly represented that it was equally impossible for him to elect the disbandment of the Contingent, when disbandment was deliberately coupled with an iniquitous condition, relative to the Subsidiary Force, which was incompatible with the common instinct of self-preservation, or to assign territory for its support. Exasperated by a persistency that was the dictate of despair, the Resident at last resorted to language which his successor, who was present at the interview, characterized as “objurgations and threats;” but without effect. The Prince refused to sign the treaty that was to dismember his kingdom, and to sanction *post facto* our long-continued exactions upon his State.

A new expedient was then resorted to, an expedient of such a nature that it has no parallel, we hope, in our diplomacy. Major Davidson, the Resident's chief Assistant, with his knowledge and approval, addressed to the Nizam's Minister a letter to be shown in original by the Minister to his master.‡ That letter the reader shall now see:—

“My dear Nawab,—I believe the Resident requires your attendance this evening, to inform you that his negotiations with the Nizam are at an end, and that he applies to the Governor-General to move troops by to-day's post.

“Indeed, I have a letter from my nephew at Poona mentioning that the 78th Highlanders and 86th Regiment H.M.'s troops have received orders to be in readiness to march to Hyderabad. Don't suppose military operations will be confined to the districts. If you are a friend of His Highness, beg of him to save himself and his dignity by complying at once with what the Governor-General will most assuredly compel him to accede to.

(Signed) “CUTH. DAVIDSON.”

“Hyderabad, 14th May 1853.”

The statement in this letter that “orders” had been issued to the troops was absolutely false, as also was the other statement that the Resident “applied to the Governor-General to move troops by that day's post.” The weapon of deceit was not, however, deemed by the British authorities sufficiently reliable of itself to compass the end in view. It was necessary that these alarming representations should be impressed on the Nizam's mind as truths by one of his own trusted advisers. It was necessary for this purpose to bribe some confidential servant to betray his master. Driven to distraction, and, as it proved, to death a few days later, the Minister found the required traitor. He told the Resident his plan,

\* See Resident's Minute of a private conference with the Nizam, dated 12th March 1853, para. 9, and his letter to Government of India No. 74 of 10th May 1853, para. 11.

† Minute of 30th March 1853, paras. 46 and 49.

‡ See Colonel Low's letter to Government of India No. 81, of 10th May 1853, paras. 2 and 3, wherein he states that the above letter expressed his own “urgent request,” and that its object was “to impress the mind of the Nizam with the belief that further unnecessary delay in settling the matter one way or other would not be permitted by his Government.”

"with a smile on his countenance, seeming rather proud of his achievement." The Resident at once approved;\* and on the 14th May, and in a subsequent letter of the 19th, that officer reported to Calcutta that his "hope" of finally carrying the negotiation rested very principally upon the fact that a confidential aide-de-camp of the Nizam, named Booran-ood-deen, had, with the Resident's knowledge and approval, been bribed "by pecuniary donations and promises of more" to betray him who was at once his master and his sovereign. Duped, coerced, and betrayed, the Nizam's final surrender is recorded by the Resident in the following terms†:—

"In the evening of Sunday, the 15th, I received a note from the Minister stating that the Nizam had at last consented to the treaty. The Minister in that note wrote as follows: 'Booran-ood-deen and I persuaded him to accede to it. This was done when we were alone.'"

Here, then, is the true story of the Hyderabad Contingent, and of the Treaty of 1853, under which the Berar Provinces passed into the hands of the British Government.

We have called it a tale of shame.

## PART II.

### THE NIZAM'S EFFORTS AFTER RESTITUTION.

It need excite no surprise that soon after the Berar districts had been taken from the Nizam, under the circumstances above narrated,—whenever, in fact, the echoes of Lord Dalhousie's "threats and objurgations," menaces of military coercion, and pretences of treaty right had died away,—the Nizam took for granted that the British authorities would be very glad that the blot on the escutcheon of our Indian Empire caused by the Berar assignment should be removed, particularly as the assignment had been taken on a "formal announcement" that it was to last "merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent Force as long as the Nizam might require it." Between 1853 and 1858 two successive Nizams, accordingly, six times applied for the restoration of all the districts. Salar Jung, who had succeeded to the office of Minister, a few days after the humiliation of the assignment of Berar had resulted in the death of his predecessor, wrote to the Resident as follows, on 19th December 1857: "The late Nizam was anxious on this point, and repeatedly urged me to submit the question. The present Nizam is no less importunate on the subject." And on the 8th March 1858: "His Highness, from the period of his accession, has repeatedly desired me to endeavour to get back the districts. Their restoration would be an act of liberality and consideration worthy of the British Government." On the 4th February 1859 the Nizam caused his Minister to make "renewed efforts" for restitution, as "a matter which His Highness has very much at heart," and about which he felt "great anxiety." On the 18th of the same month the Minister notified to the Resident that the Nizam had summoned him to the palace, and blamed him for "lukewarmness" in the matter; "otherwise it seemed unaccountable that nothing had been done as yet." And the Minister proceeded: "As His Highness is so earnest and anxious on the subject, I trust you will have it fully settled." These early applications were made without any attempt at controversy as to the merits, the Nizam simply asking to have the districts restored, and undertaking "to make satisfactory arrangements for the punctual monthly payment of the Contingent." All these proposals were contemptuously rejected, without, apparently, even the formality of regular replies to the Minister's letters.

As a consequence, however, of the vital services rendered to us by the Nizam and his Minister during the revolt of 1857-8, the Indian Government was for a time really touched by a sense of obligation and by an instinct of common interests. It was a healthy change on both sides, and, if it could only have lasted, might have

\* See Resident's letters to Government of India, No. 79, of 14th May 1853, para. 9, and No. 81, of 19th May 1853, paras. 7, 8, and footnote: Papers, "The Nizam," 1854, pp. 128-9.

† See Resident's letter to Government of India, No. 81, of 19th May 1853; para. 10.

proved most beneficial, as, indeed, in its establishment and extension throughout India lies the best hope in the future for the prosperity of the protected States and the stability of the Empire. The first suggestion of emphatically marking the sense entertained of the invaluable aid rendered by the Princes of India, will be found in a despatch dated July 28th, 1858, from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors—Lord Stanley, now Earl of Derby, being President of the Board of Control—to the Governor-General, calling for a list of those “Princes, Chiefs, and others,” who had rendered valuable service to the British cause, suggesting that “territorial grants” would form the “most acceptable mode” of reward for such service, and expressing his assurance that the names of “the Nizam and his able and influential Minister, Salar Jung,” would, with some others, be found “high on the list.”

A very little study of the map, and a glance at the records of the time, suffice to remind us of the vital support rendered us by the Nizam, and of the good reasons Lord Stanley had for placing him “high on the list.” The obedience of the Madras Army and the allegiance of the South of India depended on a word from the Nizam. In tone and spirit, as to a great extent now, the Madras Army was then essentially a Mahomedan army, looking up to the Nizam as Pontifex Maximus as well as Prince. Nor was the political and spiritual influence of the Nizam confined to the Deccan and the Carnatic : it extended all over India. A very distinguished officer, of long Eastern experience, General Sir Sydney Cotton, who in 1857 commanded at Peshawur the frontier station of the Punjab, states that “intercepted letters reached him from Hyderabad in the Deccan, addressed by sepoys of one of the re-armed corps at Peshawur to brother-Mussulmans in the Nizam’s territory, in which the most seditious expressions towards our Government were used, and calling on the Mussulmans generally to rise, and make an effort to rid themselves of their common enemy.” A little further on he says :—

“The natives of the upper class of the North-West Frontier repeatedly assured the author, up to the very last moment of his sojourn there, that there will be, some day or other, a general rising of the Mussulmans of India against our government. Since the removal of the descendants of the Great Mogul from Delhi they look to the Nizam in the Deccan as the great head and chief of the Mussulman cause.”

The exigencies of space will not permit us to multiply, as could easily be done, independent as well as official testimony to the invaluable assistance given to us by the Hyderabad State in the terrible days of 1857. The same necessary restriction must be put on our citation of evidence as to the services of the Nizam’s great Minister. We shall give but one extract. In a letter to the Government of India, dated 29th of March 1858, Colonel Davidson, the Resident at Hyderabad, says :—

“The unhesitating energy and promptitude with which the Nizam’s Minister assisted the English Government were beyond all praise. . . . From his [the Nawab Salar Jung’s] open and avowed determination to assist us at all hazards, he became most unpopular, and was almost outlawed by the Mahomedan population ; but no invectives, threats, or entreaties ever made him swerve from the truly faithful line of conduct he had from the first adopted. His assassination was planned a dozen times, and I believe he was fully aware of this ; but neither dread on that account, nor for a time the continued intelligence of repeated reverses to our cause in the North-West, shook him for a moment. Every contingency, and every requisition made to him by me, was met with the same firmness and consistency ; and the resources of the Nizam’s Government were, as far as lay in his power, placed unhesitatingly at my disposal.”

The most liberal interpretation of Lord Stanley’s suggestion of a “territorial grant” in favour of the Nizam to which the Calcutta Government could rise after

\* “Nine years on the North-West Frontier,” by Lieut.-General Sir Sydney Cotton, K.C.B., (1868), pp. 305, 307.

two long years of consideration, was that embodied in the Treaty of 1860, whereby a small part of the districts which had been taken from him in 1853 for the liquidation of a debt that he did not owe, and for the payment of a force that had been fraudulently imposed upon him for our own benefit, and which part of the districts, as it furnished funds in excess of the requirements of the trust created by the said Treaty, the Resident confessed "we had no pretext for retaining,"<sup>\*</sup> was restored to His Highness's administration. The transfer was destitute of the features of an act of grace. Still it was a partial restitution very satisfactory to the Nizam. It was something gained which was very much desired.

The Nawab Salar Jung must have considered as one of the greatest advantages of this partial restitution that it afforded him the means of practically disproving the *pro humanitatis causâ* argument so skilfully employed by Indian officials to cover the dark suggestions of self-interest and love of patronage. The districts restored to the Nizam in 1860, after seven years of British administration, did not deteriorate, but continued to improve under the Nizam's sway. He had, however, while accepting back a part of his territory never in any way waived his right to the restitution of the whole. Accordingly, in 1867, a fresh application was submitted, in which the Nizam's Minister went a step in advance of the former appeals; for he ventured to urge his reversionary claims to the Mysore State, which the Calcutta bureau was then moving heaven and earth to annex. The intended annexation was however, defeated by the Home Government, and the appeal for the Berars could not be renewed on that particular line.

But the Calcutta Secretariat had now become fully aware of the change that had come over the spirit of the Hyderabad Court; and from the year 1867 may be dated the determination to break that spirit, and to put down this unwonted vivacity. The Nizam's Minister no longer spoke with bated breath and whispering humbleness. He presumed to argue, and sometimes even to get the best of the argument. He was told, therefore, that he "took too much upon himself," and that his petition must be "rejected with censure," and he was warned in future to be more "serious and circumspect."

Nothing could be more serious or more circumspect than the next application. Although not silenced or intimidated by the hard words with which his overtures had been met, it would probably be too much to say that the Minister was not hurt or discouraged. The extreme resentment betrayed in the reply to his last appeal at a suggestion—identical, by-the-bye, with one made by the Resident—"that there was a time when the British Government was less disposed than now to do strict justice to the Princes of India,"† Sir Salar Jung may well have calculated that the interests of his master would not be advanced by a direct attack on the origin of the Contingent, or on Lord Dalhousie's operations. He may well have felt a conviction that the Calcutta Government, as then constituted, would not be persuaded, on any grounds of magnanimity, generosity, or even abstract justice, to give up, without an equivalent, anything that it actually held. Even in the harsh criticism of his proposal, founded on the expected lapse of Mysore, there was no repudiation of "some satisfactory arrangement" that might be made "for the payment of the Hyderabad Contingent from another source." On the contrary, there was almost an invitation to seek for some satisfactory arrangement in the remark that, "as the alternative source of payment suggested had no existence, the restoration of Berar remained an impossibility."‡ The Government of India had repeatedly stated that its only object in retaining Berar was to have "*a material guaranty*" for the payment of the Contingent, territorial security not being declared to be indispensable.§ In 1853, beyond all question, the Nizam could have given no other security; but the finances and credit of the State

\* Resident to Government of India, No. 26, dated 27th June 1862, para. 141.

† Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 11; compare Colonel Davidson's para. 13, p. 28 of Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867).

‡ Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 20, para. 46 of despatch.

§ "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 9 (para. 6), p. 11 (para. 4), p. 16 (para. 18), p. 20 (para. 5).

had so improved under the administration of Sir Salar Jung that in 1872 he was able to suggest "an alternative source of payment," and to propose "a satisfactory arrangement," against the feasibility and permanence of which no objection could be urged. The proposal was to deposit the capital sum of £8,000,000 sterling with the British Government, from the interest of which the Contingent was to be paid, the Berar Provinces being restored to the rule of their own Sovereign. But this would never do. What was to become of the Berar Commission, that stock of good appointments? In a despatch dated 24th September 1873, one year after the offer was submitted, it was declined by the Calcutta Government on the ground that "a territorial guaranty was the fundamental principle" of the Treaties of 1853 and 1860, and that a large loan from English or other capitalists by the Nizam was highly objectionable.

This adverse decision was then reported to the Home Government. Some strong dissents were recorded in the Indian Council, notably by Sir George Clerk and Sir John Kaye, which exposed the principles on which the Government of India were acting. The former officer scathingly quoted an officially recorded "Resolution" of that Government in 1867 that "Treaties entered into fifty years ago are no longer binding on us, now that India has its Legislative Councils," and that 'Treaties with a native State were "mere courtesies of fifty years ago," containing "a poetical form of an hyperbolic expression," and "a selection of a particular conjunction of sounds"! Sir John Kaye marshalled against the Government of India the grievances that they had supplied to all the leading native States by a course which has convinced them "that the policy which we enunciated when weak" (by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858) "is now to be repudiated when we are strong;" and he concluded by prophesying "the danger to the Empire from such conduct, which my experience of twenty years in my present appointment makes me see so clearly before me." But the Secretary of State (Lord Salisbury)—who, it may be observed, had only been a few weeks in office—was very naturally unprepared to reverse a judgment already communicated to the Co-Regents of Hyderabad. In a despatch dated the 19th March 1874 he adopted the views of the Indian Government that a large loan was objectionable, that "a territorial guaranty was the main object" of the Treaties of 1853 and 1860, and was "equally paramount at the present day." But the Secretary of State, when he signed that despatch, was not in possession of the prompt reply sent four months previously by Sir Salar Jung and his colleague to the despatch from the Viceroy, which had, for the first time, blocked the claim to restitution by alleging that Lord Canning's word "material" meant "territorial." In this reply, dated 24th November 1873, which they begged might be forwarded to the Secretary of State, the Regents argued against the security for the pay of the Contingent being necessarily territorial, and against the Hyderabad State being under any obligation to keep up the Contingent at all, that force being illegitimate in its origin and engendered solely for our own benefit, the debt of 1853 being fictitious, and the treaty of that year extorted under a combination of threats and formal assurances by the Resident, Colonel Low, that the territorial assignment was "only for a time, so long as the Nizam might require the Contingent." But "their desire being to meet the wishes of the British Government," and the Viceroy having objected to their proposal to capitalize the pay of the Contingent, because it might necessitate a large loan by the Hyderabad State, they offered to furnish a "material guaranty" to the extent of two, three, or more years' payments, to be deposited in advance—which would have amounted to not more than £1,000,000 sterling—a fund which they could supply and maintain without any extraordinary effort or external aid.

Even Lord Dalhousie, when commencing a course of pressure on the Nizam, declared that he only asked for an assignment of lands in default of payment or of other good security. There could have been no real doubt in 1874 that the Hyderabad Government was well able, in the way suggested, to make such a satisfactory provision as would have contented Lord Dalhousie, and to furnish

that "material guaranty" which Lord Canning required, in the most substantial and tangible form.

This was, in short, far too reasonable and businesslike an offer, while the exposure of the transactions of 1853 and 1860, and the disavowal of any moral obligation to keep up the Contingent, were too cogent in their reasoning to be laid before the Secretary of State without some special accompaniment. The Co-Regents' reply of November 24th, 1873, was therefore accompanied home, in April 1874, by the Calcutta Foreign Secretary, Mr. (now Sir) C. U. Aitchison in person, who brought with him all the materials for managing Lord Salisbury. At the same time, viz., on the 22nd of May 1874, the Nizam's Government was served with the Secretary of State's decision of the 19th of March on the former offer of depositing capital to the amount of £8,000,000.

For the whole of 1874, a year of critical controversy, the Home Government was always kept in arrears of the Nizam's appeals, and in advance of the Viceroy's adverse views. The Secretary of State was left in ignorance of the Nizam's latest pleadings, while the Nizam's representatives were led to suppose that the Secretary of State's decision was given with full knowledge of all their strongest points. They were led, but not actually brought, to that conclusion. The dates, when they could get hold of them, could not fail to tell the truth.

There can be no doubt that one great cause of these cross-questions and stray answers, and of the gradual development of the Nizam's full case, was the aversion of the Co-Regents to put on record anything like a railing impeachment of the past. The full case, every merit of which was a demerit to the Government of India, was drawn out of them, against their inclination, by the disingenuous dialectics and tortuous action pursued by the Calcutta Foreign Office.

In a secret letter dated 16th June 1874, intended still further to add to the effect of Mr. Aitchison's visit, the Indian Government urgently pressed upon the Secretary of State the nature of the reply they wished given to the offer of a material guaranty made by the Co-Regents in their memorial dated 24th November 1873. The Secretary of State was urged to give a reply which should be "final," and "as stiff as would be consistent with politeness." The materials brought home by Mr. Aitchison, and the powers of exposition and persuasion that he was able to bring to bear upon the India Office, together with the severe official spur applied by the Indian Government's secret letter of 16th June, sufficed to obtain a letter from the Secretary of State, dated the 17th July 1874, declining to accept the last offer made by the Regents, or to give up the Berars. But Lord Salisbury was not so easily or so completely managed as had been hoped, for the letter was not of that degree of "stiffness" that was wanted; and, moreover, another despatch of the same date, far from treating the question as finally settled, asked for any *real answer* the Indian Government might have to the Nizam's claims, and particularly inquired if there was any reply to the strong statement in the memorial under reply to the effect that the very basis of the Treaty of 1853 was a "formal announcement" by the British Plenipotentiary that "the assignment was to last merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as the Nizam might require that force." All knowledge of the existence of this second despatch was, of course, carefully concealed from the Nizam's Minister by the Indian Government, and even the terms of the Secretary of State's first despatch of same date, not being "stiff" enough, were not communicated to the Co-Regents.

It was highly inconvenient, according to the official ethics and tactics in vogue at Calcutta, to communicate the Secretary of State's despatch of 17th July 1874 to the Nizam's Government, not only because its terms were not anything like "stiff" enough to terrorize and silence, but because its *date* would at once have contradicted the pretence of its being "final;" for on the 6th of that same month—July 1874—Sir Salar Jung and his colleague, convinced by the only despatch from the Secretary of State that was shown to them (dated 19th March) that a half-statement of their case would not do, had submitted that important and exhaustive letter of 124 paragraphs which we described at some length in a



previous article.\* In that letter the whole question was fully argued, and they claimed for the Nizam the restoration of his provinces, irrespective altogether of the acceptability of that material guaranty in cash for the support of the Contingent which they still offered. If, however, that material guaranty were refused, they then declared themselves entitled and compelled to demand complete territorial restitution and the disbandment of the Contingent, which was not, and never had been, of any use to the Nizam, which Lord Dalhousie had acknowledged must be broken up if the Nizam insisted on it, while the British Plenipotentiary, Colonel Low, had formally declared that the assignment must cease whenever the Nizam ceased to require the Contingent. The complexion of the case was entirely changed by the submission of this letter, which the Secretary of State had never seen, and of the existence of which he was not aware when he gave, under the urgent pressure of Mr. Aitchison's presence, and of the secret despatch from the Viceroy dated 16th of June, his decision of the 17th of July 1874. That decision was now quite inapplicable. It was no answer to the case put in by the Nizam's Government. It was most unfair to the Secretary of State to use it as his decision on the case, without first letting him know that the entire case had not been laid before him. Yet this is what was done, and the very shallow and unworthy device by which it was done was probably considered equally judicious and ingenious. It was impossible to do more than *speak* of the Secretary of State's decision as "final;" it was not possible to *write*. A copy of the despatch could not be given, because the date would have betrayed its insufficiency. Lord Salisbury's despatch of the 17th of July was therefore kept until it was old enough, the date being concealed, to serve at all events as a telegraphic answer to the letter from the Nizam's Government of the 6th of July, and its purport was then, suddenly and without any warning, sprung upon Sir Salar Jung and his colleague, in verbal harangue, as the "final" decision of the Secretary of State on all their memorials, care being taken to use language which gave no hint as to whether the said decision had been received in India by letter or by telegram. This transcendent effort of "political agency" was carried out, as we have described,† at a breakfast given by the Resident, Mr. C. B. Saunders, to the Regents and principal nobles of Hyderabad on the 21st of August 1874, and was in every respect, as it deserved to be, a signal and most undignified failure. The plan chosen on this occasion was so transparent as to be at once detected, and was implicitly confessed by the Resident when, in a letter dated the 22nd of August 1874, he refused, in reply to an application from Sir Salar Jung, to furnish a copy of the Secretary of State's communication, and abstained from mentioning its date. No copy of that despatch has, it would appear, ever been communicated to the Nizam's Government.

Although the breakfast-table harangue failed completely to silence Sir Salar Jung, it marked the initiation of the process for harassing and hampering him by local intrigue and corrupt antagonism, which has within the last three years been pushed on by Sir Richard Meade to what he, we presume, would call a large measure of success. The real character of Mr. Saunders's breakfast-table demonstration will be understood when we call to mind the fact that his own annual report as Resident for 1869-70 expressly stated that the rancour and suspicion of the nobles with regard to Sir Salar Jung and the Co-Regent formed "an element in the political atmosphere of Hyderabad," and that "it was not thought just to the Minister, or safe to the stability of his administration, that anything approaching to freedom of intercourse should take place between the Resident and the other nobles," and that "one of the latter" (Wikar-ool-Oomra), "having been pronounced guilty some eight years ago of lending himself to an intrigue, the object of which, it was believed, was to procure for himself the office of Minister, had been prohibited, under the order of the Supreme Government, from appearing on any public occasion, the Nizam's own durbars not excepted, where the British representative was present." Yet to that same Wikar-ool-Oomra significant

\* *The Statesman*, No. 5, October 1880, pp. 456-7.

† *The Statesman*, October 1880, p. 463.



attentions were paid by Mr. Saunders on and about the 21st August 1874. In his Administration Report of 1869-70 Mr. Saunders had sympathetically observed that the constant thwarting of the Minister's policy by intrigues "made his" (the Minister's) "office doubly difficult to fill," and "his burden a doubly heavy one to bear;" so much so that, to the Resident's knowledge, Sir Salar Jung "felt at times inclined to withdraw from the struggle altogether, only there was none at Hyderabad who was fitted to relieve him of duties which he performed so admirably." But in 1874, in order to check the appeal for the Berars, these very intriguers were specially summoned to the Residency, to witness the humiliation of those whom they had for years regarded with "rancour and suspicion," and to hear the representative of the British Government appeal to them to use their influence against Sir Salar Jung and his colleague.

Some time before the remarkable breakfast-party of the 21st of August 1874 Mr. Saunders is understood to have taken an opportunity of reminding Sir Salar Jung, in the most friendly manner, that a very little encouragement from the British Residency would renew the days when his administrative duties were constantly impeded and harassed by hostile intrigues, and when his very life was in danger. The Minister, whose faith as to the standard of fair dealing, dignity, and propriety accepted among us may have been somewhat shaken by this warning, can hardly have been so much alarmed by it as was probably expected. He cannot have been unconscious of the strength of his position, based on so many years of administrative progress, on the confidence and support of several Residents and Viceroys, on the local reputation he had won by the partial restitution of 1860, and, above all, on the loyalty of his colleague. Even Sir Richard Meade, though more fitted for the work than Mr. Saunders, and armed with a general license for the purpose, could not, three years later, have gagged and fettered Sir Salar Jung but for the death of the other Regent, the Ameer-i-Kaboor, in April 1877. Mr. Saunders in 1874 tried in vain to give importance to the Co-Regent's younger brother, Wikar-ool-Oomra, and the other disaffected nobles. They were useless as weapons of offence so long as the head of the house of Shums-ool-Oomra, the Ameer-i-Kaboor, went hand in hand with Sir Salar Jung. The breakfast-party lecture and the attempt at reviving faction failed entirely for the time.

Mr. Saunders had concluded his breakfast-table address, which he read off in the Hindustani language from a written paper, by declaring that he would not "receive any further communications on the subject of the Berars for transmission to the Government." In the letter dated 22nd August 1874, with which he forwarded, at Sir Salar Jung's request, a copy of this address, he said that it must "be considered as bearing all the force necessary in any assurance or intimation which His Highness the Nizam's Government can possibly require to receive from ours." "Force" was the right word certainly. In spite of the Resident's threat not to receive any more letters on the subject, Sir Salar Jung and his colleague, convinced that their duty to their Sovereign was imperative, forwarded another despatch, dated 29th September 1874, in which, adverting to the breakfast harangue, they pointed out that "the present reply amounts to a simple refusal to discuss whether the claims are just or not, with an endeavour forcibly to suppress them, while their validity remained unquestioned." They also pointed out that the decision of the Secretary of State which was invoked on that occasion, and asserted to be "final," must have been arrived at "without the Secretary of State having before him the principal document in which the claims are described;" and that his decision had been, in fact, framed upon a former letter, which was of quite a different character altogether. This despatch of 29th September was returned to the Minister by the Resident, in a letter dated 2nd October 1874, in which he stated that "the Viceroy's distinct instructions precluded him from submitting it to the Government of India." The Minister, in the most courteous language, replied, on the 5th October 1874, that it was simply impossible for him and his colleague, "consistently with our solemn duty to the State, to accept as final a decision which does not even purport to deal with the merits of the claims set forth," and "prior to His Lordship the Secretary of State having had before him the chief document in which the claims are

described." Sir Salar Jung for these reasons returned the originals to the Resident, requesting that they might be forwarded to the Government of India, "for submission, along with our letter of the 6th of July last, to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State, to be laid before Her Most Gracious Majesty in Council."

The next day, the 6th October 1874, the Resident again returned all the documents to the Co-Regents, declaring that "determined perseverance in a course of this kind would not for one moment be tolerated in private or social intercourse," that it could have "no good result in the conduct of public affairs," and that it "might have the direct effect of lessening the cordiality of those relations which the Government of India anxiously desires to preserve, both with the Ameer-i-Kaboor and yourself, during the minority of the present youthful Nizam."

Assuredly this rude game of battledore and shuttlecock was highly objectionable, but it was the Resident's own invention. After the second return the Regents took no part in it. They had acted hitherto according to constitutional rule and precedent, and it was only under actual compulsion that they now took the unparalleled step, on the 17th of October 1874, of directly addressing the Secretary of State for India. Lord Salisbury did not join in the rough horse-play of throwing despatches back in the face of a Prince or Minister, which Mr. Saunders "considered as bearing all the force necessary." The Secretary of State accepted the appeal, but was no doubt puzzled how to dispose of it without openly censuring the Resident and the other authorities in India for producing this extraordinary dead-lock by a course of abortive insult and intimidation. He held over the appeal, and again urged the Government of India to supply the full information and counsel for which he had asked on 17th June. That information was at length furnished in the shape of a conglomeration of relevant and irrelevant matter, extending to such a length as to put it out of the power of any Secretary of State even to peruse it himself. And this again was covered by a despatch dated 1st January 1875, extending to 79 paragraphs, in which were condensed more numerous and more audacious misstatements than official persons would commonly venture to put their signatures to. Thus the anxious wish of Lord Salisbury personally and promptly to dispose of the matter was defeated, and it almost necessarily was forced back to the pigeonholes of the permanent officials, where, no doubt, the Calcutta authorities deemed it much safer than in Lord Salisbury's hands. A very characteristic instance of the policy of elision of an ugly fact or argument was here shown. Lord Salisbury had, when calling for the information thus tardily furnished, specially demanded a report on the Regents' important argument based on the "formal announcement" of the Resident that the assignment of Berar was to be "merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as the Nizam might require it." This argument is the only one which the Calcutta Government omitted all reply to in the correspondence furnished, excusing themselves (letter of 1st January 1875, para. 68) for the omission by saying that they have already shown the argument to be "without foundation" in a certain "secret" letter dated 2nd October, which, when in its turn examined, is seen to demonstrate nothing of the kind.

In the mean time the memorable tour of the Prince of Wales through India was being arranged. Hyderabad, the capital of the largest and most important of the allied States, and even in population the fourth city of the Indian Empire, would naturally have been one of His Royal Highness's halting-places. On the strength of an apprehension regarding the personal safety of the Prince within the Nizam's dominions—so very ill-founded that one cannot help, under the circumstances, attributing it to a desire to slight the Regents and to discredit them at their own Court—Hyderabad was excluded from the Royal programme. Moreover, between July and October 1875, the Resident (Mr. Saunders) had involved himself, with the demi-official countenance and support of the Calcutta Foreign Office, in a correspondence with Sir Salar Jung, having for its object to force the young Nizam, then about eleven years old and of a very delicate and nervous temperament, to take, contrary to the best medical advice, a railway journey of five hundred miles, and to undergo all the fatigue and unwonted excitement of receiving the Prince of Wales at Bombay. The correspondence, which was curiously weak in style, and

even worse in taste, on the side of the Resident,\* down to the point of his giving way at last before the opinion of the Residency Surgeon, Dr. Wyndowe, is understood to have been made the subject of illustrious consideration, and to have raised feelings of mingled sympathy and indignation at the petty annoyance to which Sir Salar Jung had been subjected. Very much, it is believed, to the consternation both of the Hyderabad Residency and of certain Calcutta officials, though it was of course impossible to remonstrate, a gracious invitation to visit England was given to the Nizam's Minister. All that could be done was to exhort and entreat Lord Salisbury, who had the Regents' direct appeal still unanswered before him, not to allow Sir Salar Jung to enter on any political discussion during his stay in London. The Nawab was consequently requested to place himself under that restriction; but before his departure from England the regular channel, so improperly closed at the Residency, was reopened for him by the Secretary of State giving him leave to submit a complete statement of the case for the restitution of Berar on his return to Hyderabad. To save appearances in favour of the Government of India, by-gones were to be by-gones, and in the new statement no allusion was to be made to previous correspondence.

This new statement was presented in December 1876. The Resident, not having, we must assume, been formally apprised of the permission that had been given to Sir Salar Jung at home, professed ignorance of it as long as possible, and began by refusing to receive the memorial. Both the Resident and the Minister were then on the point of starting for Delhi, in company with the young Nizam, who, as *facile princeps* among the Native rulers of India, was about to assist at the Imperial Assemblage which took place in the first week of January 1877. On their way to Delhi they were met by a deliberate intimation from the Calcutta Foreign Secretary that they would not be received in the Assemblage unless the Regents would sign a declaration abandoning the Treaty status of their master as a Sovereign Prince. This scheme was abortive, the Nizam and Sir Salar Jung being after all *perforce* admitted, without the required concession. The Viceroy, Lord Lytton, when a personal application was made to him as to the submission of the new Berar memorial, acknowledged the instructions that had been given by the Secretary of State; and the new appeal for the Berars when again tendered was accepted, but with a miserable manifestation of ill-will against the Regents for submitting it.

The Government of India forwarded the new appeal, after the lapse of about four months, to the Secretary of State, with the copy of a reply to it, which they said they were prepared to send at once to the Hyderabad Regency. *It has not, however, been sent up to the present day.* One cannot help concluding, with such experience as we have acquired of the ways of the Calcutta Foreign Office, that this draft reply was never sent, because it would have been too quickly and effectually answered; while a suggestion of its being sent very soon was furnished for home consumption, in order once more to impress the Secretary of State with a belief that, unless he perversely plunged into disaccord with the Viceroy in Council, the malcontent Regents would be easily reduced to silence. The Government of India, moreover, regardless of the unfairness of alluding to the arguments contained in their previous correspondence, which the Regents were expressly debarred from refuting, excused themselves from traversing the Regents' claims by a statement that "the previous correspondence which has passed dispenses with the necessity" of doing so. But the great object, as usual, was to gain time; and from the official point of view this plan was very successful. In the time that was thus gained—in the twelve months during which this last appeal was left unnoticed—Sir Salar Jung's honourable colleague, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, died, and the question of a successor to the post of Co-Regent became exclusively dominant.

On the choice that might be made of a colleague for the Nawab Sir Salar Jung depended the cause of internal peace and progress within the Nizam's territories.

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\* This correspondence was the subject of a very amusing article in the *Pall Mall Gazette* shortly after its occurrence, which is credited with having caused Lord Salisbury to order the removal of Mr. Saunders from the Residency of Hyderabad.

In twenty-three laborious years this able and enlightened Minister had raised the Hyderabad State from financial ruin and moral anarchy into an unexampled condition of prosperity and good order. Administrative, and especially judicial, reform, involving the suppression of privileges and the restraint of arbitrary power, did not at any time commend itself to the great body of nobles, military vassals, and other men of weight at the Nizam's capital and in the provinces. Without direct assistance, which might have aggravated suspicion and mistrust, but with constant moral support from the Imperial Government, up to the time when his application was made for Berar, Sir Salar Jung had been able to retain the confidence of two successive sovereigns, and to overcome gradually all opposing factions. But by the time that Sir Richard Meade succeeded Mr. Saunders as Resident at Hyderabad the great "political" problem of the day was not how to help Sir Salar Jung in the work of administrative reform, but how to check him in his demand for an answer to the Nizam's unanswerable claims. The Berar agitation must be stopped even if good government in the Nizam's dominions were to be stopped with it. The Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra, notoriously incompetent and reactionary, without either character or influence, without one qualification that could possibly recommend him to the Resident's notice except his inveterate hostility to Sir Salar Jung, was violently forced upon the Minister as Co-Regent of the State, on the express condition that in return he would secure that the Berar question was put upon the shelf. And this is the way that it was done.

The Ameer-i-Kabeer Shums-ool-Oomra died on the 14th of April 1877. He had been called to the place of Co-Regent in 1869, on the accession of the infant Nizam, by the unanimous choice of the Minister and the principal nobles, which the British Government approved, without advancing any claim to regulate the judgment of the Durbar in this or any other appointment. It was admitted by the Viceroy in Council that the independence in all its internal affairs secured to the State of Hyderabad by treaty had suffered no diminution in consequence of the Prince being a minor. This was officially notified in the following passage of a despatch from the Government of India, No. 394A, dated the 22nd of March 1869: "It is not the wish of His Excellency that the representative of the British Government should, for the future, possess more direct control over the internal affairs of the State than has lately been exercised." But though the Government of India could not claim any direct control over appointments to any office, even the highest, in the Hyderabad State, it might well have claimed an indirect or negative control, to the extent of disapproving, or even of forbidding, any appointment that was injurious to its dignity as the protecting Power. If, for example, the Minister or the durbar had proposed to appoint as Co-Regent a nobleman who, "having been pronounced guilty," after a careful inquiry by the British Resident, of "lending himself to an intrigue, the object of which was to procure for himself the office of Minister, had been prohibited from appearing on any public occasion, the Nizam's own durbar not excepted, when the British representative was present," the British Government would naturally have objected to such an appointment as an unfriendly and offensive act. The Administration Report of the Resident, Mr. C. B. Saunders, for 1869-70, tells us that there was such a nobleman at Hyderabad, and that the verdict of "guilty," and a "sentence of complete political extinction," had been pronounced against him, after a careful inquiry at the Residency, by the Government of Lord Canning. This nobleman was Wikar-ool-Oomra, half-brother of the Ameer-i-Kabeer. But in 1877 there was another Resident, Sir Richard Meade; there was another Government, that of Lord Lytton. A great deal had happened since 1869, including the development of the Berar appeal into the unanswerable stage.

In 1869 the Government of India did not claim to dictate or direct the choice of a Co-Regent. In 1877 the Government insisted on nominating a Co-Regent, without consulting or considering the nobles and notables of the Hyderabad Durbar, and in absolute defiance of the Regent Minister, their leader and representative.

In 1869 the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra, though readmitted, as an act of grace, to his place in the durbar on ceremonial occasions, was not allowed to be "officially

connected with the Government," and was considered so utterly ineligible for office that the son of his half-brother, the Nawab Busheer-ood-Dowlah, was, with the full knowledge and consent, if not, indeed, at the express request, of the Government of India, placed under a course of administrative training, with a view to his succeeding his elder uncle, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, should any casualty remove or incapacitate him.\* During the absence of Sir Salar Jung in England Busheer-ood-Dowlah had acted for him as Co-Regent and Minister, and had received the thanks of the Government of India for the propriety and ability with which he had fulfilled his duties. He was universally regarded as the destined successor to his uncle, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, until 1877, when the Co-Regent's decease, just as the Berar perplexity had risen to its height, suggested the noble policy of hampering the Minister by compelling him to take a colleague with whom he could not work.

In 1869, and down to 1877, the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra was utterly ineligible. In 1877 he suddenly became eligible; and not only so, but the most eligible and the only eligible person. No one nominated him, no one chose him, no one recommended him but Sir Richard Meade, the Resident, and yet he was the only eligible person. It was quite forgotten, or quite thrown into the shade, that he had been found "guilty of lending himself to an intrigue" of a peculiarly disgraceful nature, that he had been "sentenced" by the British Government to "complete political extinction," and that he had never purged himself or been absolved from the crime, although the sentence was, after eight years' enforcement, partially remitted. Sir Richard Meade did not even think it necessary to whitewash this bankrupt in character before forcing him as a partner on a statesman of illustrious antecedents and stainless reputation.

Immediately after the decease of the Ameer-i-Kabeer, the Nawab, Sir Salar Jung, informed the Resident that, notwithstanding the honourable and conciliatory disposition of his late colleague, there had been some practical inconveniences in the semblance of a dual executive, which under less favourable circumstances might become very serious. It was his opinion, therefore, taking also into consideration the youth of the four noblemen occupying places in the Ministry, and certain objections applying to each of them, that it would be more for the public good in every way if he were able to consult them all on an equal footing as councillors than if he were obliged to single out one of them to be Co-Regent. The Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra was considered, as a matter of course, to be quite ineligible. But by about the middle of May 1877 it became evident that he was to be set up by the Resident as being alone eligible. Sir Salar Jung, doubtless never dreaming that the Resident would seriously push the candidature of such a nominee, abstained as long as possible from going fully into the question of his character and conduct. He chiefly dwelt at first on Wikar-ool-Oomra's utter incompetence and on the incompatibility of the views and practices he had constantly promoted with those of the existing administration. He reminded the Resident of the fact, easily verified by inquiry in the right quarters, that so notorious was Wikar-ool-Oomra's evil disposition that he had no respectable adherents, and that even in the palace household, where his relationship gave him such advantages, he had no influence whatever.

As the Resident's object became more clearly defined, and his determination to effect it more evident, Sir Salar Jung recalled to his recollection the strong opinion as to Wikar-ool-Oomra's unfitness always expressed by the late Ameer-i-Kabeer, his elder half-brother, even to the last act of making a will bequeathing, so far as he could dispose of matters requiring sovereign decision, his title and estates to the nephews whom he had adopted as his sons, and nominating one of them—Busheer-ood-Dowla, grandson of one Nizam and brother-in-law of the reigning Prince—to succeed him as Co-Regent. This nomination was made in accordance with the despatch of the Government of India, No. 394, dated 22nd March 1869, all the injunctions of which were in fact neglected or violated by Lord Lytton's Government

\* Paragraph 10 of letter from the Government of India to the Resident, No. 394A, dated 22nd of March 1869.

in 1877. If we add to the tried and approved qualifications of Busheer-ood-Dowla the possession of an unsullied character, his known loyalty to both Governments, and the certainty of his harmonious co-operation with the surviving member of the Regency, it will seem very strange that he should have been summarily set aside, by the British authorities of all people, in favour of his half-uncle, who was remarkable only for every opposite quality, and for every possible disqualification. It will not, however, seem so strange on the supposition, of which we shall soon make a certainty, that harmonious co-operation was exactly what the Resident did not desire, that what he wanted was not a colleague for the Minister, but a clog.

Sir Richard Meade, when recommending Wikar-ool-Oomra for the position of Co-Regent, was fully acquainted with that nobleman's previous history, with the proscription, from which he had been but partially relieved, in 1869, and with very recent instances of his incurable hostility to the cause of good order and to the first principles of regular government. The more serious and unequivocal instances of Wikar-ool-Oomra's misconduct were on record in our own archives; the plot for the personation of the Resident's wife by the woman Murray in 1861, with all its incidents of bribery and deception, had been judicially investigated at the Residency. It was on being "found guilty" of this corrupt and nefarious intrigue that the sentence of "complete political extinction" had been pronounced against Wikar-ool-Oomra. Moreover, the records of Sir Richard Meade's own office accused Wikar-ool-Oomra of having been closely connected with Moulvie Ala-ood-deen, who organized the attack on the Residency in 1857, which had it been successful would have spread the flames of the Mutiny over all Southern India; of having, in 1858, harboured and comforted mutineers and rebels against the British Government, and of having on several other occasions been suspiciously allied with disaffected persons and even with dangerous criminals. For example, the Resident was reminded that, even as late as the previous year 1876, when a body of 1,000 Pathans were expelled from the city of Hyderabad because some of them were implicated in the assassination of the young Nizam's religious teacher, Wikar-ool-Oomra sent for two of the reputed ringleaders, took them under his own protection, in his own household, and actually had one of them privately presented to the Nizam, without the knowledge and expressly in contempt of the Minister. When at length it was reported that others of the same fanatical band were about to be brought into the palace, under Wikar-ool-Oomra's patronage, to present their homage to the young Nizam, Sir Salar Jung was obliged to interfere, and to warn all concerned in these proceedings that Wikar-ool-Oomra, in spite of his rank and position, had no public functions or authority in the State.

In case the Viceroy in Council should express a decided opinion that the Minister ought not to remain sole head of the Executive Government, Sir Salar Jung had declared that he was willing to associate Busheer-ood-Dowlah with himself in the Regency, or to establish a Council of State. But the Viceroy in Council expressed no decided opinion at all, and made no direct communication on the subject of the Regency from the death of the Ameer-i-Kabeer in April until the 28th of August 1877, when the Resident suddenly wrote to inform the Minister that he had received the "final" orders of the Government as to the new scheme of administration, and that Wikar-ool-Oomra, now to be entitled Ameer-i-Kabeer in succession to his half-brother, must be appointed Co-Regent. Of course Sir Salar Jung declined to take any part in such an appointment, or to accept any responsibility for it whatever; whereupon the Resident angrily threatened that he would, in the name of the British Government, summon the nobles of the Hyderabad State to assemble, and would announce to them that the Ameer-i-Kabeer was appointed to be Co-Regent. Such a blow, at the internal independence of the Hyderabad State was clearly contrary to the stipulations of existing treaties.

At this very critical conjuncture (about the 22nd of September 1877) Sir Richard Meade took a trip by railway, to a junction station about 120 miles from Hyderabad, to pay a flying visit to Lord Lytton, who was on his way to Mysore. On the Resident's return a message was conveyed to Sir Salar Jung, we may be sure by an indirect channel, to the effect that, full powers having now been obtained

from the Viceroy, if he again refused to acquiesce in the "final orders," *his arrest and deportation to Madras* by a special train, on the Nizam's own State railway, would follow. When one of these master-strokes of "political" cajolery or coercion is undertaken, the communication is always verbal if possible, or, if anything must be written, a private and familiar note from an inferior hand is chosen, and the official form avoided.\* We are not, therefore, in a position to give absolute proof of the authenticity or authority of this disgraceful threat, the reality of which was widely talked of in Hyderabad; but although we do not believe the actual perpetration of the outrage to have been intended, Sir Salar Jung himself undoubtedly believed it. Having already been told that a man of the character and antecedents of Wikar-ool-Oomra would be installed, in defiance of the Durbar, without pretext or warrant, he no doubt assumed that the Resident had full permission to proceed to any extremities, and may well have argued that his duty now lay in submission; for if he resisted until he was made a prisoner the administrative independence of the State would be utterly destroyed, and the reign of unrestrained reaction and corruption instituted. The calculation on which the menace was hazarded proved to be correct. The Minister gave in. He intimated that as the Resident had taken upon himself to inform the Ameer-i-Kabeer that he was to be Co-Regent he would endeavour to act with him, but he disclaimed all responsibility for the appointment, or for the conduct of the Residency nominee after his elevation to power. The Ameer-i-Kabeer was installed at a durbar in the palace on the 29th of September 1877, in the presence of the Resident and of the youthful Nizam.

Only a short time elapsed before the true and only object of this retrogressive and violent intervention was triumphantly displayed. A paper was prepared at the Residency pledging both the Regents neither to agitate the question of the Berars and the Contingent, nor to solicit more specific replies to the claims yet unanswered, until the young Nizam should have attained his majority. This paper—we may be sure already signed by the Ameer-i-Kabeer—was presented for acceptance to Sir Salar Jung. He seems to have signed it, if not without reluctance, at least without hesitation. He could not act alone in a Regency of two, or rather as a minority in a Council of three. He was now chained to a colleague who was the Resident's creature; but he still possessed one element of strength in the person of his English Private Secretary. This gentleman, the son of Colonel Oliphant, formerly Chairman of the Court of Directors, was alike by his own character and the traditions of his family above the faintest suspicion of intrigue or disloyalty against our Government; but he had rendered himself obnoxious to the Resident by certain acts of honest duty to his own employer. He had helped the Minister to prepare his Berar appeals. He had successfully resisted an attempt made at the Delhi Imperial Assemblage to extort admissions from the Regents of a nature at variance with the solemnly recorded treaty rights of the Hyderabad State. He had rendered clerical aid in conducting the Minister's case against the appointment of Wikar-ool-Oomra; and, lastly, he had ventured to send copies of some letters on these topics to several high-placed friends in this country. So determined was the Resident to cut off Sir Salar Jung from the possession of even literary assistance that—throwing not only treaty rights, but even common decency, to the winds—he peremptorily ordered the Minister to dismiss his Secretary, and dismissed he was.

And now the Resident was fully prepared for the arrival from the India Office of the reply to the complete statement of the Berar case which, under the sanction of Lord Salisbury, had been submitted to the Viceroy after the Delhi Imperial Assemblage. The Secretary of State kept it by him for about eight months, but being urged to pass a draft disposing of it before he moved from the India Office to the Foreign Department, and not to leave it to his successor, a despatch dated the 28th of March 1878, prepared by the permanent officials, was addressed to the Government of India. In this despatch the specific request that the Contingent should be

\* See Captain Davidson's note threatening military occupation, *ante*, p. 445, and compare the letter which Captain Grey was made to write for Lord Lytton in the hope of deluding the Ameer Sher Ali to come to Delhi.—'Further Afghan Papers' (c. 2191 of 1878), p. 9.



abolished, which formed the whole subject-matter of the prayer in the Nizam's memorial, was not even alluded to. The omission was glaring, and would have called forth a rejoinder under any ordinary circumstances, as a matter of course. The only practical suggestion in this letter harmonized with the terms already imposed by the Resident, viz., that the consideration of all the claims of the Hyderabad State should be postponed until the Nizam came of age. As the Minister was now effectually fettered by means of the appointment of the Ameer-i-Kabeer and the dismissal of Mr. Oliphant, the communication of this despatch to him in May was almost a superfluous form.

On what principle of public law, or on what moral grounds, the Regency of Hyderabad could be asked to suspend, during the Nizam's minority, the appeal for the Berars, or how the Government of India could be justified in refusing, during the same interval, to answer or to hear that appeal, has never been explained, and still demands explanation. It could hardly be right for the Minister to be negligent because the Nizam was a child. It could hardly be right for the Government of India to be unmindful or intolerant of a claim to justice because the claimant was very young. At all events, to attain the ends in view by dragging from his well-merited obscurity to the highest post of political power in the State a man possessed of every disqualification save the single one that he was willing to do our bidding in shelving for a time an unanswerable claim for justice is to admit that we are prepared to sacrifice our most loyal friends, and the interests and safety of a whole people, by the help and for the profit of the disloyal, the moment that some ignoble and temporary advantage can be gained by doing so.

### PART III.

#### THE BRITISH RESIDENT.

It might reasonably have been hoped that the circumstances attending the appointment of this Wikar-ool-Oomra to the office of Co-Regent of the State would have made the British authorities exceedingly cautious and watchful as to his discharge of its powers. He had been taken by them out of obscurity for a distinctly immoral—but special—purpose, and placed in a position which Sir Salar Jung had warned them “he would at once attempt to abuse to his own advantage.” Knowing what would follow, Sir Salar Jung distinctly and formally warned the Resident that he (Sir Salar Jung) “must not be held responsible for the Ameer's acts.” Had it been even justifiable for the Resident to bring forward as candidate for the Co-Regency a man whose hostility to Sir Salar Jung was notoriously his sole recommendation in the eyes of our officials, common prudence suggested the propriety of looking well after him when he was once installed. He was appointed only to silence the remonstrances of Sir Salar Jung on the subject of his sovereign's alienated districts. To suppress these remonstrances, the British Resident had condescended to hector, and prevaricate, and deceive the old and tried Minister, our faithful friend, with threats of deposing and even imprisoning him—threats which even the Government of Lord Lytton would not have dared to carry into effect, as to have done so would have at once produced that exposure of their policy which they dread, and which we have resolved to make. The appointment having accomplished its specific purpose, common prudence suggested, we say, that the Co-Regent should have been suffered to do no more. To permit him to follow his own bent, and disclose those bad features of his character with which the Resident well knew he was credited, seemed purposeless and insane. There was every inducement, one would have thought, to show that, as Co-Regent, he would be made by the Resident to do the ordinary work of his place with the minimum of public scandal. The Resident's own honour, as well as the character of the Supreme Government, required that the man should be carefully prevented from abusing his newly acquired power for his own aggrandizement. The Resident had given solemn and reiterated assurances both to Sir Salar Jung and to the Ameer's nephews (the heirs of his deceased half-brother) that if they would waive their superior claim to succeed to the title of “Shums-ool-Oomra,” and to the office of Co-Regent, in the Ameer's favour, he would lay no claim, on the ground of title or office, to any part of the property or



estates in their possession as his half-brother's heirs. It was the younger of these nephews, the nobleman who had acted as Co-Regent during Sir Salar Jung's tour to Europe, and was Minister of Justice, who ought to have been selected by us (if any) ; but then he would have been of no use for the special purpose that the Resident had in hand.

It is necessary to explain here that Wikar-ool-Oomra is the last survivor of three brothers. They were, all three, sons of the same father, who was the premier noble of the Hyderabad State, and whose first wife was a daughter of His Highness the Nizam, and of her were born, in regular marriage, the two elder brothers of the present Ameer. The Ameer himself is the son of a woman of inferior rank altogether, and was consequently half-brother only to the two elder deceased sons. The eldest of the three was Co-Regent and colleague of Sir Salar Jung, and died in 1877. He left no issue, but had adopted the sons of his younger brother, who had predeceased him. The family now consisted of the present Ameer and the two sons left by his second half-brother. These two young men are of superior rank altogether to their half-uncle, the Ameer, and inherited the vast estates and possessions of his two elder brothers both by descent and adoption. Their revenues amounted, it is believed, to about twenty lakhs annually. The Ameer, Wikar-ool-Oomra, possessed simply his own estates, but these also were very large, yielding an income of about £100,000 a year.

Very soon after the Ameer's appointment his power to sway Sir Richard Meade became evident. Confident of the Resident's support, and intoxicated with the power conferred upon him, he quickly determined to wrest from his nephews the very property inherited by them from their father and uncle, which Sir Richard Meade had pledged himself should be respected. The young men urged these pledges upon the Resident, and upon his Assistant, Major Euan Smith. The Resident was bound, they pointed out, to make the Ameer respect his pledges, for he was a party to them, in the way we have already described. They had withdrawn their own candidature, and their opposition to the Ameer's appointment to the Co-Regency, on the faith of the Resident's assurances that no attempt should be made by the Ameer on their possessions. In defiance of all these pledges, the Ameer, shortly after his appointment, made a demand upon them, for which he did not even allege a pretext, for the transfer to himself of estates yielding a revenue of £25,000 a year ; and the Resident urged the nephews to let him have their property "for the sake of not creating strife."<sup>\*</sup> We make no comment upon the transaction.

The success of his first operation opened the Ameer's eyes to the full value of a British Resident whom he could thus use to disarm resistance against his exactions. He now asserted that he was in want of ready money, and straightway made a requisition† of £50,000 upon the young men for the "support of his dignity." The Residency screw was again applied‡ on his behalf, and the money paid, in the vain hope that exaction would be carried no further without being finally stopped by a British officer of the high rank of the Hyderabad Resident, holding the blue ribbon of the Indian political service.

But the robbery of the £50,000 was hardly effected than another demand followed. The claim now made upon his nephews' inheritance was for the magnificent suburban house and grounds, with hanging gardens, artificial lakes, and labyrinths, called the Jehan-nooma, the most attractive place of Hyderabad. Incredible as it must seem, the Resident supported the monstrous exaction, and once more had the hapless nephews to submit. Two conditions, however, were now distinctly stipulated, viz. : First, that the Jehan-nooma should be possessed by the Ameer only as an appanage to the title of "Shums-ool-Oomra ;" and secondly, that this so-called "voluntary assignment," but actual robbery, should be the last of the Ameer's claims upon them, and that he should make no attempt upon "the other estates in the possession of his nephews." Major Euan Smith, the Assistant Resident, was "virtually the arbitrator" in this precious "settlement,"§ under the

\* See their Memorial, para. 12.

† See Memorial, para. 12 (b).

‡ See Memorial, para. 12 (b).

§ See Memorial, para. 13.

control and responsibility, of course, of the Resident. The Ameer's representative in these delicate negotiations with the Residency was the son of a Parsee shopkeeper, one Shapoorjee, who had suddenly sprung into great favour at the Residency,<sup>\*</sup> and the *pourparlers* on these matters occupied the first six months of the Ameer's reign as Co-Regent, from September 1877 to the end of March 1878. The Resident may at last have hoped that his *protégé*, the Ameer, would be satiated with the success attending the despoiling of his nephews, and that Major Euan Smith's arrangement with him that there were to be no more exactions upon them, ratified on the 9th April 1878, would be respected. Sir Richard Meade may be credited with sincerity when he piously exclaimed "Alhamd-ool-illah !" (" God be praised !") upon being informed to this effect by the Ameer himself.†

But Wikar-ool-Oomra divined that his power to use the British Resident was by no means exhausted. His appetite "grew by what it fed on."‡ The Resident was to be a party to complicity in outrage on a grander scale. Two of the principal estates remaining to the nephews, yielding a rental of £40,000 a year, were in charge of one Mahomed Shookoor, their servant. In January 1879 the Ameer seduced this man from his allegiance, and concerted measures with him for the transfer of the entire territory to his own possession. The districts, almost as large as provinces, could be seized only by military force, and the very magnitude of the robbery inspired his nephews with a belief that the Resident would interpose to veto the spoliations, now that they were approaching to civil war. When, therefore, a proclamation was issued in the districts in the name of the Ameer that the property was his, and he began to send out large bodies of mercenary troops and "large quantities of arms and ammunition,"§ the nephews did no more than communicate the startling news to the Minister, Sir Salar Jung, and then to the Resident, by letter dated 11th June 1879, which stated that "the matter is placed officially before the Resident, so as to prevent bloodshed." The reply of the infatuated officer, dated 13th June, consisted of a direct refusal to receive their representation on the subject, thereby simply giving a *carte blanche* to the Ameer to do what he pleased. The nephews at last ordered a body of troops to advance to the imperilled districts. Sir Salar Jung, unable to contend against the coalition between his hostile colleague the Ameer and the Resident, was powerless to prevent the wrong, but, afraid of a civil war, which would have been set down at once to the discredit of the State, instead of the Resident, he, sorely against the grain, but wisely, counselled the nephews to halt their troops. The Ameer advanced and seized everything. No word of remonstrance was uttered by the Resident, who was saved having to answer for a disaster that might have kindled a wide-spread flame by the rare moderation of the aggrieved party, whom he was permitting the Ameer to despoil.

The inhabitants of the districts thus overrun by Arab and Rohilla mercenaries, knowing well that it was only with the Resident's support that the Ameer could have dared for one moment to enter on such proceedings, addressed an urgent petition|| to the Resident, representing the state to which they were reduced by the incursion. The Ameer's troops were "pulling down their houses for firewood, foraging their horses on their harvests, loopholing their principal buildings, ravishing their women shamefully, and without distinguishing between respectable women and those who are not such;" and adding, "at present one or two women are in a dying state from the harsh usage committed on their persons by the Rohillas."

To this memorial Sir Richard Meade replied by an endorsement, but not until five days after its receipt, as follows: "Petitioners are informed that they can make their own representations to His Highness's Government, or the several Nawabs named by them. The Resident cannot interfere, as he has no knowledge of the facts."

This was again a *carte blanche* to the Ameer; for, as Sir Richard well knew, he had himself made the Ameer "His Highness's Government." Petition after

\* See Memorial, para. 13.

† See Memorial, para. 13.

‡ See Memorial, para. 15.

§ See Memorial, para. 20.

|| Memorial, para. 28.

petition was sent in to Sir Salar Jung, entreating that the Resident might be called on by His Highness's Government to interfere ; but as the Ameer and the Resident were practically "His Highness's Government" Sir Salar Jung could not move, and "His Highness's Government" declined to put one of its two members on trial before itself.

The reply of the Resident to the cry of the villagers having been received the way to further spoliation was easy. The next month another body of mercenaries was sent by the Ameer to seize other estates, yielding a revenue of about £12,000 per annum. Taught by experience, the nephews could now trust to the sword only to defend their remaining possessions. They at once occupied the threatened districts in force. An attack was made by the Ameer's mercenaries on a powder magazine at the important town of Shumsabad, but was repulsed. The flame of actual civil war thus once again threatened the State, while the British Resident stood by, uttering no word of moderation or warning to the aggressor. Sir Salar Jung made strenuous efforts to effect a pacification, but was only able to do so by again entreating, and finally persuading, the wronged parties to submit.

The young Princes at last abandoned the idea of armed resistance under pressure of the Minister's solicitations. Their spoliation was complete. The Ameer had possessed himself by open violence, attended with the outrages we have described, of estates, to which he had no shadow of title, yielding a revenue of about £100,000 a year. The young noblemen who had been thus despoiled now put their case into the hands of an English barrister of the High Court of Bombay, and that gentleman, Mr. Tyrrell Leith, proceeded to Hyderabad and sought an interview with Sir Richard Meade, to ascertain, if possible, upon what grounds he had connived at their spoliation. It would serve no useful purpose, and would only weary our readers, to narrate the mockery of judicial procedure which followed upon Mr. Leith's appearance. Sir Richard Meade refused even to see him, but advised the Nizam's Government—that is, the Ameer—to institute at once a so-called inquiry, not into the lawfulness of the proceedings by which he had plundered his nephews, but calling upon the nephews to *disprove* the genuineness of a scrap of paper which the Ameer at the last moment, and but three days before Mr. Leith's arrival, professed to have found in the palace of the late Nizam, directing that the two estates *last seized* should be transferred to himself upon the death of his half-brother. Not one word had been heard of this scrap of paper till now. The estates had been seized without pretext, by open violence, under the eyes of the Resident, and with his palpable connivance ; and but for Sir Salar Jung's counsels and influence the outrage would have thrown the Nizam's country into anarchy, and undone the Minister's labours of the last twenty years. Not one word of the Ameer's proceedings did Sir Richard Meade report to the Government of India ; and we need hardly say that neither Her Majesty's Government in Downing Street, nor the Parliament and people of this country, would ever have heard of them but for our full determination that they should be known. All that Sir Richard Meade could do, by countenancing the Ameer in his proceedings, he has done, to plunge the country into a state of civil war, when the world would have been asked how it was possible for us to give back the Berars to a rule such as the Nizam's. At the last moment, we say, and but three days before Mr. Leith arrived at Hyderabad, the Ameer professed to have discovered, in a box that had been lying somewhere in the palace for twenty years, the scrap of paper on which he based an *ex post facto* justification of his last act of lawless violence. It was literally a loose scrap of paper. No one could recognize the handwriting, and the paper bore no signature whatever. It was an anonymous memorandum alleging that one Mama Peeroo, a servant of the palace (now dead), came on the 14th October 1857 from within the women's apartments and told one Mahomed Kajah, a man-servant of the palace (also now dead), who in turn told the unknown writer of this precious memorandum, that [presumably by the Nizam's orders] the two districts (which the Ameer had last seized) should be his after the death of his half-brother ! We feel that the statement is incredible when we add that the British Resident at once accepted the memorandum as complete justification *ex post*

*facto* of the Ameer's robberies ; challenged the despoiled Princes to disprove it ; hurried forward, in the most shamelessly indecent way, what he called a judicial inquiry into the facts, before a tribunal that he well knew did not dare to oppose either the Ameer or himself, and from which he directed the English barrister to be rigorously excluded ; openly coached the judge at all stages, writing to him that his inquiry "*may* clear up the case in a way favourable to the plaintiffs *which is not now apparent*," and finally pronounced his complete satisfaction with the dictum of this tribunal, which was that, as the despoiled nephews *could not disprove the authenticity of the scrap of paper* which the Ameer brought forward in justification of his title *ex post facto*, the property should remain in the possession of the plunderer ! We are abbreviating the story to the utmost, for the reasons we have already given. No more scandalous perversion of justice was ever associated with the administration of a civilized government. The result is that in the State of Hyderabad, and in every part of India where the facts are known, the very idea of justice emanating from a British officer is scoffed and jeered at ; and we now expressly charge Sir Richard Meade with inflicting this shame upon our nation.

Conscious of the true character of the proceedings, the Resident would seem to have succeeded in keeping all knowledge of them from the Calcutta Foreign Office. At all events that office has shown no sign, although an appeal was addressed to it by the despoiled Princes more than a year ago. The appeal had to go through Sir Richard Meade's own hands, as Resident, in the usual routine order by which justice is made impossible in India. The memorial, if ever sent forward at all by him, would be sure to be accompanied in the customary official way by representations that would prevent any review or reversal of his proceedings. And unless, as Anglo-Indian publicists, we have the courage to lay the history of such transactions bare they can never be heard of at all. The most melancholy part of the story to ourselves is the fact that Sir Salar Jung allowed himself to be betrayed into a seeming agreement with the Resident and the Ameer in these proceedings. The truth is one would need to be oneself in the position of this great but unfortunate Minister to understand the dangers and embarrassments that environ him. Hemmed in on all hands, by the power of the British Resident and the creatures of the Co-Regent, he has carried his policy of retirement and conciliation to most undue lengths. At all events, we can allow no regard for Sir Salar Jung, nor even the sense we have of what we owe to him as a nation, to make us hush up the proceedings which have so deeply disgraced the British name at Hyderabad of late years. Who can wonder that the ex-Resident's name is associated with rumours of the most painful character in that city ? We shall not conceal, for we ought not to conceal, the fact that rumours have been prevalent at Hyderabad for the past three years which, unless explained, are fatal to the character both of the Resident and of Major Euan Smith. Incidents, the full particulars of which are in our possession, which demand explanation, and which may be explainable as innocent on their merits, though hardly defensible in any case against the charge of unaccountable imprudence, are necessarily invested by public suspicion with the most sinister aspects, especially when there is on the face of the transactions generally so much that is difficult to account for. Sir Salar Jung weakly consented to allow his own nephew to be appointed to conduct the mock inquiry set up to justify the Ameer's robberies ; but no one in Hyderabad suspects Sir Salar Jung, or his nephew, of anything more than bowing to the sinister influences that have ruled the State since the Ameer was appointed, at the instigation of the Resident, to the supreme power. For unworthy purposes this Ameer has been set up as practically the ruler of Hyderabad, and the result is the reintroduction of the lawlessness of past times. Unhappily, another result may prove to be the ruin of the young Nizam ; for melancholy stories have reached the Government of India itself of the effect produced on the boy Prince by the influences with which he is surrounded. For it must be added that, as if to consummate the injustice inflicted upon them, the two despoiled Princes, who, as the premier nobles of the land, are his natural companions, have been, from the time their spoliation began, excluded—of course, again with the concurrence of the Resident—from the Nizam's Court, and even prohibited,

as though they were criminals, from appearing on public occasions. The effect has been equivalent to their social disgrace in the eyes of all the nobles and people of Hyderabad, without pretext of any sort for the dishonour. So keenly did the elder of the two Princes feel the bitterness of their position, that he died a few months ago heartbroken, and he was permitted to die without even knowing whether his appeal against the Resident's injustice had ever reached the Government of India or not. Incredible as the statement is, it is the fact that this Wikar-ool-Oomra, this Ameer, the Resident's creature, was allowed even to outrage the young nobleman's remains, and to prevent by an armed force of 80 men their being interred beside his father's grave. With Sir Richard Meade in London, we demand that these charges against him should be inquired into, for the honour of the nation, and the reform of our Indian administration.

We have reached the end of this "tale of shame" as far as it has as yet gone. For our own selfish purposes, we have forced a second Chundoo Loll upon the Nizam's administration. The Calcutta officials set up the former one simply to compel the Nizam to provide them with the monstrous "preserve" of patronage known as the Hyderabad Contingent Force, with its five brigadiers and brigade staffs for cushioning their sons and nephews upon. And they have now set up another to make their hold upon the Berars, with its highly-paid appointments, as secure as the Ameer's tenure of power can make it. They will never give the Provinces back but under imperative orders from home. To retain their hold upon them, they have plunged the Hyderabad State back into lawlessness, and outraged in the grossest manner the one native Indian statesman to whom the English nation owes what it can never repay.

STATESMAN (London), *September 30, 1881*.—Here is a very nice story, that has

in abolishing, in 1874, the Southern Salt Line, which crossed the border of Berar as our own provinces, we thought it desirable to close the native salt wells in the former, from which the people of Berar up to that time partly drew their supplies. Now we administer Berar in trust for the Nizam, and we settled in 1873-74 that these salt wells should be closed, and that the Nizam's revenues should be credited £30,000 a year, as his share of the increased income we were henceforward to derive from the people of Berar being forced to use our heavily excised Bombay salt, imported into Berar by railway. Can it, then, be believed possible that after crediting the Nizam this amount for a year or two the credit was quietly ordered from Calcutta to be stopped? And it has been stopped ever since. The order came, we believe, from the Accountant-General. Since 1876-77, and after making the Nizam pay compensation out of his own revenues to the owners of the salt wells we shut up in our own interests, we have appropriated *his* share of the revenue as well as our own. We do not know whether Sir Salar Jung has remonstrated or not. We did not learn the fact from him, and the story will be deemed incredible by most persons in this country. But it is, we believe, true, for all that. Her Majesty's Secretary of State, of course, knows nothing about it, nor the India Office. Such things are never reported to the India Office. Let Parliament but appoint a Select Committee next Session to inquire into the circumstances attendant upon the abolition of these Salt Lines, and if it summon but the right witnesses before it, from Sir John Strachey downwards, the true *morale* of British rule in India will come upon the nation as a very unpleasant surprise.

There should be a further Committee to inquire into our execution of the trust we undertook in the administration of the Berars. We affirm its execution to have been marked throughout by a series of almost incredible frauds. These are hard words, but they are neither intemperate nor ill-considered. Our uncontrolled, irresponsible expenditure of the revenues of Berar has long since degenerated into the grossest and most

open fraud upon those revenues, for purposes of pure jobbery and our own aggrandizement. We cannot enlarge upon the subject, but may note a fact or two of the history. First of all, then, we promised the Nizam in 1861, after instituting a formal inquiry by Commission, that the expenses of administering his revenues should not exceed 25 per cent. of their gross amount. We have run it up, upon one pretence or another, to 50 per cent. ! We settled, in the next place, that the cash balances of the province need never exceed £130,000. We have run it up to £400,000, that we may use the Nizam's money and economize our own. We have so multiplied appointments and augmented the salaries of our European officers in the Berars that there is to-day a larger and much more costly staff of English officers there than there was in all three provinces of Nuldroog, the Raichore Doab, and the Berars together when we entered upon the trust. Now, these are simple facts upon the face of our administration. Our execution of the self-imposed trust is a gigantic fraud, that we may evade paying over to the Nizam's treasury the surplus revenues of the province. And if the young Nizam's Minister is reckless enough to "kick against the pricks," to remonstrate, or to ask for explanation, let him look out. They know very well at Calcutta how to deal with a Native Minister who ventures to question the justice of their decisions in their own interests, and can always put their hand upon a Sir Richard Meade, if they cannot count upon a Wikar-ool-Oomra, to reduce him to discreet acquiescence in their arrangements. We write bitterly, for we are nearly in despair, standing, as we have stood for twenty-five years, nearly alone in the demand that England should rule India justly, and in a way worthy of herself.

When the provinces were first taken from the Nizam in 1853, we promised to render him an annual account of their revenues, and to pay over to him any surplus there might be, after defraying the expenses of their administration. The promise was not fulfilled. No accounts were rendered him, no surplus paid to him. Colonel Low had engaged, in 1853, that the expenses of the civil administration should not exceed  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the gross revenues ; and in 1861 our own Commission appointed to report upon the matter emphatically recorded their opinion that "the civil charges ought never to exceed 25 per cent. on the revenue, and," they added, "we recommend that this rule should be rigidly adhered to." Now let any member of the House of Commons ask Lord Hartington, next session, what the expenditure has really been, and he will find that, instead of the promised  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of 1853, or even the rigid limit of 25 per cent. of 1861, the expenditure is 50 to 51 per cent. Let it be remembered simultaneously that we admit we are administering these provinces as a trust for the young Nizam, and that the Government of India resents the charge that they have in any sense "annexed" them. Well, so scrupulously is the trust discharged that while we contrive to keep down the expenses of our own costly civil administration in British territories to 25 per cent. we have quietly run them up in Berar to 50 to 51 per cent. We say quietly, because it is done in that way. There is no one to remark upon it, no one to remonstrate against it. The Indian Press cares nothing about it ; the Nizam's Minister dare say nothing about it ; Parliament knows nothing about it, and the India Office shuts its eyes to it, or goes to sleep over it. But how does it arise? Simply enough. The Berars have become a great preserve of patronage in the hands of Calcutta officials ; and as the Nizam unwisely surrendered his right to *limit* the expenses of the administration under the supplemental treaty of 1860 our officials have gradually got rid of all sense of responsibility in the execution of their trust. The very fact that the Nizam has surrendered to us his right to limit the expenditure, instead of making us more jealous of his interests, has led us to throw all considerations of good faith towards him to the winds. Appointments for European officers in the Berars have been so multiplied since 1861, and salaries so augmented, that, although the two districts of Nuldroog and the Raichore Doab were restored to the Nizam in that year, we have to-day positively a larger and much more costly establishment of English officers in the Berars alone, than we

had in all three provinces in 1860 ! Now let Parliament consider this one fact, and let some of its members interrogate Lord Hartington upon the subject. Lord Hartington will be just as much surprised as his interrogators to find that what we say is true. And can we wonder that Calcutta tightens its grasp upon the provinces, crows the Nizam's Minister into silence by secret threatenings and open insult, and would fain persuade the world that the *Statesman* is a libellous and incendiary paper, that should be suppressed in the interests of the empire ? We are simply trustees of the young Nizam ; but we obtained an engagement from his father that he would impose no restrictions upon our administration. There is thus everything in the nature of the trust to awaken a sense of responsibility, and to compel us to exercise the utmost good faith in its discharge ; while the bitter libel must be told that we are acting as utter swindlers towards the Prince who reposed this faith in us. Is it really not possible to call up a blush of shame upon some man's face in the House, and make him angrily demand if these things be true ? We have seen what they have done on the revenue side of the accounts in quietly diverting £30,000 a year of his salt revenue from the Nizam's treasury to our own. It is done "quietly," we say. There is no one to speak about it, no one who knows about it, except the knot of demoralized "officials" in Calcutta, and their victim at Hyderabad ; and woe to the latter if he groans loud enough to make himself heard !

The same officials have quietly increased the strength of the Contingent Force by 1,000 men, and imposed the cost as an additional burden upon the Nizam's revenues. It is not enough that the Force ought long since to have been disbanded or incorporated into our own Army, as useless for local purposes, and existing in idleness from one decade to another, in so far as the Nizam is concerned. Without pretext or provocation of any kind except the surplus revenues in their hands, they quietly add 1,000 men to the strength of the Force, without the knowledge of any one but the few who are personally interested in the new appointments to be made, and the victim at whose expense the wrong is done. The Berars are the richest provinces of the young Nizam's kingdom, and it is to their surplus revenues that his Ministers legitimately look for developing the resources of the poorer ones. But they look in vain, because of our dishonesty. If we had but administered the Berars uprightly, and handed over to Sir Salar Jung every year the surplus revenues the provinces have yielded for many years past, he would have made the Hyderabad State the model State of India. But *that* is precisely what our Calcutta officials are determined shall not be done. It does not suit them to see our own rule contrasted to heavy disadvantage with that of a Native State. There are thus very complicated motives at work to make the restitution of the province a hateful idea to the Calcutta official. He will fight to the death to prevent it ; and, unless we can interest Parliament in the wrong, he will succeed, unprincipled as his whole course has been. Now these charges are specific and plain statements. They are either true or false, and Lord Hartington must be pressed for an explicit and categorical reply to each of them, when Parliament reassembles. We seized the provinces in 1853—the very cream of the Nizam's territories—upon the false pretence that the Prince owed us a debt of £400,000. It was false within the knowledge of our own officers who were the instruments of the wrong. The Nizam owed us nothing. Had the accounts been made up honestly, we were debtors to him and his subjects, pillaged by our extortions, to an enormous amount. We professed, however, that he owed us £400,000, and we long since paid ourselves the amount, out of the revenues we sequestrated for the purpose. But having got the territorial guarantee, we are determined, like good and honest men, not to give it back, although there is no pretence of any debt being owing now. On the contrary, and in spite of the most scandalous jobbery of the revenues, we have £400,000 in our hands that we pretend are the cash balances of the provinces. The Nizam's Minister even offered to pay down a capital sum of money the interest of which alone would suffice permanently to cover the cost of the Force we have dishonestly imposed upon



the Prince ; but the Calcutta officials declined to receive even that. It was not the £400,000 that was ever wanted by Calcutta ; what they wanted was the territory. It was Naboth's vineyard that they coveted, and having got it they will hold it at any expense whatever to the national character and honour.

*Extracts from Chapter XVIII. of Edwin Arnold's "Marquis of Dalhousie's Administration of British India."*

It was in the end of 1853, then, when the Burmese war was well settled, and the vast machine of the empire was falling again into the brief regularity of peace, that the eye of the Marquis of Dalhousie, traversing the map of India, lighted on that central portion of it named "the Nizam's dominions." In that day these included the rich red and black soil about Omrawattee, the metropolis of the cotton fields which have since rescued Manchester from her shameful partnership with the slavedrivers. It included Berar and Pal Ghaut, the fattest and most fertile tract, perhaps, in Central Hindostan, where poppy-heads and cotton-pods may be grown bigger than anywhere in the world. It included, too, the Raichore Doab, between the Tombudra and Upper Krishna rivers—a country almost as fruitful as the Berar district, and admirably irrigated by tanks and wells. But "the Nizam's dominions" include these no longer, thanks to the roving eye of the Viceroy—not on account of bad government or for unpopularity, so far as is recorded, but through the incapacity for accounts and book-keeping by double-entry shown by the Nizam of Hyderabad.

The Nizam came into our power by a process which has been often and successfully repeated in our Indian annals. There is a curious phenomenon in the insect world,\* where an egg is deposited in the body of a living creature, which nourishes itself upon the substance of its unwilling nurse, gradually taking up all the fat, flesh, and tissues of the victim, till it dies, or drags on a futile existence. Our Government in India has frequently laid such an egg, in the shape of "a contingent," within the confines of friendly States. Oudh, Gwalior, and the territories of Scindia were thus treated, and by no other means were the dominions of the Nizam brought within the grasp of Lord Dalhousie. When the power of Tippoo Saheb had just been destroyed, the Nizam, for his friendship with the English, was menaced by native princes upon more than one side. Mr. Russell, the then Resident of Hyderabad, took pains that the peril should not be overlooked ; and Chundoo Lall, the native minister, listened with fear and credulity when he was told that the Mahrattas were powerful, that the Rajah of Berar meditated attack, and that Holkar and Scindia had large armies ready to move. Thus the contingent force was saddled upon the Nizamate ; and it is worth remarking that no formal recognition of it by either the Company or the Nizam was ever produced. Lord Dalhousie knew as much, and in reply to the Nizam's question on a certain occasion, "Why the contingent was kept up longer than the proceedings of the Hindoo princes threatened war" he has written, "I, for my part, can never consent, as an honest man, to instruct the Resident to reply that the contingent has been maintained by the Nizam from the end of the war in 1817 until now because the 12th article of the treaty of 1800 obliged his Highness so to maintain it." And, earlier still, he has spontaneously denounced the absurd and costly establishment of this parasite force, which was upon the usual scale when one orders and another pays. He wrote in 1848 : "I agree with Colonel Low in thinking that we cause the contingent to become a much heavier burden on the Nizam's finances than it ought to be. The staff, in my humble judgment, is preposterously large. The pay and allowances, and charges of various kinds, are far higher than they ought to be." A more candid minute than usual upon the same subject, from the pen of a much less distinguished member of the Council, runs thus :—"I have always felt the difficulty of the position in which we should be placed if the Nizam were to fall back upon the

\* The instances of the ichneumon fly and of the New Zealand swiftmoth (*Heptalis virescens*) are cases in point.



treaties, and call upon us to explain by what authority, and on what grounds, we had organized in his name this costly army, and imposed this incubus upon the revenues of his State, and had assumed the right of regulating its every movement, and of giving and withholding at will the services of the force for purposes connected with the administration of the Nizam's own Government."

Thus there was no treaty-right, as in Oudh, to enforce the perpetuation of the contingent, and no reason but the easy ignorance of an ally to warrant the existence of five\* brigadiers for a force of 8,000 men with regiments of cavalry. But since for forty years the Nizam had borne the incubus, for forty years the British Government had very cheerfully imposed it. Its chief officers were British, its pay, training, and control were in the hands of the British, and so thoroughly was it an alien force in the midst of its *soi-disant* lord's dominions that its own leaders declared it ready to march with joyous infidelity against its patron and paymaster. The way in which the Nizams had come to tolerate or forget it was curious. With a natural hankering after an army, they had long enlisted all the Arabs, Secdees, and Rohillas who liked to take service in Hyderabad, till at last that city was a kind of Indian Cairo. The Arabs, after parading to please the Nizam, used to plunder to gratify themselves; they would seize some districts, levy blackmail there, drive the cattle, and imprison the bunyas. Then the Nizam made use of his other army, and, with "the favour of God and the Resident," sent a detachment to the fort of the unruly "faithful." There was, in point of fact, a regular programme. The second force marched summoned the first force in its fort, were defied, fired a shot, the garrison bundled out at the rear, and the British marched in at the front. This kind of thing would occur half-a-dozen times a year, and at first it would seem to prove the contingent worth its cost. But it was because the Nizams had no money for their Arab troops that they rebelled; the troops were always in arrear of pay; the treasury was, thanks to the contingent, helplessly in debt to the "sowcars," or native bankers; the Nizam's candle was burning furiously "at both ends," with everybody but himself interested in the speediest combustion. Driven to hard straits, the Court of Hyderabad encouraged, it must be confessed, although indirectly, the general turmoil. It was a common practice with it to farm out a particular province to two or three rival personages at the same time, leaving them, while it pocketed the instalment of the price all round, to fight out upon the spot the knotty question of possession. For forty or fifty years this state of things had been quietly seething, justice starved, officials driven to embezzlement, Arabs left to insurrection, merchants squeezed, commerce paralyzed, all by the "eternal want of pence" consequent upon the presence of the contingent, which, although not paid for with regularity, was still only a creditor for £750,000 sterling†; when the Governor-General grew suddenly weary of dunning the Nizam's Minister, and changed ground by observing that there were territories to the eastward of our last acquisition in India which were his Highness's to cede, and would very nicely cover even the debt of many years.

We have used the unhistorical phrase "dunning" because it exactly describes the attitude of our Government towards the Nizam. We treated him as Jew attorneys treat a client who has tried to live upon money borrowed at forty per cent., and found the system a financial mistake. We knew his difficulties had mainly sprung from the force we fathered upon him; we knew that no treaty sustained it, no necessity enjoined it; but he was in our power, and we served the

\* "It consisted of eight regiments of infantry, five regiments of cavalry, and four field batteries; yet for this force there were no less than five brigadiers with brigade majors. A Military Secretary has been appointed for it, who draws the same salary as the Adjutant-General of the Bengal army. Although there is a Superintending Surgeon for the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, who has only ten regiments and some artillery to look after, another Superintending Surgeon has been appointed for the Contingent. Although the Subsidiary Force has its magazines on the spot, the Contingent supplies its own stores, and has its Commissaries of Ordnance accordingly. The superior officers are all highly paid. By the rules of the force, officers are promoted to superior grades and to higher pay earlier than they would be in their own service, whereby the cost of the force is proportionably enhanced."—*The Resident*, November 19, 1851.

† The annual payment being £400,000.

writ upon him with merciless legal logic and punctuality. There was but one ground upon which we could do this with the equanimity of a power calling itself just and generous, and that was that during all these years he had not objected to this slow ruin. It is a good ground, perhaps, at common law, but it goes more to prove that native Governments live in grooves than that our subsequent demand was equitable. At the moment, too, that he objected, not only must all the arrears of pay have been forthcoming, but arrangements, it was hinted, must be formed for those "to whom Government is pledged, as being on the roll of the Contingent, that they shall receive from his Highness justice and their rights."\* Human nature is very susceptible to habit, and Indian human nature extravagantly so. The Nizams had become accustomed to the "old man of the sea," who hung night and day upon their shoulders. The desire to shake him off had passed away with the sense of helplessness, and to fully qualify our conduct towards them it is only necessary to observe that neither the Resident nor the Governor-General ever treated the idea that the Nizam could discharge his debt, or continue to pay for the contingent, as other than visionary.

Accordingly, the screw was gently but irresistibly turned down. In a minute, elegant as all the papers of Lord Dalhousie are, he recapitulated against the Nizam the history of his bond. "Antonio" was shown to have no leg to stand upon; step by step the minute traces him, accepting the fatal gift of the contingent; using it, writhing under it, cheating it, putting off its dues, accustomed to it, alarmed at it, repentant, economical, despairing, resigned, stoical. In 1851 His Highness had been served with what may be called the Writ of the Calcutta sheriff, his debt being then about £750,000. Translate Hyderabad into lodgings in a sponging-house, and the embarrassment of a great native prince into the language of the debtor of ordinary life, and his Kharreeta to the Governor-General becomes a document of every-day life. He shudders under the tap of the Resident's constable; he exhausts Oriental compliment in tremulous anxiety to gain time. "Your letter," he says, "filled with kind expressions, so completely fragrant with joy, and indicative of your anxious desire for the better arrangement and welfare of this Government, taking into consideration existing friendship and its continuance, and desiring alone the well-being of the Hyderabad Government, expressive in every way of the most kindly interest, and viewing the mutual engagements existing between the two Governments, and in the mode of true friends, communicated to me what was imperatively necessary, and has reached me at the most auspicious and happy moment.

"After an examination of the meaning of the friendly expressions with which it is filled, and the way of kindness pointed out, and the mode of increasing the feeling of affection indicated in so friendly a manner, the *veil is truly removed from the face.*"

This last touch of melancholy irony is followed by the announcement that thirty-four lacs of rupees have been paid,† and that the rest shall follow before the close of the year. But 1851, as Lord Dalhousie relates it, passed, the Nizam could not keep his promise, and the alternatives were put bluntly before him, that he must pay or transfer districts of the value of not less than £350,000 sterling per annum, "so as to provide for the payment of the principal of the debt within three years," and further to afford a margin, "which should in each year be applicable to meet any partial deficiencies occurring in the supply of monthly pay

\* "His Highness said, in an angry tone of voice, 'Suppose I were to declare that I don't want the contingent at all?' I answered him *instantly* by saying that I was quite prepared for that case, only that the removing of that force from his Highness's service must be done gradually, in order to preserve the good faith of the British Government towards those troops, which had been heretofore kept up for the advantage of the Hyderabad Government, first by his father's consent, and then by his own, and for a long course of years had been trained and disciplined and commanded by British officers. Some years, I said, might perhaps elapse before all those men could either be otherwise provided for or discharged as they might respectively merit, and that until the whole could be removed from His Highness's service we must still have command temporarily of districts for their regular payment."

† The Government would not take the money at the current rate of exchange, nor bills instead of coin, and Hyderabad was drained of silver to pay the first instalment.

for the troops of the Contingent." It is unpleasant to lay bare an injustice which is not likely to be reversed, but the Nizam had certainly not even such tender treatment at our hands as a fraudulent bankrupt. Suraj-ool-Moolk, his faithful Wuzeer, pointed out that the extent of district claimed would be equal to one-third of the Nizamate ; that the contingent would still exhaust another third annually, and that upon the remainder his master could not keep up the State. The Nizam himself remonstrated plaintively "that the Honourable Company was not in the habit of transferring territory in payment to its creditors." The reply was short, sharp, and obvious:—"The Honourable Company did not incur debts of the description under consideration."

Those whom inclination may induce to analyze more closely this odd blending of imperial affairs and the Bankruptcy Court will find the story culminating in a very curious conversation between the Nizam and Colonel Low, the Resident. The English gentleman was, as usual, cautious, adroit, and softly inflexible ; the Rajah pathetic, perplexed, and irritated in turn. He had not paid the balance of his debt, and the pleasing scheme by which he expected to do it, that of farming the Wuziership to the financier who promised hardest to settle everything, had failed. But he was earnest in desiring to acquit himself ; even the Resident had acknowledged that he was "exerting himself in good faith to pay the whole." Yet the year had passed, the pound of flesh was due, and Hindoo Antonio was called upon to cede Berar by treaty. Colonel Low began the conversation upon the subject by adverting to the fact that His Highness was aware that the treaty to that effect was then on its way from Calcutta. "Yes," said His Highness, "you told me that you were going to propose a new treaty, but you never told me that such a treaty as this was to be proposed to me ; you never told me that you were to ask me to give up a large portion of my dominions in perpetuity" (His Highness dwelt particularly on the word "perpetuity"), and he went on to say, "Did I ever make war against the English Government, or intrigue against it, or do anything but co-operate with it, and be obedient to its wishes, that I should be so disgraced ?" The appeal *ad misericordiam* fell flat ; the speech led to a long address, in which the Resident tried to persuade His Highness that there was no disgrace whatever in forming such a treaty as that which was proposed to him ; but the Nizam replied with some lugubrious quotations from his country's classical poets, the last of which, translated, was the following :—"Two acts on the part of a sovereign prince are always reckoned disgraceful ; one is to give away unnecessarily any portion of his hereditary territories, and the other is to disband troops who have been brave and faithful in his service."

To meet this rather touching statement of his dilemma about the contingent and the cession the Resident had no softer words than "sign the treaty." "Will your Highness consent to a new treaty ?"\* "I could answer in a moment," he said, "but what is the use of answering ? If you are determined to take districts, you can take them without my either making a new treaty, or giving any answer at all."

But petulance did not help the miserable prince more than expostulation, and he tried another tone in his despair. "Gentlemen like you," said the Nizam, "who are sometimes in Europe and at other times in India ; sometimes employed in Government business, at other times soldiers ; sometimes sailors, and at other times even engaged in commerce,—at least I have heard that some great men of your tribe have been merchants,—you cannot understand the nature of my feelings in this matter. I am a sovereign prince, born to live and die in this kingdom, which has belonged to my family for seven generations ; you think I could

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\* The Rajah might have expected the proposition, but he had never yet accepted it even verbally. At a former conference he expressed a very decided repugnance to making any alteration in the existing treaty. When Col. Low expressed an opinion to him that the only way for matters between the two States to be put upon a proper footing would be to add some new articles to the treaty, his first exclamation was, "God forbid that I should suffer such disgrace ! A change in a treaty, be it what it may, can never be an advantage to a sovereign who prefers, as I do, that there should not be any change at all. I don't want any new treaty at all, how much soever you or any person or persons may fancy it to be advantageous to my interests."

be happy if I were to give up a portion of my kingdom to your Government in perpetuity ; it is totally impossible that I could be happy ; I should feel that I was disgraced. I have heard that one gentleman of your tribe considered that I ought to be quite contented and happy if I were put upon the same footing as Mahomed Ghouse Khan ;\* to have a pension paid to me like an old servant, and have nothing to do but to eat, and sleep, and say my prayers." Here His Highness made use of an exclamation in Arabic which expresses both surprise and anger, and with a manner and a tone of voice, too, indicating anger in no ordinary degree.

After recovering a little His Highness went on, " You are not quite so preposterous in your way of judging me as that ; but you, too, do not comprehend the nature of my feelings as a sovereign prince ; for instance, you talked of my saving eight lacs of rupees per annum, by making this treaty, as something that I ought to like ! Now I tell you that if it were quite certain that I could save four times eight lacs of rupees I should not be satisfied, because I should lose my honour by parting with my territory."

In fact the Nizam was so reluctant to commit political suicide that force began to be contemplated, and a little more princely obstinacy would have caused the absurd spectacle of the contingent, established for the benefit of the Nizam, arrayed against him to despoil him of his finest territory. But a Hindoo [*sic*] does not push destiny to such extremities ; when his star wanes he accepts the omen with submission. The Nizam announced that he would sign the detested treaty.

It stipulated eternal friendship between the debtor and creditor ; the creditor was to maintain henceforward, for certain uses of the debtor, 5,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, officered by English ; and for the support of this force, as well as for the purpose of cancelling the old debt, certain districts were to be ceded to the British. Thus did we obtain all those fertile districts of Berar, the great cotton-garden of Hindostan, lying to the north of the hills which extend from Adjuntah to Woon ; the Raichore Doab, between the Krishna and Tombudra rivers ; the district of sixteen villages bordering on Ahmednuggur and Sholapore ; with a few other jewels picked out of the territory of the old Nizamate. It is some of the best soil in India : the Raichore Doab is irrigated by innumerable wells and tanks ; the Berar country about Oomrawattee is the centre of the cotton cultivation, and, by the advancing line of the Great India Peninsula Railway, Manchester has already drawn from these provinces the bales which saved her from sharing the penalty, as she once shared the crime, of the Southern States of America.

What is to be wished is that the method of acquisition had been as fair as the spoil ; but it is impossible to deny that the Nizam was treated like a broken trader whose books were badly kept. For the credit of the British Government, it should have been proposed to him more plainly than in the doubtful sentences of Colonel Low to abolish the contingent and charge the revenue of the country with an annual sum till the arrears were paid. The Nizam's question, " Why was the contingent kept up after the war ?" shows that had we made it possible he would have been glad to govern his own kingdom. Failing that, it would have been just enough to hold his territory, as sheriff's officers, till the debt was paid, and then to have reduced the cost of the contingent to such a sum as the Nizam could meet. Flesh, and blood along with it, were taken by the Shylocks of Calcutta, with no Portia by to reprove the transgression of the bond. It is flatly impossible, unless one law of morality prevails in Europe and another in Asia, to accept Lord Dalhousie's declaration that " the conduct of the Government of India towards the Nizam, in respect of the contingent and of all his other affairs, has been characterized by unvarying good faith, liberality, and forbearance, and by a sincere desire to maintain the stability of the State of Hyderabad, and to uphold the personal independence of His Highness the Nizam."

The prince thus " killed by kindness" died before the rebellion, and his successor was pretty well-disposed to us.† Thanks to him and to the ablest native

\* Meaning the Nawab of Arcot.

† Though he boggled sadly of late, as a Moslem and a despoiled man, at the silk ribband of the Star of India which we sent him.

statesman in India—the Wuzeer Salar Jung—Hyderabad, the most fiery capital in the peninsula, was quiet during that perilous time. It swarmed with Arabs and Rohillas, with turbulent Mussulmans of every turban and tribe, who had once already chased an English officer, bleeding and fainting, into his own house, because he ventured to interfere at the Mohurram. The city was full of the “budmashes” of the land ; and had the Nizam chosen merely to let things alone he could have taken bloody vengeance for his predecessor's experience of our bankruptcy laws as applied to princes. But Salar Jung, with his assent, kept Hyderabad quiet for us ; and in the face of that return of good for evil it is rather discomfiting for an English pen to confess that the restitution of the provinces, now the debt is paid, and ten times over, is neither likely nor in the most distant contemplation.

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*Extracts from Major Evans Bell's "Restrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy," pages 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, and 333.*

By the marked and acknowledged administrative improvements introduced during the reign of the present Nizam throughout his dominions that Prince has fairly earned the boon upon which he is known to have set his heart, the restoration of the two provinces of Berar, held in trust for him by our Government, to his own occupation and management. Those districts were taken from his father, by means of menace and compulsion, as a material guaranty for the regular payment of a Contingent Force,—a burden which we had, most unfairly and insidiously, “rendered permanent, contrary to the principle of the Treaty, and altered so as to be useful for our own purposes.” “Its commands and staff-appointments,” continues Major Moore, one of the Court of Directors, “have afforded rewards for meritorious officers who had distinguished themselves in our own armies ; and it has been altogether a fertile source of patronage.” On the other hand, while we imposed this “incubus on the Nizam's finances,” we turned these troops to our own pecuniary benefit in another way. Relying upon the Contingent for preserving peace and good order in the Nizam's dominions, we “disregarded our own engagements,” and “for thirty years the number of our troops,” the Subsidiary Force, “kept up within the Hyderabad country was more than one-fourth less than the number for which we had contracted” under the Treaty of 1800, in return for valuable cessions of territory.\*

The Nizam's Ministers were reduced to the greatest extremities in order “to meet our inevitable demand for the monthly pay of the Contingent,” controlled by our Resident, and commanded by our officers, whose emoluments, costing our Government nothing, were swelled to a scale of preposterous extravagance.†

“Overwhelmed with financial difficulties, the Nizam was at length unable to pay the Contingent, and we kindly lent him the money from our own treasury, first at 12 per cent., and latterly at 6 per cent. interest ; and thus our staunch Ally incurred a debt to us of about 50 lakhs of rupees” (£500,000), “the consequences of which were the present Revised Treaty.”‡

The opinions thus expressed by Major Moore were supported in Protests by Sir Henry Willock and Colonel Sykes, who quoted the testimony “of successive Residents at Hyderabad, officers of high character and standing, viz., Sir Charles Metcalfe, Colonel Stewart, General Fraser and Colonel Low,” who “severally declared that we were not justified by treaty in making such large calls on the Nizam's treasury.”§ Colonel Sykes doubted whether “a legal equitable or moral responsibility could be fixed upon the Nizam for the repayment of the total advances made by the British Government.”|| Colonel Davidson, Resident at Hyderabad in 1860, and who had been Assistant Resident in 1853, when the Revised Treaty was extorted from the Nizam, as he says, “by objurgations and threats,” declares that, “had the pecuniary demands of the two Governments been impartially dealt

\* Papers, Nizam's Debt, 1859, pp. 4. 5.

† Papers, Nizam's Debt, 1859, p. 5.

|| Ibid., p. 11.

‡ Ibid., pp. 16, 17.

§ Ibid., p. 9.

with, we had no just claim against the Nizam,"—"in 1853 we had little or no real pecuniary claim against the Nizam."<sup>\*</sup>

Such being the origin of the sequestration, and the account being but little modified in our favour by the territorial restoration and exchanges, and the relinquishment of a large balance of alleged debt under the Treaty of 1860, which still left the Nizam's large counter-claims of long standing untouched,† every dictate of equity and policy should prompt our Government to replace these provinces, with their reformed institutions and improved revenue, in the direct possession of their Sovereign.

In a despatch dated the 5th of September 1860 our Government reasserted the sovereignty of the Nizam in the provinces, and desired to "explain to His Highness distinctly that the object of the Government of India in retaining in its hands a part even of the Assigned Districts is simply that it may hold a material guaranty for the performance of the conditions of Art. VI. of the Treaty of 1853, and that the Government of India desires to hold this territory, as it has hitherto held the whole of the Assigned Districts, not in sovereignty, but in trust for His Highness, so long as the Contingent is kept up, and no longer." It fully acknowledged "the fact that the alienation of this portion of the dominions of His Highness is temporary only, and for a special purpose, conducive chiefly to the security of the Hyderabad State, and to the preservation of tranquillity throughout its limits."<sup>‡</sup>

Assuming the justice and advisability of keeping up the Contingent, on its reduced scale, it may have been necessary, from the disordered state of the Nizam's finances, and the loose mode of administration in 1853, to take such a material guaranty for the regular payment of our demands. Since that time, however, and especially since 1860, partly from the relief afforded by the revenue of the districts restored under the Treaty of that year, partly from the careful economy and judicious measures of the Minister, Salar Jung, the finances have arrived at a much more satisfactory condition. Unquestionable security could now be given for the punctual payment of the Contingent; and it might be found expedient still further to reduce the expenses of that force, to withdraw gradually some of the European officers, and to transfer the corps, with their own consent, to the direct service of the Nizam, as soon as efficient Native Commandants could be trained and appointed. This process might be carried on step by step with the conversion of the irregular and ineffective troops now forming the Nizam's army, and who, as fast as they were disbanded, would furnish a certain proportion of good recruits for the disciplined regiments. This plan, roughly sketched here, and intended to occupy several years in execution, might be made a measure of economy at once for the Nizam's Government and for ours. Half the necessity both for the Subsidiary Force and the Contingent would disappear with the reconstruction of the Nizam's Army, and the breaking up of those numerous disorderly levies which now infest the country. The Nawab Salar Jung has recently taken a most effectual step towards preserving peace and tranquillity, by forbidding the open display of arms, especially in the city of Hyderabad.

If we wish to strengthen the hands of the brave and wise Minister who has done so much to reform the Hyderabad State during the last fifteen years, we ought to return to his charge the two provinces of Berar. The honour and credit of restoring the integrity of the Nizam's dominions would redouble his influence with all classes, from the Sovereign downwards, and arm him with irresistible authority to pursue and extend the work of organization. Besides, the introduction of all the essentials of good government into every province, and into every department of the administration, might be made the condition of relinquishing the Berars. The results of the partial restitution under the Treaty of 1860 have been most encouraging, both by the continued good management of the retransferred provinces, and in the stimulus and examples thereby given to the general progress of the country. Complete restitution might be made the means and occasion of regenerating the Nizam's Government. We can gain nothing, while the cause of civilization loses, so long as this great act of redress and instruction is denied or delayed.

\* Papers, The Deccan, 1867, p. 27.

† Ibid., pp. 4, 5, and 27.

‡ Papers, The Deccan, 1867, p. 20.

The Edinburgh Reviewer of October 1866, whose Essay has already fallen under our notice,\* has learned nothing from the Rebellion of 1857 except to take precautions against another military mutiny. He has nothing to suggest except that we should reduce our Native troops to the lowest possible degree, arm our European Infantry with breech-loaders, and provide our Artillery with guns and projectiles "of the latest and most approved invention," to be employed, if necessary, "against Asiatics who could not possibly possess themselves of similar weapons." "It would be rash," he adds, "to place these improved arms in the hands of Natives, by whom they might be turned against ourselves." Having then, he says, "reduced our own force, we might well demand that the Native Princes should disband a corresponding number of their own troops." Then he trusts, "in a generation or two, unless we wilfully keep it alive, the military spirit of the people will for the most part have died out."†

A noble policy and hopeful prospects! He sees that "the reduction by one-third of the amount of European force now maintained in India would be a very sensible relief to England," but he cannot, of course, admit that the vast area and multiplied posts to be occupied in consequence of Lord Dalhousie's annexations have anything to do with the burdensome demand for European soldiers. He does not see that the Rebellion of 1857 revealed, but did not create, the want of British troops. While he feels the inconvenience of being compelled to supply so much physical force from England, he can think of no remedy but that of diminishing the armed force recruited in India, whether in our own service or in that of our Allies. In short, the policy of annexation, which the Reviewer is bound to uphold, having begun in bluster and contempt, now sinks down into mistrust and the muzzle.

Clearly the Edinburgh Reviewer, and those who think with him, would declaim vehemently against my suggestion for converting the Nizam's army into a small but efficient force. My opinion, on the contrary, is that if we make the Native Princes trust us we can always trust them. Their troops, properly equipped and disciplined, occasionally brigaded in camps of exercise with the moveable columns which should take the place of our subsidiary divisions and garrisons, ought to be a source of military strength, and, still more, a visible display of moral strength in our favour, to the great relief of our finances and our muster-roll.

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons,  
dated 17 May 1866, for

"Copy of all treaties and engagements subsisting between His Highness the Nizam of the *Deccan* and the British Government, and of all correspondence between the two Governments relative to the districts assigned by His Highness for the maintenance of 'The Hyderabad Contingent,' together with an account of the income and expenditure of the above districts, and of the cost of the 'Contingent.'"

J. WM. KAYE,

Secretary in Political Department.

India Office, 25 June 1866.

(Foreign Department.)

The Governor-General of India in Council to Sir *Charles Wood*, Bart., dated  
8th September (No. 117) 1860.

\* \* \* \* \* We have the honour to transmit copies of correspondence with the Resident at Hyderabad on the following subjects :—

- I. The affairs of Shorapoor.
- II. The traffic on the Gadavery River, the right of the Nizam to levy customs duties thereon, and the proposed negotiations with the Nizam for the relinquishment of those duties, and for the cession of territory on the left bank of the river.
- III. The receipts and disbursements of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts.
- IV. The rewards to be bestowed on His Highness, and certain of the members of his court, in recognition of the services rendered by them during the

\* *Anst.*, pp. 227 to 235.

† *Edinburgh Review*, October 1866, pp. 338, 339.



disturbances of 1857 and 1858 ; together with certain proposals to be made by the Resident to the Nizam, on the part of the British Government, relative to the receipts and expenditure of the Assigned Districts, the rearrangement of the boundaries of those districts with reference to the requirements of the Treaty of 1853, and the proposed relinquishment by His Highness of territory and customs duties on the Godavery.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) *Canning.*  
*H. Rose.*  
*H. B. E. Frere.*

(Civil Department.—No. 138 of 1859.)

Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, Resident at Hyderabad, to *C. Beadon*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 6th July 1859.

Sir,—With reference to your letter, No. 2069, dated the 18th April 1859, calling for financial statements showing the receipts and disbursements of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, from June 1853 to 30th April 1858, I am at last in a position herewith to submit a general financial statement for the information of His Excellency the Right Honourable the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, having also this day despatched the last of the detailed statements for the five years ending with the year 1857-58 to the Accountant General to the Government of India.

2. The result shows a debit against the Nizam of Rs. 9,31,612 14a. 11½p. This was entirely incurred in the first year of our administration, 1853-54, and is to be attributed to our having in that year paid up the Contingent four months of arrears in which it was always previously held when paid direct by the Minister.

3. In these accounts I have rejected entirely village expenses, which showed on the 30th April 1858 a considerable sum to credit, but this would only represent a fictitious prosperity, as the item was a deposit which might at any moment be called for. As, however, it is most probable that the whole amount may never be disbursed for legitimate claims established against the village expenses, I have called on the Officiating Commissioner to show what amount is likely to be claimed, and what will remain still in deposit, as from this latter I should be inclined to pay some of the extra establishments, which in these accounts are very large, and have been all charged against the actual Government demand, which would not have been the case under the Native Government.

4. The village expenses are levied with the Government demand for the benefit of the districts generally, and should be so expended. It appears to me therefore legitimate that establishments retained for their benefit should be partly paid from these collections, especially as there can be no doubt, had the Government orders for the reorganization and reduction of the schedules of establishments been earlier carried out by the Commissioner and district officers, instead of their persistence in the extravagant scale first introduced, a large amount would have been saved, and carried to the credit of the Nizam's Government.

5. Another item in these accounts deserves notice. It is an exchange transaction in the debt of Hyderabad, Rs. 49,76,132 4a. 1p., which remained against the Nizam when the Treaty in 1853 was completed, and is as follows :—

Difference between the rate of conversion (21 per cent.) at which the total of the Nizam's debt was charged in the Civil Treasury Accounts for 1853-54 and Rs. 14 Ga. per cent., the rate at which the same has since been exhibited by the Accountant General, viz., amount of debt.—

<i>Hyderabad Rs. a. p.</i>		<i>Co.'s Rs. a. p.</i>
49,76,132 4 1.....	at 14 a. 6 p. per cent.	43 50,708 2 3
Ditto.....	at 21 per cent. ....	41,12,505 15 11
Difference.....		<i>Co.'s Rs. 2,38,202 2 4</i>

6. The Accountant-General, in his account, adds this amount to the total of the Nizam's debt, and charges annual interest on it at the rate of six per cent.



This I fully expect would be objected to by the Hyderabad Government, as they were informed the total debt due was Hyderabad Rs. 49,75,132 4a. 1p., on which, in my opinion, we can alone legitimately charge interest. I have therefore charged the whole amount in a lump, and debited it as an exchange transaction to the first year. On this point, however, I have solicited the orders of Government through the Accountant-General, in letter No. 816, dated the 17th May 1859, to that officer.

7. I am prepared to expect the Minister will object to the large amount of charges for establishments, and therefore the extravagance of our management. I know, on the other hand, it will be argued that the Nizam's Government, when agreeing to the treaty, never could have expected that our administration would be conducted in the same way or cost as little as theirs, but there is no doubt General Low, C.B., allowed the former Minister, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, and the present one, Salar Jung, to suppose that our management would cost about two annas in the rupee, or about 12½ per cent. on the revenue, and he spoke of civil charges in the tabular statement dated 2nd September 1853, attached to letter No. 120, dated 2nd September, to Government, as 13a. 8p., and on one occasion remarked to the Nizam, in the presence of the Minister, "Why should he object so much to the cession, as we should be, in the place of his talookdars, only be more honest in rendering correct accounts?" which confirmed the Durbar in the opinion that our system of administration would not cost more than they paid for the talookdaree. Salar Jung has often referred to this speech when I have verbally told him the revenues did not cover the expenditure, and I distinctly remember its being made use of as an argument to induce compliance in signing the treaty by General Low. Indeed, that officer's first intention was that the districts should be managed as Nagpore was under Sir Richard Jenkins, and the Hyderabad districts under Sir Charles Metcalfe, and he proposed this to the Government of India in despatch No. 98, dated 8th July 1853 (Political Department).

The total of Receipts for 1853-54, as shown in the General Abstract Statement accompanying this letter, is .....	Rs.	a.	p.	debt, that there has been a steady increase in the revenue, which from Rs. 34,59,754 5a. 1p. in the first, arrives at 42,71,338 rupees in the last year, 1857-58; and that without actually drawing one rupee from the Imperial treasury the Contingent has been kept up, and all other payments made, except the total amount of interest on debt of Rs. 2,46,750 5a. 9p., which would have amounted in the five years to Rs. 12,33,751 12a. 9p., and as
	38,43,198	0	0	
But from this has been deducted the Balance of Accounts of the Contingent up to Dec. 1853, and the value of Ordnance Stores in hand on the 1st January 1854, amounting in all to .....	3,83,443	10	11	
Revenue Receipts.....Rs...	34,59,754	5	1	

Rs. 9,31,612 14a. 11½p. is due, even a portion of the interest has been paid, although not all; but everything else, agreeably to the provisions of the treaty, has been provided for, and I cannot but think it would be an act of liberality, if we are not required by justice, to remit this annual payment for interest, if not from date of cession until now, at least prospectively. The Nizam's remark is, "Sovereign princes do not take interest from each other like shopkeepers and merchants;" and it should not be forgotten, if the former Nizam had agreed to the cession of the Assigned Districts in perpetuity, this debt was to have been remitted altogether. Under the orders issued regarding the Treaty of 1853, the cession in name is not in perpetuity, but it appears to me to be so in reality, as without the districts we cannot keep up and pay the Contingent, and the last two years have proved its immense value to us; and, further, that insurrection and anarchy in the Hyderabad territories would be the result of its disbandment. Of this the Nizam is fully aware; it is not, then, too much to say the cession, as the Contingent must be kept up, is in perpetuity, although nominally not so; and that the Nizam is fairly entitled to the remission of the Rs. 49,76,132 4a. 1p., with the annual interest accruing on it.

9. We have remitted Rs. 14,29,518 5a. 8p. of customs duties since the year 1854-55, which would have brought in, agreeably to former years, annually

Rs. 3,57,379 9a. 5p. A payment for the equivalent of this I know it is the intention of the Minister to claim, as these inland customs were a part of the revenue ceded to us by the Treaty of 1853, and he argues ought not to have been abolished without the permission of the Hyderabad Government, as it was done for our own convenience. No doubt the trade and produce of the Assigned Districts benefited to a certain extent by the remission, but I doubt whether their prosperity would not have been as great, and their revenue increased as much, if these cesses had not been abolished, as it is to just and honest revenue management that the prosperity must justly be attributed. The general and imperial benefit was certainly as much as that of the districts from the abolition of these inland taxes ; but if Rs. 2,46,750 5a. 9p., the annual interest of the debt, is remitted, the one may fairly be quoted against the other ; and our liberality will then be conspicuous, both as remitting a heavy debt to the Nizam and vexatious cesses in the districts.

10. I would beg that instructions be issued that all claims payable by the Assigned Districts be preferred to the Resident for settlement, and, not as now, from the different Presidencies direct to the Accountant-General for adjustment by a transfer entry. Unless this is done, which I believe is in accordance with the wishes of the Accountant-General, contained in his letter of the 30th March 1859, No. 111, it is impossible to check charges that are evidently high, or to know whether they are correct. I would instance the yearly charge for clothing for the Contingent. According to the average of the five years previous to the cession, when the Contingent was numerically stronger than now, this item was Rs. 16,571 1a. 2p. By the last three years, as entered in Accountant-General's Statements, it is Rs. 28,240 8a. 2p. This I do not understand, nor have I any means of explanation, as the bills are not furnished to my office. This equally applies to military stores and all similar miscellaneous charges.

11. In conclusion, I would beg to apologize to Government for the inaccuracy of the former returns transmitted on the dates as per margin ; it would appear the paymaster and district officers did not then understand what was required of them, and confused themselves with adjusted and unadjusted items, instead of furnishing statements of their actual receipts and disbursements for each year in account current with the Nizam's Government. The result now shown is, I think, highly satisfactory. The Assigned Districts have paid debt as follows :—

Balance against His Highness the Nizam on 30th April 1858.	Rs.	a.	p.
	9,31,612	14	11½
Against which are to be set off the following remissions of Revenue, Liquidation of Debt, &c. :—			
Payment of Arrears due to the Contingent	Rs.	a.	p.
prior to the Cession .....	13,76,653	0	1
Amount of Transit Duties abolished .....	14,29,518	5	8
Exchange or Conversion of the Debt .....	2,38,202	2	4
	30,44,373	8	1
BALANCE .....	Rs. 21,27,760	9	11½

and it must not be forgotten that in the first year of our administration the revenue suffered considerably from a famine in the eastern district of the Raichore Doab.

12. True, there is a balance still due of Rs. 9,31,612 14 a. 11½p. ; but the establishments are now revised and put on a permanent footing, and during the last year and a half the heavy items payable for the Commissioner's and Chief Engineers' salaries and establishments, also expenditure (although still somewhat small) on public works, have been added to the disbursements. I have no dread for the future, especially with a proper survey and settlement, which I think should be vigorously pushed on, and will pay itself, as it is well known that in both Berars large tracts of country under cultivation are concealed, and no revenue is paid for them.

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

GENERAL ABSTRACT STATEMENT showing the Actual Revenues, &c., realized in the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, and the Expenditure chargeable thereto, from June 1853 to 30th April 1858.

RECEIPTS.	Company's Rupees.			DISBURSEMENTS.	Company's Rupees.		
	Rs.	a.	p.		Rs.	a.	p.
1853-54	38,43,198	0	0	1853-54	46,83,702	10	10
1854-55	41,03,375	0	1	1854-55	41,95,687	13	10
1855-56	40,15,112	14	0	1855-56	40,03,830	1	0
1856-57	41,12,402	5	11½	1856-57	40,00,539	11	
1857-58	42,71,838	10	3	1857-58	43,93,779	8	
TOTAL Receipts for the Five Years ...Rs.	2,03,45,426	14	3½	TOTAL Disbursements for the Five Years ... ..	2,12,27,039	13	2½
				Deduct Receipts	2,03,45,426	14	3½
				Balance against the Nizam on the 30th April 1858 Rs.	9,31,612	14	11½

Hyderabad Residency,  
6 July 1859.

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Resident.

(Foreign Department.—No. 2522 of 1860.)

From *C. Beadon*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, Resident at Hyderabad.

Fort William, 7 July 1860.

Sir,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 138, dated 6th July 1859, submitting a general abstract statement of the receipts and disbursements of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts from June 1853 to April 1858.

2. The result, as you observe, shows a debit against the Nizam of Rs. 9,31,612 14a. 11½p., but this was incurred during the first year of our administration, in consequence of the Contingent having in that year been paid up to date, instead of being kept four months in arrears as was previously the case. Excluding the sum so paid, amounting to Rs. 13,76,653 0a. 1p., and excluding on the other side the balance of accounts of the Contingent up to December 1853, and the value of Ordnance stores in hand on the 1st June 1854, amounting to Rs. 3,83,443 10a. 11p., the actual current receipts and expenditure for these five years is as per margin, showing that the districts barely suffice to meet the expenses chargeable on them, including the expenses of management, and that the balance at the Nizam's credit is insignificant.

3. You state that in those accounts you have rejected entirely village expenses, which showed, on the 30th April 1858, a considerable sum to credit. This sum is held in deposit for the benefit of those who may claim it, but you are of opinion that the whole amount will not be claimed, and propose that the balance should be applied to pay the large establishments charged in the accounts. On this I am directed to observe that the amount so unclaimed cannot be devoted to any specific purpose other than that for which it was collected, and that after a sufficient time it should be carried to the credit of the general account.

4. With regard to the item of Rs. 2,38,202 2a. 4p., referred to in the 5th para. of your letter, I am directed to observe that the Accountant-General has done rightly in including this sum in the principal of the debt upon which interest is payable at 6 per cent. under the treaty. The debt, as stated in the treaty, is about 50 lakhs of Hyderabad rupees, and it was shown at the time to be exactly

Hyderabad Rs. 49,76,132 4a. 1p.; the cost incurred by the Government in laying this sum down at Hyderabad Rs. 43,50,708 2a. 3p. This, therefore, is the exchange equivalent of the debt, and upon this sum interest is rightly charged under the strict terms of the treaty. To charge in the accounts of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, as an exchange transaction, the difference between that sum and Rs. 41,12,505 15a 11p., the equivalent of the debt at a conventional rate, would be clearly wrong.

5. The Governor-General in Council desires me to request that the accounts of the Assigned Districts may be furnished to the Nizam up to the present date, without any further delay. By the treaty we are bound to render these accounts every year, and it is not creditable that this should not have been done. It is premature, in His Excellency's opinion, to anticipate the objections of the Nizam to particular items of account. It is enough to say that the accounts represent exactly the receipts and disbursements connected with the Assigned Districts. The Nizam's Government are, of course, free to make objections if they think proper to do so; and any such objections can be subsequently considered.

6. It is evident, however, that the state of the finances of these districts is not such as to justify the Government in acceding to the appointment of a superintendent of police for the Dharaseo and Raichore districts, as proposed in your former letter.

(Extract.) (Foreign Department.—No. 2518 of 1860.)

From *C. Beadon*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, Resident at Hyderabad.

Fort William, 7 July 1860.

Sir,—I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 20, dated the 27th March 1858, recommending that rewards should be bestowed on His Highness the Nizam, and certain of the members of his Court, in recognition of the services rendered by His Highness personally, and by the Government at Hyderabad, during the disturbances of 1857 and 1858.

2. On the 26th February 1859 the Governor-General had the satisfaction of addressing His Highness a letter, of which you were the bearer, thanking him for the zeal and constancy with which he had adhered to the long-established friendship between the two Governments, and pointing to a future time at which it might be in His Excellency's power to offer His Highness a public mark of the acknowledgments of the British Government.

3. It is not necessary to refer to the circumstances which have compelled the Governor-General to defer the fulfilment of this intention to the present time. It will suffice to say that the subject has never been lost sight of, that the claim established by the Nizam to the good will and favour of the British Government has been steadily borne in mind, and that the Governor-General in Council cheerfully embraces the present opportunity of testifying to His Highness the high estimation in which his past conduct is held, and the value set upon his friendship, of which that conduct has afforded many striking proofs.

4. It is the desire of the Governor-General in Council that you will request the Nizam's acceptance of presents of English manufacture, valued at one lakh of rupees. These will be procured in Calcutta, and forwarded by an early conveyance to Hyderabad. On their arrival you will seek an interview with His Highness at a public durbar, and present them to him as a token of friendship on the part of the Governor-General in Council, and as an earnest of the desire of the British Government for a lasting concord between the two States, whose interests are in all respects the same. You will, at the same time, present His Highness with a Khureeta from the Viceroy and Governor-General, which will hereafter be sent to you, and you will inform His Highness that his valuable services and those of his faithful and able Minister are already highly appreciated by the Queen's Government, and will now again be specially brought to Her Majesty's gracious notice.

5. His Excellency in Council is further pleased to cede to His Highness in perpetuity the State of Shorapore, which by the rebellion of the late Rajah lapsed to the British Government, whose title thereto has been shown in my letter, No. 1680, dated the 7th May last, to be absolute and indefeasible. You will make over the Shorapore territory to the agents of the Nizam's Government who may be appointed to receive charge of it. The surplus revenue which accrued during the period of British occupancy, after paying all expenses, civil and military, may be applied to the discharge in part of the late Rajah's debts, for the rest of which the Nizam, as the new possessor of the territory, will be responsible; but the time and manner of defraying them must be left entirely to His Highness, and the creditors must be made to understand distinctly that the British Government does not in any way guarantee the payment of their demands, and will not interfere in their behalf.

6. It is also the wish of the Governor-General in Council, without abrogating or in any way invalidating the Treaty of 1853, to take this favourable opportunity of modifying existing arrangements in such a way as to conduce as far as possible to the maintenance of the Nizam's dignity and honour, and to the avoidance of all possible causes of discussion, such as are not unlikely to arise while every item of expenditure in connection with the administration of the Assigned Districts is liable to be canvassed, and the propriety of every improvement called in question. To effect this object in a way somewhat similar to that which has been adopted with mutual satisfaction in the case of the Maharajah Scindiah the Governor-General in Council is prepared to submit to a large sacrifice of revenue. But the Governor-General in Council will on no account consent to forego the fundamental principle of the Treaty of 1853, namely, that so long as the Contingent is maintained, the British Government shall hold a material guarantee for its punctual payment. His Excellency in Council is convinced that the existing Treaty is in that respect a security absolutely necessary, no less for the support of His Highness's throne and the safety of his person, than for the preservation of friendly relations between the two States, and the maintenance of tranquillity throughout His Highness's dominions.

7. At present it appears, from a memorandum furnished by you to the Governor-General, that the revenue of the Assigned Districts, fairly estimated, is, in round numbers, 45 lakhs of rupees, while the expenditure, including civil payments, the expense of the Contingent, interest and other treaty obligations, and public works, amounts to 47½ lakhs, showing a deficit of 2½ lakhs of rupees. But then it must be admitted that the civil payments<sup>a</sup> are much higher than they would have been under the native rule, while the charges under the head of public works<sup>†</sup> are such as probably would not have been incurred at all.

It was the expectation of the Nizam, when the Treaty was signed, that the expense of managing the districts would not exceed two annas in the rupee, or 12½ per cent., and though on the whole the expense of administration has not been greater than is usual in British districts, or greater than is necessary for efficient government, yet, taking into consideration the circumstances under which, and the objects for which, the Treaty was made, the Governor-General is not disposed to charge the Nizam, for administering a country which really belongs to him, more than he would himself have incurred, and more proportionally than he incurs in the rest of his dominions.

8. Taking, then, the payments to be provided for, under the Treaty, at 30½ lakhs<sup>a</sup>, it would require an addition of 4½ lakhs to provide for the rate of expenditure admitted by the Nizam's Government on lands yielding a gross revenue of 35 lakhs<sup>†</sup>. The Governor-General in Council is prepared, therefore, to give up so much of the Assigned Districts as yields a gross revenue in excess of that sum, and also to admit the excess civil expenditure of past years as a set-off against the Nizam's debt of 50 lakhs of Hyderabad rupees, and to make a further reduction of 2,50,000 rupees on

* Contingent ...	Rs. 26,75,000
Miscellaneous ...	" 3,75,000
<b>TOTAL...</b>	<b>Rs. 30,50,000</b>

† Thus—	
Gross Revenue ...	Rs. 35,00,000
Deduct 12½ per cent. "	4,87,500
	<b>Rs. 30,62,500</b>

account of the interest thereon, so as to reduce the gross revenue districts to be kept under British management to 32½ lakhs of rupees, provided the Nizam will agree to a final settlement of accounts on this basis up to the present time, and will forego for the future the rendering of accounts by the British Government, and will leave the districts in its possession to be managed in the best way according to its own judgment, with all chances of profit or loss, on the understanding that the Contingent shall be kept up as at present, and that, if hereafter its strength shall be reduced with the consent of both parties, a further restoration of territory shall be made.

9. These proposals are so obviously for the advantage of the Nizam's Government that the Governor-General cannot anticipate otherwise than that they will be readily accepted, and that His Highness will see in them the evidence of a sincere willingness on the part of the British Government, at a pecuniary sacrifice, to strengthen his hands, to maintain the dignity of his Government, to improve his resources, and remove all occasion of future disagreement.

10. If His Highness agrees to the conditions you are thus authorized to propose to him, it will have to be considered immediately how the revised arrangements may best be carried out. It would in all respects be most convenient to the Government to give up to the Nizam the districts of Dharaseo and Raichore, and to retain only East and West Berar with such additions as may be necessary to make up the full amount of 32,50,000 rupees a year. The present revenues of the Berar districts are about 26,00,000 rupees, and if to this be added the Surf-i-Khas estates in those districts it would probably not be difficult for His Highness to give in exchange some pergunnahs adjoining Berar, yielding a revenue sufficient to make up the difference, especially if this difference be reduced by compensation for the territory on the left bank of the Godavery, the cession of which you have been enjoined to negotiate, and for the customs collections on the Godavery, which it is the desire of the Government of India that the Nizam should be induced by the offer of an equivalent to relinquish.

11. By holding Berar alone the expenses of management may be economized to a much greater extent than if any portion of the districts of Dharaseo or Raichore were to remain in the hands of the Government. At the same time it is of the greatest importance that all the Surf-i-Khas estates included within the ring fence of the Berar districts should come entirely into the possession and under the management of the British authorities, and that the boundary of the assigned districts remaining in the hands of Government should be clear and well defined.

12. With reference, therefore, to the foregoing observations, and to the contents of my separate letters noted on the margin, I am directed to recapitulate as follows:—

No. 2519, dated 7th instant.  
No. 2522, dated 7th instant.

1st. That you will request the Nizam to accept presents from the Governor-General to the value of a lakh of rupees.

2nd. That you will make over to His Highness in full sovereignty the lapsed Suwasthan of Shorapore.

3rd. That you will propose to His Highness to relinquish to the British Government the whole of his possessions on the left bank of the Godavery, receiving an equivalent for the same.

4th. That you will propose to His Highness to relinquish the levy of all customs dues on the Godavery, receiving an equivalent for the same.

5th. That you will propose to His Highness to dispense with the accounts of the receipts and expenditure of the assigned districts.

6th. That conditional on acceptance of the fifth proposal you will inform His Highness that the Government will agree to cancel the debt of 50 lakhs, to forego all further demand on account of interest, and to give up so much of the assigned districts as will leave in its possession territory yielding 32½ lakhs of rupees.

7th. That conditionally, as above explained, you will propose to His Highness that the British Government should relinquish the districts of Dharaseo and Raichore, and should keep East and West Berar increased by

the absolute transfer of the Surf-i-Khas estates included therein, and by so much adjoining territory as will make up a total gross revenue of 32½ lakhs of rupees, less whatever it may be agreed upon to deduct as an equivalent for the cession of the left bank of the Godavery, and the relinquishment of the river customs.

13. The Governor-General in Council is generally averse from mixing up concessions of grace and acts of friendly acknowledgment with arrangements proposed for mutual convenience, but in the present instance the object of freeing both ourselves and the Nizam from the cumbrous and vexatious arrangements arising out of the Treaty of 1853, and at the same time of putting the navigation and trade of the Godavery on a satisfactory footing, is so important, and so likely to be facilitated by dealing with these questions simultaneously and broadly, that His Excellency in Council is content to waive the objection.

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(No. 4.)

(Extract.)

Lord Canning to Sir Charles Wood, Bart., G.C.B., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Foreign Department, Camp Peperode,  
5 January 1861.

Sir,—I have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of the documents entered in the accompanying abstract of contents, in continuation of those which formed the enclosures of the despatch, No. 117, addressed to you on the 8th September last.

2. Among the papers then transmitted was a copy of a letter to the Resident of Hyderabad, dated the 7th July, No. 2518, in which, amongst other things, he was instructed :

1st. To make over to the Nizam in full sovereignty the lapsed Sawusthan of Shorapore.

2nd. To propose to His Highness to relinquish to the British Government the whole of his possessions on the left bank of the Godavery, receiving an equivalent for them.

3rd. To propose to His Highness to dispense with the accounts of the receipts and expenditure of the assigned districts.

4th. To inform His Highness that conditional on his acceptance of the last proposal the Government would agree to cancel the debt of 50 lakhs due by His Highness, to forego all further demand on account of interest, and to give up so much of the assigned districts as will leave in its possession territory yielding 32½ lakhs of rupees.

5th. Conditionally, as above explained, to propose to His Highness that the British Government should relinquish the districts of Dharaseo and Raichore, and should keep East and West Berar, increased by the absolute transfer of the Surf-i-Khas estates included therein, and by so much adjoining territory as will make up a total gross revenue of 32½ lakhs of rupees, less whatever it may be agreed upon to deduct as an equivalent for the cession of the left bank of the Godavery, and the relinquishment of the river customs.

3. The objects in view in making the above proposals are explained in detail in the letter of instructions above referred to. It will be sufficient to advert briefly to some of the leading points of the negotiation.

4. The fundamental principle of the Treaty of 1853 was that the British Government should have a material guarantee for the punctual payment of the Hyderabad Contingent; and, with this object, certain districts were placed by the Nizam under our management, on the understanding that we should render accounts of receipts and disbursements to His Highness, and make over to him any surplus revenue that might accrue.

5. This obligation to render accounts to the Nizam has proved a fruitful source of difference. Not only has the amount of many items of our expenditure

been matter of discussion with the Hyderabad Durbar, but the expediency of our improvements has been called in question, and it has come to the knowledge of the Government, although the raising of a distinct issue on such points has been avoided, that on certain classes of improvements—improved education, for instance—there would have been decided opposition to any expenditure whatever.

6. It was expected by the Nizam that the expense of management would not exceed  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the gross revenue. But within this limit it was not possible to secure an efficient administration of the districts and to provide for works of public utility. In fact, the country could not be governed creditably, according to our view of the duties of a Government, without spending more money than the Nizam would consent to see spent, and a persistent attempt so to govern it would have led to constantly recurring and irritating disputes.

7. The revenue of the assigned districts has been estimated at 45 lakhs of rupees, while the total expenditure has been  $47\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs. The payments provided for under the treaty amount to  $30\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs.

8. It was thought that the occasion of ceding to the Nizam in perpetuity the lapsed state of Shorapore, and bestowing other rewards upon him for the services rendered by him during the disturbances of 1857-58, was a favourable opportunity for making the proposals described in paragraph 2.

9. The Nizam readily agreed to most of the above proposals; but he was not disposed at first to consent to dispensing with the obligation of the British Government to render accounts of receipts and expenditure, from an apprehension that his complete sovereignty over the retained districts might be compromised by his doing so. He was also reluctant to consent to the administration of those districts through any other agency than that of the Resident at Hyderabad.

10. It was explained to the Nizam that the Government of India desired to hold the assigned districts not in sovereignty, but in trust, and for so long as the Contingent was kept up, and no longer. Also that it desired to hold only so much of the assigned districts as would meet the actual charges provided for in the Treaty, and yield  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the gross revenue towards the payment of the expense of administration. The Berar districts, he was told, would still form an integral part of His Highness's dominions, and would be restored to him entire whenever it should seem fit to the two Governments to terminate the engagement under which the Contingent was kept up.

11. The sacrifice which the British Government had offered to make was brought to the notice of His Highness, and an expectation was expressed that, in consideration of this sacrifice, some concessions would be made by the Nizam. The dispensing with the rendering of accounts, and the absence of restriction in regard to the system and agency of the administration of the districts retained, were objects for the attainment of which the British Government had been induced to incur the certainty of a present and the chance of a long-continued pecuniary loss; and His Highness was strongly urged to comply with the wishes of the Government on these points.

12. After some hesitation, the Nizam consented to dispense with the accounts, past, present, and future, and to leave the amount of all expenses of administration entirely to the discretion of the British Government, but he adhered to his objections to the transfer of the administration from the control of the Resident of Hyderabad. It was finally agreed that the British Government should cancel the debt of 50 lakhs, and forego all further demands on account of interest; that the districts of Raichore and Dharaseo should be restored to the Nizam; that the British Government should retain East and West Berar, and receive in addition the whole of the Crown lands in those districts, and so much of the intermixed and adjoining territory as would make up in all a present gross annual revenue of 32 lakhs of rupees; that those districts should be under the supervision of the Resident at Hyderabad; that no accounts should be rendered to the Nizam; that when a surplus revenue accrued it should be made over to His Highness, but that all charges which the officers of the British



Government might consider proper and necessary for the administration of the districts should be defrayed from the revenues without question before any surplus could be made over to the Nizam, and that any deficiency arising from excess of expenditure over income in one year should be made good from the surplus in another year.

13. The Nizam further agreed to cede to the British Government in full sovereignty, for an equivalent, the whole of his possessions on the left bank of the Godavery and Wyne Gunga, and to declare the navigation of the Godavery and its tributaries, so far as they formed the boundary between the two States, to be free.

14. The above stipulations have been embodied in a Supplemental Treaty, which, after having been duly executed by the Nizam, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson on behalf of the British, was ratified by me on the 31st ultimo.

15. It will be seen from the correspondence now forwarded that the promise of the Nizam has been obtained that the Madras Railway and Irrigation Companies shall be allowed to take whatever land they may require in the districts retransferred to His Highness under this Treaty.

16. The territory ceded by the Nizam on the left bank of the Godavery has already been made over to the charge of the Commissioner of Nagpore, and no time will be lost in carrying into effect the other transfers on either side.

(No. 131 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *Cuthbert Davidson*, c.b., Resident at Hyderabad, to *Cecil Beadon*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department; dated Hyderabad, 6th August 1860.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 2522, dated the 7th ultimo, conveying the observations and orders of His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council on the financial results of the Hyderabad assigned districts from the date of cession to the end of April 1858, as submitted in my despatch, No. 138, of the 6th July 1859.

2. With reference to the third paragraph of your letter, I beg to state that, as I anticipated, the whole amount on account of village expenses was not claimed, and 75,647 rupees were, under instructions from this office, ordered by Mr. Bullock, the late Officiating Commissioner, to be carried to the credit of the general revenue.

3. In regard to your fourth paragraph, I have the honour to observe that the orders of Government have been already obeyed in the accounts lately submitted demi-officially to your office in regard to the sum principal of the debt due by the Nizam on which interest should be calculated.

4. Referring to your fifth paragraph, I do not think that, under new arrangements, the Minister will require the submission of the accounts of the Hyderabad assigned territories if the debit against the districts restored is remitted, which I understand is contemplated, from the general tenour of your despatch, No. 2518, of the 7th July 1860.

5. Should, however, the Nizam, or his Minister, require the accounts from April 1853, I beg to be informed whether I am to forward those prepared in my office, in communication with the paymaster and the district officers, or if I am still to await those so long promised by the Accountant-General. Those prepared in my office were embodied in the financial portion of the Administration Report of the Assigned Districts forwarded to your office on the 23rd June last.

6. What I apprehend has caused most of the confusion and inconvenience in adjusting these accounts is that we rather regarded ourselves as dealing with imperial revenue than with revenue really belonging to the Nizam, and made over to us under restriction and for special purposes. The Treaty of 1853 appears to me clearly to provide, and certainly it was so understood by the Native Government, that these accounts were to be furnished by the Resident, not by the Accountant-General. A departure from this principle has, I believe, greatly embarrassed our

proceedings by occasioning a delay in placing the results of our administration before the Nizam, naturally tending to engender disappointment which it was difficult to appease, and elicit remonstrances which it daily became more perplexing to reply to satisfactorily.

7. The Resident's accounts could have been promptly prepared had all the accounts from the Assigned Districts passed through this office to that of the Accountant-General. They would have been equally under the Accountant General's final control as when forwarded piecemeal to that functionary by the district officers, while any documents from the districts could have been transmitted to him direct which he considered necessary. I would beg to express my conviction that much cause of reasonable dissatisfaction on the part of the Native Government would have been removed, while the interests of all parties would have been abundantly secured, had the audit of the expenditure been entrusted to the Resident, subject to the general supervision of the Calcutta authority.

8. In illustration of the perpetually recurring difficulties which the present system involves, I may remark that the paymaster of the Hyderabad Contingent informs me he has only just received his accounts, passed by the Auditor-General, for the months of August and September 1859.

9. It is quite true, as His Excellency remarks, that it would have been premature to anticipate any objections to particular items of account, but objection had already been taken by the Minister, particularly in the instance of the abolition of the customs duties.

10. Immediately after my arrival at Hyderabad he verbally addressed me on this subject, and showed that he was quite conversant, without being furnished with the annual accounts, with all receipts and expenditure in the Assigned Districts. This could hardly have been otherwise, as the native Amlahs employed by us were generally the same as those originally employed by the Hyderabad Government. Indeed, he informed me that he had conferred with, and remonstrated with, my predecessor on the heavy expenditure he was allowing in the Assigned Districts, and particularly protested against the abolition of the Sayer (customs duties), as revenue assigned for the due payment of the Contingent and the Treaty engagements: it will be seen from this that I did not anticipate objections, but my intention was to prepare Government to expect those I felt certain would be urged on the annual accounts in detail being transmitted to the Minister.

(No. 67 of 1860.)

(Extract.)

Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, c.b., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Hyderabad Residency, 12th August 1860.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt, on the 20th ultimo, of your despatch, No. 2518, dated the 7th July 1860, and to state that, agreeably to the instructions therein contained, I, on the 21st idem, invited the Minister to a conference, and placed the note marked A, herewith appended, in his hand, with a request that he would submit it to His Highness the Nizam, pointing out the great advantages to be obtained by the Hyderabad Government from the terms now offered by the Viceroy and Governor-General.

2. On the 23rd July (ultimo) the note and certain explanatory papers showing in detail the advantages His Highness was obtaining were submitted to the Nizam by the Minister, through his vakeel. His Highness caused these documents to be read three times over, then put them all into his pocket, and said he would give a reply after the festival of the Mohurram; he subsequently met Shums-ool-Oomrah and said the same to him.

3. The only remark of any consequence made by the Minister was in regard to the 5th, 6th, and 7th propositions of Government, viz., "Are these districts in Berar, valued at 32½ lacs, to become 'red,' and incorporated into British territory?" I replied I was instructed to negotiate so that annual accounts should not be

required, and that we should manage the administration without any discussion as to expenditure, taking on ourselves the responsibility for all loss or gain.

4. To this the Minister replied, "That would be making them over to you, as Bellary, &c." (meaning the "ceded districts,"), and they would be no longer the Nizam's territory." I remarked that the Governor-General had made a similar arrangement with Scindiah, which was for the mutual convenience of both Governments. Salar Jung did not, apparently, like the allusion made to Scindiah, and I have observed this on two recent occasions, remarking that the Nizam was of a much higher rank among the princes of India than Scindiah, and that he had no hope that His Highness would willingly assign any territory to us unreservedly without an equivalent.

5. I referred to my note, and replied that my Government only required the uncontrolled management, and not to render annual accounts, of the Berar districts, and that it would perhaps be better to enter into no further preliminary discussion till he had submitted the whole of the propositions, and received the orders of the Nizam in regard to them.

6. The Nizam, as it will be observed, took several days for consideration, and after much counsel with his immediate followers, and a conference with Shums-ool-Oomrah, whom I earnestly urged to advise him to accept without reserve all the propositions of the Governor-General, His Highness sent, on the 6th instant, for Shums-ool-Oomrah and his Minister to the durbar, and after being closeted privately with the former noblemen for two hours he sent for Salar Jung, and said, "Why are my Surf-i-khas (crown lands) required?" Salar Jung replied, "They are in the heart of the assigned territory, and caused incessant disputes about jurisdiction and authority between the English officers and your Highness's Naibs." "But where is the equivalent?" "Wherever your Highness pleases: estates of their value can immediately be given from the Dewaull revenues." On this His Highness assented.

7. The only other objection raised was with reference to furnishing annual accounts. His Highness asked why should the Treaty made so lately by his father not be adhered to. Salar Jung replied, "Rendering annual accounts was found inconvenient, and led to unpleasant discussions, which it was the Governor-General's object now finally to end." His Highness remarked there always must be more or less discussion between the two Governments, and that in every Treaty and agreement the Hyderabad Government had been called on to enter into for the last 100 years this plan was invariably urged to induce compliance with the requests of the British Government. His Highness then said, "You have the accounts, however, since the cession?" The Minister answered, "No, they have not been furnished, except for one year, which were not understood, and explanation begged for, and since then they have not been received."

His Highness then ordered the Minister to forego requiring the annual accounts of the Assigned Districts, but said, "Write and tell the Resident I make over the two Berar districts, my best and richest country, to his management, according to the Treaty of 1853; and when there is a surplus beyond the expenditure, after everything is paid, I require him to pay it into my treasury." The Minister's note, in reply to my note of the 21st July 1860, is herewith enclosed, marked (B).

12. My greatest difficulty in this negotiation has been to counteract the impression on the Nizam's mind that we were merely giving him back what is his own, however advantageous the terms that we offered, and that our intention was to persuade him to consent that the Berar districts should be incorporated with the neighbouring British territory. This idea became more confirmed as a mischievous rumour was for several days current (by whom propagated I know not) that the Berar districts were to be incorporated with the province of Nagpore.

13. The above must account for my being unable to obtain the entire possession and a more complete cession of these districts to our Government, in spite of every argument I could urge in favour of such an arrangement.

14. On receiving your telegram of the 4th August (instant), which only reached me on the 9th idem, when all the negotiations were just on the point of conclusion, Enclosure No. 2 and the Nizam had given his consent to forward the answer enclosed, I, in accordance with the instructions of the Governor-General therein

communicated, renewed the negotiations with the Minister, but he said it would be of no use to address His Highness, as already he had had the greatest difficulty in removing the Nizam's suspicions on the point of the cession of Berar, and that if again pressed all that had already been accomplished would be nullified.

15. I possibly might have been able to induce the Nizam to assent that the British Government should manage the Berar districts by any agency thought most economical and advantageous, had I been able to inform His Highness what the proposed agency was. The Minister put the question, but as I was not in possession of the views of the Government of India I was unable to give him any reply.

16. We have now, however, obtained the material guarantee for the pay of the Contingent, &c, the fundamental principle of the Treaty of 1853; and I cannot think, reviewing all the circumstances under which that Treaty was forced<sup>a</sup> on the Hyderabad Government, and its peculiar nature, that after the Nizam has shown such repugnance to cede unconditionally any portion of his dominions to our management it would be a gracious or generous policy to exact any better or more convenient terms for ourselves than we now obtain, especially with reference to the sentiments expressed in the first five paragraphs of your despatch under acknowledgment.

17. We take, without furnishing annual accounts,—which arrangement has been found inconvenient,—territory in Berar, in trust (amaull), under our immediate management, for certain specific purposes, with 32½ lacs of rupees of annual gross revenue, but which the calculation of the district officers, according to the Administration Report of this year, shows will in a few years at the very least increase by nine lacs; so we are sure eventually to repay ourselves any expenditure on account of present establishment that we may think actually necessary, and that may be above the revenue receipts, as they are just now.

18. It seems hardly necessary for me here, without reference to the virtual possession of the Berar districts, to recapitulate all the advantages we obtain by having such a body of troops as the Contingent at our command without costing us a single rupee; while we hold a material guarantee for their regular payment. True, the force is intended specially to ensure the tranquillity of the Hyderabad territory, but tranquillity there promotes peace within our own frontier, and these troops, as was shown in the Central Indian Campaign, can be made most useful to our Government as an auxiliary force. It therefore appears to me that on this account alone, if on no other, we should not dictate to the Nizam anything in regard to his districts which is distasteful to him, when we have gained the material guarantee for the pay of the Contingent, the fundamental principle contemplated in the Treaty of 1853.

19. I have heard it argued, Why take upon ourselves the trouble and responsibility of managing territory that belongs to the Nizam, without receiving any advantage for our good administration, by obtaining whatever may hereafter be the surplus revenue? I believe I have shown some of the advantages obtained in the preceding paragraph. Moreover, I do not think such an argument deserves much weight. We obtain what we state we alone require, viz., a material guarantee for the regular pay of the Contingent. If we require anything else, in my opinion we are bound plainly to say so. Then, again, it would be a most selfish policy to deny to the people of the Berar districts as good a government as we can give them because we put ourselves to some trouble and inconvenience in managing these districts as trustees for His Highness the Nizam. The whole people of India appear to me entitled at our hands to everything we can do for them in the way of good government, without entering too minutely into the question of profit and loss; and in this instance I think it is clear we make no pecuniary sacrifice.

20. The only other matter in the present negotiation which it appears requisite for me to notice in this despatch is in regard to the 4th proposition of the Government of India. The Hyderabad Government is willing to relinquish the levy of all customs dues on the Godavery and its confluent, which may be determined as the frontier of the two territories, and, the Minister informs me, will require no equivalent, as the income is at present of very small amount. He does this, he

\* *Vide* Parliamentary Blue Book ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, 26th July 1854.

says, to prove his anxiety to meet all the wishes of the British Government; but at the same time he observes it is not intended by this arrangement to relieve merchandize brought by the Godavery route from the usual duties if it is sent into the interior or to Hyderabad for sale, nor will it relieve exports from the duties, amounting to a maximum of 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, now generally levied at the market in the Nizam's territory where the goods are brought, but merely to clear the immediate rivers, viz., the Godavery and its feeders, named as the frontier line, from all cesses of every description.

21. I hardly think we could expect anything more from the Hyderabad Government, unless it is our wish to give the east coast trade by the route of the Godavery an unfair advantage and privileges over that of the west and other routes.

22. The only way to relieve trade thoroughly and fairly of the five per cent. we have guaranteed to the Nizam by the Treaty of 1802 without showing a preference to one set of traders or routes over another would be to purchase the whole right of the Nizam to levy any cesses whatever on imports from, or exports to, British territory; but as this is a very comprehensive question, and would involve a very large disbursement of money, I would on this point beg to be favoured with instructions.

23. It will be seen by a separate note, marked C, that if we restore the Raichore Doab to the Nizam I have provided that ground sufficient for the purposes of the Madras and Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company, which will have their junction at "Moodgul," in that district, and for the extension of the Madras Irrigation Company to "Pangtoor" from "Kurnool," shall be allowed, and to this the Minister has assented. He also informs me that all agreements (cows) entered into by our officers which have a further period to run on shall be respected and held valid.

(A.)

TRANSLATION of a NOTE from the Resident to the Minister dated 21st July 1860 (1st Mohurum 1277), No. 1114.

I beg to enclose extracts of five paragraphs of a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India expressing the thanks of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and to request that the same may be communicated at an auspicious moment to His Highness the Nizam. In addition to the above I have received orders as follows:—

1. That I would request the Nizam to accept presents from the Governor-General to the value of a lac of rupees.

2. That I would make over to His Highness, in full sovereignty, the lapsed Suwasthan of Shorapore.

3. That, in consequence of your having repeatedly requested, on the part of His Highness the Nizam, that I would submit to the Governor-General that the whole of the Assigned Districts should be restored to His Highness, and that he would make satisfactory arrangements for the punctual monthly payments of the Contingent, the Governor-General has not thought it advisable to accede to the above request, and makes the following observations:—"But the Governor-General in Council will on no account consent to forego the fundamental principle of the Treaty of 1853, namely, that so long as the Contingent is maintained the British Government shall hold a material guarantee for its punctual payment. His Excellency in Council is convinced that the existing treaty is in that respect a security absolutely necessary, no less for the support of His Highness's throne and the safety of his person, than for the preservation of friendly relations between the two States, and the maintenance of tranquillity throughout His Highness's dominions."

4. That I would propose to His Highness to relinquish to the British Government the whole of his possessions on the left bank of the Godavery, receiving an equivalent for the same.

5. That I would propose to His Highness to relinquish the levy of all customs dues on the Godavery, receiving an equivalent for the same.

6. That I would propose to His Highness to dispense with the accounts of the receipts and expenditure of the Assigned Districts.

7. That conditional on acceptance of the sixth proposal I would inform His Highness that the Government will agree to cancel the debt of 50 lacs, to forego all further demand on account of interest, and to give up so much of the Assigned Districts as will leave in its possession territory yielding  $32\frac{1}{2}$  lacs of rupees.

8. That conditionally, as above explained, I would propose to His Highness that the British Government should relinquish the districts of Dharaseo and Raichore, and should keep East and West Berar, increased by the absolute transfer of the Surf-i-Khas estates included therein, and by so much adjoining territory as will make up a total gross revenue of  $32\frac{1}{2}$  lacs of rupees, less whatever it may be agreed upon to deduct as an equivalent for the cession of the left bank of the Godavery, and the relinquishment of the river customs.

I beg the Nizam may be informed that the revenue of the Assigned Districts for 1859-60 (1269 Fuslee) is estimated at 45,59,000 Co.'s rupees.\*

(B.)

TRANSLATION of a NOTE from Mooktar-ool-Moolk Salar Jung Bahadoor, Minister to His Highness the Nizam, to the address of Colonel C. Davidson, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, dated 22nd Mohurrun H. 1277 (11th August 1860).

(No. 1451.)

I have been favoured with your letter, No. 1114, dated 1st Mohurrun H. 1277 (21st July 1860), giving cover to a copy of five paragraphs from a despatch from the Supreme Government. (Here the purport of the Resident's letter is recapitulated.) I have submitted your letter to His Highness the Nizam, and have received his commands to say that His Highness will have much pleasure, and derive great gratification, in accepting the presents referred to, and in receiving the Shorapore Suwasthan under his government and control.

2. The districts situated on the left bank of the Godavery river, namely, Rakapilly, Buddrachellum, Cherla, Albaka, Noorgoor, and Sironcha, as specified in your letter, No. 1174, dated 15th Mohurrun 1277 (4th August 1860), which the British Government requires, will be delivered over, and others will be taken in lieu of them by the Nizam's Government.

3. With a view to the convenience and facility of British traders and others, the transit and other duties levied on the banks of the Godavery will be abolished by the Nizam's Government, and no compensation will be required from the British Government. But upon all goods imported or exported from His Highness's territories in that direction a duty of five per cent. will be levied, agreeably to the Treaty, with the exception of salt, on which a different rate is leviable, in accordance with usage, by the Nizam's Government.

4. The proposal to cancel the debt of 50 lacs due by the Nizam's Government to the British, with interest thereon, on condition that no accounts of receipts and disbursements of the Assigned Districts shall in future be required from the British Government, is accepted by His Highness the Nizam, and no accounts will be required; and His Highness will leave in charge of the British Government, in "Amanee," districts yielding a gross revenue of about 32,50,000 Company's rupees, or such an amount as shall suffice to cover the charges of the pay of the Contingent, the yearly stipends of Appa Dessaye, and Mohiput Ram's family, and the amount payable to the Mahratta Salianadars, as provided by the Treaty, together with the charges of management (Sibbundy Ladur) at the rate of two annas per rupee, and will take back all districts surplus to the above.

5. The entire management of the districts which shall remain in the hands of the British Government shall be vested in the Resident, as provided by the Treaty.

6. The districts assigned as above shall continue to bear the name of His Highness the Nizam, and these districts, or the revenue therefrom, shall not be incorporated with those of the British Government.

7. As there is prospect of a large increase in the revenues of the Berar districts,

\* This paragraph was inserted at the request of the Minister, in order to make intelligible certain financial statements he had to submit.

therefore, after deducting all charges of management, for which no objections whatever shall in future be brought forward by His Highness the Nizam, together with the charges of the payment of the contingent, Appa Dessaye, Mohiput Ram's family, and the Mahratta Salianadars, whatever surplus shall remain shall be paid over to His Highness through the Resident. If at any time a deficiency occur in the revenues of the above districts no demand shall be made on the Nizam's Government to supply it, but it must be met by the future increase of those revenues, and with the view that His Highness's Government may be informed of the increase of revenue the British Government will adopt such measures as may be deemed advisable.

8. His Highness the Nizam will leave in "Amanee" with the British Government, agreeably to the above conditions, from among the districts of East and West Berar, and the Surf-i-Khas and other talookas situated within the limits of those districts, and the talookas on the left bank of the Godavery, districts yielding about 32,50,000 Company's rupees, or as much as will suffice to cover the items specified in the 4th para. of this letter, and will receive back the remaining talookas in the zillas of Dharaseo, Raichore Doab, &c., on account of the surplus, and in lieu of the talookas of the Surf-i-Khas my jagheers of Montoosapoor, &c., and the talookas on the left bank of the Godavery.

9. His Highness the Nizam has been informed that the revenues of the Assigned Districts for the year 1859-60, corresponding with the Fuslee year 1269, amount to 45,59,000 Company's rupees.

*Note.*—The Minister requested to give his own translation of the Persian note herewith annexed.

Hyderabad Residency, 12th August 1860.

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Resident.

(C.)

TRANSLATION of a NOTE from the Resident to the Minister dated 12th August 1860 (23rd Mohurru 1277), No. 1216.

Your note, No. 1451, of yesterday's date, communicating the instructions of His Highness the Nizam, in reply to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General's propositions contained in a letter dated the 7th July, ultimo, has been received.

2. If the Raichore Doab is restored to His Highness, it will be necessary to grant ground sufficient for the canal of the Madras Irrigation Company between Pangtoor and Kurnool, as well as for the purposes of the Railway Company between Bombay and Madras, *via* Moodgul, as this promise has already been held out to the Railway and Irrigation Companies.

3. On the restoration of the talooks to the Nizam's Government all agreements and covenants already entered into by the district officers must be respected and held valid.

(No. 71 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, c.b., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Hyderabad Residency, 14th August 1860.

Sir,—Adverting to the concluding paragraph of my despatch (No. 67) of the 12th instant, I beg to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, the accompanying copy and translation of a note received from the Minister, by which it will be seen that the Nizam's Government has given its formal and official assent to provide ground sufficient in the Raichore Doab district, in the event of its restoration, for the purposes of the Railway and Irrigation Companies.

No. 1457, dated 13th August 1860—24th Mohurru 1277.

TRANSLATION of a NOTE from the Minister to the Resident dated 13th August 1860 (24th Mohurru 1277), No. 1457.

Your note of yesterday's date, No. 1216, regarding land required for the Railway and Irrigation Companies in the Raichore Doab district has been received.



Agreeably to your proposal, the lands requisite for the above purposes between Pangtoor and Kurnool and in the Moodgul district will be granted by this Sircar if the Raichore Doab is restored to His Highness. I beg to add that all covenants and agreements which have been entered into by the district officers in the districts will be adhered to and respected during the period which they have yet to run.

(Foreign Department—No. 3889.)

From *A. R. Young, Esq.*, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated Fort William, 5th September 1860.

Sir,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 67) of the 12th ultimo, and to express the satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council at the readiness shown by the Nizam to accept, for the most part, the proposals made to His Highness in Mr. Beadon's letter of the 7th July. His Excellency in Council also gladly acknowledges the ability and tact with which you have conducted the negotiations to their present stage.

2. It is now agreed on the part of the two Governments—

1st. That the Sawasthan of Shorapore shall be ceded by the British Government in full sovereignty to the Nizam.

2nd. That the whole of the Nizam's possessions on the left bank of the Godavery and Wynegunga shall be ceded by the Nizam in full sovereignty to the British Government.

3. That the navigation of the Godavery and its tributaries, so far as they form the boundary between the two States, shall be free, and that no customs duties shall be levied on goods passing up and down those rivers.

3. In regard, however, to the rest of the plan proposed by the Government of India, there are two points on which the reply of His Highness, as given in the Minister's note of the 11th August, is not altogether in conformity with the views of the Governor-General in Council, or consistent with the object for which the arrangement, as a whole, was proposed. These two points are : first, the rendering of accounts by the British Government in respect to such part of the Assigned Districts as may remain in its possession in trust for the performance of the obligations imposed by Art. VI. of the Treaty of 1853 ; and, secondly, the arrangements for the future administration of those districts.

4. The Governor-General in Council gathers from your letter and its enclosures that these two points were not placed before His Highness as clearly as might have been wished, and that when you were asked by the Minister for explanation as to the footing on which the Government of India desired to hold the Berar districts a more explicit reply would perhaps have served to remove from the Nizam's mind the objections which he appears to have felt to this part of the arrangement. The Minister's remark that it would be making the districts over to the British Government, as Bellary, &c., and that they would be no longer the Nizam's territory, should have been met by a direct denial.

5. I am therefore desired to request that you will again address the Nizam on the subject, explaining to His Highness distinctly that the object of the Government of India in retaining in its hands a part even of the assigned districts is simply that it may hold a material guarantee for the performance of the conditions of Art. VI. of the Treaty of 1853, and that the Government of India desires to hold this territory, as it has hitherto held the whole of the assigned districts, not in sovereignty, but in trust for His Highness, so long as the Contingent is kept up, and no longer.

6. The districts remaining in the hands of the Government of India for this purpose will continue to be called " the Hyderabad Assigned Districts," or by any other suitable name that may better serve to mark the sovereignty of the Nizam ; and the fact that the alienation of this portion of the dominions of His Highness is temporary only, and for a special purpose conducive chiefly to the security of the Hyderabad State, and to the preservation of tranquillity throughout its limits.

7. The Nizam cannot be unaware that in consenting to relinquish so large a portion of the assigned districts, and to keep in its hands only so much as will



yield a gross revenue of 32 lakhs\* of rupees, the Government of India subjects itself to a certain pecuniary loss of no small magnitude. Although, out of consideration for the interests of the Nizam and for the long-standing friendship between the two States, the Governor-General in Council has consented to retain only so much of the assigned districts as will meet the actual charges provided for in the Treaty of 1853, and yield 12½ per cent. on the gross jumma in payment of the expense of administration, yet His Highness must well know that the actual expense with which the British Government will charge itself for the benefit of the districts in question is considerably in excess of this, and that for many years to come, if not always, the administration of these districts must involve an annual charge on the imperial treasury.

8. It was only with a view to the conclusion of all pecuniary transactions between the two Governments, and to the avoidance of any such in future, that the Governor-General in Council consented to this sacrifice; and if, after all, the object of the generosity of the Government of India be not attained, or if it be not permitted to adopt such measures as may conduce to the most economical and efficient management of the remaining districts, it will be necessary for the interest of the Government of India that the other parts of the arrangement to which His Highness has consented should be subject to modification.

9. The Governor-General in Council cannot agree that so much of the proposed plan as is plainly advantageous to the Nizam should be adopted, and that so much of it as enables the Government of India to indemnify itself to some extent for the loss to which it submits, and to reap the fruit of a more expensive, and, consequently, as the Governor-General in Council believes, of a more efficient administration, should be rejected. Whenever the districts in question are restored to the Nizam His Highness will derive all the future benefit that may possibly arise from their improvement while under the management of British officers.

10. So, in regard to the mode of administering the assigned districts, the Governor-General in Council, while strictly regarding them as part of the dominions of the Nizam, and without incorporating them with any British district, would desire, for the sake of administrative convenience and economy, to place them under the supervision of the Commissioner of Nagpore. By this means the office of Judicial Commissioner could be abolished, the establishment entertained at Hyderabad in connection with the administration of the assigned districts could be dispensed with, and other economical reforms could be accomplished. It is clear that, with a margin of only 4½ lakhs of rupees for expenses of management, including public works, every effort must be made to limit the expenditure within the narrowest bounds, and the surest means of effecting this is to place the districts under the administration of the Commissioner of Nagpore. They will still form an integral part of the Nizam's dominions, and will be restored to His Highness entire whenever it shall seem fit to the two Governments to terminate the engagement under which the Contingent is kept up.

11. Having regard, then, to these observations, and putting aside those propositions which were unconditionally made, and to which the Nizam has already agreed, the Governor-General in Council desires me to request that you will again submit to His Highness the following propositions:

1st. That the British Government should restore to the Nizam the Raichore Doab and the district of Dharaseo.

2nd. That the British Government should cancel the debt for 50 lakhs of rupees, and forego all further demand on account of interest.

3rd. That the Nizam should dispense with the accounts of the receipts and expenditure of the assigned districts for the past, present, and future.

4th. That the Nizam should assign to the British Government in trust, for the fulfilment of the objects of the Treaty of 1853, all the Surf-i-Khas lands included within the limits of East and West Berars, and so much additional territory adjoining thereto as shall make up in all a present gross annual revenue of 32 lakhs of rupees.

\* Half a lakh of rupees is given up as the equivalent of the loss of revenue involved in the cession of the Cis-Godavery districts and the relinquishment of customs dues on the Godavery.

12. These four propositions the Governor-General in Council regards as essential parts of one arrangement to be accepted or rejected as a whole, and on this view of the case you are desired to insist. You will explain to the Nizam that it is for the advantage of His Highness that the Governor-General in Council seeks to alter any of the arrangements made under the Treaty of 1853; that His Highness can of course reject the proposals that have been made to him, but that he must not expect that the Government of India can consent to his accepting so much of it as is perfectly agreeable to him, and repudiating the rest.

13. I am directed to enclose the draft of a Treaty which you will use your discretion in presenting to the Nizam for his acceptance. The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that it is desirable to mark these important transactions, and the occasion which gave rise to them, by a solemn engagement, and hereby vests you with full powers in that behalf; but if His Highness objects to this His Excellency in Council will not press it.

14. You are authorized to make over the Shorapore territory to the Nizam without delay; and you will at the same time request the Nizam's Government to deliver over the districts on the left bank of the Godavery to the officer who may be sent by the Commissioner of Nagpore to take charge of them. The Nizam's Government should also be moved to issue a proclamation declaring the navigation of the Godavery and its tributaries, so far as they form the boundary of the two States, to be free, and absolutely to prohibit the levy of any customs or other duties on goods passing up and down the river. The Governor-General in Council does not desire in the least to interfere with the liberty of the Nizam's Government to levy customs duty on goods entering or leaving the Hyderabad territory, whether by land or water. This is a sufficient answer to the 2nd paragraph of your letter under reply.

15. The Governor-General in Council learns with much pleasure from the last paragraph of your letter under reply, and from your subsequent letter of the 14th ultimo (No. 71), that the Nizam has agreed to give whatever land may be required in the Raichore Doab (in the event of its being restored to His Highness) for the Railway and Navigation Companies, and that all agreements made by the British officers will be adhered to and respected.

DRAFT OF SUPPLEMENTAL TREATY between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain on the one Part, and His Highness the Nawab Uzool-ood-Dowlah Nizam-ool-Moolk Asuph Jah Bahadoor on the other Part, settled by Lieutenant-Colonel Cuthbert Davidson, C.B., Resident at the Court of His Highness by Virtue of full Powers to that effect vested in him by His Excellency the Right Honourable Charles John, Earl Canning, G.C.B., Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council.

WHEREAS it will be for the convenience of both the contracting parties to the Treaty of 1853, and will simplify the relations of the two Governments, if certain modifications of that Treaty are made; and whereas certain matters not dealt with in that Treaty call for adjustment between the two contracting parties; and whereas it is the desire of the Governor-General in Council to give all possible solemnity to certain acts marking the high esteem in which His Highness the Nizam is held by Her Majesty the Queen; therefore the following articles have been agreed upon and determined between the Viceroy and Governor-General, on behalf of Her Majesty, and the Nawab Uzool-ood-Dowlah Nizam-ool-Moolk Asuph Jah Bahadoor.

Article I. All Treaties and engagements between the two States and not contrary to the tenor of this engagement are hereby confirmed by it.

Article II. The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council cedes to His Highness the Nizam in full sovereignty the territory of Shorapore.

Article III. The debt of about 50 (fifty) lakhs of Hyderabad rupees due by the Nizam to the British Government is hereby cancelled.

Article IV. His Highness the Nizam agrees to forego all demands for an account of the receipts and expenditure of the Assigned Districts for the past,

present, or future, but the British Government will pay to His Highness any surplus that may hereafter accrue, after defraying all charges under Article VI., and all future expenses of administration, the amount of such expenses being entirely at the discretion of the British Government.

Article V. The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council restores to His Highness the Nizam all the Assigned Districts in the Raichore Doab and on the western frontier of the dominions of His Highness adjoining the Collectorates of Ahmednuggur and Sholapore.

Article VI. The districts in Berar already assigned to the British Government under the Treaty of 1853, together with all the Surf-i-Khas talooks comprised therein, and such additional districts adjoining thereto as will suffice to make up a present annual gross revenue of 32 lakhs of rupees currency of the British Government, shall be held by the British Government in trust for the payment of the troops of the Hyderabad Contingent, Appah Dessaye's Chout, the allowances to Mohiput Ram's family, and certain pensions mentioned in Article VI. of the said Treaty.


Article VII. The Surf-i-Khas talooks and additional districts mentioned in the foregoing Article are to be transferred to the Resident as soon as this Treaty is ratified.

Article VIII. His Highness the Nizam cedes to the British Government in full sovereignty all the possessions of His Highness on the left bank of the River Godavery and of the River Wyne Gunga above the confluence of the two rivers, viz., the talooks of Rakapilly, Buddrachellum, Cherla, Albaka, Noogoor, and Sironcha.


Article IX. The navigation of the River Godavery and its tributaries, so far as they form the boundary between the two States, shall be free, and no customs duties or other cesses shall be levied by either of the two contracting parties, or by the subjects of either, on goods passing up or down the aforesaid rivers.

Article X. This Treaty, consisting of ten Articles, being this day concluded and settled by Lieutenant-Colonel Cuthbert Davidson, c.b., on behalf of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, with the Nawab Ufzul-ood-Dowlah Nizam-ool-Moolk Asuph Jah Bahadoor, Lieutenant-Colonel Cuthbert Davidson has delivered one version thereof, in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the Nawab, who, on his part, has also delivered one copy of the same to Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson, duly executed by His Highness; and Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson hereby engages to deliver a copy of the same to His Highness the Nizam, duly ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General, within 30 days from this date, when this copy herewith signed and sealed by the British Resident will be returned. Signed, sealed and exchanged at

Hyderabad on the 26th day of December A.D. 1860  
(12 Jummadee-Sanee, 1277 Hijree).



(Signed) *Cuthbert Davidson*, Resident.



(Signed) *Canning*.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Camp at Ammerpattun on 31st day of December 1860.

(Signed) *A. R. Young*,  
Secretary to the Government of India  
with the Governor-General.

(No. 3889 A.)

From *A. R. Young*, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, to the Commissioner of Nagpore, dated Fort William, 5th September 1860.

Sir,—Negotiations being in progress with His Highness the Nizam for the cession in full sovereignty to the British Government of his possessions on the left bank of the Godavery, and of the Wyne Gunga above the confluence of the two rivers, and the Governor-General in Council having determined that the said possessions shall be placed under your management, I am directed to request that you will, in communication with the Resident of Hyderabad, depute an officer to take charge of the districts whenever the Nizam's Government is prepared to make them over.

(No. 80 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, c.b., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Hyderabad Residency, 1st September 1860.

Sir,—Adverting to the fourth paragraph of my despatch (No. 66) of the 12th ultimo, and after communicating with Captain Haig on the subject, a copy of whose letter and of my reply is enclosed, it will be seen that the proposed new frontier line is the one desired by him, although there is apparently some difference in the nomenclature of the rivers.

2. I am not sure that the Nizam would agree to cede his right on the Paloncha talook, on the right bank of the Godavery, belonging to the Rancee of Buddrachellum as his tributary.

(No. 178.)

From Captain *F. J. Haig*, District Engineer, Upper Godavery, to the Resident, Hyderabad, 20th August 1860.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter (No. 1526) of 13th August, containing extract from a despatch addressed by you to the Government of India, on which, as requested, I beg to offer the following remarks :—

2. The talooks of Cherla, Albaka, and Noogoor are not, as stated in para. 6 of extract, held by dependencies of the Rancee of Buddrachellum. They are appendages of a zemindaree on the right bank, that of Mahadeopoor, if I recollect right, though I cannot at this moment be certain, being absent from my office. This error is, however, a matter of no consequence, as it does not appear in any way to affect the arrangements you propose. The nomenclature of the rivers in the definition of the proposed boundary line is also not quite correct. It should rather be, "1st. The Godavery till it reaches the confluence of the Pranhata. 2nd. The Pranhata till the confluence of the Wyne Gunga; afterwards the Wurdah."

The Wurdah is the name of the river flowing down past Hingunghat and Chandah to the junction of the Wyne Gunga. The river formed by their united streams from that point to the Godavery is called the Pranhata.

3. The memorandum I lately sent you on the statistics of the talooks on the left bank, which under the new arrangements will become British territory, contains, I believe, nearly all the information I possess on the subject. With regard to that of Paloncha, on the right bank, which I understand to include the whole of the Buddrachellum zemindaree on that side of the river up to Mingapett, I think the proposed transfer of it also could not fail to be most profitable to us in every point of view. The value set on it, 6,000 rupees, is just about what it is now worth to the Nizam, but ridiculously below its actual value. It is well watered and possesses numerous fine tanks, now mostly in ruins, and other capabilities in respect of soil and population, which under British rule would speedily raise its revenue to several times its present amount. Its acquisition would give us possession of 100 miles more of that bank of the river, and afford a footing which would be of great importance in connection with our military communication with Secunderabad, the route

## HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

thither *via* the Godavery and Buddrachellum having been definitely adopted for the transport of military stores of all kinds from the arsenals of the coast to that station. The existing road from Buddrachellum through Paloونها and Cumnamet will, I presume, be the one used for this purpose. The entrepôt for the stores has been established on that bank opposite Buddrachellum, and as large quantities will be accumulated there every year it is very desirable that we should have the means of effectually protecting them.

(No. 1665 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to Captain *Haig*, District Engineer, Upper Godavery, dated Hyderabad Residency, 1st September 1860.

Sir,—With reference to para. 2 of your letter (No. 178) of the 20th instant, I beg to observe that from the statements of the native Government, and by a reference to the Surveyor General's map of the Nizam's dominions, exhibiting the territories surveyed from 1816 and those assigned to the British Government by the treaty of 6th June 1855, you appear to be mistaken. It will be seen that the Pyne Gungah, flowing into the Wurdah, forms the Pruncheeta, not the Wyne Gungah; and that the Pruncheeta flowing into the Wyne Gungah then takes the latter denomination until it reaches the Godavery.

2. I do not, however, consider the nomenclature of these rivers of much consequence, as the boundary is distinctly defined.

3. With reference to your remarks about the different talooks to be ceded, it appears from the accompanying memorandum, furnished by the native Government, in which they have corrected their former statement, that only Buddrachellum and Rakapilly are dependencies of the Paloونها and Buddrachellum zemindarnee (Ranee), who is a tributary of the Nizam, and her lands are her own to manage as she pleases, after the payment of her annual tribute of 68,000 rupees; I doubt, therefore, were the Nizam to cede Paloونها as well as the other six talooks on the left bank of the Godavery and its affluents, whether our Government could make any additional demand from her; however, that is a matter for after consideration. My business is to deal with the cession of the Nizam's sovereignty and other rights, and at present he agrees to cede all those over the talooks of Rakapilly, Buddrachellum, Cherla, Albaka, Noogoor, and Sironcha.

### MEMORANDUM.

The talooks of Buddrachellum and Rakapilly belong to Luchmee Ninsee, zemindarnee of Paloونها, and who pays on account of Paloونها, &c., in which the two talooks above mentioned are included, an annual tribute of 68,340 rupees. The talook of Cherla belongs to Goolshakur Rao Sur Deshmook, of Chinnoor, &c., and is held by him as a kowl from the Sircar, which expires at the close of the present Fuslee year, 1270 (A.D. 1860-61). The talook of Albaka belongs to Venkut Rama Rao Sur Deshmook, of Chinnoor, &c., held by him on a kowl from the Sircar, which terminates at the close of the present Fuslee year, 1270 (A.D. 1860-61).

The talook of Noogoor belongs to Boochae, widow of Achut Rao Sur Deshmook, of Chinnoor, &c., is in Amancee, and managed by the Sircar's talookdar.

The talook of Sironcha belongs to Mootum Rao Sur Deshmook, of Chinnoor, &c., is in Amancee, under the management of the Sircar's talookdar.

### COPY OF SERVICE MESSAGE by Electric Telegraph.

From Calcutta.

To Hyderabad.

From Mr. Beadon.

To Resident, dated 29th September.

In paragraph 12 of my letter (No. 2519) you were authorized to negotiate with the Nizam for the cession of the Godavery districts to the British Government in return for a full equivalent, either in land or money, and you were told that the Government would cede in lieu of those districts either the lands in Masulipatam or a

portion of Nagpore, or, if His Highness preferred it, a convenient strip of the assigned districts.

In paragraph 12 of my letter (No. 2518) of the same date you were authorized to propose this arrangement absolutely. You were also authorized to propose that all accounts of the Assigned Districts should be dispensed with, and conditionally thereon that the debit should be cancelled, and a large portion of the assigned districts restored to the Nizam.

In the Minister's note of the 11th August the Nizam agreed to cede the Godavery districts in lieu of others to be given by the British Government, and this cession has been conclusively accepted on these terms by the Government.

But His Highness objected to dispense with the accounts, and therefore the negotiation in respect to all the proposals which were conditional thereon is still pending.

But those proposals are entirely unconnected with the cession of the Godavery districts, to which the Nizam has absolutely agreed. The Government expects that His Highness will not recede from this position, and is prepared to give lands of equivalent value from any quarter that may be preferred, as mentioned in my letter (No. 2519).

You will represent this to the Nizam's Government, but the form and manner of doing so are left to your discretion.

You will do it in the manner which you may judge best calculated to bring about a fulfilment of your instructions.

On the other four points, which are still under discussion, the Governor General does not desire to hurry the Nizam, or press for an immediate answer.

COPY of SERVICE MESSAGE by Electric Telegraph.

From Hyderabad, Deccan.

To Calcutta.

From Resident.

To Foreign Secretary, Friday, 12 October  
6-15 p.m.

Nizam adheres to his determination to require surplus revenue, but gives up all accounts, past, present, and future. Does not consent to the Berar Assigned Districts being put under the supervision of the Commissioner of Nagpore. I can, I believe, get 30 lacs of gross revenue in Berar, which will include crown and jageer lands within our boundary; that is, 28 for treaty engagements and 2 at 25 per cent. for civil management. If latter, is not to exceed. Orders for the transfer of the Godavery districts to Commissioner of Nagpore received and despatched to that officer. Reported fully my proceedings during negotiation by to-day's post.

(No. 91 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, c. b., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Hyderabad Residency, 12 October 1860.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Deputy Secretary Young's despatch (No. 3889) of the 5th September 1860; and before proceeding to report the result of my further negotiations in detail, I beg to premise that I have had to contend against a desire on the part of the Nizam and his Durbar to make it appear that I was forcing them into the acceptance of arrangements that they did not desire, and that they were again, in spite of the Queen's Proclamation, made to suffer from a system of coercion which had for many years caused them great pecuniary embarrassment. My instructions did not at all warrant my accepting such a position, and I therefore refused to acknowledge any such intention on the part of my Government, and pointed out the offers contained in the Government letters, which were open and plain, and the terms tendered must be considered most advantageous to the Hyderabad Government.

2. On the 17th September I received the official despatch under acknowledgment, and on the 23rd Mr. Beadon's demi-official letter, for which I had been ordered to wait before renewing the negotiations.

3. I immediately on its receipt communicated with the Minister, sending him an English copy of the Deputy Secretary's despatch (No. 3889) of the 5th September 1860, and requested that he would come to breakfast with me next day, in order that we might have a conference afterwards. This he did, and we then compared the despatch above mentioned, paragraph by paragraph, with

- Enclosure No. 1. a translation (marked A) the Minister had made ; but I could not elicit from him what was likely to be the Nizam's reply, but in the evening I received a note (marked B), herewith appended, and
- Enclosure No. 2. with as little delay as possible I forwarded a telegram (marked C)
- Enclosure No. 3. to your address ; and on receipt of the telegram in reply (marked D) I transmitted it for the information of the Minister, with a
- Enclosure No. 4. view to its submission to His Highness the Nizam, accompanied by a note (marked E).

4. I was present during the negotiations that took place in 1853 for the unreserved cession of the Berar districts to our Government, when General Low informed the Durbar, if so surrendered, he was authorized to cancel all our pecuniary demands on the Hyderabad State. I witnessed the objurgations and threats then used in order to induce the late Nizam to acquiesce in the Government proposals, similar, with slight modifications, to those now submitted to his successor for acceptance ; and I am satisfied his son has inherited all his father's aversion, and disliked to part with the Berars, except under certain stipulations, to our Government.

5. When I made the remark, in the 15th paragraph of my despatch (No. 67) of the 12th August last, that perhaps the Nizam, if he knew the agency by which our Government proposed to manage the assigned territory, might be induced to consent to our wishes in that respect, I never supposed that the agency intended was to be the Commissioner of Nagpore ; indeed, it will be seen by para. 12 of that despatch that I spoke of a mischievous rumour that the Berar districts were to be incorporated with the province of Nagpore having got abroad here, that nearly put an end to all negotiations whatever.

6. In the course, however, of the negotiations reported in this despatch, I informed the Minister, with reference to Mr. Beadon's demi-official letter of the 10th September, that my Government were prepared not to press the point of the transfer of the districts to the supervision of the Commissioner of Nagpore if he could induce the Nizam to yield their entire management to the British Government without demanding any surplus revenue that might hereafter accrue. He said he would submit the proposition to His Highness, but that he felt sure that the Nizam would willingly agree to nothing but what had been stated to Government in his (the Minister's) note of the 11th August last. In short, it has come to this : the Nizam will not, unless frightened or intimidated, of his free will and consent agree to anything but his former terms, as stated in the Minister's note of the date above mentioned.

7. With reference to Mr. Beadon's telegram of the 27th September, it will be seen from proposal enclosure (A) of my despatch 12th August last that I did submit a proposition to the Nizam for the cession absolutely of the Godavery districts to our Government ; but His Highness, from all the other propositions of the Government being tendered at the same time, says that had what has since been explained been then made known to him he would not have consented to the surrender of the Godavery districts without the other terms he agreed to in the Minister's letter of the 11th August being conceded. His Highness's answer does appear to bear a conditional construction, as the word "will" is used ; not that he accepts as in the case of the presents and the Shorapoor Suwasthan. I requested the Minister, however, to press the immediate transfer of the Godavery districts on the receipt of your telegram of the 27th ultimo, and at last the Nizam said, "If the Governor-General so interpreted my reply to the Government letter, transfer all my sovereign and other rights over the Godavery districts to the British Government."

8. I have ascertained that translations of all the Government letters have been laid before the Nizam, and that, after long and earnest consultation with his most confidential counsellors, the enclosed note marked (F) emanated from himself, and has been recorded on the (Secai)\* annals of his Government.

Enclosure No. 6.

9. I have always been of opinion that had the pecuniary demands of the two Governments been impartially dealt with we had no just claim against the Nizam for the present debt of 43 lacs of Company's rupees. His Highness's Minister, in a note dated 19th August 1851†, when pressed on account of the arrears of the pay of the Contingent, asked for the surplus of the abkaree of the revenues of Secunderabad and Jaulnah, which was afterwards prospectively allowed to be a portion of the legitimate revenue of the Hyderabad State. We carried these revenues, which at present amount to one lac annually, to our own credit from 1812 to 1853, say for 41 years. The above would have given the Nizam a credit of 41 lacs, without interest, against the debt we claimed. Further, we charged His Highness from January 1849 to May 1853 with interest at six per cent. on advances for the pay of the Contingent, which charge for interest amounted to 10½ lacs of rupees, although the Nizam earnestly protested against being made to pay interest at all, but nevertheless it was debited against him in account.

10. I believe it must be apparent, from what I have stated above, that in 1853 we had little or no real pecuniary claim against the Nizam; but I find, since the cession in 1853, besides 18 lacs of rupees we remitted of Sayer customs duties in the Assigned Districts, which we accepted as revenue for the treaty engagements of 1853, that we have charged 18 lacs of rupees against the revenues of the districts for the interest of the debt of 43 lacs, which His Highness acknowledged, under pressure, to be due by him by the Treaty of 1853, but which he never considered he justly owed.

11. I also discover, by a reference to a memorandum by the late Sir William Macnaghten, of 11th January 1834, from your office, that in some years 11 lacs, 12 lacs and 13 lacs were charged annually to the Nizam as the pay alone of European officers of a Contingent that now, when nearly as strong numerically, we find we can efficiently maintain at a cost altogether of 26 lacs per annum. The wonder clearly is that, instead of owing only 43 lacs of Company's rupees at the end of 50 years of such a system, our claim did not render the Nizam hopelessly insolvent.

12. The policy the Honourable Company's Government pursued towards the Nizam ever since the Partition Treaty of 1817, after the termination of the Mahratta war, has been, especially in regard to pecuniary transactions, so completely one on their side of *sic volo sic jubeo*, that expressions such as "His Highness can of course reject the proposals," as contained in 12th paragraph of your letter under acknowledgment, which I was ordered to communicate to the Nizam in Mr. Beadon's demi-official note of the 10th ultimo, renders successful negotiation almost an impossibility, although we thereby elicit an expression of the Nizam's real wishes at the expense of the point we are desirous of carrying.

13. I deem it imperative on me, particularly as we propose at the present time to reward the Nizam, to put these facts prominently before the Government. Knowing that the princes of India, owing to the Queen's Proclamation, think that the *régime* by which they were always shown to be in debt to our Government, by not having their counter-claims admitted, has passed away, and that the Viceroy and Governor-General may, before passing his final decision on the present question, succinctly understand some of the pecuniary dealings by which the Nizam's Government considers itself to have been injured and aggrieved by that of the Honourable Company.

\* In a former despatch I particularly mentioned that this was considered a most formal ceremony by the Durbar.

† Vide despatch, No. 166, dated 2nd September 1851, and from General Low, No. 118, of the 27th August 1853.



## HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

14. I believe I can obtain in trust, as proposed by the Nizam, 35 lacs of territory in Berar, instead of 32½, which would give us 25 per cent. for civil charges in the Berar districts; but this percentage we must engage not to exceed; we should then retain what we at present hold in Berar with the Surf-i-Khas estates added, and the account would stand thus:—

Present Revenue of Berar .....	<i>Co.'s Rs.</i>	26
Surf-i-Khas and Minister's estates; say, 10 lacs Hyderabad currency .....		
	<i>Co.'s Rs.</i>	35
Disbursements:		
Contingent and Treaty engagements		28
Civil management, at 25 per cent.,....		7
	<i>Co.'s Rs.</i>	35

15. From a wish not to be considered to embarrass the Government in carrying out a policy on which they appear to have determined, I have hitherto abstained from mentioning the perfect horror and dismay, among almost every class, with which the intelligence was received in the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo districts that they were again to be transferred to the government of His Highness's Naibs. No one knows so well as I do, from long residence in the Hyderabad territory, the tyranny and grinding oppression with which these miscreants treat the inhabitants of the country placed under their control.

16. My several Administration Reports of the last three years have shown to the Government, perhaps imperfectly, that, although our administration may yet admit of improvement, we have introduced order where we found anarchy, and that we have afforded the people protection for life and property, while they acknowledge themselves happy, prosperous, and contented under British rule in the Hyderabad Assigned Districts.

17. I informed the Minister that the Shorapoor Surwusthan, and lands of the annual value of 50,000 rupees, would be made over to whomsoever he pleased. He replied that he would rather wait till the whole question was settled, unless His Highness the Nizam called at once for these estates.

18. It will be observed that my application for an interview with the Nizam was not noticed. The reason is that a few days ago one of the Nizam's dependants, Tynath Jai Jung, was shot at by one of his own Arab followers when conveying a message from the Nizam to the Minister; and the Nizam seems to fear some insult might be offered to me, as no doubt the impression has got abroad among the people we are endeavouring to force something unpalatable on His Highness.

(A.)

TRANSLATION of a NOTE from the Resident to the Minister dated  
24th September 1860 (7th Rubbee-ool-Awal).

(No. 1427.)

I beg to enclose a rookah which I have addressed to His Highness the Nizam, with a copy of the same for your information, and request that the same may be delivered to His Highness at an auspicious moment. I further request that you will explain to His Highness the great advantages which would accrue to His Highness in accepting the terms now offered by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

2. It is desirable that you should kindly arrange for my receiving an early reply to this communication, and that I may be favoured with an interview with His Highness at a durbar, in order that the reply in question might be delivered to me personally by His Highness.

TRANSLATION of a ROOKAH from the Resident to His Highness the Nizam  
dated 24th September 1860 (7th Rubbee-ool-Awal, 1277 (H.).

After the usual compliments.

I beg to state that on receiving the Minister's note of the 11th August last, conveying your Highness's reply to the proposals of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, it was duly communicated to His Lordship. I have received a letter in reply from the Secretary to the Government of India, which I have delivered to the Minister, and enclose a translation of the same for your Highness's information.

2. I beg that your Highness will take into your serious and earnest consideration the Governor-General's proposals as therein expressed, and favour me with an early reply.

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(B.)

My dear Colonel Davidson,

I was not aware of the full purport of the 14th paragraph of the extracts while with you to-day, and imagined that it referred only to the duties levied on the Godavery ; I have therefore written you a separate note on the subject, which I deem necessary, and which is herewith forwarded.

The 14th paragraph is not, of course, included in the translation I gave you, which must now be added.

24th September 1860.

Believe me, &c.,  
(Signed) *Salar Jung.*

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(C.)

COPY of a TELEGRAM from Colonel *Davidson*, Hyderabad, to *Cecil Beadon*, Esq.,  
Calcutta, dated 26th September 1860.

Cipher Telegraphic Message.

" Your private letter of 10th reached me on the 23rd, and I at once communicated the official reply from Government to the Minister, and invited him to a conference next day. He brought with him a translation of the Government letter; and together we verified it with the English version, paragraph by paragraph. Although I pressed him on the point, he told me it was impossible to then give an opinion how the Nizam would receive what was now proposed to him. We agreed together that, in order to give the transaction greater importance, I should address a note direct to the Nizam, on golden paper, enclosing the translated Government letter. This I did, giving the Minister English and Persian copies of the Government letter, and a copy of my note to the Nizam.

" In the evening I received a note from the Minister as follows: 'With reference to the 14th paragraph in the extracts of a letter from the Supreme Government which you gave me to-day, which refers to the Shorapoor territory being made over to the Nizam without delay, and the delivery of the districts on the left bank of the Godavery to the officer who may be sent by the Commissioner of Nagpore, I beg to say that the transfer of the Godavery districts is connected with the four proposals relative to the restoration of certain of the Assigned Districts, and must be settled together. It cannot form a separate arrangement, as desired in the paragraph in question.'

" It is evident it is seen what importance we attach to the cession of the Godavery districts, and the Nizam's Government also know that they will never be able to manage Shorapoor without a large force being kept up there ; so the insinuation is clear that the negotiation will break down altogether unless the terms of the Nizam already submitted to Government are unconditionally accepted. Under such circumstances, how does the Government desire me to act? It was only by making it appear a matter of no importance whatever that I induced the Nizam so readily to agree to give up the Godavery districts, as he formerly consented to do. The Nizam has requested not to be hurried, and to be allowed 15 or 20 days to consider the present Government proposal. A reply by telegraph is requested."

## HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

(D.)

COPY of a TELEGRAM from Mr. *Beadon* to the Resident at Hyderabad dated Calcutta, 29th September 1860.

"Clear the line. In paragraph 12 of my letter (No. 2519) you were authorized to negotiate with the Nizam for the cession of the Godavery districts to the British Government, in return for a full equivalent, either in land or money; and you were told that the Government would cede, in lieu of those districts, either the lands in Masulipatam or a portion of Nagpore, or, if His Highness preferred it, a convenient strip of the Assigned Districts. In paragraph 12 of my letter (No. 21,518) of the same date you were authorized to propose the arrangement absolutely.

"You were also authorized to propose that all accounts of the districts should be dispensed with, and conditionally thereon that the debt should be cancelled, and a large portion of the Assigned Districts restored to the Nizam. In the Minister's note of the 11th August the Nizam agreed to cede to Government the Godavery district in lieu of others given by the British Government, and this cession has been conclusively accepted on these terms by the Government. But His Highness objected to dispense with the accounts, and therefore the negotiation in respect to all the proposals which are conditional thereon is still pending. But those proposals are entirely unconnected with the cession of the Godavery districts, to which the Nizam has absolutely agreed. The Government expects His Highness will not recede from his position, and is prepared to give lands of equal value from any quarter that may be preferred, as mentioned in my letter No. 2519. You will represent this to the Nizam's Government; but the form and manner of doing so are left to your discretion. You will do it in the manner which you may judge best calculated to bring about a fulfilment of your instructions on the other points which are still under discussion.

"The Governor-General does not desire to hurry the Nizam or press him for an immediate answer."

(E.)

COPY of a LETTER from Lieutenant-Colonel *Davidson* to the Nawab *Salar Jung* dated Hyderabad Residency, 30th September 1860.

My dear Salar Jung,

I herewith enclose the telegram I received last night, in reply to your note of the 24th. You will observe the British Government will not allow His Highness the Nizam to retract from the cession of the Godavery talooks for an equivalent elsewhere.

There is no sort of loss to the Hyderabad Government from this arrangement, and I strongly urge on you to meet the Governor-General's requisition, as it will otherwise assuredly lead to an unfriendly and angry feeling between the two Governments.

If you would like to have the telegram officially, I will send in the usual public note if you will address me officially on the subject of your note of the 24th.

Ever yours, &c.,  
(Signed) *C. Davidson.*

(F.)

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Highness the Nizam to Colonel *C. Davidson*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, dated 12th October 1860 (25th Rubbee-ool-Awal.)

I am in receipt of your letter informing me that you have received a communication from His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General, which you delivered to my Dewan, on the subject of the letter addressed by him to you under date the 11th August last, in reply to the propositions which were made by His

Lordship, and you enclosed a translation of the Governor-General's communication in your letter to me, with a request that my attention may be directed to what His Lordship has written. Agreeably to your intimation, the communication from the Supreme Government has been attentively perused by me.

In the 3rd paragraph of the Governor-General's communication it is stated : " That in regard to the rest of the plan proposed by the Government of India there are two points on which the reply of His Highness, as given in the Minister's note of the 11th August, is not altogether in conformity with the views of the Governor-General in Council or consistent with the object for which the arrangement, as a whole, was proposed : first, the rendering of accounts by the British Government in respect to such parts of the Assigned Districts as may remain in its possession, in trust, for the performance of the obligations imposed by Article VI. of the Treaty of 1853 ; and, secondly, the arrangements for the future administration of those districts." In my Dewan's letter of the 11th August these two points were stated agreeably to my commands, under the idea that there would be no difficulty in giving effect to them by the Supreme Government ; and now I refer to them again more particularly, and I am sure that the doubts entertained by His Excellency the Governor-General in regard to them will be entirely dissipated.

The Supreme Government is under an impression that my Government requires the accounts of the districts, but it will be perceived from the 7th paragraph of my Dewan's letter of the 11th August that my Government did not at all make a request for the accounts of the Assigned Districts, but, considering that the districts which the British Government propose to retain in their possession are very productive, and the best in my dominions, and in former times yielded a much larger revenue than they do now, and that it may be deemed certain that hereafter, when they have been all surveyed, and extensive tracts which were before under cultivation, but are now neglected, are again reclaimed, the revenue will largely increase under the administration of British officers, and that General Low, when negotiating for the districts to be held in Amanee, distinctly stated that by the assignment of the districts to the British Government the benefit to my Government will be so great as to prove a source of great satisfaction to it. It was stated in the paragraph above alluded to, in accordance with this, that from the revenues of the aforesaid districts, after deducting all charges in regard to which there will be no objections raised in future by my Government, and after providing for the payment of the Contingent troops, the yearly stipends to Appa Desaye and Mohiput Ram's family, and the Mahratta Sallianadars, agreeably to the Treaty, whatever surplus remains should be paid to my Government. Therefore, it is clearly evident, from the paragraph above referred to, that my Government does not in any way require accounts of the districts to be rendered, as is supposed by the British Government, but asks merely for the surplus, that is, that when all the charges of administration considered proper and necessary by the officers of the British Government have been defrayed, and after payment of the Contingent, &c., as provided by the Treaty of 1853, any surplus that may then remain should in future years be paid to my Government ; but in the event of any deficiency occurring at any time no demand should be made on my Government for it, but when it has been covered the surplus should be paid to it. Under the above view of the case, the Governor-General in Council will consider that my Government is in every way entitled to receive such surplus.

In the latter part of the 5th and the beginning of the 6th paragraph of the communication of the Supreme Government it is stated : " That the Government of India desires to hold this territory, as it has hitherto held the whole of the Assigned Districts, not in sovereignty, but in trust for His Highness, so long as the Contingent is kept up, and no longer. And these Assigned Districts will continue to be called 'The Hyderabad Assigned Districts,' or by any other suitable name that may better serve to mark the sovereignty of the Nizam." I am happy to find that the Governor-General in Council has borne in mind the above point, but by merely styling them "in trust," or the "Hyderabad Assigned Districts," the object of the sovereignty of this State is not fully attained, as it ought to be, but it

will be realized when information of the increase of revenue, when it occurs hereafter in the districts, is given by the British Government, and the surplus paid to my Government as described above.

In the 7th paragraph of the Governor-General's letter it is observed that "the Nizam cannot be unaware that in consenting to relinquish so large a portion of the Assigned Districts, and to keep in its hands only so much as will yield a gross revenue of 32 lakhs of rupees, the Government of India subjects itself to a certain pecuniary loss of no small magnitude. Although, out of consideration for the interests of the Nizam, and for the long-standing friendship between the two States, the Governor-General in Council has consented to charge  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the gross jumma in payment of the expense of administration, yet His Highness must well know that the actual expense with which the British Government will charge itself for the benefit of the districts in question is considerably in excess of this." My Government is not, nor will it ever be, desirous that the British Government should incur any loss. These districts are assigned merely for the pay of the Contingent troops deemed as (necessary for) maintaining the tranquillity of the country, and who, in time of need, are prepared to render service, and to devote their lives on important occasions of the British Government, and for the payment of certain other items specified in the Treaty of 1853; and whatever the actual expenses for the administration and benefit of the districts in question may amount to, my Government will accept and raise no objections in future, as will be apparent from the explanation given above, and therefore there will be no cause for any loss being incurred by the British Government.

With reference to the proposal made in the 10th paragraph of the despatch from the Supreme Government, to place the administration of the Assigned Districts under the Commissioner of Nagpore, as the Resident at Hyderabad is the medium of carrying on the transactions between the two States, my Government desired that the whole administration of the districts that shall remain in trust with the British Government should be vested in that officer. It is provided by the VI. Article of the Treaty of 1853 that the districts shall be placed under "the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at Hyderabad, and to such other officers acting under his orders as may from time to time be appointed by the Government of India to the charge of those districts;" and this provision was made at the request of my Government, in consequence of the reports then prevalent that the districts would be incorporated in other zillas of the British Government, and this was done only with this object, that by the administration of the districts remaining in the hands of the Resident delegated to this Court by the British Government the districts should be publicly recognized as belonging to this State, and that it should not be said that they or the revenue from them had been incorporated with British territory.

In the 8th paragraph of the letter from the Supreme Government reference is made to modifications of other parts of the arrangements to which I have already assented; in the 11th paragraph four propositions are made; and the 12th paragraph refers to my acceptance or rejection of the four proposals together as a whole. My Government accepts the whole of the propositions.

The first is that the British Government should restore to me the Raichore Doab and the districts of Dharaseo. My Government will be happy to take back these districts.

The second proposition is that the British Government should cancel the debt for 50 lakhs of rupees, and forego all further demand on account of interest. This is accepted by my Government.

The third proposition is that I should dispense with the accounts of the receipts and expenditure of the Assigned Districts for the past, present, and future. Although in your letter dated the 1st Mohurram H. 1277 (21st July 1860), it was intimated that the accounts for the future only should be dispensed with and which was accepted, yet agreeably to the wishes of the British Government the accounts for the past will not be called for.

The fourth proposition is that I should assign to the British Government in

trust all the Surf-i-Khas districts, included within the limits of East and West Berars, and so much additional territory adjoining thereto, and shall make up in all a present gross annual revenue of 32 lakhs of rupees. This is also accepted by my Government.

My Government has accepted all the propositions made by the Supreme Government, and two points only are submitted to His Lordship. One of these relates to the payment of the surplus revenues of the districts, which has no connection with any demand for accounts or discussion of any kind, and the other relative to the administration of the Assigned Districts being placed under the Resident at my court. Under these circumstances there will be no necessity for any modification of the arrangements, nor is there anything left for me to reject.

In the 14th paragraph of the letter from the Supreme Government it is intimated that the Shorapore territory should be made over to me without delay, and that my Government should be requested to deliver over the districts on the left bank of the Godavery to the officer who may be sent by the Commissioner of Nagpore to take charge of them. Although this subject was not a separate one from the restoration of a portion of the Assigned Districts to my Government, and the propositions relating to all these matters were received together by my Government on behalf of the Supreme Government, in your letter of the 1st Mohurrum, H. 1277 (21st July 1860), still, however, as I am always anxious to satisfy the Governor-General in Council, and keeping in view the unity of the two States, I have given orders to Mookhtar-ool-Moolk Salar Jung Bahadoor that the districts on the left bank of the Godavery, valued at about 20,000 rupees a year, should be made over to the officer of the British Government; and, agreeably to the intimation of the Supreme Government, the navigation of the Godavery and its tributaries, so far as they form the boundary of the two States, shall be made free, and the levy of any customs or other duties on goods passing up and down the river shall be prohibited.

My Government takes this opportunity to submit for the consideration of the British Government that from the beginning it has always been customary with it to keep the British Government pleased and satisfied, and with this view my Government has not had an eye to its own advantage, as may be instanced in the matter of the large amount of arrears of the Secunderabad and Jaulnah Abkarries; in the deficiency of the number of troops in the Subsidiary Force as compared with the strength of that force stipulated for by the Treaty of 1800; and in the remission of duties in the Assigned Districts; of all which the Supreme Government is thoroughly aware; and that likewise the advantage of the services of the Contingent troops, both at present and in future, is available to the British Government, and the Supreme Government is well aware of the services they rendered, and the devotion they exhibited, during the rebellion in India.

In consideration of the unity and friendship which has existed between the two States, and which, by the grace of God, is daily increasing, you will be pleased to submit to His Excellency the Governor-General the above-mentioned two subjects, by which it is deemed no loss can accrue to the British Government, in such a manner as may dispose His Lordship to accept and sanction them, which will be a source of gratification.

Translation furnished by Minister, and transmitted at his request.

(Signed) *Cuthbert Davidson*, Resident.

TRANSLATION of a NOTE from the Minister to the Resident of 25th Rubbee-ool-Awul, 1277 H. (12th October 1860), No. 1846.

Your note of the 24th September (7th Rubbee-ool-Awul, No. 1427), with its enclosure, to the address of His Highness the Nizam, has been received, and duly presented to His Highness at an auspicious moment, when I also took the opportunity of intimating to His Highness your sentiments on the subject. I now beg to enclose His Highness's reply to your letter, in which every particular is fully stated. I am confident that you will explain the purport thereof to His Excellency the

Viceroy and Governor-General, and that His Excellency, viewing the existing friendship between the two Governments, will accept His Highness's reply favourably, which is His Highness's desire.

Agreeably to His Highness's orders, two ahkams<sup>a</sup> to the address of Lushkur Jung Bahadoor and Mirza Goolam Hussun Beg Talookdars, with two proclamations for making over the talooks† on the left bank of the Godavery (agreeably to your note of the 15th Mohurram, No. 1174) to any officer deputed to receive charge thereof on the part of the British Government, together with two proclamations on the subject of goods passing up and down the Godavery, &c., are herewith sent.

<sup>a</sup> Forwarded to Commissioner, Nagpore.  
<sup>†</sup> Buddrachellum.  
 Rakapilly.  
 Cherla.  
 Albaka.  
 Noogoor.  
 Sironcha.

(No. 5576.)

From *A. R. Young*, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated Fort William, 19th November 1860.

Sir,—I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 91) of the 12th ultimo, on the subject of the present negotiations with the Nizam's Government, and in reply to state that His Excellency in Council, in consideration of the advantages to be derived from this re-transfer of the districts of Dharaseo and Raichore to the Nizam, and from the discontinuance of accounts between the two Governments, is willing to forego the further objects, namely, exemption from the obligation of paying to the Nizam's Government any surplus revenue that may hereafter accrue from the two Berars, and the administration of those districts, through the agency of the Nagpore establishments, which, though deemed of importance by the Government, are found to be distasteful to the Nizam.

2. You will accordingly address to the Minister a letter, of which the draft is enclosed, and take such further steps as may be necessary to bring the arrangement to a conclusion.

3. It will be necessary to make two alterations in the draft of Supplemental Treaty, which was sent to you with my letter (No. 3889) dated the 5th September last. To Article 4 the following words must be added: "But the British Government will pay to His Highness any surplus which may hereafter accrue, after defraying all the charges under Article 6, and all future expenses of administration, the amount of such expenses being entirely at the discretion of the British Government." Article 8 will be omitted, and the number of articles contained in the Treaty will be ten.

4. With reference to the observations contained in paras. 9 and 10 of your letter, I am desired to state that the Governor-General in Council declines to enter upon a discussion of subjects that must be held to have been disposed of by the Treaty of 1853, or to admit that the Nizam has any claim in consequence of the abolition of the transit duties. Those duties were abolished by the Government, in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by Treaty; and the measure was one obviously calculated to promote the prosperity and increase the resources of the Assigned Districts, and to be equally beneficial to both States. It would be most unfair that the Nizam should be allowed to claim for duties remitted, and that the British Government should receive no credit for the improved revenues from other sources—an improvement which may be attributed in a great measure to the abolition of the transit duties.

5. You say that you have had to contend against the desire on the part of the Nizam and his Durbar to make it appear that you were forcing them into an acceptance of arrangements that they did not desire, and that they were again, in spite of the Queen's Proclamation, to suffer from a system of coercion which had for many years caused them great pecuniary embarrassments. You add that your instructions did not at all warrant your accepting such a position, and that you therefore refused to acknowledge any such intention on the part of the Government, and pointed out that the offers contained in the Government letters

were open and plain, and that the terms tendered must be considered most advantageous to the Hyderabad State. In so doing I am to observe you acted rightly. The general tenor of your instructions, as well as the specific terms offered in them, gave you the means of conclusively disproving the assumption of the Durbar by a frank and conciliatory exposition of the spirit in which the Government was acting.

6. Further on you remark that, owing to the character of the policy pursued by the late East India Company towards the Nizam since 1817, expressions such as "His Highness can of course reject the proposals" (which expression is used in the letter addressed to you on the 5th September) render successful negotiation almost an impossibility; and you say that you were ordered to communicate the letter containing this expression to the Nizam. Upon this I am to observe, in the first place, that you are in error as to the fact: you had no such orders. The only opinion conveyed to you on this point is contained in a demi-official letter of the 10th September, in which you were told that the official letter of the 5th September (in which the above-cited expression occurs) is "one which, so far as relates to this part of the subject" (namely, the arguments used to induce the Nizam to agree to the two points of foregoing the surplus revenue and of administering the Berar districts from Nagpore), "can be shown entire to His Highness; and it may appear to you advisable to let him read verbatim the arguments used by the Government in support of its views." No order was given to you to communicate any part of the letter to the Nizam, least of all any part of it which might appear to you to render negotiation hopeless. One part was indicated as a part which might be communicated to His Highness if you thought this advisable, whilst as regards the rest of the letter not even a permission to communicate it was given.

7. Secondly, I am to observe that the Governor-General in Council sees no reason to accept your opinion that this expression to which you have referred was one which should impede the success of the negotiation even if orders to communicate it had been given to you. It was an impression thoroughly sincere on the part of the Government of India, and if placed before the Durbar by the representative of Government in the spirit in which it was used, and in that spirit towards the Nizam which has pervaded every line of the instructions addressed to you, the effect of it should have been exactly the reverse of that which you attribute to it.

8. The Governor-General in Council does not approve of the proposal made in para. 14 of your letter. His Excellency in Council is not disposed to accept territory yielding 35 lakhs a year, when the Nizam has already been told that we require only so much as will yield 32 lakhs; and as the Nizam agrees to demand no accounts, and to make the judgment of our officers the measure of what may be spent on the administration of the districts before beginning to count surplus, additional territory is not required to secure Government from eventual loss, though in the first years there may be some deficiency.

9. With reference to para. 15 of your letter, I am desired to observe that, although the condition of the people of the Assigned Districts about to be restored to the Nizam had received the full consideration of the Government, you mistook your duty in abstaining from mentioning anything relating to it which appeared to you to be deserving of mention. It is not necessary for an officer in your position to consider whether any information or opinions which he may think deserving of being known to the Government are likely to be embarrassing to it or not. If the information be accurate, and the opinions be well-considered and sound, the communication of them cannot be an embarrassment.

#### DRAFT of LETTER from the Resident to the Minister.

I am instructed by the Governor-General in Council to request that you will inform His Highness the Nizam, with reference to His Highness's note of the 12th October, that His Excellency in Council has received with satisfaction the signification of the acceptance by His Highness of the main points of the arrangement



proposed to him ; that in regard to that part of it to which His Highness objects the Governor-General in Council will not for a moment press it against the wish, now personally expressed, of the Nizam himself ; and that His Excellency in Council is the less disposed to do this as the ground of His Highness's objection seems to be an apprehension that the true and complete reservation of His Highness's sovereignty over the retained districts might by his acceptance of that part of the proposal become questionable.

The Governor-General in Council has already shown his desire carefully to guard the integrity of His Highness's sovereignty against all manner of doubt ; and, therefore, although by foregoing the service of the civil establishments of Nagpore as the means of administering the two Berars, and by retaining the administration of these districts under the authority of the Resident, it is certain that a less satisfactory, convenient, and economical mode of administering them will be pursued, His Excellency in Council will not urge the proposed change further.

To the payment to the Nizam of any surplus revenue which may accrue from the districts to be retained, when the charges upon them and the expense of administration shall have been met, the Governor-General in Council will agree, but it must be on the understanding that the widest latitude is allowed to the British Government on this head, and that all charges which its officers consider proper and necessary for the administration of these districts will be defrayed from the revenues, without question, before any surplus can be made over to the Nizam ; and that any deficiency arising from excess of expenditure over income in one year will be made good by the surplus in another. His Excellency in Council also understands that no accounts are to be rendered to the Nizam's Government, but that when a surplus accrues it is to be made over. The British Government having taken upon itself the administration of these districts, the Governor-General in Council entertains the strongest objection to hold them on any terms which would hinder the Government from establishing a sound and efficient administration, or from promoting general advancement ; while to revert to a system of annual accounts would be to revive a source of unpleasant discussion and possible misunderstanding.

The Governor-General in Council desires me to conclude by expressing his sincere conviction that the present arrangement will tend to promote a good understanding between the two States, and to strengthen the friendship which has so long and uninterruptedly existed between them,

(Signed) *C. Davidson*,  
Resident, Hyderabad.

(Political Department — No. 108 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, Camp ; dated Hyderabad Residency, 21st November 1860.

Sir,—Adverting to my letter of the 15th instant (No. 104), I beg to forward, for submission to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, the

1. To Minister, No. 1706, dated 15th instant 1860. accompanying copies and translations of notes which  
2. From Minister, No. 2086, dated 19th instant 1860. have passed between myself and the Minister ; by the  
3. From Minister, No. 2092, dated 20th instant 1860. two latter of which it will be observed that Lieutenant Glasford has taken charge of the districts on the left bank of the Godavery ceded by the Nizam to the British Government.

(No. 1706.)

TRANSLATION of a NOTE from the Resident to the Minister dated 15th November 1860 (1st Jumadee-ool-Awul 1277).

With reference to the 2nd paragraph of your note of the 12th October, I beg to state that Lieutenant Glasford has been appointed by the Right Honourable

the Governor-General to the charge of the districts on the left bank of the Godavery recently ceded by the Nizam, and that the British Government is ready to take possession of the same.

(No. 2086.)

TRANSLATION of a NOTE from the Minister to the Resident dated 19th November 1860 (5th Jumadee-ool-Awul 1277).

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 15th instant (recapitulates the contents of the Resident's note). Ahkams were forwarded to you in my note of the 12th October (No. 1846), agreeably to which the talooks of Cherla, Albaka, Noogoor, and Sironcha, belonging to the Illaka of Chinnoor, have been made over by the talookdar of this Circar to Lieutenant Glasford, whose receipt is enclosed. In the same manner the talooks of Buddrachellum and Rakapilly have no doubt been made over to Lieutenant Glasford, and that officer's receipt for these talooks will be sent when received. I beg that the receipt now forwarded may be returned for record in my office.

TRANSLATION of RECEIPT.

Before Lieutenant Glasford, Assistant Agent, Governor-General, Zillah Godavery. Seal of the Kutcherry of Zillah Chandah. To Bindiah Pundit Sur Dufter Illaka Mirza Goolam Hoossain Beg, Talookdar, Circar Aramghar.

I have this day delivered to you ahkams and proclamations from Nawab Mookhtar-ool-Moolk Bahadoor to the address of the above-mentioned talookdar, to make over the talooks of Cherla, Albaka, Noogoor, and Sironcha in perpetuity to the British Government. I acknowledge that, agreeably to these instructions, you have made over to me four takeeds in the Illakadars of the above-named talooks, to take charge of the talooks in question, and that I have accordingly received possession of the villages on the left bank of the Godavery on behalf of the British Government.

Dated 6th November 1860. (20th Rubbee-oos-Sannee 1277.)

(Signed) *C. Glasford*,  
Assistant Agent Governor-General.

(No. 2092.)

TRANSLATION of a NOTE from the Minister to the Resident dated 20th November 1860 (6th Jumadee-oos-Sannee 1277).

Referring to my note of yesterday's date (2086), I beg to enclose Lieutenant Glasford's receipt of having been furnished with authority from Syud Nizam-ood-deen to the address of the Naib and Zumeendarnee of the Poloncha, &c., talook, to give over charge of the talooks of Buddrachellum and Rakapilly to him (Lieutenant Glasford). I request that the receipt may be returned.

TRANSLATION of RECEIPT.

Given by Lieutenant Glasford, Assistant Agent Governor-General, Zillah Godavery, to Syud Nizam-ood-deen, Ally Sahib Munsubdar.

After compliments.

Your note with two letters to the address of Dhamur Lutchmee Nursunammah Zumeendarnee (the mother of Seetaram Chundur Savai Ashwaun Bahadur), and Syud Curreem-ood-deen, Sahib Naib of Poloncha, and regarding making over to me, on behalf of the British Government, the talooks of Buddrachellum and Rakapilly, has been received and understood. The letters in question have been despatched to the Zumeendarnee and Naib.

Dated 7th November 1860. (21 Rubbee-oos-Sannee 1277.)

(Signed) *C. Glasford*,  
Assistant Agent Governor-General.

(No. 116 of 1860.)

(By Express.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, dated Hyderabad Residency, 7th December 1860.

Sir,—I have the honour herewith, in accordance with the instructions conveyed in your despatch (No. 5576), dated the 19th ultimo, to transmit a Supplemental Treaty, duly signed and sealed, entered into this day with His Highness the Nizam.

2. Nothing particular occurred at the durbar, and it has so frequently been described that it appears needless here to add to previous descriptions. His Highness the Nizam, as I was taking my leave, begged I would express to His Excellency the Governor-General the high sense of obligation and gratification he felt that his wishes on the two points previously discussed had been conceded by His Lordship.

3. The only differences between the present transcript of the Supplemental Treaty and the Draft transmitted from your office in letter (No. 3889) dated the 5th September last are as follows :—

1st. The designation of the Nizam and his titles in the preamble of the Treaty, and in Article X., are corrected according to the custom at Hyderabad.

2nd. Article IV. The addition ordered in para. 3 of the despatch dated 5th September 1860 (No. 3889) has been introduced at the end of this article, as directed.

3rd. Article VI. The words “currency of the British Government” have been added, to prevent any mistake about the Hyderabad or Company’s rupees, as in the Surf-i-Khas estates the revenue has hitherto been collected in the Hyderabad currency, whereas in the assigned territory it has been collected in Company’s rupees.

4th. Article VIII. The talooks ceded on the left bank of the river Godavary, &c., have been specified, at the request of the Hyderabad Government.

5th. The Nizam requested that the words “when this copy herewith, signed and sealed by the British Resident, will be returned” might be added ; they will of course be omitted in the ratified Treaty.

6th. Article VIII. of the Draft Treaty has, agreeably to instructions, been struck out, and the present Treaty consists of 10 Articles.

(No. 2315.)

TRANSLATION of a NOTE from the Minister to the Resident dated 22nd December 1860 (8th Jummadec-oos-Sanee 1277 H.).

Your letter of to-day’s date (No. 1912), stating that you understand, from the records of your office, that on a previous occasion the seal of the late Nizam was attached at the top of the Draft Treaty of 1853, in the same way as the seal of the present Nizam was fixed at the top of the present Treaty, and that I should ascertain from the records of this Government and let you know whether this was the case or not, has been received. My friend, it is true the seal of the late Nizam was fixed at the top of the Draft Treaty of 1853, and when the Treaty was returned duly ratified by His Excellency the Governor-General there was no space left for a seal at the top, but there was at the bottom. For this reason the late Nizam raised some objections, and mentioned the circumstance to General Low. The said gentleman remarked that the Treaty had been received by him as submitted to His Highness, and that it would not be advisable to return it to the Government merely because the seal was fixed at the end of the Treaty. Under these circumstances his late Highness then also attached his seal at the end of the Treaty, and of all these circumstances you yourself are cognizant.

(No. 119 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, c.b., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General, Camp, Benares, dated Hyderabad Residency, 7th December 1860.

Sir,—I have the honour, with reference to my despatch of this date (No. 116),

Forwarding Supplemental Treaty concluded this day with H. H. the Nizam.

No. 2215, dated 7 December 1860 (23 Jummadec-ool-Sannee 1277 H.), with English translation.

and the draft of a note which I was directed to communicate to the Hyderabad Government, to enclose the reply dictated under His Highness the Nizam's orders.

2. I also beg to transmit copy of a note, and of my reply, regarding an

No. 2216, dated 7 December 1860 (23 Jummadec-ool-Sannee 1277 H.), with English translation.

No. 1834, dated 7 December 1860 (23 Jummadec-ool-Sannee 1277 H.), with English translation.

application from His Highness to be furnished with schedules showing the amount of revenue of the different talooks assigned to the British Government agreeably to the present Supplemental Treaty.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from *Mookhtar-ool-Moolk Bahadoor*, Minister to his Highness the Nizam, to the address of Colonel *C. Davidson*, c.b., British Resident at Hyderabad, dated 7th December 1860 (No. 2215) (23rd Jummadec-ool-Awul H. 1277).

I have been favoured with your letter of the 29th November 1860 (15th Jummadec-ool-Awul, 1277), (No. 1769), the purport of which is here recapitulated. In accordance with your suggestion, I have duly submitted to His Highness the Nizam the several subjects of the communication from His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, as contained in your letter. The line of justice, and appreciation of rights, shown by His Lordship, in accepting the propositions of this Government, have been highly gratifying to His Highness the Nizam; and I also feel very thankful and under great obligations to His Lordship in Council for this mark of his kindness and favour. And with reference to full power being allowed to the British Government regarding the expenditure of the assigned districts, it is stated in your letter that all charges which its officers consider proper for the administration of these districts shall be defrayed without question; this point has been previously explained distinctly in His Highness's letter to your address; and this Government is fully satisfied that, by the kindness of His Excellency the Governor-General, instructions will be issued to the British Residents (at this Court) to see that the charges which may appear proper and necessary for the administration and improvement of the districts shall be defrayed.

2. I have represented to His Highness the Nizam that His Excellency the Governor-General in Council has expressed his sincere conviction that the present arrangement will tend to promote and strengthen the union and friendship between the two States, which has so long and uninterruptedly existed between them; and His Highness has been pleased to say that the union and friendship of the two Governments has been continually on the increase from the commencement, and it is certain that, under the present arrangements, the foundations of the ancient friendship, and the firm fidelity mutually existing between the two Governments, has acquired more than former strength, and which, by God's grace, will be duly promoted and increased.

(No. 2216.)

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from *Mookhtar-ool-Moolk Salir Jung Bahadoor*, Minister to His Highness the Nizam, to Colonel *C. Davidson*, c.b., British Resident at Hyderabad, dated 7th December 1860 (23rd Jummadec-ool-Awul 1277 H.).

I have been favoured with your letter of the 1st December 1860 (17 Jummadec-ool-Awul H. 1277) (No. 1786), with copy of a Treaty received from the Supreme Government for submission to His Highness the Nizam in due form.

The Treaty, signed and sealed by His Highness, has been delivered by him to you this day ; His Highness has intimated his commands to me that it is necessary for this Government to have a schedule of the districts to be exchanged for the Surf-i-khas and other talooks of the surplus districts to be re-transferred ; and of the districts, yielding a gross annual revenue of 32 lacs of rupees, to be retained by the British Government in trust for the payment of the Contingent troops, &c. ; detailing the amount of the revenue of each of the respective districts. I have the honour, accordingly, to request you will be pleased to furnish me with the schedule in question, signed and sealed by you, for submission to His Highness the Nizam.

(No. 1934.)

TRANSLATION of a NOTE from the Resident to the Minister dated 7th December 1860 (23rd Jummadee-ool-Awul 1277 H.)

I beg to state, in reply to your note of this date (No. 2216), that after the ratified Treaty arrives, and after the amount of the revenue of the Surf-i-khas and other talooks is ascertained by an officer on the part of the British Government, and one on that of the Nizam, the required schedules will be transmitted to His Highness under my seal and signature.

(No. 137.)

From *A. R. Young*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General, to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated Camp, Mirzapore, 17th December 1860.

Sir,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 116, of the 7th instant, transmitting for ratification a Supplemental Treaty entered into by you, on behalf of the Viceroy and Governor-General, with His Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad.

2. His Excellency the Governor-General observes in this document an informality which must be corrected before the Treaty can be ratified. The seal of His Highness has been affixed at the top instead of at the bottom of the document, which is not only unusual in papers of the kind generally, but is a deviation from the practice which, in reference to previous Treaties, appears to have been invariably followed in engagements entered into between the British Government and the present and former Nizams of Hyderabad.

3. The delay which the rectification of this mistake will occasion is to be regretted ; and His Excellency cannot but express surprise that you should have permitted a deviation from former practice in a transaction of so formal a character, the more so as you seem by your note to have been aware that in 1853 this deviation was not allowed, and as you have assigned no reason for now allowing it.

4. To prevent further delay two copies of the Treaty are herewith forwarded, on which are marked in pencil the proper places for your seal and signature, and for those of His Highness the Nizam. You will be so good as to return both of these documents duly executed, by express, when they will be ratified by the Governor-General. One of the ratified copies will be sent to you to be delivered to His Highness the Nizam, and one will be retained in this office. An attested copy will hereafter be furnished for record in the Residency Office.

5. The copy of the Treaty submitted by you is herewith returned, and I am to suggest that it and the copy now in the possession of His Highness should be destroyed when the copies now transmitted have been signed and sealed as directed.

6. You will, if you should see reason to do so, explain to the Nizam that nothing is further from the Governor-General's intention than to show any discourtesy to His Highness in withholding his signature from the instrument which His Highness has already signed.

7. But, having regard to the well-understood meaning which attaches to documents which the head of any State in India transmits to their destination, signed or sealed at the top, and having regard, too, to the fact that all Treaties between the British Government and Native States have been signed at the foot, it is not possible for the Governor-General to accept the document which you have transmitted to His Excellency.

8. In the absence of explanation of the reason which has induced you to depart from an invariable custom, the Governor-General does not consider it necessary to say more on this subject.

(No. 125 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, c.b., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General; Hyderabad Residency, 22nd December 1860.

Sir,—I have the honour to annex a copy of a telegram which has been despatched to you this day.

“Express of 17th received at 2 p. m. of 22nd. All documents in my office show that the Draft Treaty of 1853 was sealed by the Nizam at the top. I have written for information to the Minister. The returned ratified Treaty had the late Nizam’s seal placed at the bottom, as no room was left at the top for the seal, he objecting, but remarking he would seal anywhere, as he did not wish to give the Governor-General any further trouble.”

(No. 127 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, c.b., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, Camp, Benares, dated Hyderabad Residency, 24th December 1860.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of the 23rd instant, to the following effect :—

“Your message of 22nd received. The records in Calcutta have been examined, and show that the Nizam’s seal and signature are invariably at the bottom of the Treaties. All Treaties whatever to which Governors-General have put their signatures have been signed both by the Governor-General and by the ruler of the State at the bottom. The Governor-General desires that this practice be adhered to in the present instance. His Excellency cannot accept a document signed or sealed at the top.”

2. I beg to add that the Nizam, on receiving my communication on the above subject, said to the Minister he would receive me in three or four days, that is, after Christmas, and sign and seal the Treaty at the bottom, as required by His Excellency the Governor General, when I shall do myself the honour to submit the explanation called for in your despatch, No. 137, of the 17th instant.

(By Express.)

(No. 128 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *Cuthbert Davidson*, c.b., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, Benares; Hyderabad Residency, 26th December 1860.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Officiating Secretary Young’s letter (No. 137) of the 17th instant, and in reply beg to state in explanation that no Treaty or engagement was previously made with the present Nizam, and that in the preparation and submission of the draft Supplemental Treaty to His Highness I have followed exactly the precedent and mode of procedure adopted by General Low in 1853.

2. You will find from the accompanying attested copy\* of the draft Treaty of 1853, signed by General Low, C.B., which I beg may be returned to my office, that the Nizam's seal was placed at the top of that document, and that no objection was made on the part of General Low, nor by the Government of India, when it was submitted to that authority.

3. On the ratified Treaty of 1853 being returned, no place was left at the top for the Nizam's seal, and His Highness objected that he was required to seal in a different place in the ratified from what he had done in the draft Treaty, and that it was unusual for him, in a State paper of consequence, to put his seal at the bottom of the paper. General Low, it will be seen from the enclosure as per margin, did not refer the matter to Government, but evaded the question raised, and, as far as my recollection serves me, after a lapse of seven years and a half, said if the Nizam would not seal in the place marked out by the Governor-General he could not receive the ratified Treaty within the 30 days promised, on which His Highness assented, saying he did not desire to give His Lordship any further trouble on the subject.

Enclosure No. 2.  
Minister's note, dated  
22nd December 1860  
(8 Jumma-dee-oos-Sannee  
1277 H.), No. 2315  
with English translation.

4. When the present Treaty was being negotiated, the Minister begged that in the returned ratified Treaty space might be left for the Nizam's seal at the top of the document, remarking that it was not unlikely the present Nizam would object to seal anywhere but in the place he had done in the draft Treaty.

5. I inquired if by sealing at the top the Nizam wished to assume any superior position over those who would place their seals at the bottom of the document. Salar Jung assured me this was not the case; that in their (the natives') eyes it would give more validity and importance to such a State paper if it were sealed by the Nizam at the top, with his sign manual, or "Allurq," at the bottom, and that His Highness only signed and sealed the Persian part of the document. I offered to refer the question officially to my Government, but he begged I would not do so, but address the Secretary privately, as the Nizam had not as yet objected to seal anywhere. This occasioned my official memorandum to you of the 7th instant, as I knew that if there was anything informal and incorrect in the Minister's request you would inform me, giving me the necessary instructions, and I was most unwilling that any proceeding of mine should prove distasteful to His Highness, or have the slightest appearance of detracting in the least degree from the act of grace conferred on His Highness the Nizam by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

6. I attended durbar this day, and had the draft Treaty in the Nizam's possession returned, and one of those received with your despatch under acknowledgment substituted, and the two copies prepared in my office destroyed as directed; and I now beg herewith to enclose the Supplemental Treaty for ratification, signed and sealed in the manner ordered by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General.

7. The question of where the Nizam's seal is to be affixed, whether in preliminary draft Treaties or those ratified by the head of the Government, is, by the present proceedings, now definitively settled at this Court. I could not, in the face of the wording of the 10th Article of the Treaty, ask the Nizam to return both copies of the document, as instructed in the 4th paragraph of your letter, as that Article provides that one of the copies shall remain with the Nizam till the ratified Treaty is returned; and to exchange the documents when this is done has been, I am informed, the invariable usage hitherto.

8. Nothing of consequence occurred at the durbar; the only question put by the Nizam was in regard to the Governor-General's health, and where His Excellency now is.

\* A copy of which was forwarded to the Foreign Secretary in Calcutta—*vide* despatch, No. 83, dated 21st May 1853. The draft Supplemental Treaty previously submitted is a counterpart of the above.

9. When the document was being sealed, Iktidhar-ool-Moolk (Shums-ool-Oomrah's youngest son), who is the keeper of the Nizam's great seal, rather significantly asked the Minister if it was to be affixed at the bottom, to which question Salar Jung replied, "Yes," and the Nizam nodded assent.

*P. S.*—The parchment arrived wet and damp, and therefore the ink ran where the Resident's seal and signature is placed on this copy.

2nd. I would beg to call attention to the 5th paragraph of my letter (No. 116), dated the 7th instant, and to request that should the suggestion therein contained, of omitting the words "when this copy herewith signed and sealed by the British Resident will be returned" be approved of, the words in question may be omitted in the ratified Treaty transmitted to me.

(Foreign Department.—No. 14.)

From *A. R. Young*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General, to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated Camp, Goonwarra, 2nd January 1861.

Sir,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (W. 128), dated the 26th ultimo, submitting explanation connected with the signing of the Treaty by His Highness the Nizam, and in reply to inform you that the Governor General does not consider it necessary to remark further on that point.

2. The Supplemental Treaty, as ratified by the Governor-General, is herewith forwarded, and I am to request that you will deliver it to the Nizam, and return the copy now in his possession, duly executed. That copy will remain in the Foreign Office, and an attested transcript of it will be forwarded to you for record in your office. No words can be omitted, as suggested in your postscript, as it is necessary that your copy should correspond precisely with the originals.

3. The copy of the Treaty of 1853 which accompanied your letter is herewith returned.

(Political.—No. 82.)

Sir *Charles Wood* to the Governor-General of India in Council, dated 18th June 1861.

1. I proceed to notice the very important subjects connected with Hyderabad affairs treated of in the enclosures of your letters dated 8th September 1860 (No. 117) and 5th January 1861 (No. 4), and especially those referred to in your letter to the Resident of the 7th July 1860 (No. 2518). These papers have been considered by me in Council with the attention which their importance demands.

2. You have explained that circumstances, to which it is needless further to advert, prevented your making at an earlier period to His Highness the Nizam any suitable acknowledgment of the very valuable services rendered to Her Majesty's Government by himself and his faithful Minister, Salar Jung, during the eventful period of the mutiny of the Bengal Army.

3. It was not unknown to you that the transfer of the assigned districts was not obtained from the Nizam without much unwillingness and opposition on his part, and that His Highness more earnestly desired a restoration of that territory, partial or entire, than any other object which could be presented to him as worthy of acceptance in acknowledgment of these services. It naturally, therefore, occurred to you to endeavour to combine the gratification of this with the accomplishment of other arrangements beneficial to both Governments.

4. On reviewing the results of the past administration of the assigned districts by our officers, it appears that, although distinguished by a degree of regularity and freedom from oppression, fully appreciated by the people, the administration had not in a financial point of view been attended with the expected success. The papers submitted by Colonel Davidson show that a deficit of 9,31,613 rupees had accrued during the period (five years) of British management. This deficit,



## HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

however, is caused by the payment, at the commencement of our administration,

* 6th July 1859.—Hyderabad Assigned Territories.		
YEAR.	Receipts.	Charges.
	Rs.	Rs.
1853-54 .....	38,43,198	46,83,703
1854-55 .....	41,03,375	41,95,687
1855-56 .....	40,15,113	40,03,330
1856-57 .....	41,12,402	40,00,539
1857-58 .....	42,71,338	43,93,779

of the arrears of pay due to the Nizam's Contingent. Leaving out of account the sum (13,76,653 rupees) thus expended, I find that the assigned territories have yielded during the five years from 1853-54 to 1857-58, during which they had, at the date\* of Colonel Davidson's Report, been under our management, 2,03,45,427 rupees, while the charges, including those of administration, and the payment of expenses of the Contingent, 32 lacs yearly, have, during the same period, amounted in the aggregate to 1,99,90,385 rupees, showing a surplus of 4,45,041 rupees.

5. The assigned districts were taken over to provide for annual charges on account of the Contingent, estimated roughly at 30,50,000 rupees. Their gross revenue is estimated at 45,00,000 rupees in Mr. Secretary Beadon's letter dated 7th July 1860, upon the authority of a memorandum furnished by the Resident. But the same memorandum assumes the civil expenditure at 12½ lacs of rupees, and a further charge of 4½ for public works has hitherto been incurred. With the administration conducted on these principles the expectation of a surplus accruing for the benefit of the Nizam was not likely to be realized, and the omission to render accounts to His Highness, so as to give him the opportunity of urging objections to the heads of your expenditure, and to remissions of objectionable imposts, placed your Government in a position of embarrassment in its relations with the Nizam, the sources of which it was very desirable that you should seek to remove. The occasion, therefore, presented by His Highness's claims on your liberality for essential services rendered during the mutiny was judiciously used to bring all these troublesome points to a final and permanent settlement.

6. Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the instructions addressed under your orders to the Resident at Hyderabad on the 7th July 1860, explaining the basis upon which he was to open negotiations for effecting all these desirable objects.

7. It was proposed by you to limit the extent of territory to be reserved as a provision for the charges of the Contingent to the districts of East and West Berar, yielding, with the Surf-i-Khas or Privy Purse estates, 32½ lacs, and restoring to His Highness Dharaseo and Raichore, besides making over to him in perpetuity the principality of Shorapore.

8. You also directed the Resident to negotiate, in exchange for an equivalent, the cession of a strip of territory on the banks of the Godavery, which was desired in order to carry out your intention of rendering that river navigable. On condition also of His Highness relinquishing his right to call for annual accounts, you were prepared to cancel the debt of 50,00,000 rupees due from the Nizam to the British Government.

9. The negotiation conducted by Colonel Davidson upon this basis resulted in the Treaty ratified by you on the 2nd January 1861. I have laid this Treaty before the Queen, and I am commanded to signify Her Majesty's approval of the arrangements which you have brought to so satisfactory a conclusion.

10. Although the territory that will remain to be administered by British officers, in order to provide for the annual charges of the Contingent force to be maintained at Hyderabad, will be considerably reduced in extent and in amount of revenue by the arrangements made under the Treaty, the British Government will hold the districts retained on a footing of greater independence, and will be able to conduct the administration with greater freedom and latitude of discretion. The acquisition of the Surf-i-Khas or Privy Purse lands, and the immunity from all necessity to render accounts and afford explanations to His Highness's Government, are essential objects, while the claims of the Nizam for good service during a season of trouble could not have been satisfied without a sacrifice of revenue in some shape.

11. Your determination to add the forfeited territory of Shorapore, with which districts of the Nizam were much intermixed, and which heretofore was a dependency of His Highness's Government, was a liberal and judicious means

of giving to the measure the display of grace and friendly acknowledgment of service that was desired.

12. Undoubtedly there are objections, arising from the character of His Highness's administration, to replacing any population that has once enjoyed the blessing of a regular government by British officers under the loose system adopted by His Highness's farmers and talookdars. A retransfer of territory to a native power is always a source of regret to Her Majesty's Government, but the objection is outweighed by the obligations under which we stood towards His Highness, and is lessened by the peculiarity of the tenure and conditions upon which the territory was held by our officers, which evidently was an arrangement that could not continue.

13. I cannot but express regret that you were unable to obtain from His Highness the cession of the retained districts in full sovereignty, but I am not insensible to the weight of the considerations which induced His Highness to refuse wholly to relinquish any part of his paternal dominions. What occurs to me as most open to objection in the stipulations on this subject is the limit placed on the power of your Government to conduct the administration according to its own views, and to place the officers employed under such control as it may seem most expedient for the public service.

14. I attach less importance to the claim reserved by His Highness to secure any surplus that may arise under our administration, because both the number and constitution of the Contingent on one hand, and the free disposal of the revenues on the other for purposes of local improvement, rest entirely in your discretion. It would, however, have been more reasonable, in the event of increased revenue resulting either from improved management or from the returns of capital expended, that the surplus should have accrued to the State to whose improved administration alone its existence was due.

15. Her Majesty's Government approve the relinquishment to His Highness of the claim to 50 lacs of rupees, on account of past advances for the pay and charges of the Contingent force, as an important act of grace towards His Highness, while the final settlement of all past accounts, and freedom from any future embarrassing pecuniary relations of the same description, is not less a benefit to your Government.

16. Although, in more than one instance, Colonel Davidson allowed himself to deviate not only from the letter, but even from the spirit, of the instructions laid down for his guidance, and I cannot altogether approve of the tone of his correspondence with the Nizam or with your Government, the negotiations appear to have been on the whole conducted by him with ability and judgment, and in a manner to entitle him to the commendations which your Government have bestowed upon him.

17. In conclusion, I have only to observe that Her Majesty's Government confidently hope that the results of the new Treaty will be advantageous to both States, and that they will tend to confirm the amicable relations which have so long existed between the two Governments.

(Foreign Department.)

The Governor-General of India in Council to Sir *Charles Wood*, dated  
22nd June (No. 87) 1861.

We have the honour to transmit, for your information, copies of correspondence with the Resident at Hyderabad on the following subjects :—

1. Disposal of the local funds of the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo Districts on their transfer to the Nizam's Government.
2. Adjustment of territory under the new Treaty with His Highness the Nizam.
3. Audit and adjustment of the accounts of the assigned territories and the Hyderabad Contingent.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) *Canning.*  
*H. B. E. Frere.*  
*R. Napier.*

(Civil Department.—No. 11 of 1861.)

From Lieut.-Colonel *Cuthbert Davidson*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General; dated Hyderabad, 12th January 1861.

Sir,—I have the honour to submit, for the consideration of His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General, a proposal from the Commissioner of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts relative to the disposal of the balance of the local fund of the Raichore Doab on its transfer to the Nizam's Government.

2. The cash in hand on account of the local fund of the Raichore District is	Rs.	a.	p.
	61,913	1	2
Expected collections in December 1860 and January 1861	18,000	0	0
Making a Total of ... .. Rs.	79,913	1	2

From this sum has been paid, or it is proposed to pay, certain sums, amounting to Rs. 25,553-3-10, and 34,000 rupees on account of expenditure on the Hyderabad and Sholapoor Road, leaving a balance of Rs. 20,359-13-4.

3. The Commissioner recommends that the balance available, after meeting all existing charges, should be added to the available balance of the Dharaseo District, and rateably divided in compensation to officers and others whose property in both districts will by the approaching transfer be lost to them.

4. The available balance of local funds in the Dharaseo District up to the 22nd December is Rs. 15,243-3-7.

5. I would beg, therefore, to support the Commissioner's recommendation, this being a peculiar and special case, that after paying all existing charges, and the 40,000 (not 34,000) rupees on account of the Supplementary Estimate for the Hyderabad and Sholapoor Road, sanctioned by Government in the Public Works Department in letter, No. 144, dated the 22nd December 1860, that the surplus balance of the two districts be added together and paid as compensation to officers and others who have built houses in those districts, and who will become losers by their transfer to the Nizam's Government.

6. To those who possess houses at Lingsoogoor I would propose to pay one-third of the amount claimed as depreciation of their value, and allow them to retain their property, as they will probably, from the civil lines adjoining the military cantonment of Lingsoogoor being still occupied by a regiment of the Hyderabad Contingent, be able to sell or rent their property.

7. I beg herewith to enclose copy of a letter, dated 3rd January 1861, from the Commissioner on the subject of compensation to officers and others in the Dharaseo District, to whom I would propose to pay the value of their houses in full, deducting only a rateable percentage on the *bond fide* price, say 15 per cent., as house rent for the time they had been occupied as residences; these houses will then become the property of the Native Government.

8. What is now submitted is, as it will be seen, an approximate estimate of what may be the balance of the local fund at the date of transfer. If the proposal now submitted is approved of, a statement of the actual receipts and disbursements will be transmitted hereafter.

From *C. B. Saunders*, Esq., Commissioner, Hyderabad Assigned Territories, to Captain *Fraser*, Officiating First Assistant Resident; dated Camp, Bolarum, 3rd January 1861.

Sir,—I have the honour to forward, for the consideration and orders of the Resident, a copy of a letter, No. 192, from Lieutenant Cadell, Deputy Commissioner, Dharaseo District, dated 26th December 1860, with its enclosures in original, applying in behalf of the officers and servants of Government for compensation to be granted to them on account of the loss of their house property at Dharaseo, owing to the transfer of the district to the Government of His Highness the Nizam.

2. I enclose an abstract statement showing the amounts claimed by each individual on account of their expected losses. It appears to me that the claims advanced are moderate in amount, as well as legitimate and equitable in principle.

3. The whole of the above parties were either required or led to erect habitations for themselves at the station of Dharaseo, upon the implied guarantee of Government that they would be continued in their several appointments subject to their own good conduct, and that the district would remain under the administration of British officers.

4. It has consisted with the policy of the Government to restore to His Highness the Nizam the district as a reward for his loyal and faithful conduct during the mutinies ; but this fact can hardly be held to affect prejudicially the interests of private individuals.

5. The Government, without in any way committing themselves to a distinct promise on the subject, have already signified their intention of providing, if possible, for the officers who may, in consequence of the new arrangements, lose their present appointments, and I feel confident that the same liberal and equitable consideration will be extended to them in the matter of compensating them for losses which are about to occur through no fault of their own, but from causes entirely beyond their control.

6. There are several of the officers and others who, although they have expended considerable sums upon the houses they were erecting, have not yet inhabited them for a single day, and, unless relieved by the payment to them of compensation for the amount of their respective outlay, will suffer considerable pecuniary loss and inconvenience.

7. I would therefore beg strongly to urge upon the consideration of the Resident the advisability of applying the balance of any sums remaining in the local funds of the two districts of the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo rateably, in liquidation of the amounts expended by private individuals connected with the administration of those two districts in erecting house accommodation for themselves.

8. The Deputy Commissioner of Raichore Doab has not yet submitted detailed lists of the expenditure incurred by individuals in erecting accommodation for themselves at Raichore, but I gather from that officer's letter, No. 243, dated 26th December 1860 (copy of which was forwarded for the orders of the Resident under cover of my letter, No. 1242, dated 31st idem), that the amount which may be claimed by such parties will not exceed 10,000 rupees, and therefore the total amount claimable for both districts will fall short of 40,000 rupees.

9. I am not able to state exactly what the balance outstanding in the local funds will be when the accounts are brought to a final adjustment ; but, whatever the balance may prove, I do not think that under the circumstances it can be considered otherwise than a legitimate and proper expenditure of the same to liquidate the cost of buildings which will remain for local purposes, and may be turned by the Native Government in all probability to profitable use.

10. Should the amount remaining in the local funds not prove sufficient to meet the claims of all parties, after such claims have been properly taxed and ascertained to be correct, I trust that the Government of India, or that the Native Government, who will reap the advantage from the expenditure of private capital on the house property, will liberally defray the balance.

11. From an inspection of some of the enclosed claims, it would appear that sums have been charged on account of advances made for the purchase of materials which have not yet been applied in the construction of the works, and I am of opinion that in such cases, if compensation is awarded, the materials in question should be sold to the best advantage for Government, and the value thus obtained be credited to Government.

12. I regret that, in consequence of my immediate departure to join my new appointment as Judicial Commissioner at Mysore, I am unable to undertake myself the duty of taxing and ascertaining their accuracy, but I have no reason to believe that any overcharge whatever has been made.

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

(Financial.—No. 192 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant *W. Cadell*, Deputy Commissioner, Dharaseo District, to *C. B. Saunders*, Esq., Commissioner, Hyderabad Assigned Territories.

Camp, Mourinabad, 26 December 1860.

Sir,—I have the honour to forward, for your favourable consideration, claims for compensation made by the officers and some of the subordinates for expenditure incurred on houses which they were compelled to build on Dharaseo being established by Government as the head-quarter station of the district.

## ABSTRACT STATEMENT of CLAIMS for Compensation for Houses made by the Officers and Subordinates of the Dharaseo District.

No.	NAMES.	Amount of Claim.		
		Rs.	a.	p.
1	Lieutenant Cadell, Deputy Commissioner ... ..	6,575	3	8
2	Lieutenant Temple, Assistant Commissioner ... ..	2,622	12	5
3	Mr. C. Horden, Officiating Assistant Commissioner... ..	1,262	12	8
4	Mr. Shunker Rao Rugonath, Extra Assistant Commissioner ... ..	1,753	6	0
5	Mr. Jiwunjee Ruttonjee, Extra Assistant Commissioner... ..	347	7	2
6	Dr. J. B. Fleming, Superintendent Central Gaol... ..	* 4,703	6	7
7	Sub-Assistant Surgeon F. Copwicke ... ..	188	0	0
8	Assistant Apothecary Manasse ... ..	1,167	0	0
9	Bhaskur Succaram, Acting Head Clerk ... ..	47	0	0
10	Mr. Torrick, Clerk ... ..	29	2	10
11	Kistiah, Clerk... ..	150	0	0
12	Suddaseo Rajahram, Revenue Serishtadar... ..	100	13	0
13	Arnachel Rao Goondoo, Judicial Serishtadar ... ..	20	0	0
14	Kundeo Rao Ram Chunder, Judicial Naib Serishtadar ... ..	43	8	0
15	Pandoorung Ram Chunder, Nazir ... ..	31	12	0
16	Rugonath Ram Chunder, Jukman... ..	55	0	0
17	Cassim Allee, Jemadar ... ..	7	4	0
18	Ram Chunder Vithul, Roobear Novees... ..	27	15	0
19	Rookmajee Venkatesh ... ..	35	0	0
20	Mulkor Succaram, Roobear Novees ... ..	59	0	0
21	Waman Rao Narseo, Mabafiz Daftur... ..	50	0	0
22	Waman Rugonath... ..	15	0	6
23	Shaik Bickun, Sowar ... ..	90	0	0
24	Govind Norhen, Darogah ... ..	1,011	8	0
25	Krista Rao Narseo, Izhor Novees... ..	104	6	3
26	Rookree wulud Byragee, Chuprassee ... ..	27	0	0
TOTAL... .. Co.'s Rs.		20,524	6	1

3 January 1861.

(Signed) *Chas. B. Saunders*.

(Foreign Department.—No. 285 of 1861.)

From *A. R. Young*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General, to Lient.-Colonel *C. Davidson*, c. B., Resident at Hyderabad ; dated Camp, Kylwara, 29th January 1861.

Sir,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 11, dated the 12th instant, submitting a proposal that the officers of the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo Districts should be compensated from the local funds of these districts for the houses which they will have to abandon when the above districts are transferred to the Nizam.

2. In reply I am directed to inform you that these funds can be expended only on the improvement of the districts within which they were raised, as they belong to the people of those districts, and are not Government money in the sense of ordinary revenue. The Governor-General is of opinion that the whole of the balance of the local funds, and the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo Districts,

\* I do not recommend that interest be allowed on the expenditure, and I therefore have reduced the claim by Rs. 207-13-7 charged on that account.

should be transferred to the Nizam along with the districts, on the understanding that the money will be expended on works of local interest.

3. As regards the question of compensation to the officers and other servants of Government in those districts, I am directed to inform you that His Excellency sanctions the grant of the compensation suggested by you in the 6th and 7th paragraphs of your letter under acknowledgment, the amount being charged to the ordinary revenue of the districts which we retain.

4. You are requested to furnish details of the amount which you may pay as compensation under this sanction.

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(No. 286 of 1861.)

Copy forwarded to the Financial Department at the Presidency for information.

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(No. 287 of 1861.)

Copy of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this letter, and of paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 of the letter to which it is a reply, forwarded to the Public Works Department with the Governor-General, for information.

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(Civil Department.—No. 52 of 1861.)

From Lieut.-Colonel *Cuthbert Davidson*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to *G. C. Barnes*, Esq., C.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department; dated Hyderabad, 6th April 1861.

Sir,—Referring to my telegram of the 18th February 1861, wherein I reported the dates on which the Raichore Doab and the Dharaseo Districts had been transferred to the management of the Nizam's talookdars, and that the Deputy Commissioners of East and West Berar had also received charge of the Surf-i-Khas estates in their respective divisions, I now do myself the honour to submit a further report in connection with these arrangements, having received the necessary information which I had been awaiting.

2. Agreeably with the instructions conveyed under my orders to the Deputy Commissioner, Dharaseo District, in a letter, No. 169, of the 21st January 1861, that officer reported in a communication, No. 12, of the 31st January 1861, that he had on that day made over charge of those districts to Mahomed Ibrahim Munsubdar, Esre Pershaud, and Syud Mohideen, the officers appointed by the Nizam's Government for that duty.

3. Mr. Cadell reported, at the same time, that he had informed the Nizam's officers that all collections made after that date would belong to His Highness the Nizam, but that the balance in the treasuries on that day belonged to the British Government.

4. Although instructions had been issued to the Deputy Commissioner, Raichore Doab, on the same date as that on which they had been sent to the Deputy Commissioner of the Dharaseo District, viz., the 21st January 1861, the arrangements for the transfer of the Raichore Doab Districts to the management of the officers appointed by the Nizam's Government were not finally completed until the 28th February 1861, as reported by Mr. Ricketts, the officer in charge of those districts, in his letter No. 71 of that date.

5. This delay in the transfer of these districts to the Native Government induced me to call for an explanation from Mr. Ricketts, who stated the delay to have been caused by the Nizam's Talookdars themselves, who did not arrive at Linsoogoor till the 2nd February 1861; that at an interview the same day they expressed a desire for Mr. Ricketts to communicate any suggestions he might have to make to them in regard to making over charge of the talooks in writing; that this was done the same day, and their reply being received on the 4th, on the 5th all the Talook Tehsildars were desired to receive charge on behalf of the Talookdars. From the date on which the Tehsildars received these instructions, and similar orders from the Talookdars, they were virtually in charge, and all reports, revenue, collections, &c., were forwarded to them. On the 7th February they were in charge, except of the Sudder Establishments, which were occupied in preparing the necessary accounts, and particularly in showing the collections that had been made, and what remained to be made.

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

6. The accounts of the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo Districts up to the date of transfer to His Highness the Nizam's officials have been closed and forwarded by the district officers direct to the Accountant-General to the Government of India.

7. The following statement shows the demand for the current Fuslee year 1270, A.D. 1860-61, in the above-mentioned districts; the collections that had been made on account of the British Government up to the date of their transfer to the Nizam's officials, and the balance that was left to them to collect :—

	Land Revenue.			Miscellaneous Revenue.			TOTAL.			Local Funds.			Village Expenses.			TOTAL.		
	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>
<b>RAICHORE DOAB.</b>																		
Demand ... ..	10,94,503	8	5	2,31,397	10	11	13,25,901	3	4	42,483	9	5				42,483	9	5
Collected by Deputy Commissioners ... ..	6,28,473	2	4	1,52,918	6	1	7,81,391	8	5	29,902	10	11				29,902	10	11
BALANCE remaining to be collected by Nizam's Officers ... ..	4,66,030	6	1	78,479	4	10	5,44,509	10	11	12,580	14	6				12,580	14	6
<b>DHARASEO DISTRICT.</b>																		
Demand ... ..	7,95,574	6	11	15,287	8	0	8,10,861	14	11	16,397	11	0	99,436	11	4	1,15,834	6	4
Collected by Deputy Commissioners ... ..	2,93,096	2	6	11,372	10	0	3,04,468	12	6	7,009	0	4	58,838	11	3	65,392	11	7
BALANCE remaining to be collected by Nizam's Officers ... ..	5,02,478	4		3,914	0	0	5,06,393	2	5	9,388	10	8	41,053	0	1	50,441	10	9

8. The balances of revenue of 1270 Fuslee, A.D. 1860-61, remaining to be collected from the Surf-i-Khas and other estates now transferred to our management in the two Berars are as follows :—

DISTRICTS.	Amount of Balances.			TOTAL.			Recoverable.			Irrecoverable.		
	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>
<b>EAST BERAR.</b>												
<b>Surf-i-Khas.</b>												
Nizampoor ... ..	16,840	14	4									
Salode ... ..	493	1	8									
Makhair ... ..	456	15	2									
Riedpoor ... ..	28,241	14	3									
Batkooly ... ..	10,543	13	3									
<b>Dewanee.</b>												
Moortijapoor ... ..	1,093	9	10									
Mannah ... ..	428	9	3									
Koorum ... ..	359	13	3									
Mungroolpeer ... ..	1,453	14	10									
Koorah ... ..	400	7	0									
Mungrool Dustageer ... ..	213	21	1									
Dorriapoor ... ..	.....											
Jagheer villages ... ..	542	11	6									
Total Rupees ... ..	.....			35,648	15	3	31,824	10	5	3,824	4	10
<b>WEST BERAR.</b>												
<b>Surf-i-Khas.</b>												
Budnair Gangai ... ..	384	1	0									
Punny Mahagaom ... ..	565	14	6									
Punchghowan ... ..	1,763	7	3									
Yewdah ... ..	240	0	0									
Budnair Bolejee ... ..	2,603	10	9									
<b>Jagheer.</b>												
Amborah ... ..	459	6	0									
Julkah ... ..	49	2	0									
Khodawundpoor ... ..	152	12	0									
Bowenbeer ... ..	2,003	2	6									
Wunchornai, or grazing tax, of Talook Budnair ... ..	1,406	14	6									
Total Hyderabad Rupees ... ..	.....			9,630	6	6	3,949	12	0	5,680	10	6

9. I would here, however, beg to observe that the officers of the Native Government, immediately they heard of the proposed transfer of the Surf-i-Khas and other estates to the British Government, insisted on all revenue being paid up, hence the small sum which has been left to us to collect in Berar.

10. The balances in the treasuries of the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo Districts up to the date of their transfer to the Nizam's Government, remitted assets of the

British Government to the Collectors of Dharwar and Sholapoor respectively, were 10,60,000 rupees from the former, and Rs. 3,11,127-11-2 from the latter district, as per statement appended, marked No. 1.

Enclosure No. 1.

11. But the balances which have been remitted as assets of the British Government to the Bombay Presidency, it will be perceived from the statement above referred to, include certain sums, such as balances of the local funds, which, agreeably to the instructions of Government, as conveyed in their letter No. 285, dated 29th January 1861, are assets of the Nizam: balances of collections on account of village expenses, and of deposits which had remained unpaid, and which are locally repayable, amounting in all to Rs. 1,03,537-8.

12. As a set-off against the above, however, are certain other items, amounting to Rs. 57,596-10, on account of expenditure incurred under our administration by the Bombay Revenue Survey Department, for erecting boundary works in Government cultivated and Inam lands in the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo Districts which are recoverable from the ryots and Inamdars, and a sum of Rs. 2,998-7 of Tuccavee advances made by the Deputy Commissioner, Dharaseo District, remaining to be collected from ryots. These sums will now be collected from the parties by the Nizam's Talookdars, and are therefore, debitable against the items mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

13. The actual sum remitted in excess to the Bombay Presidency from the assets of the Nizam's Government, after the above adjustment, amounts to Company's Rs. 23,507-11-7.

14. The sum of Rs. 22,433-2-5, the balance in the Raichore Doab treasury on the 28th February 1861, deposited by the district officer in the Military cash chest at Lingsoogoor, is also a portion of the assets of the Native Government, which should have been made over to the Nizam's Talookdars, but as, for reasons of financial economy, it was found desirable to withdraw that sum for the pay of the troops of the Hyderabad Contingent stationed at Lingsoogoor, the same is recoverable from the revenues of the districts which we retain, as is also the item of 400 rupees advanced from the Dharaseo Treasury for the conveyance of timber from that district to Berar. The small item of Rs. 32-8 advanced from the same treasury on account of Government horses proceeding to Hyderabad is a charge against the British Government, and will be duly adjusted in account with the Political Treasury at this Residency.

15. The Berar Districts at the end of the present year will, by the retransfer of Dharaseo and Raichore to the Nizam, have borne a very unproportionally large share of the general expenses of the administration, and the general charges payable under the Treaty. From the more profitable rates of exchange available to us by bills on the Berar treasuries we have drawn on them principally during the year for the supply of this treasury, for the pay of the Contingent at other stations, and indeed in all possible cases. It would not appear that His Highness the Nizam should profit in every way to our pecuniary disadvantage by the late negotiations. The kists not actually due in the Raichore and Dharaseo Districts were left undisturbed; those in the Districts of Berar under transfer to us were eagerly forestalled. Until the revenues of the Berars reach the stipulated amount of 32 lacs of rupees it could hardly be expected that they should bear so disproportionate a share of the pay of the Contingent as will have been borne by them this year, at a rough estimate 22,66,000 rupees against the 2,64,544 rupees which alone has been drawn on this account from the revenues of Dharaseo and Raichore. It is estimated that the revenues of the Berars during the present year will amount only to 24,65,488 rupees, inclusive of the balances left uncollected by the native officials in the Surf-i-Khas and Jagheer estates. It may perhaps be intended by the expression in the late Treaty of dispensing "with all accounts, past, present, or to come" that no question of accounts shall now be entered into; otherwise it appears to me that we might, under the foregoing considerations, very fairly claim the sum of Rs. 3,89,938-3-10, as per accompanying statement—the difference between the estimated revenues of Berar for the year and the stipulated amount of 32 lacs at which they were made over to us.

Enclosure No. 1 A.

16. The officers of the commission in the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo Districts



gave up their respective charges on the following dates, up to which period their salaries were disbursed to them from the district treasuries of the British Government.

17. Mr. T. H. Bullock, Deputy Commissioner, left the Raichore Doab District on the leave to Europe granted to him by Government on the 29th January 1861, making over charge of the district to Mr. Ricketts, Assistant Commissioner, and he disbursed to himself half-pay from that date up to the 26th February 1861, the date on which he embarked at Bombay.

18. Mr. Rustonjee Viccajee, Assistant Commissioner, vacated his appointment in the Raichore Doab on the 31st January 1861, and proceeded to Hyderabad, pay being disbursed to him up to that date.

19. Mr. Narrainsawmy Naidoo, Extra Assistant Commissioner, vacated his appointment on the 14th February 1861, and was paid up to that date.

20. Mr. Ricketts, Assistant Commissioner at Lingsoogoor, the Sudder station of the Raichore Doab, up to the 28th February 1861, to close the accounts of that district, being paid up to that date, and left to take up his appointment as Assistant Commissioner in the Mysore Commission.

21. Mr. Mahomed Hunneef, Extra Assistant Commissioner, vacated his office on the 28th February 1861, and was paid up to that date.

22. *Dharaseo District*.—Lieutenant Cadell, the Deputy Commissioner, received his salary from the treasury of the Dharaseo District up to the 31st January 1861, the date on which the charge of the district was made over to the Nizam's officials, but remained at Nuldroog, to close the accounts of the district, up to the 28th February 1861, when he proceeded to West Berar.

23. Lieutenant S. Temple, Assistant Commissioner, vacated his appointment on the 31st January 1861, being also paid up to that date.

24. Mr. C. Hordern, Extra Assistant Commissioner, vacated his appointment on the 31st January 1861, was paid up to that date, and proceeded to West Berar.

25. Mr. Shunker Rao Rughonath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, vacated his appointment on the 31st January 1861, and was paid up to that date.

26. Mr. Jivanjee Ruttonjee, Extra Assistant Commissioner, vacated his appointment on the 28th February 1861, and was paid up to that date; he was detained up to this period, his services being required by the Deputy Commissioner.

27. Dr. Fleming, the Superintendent, made over the prisoners in the Central Gaol of Dharaseo to the Nizam's authorities on the 14th February 1861, and salary was disbursed to him up to 31st January 1861 from the treasury of the Dharaseo District; his salary up to the 14th February was disbursed from the Civil Treasury at Hyderabad.

28. *Establishments*.—The different establishments in these districts were dispensed with on the following dates:—

RAICHORE DOAB.

Tehseel Establishments	...	...	...	...	the	7th	February 1861.
Thannah Establishment	...	...	...	...	"	7th	" "
Gaol Establishment	...	...	...	...	"	7th	" "
Post Office Establishment	...	...	...	...	"	7th	" "
Assistant Commissioners' Establishment	...	...	...	...	"	14th	" "
Sub-Divisional Assistant Commissioners	...	...	...	...	"	14th	" "
Extra Assistant Commissioners	...	...	...	...	"	14th	" "
Extra Assistant Commissioners	...	...	...	...	"	14th	" "
Deputy Commissioners	...	...	...	...	"	28th	" "
Treasury Establishments	...	...	...	...	"	28th	" "

DHARASEO DISTRICT.

1st Class Assistant Commissioners' Establishment	...	...	...	...	"	31st	January 1861.
2nd Class Assistant Commissioners' Establishment	...	...	...	...	"	31st	" "
Extra Assistant Commissioner	...	...	...	...	"	31st	" "
Extra Assistant Commissioner	...	...	...	...	"	31st	" "
Tehseel Establishments	...	...	...	...	"	31st	" "
Police Thannah Establishments	...	...	...	...	"	31st	" "
Mounted Police Establishments	...	...	...	...	"	31st	" "
Medical Establishments (excepting three Waiters at 5 rupees each, who were dispensed with on the 28th February 1861)					"	31st	" "
District Gaol Establishment	...	...	...	...	"	31st	" "
Surt-i-Khas Thannah Establishment	...	...	...	...	"	31st	" "
Deputy Commissioner's Establishment	...	...	...	...	"	28th	February "
Treasury Establishment	...	...	...	...	"	28th	" "
Talook Treasury Guard	...	...	...	...	"	28th	" "
Central Gaol Establishment	...	...	...	...	"	9th	" "

29. I would here beg to solicit the instructions of Government in regard to an application for a gratuity of six months' pay, under section III. of the pension and gratuity rules, made to me by several Government officials in the Dharaseo Division, in consequence of their being thrown out of employ by the transfer of that district to the native Government; a similar application in behalf of the officials similarly situated in the Raichore Doab was likewise made by Mr. T. H. Bullock, the Deputy Commissioner of that division. The maximum sum that will be required for the disbursement of these donations to servants in the two districts above mentioned will probably amount to about 1,10,000 Company's rupees.

30. I now proceed to report upon the arrangements that have been made for taking under our management districts in Berar to the extent of 32 lacs of rupees, in conformity with the recent Treaty with His Highness the Nizam.

31. From the accompanying two statements received from the district officers it will be perceived that the revenues of West Berar, including the Surf-i-Khas and other estates (exclusive of village expenses) taken over by the Deputy Commissioner under his charge, amount to Company's Rs. 16,13,685-10-6, and that of East Berar likewise, including the Surf-i-Khas and other estates, to Company's Rs. 14,47,928-13-8, making a total of Company's Rs. 30,61,614-8-2, or Rs. 1,38,385-7-10 less than the amount we require.

32. As the Rs. 16,13,685-10-6, however, in West Berar is exclusive of 1,40,000 rupees on account of remissions in 1859-60, that season being one unusually unfavourable, the same has been taken into account in calculating the revenues of that district, which enhances the revenue of it to Rs. 17,53,685-10-6.

33. At the same time it will be observed that the Rs. 14,47,928-13-8, the revenue of East Berar, includes a sum of Rs. 71,579-4-2, collections on account of former years which should not have been taken into account, not being revenue collections for the year. This deduction reduces the revenue of East Berar to Rs. 13,76,349-9-6, and from which should further be excluded 15,000 rupees, the balances of previous years remaining uncollected at the end of 1859-60, thus bringing the actual revenue of East Berar down to Rs. 13,61,349-9-6.

34. According to these adjustments the total revenue of the two Berars, as per statement accompanying, would amount to Rs. 31,15,035-4, or Rs. 84,964-12 less than the 32 lacs we require.

35. It has already been shown that the revenues of West Berar, as given by the Deputy Commissioner, amount to Rs. 16,13,685-10-6, or Rs. 13,685-10-6 over and above the sum of 16 lacs of rupees which it is proposed to allot hereafter to that district as its share of the 32 lacs allowed by the Treaty.

36. With a view to bringing about this equalization of revenue in the two districts, the Deputy Commissioners propose that Mehals of West Berar yielding (after deducting village expenses) Company's Rs. 14,244-1-4, and lying within the boundary of Circar Gawil, should be transferred to East Berar, bringing the revenue of the Western Division Rs. 558-6-10 short of the sum of 16 lacs. These Mehals are shown in the margin; the principal is

	Rs.	a.	p.
Mouza Luckpooree, near Moortizapoor, in			
Circar Gawil	859	3	8
Kusba Burda, received from Surf-i-Khas,			
Circar Gawil	13,384	13	8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Co's. Rs. 14,244</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>

one of those lately received in West Berar from the Surf-i-Khas estates.

37. The above sum of Rs. 14,244-1-4 added to the revenue of East Berar as given by the Deputy Commissioner, viz., Rs. 14,47,928-13-8, will make up the revenue of that district to Rs. 14,62,172-15-0, or Rs. 1,37,827-1-0 short of the sum required to complete the 16 lacs allotted to the Eastern Division.

38. The Deputy Commissioners conjointly are of opinion that this deficiency of Rs. 1,37,827-1 may be best made up by receiving additional Purgunnahs now belonging to His Highness the Nizam, and lying to the north of the Pyne Gunga river, as shown in the map accompanying; by this arrangement the Pyne Gunga will form the boundary of East Berar to the south, and though the country is in some places jungly, and not densely populated,

## HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

still it is believed to be, like the Woon Talook, to which it is adjacent, highly capable of improvement, and with adequate protection will no doubt in a few years increase greatly in revenue.

39. The Deputy Commissioners are not in possession of correct data on which to form an exact estimate of the value of these Purgunnahs to the north of the Pyne Gunga, but believe the revenue of them will be found to amount to the sum required.

40. Although it is our object not to extend our frontier in that direction, still, situated as the Sudder stations of the two divisions of Berar are, the Deputy Commissioners consider it impossible to hand over more mehals from West to East Berar without bringing the boundary of the latter district close up to the Sudder station of the former, and that, under any circumstances, the frontier towards His Highness the Nizam's territories must be an extended one, and they do not consider that it would be desirable to bring that frontier nearer to the Sudder station of our districts.

41. The map forwarded will show that between Talook Mehkur, of West Berar, and Booldanah there is a strip of country still held by His Highness the Nizam's Government, and running far into the district close to the new military station of Telgaon; this interrupts the communication between Talooks Mehkur and Davulghaut, and it will be at once apparent that a fresh arrangement of our frontier in this direction is desirable.

42. In this strip of country are the Purgunnahs of Amrapoor, Chicklee, Chandole, &c., and the Deputy Commissioners are of opinion that they should be brought within the boundary of the Assigned Districts. As far as can be ascertained, the Deputy Commissioners state the revenue of these Purgunnahs and other adjacent mehals amount to about Company's Rs. 35,000, and that an equivalent may be given to His Highness the Nizam's Government, by restoring to it mehals, as per statement No. 6, in West Berar, amounting to Company's Rs. 35,455-7-6.

*Vide Enclosure No. 5.*

43. The two first mehals in this statement are to the extreme south-west of West Berar, and yield Company's Rs. 31,744-14-1, to which are added seven villages now under Purgunnah Nursee, which form part of Talook Bassim; they are completely detached from our districts, and are in the centre of, and belong to, Purgunnahs under His Highness the Nizam—some of them 20 or 30 miles to the south of Hingolee, and nearly 60 miles from the Tehsil station of Bassim; one of them is on the banks of the Godavery. It is inconvenient to have the revenue management of villages so situated, while proper supervision in matters of police is altogether impracticable. These seven villages yield Company's Rs. 3,700-9-5, which added to the two Purgunnahs of Shewly and Sundkhair above referred to makes a total of Company's Rs. 35,445-7-6, for which an equivalent would easily, and with great advantage to us, be obtained in the Purgunnahs of Umrapur, &c., intervening between Mehkur and Booldanah.

44. I concur generally in the desirability of the arrangements as proposed by the Deputy Commissioner, but we require, according to the statement prepared in my office, the further sum of Rs. 84,964-12 of annual revenue to make up the 32 lacs, and I would propose to retransfer to the Nizam districts of the value of Rs. 52,862-5, with a view to the rearrangement of the frontier, making a total amount of Rs. 1,37,827-1 of annual revenue to be received from the Hyderabad Government.

*As per Enclosure No. 7.*

45. The above proposals have already been made by me to the Minister with a view to their submission to His Highness the Nizam, and although our frontier towards the south and south-west in West Berar is still open, and not as well defined by natural boundaries as I would wish, still I believe it is possible to defend it, as we now get rid of all the isolated talooks and Surf-i-Khas estates dotted over both districts of Berar, the nature of which will be seen by the portions marked green in the accompanying map, and which have hitherto rendered an efficient police almost an impossibility.

*Vide Enclosure No. 5.*

**THE BERARS.**

**MEMORANDUM of Balances of Cash remitted to Dharwar and Sholapoor from the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo District Treasuries on closing the accounts of those districts previously to their transfer to the Nizam's officers, and the portions of those balances which are assets of the native Government.**

Balance in the Raichore Doab Treasury remitted to Dharwar		Co.'s Rs.	a.	p.
Balance in ditto transferred to the military cash chest at Lingsoogoor		10,60,000	0	0
		22,433	2	5
Balance in the Dharaseo District Treasury remitted to Sholapoor		10,87,133	2	5
TOTAL Balance in the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo Treasuries		Co.'s Rs.	3,11,127	11 2
			13 93,560	13 7
Balance of Local Funds of the Raichore Doab, included in the above balance of Rs. 10,82,433-2-5	Co.'s Rs.	a.	p.	
	52,378	3	10	
Balance of Local Funds in the Dharaseo district, included in the above balance of Rs. 3,11,127-11-2	15,749	2	3	
	28,155	0	5	
Balance of collections on account of village expenses remaining unpaid, included in the above balance	7,275	1	6	
	51,159	4	2	
TOTAL Balance, being assets of the Nizam's Government		Ra.	1,03,537	8 0
Balance of expenditure incurred by the Bombay Rev. Survey Depts. on account of boundary works in Govt. cultivated and Inam lands in the Raichore Doab, recoverable from the Ryots by the Nizam's Govt.		Co.'s Rs.	a.	p.
Expenditure by the Bombay Rev. Survey Dept. on account of boundary works in Govt. cultivated and Inam lands in the Dharaseo district, recoverable from the Ryots by the Nizam's Govt.		31,547	5	5
Balance of Tuccavee advance made by the Dy. Comr., Dharaseo district, remaining to be recovered from Ryots by the Nizam's Govt.		2,998	7	0
[Govt.]			57,596	10 0
Actual balance due to Nizam's			45,940	14 0
TOTAL		Ra.	1,03,537	8 0
Balance remitted to Bombay in excess of the assets of the British Government, which was payable to the Nizam		Co.'s Rs.	a.	p.
Balance transferred to military cash chest at Lingsoogoor, which was payable to the Nizam, now recoverable from the revenues of the Berar districts, having been withdrawn for pay of the troops of the Hyderabad Contingent at Lingsoogoor		23,507	11	7
ACTUAL BALANCE of Local and other Funds repayable to the Nizam		Co.'s Rs.	22,433	2 5
			45,940	11 6
The following sums advanced from the Dharaseo District Treasury are recoverable as follows:				
Advanced for Government works proceeding to Hyderabad, recoverable from the British Government			2	8 0
Advanced for conveyance, &c., of Timber, from Dharaseo to Omrowtee, recoverable from the Berar Division of Public Works			400	0 0
		Co.'s Rs.	432	8 0
Hyderabad Residency, 6 April 1861.		(Signed)	Hastings Fraser,	Officiating 1st Assistant Resident.
<b>STATEMENT showing the anticipated REVENUE of the BERAR DISTRICTS for the Year 1860-61, under the new treaty arrangements, and the amount that will be required to make up the 32 lacs of rupees of revenue of that year of those districts, after taking into account the balances of the revenue collections of the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo districts, up to the date of their restoration to His Highness the Nizam.</b>				
Anticipated Revenue of East and West Berar for 1860-61, as given by the Deputy Commissioners of those divisions from all sources of Revenue		Rs.	a.	p.
Left uncollected by the Nizam Talookdar's Naibs in the Surf-i-Khas and other estates, at the time they were made over to the Deputy Commissioners		21,29,714	0	0
		35,774	6	8
Collected by the Deputy Commissioner in the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo districts, exclusive of village expenses		10,85,860	4	11
			21,65,188	6 5
Deduct expenditure incurred by the Deputy Commissioners in the above-mentioned districts up to date of transfer:—	Raichore Doab.	Dharaseo Districts.		
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.		
On account of salaries	29,195 14 3	33,150 0 0		
Ditto establishments	1,08,607 6 5	95,241 15 6		
Ditto contingencies	81,152 2 6	71,504 15 8		
	2,19,255 7 2	1,97,896 12 8		
Expenditure incurred by Public Works Depart.	58,550 0 0	66,382 0 0		
Drafts on Deputy Commissioners for supply of funds for Civil Treasury at Hyderabad, and for pay of troops of the Hyderabad Contingent	2,01,741 15 2	62,801 11 0		
	Ra. 4,59,547 6 4	3,27,680 7 8	7,87,227	14 9
			3,98,632	6 11
Add balance of Local Funds, &c., remitted to Dharwar and Sholapoor, and deposited in the military cash chest at Lingsoogoor, repayable to His Highness the Nizam			45,940	11 10
			3,41,573	5 5
			28,10,631	12 2
Amount required to make up the sum of 32 lacs			3,89,538	3 10
		TOTAL	Co.'s Rs.	32,00,000 0 0
Resident's Civil Office, Hyderabad Residency, 6 April 1861.		(Signed)	Hastings Fraser,	Officiating 1st Assistant Resident.

HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

IV.—STATEMENT OF ACTUAL COLLECTIONS OF Government Demand for the Year 1859-60 of the Old Talooks of *East Berar*, and of the New Talooks just received, after Deductions shown in Statement No. 3.

	Land Revenue.			Abkaree.			Salt Pans.			TOTAL.		
	Current Year.	Former Years.	TOTAL.	Current Year.	Former Years.	TOTAL.	Current Year.	Former Years.	TOTAL.	On Account of Current Year.	On Account of Former Years.	GRAND TOTAL.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
<b>EAST BERAR.</b>												
Omrouttee...	1,62,700 5 6	10,026 7 4	1,73,326 12 10	27,883 13 4	1,208 2 4	29,181 15 8	4,730 1 4	4,251 14 6	6,981 15 10	1,95,314 4 2	14,176 8 2	2,09,490 12 4
Karinjah ...	1,07,155 10 8	7,202 14 4	1,14,358 9 0	12,708 13 0	.....	12,708 13 0	.....	.....	.....	119,861 7 8	7,202 14 4	1,27,067 6 0
Tallagaon ...	75,485 7 7	6,145 3 2	81,600 10 9	15,288 15 0	509 2 0	15,878 1 0	.....	.....	.....	90,734 6 7	6,744 5 2	97,478 11 9
Ellichpoor ...	1,14,355 12 6	14,988 4 2	1,29,544 0 8	31,601 0 0	3,089 3 2	34,690 3 2	.....	.....	.....	1,46,156 12 6	18,077 7 4	1,64,234 3 10
Moorsee ...	1,48,061 11 11	2,304 8 2	1,50,366 4 1	20,193 0 0	1,635 4 10	21,828 4 10	.....	.....	.....	1,68,254 11 11	3,930 13 0	1,70,194 8 11
Kurrugoom ...	94,290 6 11	1,793 1 7	96,083 8 6	15,188 4 0	839 3 2	16,027 7 2	.....	.....	.....	1,09,478 10 11	2,632 4 4	1,12,110 15 8
Woon ..	51,128 3 1	2,381 9 10	53,509 12 11	11,329 0 0	.....	11,329 0 0	.....	.....	.....	62,457 3 1	2,381 9 10	64,838 12 11
<b>TOTAL Company's Rupees.</b>	<b>7,51,817 10 2</b>	<b>43,442 0 7</b>	<b>7,98,789 10 9</b>	<b>1,34,182 13 4</b>	<b>7,460 15 6</b>	<b>1,41,643 12 10</b>	<b>4,730 1 4</b>	<b>4,251 14 6</b>	<b>6,981 15 10</b>	<b>8,90,260 8 10</b>	<b>55,154 14 7</b>	<b>9,45,415 7 5</b>
<b>SURF-I-KHAS.</b>												
Nizampoor Pergunnah	1,06,554 2 0	1,000 0 0	1,23,554 0 0	5,579 6 6	.....	5,579 6 6	1,701 0 0	.....	1,701 0 0	1,13,834 8 6	16,000 0 0	1,30,834 8 6
Salade "	7,945 1 6	.....	7,945 1 6	1,329 1 0	.....	1,329 1 0	.....	.....	.....	8,874 2 6	.....	8,874 2 6
Papri "	3,006 11 0	.....	3,006 11 0	214 12 0	.....	214 12 0	.....	.....	.....	3,821 7 0	.....	3,821 7 0
Malikhair "	5,135 9 0	.....	5,135 9 0	892 10 0	.....	892 10 0	.....	.....	.....	6,028 3 0	.....	6,028 3 0
Pullas Khaid "	4,807 0 9	.....	4,807 0 9	672 3 0	.....	672 3 0	.....	.....	.....	5,479 3 9	.....	5,479 3 9
Cusba Khaid "	3,542 3 9	.....	3,542 3 9	223 12 3	.....	223 12 3	.....	.....	.....	3,766 0 0	.....	3,766 0 0
" Bailoorah	8,766 1 0	.....	8,766 1 0	433 9 0	.....	433 9 0	.....	.....	.....	9,199 10 0	.....	9,199 10 0
Pergunnah Reetpoor	63,572 2 3	1,200 0 0	64,772 2 3	4,794 4 0	.....	4,794 4 0	2,561 10 0	.....	2,561 10 0	68,366 6 3	1,200 0 0	69,566 6 3
" Bhatthooly	31,388 5 6	3,000 0 0	34,388 5 6	1,366 12 6	.....	1,366 12 6	.....	.....	.....	35,216 12 0	3,000 0 0	38,316 12 0
<b>TOTAL Hyderabad and Company's Rupees...</b>	<b>2,34,917 4 9</b>	<b>20,200 0 0</b>	<b>2,53,117 4 9</b>	<b>15,506 6 3</b>	.....	<b>15,506 6 3</b>	<b>4,262 10 0</b>	.....	<b>4,262 10 0</b>	<b>2,54,686 5 0</b>	<b>20,200 0 0</b>	<b>2,74,886 5 0</b>
<b>Details { Hyderabad Ra. ...</b>	<b>1,59,487 12 3</b>	<b>20,200 0 0</b>	<b>1,79,687 12 3</b>	<b>15,458 0 0</b>	.....	<b>15,458 0 0</b>	<b>4,262 10 0</b>	.....	<b>4,262 10 0</b>	<b>1,79,208 6 3</b>	<b>20,200 0 0</b>	<b>1,99,408 6 3</b>
<b>Company's Rs. ...</b>	<b>75,429 8 6</b>	.....	<b>75,429 8 6</b>	<b>48 6 3</b>	.....	<b>48 6 3</b>	.....	.....	.....	<b>75,477 14 9</b>	.....	<b>75,477 14 9</b>

**THE DEBARS.**

<b>DEWARIES.</b>									
Pergunah Moortizapoor	45,825	7	0	45,825	7	0	2,075	8	6
Manah	25,830	13	9	25,830	13	9	473	6	3
"	13,788	10	3	13,788	10	3	523	5	6
"	36,779	7	6	36,779	7	6	580	6	6
"	20,854	6	9	20,854	6	9	369	13	0
Mouza Gurwarree	1,432	11	9	1,432	11	9	26	0	0
Pergunah Koorah	52,477	9	6	52,477	9	6	1,891	6	0
" Mangrool Dustageer	20,414	5	0	20,414	5	0	409	8	0
" Durriapoor	68,698	9	9	68,698	9	9	3,495	13	9
Mouza Kokardah	973	3	6	973	3	6	1,034	0	0
TOTAL, Hyderabad	2,80,075	4	9	2,80,075	4	9	11,845	3	6
<b>JAGHEER.</b>									
Mouza Dabab	1,450	13	0	1,450	13	0	25	3	6
" Pahore	3,058	15	6	3,058	15	6	104	3	3
" Darmengam	5,331	15	0	5,331	15	0	1,575	11	9
" Munbah	5,682	14	9	5,682	14	9	119	8	0
" Porslah	4,667	13	3	4,667	13	3	315	0	0
" Khanjannah Nugur	679	12	6	679	12	6	80	0	0
" Verrook	1,420	14	9	1,420	14	9	253	2	3
" Thar Kheira	350	7	9	350	7	9	525	15	6
TOTAL, Hyderabad	22,643	10	6	22,643	10	6	2,998	12	3
TOTAL of Surf-i-Khas, Dewaries, and Jager Estates in Hyderabad	5,46,636	4	0	5,46,636	4	0	30,350	6	0
Company's Rupees	5,46,636	4	0	5,46,636	4	0	30,350	6	0
Viz. Company's Rupees Hyderabad Rupees converted into Company's currency at Rs. 23-6-10 percent....	75,429	8	6	75,429	8	6	48	6	3
TOTAL of Surf-i-Khas, Dewaries, and Jager Estates in Company's Rupees	3,81,569	4	11	3,81,569	4	11	24,550	8	3
GRAND TOTAL, Company's Rupees	12,98,546	7	7	12,98,546	7	7	1,06,242	11	4

*Note.*—The total of Rs. 11,47,928 13 s. p. includes Rs. 16,424 5 a. 7 p. on account of the previous year of Surf-i-Khas Estate, and Rs. 55,151 11 a. 7 p. of East Berar.

Deputy Commissioner's Office, Oomrawtee.

(Signed) *J. Allardye,*  
 Officiating Deputy Commissioner, East Berar.

5 March 1864

HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

IV.—STATEMENT of REVENUE of *West Berar*, for 1269 Fuslee, including that of the Surf-i-Khas and Jagheer Estates recently transferred.

Number.	Talookas and Purgunnas.	Amount.	Total.
	<b>TALOOKS OF WEST BERAR.</b>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
1	Dewulghat ... ..	1,05,450 11 10	
2	Mulcapoor ... ..	1,61,725 3 0	
3	Julgaom ... ..	1,09,041 4 7	
4	Ballapoor ... ..	2,65,274 8 6	
5	Akolah ... ..	1,61,784 11 9	
6	Udgaom ... ..	1,18,793 8 8	
7	Akote ... ..	1,40,691 2 4	
8	Mailghau ... ..	24,508 1 9	
9	Mehkur ... ..	2,00,229 5 6	
10	Bassim ... ..	1,31,916 11 9	
	Amount realized at the Sudder ... ..	25,300 9 2	
	<b>SURF-I-KHAS ESTATES.</b>		14,44,715 14 10
11	Purgunnah Budnair Gaugai ... ..	48,268 4 10	
12	Ditto Puroney Mahagaom ... ..	29,299 1 1	
13	Ditto Punchghowham ... ..	7,389 5 6	
14	Kusbah Yewdah ... ..	13,384 13 8	
15	Ditto Sonalah ... ..	9,917 14 2	
16	Mouza Sawurgaom ... ..	2,226 9 6	
17	Turf Chinchonah ... ..	12,693 0 6	
18	Mouza Taklee ... ..	660 4 11	
19	Ditto Porallah ... ..	75 4 9	
20	Wunchorai of the above nine mehals ... ..	1,215 4 8	
	Purgunnah Budnair Bolejee... ..	18,569 6 10	
	<b>JAGHEER VILLAGES.</b>		
21	Mouza Pulsee ... ..	2,778 8 6	
22	Ditto Kudmapoor... ..	1,755 10 9	
23	Ditto Tumboorna ... ..	2,363 1 6	
24	Ditto Amborah ... ..	1,552 4 6	
25	Ditto Julka ... ..	2,903 4 9	
26	Ditto Seradoni ... ..	702 4 0	
27	Ditto Khodawundpoor ... ..	279 14 9	
28	Purgunnah Bawenbier ... ..	12,935 4 6	
			1,68,969 11 8
		<i>Rs.</i>	16,13,685 10 6

(Signed) *Ivie Campbell*,

Deputy Commissioner, West Berar.

Deputy Commissioner's Office, Camp Romtaik,  
9th March 1861.

THE BERARS.

STATEMENT showing the REVENUE RECEIPTS of *East* and *West Berar*, including the Surf-i-Khas, Jagheer, and other estates, for the Fuslee year 1269, A.D. 1859-60.

	Co.'s Rs. a. p.	Co.'s Rs. a. p.	Co.'s Rs. a. p.	Co.'s Rs. a. p.
Estimated revenue of the districts to be taken in Berar, exclusive of village expenses, agreeably with the Treaty of 31st December 1860.	.....	.....	.....	32,00,000 0 0
<b>EAST BERAR.</b>				
Collections from old talooks of East Berar, as per Deputy Commissioner's statement, marked Enclosure No. 2.	9,45,415 7 5			
Deduct amount included in the above sum as collections on account of previous years, as per ditto.	55,154 14 7			
		8,90,260 8 10		
Collections from the Surf-i-Khas, Jagheer, and other estates, as per Deputy Commissioner's statement, marked Enclosure No. 2.	5,02,513 6 3			
Deduct amount included in the above sum as collections on account of previous years, as per ditto.	16,424 5 7			
		4,86,089 0 8		
		13,76,349 9 6		
		15,000 0 0		
Deduct balances for previous years remaining uncollected at the end of the year 1266 Fuslee, as estimated by Deputy Commissioner in his letter, No. 116, dated 4th March 1861.	.....			
Estimated revenue of East Berar	.....		13,61,349 9 6	
<b>WEST BERAR.</b>				
Collections from old talooks of West Berar, as per Deputy Commissioner's statement, marked Enclosure No. 3.	14,44,715 14 10			
Collections from the Surf-i-Khas and other estates, as per ditto.	1,68,969 11 8			
		16,13,685 10 5		
Add remissions of revenue made in the year 1859-60 in the old talooks of West Berar and the Surf-i-Khas and other estates, after deducting village expenses, as per Deputy Commissioner's letter, No. 25, dated 29th March 1861.	.....	1,40,000 0 0		
			17,53,685 10 6	
Estimated Revenue of East and West Berar	Co.'s Rs. ....	.....	.....	31,15,035 4 0
Deficit, for which additional Talooks are required	.....	Co.'s Rs.		84,964 12 0

(Signed) *Hastings Fraser*,  
Officiating First Assistant Resident.

Resident's Civil Office, Hyderabad Residency,  
6 April 1861.



# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

STATEMENT (B), showing Mehals proposed to be restored to His Highness the Nizam's Government.

	Revenue of 1859-60.		
	Rs.	a.	p.
Pergunna Sheolee .....	11,786	15	4
Ditto Scindiah, with Rajah Dewulgaom .....	19,957	14	9
Mouza Kooptee, Pergunna Wallore .....	1,004	9	8
Ditto Kannah, Pergunnah Cheirwair .....	183	2	0
Ditto Dewulgaom, Pergunnah Lohurra .....	935	5	6
Ditto Gurrud Goorhan, Pergunnah Jurtoor .....	241	14	8
Ditto Chamme, Pergunnah Jurtoor .....	234	13	9
Ditto Alpoor, Pergunna Jurtoor .....	236	1	0
Ditto Pangree, Pergunnah Jurtoor .....	864	10	10
Total.....Co.'s Rs.	35,445	7	6

(Signed) *Ivie Campbell*,  
Deputy Commissioner, West Berar.

Deputy Commissioner's Office,  
Camp Hudgaom, near Moortizapoor,  
29th March 1861.

*J. Allardyce*,  
Officiating Deputy Commissioner,  
East Berar.

(Civil Department, Financial.—General No. 565 of 1861.)

To Major *T. A. Cowper*, Commissioner, Hyderabad Assigned Districts.

Sir,—I have the honour, by desire of the Resident, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 297½, dated 19th March 1861, offering certain suggestions for the rearrangement of the Berar Districts, agreeably with the terms of the Treaty of 31st December 1860.

2. With reference, however, to this Office No. 486 of the 21st March 1861, forwarding for your information copy of a letter to the address of the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of East Berar, No. 484, of the same date, in which that officer was directed by the Resident to meet Captain Campbell, Deputy Commissioner of West Berar, and to rearrange with him the establishments to be entertained agreeably to the amount allowed for the civil expenditure of the two Berars, and to finally determine, subject to the approval of higher authority upon all questions connected with the equalization of the revenue of the two divisions of those districts, and the adjustment of the new frontier between the Nizam's immediate districts and the assigned territories, I am directed to convey Colonel Davidson's views and opinions on the conjoint proposals of the two district officers referred to, as submitted in their letter, No. 25, of the 29th ultimo, a copy of which the Resident presumes has already been furnished to you by them direct.

3. According to the calculation of revenue made by the Deputy Commissioners of East and West Berar, it will be perceived that they show we shall require additional territory to the extent of Rs. 1,37,827-1-0, but the accompanying statement, prepared in this office, shows no more than Rs. 84,964-12-0 worth of territory is wanting to make up the 32 lacs we require.

4. The Resident does not consider it, however, desirable to make any change in the arrangements proposed by the Deputy Commissioners in the transfers suggested by them, but, with a view to reducing the amount to the Rs. 84,964-12-0 of revenue required to make up the deficit, Colonel Davidson has proposed to the Nizam's Government to restore districts to them in the talooks of Sindkhair, Bassim and Karunjah, to the extent of the difference between that sum and Rs. 1,37,827-1-0.

5. The accompanying map of Berar Districts is forwarded in illustration of the Resident's proposals.

**THE BERARS.**

6. If necessary, an assistant or extra assistant should be directed to fix his head-quarters at some eligible spot in the Woon Talook, as it appears to Colonel Davidson that if this officer is accompanied by a sufficiently strong detachment from the Hyderabad Contingent to act in support of a party of the Hill Rangers and of the organized police of the district, which should be stationed on the frontier, to protect the inhabitants of Woon from the depredations of marauders from the neighbouring territory of His Highness the Nizam, notoriously the most disturbed of His Highness's country, the confidence which such an arrangement would instil in the minds of the people would tend materially to induce farmers to come forward to take up waste land, and to develop the present latent resources of a talook which the Resident is confident only requires capital and labour to render it as remunerative as any of the other talooks in Berar.

7. The proposals of the Deputy Commissioners as contained in their letter under reference in regard to equalizing the establishments of their respective districts are approved by the Resident.

8. As His Highness the Nizam is desirous of being furnished with a statement exhibiting the revenue talookwarree of all the old talooks of both Berars, with the Surf-i-Khas and other estates received and about to be received over by us from the Native Government, the Resident begs that you will have the goodness to cause the preparation and submission of such a document with the least practicable delay.

9. Colonel Davidson begs that you will at the same time call for and furnish him with a similar statement of the revenue of the talooks now proposed to be made over to the Nizam in conformity with the arrangements herein approved.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) *H. Fraser,*

Officiating First Assistant Resident.

Hyderabad Residency,  
6th April 1861.

STATEMENT showing the Transfers of District proposed to be made to make up  
the Revenue of *Berar* to 32 lacs of rupees.

	Rs.	a.	p.
Estimated Revenue of districts in Berar which are required according to Treaty ...	32,00,000	0	0
Rs.      a.      p.			
Revenues of West Berar as proposed by Deputy Commissioners with a view to equalize the Revenues of the two divisions...	16,00,000	0	0
Revenues of East Berar as proposed by Deputy Commissioners with a view to equalize the Revenues of the two divisions...	14,62,172	15	0
	30,62,172	15	0
Deficit as shown by Deputy Commissioners .....	Rs. 1,37,827	1	0
In lieu of which it is proposed to take additional districts to the north of the Pyne Gunga River adjoining the Woon Talook .....	1,37,827	1	0
Deduct districts proposed to be restored to H. H. the Nizam in the Talooks of Sind- khair, Bassim, and Korrinjah in lieu of the difference between the deficit shown by the Deputy Commissioner and that exhibited in the Statement prepared in the Resident's Office .....	52,862	5	0
Talooks required to make up the deficit according to Resident's Estimate .....	84,964	12	0
Total .....	Rs. 1,37,827	1	0
Districts between Talook Mekhur and Deolghant, viz., Amrapoor, Chicklee, Chandole, &c., which it is proposed to take from the Nizam, being inconveni- ently situated, and causing interruption to communication between the two Talooks referred to. Estimate revenue .....	Rs. 35,000	0	0
Districts proposed to be restored to H. H. the Nizam in lieu of the above Talooks, as per Enclosure No. 6 .....	35,445	7	6

(Signed) *Hastings Fraser,*

Officiating First Assistant Resident.

Resident's Civil Office,  
Hyderabad Residency, 6th April 1861.

(Civil Department.—No. 56 of 1861.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *Cuthbert Davidson*, c.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to *G. C. Barnes*, Esq., c.B., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department ; dated Hyderabad, 9th April 1861.

Sir,—In continuation of my letter to your address, No. 52, of the 5th instant, I have the honour to point out that it is believed a clerical error may exist in the latter part of para. 44, which, if such is the case, I beg may be corrected. The value of the districts proposed to be restored to His Highness the Nizam in the Talooks of Bassim, &c., should be Rs. 52,862-5-0, as will be perceived on reference to figured statement No. 7, and not Rs. 53,862-5-0, as it is feared may have erroneously been written, as the correct and incorrect amounts both appear in the copy retained in my office.

(Foreign Department.—No. 2313 of 1861.)

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., Under-Secretary to the Government of India, to Lieutenant-Colonel *C. Davidson*, c.B., Resident at Hyderabad ; dated Fort William, 8th May 1861.

Sir,—I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to reply to your letter, No. 52, dated 6th ultimo, in which you submit a report on the arrangements that have been made for the adjustment of territory under the late Treaty with His Highness the Nizam.

2. The first 29 paras. of your letter have been sent to the Financial Department for consideration. The only point in these paras. which appears to call for orders in this department is that raised in para. 15. The value of the lands to be retained under the Treaty is 32 lacs. But for the year 1860-61 there will be a deficiency of Rs. 3,89,938-3-10.

	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
Amount due under the Treaty .....	.....			32,00,000	0	0
Revenues of East and West Berar for the year 1860-61 .....	24,65,488	6	5			
Net amount realized from Raichore and Dharaseo, balance of local funds .....	3,44,573	5	9			
				28,10,061	12	2
				Deficit.....Rs,	3,89,938	8 10

The question is shall this deficit for the year 1860-61 be demanded of the Nizam? You think we may fairly demand it unless the expression in the new Treaty dispensing with all accounts, past, present, and future, means that no question of account shall now be entered into.

3. His Excellency in Council observes that if the accounts by which this deficit is calculated were merely the estimated revenues of the districts we retain there would apparently be no objection to demanding the balance from the Nizam. But as these accounts comprise the receipts and expenditure in Raichore and Dharaseo up to date of transfer the demand cannot be made without submitting accounts for Raichore and Dharaseo ; and His Excellency in Council therefore directs that the amount be debited to the revenues of the districts we retain, as has been done with regard to the balance of debt against the Nizam for 1858-59.

4. Paras. 31 to 45 of your letter relate to the lands which are to be taken from the Nizam to make up the deficit between the revenues of East and West Berar and the 32 lakhs stipulated for in Art. VI. of the Treaty, and to the question of certain exchanges to be effected with the Nizam, with a view to improve the boundaries of the Assigned Districts. Divested of its complications your scheme appears to be the following :—

# THE BEBARS.

The Deputy Commissioners of East and West Berar calculate the revenues of their respective districts to be—

	Rs.	a.	p.
West Berar ... ..	16,13,685	10	6
East Berar ... ..	14,47,928	13	8
<b>TOTAL Rs.</b>	<b>30,61,614</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>

They propose, after lands have been assigned to make up 32 lakhs, that the districts should be more equally divided, so as to yield, as nearly as may be, a revenue of 16 lakhs each. It is therefore proposed to transfer from West to East Berar villages worth Rs. 14,244-1-4, which would reduce the present revenue of West Berar to Rs. 15,99,441-9-2, and raise that of East Berar to Rs. 14,62,172-15-0, or Rs. 1,37,827-1-0 under 16 lakhs. To make up this deficiency, they propose to take from the Nizam lands to that value north of the Pyne Gunga.

5. Between the Mehkur Purgunnah of West Berar and Booldana there is an awkward strip of land held by the Nizam. Its value is 35,000 rupees. This it is also proposed by the Deputy Commissioners to take, giving in exchange lands to the south of East and West Berar worth Rs. 35,455-7-6.

6. You approve generally of these proposals for exchange. But you observe that as regards the deficiency under the 32 lakhs the calculations have not been properly made. The revenues of East Berar, as calculated by the Deputy Commissioner, include balances on account of previous years to the amount of Rs. 86,579-4-2, which should be excluded, while the revenues of West Berar should include a sum of 1,40,000 rupees remitted in 1859-60 for reasons of a temporary kind. Your calculations are therefore—

	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
Due under the Treaty... ..	.....			32,00,000	0	0
Revenue of East Berar, as stated by Deputy Commissioner...	14,47,928	13	8			
Deduct balance of former years ... ..	86,579	4	2			
	13,61,349	9	6			
Revenue of West Berar, &c....	16,13,685	10	6			
Add remissions ... ..	1,40,000	0	0			
	17,53,685	10	6	31,15,035	4	0
Deficiency ... ..	...	...	...Rs....	84,964	12	0

You therefore propose “to retransfer to the Nizam districts of the value of Rs. 52,862-5-0,” in the Talooks of Sindkhair, Bassim, and Korinja, in lieu of the difference between the deficit shown by the Deputy Commissioners and by yourself, “with a view to the rearrangement of the frontier, making a total amount of Rs. 1,37,827-1-0 of an annual revenue to be received from the Hyderabad Government.” You have made the above proposals to the Minister, with a view to their submission to His Highness the Nizam.

7. The Governor-General in Council is not sure that he has apprehended your exact meaning. It seems, however, to His Excellency in Council to be this: The Deputy Commissioners have proposed to take from the Nizam lands on the north of the Pyne Gunga to the value of Rs. 1,37,827-1-0, or Rs. 52,862-5-0 in excess of the real deficit of the revenues of East and West Berar under 32 lakhs. You approve of this, but observe that it will be necessary to retransfer to the

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

Nizam lands yielding Rs. 52,862-5-0. But His Excellency in Council cannot discover where these lands lie which it is proposed to retransfer to the Nizam. In enclosure No. 7 of your letter you say, "in the Talooks of Sindkhair, Bassim and Korinja." But from Statements No. 6 and No. 7 it appears that the land in Sindkhair and Bassim is to be given in exchange for the strip, worth 35,000 rupees, between Mekhur and Booldana. If the "part of Korinja" (coloured purple in the map) "is the land to the value of Rs. 52,862-5-0 which is to be retransferred, His Excellency in Council finds it difficult to see how the boundary will be improved unless the map be faulty. Apparently the boundary will be made worse than it is at present. His Excellency in Council does not see why you should have troubled yourself at all with the deficit of Rs. 1,37,827-1-0 shown by the Deputy Commissioners. It is an erroneous calculation, and there seems no reason why you should have encumbered your present report with it.

8. The proper account seems to His Excellency in Council to be this:—

Deficit of Revenues of East and West Berar under 32 lakhs .....				Rs.	a.	p.
				84,964	12	0
	Rs.	a.	p.			
Lands to be given, as per Statement No. 6, for adjustment of boundaries ... ..	35,455	7	6			
Lands to be received for adjustment of boundaries .....	35,000	0	0			
Difference .....				455	7	6
TOTAL excess of lands to be given by Nizam over lands to be received by him .....				Rs.	85,020	3 6

His Excellency in Council thinks that lands to this extent north of the Pyne Gunga might be taken from the tract coloured yellow in the map.

(No. 2314 of 1861.)

ORDERED that paragraphs 1 to 29 of the Resident's letter, and paragraphs 1 and 3 of the above reply, be sent to the Financial Department for information and further orders.

(No. 1266.)

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of India, in the Financial Department, under date 4th February 1861.

READ again the Financial Resolution, No. 1095, dated the 14th January 1859, on the subject of the irrecoverable balances of the North Berar division of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, and the preparation of the annual account of the revenues and charges of those districts.

Read the Resolution recorded in the Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, No. 2, dated the 1st ultimo, and the papers which accompanied it, on the subject of the proposed modifications of the Commission, and the revision of the establishments of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, in consequence of the restoration of Raichore Doab and Dharaseo to the Nizam.

*Resolution.*—The Honourable the President in Council observes that on the 5th December last His Excellency the Governor-General requested the Resident at Hyderabad to report on the arrangements which it might be necessary to make in connection with the transfer of a portion of the assigned districts to the Nizam's Government, and for the administration of the Berar districts, with such additions as may be made to them when the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo districts shall have been transferred to the Nizam, and when Shorapore shall also have been made over to His Highness in accordance with the conditions agreed upon.

The Resident accordingly submitted the statements given below, showing the designations of the officers whom he proposed to retain for the administration

# THE BERARS.

of East and West Berar, and schedules of the office establishments which he proposed to retain for those officers, an abstract of which follows :—

	Salaries proposed to be retained at present.	Prospective Salaries.	
	Rs.	Rs.	
Commission... ..	2,000	2,000	} Exclusive of all Estab- lishment. East and West Berar. Ditto. Ditto. East Berar. West Berar. Ditto. Ditto. West Berar. Ditto. Residency Civil Officer. West Berar. Ditto. East Berar. Ditto.
Chief Engineer ... ..	800	800	
Second Assistant Resident... ..	600	600	
Executive Engineer ... ..	750	750	
Assistant Engineer ... ..	250	250	
Superintendent of Police .. ..	700	500	
Deputy Commissioner ... ..	1,200	1,200	
Ditto ditto ... ..	1,200	1,000	
Assistant Commissioner ... ..	700	700	
Ditto ditto ... ..	600	600	
Ditto ditto ... ..	600	600	
Ditto ditto ... ..	600	500	
Ditto ditto ... ..	500	500	
Extra Assistant Commissioner... ..	400	400	
Ditto ditto ... ..	400	300	
Ditto ditto ... ..	300	250	
Ditto ditto ... ..	250	250	
Ditto ditto ... ..	250	250	
TOTAL per Mensem ... Rs.	12,100	11,450	
TOTAL per Annum ... Rs.	1,45,200	1,37,400	

## ABSTRACT.

	Cost per Mensem.	Cost per Annum.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Resident's Civil Office Establishment .....	1,389 0 0	16,668 0 0
Commissioner's Establishment .....	1,608 0 0	19,296 0 0
Engineers' Establishment in East and West Berar .....	284 0 0	3,408 0 0
West Berar Establishment of District Officers .....	15,049 1 4	1,80,589 0 0
East Berar       "       " .....	11,228 8 6	1,34,742 6 0
TOTAL amount of Establishment for which sanction is solicited ..... } Rs.	29,558 9 10	3,54,703 6 0

These establishments, it was said, are the same as those which have already received the sanction of Government, which the exception of one Assistant Commissioner's establishment which has been added for the management of the revenue of the Surf-i-Khas estates in each of the districts of East and West Berar, and may suffice for the present, though some future modifications in respect to them may be found necessary, as the Berar districts with the Surf-i-Khas estates will, it was expected, yield a larger revenue than before, and the restoration of some Talooks be probably necessary.

In submitting the above schedules the Resident again solicited the consideration of the Governor-General to the question of entrusting him with the audit and adjustment of all charges, both civil and military, in connection with the assigned territories and the Hyderabad Contingent. It did not appear to him

there were any insuperable objections to the plan, while the advantages and convenience of early audit and adjustment being thus effectually ensured are, he stated, too manifest to need recapitulation.

He also proposed to abolish the Inam Commissioner's office and establishments, as very few claims would remain on the file after the restoration of Dharaseo and Raichore to His Highness the Nizam, and those cases might be disposed of by the Commissioner and his district officers.

The President in Council observes that His Excellency the Governor-General has approved of the selection which has been made by the Resident of the officers whose services will be retained for the administrations of East and West Berar, and of the salaries proposed for them both present and prospective, as also of the appointment of a Commissioner on 2,000 rupees a month, and has sanctioned the abolition of the Inam Commissioner's office and establishment, and that under His Excellency's direction the sanction of the Government of India is requested to the salaries above approved of, the remaining questions being referred to it for consideration and orders.

His Honour in Council is pleased to sanction the salaries and appointments approved by the Governor-General.

In regard to the office establishments, His Honour in Council remarks that the Resident has not submitted a paper showing the financial result of the arrange-

-----	According to Civil Auditor's Book of Entries			Proposed by the Resident.		
	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
Resident's Civil Office Estab-	2,923	0	0	1,389	0	0
lishments ... ..	2,527	0	0	1,608	0	0
Commissioner's Office ... ..	1,057	0	0	284	0	0
Engineer's Establishment ... ..	13,978	7	4	15,049	1	4
West Berar ... ..	11,063	8	6	11,228	8	6
East Berar ... ..	2,088	0	0	...	...	...
Inam Commissioner's Office and Establishments ... ..	10,451	15	1	...	...	...
Raichore Doab ... ..	8,590	10	8	...	...	...
Dharaseo ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>TOTAL.....Rs.</b>	<b>52,679</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>29,558</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>

ments now reported. But the table given in the margin, prepared from the Civil Auditor's Book of Establishment for 1859 in the Financial Department, exhibits a saving effected of Rs. 23,120-15-9 per mensem, which may be relied on as a sufficiently correct result, and as the proposed establishments do not on the whole appear excessive His Honour in Council is pleased to sanction them for one year, subject to report at the expiration of that period. His Honour in Council at the same time requests that the Resident will prepare and submit a

tabular statement in the usual form, showing in detail the former and present establishments, so as clearly to exhibit the increases and decreases in each office caused by the revision in question.

His Honour in Council observes that the question of transferring to the Resident the business of auditing the accounts of the assigned territories was once before submitted to this Government in 1859. It was then stated, in the Financial Resolution, No. 1075, dated the 14th January 1859, that this Government agreed with the Accountant General to the Government of India in thinking it likely that the plan proposed by the Resident would be productive of much greater inconvenience and delay than the plan in force. In now making a second application the Resident has not, as he ought to have done, shown that he possesses all the means of enforcing the rules of audit and account with sufficient exactness to obviate the multifarious references and counter-references to Calcutta, without which the retrenchments, explanations, and correspondence which would inevitably follow would cause far more labour and greater delay than the present system, and would thus defeat the object to attain which the change is proposed. This was pointed out to the Resident in the resolution above referred to, but as he has submitted no explanation on the point, and as the new system of audit and account is about to be introduced, His Honour in Council desires that the Resident may be informed that no change in the system of preparing the accounts can be sanctioned at present, but that the question will be reconsidered on the receipt of a report from the Budget and Audit Committee (to whom the question will be referred) as to the expediency of extending the number of local auditors to distant provinces, such as Pegu, Tenasserim, Hyderabad, &c.

From the Budget and Audit Committee to *C. H. Lushington, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Financial Department.*

Fort William, 22nd February 1861.

Sir,—We have the honour to reply to your despatch (No. 1269) of the 4th February, forwarding for our report the questions raised in a Resolution passed by the Supreme Government, in a reference by the Resident of Hyderabad, regarding the audit of the civil accounts of that jurisdiction :—

2. We understand the questions referred to us to be :—

1st. Whether the audit and adjustment of all charges, both civil and military, in connection with the assigned districts, and the charges of the Hyderabad Contingent, should be entrusted to the Resident.

2nd. Whether it is desirable to appoint additional local authorities to detached and distant provinces.

3. The first of these questions, which has indeed been broadly raised by the Resident, amounts, as we understand, to a request on the part of that officer that he should audit his own accounts. After the promulgation of the new system of audit and account in India, based on principles which have prevailed equally in India as in England, it will not be necessary for us to trouble the Supreme Government with detailed remarks to show that such a proposition would not be admissible. We presume that it could never be contemplated to exempt the Resident of Hyderabad from conditions to which every Government, Local Government, and Department throughout India is now subjected—namely, the auditing of accounts by an agency independent of the party responsible for those accounts. The Resident is responsible for the accounts of his jurisdiction, and by the Imperial system those accounts must be audited by independent agency; even if the audit be at Hyderabad, still it could not be conducted in subordination to the Resident.

4. This brings us to the second of the two questions, namely, the desirability of appointing additional local authorities for detached and distant provinces generally, and for Hyderabad in particular. Now, as a matter of principle, we have always been prepared to admit that for any detached province of sufficient size and importance it may very possibly be desirable to appoint a special local auditor; such appointment must, however, we apprehend, entirely depend on the circumstances of the province, and the amount of work to be done. It is to be remembered that each new appointment of this nature entails considerable expense on Government in salary and establishment, not less than a quarter of a lac per annum, or perhaps more. We are therefore anxious to save the necessity of such appointments. Again, the multiplication of auditors entails the chance of greater deviations from uniformity, and the distance of these officers from central authority indirectly lessens control.

5. Such being the general principle, we have not, under existing circumstances, perceived the necessity of appointing additional auditors for detached provinces. We thought that the accounts of the Eastern Settlements may be audited by the Bengal Deputy Auditor General, those of Oudh and Rajpootana by the North-Western Provinces auditor, those of Nagpore and Baroda by the Bombay auditor, those of Hyderabad by the Madras auditor. We still entertain a hope that, with one exception, this plan may work sufficiently well for the present, and that thus extra expense may be avoided. The exception above indicated is that of the Eastern Settlements in British Burma. When the provinces of Pegu, Arracan, and Tenasserim shall be amalgamated under one administration, we think it possible that the preaudit of sanctioned charges may, in order to save delay, be conducted at Rangoon by an assistant under the Chief Commissioner, on a salary of, say, 600 rupees per mensem; but this preaudit pertains to the Pay rather than to the Audit Department, and will not affect the ultimate audit and adjustment of charges. Even for Pegu, then, we do not propose that a separate Deputy Auditor General be appointed at present, though we think that the necessity for such an officer is more likely to arise there than anywhere else.



We have only to submit that we shall be prepared to admit the necessity whenever it shall be shown to arise.

6. As regards Hyderabad in particular, however, we would submit that such necessity is less likely to arise there than in any other case. The purely civil charges are now limited, compared with the civil charges of other provinces. The accounts which once had to be rendered to His Highness the Nizam will no longer be required, since the restoration of some of the assigned districts. It appears to us that the work to be done at Hyderabad could not possibly afford employment to one officer. The accounts of the Hyderabad Contingent are audited by the Military Auditor General of Bengal. The only change that could possibly be needed there would be the transfer of that particular audit to the Madras Military Auditor General; but this point can be settled by the Military Finance Department. There can be no more difficulty respecting these accounts than the accounts of the Nagpore Military Force, or the Punjab Frontier Force, or Central India Levies, of all which the accounts are audited in the same manner. We have no doubt that whatever arrangements may be necessary for the speedy auditing of these accounts will be made by the Military Finance Commission; but we apprehend that in that department it would be found quite impossible to provide a separate audit establishment for each separate body of troops.

7. We are therefore precluded from recommending that any additional auditor be appointed for Hyderabad.

We have, &c.,  
(Signed) *C. H. Lushington.*  
*E. Drummond.*  
*R. Temple.*

(No. 2000.)

Fort William—Financial Department, 28th February 1861.

His Excellency the Governor-General in Council concurs in the views of the Budget and Audit Committee, as expressed in the above report, on the ground that the appointment of local auditors in distant provinces will entail additional expense to the State.

By order of the Governor-General in Council.

(Signed) *C. H. Lushington.*

Secretary to the Government of India.

To the Foreign Department for information and for communication to the Resident at Hyderabad, in continuation of the Financial Resolution (No. 1266) of the 4th instant.

(Civil Department.—No. 24 of 1861.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel *Cuthbert Davidson*, c.b., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Hyderabad, 22nd February 1861.

Letter from the Accountant General to the Government of India, to the Resident at Hyderabad, No. 242, dated 9th February 1861.  
Letter No. 322-16 to Accountant General, in reply, dated 21st February 1861.

Sir,—I have the honour to enclose copies of the correspondence as per margin, which has passed between the Accountant General to the Government of India, and myself, in relation to the proposed financial arrangements connected with the Hyderabad Assigned Districts.

2. In my letter to your address (No. 180) of the 13th December 1860 I took the liberty of suggesting that much convenience and advantage would result from the adjustment of all charges, both civil and military, being entrusted to the Resident at Hyderabad.

3. In the present correspondence I have urged the adoption of this system upon the Accountant General with a view to ensure more prompt audit, as well as to relieve the officers at Calcutta from no small share of labour.

4. I would solicit especial attention to the fact that so long as the district and departmental accounts are rendered direct to the offices of audit and account

at Fort William, by no possibility can the Resident at Hyderabad reconcile the financial statements received from thence with those he receives from the district offices. They appear to be prepared on different systems, and not to be contemporaneous, while details are not, and scarcely can be, given with that minuteness which would enable me to determine the precise cause and extent of discrepancies, as these are often rather apparent than real.

5. I may observe also that the financial statements received from the Accountant-General have several times required and received alteration, but I am to this day without the means of stating satisfactorily the exact amount derived from the different sources of revenue in the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, and the exact amount of disbursements fairly chargeable against them.

6. A statement of discrepancies, which I have forwarded to the Accountant-General, and which can be called for if required, will show the many points of difference which still require elucidation.

7. Until the financial questions under discussion with the Accountant-General are decided, and the orders of Government have been passed upon the revised schedules of establishments for my office and that of the Commissioner, which, with the letter above quoted, I did myself the honour to submit for the consideration of His Excellency the Governor-General of India, and which, on the score of economy, I have, pending the sanction of Government, directed to be introduced from the 1st instant, things are naturally liable to fall into confusion, and I would therefore beg to be favoured with the instructions of Government in regard to them at as early a date as may be found convenient.

(No. 242.)

The Accountant-General to the Resident at Hyderabad.

9 February 1861.

SIR,—Referring to Article IV. of the new Treaty concluded with the Nizam in December last, in which it is stipulated that His Highness shall “forego all demand for an account of the receipt and expenditure of the Assigned Districts for the past, present, and future,” I have the honour to inquire whether it will still be requisite to furnish you with His Highness’s account with this Government for 1859-60, which is alluded to in my letter to your address, No. 134, dated 8th October last. Future returns of the same description need not, I apprehend, be prepared, as the balances for or against the Nizam can best be determined at the close of each year’s adjustments of the accounts of the Assigned Districts in the books of this office, but your opinion on this point is solicited.

2nd. I observe that Article III. of the new Treaty cancels the Nizam’s old debt of about 50 lacs of Hyderabad rupees, which had accumulated up to May 1853, but makes no allusion whatever to the subsequent demands against His Highness, which at the close of 1858-59 amounted to nearly 3,20,000 rupees, as ascertained in this office. It may be necessary, therefore, to make a reference on the subject to Government, in case it is intended that the entire balance outstanding up to the date of the Treaty should, as on a previous occasion, be written off.

3rd. I take this opportunity to inquire whether arrangements have been made for the adjustment of the balances of the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo treasuries, which will remain outstanding in the accounts after the transfer of those two districts.

4th. In conclusion, I beg that in submitting the Hyderabad Budget Estimate for 1860-61 and 1861-62 (now over-due) due regard may be had to the increase or decrease of receipt or expenditure which the terms of the Treaty may involve.

Civil Department.

The Resident at Hyderabad to the Accountant-General.

21 February 1861.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 242) under date the 9th February 1861, calling for my opinion upon the system to be

pursued in future in regard to the adjustment of the accounts of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts.

2nd. Although it is stipulated in the new Treaty that His Highness the Nizam shall "forego all demand for an account of the receipt and expenditure of the Assigned Districts for the past, present, and future," yet, as any surplus revenue that may hereafter accrue is to be paid to the Nizam, it will be necessary that the Resident at Hyderabad should have the means of ascertaining the exact financial position of those districts.

3rd. It is observed by you that the balances for or against the Nizam can best be determined at the close of each year's adjustments of the accounts of the Assigned Districts on the books of your office. I would beg to remark that experience has fully demonstrated the serious inconveniences of this system; while the Resident is responsible both to the British and the Native Governments for the efficient and economic administration of the Assigned Districts, he is precluded, under existing circumstances, not only from guarding against extravagant expenditure, but even from acquainting himself with the amount of expenditure that has been incurred until the accounts have been received from Calcutta.

4th. The distance between the district officers and the department of audit and account necessarily causes, as we must perceive has throughout been the case, great delay in the adjustment of these accounts. It has been objected that one cause of the delay has been in my having returned the accounts to Calcutta for explanation or revision. I do not dispute this, but I trust that it will be perceived that they have not been unnecessarily returned, and that it was not possible for me to submit accounts to the Nizam which I did not understand, and on which large corrections were obviously requisite, and were eventually made.

5th. I beg to be understood as not having the most remote intention of imputing any avoidable delay, or anything in the shape of remissness, to your department; but I regard it as an inevitable consequence of the distance between Calcutta and these districts, when it must frequently happen, as it frequently has happened, that references backward and forward are so repeatedly requisite that the accounts cannot be furnished with the desired punctuality.

6th. It has also been decided by the Finance Commissioners that the audit offices at Calcutta are already over-worked, and I would for many reasons strongly recommend that the audit of all charges connected with the Hyderabad Assigned Districts should be entrusted to the Resident at that Court.

7th. The Finance Commissioners have expressed this opinion, that "the powers of the Resident at Hyderabad, the Commissioner at Nagpore, and the Officer Commanding the Irregular Forces, as regards sanctioning expenditure being clearly defined, and the pay and allowances being fixed by the Government of India, the allotment of stores being also laid down, the duty of officers connected with the control and examination of money charges, or of expenditure of stores, would be quite easily performed."

8th. I have already, in a letter (No. 180) of the 13th December last to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, urged that all charges, civil and military, in connection with the assigned territories should be left to the Resident; and I trust you will concur with me in the opinion that, while your department would thus be relieved from considerable labour, prompt audit would be ensured, all charges would be immediately brought under the notice of the Resident, and he would then have it in his power effectually to control expenditure, instead of remaining in ignorance with regard to it until information reaches him from a distant source and what is done is irretrievable.

9th. There would be little difficulty in the accounts being so arranged "as to allow of transactions being recorded as they occur;" and while it is admitted that there is no great peculiarity in the nature of the duty of audit and account, I would beg to point out that the delay attending a reference to Calcutta on every little point upon which any obscurity may rest has been productive of much embarrassment and delay.

10th. I beg, in illustration, to append copy of a letter from the Deputy

Commissioner, Raichore Doab (No. 378), of the 29th December 1860, in which he confesses himself wholly incapable of reconciling your accounts with those of his own office, although he supposes the discrepancies are rather apparent than real, or that the accounts are not contemporaneous.

11th. I also submit a statement prepared in my office exhibiting discrepancies which have been found to exist between the accounts of your office and those of the district officers, and which I am unable to reconcile; and when you call to mind the multitudinous references that it has been requisite to make before these accounts could be closed, you will, I have no doubt, agree with me that a change of system is indispensably necessary.

12th. One chief source of the difficulties that have been experienced in adjusting these accounts is, it appears to me, that we have throughout dealt with the revenue of the Assigned Districts as if it had been Imperial revenue, which it clearly is not. The districts were assigned by the Nizam for certain specific purposes, and whenever we realize more income than we find sufficient for those purposes we are bound to make over the surplus to the Native Government. Had we not incorporated these accounts with those of the General Government much inconvenience and delay in their adjustment would have been avoided.

13th. I may here also mention that the incorporation of the revenues of the Assigned Districts with Imperial revenue on the financial statements that have been published in public prints as emanating from the authority of the Government of India has given umbrage to the Hyderabad Government, as I have been questioned by the Minister as to the reason why the revenue of the assigned territory should be included in the Imperial revenue.

14th. I would therefore earnestly recommend that the audit of these accounts be left to the Resident, who would furnish monthly accounts and vouchers to your office in the same manner as the civil treasury accounts are now submitted.

15th. In reply to the 3rd paragraph of your letter under acknowledgment, I beg to inform you that orders have been issued to make up all accounts in the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo Treasuries to 1st March 1861. Financial statements will be furnished as soon as practicable. The accountants have been directed to come with their accounts to Hyderabad, and all cash balances have been ordered to be paid into the treasuries of Sholapore and Dharwar, and the military cash chest at Lingsoogoor.

16th. In preparing the Budget Estimates for 1860-61 and 1861-62 due regard has been had to the increase or decrease of receipt or expenditure which the terms of the new Treaty may involve; but I regret that, in the present transition state of the assigned territories, it has been found impossible to furnish estimates with the desired degree of accuracy.

17th. It has not escaped my recollection that on a previous occasion it was pointed out that it was open to me to call for such duplicate returns or financial statements, from the district officers, that I might consider necessary to a thorough exposition of the financial position of the Assigned Districts; but these, it is evident, would not enable me to reconcile them with the accounts preferred in your office, when, as Mr. Bullock has remarked, there is a difference between the two systems of accounts. The district officers also have too frequently complained of the inadequacy of their establishments, and any considerable increase in their official duties would, I have little doubt, have been immediately followed by applications for an increase of their office establishments.

18th. With regard to the balance of Rs. 3,25,198-9-10 $\frac{3}{4}$  appearing in your accounts against the Nizam at the end of 1858-59, it is not quite clear to me how we can demand it from His Highness unless we render accounts, and that is specially provided against by the Supplemental Treaty. From the accompanying statement it will be perceived that this balance does not correspond with the balance elicited by me from the district officers' accounts; and I, of course, cannot consequently be expected to feel satisfied of the accuracy of the results shown in the Calcutta accounts.

19th. But there will be a still larger balance against the Nizam, owing to the districts being just now retransferred in the midst of a Fuslee year, and an

immediate decrease of revenue ensuing, which will not be accompanied by a simultaneous amount of reduction of expenditure on establishments. My own idea is, and the following may perhaps be the intention of the Government, that we should forego all claim for balances due to us, and commence the ensuing Fuslee year with a clear balance-sheet or entirely fresh account, otherwise I presume our alternative will be to charge such balances against the revenues of the districts the management of which it is agreed that we retain.

(Financial—No. 378 of 1860.)

From *T. H. Bullock, Esq.*, Deputy Commissioner, Raichore Doab, to Captain *H. Fraser*, Officiating Assistant Resident, Hyderabad.

29 December 1860.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Circular Letter (No. 11) of the 24th November 1860.

2. I have endeavoured to reconcile the discrepancies between the Accountant-General's statement [and the statements] of the district officers, but the difficulty is that the Accountant-General does not seem to have included his items under the same heads as we have ; that is to say, that he has embodied his totals under fewer heads, particularly the contingent charges, and yet there is not sufficient detail for us to discover what he has included in each heading. For instance, in 1858-59 he has got ordinary contingencies Rs. 5,318-7-3. No such item was in the district accounts, nor can we, by adding several together, make up such a total. Again, in 1856-57 he makes out our disbursements in village expenses Rs. 11,896-10, whereas by adding every description of village expense in the district statements, viz., lighting, chowries, stationery, &c., both adjusted and unadjusted, the total comes to Rs. 9,895-15-6 ; therefore, it would be seen that the Accountant-General's accounts are not contemporaneous with ours, and to effect reconciliation it would be necessary to go through every year's receipts and disbursements, and compare them with each other in detail.

3. I would beg to suggest that the statements of receipts and disbursements from 1853-54 to the present year should be forwarded to the Accountant-General for comparison.

4. It appears to me that the discrepancies can only be apparent and not real, and that they would disappear in comparison of accounts, because the accounts of this district have been passed as correct by the Accountant-General himself.

5. As I believe all the English records of the office are to be sent to the Residency, it might perhaps be advisable that the head accountant, Mahomed Fazil, who has always had charge of the accounts of the Raichore Doab, should accompany them, when he would be able, by the original vouchers, contingent bills, &c., to verify all the accounts of this district year by year.

(No. 4048.)

OFFICE MEMORANDUM.

Fort William, Financial Department,  
27 March 1861.

In respect to the several questions mooted in the foregoing correspondence, the Governor-General in Council observes that the question relating to the audit and adjustment of the accounts of the Assigned Districts has already been determined,\* it being considered that it is inexpedient, on the score of expense, that such audit and adjustment should be conducted at Hyderabad.

With respect to the continued necessity of furnishing an annual account of receipts and disbursements, His Excellency in Council agrees with the Accountant General to the Government of India in thinking there is no such necessity, as the balances for or against His Highness the Nizam can best be determined at the close of each year's adjustment in the books of this office.

\* Financial Resolution, No. 2000, dated 28th ultimo.

On the question as to the mode of dealing with the revenues of the Assigned Districts, His Excellency in Council desires that it may be pointed out to the Resident that he labours under a mistake in supposing that those revenues have been hitherto dealt with as Imperial revenue. The accounts of the revenues and charges of the Assigned Districts, though included in the accounts of the General Government, are shown under the distinct head of "Debt," not under the head "Revenues and Charges."

The question as to the adjustment of a balance standing against His Highness at the close of 1858-59, amounting to nearly 3,20,000 rupees, should, His Excellency in Council thinks, be decided in the Foreign Department.

By order of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council,

(Signed) *C. H. Lushington*,  
Secretary to the Government of India.

(No. 1474.)

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department under date the 30th March 1861.

READ a letter and its enclosures from the Military Finance Department (No. 185A.), dated 22nd instant, suggestive of a change in the system of auditing the accounts of the Hyderabad and Nagpore forces, and recommending a local audit.

Ordered, that the above letter and its enclosures be sent in original to the Financial Department for consideration and orders, with reference to the Resolution of Government in that department (No. 2000) dated 28th ultimo, with a request that the papers be returned when no longer required.

(Foreign Department.—No. 2201.)

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Under-Secretary to the Government of India, to Lieutenant-Colonel *Cuthbert Davidson*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad; dated Fort William, 2nd May 1861.

Sir,—With reference to your letter dated 22nd February last (No. 34), with its enclosure, regarding proposed financial arrangements connected with the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General in Council has resolved that the balance standing against His Highness the Nizam at the close of 1858-59, amounting to nearly 3,20,000 rupees, shall be charged to the revenues of the districts retained.

2. A further communication will be made to you hereafter on the other points mooted in your letter under acknowledgment.

(No. 2202.)

Ordered that with reference to memorandum from Financial Department (No. 4048) dated 27th March, and also to extracts to Financial Department (No. 1474) dated 30th March, a copy of the above be sent to the Financial Department, for information and further orders.

(No. 5101.)

Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Financial Department under date 22nd April 1861.

READ again the undermentioned papers on the subject of transferring the audit and adjustment of the Hyderabad accounts from Calcutta to Hyderabad:—

Financial Resolution No. 1266, dated 4th February last.

Ditto ..... No. 2000, dated 28th idem.

Ditto ..... No. 4048, dated the 27th ultimo.

Read an extract from the Foreign Department (No. 1474), dated the 30th ultimo, forwarding, for consideration and orders, a letter and its enclosures from the Military Finance Department, submitting certain proposals for the audit and adjustment of the accounts of the Hyderabad Contingent and Nagpore Forces.

Resolution.—In a report (No. 13) under date the 22nd February last, the Budget and Audit Committee, with reference to a proposal by the Resident of

Hyderabad for the transfer of the audit and adjustment of the civil accounts from Calcutta to Hyderabad, were of opinion that as a matter of principle it may be desirable to appoint for any detached province of sufficient size and importance a special local auditor, such appointment being, however, entirely dependent on the circumstances of the province and the amount of work to be done. But as these appointments would entail additional expense to the State, and their distance from central authority would indirectly lessen control, they felt precluded, under existing circumstances, from recommending such appointments for sanction generally, and especially for Hyderabad, where the purely civil charges are more limited, compared with the civil charges of other provinces.

This Government concurred in the views of the Committee, on the ground that the appointment of local auditors would entail additional expense.

The question has now again come forward for consideration in connection with the letter of the Military Finance Department to the address of the Secretary to the Government in the Foreign Department, No. 185A, dated 22nd ultimo, with which they forwarded, for the information of the Foreign Department, copies of the letters noted in the margin, addressed by them to the Military Department, suggestive of a change in the system of auditing the accounts of the Hyderabad and Nagpore forces, regular and irregular.

30th July 1860, No.  
2010, 18th March 1861,  
No. 183A.

In the first of these letters the Military Finance Department pointed out certain difficulties and anomalies in the existing practice, and suggested, first, that the contingent charges of the forces, now sent to the Commissariat Auditor, Calcutta, should be sent to the Auditor of Commissariat Accounts at Madras, who, having the Commissariat disbursements before him for the Madras troops at Secunderabad and Kamptee, has better means than the Calcutta auditor of checking the rates charged for Commissariat supplies for the Contingent and Nagpore Irregular Force; secondly, that the bills now sent to the Auditor of Commissariat Accounts, Calcutta, for Ordnance supplies to the Contingent and Irregular Force, should be brought under the control and check of the Inspector-General of Ordnance at Madras; thirdly, that the journalized system in use in Madras for the accounts of the Pay, Commissariat, and Ordnance Departments would admit of the charges for the forces being entered therein without keeping up, as at present, two sets of accounts; and observed that the powers of the Resident at Hyderabad, the Commissioner at Nagpore, and the Officer commanding the Irregular Force as regards sanctioning expenditure being clearly defined, and the pay and allowances being fixed by the Government of India, the allotments of stores being also laid down, the duty of officers connected with the control and examination of money charges or of expenditure of stores would be quite easily performed.

In their second letter to the Military Department the Military Finance Department adverted to the difficulties that had presented themselves to the different officers who had been consulted on the above-mentioned questions, and the disinclination expressed by the Madras Government themselves to the transfer of the accounts of the Contingent to the Madras authorities; and they then went on to consider a measure recommended by the Resident of Hyderabad, viz., that the accounts of the Contingent be subjected to a local audit, a measure which the Military Finance Department consider to be decidedly the best of the measures before the Government.

According to the plan of the Resident, this local audit would be conducted by the Military Secretary at Hyderabad, under the orders of the Resident; and as the duties of the Military Secretary appear to be such as to leave him ample time for auditing the accounts of the Contingent, and as, moreover, the Resident states that this officer is available for this special duty, and is prepared to undertake the transmission of the audited accounts to Calcutta with promptitude and regularity, the Military Finance Department advise that the appointment of Military Secretary to the Resident be abolished as such, and that the designation of the office, in substitution, be changed to that of Controller of Military Finance at Hyderabad, adding that they shall then propose the transfer to him of several important duties, and that they hope that by changes in the offices of the paymasters at Secunderabad and Nagpore they shall have it in their power to provide efficiently for the office establishment of Controller.

With advertence, however, to the recent treaty concluded between the British Government and His Highness the Nizam, under Article IV. of which the Nizam has agreed to forego all demand for accounts of the Assigned Districts, either for the past or for the future, and the British Government are left at full liberty to appropriate the revenues and arrange the expenses of administration at their entire discretion, being only required to pay over to the Nizam any surplus that may remain over the cost of such discretionary administration, without any necessity for accounts being shown to His Highness, the Military Finance Department subsequently recommended the appointment of a local controller of military finance for Hyderabad and Nagpore, a local examiner and two deputy paymasters, one at Secundrabad and the other at Nagpore, observing that for the duty of controller the Resident's military secretary was available, but that a separate officer would have to be appointed for the duties of examiner, and that arrangements would have to be made for converting the paymasters at Secundrabad and Nagpore into deputy paymasters. "The deputy paymasters," the Military Finance Department observe, "will estimate for and pay both the regular and local forces, granting cheques for the purpose on the civil treasuries. They will transmit their accounts to the examiner, by whom the accounts thus rendered will be audited and classified, and when approved by the controller will be forwarded to the officers of account, viz., that appertaining to the Madras troops to the Military Accountant, Madras, through the Madras Controller, and that appertaining to the contingent and irregular troops to the Military Accountant, Calcutta, through the Controller at Calcutta, the accounts so transmitted being incorporated with the Bengal and Madras general accounts respectively.

"In the same way the commissariat and ordnance charges will be estimated for and disbursed by the existing departments, and on examination and approval by the local examiner and controller will be transmitted for the purposes of incorporation to the military accountants, through the controllers of Madras and Bengal respectively, viz., the charges appertaining to the regular troops to the accountant at Madras, and those appertaining to the contingent and irregular force to the accountant at Calcutta."

The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that the last recommendation of the Military Finance Department may, with advantage, be adopted, and His Excellency in Council sees no difficulty in entrusting the Controller of Military Finance at Hyderabad with the disposal of the accounts of the Nagpore forces in addition to those of the forces at Hyderabad, the total expenditure on account of both forces being 1,03,32,000 rupees per annum, as shown in the following table:—

	European.	Natives.	Total.
Hyderabad Force, Subsidiary .....	3,454	5,145	8,599
Nizam's Contingent .....	87	9,519	9,606
Nagpore Begular Force.....	1,052	4,401	5,453
Nagpore Irregular Force .....	*40	*3,731	3,771
<b>TOTAL.....</b>	<b>4,633</b>	<b>27,796</b>	<b>27,429</b>

\* These are to be shortly reduced to—

Europeans	20
Natives	1,699

Cost of the above.—At 1,000 rupees for each European, and 250 rupees for each Native per annum, the aggregate cost will be as follows:

	Rs.
Europeans	46,33,000
Natives ...	56,99,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>...Rs. 103,32,000</b>

It also appears to His Excellency in Council that the supervision of the accounts of the Civil Department at Hyderabad might without objection be



committed to the controller in addition to his military duties, and that an uncovenanted officer of the Account Department might be appointed to that post under the designation of Controller of Military Finance and Deputy Auditor-General at Hyderabad, and subordinate to the Military Finance Departments in matters of military, and to the Auditor-General for India in respect of civil finance.

Before carrying out these arrangements, however, His Excellency in Council desires to be informed whether there are any objections in the Military Department :—

- 1st. To the appointment of a local Controller of Military Finance for Hyderabad and Nagpore,
- 2nd. To entrusting the supervision of the Civil Accounts to the Controller of Military Finance, and
- 3rd. To the appointment to that post of an uncovenanted officer of the Account Department.

His Excellency in Council also desires to be informed whether there are any objections in the Foreign Department to the abolition of the office of Military Secretary to the Resident at Hyderabad.

(Political.—No. 8.)

Sir *Charles Wood* to the Governor-General of India in Council ; dated 31st January 1862.

1. I have duly considered in Council the letter of your Excellency's Government No. 87 of the present year, dated the 22nd of June, respecting the details of the arrangements for carrying into effect the Treaty of 1860 with the Government of His Highness the Nizam.

2. I observe that Colonel Davidson proposed to you to compensate, from the local funds of the two districts, Dharaseo and Raichore, which have been restored to the Nizam, those officers of your Government who had built houses or acquired house property in those districts. You properly pointed out to Colonel Davidson that these funds were not Government money in the ordinary sense of the term as belonging to the Imperial revenues. They were levied for a special purpose, and the faith of the British Government may be said to be involved in their due application to that object. This being so, I approve your orders that the amount should be made over to the Nizam's Government, on the understanding that it should be applied to the purposes of local advantage for which it was levied.

3. Considering the circumstances in which these districts revert to the Nizam, I sanction the grant made by you of compensation (to an extent varying according to the loss they may have sustained) to public officers who have erected or acquired property in Dharaseo and Raichore. It does not appear from the papers whether anything had been done to obtain payment from the Nizam's Government for these houses at a fair valuation.

4. I now proceed to the second subject (noted in the margin) to which you have directed my attention in the letter under reply. The value of the lands to be retained by us under the new Treaty with His Highness the Nizam is 32 lacs of rupees. It is, however, calculated that, with the addition of the Surf-i-Khas the Berar districts, which are the to remain in our possession, will in future years yield a revenue short of this sum by 84,964 rupees. For the past year, 1860-61, there was a still larger deficiency, amounting, as shown in the marginal statement

	Rs.	a	p.	Rs.	a	p.
Amount due under Treaty	82,00,000	0	0			
Revenue of East and West Berar for 1860-61	24,65,488	6	5			
Amount realized from Raichore and Dharaseo, balance of local funds	3,44,573	5	9			
				28,10,061	12	2
Deficit	Rs.			3,89,938	10	0

extracted from your Secretary's letter of the 8th May 1861, to 3,89,938 rupees. This large deficit for 1860-61 appears to be, in a considerable measure at least, attributable to the fact that payments not actually due in the Surf-i-Khas under transfer to us were forestalled by the Nizam's officers, whilst similar payments

in Raichore and Dharaseo, under transfer to His Highness, were left uncollected by our officers. In these circumstances, they were of opinion that "if the accounts by which this deficit was calculated were merely the *estimated* revenues of the districts we retain there would apparently have been no objection to demanding the balance from the Nizam; but as these accounts comprise the receipts and *expenditure* in Raichore and Dharaseo up to the date of transfer the demand could not have been made without submitting accounts for Raichore and Dharaseo," and you considered it preferable to forego the amount altogether. In this opinion I concur; but I cannot but think that if Colonel Davidson had been more careful in arranging with the Nizam's Government the details connected with the transfer of territory a portion at least of this loss might have been avoided.

5. When the proposed exchange of territory, with a view to the adjustment of boundaries, shall have been carried out, the lands then in our possession will yield a revenue less than the stipulated sum of 32 laes by Rs. 85,420-3-6. To make up this deficiency, in accordance with the 6th Article of the Treaty, you propose that territory of this annual value should be taken north of the Pyne-Gunga river. I approve this arrangement; but the suggestions of Colonel Davidson, both for this object and for the improvement of the boundaries of the Assigned Districts, are reported by that officer in a manner so complicated as to render them difficult of comprehension.

6. I must again call your Excellency's attention to the importance of attaching to the papers sent to me copies of any maps to which they may refer. It is impossible for me, in the present instance, to understand the precise position of lands which are described as marked a certain colour in a map which has not been forwarded.

7. The third subject mentioned in your letter under reply comprises several matters relative to the audit and adjustment of the accounts of the Assigned Districts and the Hyderabad Contingent. Before noticing the arrangements which you propose to carry out, I await the reports from the Resident at Hyderabad and the Military Department, to whom you have referred certain questions connected with the details of the proposed changes.

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RETURN to an Order of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated 6th April 1854 for Copy "of all Papers relative to Territory ceded by His Highness the Nizam in liquidation of debts alleged to have been due by His Highness to the British Government."

*James C. Melvill.*

East India House, 31st May 1854.

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EXTRACT Foreign Letter from the Governor-General  
dated 22nd January (No. 5) 1851.

2. The time having elapsed within which the Nizam was required to discharge the large debt due by him to the Government of India, I have directed the Resident to call upon His Highness for a settlement of the claim, and to provide means for the future regular payment of the Contingent.

3. A copy of the instructions issued to the Resident is herewith forwarded, to which I would beg to refer your Honourable Court, as indicating my sentiments in regard to His Highness's conduct, and the course to which the Government should resort in order to protect its own interests.

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EXTRACT Foreign Letter from the Governor-General  
dated 4th June (No. 39) 1851.

2. The increasing debt of His Highness to the British Government, which he has taken no steps to liquidate, his utter disregard of my own and the Resident's reiterated remonstrances, his apathy and his waywardness, are amply illustrated in the papers now submitted. I beg to refer your Honourable Court to my Minute of 27th May, which details my views and the measures I have felt myself bound to

adopt for the recovery of the large sum due to us from the Hyderabad State. I have also deemed it expedient to address His Highness once again in terms of warning and reproof, pointing out to him the inevitable result of a continuance of his reprehensible and misguided conduct.

3. Your Honourable Court will observe that I deprecate any direct interference at present on our part in the internal administration of His Highness's dominions. Upon this part of the subject I have fully entered in my minute already adverted to.

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No. 53.—Foreign Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,—My despatch of the 4th June last, No. 39, will have informed you of the measures which I had felt myself bound to adopt for the recovery of the large sum due by the Nizam of Hyderabad to the British Government. I have now

Dated 16th July, No. 146. the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a communication from the Resident detailing the particulars of his interview with His Highness on the occasion of his delivering the Khurecta which I had addressed to him on the subject.

2. Your Honourable Court will perceive that the Nizam has appointed Suraj-ool-Moolk as his Dewan, and arranged to liquidate the debt due to the British Government by the payment of half the amount immediately and the remainder by the 30th of October next. His Highness has also made provision for the regular payment in future of the Contingent Force, by setting apart for that purpose the revenues of certain talooks specified in the list which accompanies the Resident's despatch.

3. The arrangements made by the Nizam appeared to me sufficient and satisfactory, and I have assented to them. At the same time I caused an intimation to be made to the Resident that I did not doubt that the solemn pledge given by His Highness of fully discharging the debt in the manner detailed and within the period specified would be redeemed in full; but that if, from whatever cause, the arrangement which I have now sanctioned should materially fail, he would fall back on the instructions conveyed to him in the letter of June last, and would then require and enforce the cession of territory therein enjoined.

4. A further despatch from the Resident reports the receipt into his treasury, in deposit, of hoondees to the extent of Rs. 16,04,463-8, Dated 19th July, No. 147. in part payment of the first instalment.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*

Simla, 16th August 1851.

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No. 59.—Foreign Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,—In continuation of my despatch of the 16th ultimo, No. 53,

Dated 15th August, No. 160. I have the honour to transmit, for your information, copy of a communication from the Resident at Hyderabad reporting the payment in full by the Nizam's Government

of the first instalment of its debt to the British Government.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*

Simla, 16th September 1851.

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EXTRACT Political Letter to India, dated 3rd December (No. 40) 1851.

4. The 31st December 1850 was the time peremptorily fixed by your Government in August 1849 for the complete liquidation of the debt due by the Nizam to the British Government. At that date, instead of being reduced, the debt had increased to upwards of 70 lacs. On the 4th January 1851 the Governor-General directed the Resident to request an audience of the Nizam for the purpose of informing His Highness that the interval allowed him had expired, and that unless immediate steps were taken for the discharge of the debt your Government would at once take measures for the protection of its own interests, by taking possession of

some portion of His Highness's territories, from the revenues of which repayment might be made. The opinion of Major-General Fraser was at the same time called for respecting the particular districts which, from considerations of police as well as of revenue, might most expediently be taken under our control for the purpose of liquidating the debt.

5. In reply to this reference, Major-General Fraser reported that the districts, in his opinion, best suited for the purpose were Berar Pain Ghaut, the "border districts from thence down to Shorapore, and the territory of the Doab, between the Kistnah and the Toombudra."

6. These districts are supposed to yield an annual revenue of between 36 and 37 lacs. With the addition of Shorapore, already under our management, they comprise the whole of the northern and western and part of the southern frontier of the Nizam's dominions. They include the districts in which disputes principally arise between our own subjects and those of the Nizam, and the possession of them would, in the Resident's opinion, "enable us to prevent the further influx of foreign military adventurers into the country, which neither the authorities in Scindia's territory to the north, nor those in Kandeish to the north-west, have been able to effect."

7. In the same communication Major-General Fraser represented in strong terms the weakness of character of the Nizam, and the disorganized state of his administration, and submitted to your Government "whether the present circumstances of this State would not justify our making a proposition to the Nizam of a more comprehensive nature than that at present contemplated by Government, which provides for our own interests only, not for those of the country at large, either as regards its sovereign or its inhabitants. I mean," continued Major-General Fraser, "a proposition for the cession of the whole of the Nizam's country to our sole and exclusive management and authority for a definite number of years, with the allotment of such portion of its revenue as might be considered suitable for the honourable support of His Highness and family, and a guarantee for the maintenance of the nobles and inhabitants of the country generally in all their just rights and privileges: I speak of this as a proposition only, and by no means an imperative demand from which His Highness would not be permitted to dissent."

8. The Governor-General for some time abstained from issuing any orders, in hopes that "the strong language of warning which has been addressed to the Nizam, and the alarm which His Highness's subsequent proceedings seem to indicate, might have led to proposals on his part" for the liquidation of the debt, by which the necessity of resorting to the sequestration of territory might have been averted.

9. On the 27th of May, however, when the debt had further increased to more than 75 lacs, and no signs appeared of any intention on the part of the Nizam to make a serious effort for its liquidation, the Governor-General recorded his views respecting the course to be adopted.

10. His Lordship expressed his entire disapproval of the measure recommended by Major-General Fraser: he argued that a proposal for making over the administration to the British Government would never be voluntarily consented to by the Nizam; that to impose it upon him without his consent would be a violation of treaties; that the maladministration of the Nizam's territory does not materially affect the security of British territory or the interests of British subjects, and that our Government is not called on, nor at liberty, to set aside an independent native Government because in its opinion that Government exercises its authority in a manner injurious to his subjects.

11. The only interference which the Governor-General considered to be admissible was that which has for its object the realization of our own just claims, grounded principally on pecuniary advances made in circumstances of absolute necessity, "for the maintenance of good faith with a body of troops over which we exercised authority," and which was "the only force on which His Highness could rely for preserving the internal tranquility of his kingdom."

12. All attempts having failed to obtain from the Nizam either the payment of this debt, or any arrangement affording a reasonable hope of payment, the Governor-General addressed a letter to the Nizam requiring that he should forthwith make over to the Resident the districts enumerated in the Resident's letter above referred to.

13. He further stated that the advances heretofore made for the payment of the Contingent Force would no longer be continued, and that unless the payment was regularly made by the Nizam a further sequestration of territory would be necessary.

14. He then proceeded to impress on the Nizam the impossibility of his meeting this demand, from his diminished resources, without immediate and vigorous measures for the reduction of expenditure, and more particularly urged the disbandment of his "numerous and utterly useless military levies," consisting chiefly of disorderly and mutinous foreign mercenaries, and proffered the aid of the Resident, if required, for effecting this measure. He further intimated "his expectation" that the Nizam, "without any further delay," would appoint a Minister fitted by social position, character, and experience "for transacting the important affairs which are now depending between the Government of India and the Court of Hyderabad."

15. On being aware of this communication from the Governor-General, and before the Khureefa had been formally delivered to him, the Nizam appointed Suraj-ool-Moolk to the office of Dewan. He subsequently gave a positive pledge that one-half of his debt to your Government should be paid immediately, and the remainder on the 31st of October. He lodged hoondees with the Resident for 16,04,463 rupees, in part payment of the first instalment; and he promised to provide for the future payment of the Contingent Force by setting apart for that purpose the revenues of certain talooks; the mode, however, in which those revenues are to be made available for the purpose is not specified.

16. In consideration of these engagements on the part of the Nizam, Major-General Fraser suspended the sequestration of districts pending further orders. The Governor-General approved the conduct of the Resident, and gave his assent to the proposals of the Nizam, but directed that "if, from whatever cause, the arrangement to which His Lordship now assents shall materially fail," the Resident should fall back on his former instructions, and "require and enforce the cession of territory therein enjoined." Your despatch of the 16th September informs us that the Nizam had completed the payment of the first half of his debt to your Government.

17. We entirely approve the proceedings of the Governor-General.

18. We are persuaded that nothing less than the decisive step which His Lordship adopted would have produced an effort on the part of the Nizam for the immediate payment of even a part of the debt. Had no such effort been made, we should have been prepared, though with great regret for its necessity, to sanction the proposed sequestration of territory. We trust that the Nizam is now convinced that evasions and delays will be of no further avail, and we hope that by the fulfilment of the pledges now given he will render it unnecessary to resort to that stringent measure which he must now be aware that there are no other means of averting.

19. We hope that the arrangement proposed by the Nizam for securing the future punctual payment of the Force will be effectual. We must at the same time remark that, while we are thus enforcing the payment of the expenses incurred in maintaining a Force for his benefit, it is peculiarly necessary that the whole of the expenses so incurred should be such as we can in all respects justify.

20. In the Governor-General's minute dated 25th September 1848 His Lordship, while maintaining in strong terms the importance of the Contingent Force to the Nizam's interests, as well as our right to require its maintenance in an efficient state, expressed himself at the same time in the following terms:—

"I agree with Colonel Low in thinking that we cause the Contingent to become a much heavier burden on the Nizam's finances than it ought to be.

The staff, in my humble judgment, is preposterously large. The pay and allowances, and charges of various kinds, are far higher than they ought to be. Whenever His Highness shall evince a desire to enter honestly and sincerely into an examination of the state of his kingdom, and give evidence of his willingness to endeavour to find a remedy, I am ready, on the part of the Government of India, to make every exertion to introduce such changes into the Contingent Force as may safely diminish the great cost which it imposes on the State. More than this—I am very willing to commence on the reduction of the numerous and expensive staff appointments in the Force, by getting rid of them as vacancies occur and opportunities arise.”

21. We think that the time is now come for acting on the opinions expressed by the Governor-General in the preceding passage; and we are anxious that, by a general revision of the constitution and expenses of the Contingent Force, your Government should set an example to the Nizam of the retrenchments which the condition of his finances so urgently requires.

## No. 2.—Foreign Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,—I have the honour to transmit the documents marginally noted, from which your Honourable Court will learn that the second instalment of the Nizam's debt to the British Government, which His Highness had promised to pay on or before 31st October 1851, has been discharged in part only.

2. The annexed further correspondence<sup>a</sup> has reference to the measures contemplated by me for the gradual reduction of the Nizam's Contingent, to which it appears His Highness is opposed.

My minute of 3rd January 1852, which accompanies, will acquaint your Honourable Court with my views on both subjects.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*

Camp, Oung, 9th January 1852.

## EXTRACT Foreign Letter from India dated 6th March (No. 9) 1852.

32. The papers noted marginally contain His Highness the Nizam's reply to the letter addressed to him by the Governor-General in June 1851, Nos. 173 and 174. last, a copy of which was forwarded to your Honourable Court with His Lordship's despatch of 4th June, No. 39, with the Resident's comments thereon.

## No. 41.—Fort William, Foreign Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,—It will be in the recollection of the Honourable Court that the affairs of His Highness the Nizam had two years ago arrived at such a pitch of confusion as to call for decided action on the part of the Government of India.

Disregarding all advice and remonstrance, His Highness had continued for several years habitually to neglect the provision of payment for the Contingent Force. The Government of India, justly considering that its good faith was pledged to a body of troops which was commanded by British officers and subject to its control, advanced the money which was necessary to make good the shortcomings of the Nizam. These advances amounted in 1851 to upwards of 70 lacs of rupees.

2. During this course of neglect, and while the debt was accumulating, the warnings and remonstrances of the Government of India were incessant; but they were unavailing. Every effort to check the reckless career of the Nizam having

<sup>a</sup> Letter from Resident, Hyderabad, dated 14th October 1851, No. 189, with two enclosures. Letter to Resident, Hyderabad, dated 7th November 1851, No. 3466. Letter from Resident, Hyderabad, dated 7th December 1851, No. 214. Minute by the Most Noble the Governor-General dated 3rd January 1852.

failed, the Government of India intimated to His Highness that no further debt could be allowed to accrue ; that the pay of the Contingent must thenceforth be regularly supplied ; that the principal sum of debt must be liquidated ; and that if His Highness failed to meet that demand by payment within a year territory must be made over in satisfaction of it.

The Government of India had recourse to this tone of severity less from a consideration of its own interests, which had become heavily involved, than in the hope that it might reasonably alarm the Nizam for the consequences of his proceedings, and might bring about the amendment which had long been sought in vain.

His Highness failed to meet this demand : nevertheless six months more were allowed by the Government of India to elapse without carrying into effect the resolution it had announced to the Nizam. This forbearance appears rather to encourage His Highness in his disregard of the danger of his position than to induce him to make an effort for his extrication.

Thereupon the Resident was instructed to demand the temporary assignment of territory for the liquidation of the debt, and to require permanent and satisfactory arrangements for the regular payment of the Contingent.

3. The peremptory demand roused at last the Nizam from his apathy. Payment of the debt was promised, as well as regularity in the affairs of the Contingent. Large instalments were accordingly paid up ; the Contingent was for some time duly paid ; a resolution was expressed by His Highness to discharge numbers of his useless troops ; and there seemed good reason to believe that His Highness was about to enter upon a new and better course.

The promise was of short duration.

The further instalments of the debt were not paid up. The pay of the Contingent began again to fall into arrears. By the summer of 1852 the officers and men of the Force were reduced to the greatest straits. Six months of arrears were due. Money could not be obtained at less than 24 per cent., and very grievous hardships were thus inflicted.

4. The Government of India, upon the very first appearance of a desire on the part of the Nizam to meet the claims to which he was liable, and to discharge the duties of his position, had relaxed its previous demands and had forbore to press His Highness in any respect.

In the circumstances, however, of the Contingent in the summer of 1852, the Government felt itself called upon to cause the pay of that Force to be disbursed from its own Treasury, and it renewed its remonstrances to the Nizam : they were attended with as little success as before. Nevertheless so reluctant was the Government of India to proceed to measures having an appearance of severity that it patiently bore with the repeated breaches of promise and empty professions of the Nizam and his Minister till the spring of the present year.

5. But at that time the relations of the Government of India with the Court of Hyderabad had reached a point at which the execution of some definite measure could no longer be delayed consistently with the duty which the Government owed to its own interests and to those of the Contingent Force.

The troops were still left many months in arrears. The advance made by the Government of India for their pay had again raised the principal sum of debt to about 50 lacs of rupees. The liquidation of the principal, the provision of the annual interest, and the payment of the Contingent Troops were all equally hopeless. Every project had been allowed a trial ; every pretence had been tolerated by the Government of India, without any effect. The guarantee of nobles of the Court of Hyderabad had been given, and had been proved worthless. The Minister had a thousand times made the most solemn promises, and had broken them as often. The Sovereign himself had affected to set aside certain talooks for the pay of the Contingent ; but he subsequently repudiated his own declaration, and deliberately violated his plighted word.

Thus, in March last, it had become certain to demonstration that if the Nizam's Contingent was to be maintained and paid provision must be made for that purpose

by the cession or assignment of districts to the exclusive authority of the Government of India on the part of the Government of Hyderabad.

6. The whole subject is discussed in the accompanying minute, and is treated so fully that it would be an unnecessary occupation of the attention of the Honourable Court to repeat the arguments in this despatch.

31st March 1853.

It will be sufficient to say that the Government resolved to require either that the Contingent should be permanently provided for by a cession of territory, confirmed by a treaty, or that the Contingent should be disbanded, temporary provision being made for its maintenance during its gradual dissolution.

It was resolved at the same time to endeavour to obtain some changes in existing treaties by which the Government of India would be benefited without any detriment to His Highness the Nizam.

The main object, however, of the Government of India was to obtain a definite settlement of the question of the Contingent; and for that object it was prepared to make a heavy sacrifice by the surrender of the debt due to it by the Court of Hyderabad.

7. We have the satisfaction of transmitting to your Honourable Court a copy of a Treaty signed by the Nizam on the 21st instant, by which almost every point of importance which the Government was desirous of obtaining has been secured, and secured without the sacrifice of the principal sum of debt which we were ready to make.

The precise effects of the treaty are so fully set forth in the minute of May 30th that, as before, we abstain from repeating them in detail.

8. Your Honourable Court will perceive that mutual advantages are conferred by its provisions.

The course of these negotiations has shown, by the repeated and emphatical declarations of the Nizam in open durbar, that he did not seek the abolition of the Contingent, that he is sensible of its value, and objects even to a numerical reduction in its ranks.

Your Honourable Court will observe that the Resident, in obedience to his instructions, distinctly told His Highness that the Government of India did not insist on his maintaining the Contingent, and would provide for its being disbanded if he expressed a wish to that effect. This offer, and the renewed disclaimer of any such wish by the Nizam, echoed by such of the principal nobles at Hyderabad as were present on the occasion, effectually and for ever refuted the assertion, which has been frequently made, that the Government of India has hitherto compelled, and is now compelling, the Nizam to maintain the Contingent against his will.

9. The Government of India by this treaty gains a less restricted use of the Subsidiary Force, while it retains all its obligations in regard to that force. It obtains the formal establishment of the Contingent as auxiliary British troops, and holds full means in its own hands of paying the troops now, and of ultimately liquidating all its own claims.

The Nizam, on his part, retains every advantage he has hitherto enjoyed, together with an annual saving of six lacs of rupees, and release from the demand for payment of debt.

Both parties gain delivery from the harassing and unworthy disputes regarding money, which for some time past had been hardly compatible with the dignity of the two Governments, and were calculated to impair the good understanding between them.

These are great benefits secured, and we trust they will seem satisfactory to your Honourable Court.

10. We submit the whole subject of the relations existing of late years between the Government of India and the Court of Hyderabad, of which we trust a permanent settlement has now been effected, to the judgment of your Honourable Court.

We do so with confidence, believing that your Honourable Court will find in the documents which we send irrefragable proofs that the conduct of the Government



of India towards the Nizam in respect of the Contingent and of all his other affairs has been characterized by unvarying good faith, liberality, and forbearance, and by a sincere desire to maintain the stability of the State of Hyderabad, and to uphold the personal independence of His Highness the Nizam.—We have, &c.,

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*  
*J. Lowis.*  
*J. Dorin.*

Fort William, 3rd June 1853.

EXTRACT Foreign Letter from India dated 2nd July (No. 51) 1853.

2. We have great satisfaction in also transmitting for your information a copy of a despatch, dated the 19th June, which has just been received from the Resident at Hyderabad, wherein he reports that on the previous day, in full durbar, His Highness the Nizam signed and sealed and completed the treaty, of which copies had been sent from hence with the ratification of the Governor-General in Council.

The schedules of the treaty so signed have been amended so as to remove all doubt as to the districts included in them being capable of producing the amount of annual revenue which was specified in the body of the treaty.

3. It adds greatly to our satisfaction to know, from various sources, as well as from the official despatch, that the demeanour of the Nizam upon this occasion shows that he has at last become conscious that the treaty, which he has now completed cheerfully, is calculated to promote his interests, and to conduce to his ease.

Political Department, 2nd November (No. 45) 1853.

Our Governor-General of India in Council.

Since our last general despatch on Hyderabad affairs, No. 40 of 1851, was

New treaty with the Nizam.  
 Governor-General's letters  
 dated 2nd October (No. 60),  
 1851.

9th January (No. 2) 1852.  
 Letters from the Govern-  
 ment of India dated 7th  
 January (No. 1), 1852, pp. 8  
 to 12; 6th March (No. 9)  
 1852, p. 32; 7th April (No.  
 19) 1852, p. 33.

written, we have received the communications noted in the margin, connected with the expenses of the Nizam's Contingent Force, and the debt due by His Highness to the British Government, to which we now reply, in conjunction with your letters, dated 3rd June (No. 41) and 2nd July (No. 51) 1853, conveying to us the intelligence that a new treaty has been concluded with the Nizam, whereby the difficulties which have so long existed with respect to the Contingent Force, and the payments

due by the Nizam to our Government on that and other accounts, are finally and most satisfactorily terminated.

2. In June 1851, in consequence of the large debt then due to Government by the Nizam, and the fruitlessness of all your efforts to prevent its amount from increasing, you demanded from His Highness a temporary transfer of territory. The Nizam then gave a positive pledge that one-half of the debt should be paid immediately, and the remainder on the 31st of October 1851. The first part of this engagement was fulfilled, and in consideration of its fulfilment your demand for the transfer of territory was for the time withdrawn.

3. The Nizam, however, failed to pay the remaining half of the debt at the date named by him; of only a small portion of the amount could payment be obtained, even after considerable delay, and the pay of the Contingent Force again fell into arrear beyond the permitted period of four months, which compelled you, contrary to your declared intention, to recommence disbursements on this account from the British Treasury. Repeated representations by the Resident had no effect except that of producing a renewal of promises, and occasional small payments, not nearly equal to the amount of the current expenditure. In consequence, a large debt due to your Government again accumulated: on the 1st February 1853 it amounted to Hyderabad Rs. 38,90,491-1-7, exclusive of an item of interest not inserted in the account current, and in May following it had reached nearly 50 lacs.

4. Under these circumstances, you took into serious consideration the whole state of your relations with the Nizam's Government. The Governor-General's minute of 30th March 1853 is a masterly exposition of the subject.

5. You justly considered it desirable to make some permanent arrangement by which the disputes so constantly arising on account of the payment of the Contingent Force might for the future be obviated, and the British Government be relieved from the unbecoming position of an importunate creditor.

6. You therefore, rightly and wisely, determined to make a proposal to the Nizam for a transfer to us of territorial revenues sufficient to defray the expense of such a force as you deemed sufficient for the purposes for which the Contingent had been employed, but at the same time to give to His Highness the option of disbanding the Contingent, in which case you would only require such a temporary transfer of territory as might suffice for paying His Highness's debt to your Government, and for covering the expenses of the force during the time necessary for effecting its absorption in the gradual manner required by good faith to existing personal interests.

7. This important negotiation was entrusted to Colonel Low, who had just assumed the office of Resident; and that officer has well merited the high encomiums which you have bestowed on him, by the skill, judgment, and firmness which enabled him to overcome all difficulties, and bring the discussion to a successful issue.

8. The Nizam had on several recent occasions disclaimed all wish to dispense with the Contingent Force, or even to reduce its strength, and on this occasion he distinctly rejected that part of the proposition offered to him. For its regular payment, however, he at first showed great reluctance to make over territory, but ultimately consented to transfer districts to our management, though not to cede them in sovereignty.

9. By the treaty, as finally executed, the Contingent Force, somewhat reduced in amount, ceases to be the Nizam's force, and becomes a force maintained, under the obligation of the treaty, for the Nizam by the British Government. His Highness is also relieved from Appa Dessye's Chout, the payment to the Saliandars, and all other payments for which he was bound to us, the whole of which the British Government takes on itself. In return, districts which exhibit a gross revenue of about fifty lacs of rupees, and are estimated to yield 36,82,000 rupees annual revenue exclusive of jagheers, are made over to our management, being a reduction of 6,06,000 rupees on the annual payments previously due from His Highness to the British Government.

10. The Subsidiary Force is placed more at our disposal than hitherto for general purposes, the stipulation in former treaties for its being stationed in His Highness's territories being henceforth limited to a part, instead of the whole, of the force. And, at the Nizam's express desire, the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 is abrogated, and His Highness released from all obligation to furnish troops in the event of war.

11. It is our gratifying duty to state, in conclusion, that we regard with the greatest satisfaction this settlement of our pecuniary relations with the Nizam's Government. We approve the treaty negotiated under your instructions, and the Governor-General and the officers employed by him are entitled to our cordial thanks.—We are, &c.,

(Signed) *R. Ellice.*  
*J. Oliphant.*  
*&c. &c.*

London, 2nd November 1853.

EXTRACT Foreign Letter from India dated 18th February (No. 17) 1854.

1. In acknowledging the receipt of your Honourable Court's despatch, No. 45, dated the 2nd November last, conveying your approval of the treaty lately concluded with His Highness the Nizam, we have to express our respectful and grateful acknowledgment of the approbation with which you have honoured us.

MINUTE by the Most Noble the Governor-General of India.

1. Address the Resident at Hyderabad. State that the time has now elapsed within which His Highness the Nizam was required, in a despatch dated 25th August 1849, to discharge the large debt which was due by him to the Government of India.

2. I have purposely abstained from addressing to the Resident any instructions in anticipation which should direct him to adopt at once specific measures in the event of His Highness having failed to meet the demands of this Government at the time fixed.

The tenor of the despatches addressed to me by the Honourable Court has confirmed me in my desire to avoid to the very last any proceeding towards the Nizam which could bear the appearance of harshness or of undue haste.

But I entertain as firm a conviction as before that a due regard for our own interest forbids our consenting to any further postponement of the settlement of our claims upon His Highness, while the constant and large additions that have been made to the debt since the warning was conveyed to His Highness, and the whole course of His Highness's public conduct, plainly show that further indulgence would be no true friendship to the State of Hyderabad, but would only lead its ruler into deeper embarrassment and a more reckless course.

3. The Resident will therefore be so good as to request an audience of His Highness the Nizam. He will state to His Highness that he has been directed by the Government of India to remind him that the time has now elapsed within which, as His Highness was informed, the Government of India required that the debt due to it by His Highness should be discharged.

Although in the interval His Highness has frequently intimated his intention of taking measures for this purpose, the debt has not only not been diminished, but has been largely increased.

The Resident will observe that the Governor-General is unwilling to assume that when the period fixed shall have arrived His Highness will still have made no effort to meet the just claims of the Government of India, but that the Governor-General has instructed him to add that if he (the Resident) should report, as the result of the present interview, that His Highness has taken no effectual measures for the fulfilment of his own assurances and for the discharge of the debt, the Resident will thereafter immediately receive instructions to communicate to His Highness those measures to which the Government of India will feel it to be its duty to resort, in order to protect its own interests.

4. The Resident will further be so good as to convey to His Highness an expression of the surprise and dissatisfaction with which the Government of India has learned that His Highness continues still to neglect the appointment of a Minister for the conduct of his affairs. It is a delusion for His Highness to suppose that he, the Sovereign, alone can properly direct the difficult and complicated business of a great kingdom without the services of an experienced and responsible Minister of State.

If such a state of things should continue, the finances of the kingdom will fall into confusion even greater than that which now prevails; disorders already so rife within the bounds of his territories will multiply on all sides, and the authority of the Sovereign will speedily be set at naught.

The Government of India would regret to see the affairs of its ally involved in such perplexity; it therefore earnestly impresses on His Highness the necessity of immediately exercising the authority which belongs to him, and of discharging the duty that he owes to the State over which he rules. The Government of India, as a neighbouring power, is deeply interested in the preservation of order and obedience within His Highness's territories; it therefore has a right to call upon His Highness to take those measures for the ordinary administration of his affairs without which order and obedience will be lost.

5. If it should unfortunately be the duty of the Resident to report (as his recent despatches render probable) that no effectual steps have been taken by the Nizam for the liquidation of his debt, and that the amount of it, already increased

in the interval from 54 to 70 lacs, is becoming gradually larger still, I see no means by which its payment can be secured except by taking possession of some portion of His Highness's territories, from the revenues of which repayment can be made.

6. The Resident has further urged that whatever arrangement may be made for the payment of the debt it should embrace also a similar provision for the regular repayment of the Contingent.

Judging from experience of the past, I feel little doubt of this measure becoming eventually indispensable. Probably we shall find ourselves compelled to retain permanently, for the regular payment of the Contingent, those districts which we may now occupy temporarily for the liquidation of the debt.

7. If revenue to the amount of 35 lacs annually shall now be allotted, it will provide for the payment of the debt in three years, and will also provide means for making good the deficiencies which ordinarily occur in the payment made for the Contingent.

If, however, the Nizam's Government should, after these revenues are allotted, allow the pay of the Contingent to fall still more into arrears than heretofore, other and more stringent measures will then become necessary.

8. The Resident in forming his opinions regarding the territories to be now made over will bear in mind the probable necessity of retaining them permanently under our own control, in order to secure the regular payment of the Contingent. In selecting the districts best fitted for the purpose he will take into consideration advantages of police as well as of revenue; his long experience will enable him to state with confidence from which districts under the Madras and Bombay Presidencies references are most frequently made, or in which the most frequent troubles prevail, whether arising from the inherent turbulence of the people, or from the natural advantages which the country affords for opposition and rebellion. There will be no occasion to confine our demand to the cession of one continuous tract; for the opportunity should not be lost of endeavouring to get rid of all intermixed jurisdictions.

9. On these points, and on all others connected with this subject, I shall be happy to receive the opinion and suggestions of the Resident.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *Dalhousie*.

1st January 1851.

No. 66 of 1851.—Foreign Department.

From the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General to the Resident at Hyderabad.

Sir,—In reply to your letter No. 295, dated 29th November last, I am directed by the Governor-General to state that the time has now elapsed within which His Highness the Nizam was required, in a despatch dated 25th August 1849, to discharge the large debt which was due by him to the Government of India.

2. His Lordship has purposely abstained from addressing any instructions to you in anticipation which should direct you to adopt at once specific measures in the event of His Highness having failed to meet the demands of this Government at the time fixed.

3. The tenor of the despatches addressed to the Governor-General by the Honourable Court has confirmed His Lordship in his desire to avoid to the very last any proceeding towards the Nizam which could bear the appearance of harshness or of undue haste.

4. But His Lordship entertains as firm a conviction as before that a due regard for our own interest forbids our consenting to any further postponement of the settlement of our claims upon His Highness, while the constant and large additions that have been made to the debt since the warning was conveyed to His Highness, and the whole course of His Highness's public conduct, plainly show that further indulgence would be no true friendship to the State of Hyderabad, but would only lead its ruler into deeper embarrassment and a more reckless course.

5. You will therefore be so good as to request an audience of His Highness

the Nizam ; you will state to His Highness that you have been directed by the Government of India to remind him that the time has now elapsed within which His Highness was informed the Government of India required that the debt due to it by His Highness should be discharged.

6. Although in the interval His Highness has frequently intimated his intention of taking measures for this purpose, the debt has not only not been diminished, but has been largely increased.

7. You will observe that the Governor-General is unwilling to assume that when the period fixed shall have arrived His Highness will still have made no effort to meet the just claims of the Government of India, but that His Lordship has instructed you to add that if you should report as the result of the present interview that His Highness has taken no effectual measures for the fulfilment of his own assurances, and for the discharge of the debt, you will thereafter immediately receive instructions to communicate to His Highness those measures to which the Government of India will feel it to be its duty to resort in order to protect its own interests.

8. You will further be so good as to convey to His Highness an expression of the surprise and dissatisfaction with which the Government of India has learned that His Highness continues still to neglect the appointment of a Minister for the conduct of his affairs. It is a delusion for His Highness to suppose that he, the Sovereign, alone can properly direct the difficult and complicated business of a great kingdom without the services of an experienced and responsible Minister of State.

9. If such a state of things should continue, the finances of the kingdom will fall into confusion even greater than that which now prevails ; disorders, already so rife within the bounds of his territories, will multiply on all sides, and the authority of the Sovereign will speedily be set at naught.

10. The Government of India would regret to see the affairs of its ally involved in such perplexity : it therefore earnestly impresses on His Highness the necessity of immediately exercising the authority which belongs to him, and of discharging the duty that he owes to the State over which he rules. The Government of India, as a neighbouring power, is deeply interested in the preservation of order and obedience within His Highness's territories ; it therefore has a right to call upon His Highness to take those measures for the ordinary administration of his affairs without which order and obedience will be lost.

11. If it should unfortunately be your duty to report (as your recent despatches render probable) that no effectual steps have been taken by the Nizam for the liquidation of his debt, and that the amount of it, already increased in the interval from 54 to 70 lacs, is becoming gradually larger still, the Governor-General sees no means by which its payment can be secured except by taking possession of some portion of His Highness's territories, from the revenues of which repayment can be made.

12. You have further urged that whatever arrangement may be made for the payment of the debt it should embrace also a similar provision for the regular payment of the Contingent. Judging from experience of the past, His Lordship feels little doubt of the measure becoming eventually indispensable ; and probably we shall find ourselves compelled to retain permanently, for the regular payment of the Contingent, those districts which we may now occupy temporarily for the liquidation of the debt.

13. If revenue to the amount of 35 lacs annually shall now be allotted, it will provide for the payment of the debt in three years, and will also provide means for making good the deficiencies which ordinarily occur in the payments made for the Contingent. If, however, the Nizam's Government should, after these revenues are allotted, allow the pay of the Contingent to fall still more into arrears than heretofore, other and more stringent measures will then become necessary.

14. In forming your opinion regarding the territories to be now made over you will bear in mind the probable necessity of retaining them permanently under our own control, in order to secure the regular payment of the Contingent. In selecting the districts best fitted for the purpose you will take into consideration advantages of police as well as of revenue. Your long experience will enable you

to state with confidence from which districts under the Madras and Bombay Presidencies references are most frequently made, or in which the most frequent troubles prevail, whether arising from the inherent turbulence of the people, or from the natural advantages which the country affords for opposition and rebellion. There will be no occasion to confine our demand to the cession of one continuous tract, for the opportunity should not be lost of endeavouring to get rid of all intermixed jurisdictions.

15. On these points, and on all others connected with this subject, His Lordship will be happy to receive your opinions and suggestions.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *H. M. Elliot*,  
Secretary to the Government of India,  
with the Governor-General.

Camp, Wuzcerabad, 4th January 1851.

No. 35 of 1851.

From Major-General *J. S. Fraser*, Resident at Hyderabad, to Sir *H. M. Elliot*, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Most Noble the Governor-General.

Sir,—I have now the honour to reply to that part of your letter No. 66, under date the 4th ultimo, which refers to our taking possession of some portion of the Nizam's territories, from the revenues of which repayment of the debt which His Highness owes to us may be made in the event of his not having taken any effectual steps for liquidating it.

2. He has not yet done so ; and I do not learn, from either himself or others, that any reasonable hope can be entertained of His Highness's compliance with our just demand in this respect.

3. At all events, this had not been done at the time when the Government of India stated its expectation that the whole amount of debt should be repaid, namely, the 31st December 1850 ; for that time is past, and so far from the debt being repaid, now amounting to Rs. 70,77,436-2-4, as per enclosed account current, it has not diminished to the extent of a single rupee ; nor do I believe there is the remotest chance that the Nizam would be able to fulfil his promise of repaying his debt by instalments of 12 lacs of rupees per annum, even if we acceded to that arrangement.

4. With a view, then, to the mere repayment of the debt, nothing remains but to take possession, as proposed, of a portion of His Highness's territory for this purpose.

5. Your letter refers to the allotment of revenue to the amount of 35 lacs of rupees annually for the liquidation of the debt in three years, and at the same time the provision of means for making good the deficiencies which ordinarily occur in payments made for the Contingent.

6. In forming my opinion regarding the territories to be now made over with this view I am directed to bear in mind the probable necessity of retaining them under our own control, in order to secure the regular payment of the Contingent ; and in selecting the districts best fitted for this purpose I am instructed to take into consideration advantages of police as well as revenue.

7. In both points of view I consider that Berar Pains Ghaut, the border districts from thence down to Shorapore, and the territory of the Doab, between the Kistnah and Toombuddra, are best suited for our purpose.\*

8. The precise boundaries of several of these districts are not distinctly given in any map in my possession, nor in any map, I believe, extant.

9. The nearest approach to this information which I can obtain has been found on an inspection of several maps, printed and manuscript, compared with the enclosed revenue accounts furnished to me by Pestonjee Merjee, Esq., who has at different times had means of access to them, which I never possessed.

\* Containing the districts of Narnellah and Gaveil ; namely, Beytalbaddy, Dowlutabad, Pyetun, part of Ahmednuggur Circar, Bheer, Perainda, Nuldroog, and Gulburga, containing the districts of Raichore, Mudgul, part of Gudjunderghur, and Anuagoondoo.

10. It would be in vain for me to ask for them, or to expect anything like a correct account, either from the Sirkar or the present Government officers, even if I could with propriety at the present stage of the question apply for them.

11. Pestonjee Merjee was actually Talookdar of Berar Pain Ghaut for some years anterior to 1845, when he was removed by order of His Highness the Nizam.

12. There can be no doubt that the amount of revenue has been since considerably reduced, in consequence of the disturbances in Berar as well as general mismanagement; and probably, under all the circumstances of the case, Rs. 36,82,517-11-3, per annum is the utmost of what the Sirkar now receives from the several districts mentioned.

13. With respect to geographical position, I do not think that any territory we could select is better situated than that which I have suggested.

14. The districts herein proposed produce nearly the amount of revenue desired by the Government, and I consider them equally advantageous in a revenue and police point of view.

15. Berar Pain Ghaut is without exception the richest and most fertile part of the Nizam's country, and the Raichore Doab is the next to it in this respect. These two districts hold out great prospect of improvement in regard to revenue and commerce, from an extended culture of the two articles of cotton and opium.

16. The opium now grown in Berar is principally smuggled into Malwa, and there undergoes further preparation to fit it for exportation to Bombay, as particularly explained in a letter from me to the Government of India, No. 102, under date the 27th July 1847.

17. The quantity of this article now cultivated in Berar Pain Ghaut, as well as of cotton, might be greatly increased, and the duty upon them would form in itself a very productive source of revenue.

18. The advantages of Raichore will be more particularly stated in a memorandum I have requested from Captain Taylor, which will be forwarded with this despatch if it arrives in time. I have applied to him for it in consequence of his having become well acquainted, by his local position in the adjoining district of Shorapore, with the capabilities and resources of the south-western portion of the Nizam's country.

19. In a police point of view there can, I think, be no doubt that the proposed districts are the best that could be selected.

20. They give us the whole frontier from the north-east angle of the Nizam's country (where the Nagpore and British territories unite) along the northern and western boundaries, with exception only of Shorapore, now under British management, and also the southern boundary as far as the junction of the Kistnah and Toombuddra.

21. The possession of this frontier would enable us, I trust, to prevent the further influx of foreign military adventurers into the country, which neither the authorities in Scindiah's territory to the north, nor those in Kandeish to the north-west, have been able to effect: and as disputes between the Company's subjects and those of His Highness the Nizam have hitherto occurred principally on the western frontier adjoining the district of Ahmednuggur, and on the southern boundary, between the inhabitants of Raichore and those of the Company's Ceded Districts, these sources of inconvenience will no longer exist, or, if they recur, they will be of easy correction, since this will be in our own power, instead of that of the corrupt and procrastinating officers of the Nizam's Government.

22. With respect to the exception in the continued line of boundary above mentioned, I would fain hope that it will not prove any objection to the proposed arrangement.

23. The Rajah of Shorapore is near his majority; but I presume that when that district is given over to his own charge measures will be taken by the Supreme Government for keeping it, for some years at least, subject to the general control of a British officer. It is at present in a favourable and improving condition; but if given up to the young Rajah's exclusive and uncontrolled authority it will quickly revert to the state of barbarism and confusion in which it was before.

24. This subject will, of course, form the subject of a separate despatch hereafter.

25. I enclose a small outline map of the Nizam's country, showing the position of the districts which I am now proposing as the most suitable to be brought under our management ; but if it be wished to refer to a map upon a larger scale I would mention the latest edition of Arrowsmith, which is the only general map I have seen that contains a division of the Nizam's country into its several districts. It is by no means quite correct, with the exception of Berar Pain Ghaut, but may sufficiently answer the purpose of reference.

26. Having now stated my opinion regarding the arrangements that might be expedient in order to give effect to the object referred to in your letter, I have only to add on this part of the subject that if the British Government shall think proper to adopt them, this had better, I think, be done in decided terms by means of a letter from the Most Noble the Governor-General himself, than that they should be made the subject of preliminary discussion and negotiation at Hyderabad.

27. The weak character of the Nizam, and the corrupt influence under which he acts, would render all negotiation hopeless, especially situated as we are at present, without a Minister or public officer of any kind with whom I could place myself in direct communication upon matters of business with the slightest prospect of advantage.

28. I would now beg permission to proceed somewhat beyond the limits of the view of policy taken in your letter, and to submit to the Government of India whether the present circumstances of this State would not justify our making a proposition to the Nizam of a more comprehensive nature than that at present contemplated by Government, which provides for our own interests only, not for those of the country at large, either as regards its Sovereign or its inhabitants.

29. I mean a proposition for the cession of the whole of the Nizam's country to our sole and exclusive management and authority for a definite number of years, with the allotment of such portion of its revenue as might be considered suitable for the honourable support of His Highness and his family, and a guarantee for the maintenance of the nobles and inhabitants of the country generally in all their just rights and privileges.

30. It should be, however, an indispensable part of the arrangement, without which its great advantages might again be ultimately lost, that on the lapse of that period, and the restoration of the country to the management of His Highness, such political relations should be established between the British Government and that of the Nizam as should admit of a sufficiently decided interference on our part, when necessary, to prevent the possibility of the country ever reverting to its present state of ruin and degradation.

31. I speak of this as a proposition only, and by no means an imperative demand from which His Highness would not be permitted to dissent ; for this latter would be unjustifiable under any consideration of international law, in as far as it is not called for by any sufficiently sensible injury which has yet accrued to the neighbouring British territory, nor any such detriment to the general interests of the Indian Empire as we might render the ground and motive of an absolute demand.

32. The proposition might be brought forward in a letter from the Government of India in such a calm and dispassionate tone as could give no offence, and with those reasons for it which I shall now proceed to detail.

33. They not only ostensibly, but in point of fact, have reference much more to the interests of the Nizam himself than to those of the British Government.

34. We are about to assume, in pursuance of a just right to do so, which cannot be denied, the temporary management of a tract of country yielding from 30 to 40 lacs of rupees per annum, and the Nizam, therefore, will have so much income less to meet those demands to which his whole and undivided revenue has long been proved to be quite unequal. He has been unable for the last five years to pay the Contingent, excepting by partial instalments only, although he considers this to be the first and most important payment incumbent on his Government to



make ; and it cannot, therefore, be expected that he should be able to meet this essential claim upon him with his financial means diminished to the extent above mentioned. It is all but certain that he will not be able to pay the Contingent for any further period than perhaps the next few months, and this probably but in small proportion only. The ultimate consequence, then, must be—and I see no reason why this argument should not be set before him in a plain and distinct light—that we shall be under the necessity of retaining permanently in our possession the territory of which we are now about to assume the temporary charge.

35. That the Contingent should ever be done away altogether is a vain idea, impossible to be realized without the most immediate ruin of the country, and final destruction of even that portion of peace and tranquillity of which the inhabitants are still left in the enjoyment ; all these consequences being so palpable and certain to ensue, that the idea of disbanding, or even much reducing, the Contingent is, I believe, one of the last that the Nizam would entertain.

36. The debts of the Nizam's Government now amount, perhaps, to three crores of rupees, besides the two crores which he alleges to have advanced during Rajah Ram Buksh's administration, and which he himself told me he expected to be repaid. But these two crores were lent without interest, or, to use the very words which the Nizam employed in speaking to me on the subject, "Qurzihusuna." A great portion, however, of the remainder of the debt bears interest, and there certainly can be no chance of this being supplied, when it cannot be so even now.

37. The soucars are clamorous for the payment of their debts, and refuse to make any more advances till satisfactory arrangements are made for the liquidation of the payments already made. One alone of these soucars, Pestonjee Merjee, Esq., claims a debt of 42 lacs of rupees from the Nizam's Government ; but he finds it so impossible to obtain the payment of even a single rupee that he is sending home his son and nephew, by the present steamer from Bombay, with a view to memorialize the Court of Directors for such assistance and redress as they may think proper to afford him.

38. The Irregular Troops of the Nizam, absorbing nominally half, or at least a third, of the revenues of the State, are so far in arrears that, if they do not actually mutiny, they declare almost invariably when they are ordered upon service that they cannot move for want of pay. The reduced means of the Nizam will equally increase the difficulty of his paying these men as it does with respect to the other claims above mentioned.

39. The Arabs, a powerful body of men, have claims on the Government to the amount, I understand, of about 20 or 25 lacs of rupees ; and but for the fact that they have possession of districts and forts, which they will continue to retain as a guarantee for repayment, unless they are actually driven from them by military force, which might prove no very easy task, or are influenced by the hope of a just settlement of their accounts under British authority, their claims also, and the difficulties arising from this cause, would have to be added to the rest.

40. The distracted state of the northern part of the Nizam's country, occasioned in a great measure by the presence there of bands of foreign adventurers, has been sufficiently explained in my recent correspondence.

41. This particular mischief, it is true, may be remedied in some degree by the measures I have already recommended in recent despatches to the sanction of the Government of India, and its recurrence may be entirely and for ever prevented by our possession of the frontier districts.

42. But all the other difficulties I have enumerated will not only continue to exist, but will certainly be rapidly increased by our partial assumption of territory ; and in securing our own interests we shall greatly have deteriorated those of the Nizam.

43. But it is not only his increased pecuniary embarrassments and further disorganization of the country that are to be apprehended, but a great deal of that misery which the inhabitants are now suffering must still continue to be endured.

44. I submit, then, to the Government of India, whether it will not be at once more expedient and more just to the Nizam himself and his country at

large to lay before him a proposition to the effect I have now suggested, and to induce him, if he must necessarily cease to be an independent and absolute Prince, to terminate at least his misused and now expiring power without the dishonour of being forced to it by irresistible circumstances, instead of calmly and with some degree of dignity yielding a voluntary assent to that which cannot long be avoided.

45. If he refuses and turns a deaf ear alike to what should be the dictate of his own interests and to the representations of the British Government, the consequences will rest with himself; and while we might lament his blindness and insensibility to the truest interests of the country he has long misgoverned, we should at least not have to reproach ourselves for having precipitated his fall.

46. With the proposition I have suggested, and frank exposition of the Nizam's real position and present best course of policy, the British Government will have discharged its duty not only to itself and the Empire at large, but so also in an equally marked degree to the blind and ignorant Prince who rules this State.

47. If he rejects this last effort to save him, on the part of the supreme power in India, acting in a straightforward and honourable manner, and entertaining the most sincere as well as candidly expressed intentions, the responsibility of ulterior events will rest with himself, and he never can blame us for having withheld from him a knowledge of his present actual position, and the consequences to which we foresaw it must inevitably lead.

48. Whatever representation of importance is now to be made to the Nizam had better, I think, as I have already observed, be embodied in a letter from the Governor-General.

49. There is no recognized public individual here at present with whom I can personally and officially confer, excepting with the Nizam himself; and the inutility of a personal conference with him, as well as the difficulty of obtaining it under all the requirements of Court etiquette, have been too often proved to render any further advertence to this subject necessary.

50. I have to apologize for the delay that has occurred in fully replying to your letter under acknowledgment; but it has been impossible for me to obtain at an earlier period the revenue accounts now submitted, of which a memorandum is subjoined:—

Statement of the gross and net amount of the Revenue of the Districts of Berar Pain Ghaut.

Statement of the gross and net amount of the Revenue of the whole of the Districts between Berar Pain Ghaut and Sherapore, and of the Raichore Doab.

Statement of the Tunkha Jageers in the Districts of Berar Pain Ghaut.

Statement of the Tunkha Jageers in the whole of the frontier Districts between Berar Pain Ghaut and Shorapore, and in the Raichore Doab.

51. I received this morning, and do myself the honour to forward, the Memorandum furnished to me by Captain Taylor, which is prepared with the ability and minuteness of detail that characterize all his correspondence.

52. With respect to the revenues of the Raichore Doab, of which Captain Taylor observes that his estimate is a rough one only, he states the gross amount to be 10,55,000 Rupees; whereas Pestonjee's account makes it only Rupees 9,03,965-4-0, there being a difference between the two of Rupees 1,51,034-12-0.

53. One lac and 40,000 of this difference is accounted for by Captain Taylor's having included in his account two items of Peshcush and one item of Tunkha Jageer which Pestonjee has omitted.

54. The remaining difference may not improbably be attributable to the rough manner in which Captain Taylor observes that his estimate was framed, as I have reason to believe that Pestonjee's Statements are as nearly correct as can be obtained, he having received them from the Revenue Cutchery itself at Hyderabad during the late administration of Rajah Ram Buksh.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 4th February 1851.

**HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.**

**His Highness the Nizam's Government in Account Current with the  
the Quarter ending**

*Dr.*

		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
1850: 1st Nov.	To balance of cash due by the Nizam's Government on account of advances made at different periods by the British Government for the pay of the Nizam's Contingent, Appa Dessaye's Choute, to the 30th April 1847, at Hyderabad. Rs. 1,20,000 per annum; and allowance to Mohiput Ram's family from the 1st November 1842 to the 31st October 1846, at Co.'s Rs. 5,000, or Hyd. Rs. 5,610-6-8, per annum; as also the two latter sums for the official year 1849 50 ...	.....	.....	.....	70,19,441 7 11
1st "	To balance of interest due, as per last quarterly account.....	.....	1,02,028 5 3	.....	.....
4th "	To amount advanced to the Nizam's Government on account of pay to the Troops of the Contingent at the out-stations, in arrears for the month of July 1850.....	.....	.....	1,06,816 0 0	.....
21st "	To ditto ditto to ditto, on account of ditto in arrears for August 1850.....	.....	.....	60,796 1 10	1,67,612 1 10
					71,87,953 9 9
30th "	To simple interest, at 6 per cent. per annum, on the balance of principal, Hyd. Rs. 79,19,441-7-11, for the month of November 1850, being for 30 days .....	34,616 6 9	.....	.....	.....
30th "	To simple interest, at 6 per cent. per annum, on the amount advanced on the 4th November 1850, Hyd. Rs. 1,06,816, being for 26 days.....	456 8 5	.....	.....	.....
30th "	To simple interest, at 6 per cent. per annum, on the amount advanced on the 21st November 1850, Hyd. Rs. 60,796-1-10, being for 9 days.....	89 15 1	.....	.....	.....
1st Dec.	To simple interest, at 6 per cent. per annum, on the balance of principal, for the month of December 1850, Hyd. Rs. 71,87,053-9-9, being for 31 days .....	.....	35,162 14 3	.....	.....
		.....	36,624 7 0	.....	.....
1851: 22nd Jan.	To amount advanced to the Nizam's Government on account of pay to the troops of the Contingent at the out-stations, in arrears, for the month of October 1850 .....	.....	.....	.....	55,550 11 0
31st "	To simple interest, at 6 per cent. per annum, on the balance of principal, for the month of January 1851, Hyd. Rs. 71,87,053 9-9, being for 31 days.....	36,624 7 0	.....	.....	.....
31st "	To simple interest, at 6 per cent. per annum, on the amount advanced on the 22nd January 1851, Hyd. Rs. 55,550-11-0, being for 9 days .....	82 2 11	.....	.....	.....
			36,706 9 11	.....	.....
				.....	72,42,604 4 9
	<i>Hyderabad Rupees.....</i>		2,10,522 4 5	.....	

Hyderabad Residency, 1st February 1851.

## THE BERARS.

Honourable Company on account of Pay to the Contingent, &c., for  
31st January 1851. •

*Cr*

		Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
1850 : 12th Nov.	By amount received from the Nizam's Government in payment of interest due upon the general debt for the months of August, September, and October 1850.....	.....			1,02,028	5	3	.....			.....		
6th Dec.	By amount received from the Nizam's Government in part payment of the advance made on the 21st November 1850, on account of the troops of the Contingent, in arrears, for August 1850.....	.....			.....			.....			35,207	7	8
9th "	By amount received in payment of the interest due to the British Government on the general debt for November 1850 .....	.....			35,162	14	3	.....			.....		
11th "	By amount received from the Nizam's Government in payment of the balance of the sum advanced on the 21st November 1850.....	.....			.....			25,588	10	2	.....		
11th "	By amount received from the Nizam's Government in part payment of previous advances on account of the troops of the Contingent .....	.....			.....			59,839	7	5	.....		
											85,428	1	7
31st Dec.	By amount of simple interest, at 6 per cent. per annum, due to the Nizam's Government upon Hyd. Rs. 35,207-7-8, received on the 6th instant, being for 25 days.....	144	10	2	.....			.....			1,20,635	9	3
31st "	By ditto ditto, on Hyd. Rs. 85,428 1-7, received on the 11th instant, being for 20 days .....	280	13	11	.....			.....			.....		
					425	8	1	.....			.....		
1851 : 6th Jan.	By amount of ditto received from the Nizam's Government on account of interest on the general debt for the month of December 1850.....	.....			36,198	14	11	.....			.....		
15th "	By amount received from the Nizam's Government in part payment of the previous advances.....	.....			.....			.....			44,532	9	2
31st "	By amount of simple interest, at 6 per cent. per annum, due to the Nizam's Government, on Hyd. Rs. 1,20,635-9-3, for the month of January 1851, being for 31 days .....	.....			614	11	11	.....			.....		
31st "	By amount of ditto ditto, on Hyd. Rs. 44,532-9-2, being for 16 days .....	.....			117	2	0	.....			.....		
					1,74,547	8	5	.....			1,65,168	2	5
	Balance, principal and interest, due on the 31st January 1851 by the Nizam's Government....	.....			35,974	12	0	.....			70,77,436	2	4
	Hyderabad Rupees.....				2,10,522	4	5	.....			72,42,604	4	9

( Errors excepted. )

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

**HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.**

**PAIN GHAUT.**

STATEMENT of the Gross and Net Amount of the REVENUE of the following Districts of PAIN GHAUT, in the Dewanee Management (exclusive of Zatee and Lifatee, or Tunkha Jageers, and the Districts in the Nizam's own management), after deducting Deh Sadur and Roossooms, &c., in the year 1258 Fuslee (A.D. 1848-49).

NAMES OF THE DISTRICTS.	The Gross Amount including the Sadur Sebundee, but excluding Deh Sadur and Roossooms, &c.			The Sebundee Sadur (in Government Account some were deducted at 1½, 1¼, to 2 Annas per Rupee), here deducted at 2 As. to a Rupee.			NET AMOUNT.		
	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
Purgunna Vernaree Bhabjee.....	34,785	14	6	4,384	3	9	30,437	10	9
" Karingah Bebee.....	24,336	4	3	3,042	0	6	21,294	3	9
" Durhunn.....	25,386	0	0	3,173	4	0	22,212	12	0
" Khurree Dhaunny.....	15,002	7	0	1,875	4	6	13,127	2	6
" Kamergaum.....	2,230	8	0	278	13	0	1,951	11	0
Mouza Pordah and other villages.....	2,545	0	0	318	2	0	2,226	14	0
Purgunna Soresgaum.....	19,189	4	9	2,398	10	6	16,790	10	3
" Visrooly.....	4,113	5	0	524	2	6	3,599	2	6
" Nadgaum Cajee.....	13,263	15	0	1,658	0	0	11,605	15	0
" Mirpursopundut.....	8,660	9	0	1,082	8	6	7,578	0	6
" Margurkuir.....	8,525	15	0	1,065	12	0	7,460	3	0
Kusha Heevurkair.....	22,601	0	0	2,825	2	0	19,775	14	0
Pergunna Annair.....	6,855	10	9	856	15	6	5,998	11	3
" Oomraovutty Eanee.....	4,665	3	0	583	2	6	4,082	0	6
" Vacekotah.....	3,226	11	0	403	5	6	2,823	5	6
Village of Damoukan.....	2,899	4	0	362	6	6	2,536	13	6
Pergunna Budnairu Belee.....	28,503	3	6	3,562	14	6	24,940	5	0
Mouza Unjungaum.....	2,925	0	0	365	10	0	2,559	6	0
" Loneo.....	1,667	8	0	208	7	0	1,459	1	0
" Timfaloh.....	132	0	0	16	8	0	115	8	0
" Lataphkul.....	277	4	0	34	10	6	242	9	6
" Nandgaum Pait.....	20,556	2	3	2,569	8	3	17,986	10	0
" Nundoora.....	1,151	0	0	143	14	0	1,007	2	0
" Ramnoona.....	475	0	0	59	6	0	415	10	0
" (No name).....	40	0	0	5	0	0	35	0	0
" Nowsaree.....	1,016	15	9	127	2	0	889	15	9
" Recasah.....	1,115	0	0	212	12	0	1,007	4	0
Mouza Loorly, Pergunna Kurekgaum.....	2,151	0	0	268	14	0	1,882	2	0
" Hursoora, &c., Pergunna Chandore.....	3,410	0	0	426	14	0	2,983	2	0
Pergunna Putadah.....	21,437	15	0	2,679	12	0	18,758	3	0
Talook Choheldoo and Soorkana.....	9,385	13	3	1,173	3	6	8,212	9	9
Village of Rajupoor, &c.....	2,847	8	0	355	15	0	2,491	9	0
Pait Oomravouttee.....	58,463	15	3	7,308	0	0	51,155	15	3
Pergunna Baroor.....	94,814	1	0	11,855	8	3	82,988	8	9
Kusha Seerala.....	7,014	9	0	876	13	3	6,137	11	9
" Vulgaum.....	9,001	0	0	1,125	2	0	7,875	14	0
Mouza Unrubb.....	1,185	12	0	148	3	6	1,037	8	6
" Rookrdamunjumpore.....	817	6	0	105	14	9	711	7	3
Pergunna Peenpugaum Raja.....	32,473	12	0	4,059	3	6	28,414	8	6
" Barsee Tahlee.....	11,589	5	9	1,448	10	9	10,140	11	0
" Peenjuri.....	17,087	8	0	2,135	15	0	14,951	9	0
" Moham.....	3,409	12	0	426	3	6	2,983	8	6
" Patoor.....	17,276	14	3	2,159	9	9	15,117	4	6
" Kholapoor.....	38,068	11	6	4,758	9	6	33,310	2	0
Mouza (No name).....	1,950	0	0	243	12	0	1,706	4	0
" ditto.....	315	0	0	39	6	0	275	10	0
Pergunna Talegaum Dussasoor and Mouza Bugy.....	21,537	1	9	2,692	2	6	18,844	15	3
Mouza Lurggaum.....	2,037	15	3	254	12	0	1,783	3	3
Pergunna Jamode.....	35,155	0	0	4,394	6	0	30,760	10	0
Talook Dhool Ghaut.....	2,401	0	0	300	2	0	2,100	14	0
Mouza Karla, &c.....	7,020	2	6	877	8	3	6,142	13	3
" Lurggaum, &c., Pergunna Banun Beer.....	4,410	0	0	551	4	0	3,858	12	0
" Moengaum (half-share).....	2,550	0	0	318	12	0	2,231	4	0
Pergunna Balekadee.....	2,550	0	0	318	12	0	2,231	4	0
" Balapoor.....	2,23,089	1	0	27,886	2	0	1,95,202	15	0
" Akola.....	82,942	14	0	10,367	13	9	72,575	0	3
Mouza Vadeygaum.....	15,354	14	0	1,919	5	9	13,435	8	3
" Lachpooree.....	2,401	0	0	300	2	0	2,100	14	0
" Puroola.....	495	1	0	61	14	0	433	3	0

THE BERARS.

NAMES OF THE DISTRICTS.	The Gross Amount, including the Sadur Sebundee, but excluding Deh Sadur and Roosooms, &c.			The Sebundee Sadur (in Government Account some were deducted at 1½, 1¼, to 2 Annas per Rupee), here deducted at 2 As. to a Rupee.			NET AMOUNT.		
	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
Mouza Loongaum, &c .....	1,535	6	3	191	14	9	1,343	7	6
" Burroor Pimpree .....	1,774	1	0	221	12	0	1,552	5	0
" Mulkapoor, with Moja Molegaum .....	50,865	8	0	6,358	3	0	44,507	5	0
Pergunna Chandore .....	18,087	6	0	2,260	14	9	15,826	7	3
Mouza Rohoukhaida .....	2,959	0	0	369	14	0	2,589	2	0
" Rajoora .....	3,859	0	0	482	6	0	3,376	10	0
" Kothlee .....	934	0	0	116	12	0	817	4	0
" Sajroo, with confiscated villages .....	2,735	15	0	342	1	0	2,393	14	0
" Jeypoor .....	3,646	0	0	455	12	0	3,190	4	0
" Nungaum .....	3,236	0	0	404	8	0	2,831	8	0
" Nadoora .....	8,145	12	0	1,018	3	6	7,127	8	6
	Rs.	a.	p.						
Pergunna Edlabad. ....	54,208	13	6						
" Cawyer .....	4,816	7	3						
" Borree .....	6,911	15	6						
" Sakurpait .....	5,894	13	3						
" Babygaum .....	8,750	9	0						
" Nubhinghud. ....	3,125	0	0						
Mouza Kurring .....	793	9	6						
	84,501	5	0						
Deduct Roosooms .....	4,875	0	0						
	79,626	5	0	9,953	4	6	69,673	0	6
Pergunna Manockghur .....	24,598	11	6	3,074	13	6	21,523	14	0
" Oonseerj ore .....	27,770	6	0	3,471	4	9	24,299	1	3
" Durgee .....	2,421	13	0	302	11	6	2,119	1	6
" Chicknee .....	15,001	0	0	1,875	2	0	13,125	14	0
" Chincholee .....	13,422	7	0	1,677	13	0	11,744	10	0
" Mahagaum .....	11,370	8	0	1,421	5	0	9,949	3	0
" Lardkhair .....	4,556	8	0	569	9	0	3,986	15	0
" Enant Mohal. ....	2,287	15	0	286	0	0	2,001	15	0
" Pargaum .....	975	9	6	121	15	6	853	10	0
" Kullom .....	2,510	12	3	313	13	6	2,196	14	9
Mouza Saungaum .....	322	10	0	40	5	6	282	4	9
Pergunna Pardy. ....	963	3	6	120	6	6	842	13	0
" Borry .....	1,741	4	0	217	10	6	1,523	9	6
" Vunnee .....	520	0	0	65	0	0	455	0	0
Mouza Doogurkair .....	176	8	0	22	1	0	154	7	0
Kusba Kurugkhair, &c. ....	8,308	6	6	1,038	8	9	7,269	13	9
Mouza Dhumny, &c. ....	3,320	3	0	665	0	3	4,655	2	9
" Ussulgaum, &c., Pergunna Julgaum. ....	9,356	0	0	1,169	8	0	8,186	8	0
" Klundala, Pergunna Garoo Mattugaum .....	423	9	0	52	15	0	270	10	0
" Gednapore, Pergunna Peepulgaum Raja .....	1,707	15	0	213	8	0	1,494	7	0
	Rs.	a.	p.						
Pergunna Ankote .....	71,130	0	0						
" Adgaum .....	1,11,808	14	3						
" Julgaum .....	78,327	5	0						
" Merchee .....	28,562	14	0						
" Palla .....	4,396	8	0						
" Jurroor .....	6,455	8	0						
" Maleyghaut .....	5,542	0	0						
Kusba Longaum, Pergunna Jamode. ....	6,852	0	9						
	3,16,075	2	0						
Deduct Roosooms .....	22,125	4	0						
	2,93,949	14	0	36,743	12	0	2,57,206	2	0
Kusba Boregaum, &c., Pergunna Machungaum .....	2,918	0	0	364	12	0	2,553	4	0
Pergunna Unjungaum, Sircar Gassils Mookassa, as follows:									
Ditto ditto, net amount without Sadur Sebundee. ....	1,04,686	8	6	.....			1,04,686	8	6
Ditto Dhuunegaum ditto ditto .....	533	5	0	.....			533	5	0
Rs....	17,03,252	5	3	1,98,983	10	6	15,04,268	10	9

(Signed) J. S. Fraser, Resident.

**HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.**

**STATEMENT of Gross and Net REVENUE of the whole of the Districts between BERAR PAIN GHAUT to SHORAPOOR and RAICHORE DOAB (excluding Zatec and Lifatie Jagcers), after deducting Deh Sadur and Roossooms, &c., in the Year 1258 (1848-49) Fuslee.**

NAMES OF THE DISTRICTS.		Gross Amount including Sadur Seebundee, but excluding Deh Sadur and Roossooms.	Sadur Seebundee, at 2 As. per Rupee.	NET AMOUNT.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
<b>Circar Beytulwaddy, Sooba Bala Ghaut :</b>				
Kusba Ghant, Saveree, and other villages .....	1,389 10 9			
Pergunna Dhar .....	7,012 14 0			
Mouza Seh and other villages, Pergunna Dhaverch .....	1,867 4 6			
" Sattara .....	82 11 0			
" Burroor Deverece .....	1,505 4 0			
" Parudh, Pergunna Sewrey ...	1,298 4 0			
		13,156 0 3	1,644 8 0	11,511 8 3
<b>Circar Dowlatabad, Sooba Aurungabad :</b>				
Mouza Jadowarree and other villages, Pergunna Hursool .....	602 12 0			
Pergunnah Autoor, Kusba Kuemdale, &c., Mouza .....	27,105 10 3			
Chinnuapoor and Mouza Gopagoon. } " Khundala .....	12,425 11 0			
Villages of Pergunna Seetarah .....	10,073 15 9			
Pergunna Phoolmarce .....	46,968 6 3			
" Ellore .....	9,759 5 3			
" Wallooj .....	42,664 10 9			
Mouza Cheekultana and other villages, Pergunna Hursool .....	4,710 3 3			
Pergunna Khooltabad .....	16,025 2 9			
" Beyzapoor .....	40,737 13 9			
" Gandapoor .....	81,738 1 6			
Mouza Khabgaon and other villages. }	2,101 14 0			
" Kuvalce and other villages.. }	942 2 6			
" Mulley Sumnumder .....	618 12 0			
" Pulsee, Pergunna Hursool ...	1,264 8 0			
Pergunna Kunner, and Mouza Vudgaon .....	11,680 7 0			
" Sandoorwarat .....	6,907 9 0			
Villages of Pergunna Seelore .....	11,500 0 0			
		3,27,827 1 0	40,978 6 0	2,86,848 11 0
<b>Circar Pyetun, Sooba Aurungabad :</b>				
Pergunna Huvalce Pyetun .....	70,919 9 0			
" Daverwarree .....	5,389 14 0			
		76,309 7 0	9,538 11 0	66,770 12 0
<b>Circar Ahmednuggur, Sooba Aurungabad :</b>				
Talooka Seerala Dhamungaon, Mouza Seemaporee Vudgaon, Mouza Kurghat, Pergunna Mandull and Tudgaon .....	36,304 5 6			
Talooka Ashtee .....	28,364 14 0			
Mouza Sewney and other villages, and Mouza Tudgaon, Pergunna Jamkhaird .....	4,380 6 0			
Mouza Tanklee and other villages, Pergunna Mauday .....	2,807 4 9			
		71,856 14 3	8,982 1 9	62,874 12 6
<b>Circar Bheer, Sooba Aurungabad :</b>				
Huvalce Bheer .....	4,20,231 7 0			
Mouza Rackusbhona and other villages .....	16,949 14 0			
" Janygaon .....	891 4 0			
" Rannohoo .....	1,875 0 0			
Ashare, of Paintnawarsee .....	5,000 0 0			
Mouza Javirwarree .....	211 10 0			
" Mangrool .....	1,068 0 0			
		4,46,227 3 0	55,778 6 3	3,90,448 12 9

**THE BERARS.**

NAMES OF THE DISTRICTS.		Gross Amount, including Sadur Seebundee, but excluding Deh Sadur and Roosooms.	Sadur Seebundee, at 2 Annas per Rupee.	NET AMOUNT.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
<b>Circar Perraindah, Sooba, Aurungabad :</b>				
Pergunna Amunt.....	6,498 8 0			
Huvalce Perraindah .....	38,987 12 6			
Pergunna Maudoy .....	33,826 1 9			
Mouza Vungaun, and other villages of Pergunna Kautee .....	6,832 2 0			
Pergunna Wasce .....	25,111 12 9			
" Rantee .....	25,975 4 9			
" Mardy .....	17,535 7 0			
Mouza Davesarlee, Pergunna Mardy ..	2,793 0 0			
" Sirruppimtee, and other villages, Oodeogaon.....	6,745 12 3			
		1,64,305 13 0	20,538 3 6	1,43,767 9 6
<b>Circar Nuldroog, Sooba Beejapoor :</b>				
Talooka Davree, Pergunna Nuldroog ..	6,895 11 0			
Pergunna Toojapore .....	22,390 11 3			
" Dharasive .....	22,174 10 3			
" Dhokee .....	25,929 6 0			
" Nallungeh .....	41,346 1 0			
" Nectoor .....	14,360 0 0			
Mouza Elloora and other villages.....	1,500 0 0			
" Tooraon, Pergunna Neelbunga ..	2,150 0 0			
" Achlur and Ashtay, Pergunna Nuldroog .....	4,830 0 0			
		1,41,576 7 6	17,697 1 0	1,23,879 6 6
<b>Circar Koolburga, Sooba Beejapoor :</b>				
Mouza Bunddala and other villages...	17,484 8 0			
Huvalce Culburga, &c .....	3,26,725 13 0			
		3,44,210 5 0	43,026 4 6	3,01,184 0 6
<b>Circar Sackur, Sooba Beejapoor :</b>				
Pergunna, Doodroog, &c.....	54,851 0 0	.....	6,856 6 0	47,994 19 0
<b>Circar Moodgul, Sooba Beejapoor :</b>				
Pergunna Koopal.....	1,54,554 14 0			
" Ellerghee.....	35,284 15 0			
" Seemoor .....	19,599 2 6			
" Rode Khan .....	22,851 14 6			
Summut Lingsungoor .....	17,206 14 0			
Pergunna Kuunkgera and Talooka Mungloor with Erkulgunda .....	31,337 9 3			
Pergunna Taverkhan .....	47,334 11 9			
Mouza Deckendroog, and other villages, Pergunna Badamee .....	8,893 15 0			
Pergunna Munulgaon, and other villages, Pergunna Badamee .....	10,575 15 0			
Talooka Sirkonah.....	14,576 6 0			
" Sonee .....	6,299 14 0			
" Borekat, Pergunna Gunga- wuttee .....	14,398 8 6			
Pergunna Koochoor.....	33,896 4 0			
" Korieo and Smisagur, and other villages .....	46,510 12 0			
Mouza Juvkhairs, and other villages }				
Pergunna Sinmoor and Rode Khairn.	9,000 0 0			
		4,72,314 11 6	59,039 5 6	4,13,275 6 0



# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

NAMES OF THE DISTRICTS.		Gross Amount, including Sadur Seebundee, but excluding Deh Sadur and Roosooms.	Sadur Seebundee, at 2 Annas per Rupee.	NET AMOUNT.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. a.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
<b>RAICHOOR DOAB.</b>				
<b>Circar Raichoor, Sooba Baijapoor :</b>				
Pergunna Hewalee Raichoor .....	1,88,455 5 6			
" Bhunnoo .....	56,685 12 0			
" Kowtal .....	43,187 15 0			
" Gungavuttee .....	16,885 9 6			
Mouza Kootour .....	19,086 14 6			
Talooka Coudlore .....	52,491 0 0			
		3,76,792 8 6	47,099 1 0	3,29,693 7 6
Circar Gudjunderghur (none). No revenue to this Nizam's Government.	.....			
Circar Anagoondy " "	.....			
Total.....Rs.	.....	24,89,427 7 0	3,11,178 6 6	21,78,249 0 6

## SUMMARY OF REVENUE, GROSS AND NET.

	GROSS.	NET.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Berar Pain Ghant .....	17,03,252 5 3	15,04,268 10 9
Frontier Districts, as far as Shorapore .....	15,85,469 0 0	13,87,285 8 6
Doab of the Kistna and Tumbodra, bounded on the west by the Nizam's Frontier .....	9,03,965 4 0	7,90,963 8 0
Total.....Rs.	41,92,686 12 3	36,82,517 11 3

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

STATEMENT of TUNKHA JAGEERS in the following Circars, being the whole of the Frontier Districts between Berar Pain Ghaut, Shorapore, and in the Raichoor Doab, after deducting Deh Sadur and Roosooms, &c., in the year 1258 (1848-49) Fuslee.

NAMES OF JAGEERDARS.	NAMES OF DISTRICTS.	DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE.	Gross Amount including Sadur Seebundy but excluding Deh Sadur and Roosooms.	Sadur Seebundy, at 2 Annas per Rupee.	NET AMOUNT.
			Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
<b>Circar Bevtulbuddy, Sooba Bala Ghaut :</b>					
Hoossain Khan Mandroze.	Pergunna Sewney and Tabootwar, including customs.	For the maintenance of troops.	15,393 1 6	1,924 2 3	13,468 15 3
Hoossain Khan and Ahmed Ali Khan .....	Mouza Selore, and other villages.	ditto	23,338 1 6	2,917 4 0	20,420 13 6
Sajawur Jung .....	Mouza Saelgaon, Per- gunna Dhar.	ditto	.....	.....	9,150 0 0
<b>Circar Dowlatabad, Sooba Aurungabad :</b>					
Raja Govind Narrain .....	Kusba Masord, and other villages, Per- gunna Autoor.	ditto	12,759 0 6	1,594 14 0	11,164 2 6
Raschid-ul-Mulk .....	Mouza Kennery, &c., Pergunna Sooltanpoor.	ditto	.....	.....	15,062 13 6
Goreebudden, son of Bey- neebudden .....	Inokhaira, &c., Per- gunna Autoor.	ditto	14,053 0 0	1,756 10 0	12,296 6 0

THE BEBARS.

NAMES of JAGERDARS.	NAMES of DISTRICTS.	DESCRIPTION of SERVICE.	Gross Amount, including Sadur Seebundee but excluding Deh Sader and Roosrooms.	Sadur Seebundee, at 2 Annas per Rupee.	Net Amount.
<i>Circar Dowlatabad—continued.</i>			Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Syed Jasir Ali Khan Bahadoor.	Dhenrygaon, &c., Pergunna Autoor.	For the pay of Munsubdars.	.....	.....	902 4 0
Rae Sonajee Pundit .....	A share of Mouza Naigam, Pergunna Pulmarry.	ditto	72 1 0	9 0 0	63 1 0
Ditto .....	Quarter of the Chouth Mouza Vajoor, &c.	ditto	.....	.....	312 10 0
Ditto .....	A share of Mouza Monnore, &c., Pergunna Kunner.	ditto	320 7 0	40 1 0	280 6 0
<i>Circar Pyetun, Sooba Aurungabad:</i>					
Jeevan Pursad .....	Mouza Boree and Mubda.	ditto	.....	.....	1,200 0 0
Rae Sonajee Pundit .....	Quarter-share of confiscated Roosroom of Pergunna Pyetun.	ditto	300 0 0	37 8 0	262 8 0
Raja Sree Newas Rao .....	Quarter-share of Mouza Moodhut and Rao.	ditto	.....	.....	413 15 6
<i>Circar Bheer, Sooba Aurungabad:</i>					
Ruffeez Yawur-ud Dowlah...	Quarter of Mouza Pipulnair, &c.	For the maintenance of Troops.	2,461 0 0	307 10 0	2,153 6 0
Atmaram Pundit .....	Mouza Parah.	For the pay of Munsubdars.	5,661 0 0	707 10 0	4,953 6 0
Bholachund .....	„ Rajovree.	ditto	.....	.....	4,500 0 0
<i>Circar Persindah, Sooba Aurungabad:</i>					
Ruffeez Yawur-ud-Dowlah.	Quarter of Mouza Warree-fal, &c., Pergunna Kanteer.	For the maintenance of Troops.	73 12 0	9 3 6	64 8 6
Abdool Sulam Khan .....	Mouza Inva Kulleer.	ditto	.....	.....	1,572 0 0
Mohomed Asudeolah.....	„ Salegaon, &c. villages.	ditto	.....	.....	2,001 9 9
Meer Zoonicar Ali Beg .....	„ Kowachwara, Pergunna Wasee.	ditto	1,768 3 0	221 0 3	1,547 2 3
<i>Circar Nuldroog, Sooba Beejapoor:</i>					
Ruffeez Yawur-ud-Dowlah.	Pergunna Huvaalee Nuldroog.	ditto	9,893 14 0	1,236 11 9	8,657 2 1
Ditto .....	Mouza Moorba.	ditto	3,950 0 0	381 4 0	2,668 12 0
Ditto .....	„ Moorba and Chilwaree.	ditto	18,590 0 0	2,523 12 0	16,266 4 0
Bahbood Ali Khan .....	Mouza Rancee, and other villages, Pergunna Dhekee.	ditto	.....	.....	1,000 0 0
Bahadoor Hoossain .....	Mouza Hussoree and Ummulga, Pergunna Neelga.	ditto	.....	.....	2,381 10 0
Rae Sonajee Pundit .....	Mouza Kuskee, Pergunna Allund.	For the pay of Munsubdars.	1,300 0 0	162 8 0	1,137 8 0
Mohomud Khan Dilaver Nawas Jung.	Mouza Node, Pergunna Culburga.	For the maintenance of Troops.	.....	.....	9,000 0 0
Syed Oomer Jemadar .....	Mouza Aviad, &c., Pergunna Culburga.	ditto	4,566 13 0	570 13 6	3,995 15 4
Rae Sonajee Pundit .....	Pergunna Poll, ditto.	For the pay of Munsubdars.	769 14 0	96 3 9	673 10 1
<i>Circar Mudgal, Sooba Beejapoor:</i>					
Hummunifa Chareea .....	Mouza Chilwurgae, Kunnerger and Gungolah.	For the payment of daily allowance (Yomeea).	991 0 0	111 6 0	779 10 0
Kristna Chareea .....	Mouza Dhoupullee, &c., Pergunna Copal.	ditto	797 4 0	99 10 6	697 9 6
Vyapa Chareea .....	Mouza Kamurpullee, Pergunna Copal.	ditto	354 0 0	44 4 0	309 12 0
<i>Circar Raichoor, Sooba Beejapoor:</i>					
Mohomud Hussam Peerzada.	Mouza Rungdhan, Pergunna Dhunroo.	ditto	.....	.....	155 0 0
Meer Akoorshaid Ali .....	Mouza Souversee, &c., Pergunna Huvaalee.	For the maintenance of Troops.	3,063 2 0	382 14 3	2,680 3 3
Bidree Lall .....	Mouza Koorrayhak and Kurrukonda.	ditto	2,681 8 0	335 3 0	2,346 5 0
Syed Jumalodeen .....	Mouza Deywanpullee, Pergunna Huvaalee.	For the payment of daily allowance (Yomeea).	.....	.....	1,417 6 0
			Total Rs. .... 1,55,987 11 6		

(Signed) J. S. Fraser, Resident.

## HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

## PAIN GHAUT.

## STATEMENT OF TUNKHA JAGEERS.

NAMES OF JAGEERDARS.	NAMES OF DISTRICTS.	DESCRIPTION of SERVICE.	Gross Amount, including Sadur Seebundee but excluding Deh Sader and Roosooms.	Sadur Seebundee, at 2 Annas per Rupee.	Net Amount.
			Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Mahomed Khan Dilawur Nuwaz Jung.	Pergunna Deybandab, &c.	For the maintenance of Troops.	1,38,769 15 9	16,721 4 0	1,17,048 11 9
Ditto .....	Shroozam.	ditto	61,425 0 0	7,678 2 0	53,746 14 0
Hussain Ali Khan, brother of Usur Dowla.	Mekassa Pergunna Numbha.	ditto	.....	.....	12,000 0 0
Syed Jaffer .....	Pergunna Kowtal.	ditto	13,922 5 0	1,740 4 6	12,182 0 6
Mahomed Noor Ali Khan .....	Mouza Dhenee Mudnee, &c.	ditto	.....	.....	2,071 0 0
Ushruf Dowla Munsubdar .....	„ Tarkhaida, and Muteor, Pergunna Rajah Papulgannis.	ditto	5,259 10 0	657 7 3	4,602 2 9
Syed-ool-dowla Bahadur .....	Mouza Umboorah, &c., Pergunna Nadoor.	ditto	1,552 10 9	191 1 3	1,358 9 6
Murcokow Vittul .....	Half-share of Mouza Bairkaidah.	ditto	.....	.....	4,300 0 0
Formerly Hubbeeboolasha, now deceased, continued to his family and servants.	Mokassa Mouza Khane-gaon.	Payment of the Nizamut Kutchery at Hyderabad.	.....	.....	500 0 0
Boogulkisore Tup pawalla .....	Pergunna Dhanore.	Payment of the Nizam's dawk dependants.	18,923 8 0	2,365 7 0	16,558 1 0
Raja Balrokund, managed by Zumerool Hassain.	Mouza Ramood Khair, &c.	Gunoul Fort .....	.....	.....	7,017 7 9
Beyhood Ali Khan .....	Villages of Pergunna Whethalee.	Fort of Nurmulla .....	3,365 11 6	420 11 6	2,945 0 0
Janrow and Martunrow, &c., Munsubdars.	Mouza Tuskee, Pergunna S conece.	Munsubdar's personal allowance.	2,702 12 0	337 13 6	2,364 14 6
Rae Sonajee Pundit .....	Mouza Raynee.	ditto	854 14 9	106 13 9	748 1 0
Ditto .....	„ Maree, Pergunna Jagoon.	ditto	650 0 0	81 4 0	568 12 0
Ditto .....	Kusba Neengoon, &c.	ditto	8,667 4 0	458 6 6	8,208 13 6
Ditto .....	Mouza Kumbefol, Pergunna Rajah of Papulgannin.	ditto	2,574 0 0	321 12 0	2,252 4 0
Ditto .....	Mouza Sonoe, Pergunna Royeora.	ditto	979 4 0	122 6 6	856 13 6
Ditto .....	Mouza Patoor and Bydapper, Pergunna Moor-tezapoer.	ditto	2,476 0 0	309 8 0	2,166 8 0
Ditto .....	A share in the village of the Jageerdar of Nan doora.	ditto	412 8 0	51 9 0	360 15 0
Ditto .....	Mouza Sir-oer.	ditto	2,942 8 0	367 13 0	2,574 11 0
Ditto .....	„ Khonjapoer, Pergunna Dehbandobe.	ditto	1,900 0 0	237 8 0	1,662 8 0
			Total Rs.... 2,51,091 3 9		

(Signed) J. S. Fraser, Resident.

## MEMORANDUM BY CAPTAIN TAYLOR.

1. In any requisition of territory from the Nizam I should consider it necessary, indeed indispensable, that such portions should be required as would hereafter incorporate most readily with the British provinces; for it is impossible not to perceive that as the Nizam's Government at present, with the whole of its possessions undisturbed, is unable to meet its liabilities, foreign or domestic, so it would not be able hereafter, by any spontaneous effort, to redeem any territory that it may have mortgaged to, or which may be taken possession of by, the British Government.

2. There is no doubt whatever that, under a proper system of economy, the Nizam's Government could have a large surplus revenue at its disposal, larger probably than that of any other Native State in India.

3. But as the Nizam himself will make no diminution of the present extravagant state of expenditure, nor sanction or assist any by his Ministers, and as it is also perhaps questionable whether he has the moral courage to effect, even if he should admit the necessity of it, any resumption of Jageers, or

other alienations from the State resources, or any comprehensive reform by the reduction of useless stipendiaries, troops, &c., so it must needs result that the present expenditure will be nominally continued with diminished resources, to the further embarrassment of his affairs.

4. On these grounds, therefore, I assume that he would not hereafter be able to release any territory which might be taken possession of by the British Government, even under the denomination of a temporary arrangement; and though, for political reasons, any cession of territory may for the present be termed temporary, it would in all probability prove perpetual, and the cession ought therefore to be considered in that light from the beginning.

5. I am disposed to consider also that any merely temporary occupation and management of country would be inexpedient,—

1st. Because our systems of management, even supposing that for some years to come laws and regulations were not introduced, would be very different on many essential points to that of the Nizam's authorities; and as the people would necessarily be gradually brought under the influence of our systems, which the Nizam's Government would not afterwards follow, they would be the more unfitted for returning to the old ones, on any retransfer of the country. I consider that the interests of the people on this point ought to be a subject of primary and especial consideration.

2ndly. That any temporary occupation of territory would fail to establish the confidence of the people in a necessary degree either as to agricultural or trading operations.

3rdly. That our Government must necessarily become involved, by direct exercise of its authority in many responsibilities with the people, which it could not afterwards avoid, and in regard to which future discussions with the Nizam's Government, and probable interference also, on any retransfer, would be unavoidable.

6. Many other obvious propositions could be adduced; but the above, and the many general considerations and liabilities connected with them, are perhaps the most apparent.

7. In any occupation of new territory a clear and decided frontier is a most obvious and necessary consideration. Many inconveniences arise from absence of distinguishing natural features of boundary, and these would be the more embarrassing in regard to the Nizam's Districts, the boundaries of villages and pergunahs being often very undecided, and subjects of constant dispute.

8. Large rivers are to be preferred to any other boundaries. The Dekhan rivers, being confined between high or rocky banks, are not subject to any changes, of course, and they never form new lands, as in Bengal, &c., which might hereafter form subjects of dispute.

9. It would be more advisable, in relation to the establishment of proper boundaries, rather to occupy such districts as possess natural ones of a well-defined character, even though they should be comparatively of a somewhat smaller intrinsic value, than that more fertile tracts should be selected which would have no well-defined boundaries, or should be inconveniently situated in regard to the British Provinces or the positions of troops.

10. Under these general considerations, therefore, I would suggest the Doab, between the rivers Bhewa and Tumboodra, as a fit district for transfer, either temporarily or permanently, as part at least of the amount of revenue required from the Nizam's Government.

11. The boundary would be defined by the Bhewa, from the edge of the Sholapore Collectorate and the principality of Akulcote to the junction of that river with the Kishna, and afterwards by the Kishna to its junction with the Tumboodra. This would complete the Nizam's boundary to the south and south-east.

12. The cessions would include—

1. The Principality of Shorapoor.
2. The whole Soobah of Raichoor, including the Principality of Gudwal.
3. The Soobah of Moodgul, including Kossal, Bahadur, Bundah, Kunægeri, Mooshki, &c.

13. It is not probable that this district would require any military force for permanent cantonment in it beyond the force at Lingsoogoor, or the strengthening of this force by some additional troops might form a subject of decision hereafter.

14. The station of Sholapoor is about 60 miles from the north-western corner of Shorapoor, Gulburgah is 20 miles north of the Bhewa, Bellary south of the Tumboodra about 30 miles, Kurnool on the immediate south-east corner, and the Stations of Belgaum and Kulladgee and Dharwar are all within a convenient distance of the south-western frontier.

15. In case of any necessity, a combined movement could be made at any time, on points not exceeding 50 or 60 miles, of a sufficient body of troops to check any local disturbance that could possibly arise, and from distances of 100 to 150 of a much larger body.

16. I purposely include Shorapoor and Gudwal. In regard to the first, as it has been for some years past connected with Government, it would be advisable to include it, if possible, in any new temporary cession which might become permanent. The necessary supervision over the affairs of the State might be continued without direct interference; and the revenue it now pays as Peshcush to the Nizam's Government would be paid to us punctually. This might not be the case hereafter to the Nizam's Government were our supervision entirely withdrawn on the expiration of the Rajah's minority; and we might again, as we are bound by treaty to interfere, be drawn, in a greater or less degree, into our former position of most unsatisfactory interference in its affairs. The police of the country would continue to be regulated, and the conduct of the Bedur population watched. The future interests and well-being of the State and its people would be more effectually secured by these than by any other means that I am aware of short of direct superintendence of the country as at present. Interference in Shorapoor affairs is, to some extent, provided for by the treaty with the Nizam; and in reference to the Peshwa's relations with it we have already claims to consider Shorapoor as our own feudatory, equal, if not superior, to those of the Nizam.

17. We could not occupy the district in question without placing Gudwal in the same category as Shorapoor, and it would be necessary to watch that Principality as narrowly as Shorapoor. We could enforce regular payment of the tribute of Gudwal, which the Nizam's Government is unable to obtain regularly at present, and the amount could be arranged with probable relief to the family.

18. With diminished resources and influence Gudwal and Shorapoor would be formidable to the Nizam's Government, and it would possibly be glad to be relieved of both.

19. I am not well advised as to the revenues of the whole of the Doab, but the following is a rough estimate, which I will correct in a few days, when I can receive the necessary information :—

	Ra.	Ra.
Shorapoor Peshcush .....	40,000	} 1,00,000
Revenue of Deodroog .....	60,000	
Gudwal Peshcush, probably .....		1,00,000
Soobah of Raichoor, probably .....		3,00,000
Kanageerree and Gungawattee .....		1,25,000
Kopal, Bahadur, Bunda, &c. ....		1,30,000
Moodgul and Mooshki .....		1,50,000
Other Talo ks of Moodgul Soobah and Zemindars' payment .....		1,50,000
Peshcush of Goorgoontah .....		10,000
Goboor, &c., in Tuukha Jahgeri, to Sultan Newaz-ool-Moolk .....		30,000
TOTAL.....Ra.		10,95,000

or say 11 lacs, not including Jageer villages. The amount may be, possibly, more considerable, but would not in any case be found to exceed 13 lacs.

20. The whole or greater part of this district is fertile, and the southern and the south-western portions produce considerable quantities of cotton, which is now transported to Bombay, *via* Dharwar and Compta. The distance of transport, and means of communication with the coast, are comparatively easy when compared with Berar, and I have no doubt that the culture of cotton, especially the American

varieties, which is so rapidly progressing in Dharwar, could be considerably increased in these districts under proper encouragement and judicious management.

21. The Sooba of Raichore is under the direct revenue management of the Government revenue officers, and there are few alienations to Zemindars. I am not advised of the number of Jageer villages, but I believe them to be more inconsiderable than in other Soobas of the Dekhan.

22. The talooks, or divisions of Moodgul proper, and Mooskhi, are in Jageer to the Nawab of Kulleeanee, a relation by marriage of the Nizam's, a very aged man, who has, I believe, no family. The Nizam's Government would reimburse the Nawab, or otherwise, as it would consider expedient.

23. The talooks of Gungahwulke, Canageerie, and Goboor are in Tunka Jageer to Sooltan Newaz-ool-Moolk, for the payment of his retainers. Equivalents for their resumption would, of course, depend on the Nizam's Government. The other talooks of the Moodgul District are under the direct management of the Nizam's revenue officers.

24. Several small Suwasthans, or hereditary estates, exist, which pay quotas of Peshcush :

Goorgoonta, near Lingsoogur	} Bedurs.	
Gollug .....		ditto.....
Kanagherry .....		ditto.....
Jowulgerry, near the Tumboodra.		

25. Independently of these there are several Zemindaries of Nargonis, or Sur Nargonis, Dessayes, &c., which pay a computed sum for their possessions. They exist in and near the central and western portions of the Moodgul Sooba. These revenues are at present very irregularly paid, owing to the inability of the local authorities to enforce payment.

26. The possessions of these Zemindaries, and the country adjacent to them, are in general very lawless, and the Zemindars at perpetual feud among themselves. Outrages of a serious character are of constant occurrence ; but there is nothing at present existing that would require any very material effort to subdue ; and a short period of firm management on the part of a Government which all would know had the power to quell any irregular or violent proceedings would, I am of opinion, secure the tranquillity of the district. An amnesty for all past offences, excepting perhaps wilful murder, might be given with advantage as an incentive to future good conduct.

27. The general lawlessness prevalent is the direct effect of a weak and unsystematical Government, and is not probably much greater, though considerable at present, than in other portions of the Nizam's Dominions.

28. There is a large amount of Bedur population in portions of the Doab, and where it abounds, as in Deodroog, Arikera, Gullug, &c., some extra precaution would be necessary, and the establishment of strong local police or detachments of troops advisable.

29. It is probable that these Bedurs could be made use of as police, as they hold lands to some extent in their localities.

30. Some very valuable Aincuts are said to exist at Gungawattee from the Tumboodra, and the Raichoor District is well supplied with tanks.

31. The soil is of a varied character, being partly black and partly red, but the whole is considered fertile, and is in some portions, indeed most, well cultivated. The district of Kopal is reported to be very valuable, as also that bordering on the Tumboodra. The seasons are usually favourable, and the district is considered a healthy one, the country being open, and generally free from extensive jungles.

32. If, in addition to this district, other transfers should be necessary to complete the amount of revenue required by the Government of India, I would suggest that as far as possible the same precautions should be observed in regard to natural boundaries, though no portion of the Nizam's further districts are so eminently favourable in this respect as the Doab of the Kishna and Tumboodra.

33. The province of Berar is certainly the next best that could be selected ; but there is no doubt that, owing to bad management, the revenues have largely declined of late years, and the population also ; and that it would require many

years of good administration to restore it to its original state of prosperity. Still it exports cotton and other valuable products to a very considerable extent, as you are aware ; and the revenue may not be less than would suffice with that of the Doab to make up the sum which might be required by Government.

34. The position of the Ellichpoor Brigade and the Jaulnah Force already ensure its protection ; and general good management of the district would in all probability remedy those disturbances which have occurred in it of late years, and which have rendered the employment of troops necessary.

35. The natural boundaries of the province are better defined than any other portions of the Nizam's frontier possessions, which could be contemplated with a view to transfer, temporarily or permanently, to the British Government, and on this account, as well as its present intrinsic and prospective value and capability of improvement, it is deserving of the best consideration.

36. If the whole of Berar should be too valuable in addition to the revenues of the Southern Doab, such portions of it could be taken as lie nearest to the British provinces. These, including Akola, Balapoor, and possibly Oomraotee, would include the best portions of the cotton-producing country, and would, on the north and south, present the best boundaries. Natural and defined boundaries would be in any case wanting to the eastward.

37. It would be more advisable, I consider, to take the districts I have mentioned on the north and west than any others : eventually they might become incorporated with the Madras and Bombay Presidencies respectively.

38. The boundary of the Kishna is so complete towards the sea, and indeed for the whole of its course, that it could not be disturbed with any advantage, and the districts bordering on the Ellore Sircar would in no respect be so eligible, and would be more unprofitable than those I have mentioned.

39. As it is a great object to encourage the cultivation of cotton as much as possible, our Government, in the districts I have suggested, would possess those which border on the Dharwar District, and to which the soil and climate is similar, and those of Berar, which are already celebrated ; and there are no others in which cotton is already much produced, or which possess equal advantages in regard to transport to the coast.

40. In the direction of Aurungabad, and generally to the westward, there are no Districts which present advantages equal or at all to be compared to those I have mentioned, and any encroachment on the present frontier might be unadvisable, as there are no material natural features to determine any line in this direction.

41. But should any territory be desired to the westward the districts about Peraindah would be the only ones I consider fitting or profitable, and the range of hills which runs from the Akulcote frontier near Nuldroog to Ahmednuggur would form a tolerable frontier line should the pergunnas or districts be found to be minute at their bases : this point, however, is doubtful.

42. I am not acquainted with the revenue of these districts, though I have seen them. The country below the hills and to the westward of them is in some places very fertile, but as the country advances to the westward it is not so valuable, and is subject to drought.

43. In the revenue arrangements of any districts transferred to the British Government, whether temporarily or in perpetuity, I am inclined to consider that Government would not immediately realize the full amount of the Nizam's collections. In most districts, in reference to the present prices of produce and the conditions of the people, assessments are too high, and the districts generally have been much rack-rented by the Sahibs and persons who have farmed the revenues of localities. Remissions of land rates, and general equalizations of revenue settlement and assessment, would be found necessary.

44. But I am of opinion, as the people are generally industrious and enterprising, that cultivation under such management would increase very materially, and therefore that the entire amount of the present rates would be more equitably increased and collected in a few years.

45. It would also be necessary to reduce the rates of transit duties, should

they not be entirely abolished, as also the sayer or customs tariff, and the present taxes on traders and artizans, termed "Moturfa." The weavers especially suffer heavily under these taxes, as also the small merchants.

46. The Nizam's Government would claim admission of the full rates of the present collections, and it would be very necessary to consider the above points of probable necessary reduction in any valuation or estimates of the districts to be transferred.

Camp at Kembhawl, January 1851.

(Signed) *Meadows Taylor*.

On special duty.

(True copies.)

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

#### MINUTE by the Most Noble the Governor-General of India.

IN the autumn of 1849 I recorded briefly the various considerations which had led me to the conviction that the large and increasing debt due by His Highness the Nizam to the British Government could no longer be allowed to accumulate, and that His Highness should be called upon to provide for its liquidation within a certain fixed period.

The Nizam was accordingly informed that the debt must be liquidated on or before the 1st January 1851.

When that period had elapsed, and not till it had elapsed fully, the Resident was instructed to call upon His Highness for repayment of the large advances made to him by the Government of India.

2. The reply of the Resident has been for some time in my hands. I have been concerned—though the line of conduct which His Highness has of late pursued hardly admitted of my being surprised—to receive from the Resident an intimation that the Nizam was not prepared to liquidate the debt, now amounting to more than 75 lacs of rupees, and had made no preparations for discharging either the whole or any part of it.

I have purposely abstained for some time from issuing the orders which this communication has rendered it my duty to convey to the Resident at Hyderabad, in the hope that the strong language of warning which has been addressed to the Nizam, and the alarm which His Highness's subsequent proceedings seemed to indicate, might have led to proposals on his part which I could have felt myself justified in accepting, and might have relieved me from the necessity of resorting to measures which cannot be otherwise than painful to the Prince whose misguided folly has rendered them inevitable.

But several months have now passed since I last addressed His Highness, without producing any indication of his intention to make an effort in order to meet the serious demand which has been advanced against his State; I can, therefore, no longer postpone the execution of my settled and declared purpose "to take such decided steps as the interests of the British Government may demand."

3. If it could with truth be alleged that the large sums in which the Nizam is indebted to the British Government had been advanced to him on his solicitation and without reluctance on our part, or if we had become his creditor to serve any purposes of our own, I should have been slow to resolve on requiring at this time peremptorily and promptly a repayment of the sums we had thus advanced.

4. If, as has been stated, the Government of India had silently, if not insidiously, permitted His Highness to sink deeper and deeper into financial embarrassments, without warning him of the perplexities into which he was hurrying, I should have abstained from the measures which I now feel it my duty to enforce.

5. If, again, the debt which His Highness has incurred had been forced upon him by adverse circumstances, or if, whatever had been its origin, the



liquidation of it were now impracticable without reducing His Highness to straits which he would have reason to regard as harshly subjecting his sovereignty to indignity, I should have been desirous of showing a due degree of consideration to a Prince whose relations with this Government have been so intimate and of such long endurance.

6. Finally, if the Nizam had appeared to make any material efforts towards reducing the extent of his vast liabilities to us, or had shown himself less than utterly indifferent to their rapid increase, or otherwise than wilfully blind to the consequences which have been pointed out, and obstinately deaf to the advice which has been offered to him for his own interests in respect of these liabilities; if a further accumulation of His Highness's debt could have been permitted without grave inconvenience to the British Government, or with any prospect of real advantage to the State of Hyderabad, I should have been well-disposed to bear with His Highness yet a little longer, and should have sought to effect by persuasion or by renewed remonstrances those ends which must now be accomplished by more vigorous means.

7. The records of the Government of India will show that the Nizam can advance no such pleas as these for further forbearance, and that the British Government not only lies under no obligation, but has no inducement, to abstain any longer from pressing its just claims on the Court of Hyderabad.

8. The sum due by His Highness amounts to more than 75 lacs of rupees. It consists chiefly of advances made by the Resident at Hyderabad, under the instructions of this Government, for the payment of the Contingent Troops. These were not loans offered and conceded with undue facility by us ministering to His Highness's improvidence, or merely meeting his convenience; still less were they furnished out of our abundance as a convenience to ourselves, or with the view of serving any secondary or secret purpose of our own; they were advances made for the payment of the troops of the Contingent, supplied reluctantly, and not until the neglect or inability of the State of Hyderabad to furnish the money necessary for the purpose had compelled this Government, as an act of good faith, to provide their pay for a force which, existing under our treaties, commanded by our officers, and retained under our control, has a right to look to us for the fulfilment of the conditions on which they took service under our virtual guarantee.

Thus the advances were absolutely necessary for the maintenance of good faith with a body of troops over which we exercised authority; they were equally necessary for upholding discipline and efficiency in the only force on which His Highness could rely for preserving the internal tranquillity of his kingdom; they were never made until every effort to obtain them from the treasury of His Highness had failed; and they have been furnished by us for the most part at a time when difficulties pressed heavily on our own financial resources.

9. There is no warrant for the supposition that His Highness has been permitted gradually and unconsciously to become entangled in embarrassment from which he could hardly extricate himself, and without being warned of consequences which he had not the sense to foresee.

On the contrary, a reference to the correspondence will demonstrate that the attention of His Highness has been often and earnestly called to the increasing amount of his debt, and to the thickening perplexities of his Government; he has received warning with a frequency which appears only to have weakened their force in his estimation. He has been told in language which could not be misunderstood that the course he was pursuing must of necessity lead in time to the bankruptcy of his State, and has been urged with a constancy which only sincerity could dictate, and which recklessness alone could disregard, to set himself in earnest to the task of extricating his State from its financial difficulties by means which have again and again been pointed out, and in which His Highness must have been fully assured he might count on the aid and counsel of the British Government.

10. No circumstances beyond his own control have created the difficulties by which His Highness is now surrounded; no war has drained his treasuries; no

rebellion has ever temporarily straitened his resources. The territory of Hyderabad is well known to produce a revenue capable of meeting every reasonable demand which could be made upon it for the service of the State, and fully sufficient to maintain His Highness's court in splendours and his Sovereignty in respect; honestly administered, and husbanded with only ordinary care, the income of the State of Hyderabad would have amply provided against the accumulation of the heavy burdens by which it is at present oppressed.

Even now, although the debt to the British Government has reached the large sums I have named, and although a further and still larger debt is due to other creditors, the public revenues would be able, without much difficulty, to meet all these demands, if the Nizam would consent to enter upon an examination of the condition of public affairs, would disband the hordes of useless rabble that encumber his State, and would remove the foreign mercenaries who eat up his revenue, oppress his people, and hold even his royal power in check.

11. By carrying these measures into effect the Nizam would in no degree lower his own dignity, and would unquestionably add to his substantial power, while he would thereby provide at once the means of meeting rapidly and easily the claims on his treasury, and would avert from himself the mortification which is now impending over him.

Unhappily the Nizam appears to have set himself doggedly against the advice which has been repeatedly urged on him, and has neglected every attempt to meet his existing obligations, or to prevent their future accumulation. Notwithstanding that His Highness has absolutely no indispensable calls upon his treasury, excepting those which are inseparable from the ordinary expenses of civil Government; notwithstanding that his attention has been incessantly drawn to the subject, and that the Government of India has reduced by one-half the rate of interest which it had at first required him to pay, no diminution whatever has been made in the amount of his public debt. Repeated promises have been conveyed to the Resident of payments to be made at a certain time; but these resolutions have been formed only to be broken through. In little more than two years since I first addressed His Highness his debt has largely and rapidly increased, till it has reached an amount which is of moment even in the transactions of wealthy States. Of the foreign mercenaries, the Arabs and Rohillas, who are employed, none have been discharged; of the crowds of other troops, many of whom there is good reason to believe exist only upon paper, all, or nearly all, have been retained.

12. Notwithstanding the strongly expressed opinion of this Government, His Highness removed from office the Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk, the only man who seems to be possessed of the capacity or to have the strength of will sufficient to grapple with the difficulties of the State, and to cast out its abuses. One Minister after another has in like manner been removed, till for many months past no Minister whatever has been appointed by His Highness; and at this moment, in spite of the strong representations I have directed to be made to him, the Government of Hyderabad remains actually in abeyance.

13. With such experience of the conduct and character of this Prince, it would be weakness to give any credence to the proposals he has made for repayment of his debt, even by such meagre and distant instalments as five lacs per annum, or any longer to put faith in pledges which His Highness had never yet sought, and which he does not now seek, by any exertion of his own to redeem.

14. The exercise of further forbearance would not be consistent with a spirit of real friendship to the Nizam; it could only tend to encourage His Highness in permitting his debt to go on accumulating hopelessly, till it would ultimately become a burden utterly ruinous to the State he misgoverns.

15. Lastly, it must not be forgotten that the very large amount which has now been advanced cannot be regarded with indifference even by the Government of India. While our finances are as yet hardly to be considered as restored to a satisfactory condition, while very large expenditure, consequent on recent events, still presses heavily on our income, while important national works call loudly for

that full and liberal encouragement which a prudent consideration of the means at our disposal still compels us to stint, I cannot reconcile it with my duty to the Company, with whose interests I am charged, to abstain any longer, in the circumstances of this case, from taking such measures as shall be effectual for recovering the advances made to His Highness the Nizam within such a period as may render them available in some degree for the present necessities of our own treasury.

16. There is only one effectual mode of ensuring the attainment of the object which I have in view. The Nizam has declared himself unable to pay any portion of what is due. So entirely without credit is the Court of Hyderabad that it appears to be unable to contract a loan for this purpose with soucars on any terms that it has been able to offer.

In anticipation of this impediment, which has long been apparent, I intimated to the Resident that no alternative appeared to remain but that of taking possession, for the purpose required, of some portion of His Highness's territory; and I made known to him my intention of requiring the Nizam to transfer to the officers of Government districts to the value of not less than 35 lacs per annum, so as to provide for the payment of the principal of his debt within three years, and, further, to afford a margin which should in each year be applicable to meet any partial deficiencies which might still occur in the supply of monthly pay for the troops of the Contingent.

17. The Resident suggests that the districts of which we may most fitly and most advantageously demand possession are those of Berar, Pain Ghaut, the border districts from thence down to Shorapore, and the territory of the Doab, between the Kistnah and the Toombuddra.

These districts afford the amount of revenue required; their geographical position is convenient, while they are equally advantageous in a revenue and police point of view.

The possession of these districts will give to us for the present the whole frontier of the Nizam's kingdom along its northern and western boundaries, and along the southern boundary as far as the junction of the Kistnah and the Toombuddra.

It will render more difficult than at present the further resort of foreign military adventurers to His Highness's territory, and put an end to the frequent disturbances which now occur between the people of those districts and the inhabitants of our own provinces in their vicinity.

18. I have addressed to the Nizam a letter intimating to him the determination he has made it my duty to form, and calling upon him to deliver over to the Resident, for the British Government, the districts which will be specified to him, together with all authority necessary for their management.

In conveying to His Highness the resolution of the Government of India, I have taken occasion again to address him in those terms of earnest remonstrance and of authoritative counsel which the conditions of His Highness's affairs unhappily seems to demand, and which the British Government is still entitled to employ.

19. The Resident, having carefully prepared the schedule specifying the districts to be transferred, will request an audience of His Highness, and will deliver to him my letter, with the schedule attached.

The Resident will use his discretion in not urging His Highness to compliance with the requirements of the Government with undue haste; but he will meet any remonstrances or solicitations which His Highness may make for further prolonged delay, or for another reference, by the declaration that, after having afforded in vain full time and opportunity for His Highness to act, my determination has now been taken deliberately, and is fixed irrevocably. He will require His Highness to comply with the just demands of the British Government by a transfer of the districts named, in the manner which has been specified above.

20. It is not probable that the Nizam will contemplate any resistance to a demand so just in itself, and which his own conduct has rendered inevitable. If,

however, His Highness should not comply with the requirements of the Government within the time which may be specified by the Resident, that officer will request a final audience for the purpose of receiving a definite reply. If His Highness should either refuse compliance on that occasion, or should fail to complete the arrangements which are requisite, the Resident will be so good as to report the result to the Governor-General.

On receiving such an intimation (which, however, I am unwilling to anticipate), instructions will be forthwith addressed to the Resident, directing him to take possession of the districts named on behalf of the Government of India, and for the purpose set forth.

In expectation of such instructions, the Resident will state whether he will require any troops in addition to the Subsidiary and Contingent Forces for the purpose of enforcing the determination that has been announced.

21. The probability is that His Highness will yield at once to the necessity which he cannot fail to recognize, and will comply in all respects with the demand which the Resident will convey.

Whatever may be the ultimate destination of these districts, whether the Nizam shall hereafter be called upon to set them apart for the special maintenance of the Contingent or not, it must be borne in mind that the present occupation of them is for a temporary purpose only. The Resident will therefore introduce as little change as possible when transferring them to the authority of the British Government.

22. A certain amount of European superintendence over the transferred districts appears to be indispensable; but I am of opinion that for the present it should be general, and should not extend to any close interference with the details of administration.

Three Superintendents, at the utmost, will suffice at present. The experience and past services of Captain Meadows Taylor at once point him out as the proper person for undertaking the direction of those districts which lie towards Shorapore, if his present occupation will admit of his entering on this additional charge.

The interests of the British Government will be greatly promoted by entrusting another portion of the management to Mr. H. Dighton, who has long been a resident in Hyderabad. On a former occasion the Honourable Court objected to the employment of Mr. Dighton in the territory of Hyderabad, but upon considerations which are not applicable to the present proposal. Mr. Dighton at that time had received charge of certain districts on behalf of His Highness the Nizam. The Court very justly objected to any European being employed in the service of a foreign prince in such a manner as to place him beyond their control.

My proposal now is to employ Mr. Dighton in the temporary service of the Honourable Company itself. The former objection of the Court, therefore, no longer applies, and the high testimony borne by the Resident at Hyderabad to the character and capacity of Mr. Dighton satisfy me that my selection of him for the present duties will have the approval of the Honourable Court.

If a third Superintendent should be required, I request the Resident to suggest an officer of tried ability and local experience in whom he can confide as qualified to discharge the large functions which must be entrusted to him with fidelity and discretion.

23. If the Nizam should accede to the demand of the Government without demur, the Superintendents may be appointed at once.

Possession of these districts should not be taken for a broken period, but should commence after the termination of an agricultural year, and the consequent payment of the annual revenue, which it is presumed will have occurred about this period. This will relieve us from the demand and adjustment of fractional sums and obviate much future confusion in accounts.

24. The first act of the Superintendents, and one which should be preliminary to the introduction of changes of any kind, should be to prepare a general report, each of his own district, showing the actual state of the revenue, and the condition of the several branches of administration within its bounds, and drawing attention to any matters which call for the special and immediate attention of this

Government. This, of course, requires no surveying parties, or deputations of native subordinates, but can be ascertained by mere inspection of records, and personal inquiries directed by the Superintendents to those particular points.

25. These instructions are sufficient for the present to meet every contingency which is likely to arise in the execution of the particular measure which the Resident has been directed to announce. I should not have thought it necessary to enter here upon the general relations of the Government of India with His Highness the Nizam, but that the Resident at Hyderabad has thought proper, on many recent occasions, to urge upon the consideration of this Government his views of the expediency of further and direct interference on our part in the administration of the affairs of His Highness's kingdom. The suggestion of the Resident is contained in the following passages.\*

26. I desire to record my entire dissent from, and disapproval of, the policy which the Resident has suggested for the adoption of the Government of India.

27. For more than half a century relations of amity and intimate connection have existed between the British Government and the Nizam, and they have been strengthened on both sides by the stipulations of formal treaties.

The several obligations which those treaties imposed have been faithfully observed by the contracting parties on either side. Among them all, no article was more distinctly or emphatically worded than that wherein the Honourable Company's Government distinctly declared "that they have no manner of concern with any of His Highness's children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom His Highness is absolute."

28. In former times, while the power of the several Mahratta States was still formidable, and their intrigues were dangerous, the policy of the Government of India tended to the establishment of an authoritative influence in the counsels of the Nizam, which was necessarily exercised to prevent the introduction of a similar influence on behalf of other States prejudicial to British interests, and calculated to impair our alliance with the State of Hyderabad.

29. At a later period the administration of internal affairs was partially committed to the hands of British functionaries; but this arrangement was made with the sanction of the Native Government, and was at once abandoned when a successor intimated his desire that the interposition of our officers should cease.

30. Even of late years the influence of the Government of India was still so sensibly present that the nomination of a Minister of State was regarded by His Highness himself as incomplete till it had received the approving consent of the Governor-General in Council.

31. But in these days there exists no Native State whose power or whose influence renders it necessary, for the security of our external relations, or for the maintenance of our alliance with the Nizam, that we should seek for the establishment of any direct authority in the government of his kingdom.

\* Extract from Letter of Resident, dated 4th February 1854, No 35.

28. I would now beg permission to proceed somewhat beyond the limits of the view of policy taken in your letter, and to submit to the Government of India whether the present circumstances of this State would not justify our making a proposition to the Nizam of a more comprehensive nature than that at present contemplated by Government, which provides for our own interests only, not for those of the country at large, either as regards its Sovereign or its inhabitants.

29. I mean a proposition for the cession of the whole of the Nizam's country to our sole and exclusive management and authority for a definite number of years, with the allotment of such portion of its revenue as might be considered suitable for the honourable support of His Highness and his family, and a guarantee for the maintenance of the nobles and inhabitants of the country generally in all their just rights and privileges.

30. It should be, however, an indispensable part of the arrangement, without which its great advantages might again be ultimately lost, that on the lapse of that period, and the restoration of the country to the management of His Highness, such political relations should be established between the British Government and that of the Nizam as should admit of a sufficiently decided interference on our part, when necessary, to prevent the possibility of the country ever reverting to its present state of ruin and degradation.

31. I speak of this as a proposition only, and by no means an imperative demand from which His Highness would not be permitted to dissent; for this latter would be unjustifiable, under any consideration of international law, in as far as it is not called for by any sufficiently sensible injury which has yet accrued to the neighbouring British territory, nor any such detriment to the general interests of the Indian Empire as we might render the ground and motive of an absolute demand.

The first act of the present reigning Sovereign on ascending the musnud was to require the withdrawal of every trace of that interference in the internal affairs of his kingdom which, during the reign of his father and under the administration of Raja Chundoo Lall, we had been accustomed to exercise. The whole course of His Highness's policy, and his conduct up to the present moment, indicate, in a manner not to be mistaken, that his antipathy to any interposition on our part is as fixed and rooted now as when he first began to reign, and that any overtures for our admission to partial authority in the administration of his kingdom would be certainly and utterly ineffectual.

Lastly, the course of events during the several administrations that have succeeded the rule of Chundoo Lall have shown how fruitless have been our endeavours to exercise a beneficial influence in the management of His Highness's affairs through the medium of a Minister recommended by our approbation, and have demonstrated that a Minister not selected by the Sovereign's favour, though he may be supported by all our authority, is rendered powerless for good by the passive obstruction which it is and ever will be in His Highness's power to place in the way of his servants' exertions.

32. Taught by this experience, and influenced by the considerations to which it gives rise, the Supreme Government has for some years past abstained from all interference which has not been necessary for the protection of its own interests. The Nizam has been left free to choose the Ministers whom he has desired to select, not only unopposed by our negative, but uninfluenced by any authoritative expression of our will. The interference which has been again and again suggested for the forcible expulsion of Arab and other mercenaries, whom His Highness still desires to retain, has been prohibited, and the interposition of the Government of India in the internal affairs of the Nizam has on no occasion been brought into action except on the application of His Highness himself.

33. There are no facts on record before me, nor have any arguments been advanced, which are sufficient to induce me to depart from a policy which I regard as prudent and just.

34. It is sometimes stated that our relations with the State of Hyderabad are so anomalous that interference on our part is as unavoidable as it is expedient. I can by no means assent to the soundness of that view.

Were it not for the existence of the Subsidiary and Contingent Forces, our relations with the State of Hyderabad would be merely those which usually are formed between two independent powers, and the position of the Resident at Hyderabad would correspond in all respects with that of any accredited Minister of a Foreign State.

The Subsidiary Force is maintained within the territory of Hyderabad by the Government of India, and the Contingent is furnished by His Highness the Nizam, for purposes declared by treaty, and long since defined by precedent and in practice. But the presence of these forces does not create any special peculiarity in our relations with Hyderabad beyond those which characterize our relations with many other Native States. It does not produce any unusual complication in our official intercourse. It does not necessarily multiply the occasions of interference, or render doubtful the proper limits of our authority, which have long since been practically defined. In short, our relations with His Highness the Nizam do not differ in any essential particular from those which have been formed with other Native Powers, such as Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; nor do they create any necessity for more frequent interference, or imply a wider authority than is given by other corresponding treaties.

35. Again, it is often maintained that such is the misgovernment of His Highness the Nizam, that so great are the violence and lawless confusion which pervade every part of his dominions, that it has become the moral duty of the British Government, as the paramount power in India, to assume to itself the government of His Highness's dominions, in order to correct the evils of his rule, and to rescue his subjects from the sufferings which are alleged to proceed therefrom.

I desire to repudiate all adhesion to a doctrine which leads, in my humble judgment, to a system of unwarranted and officious meddling.

In too many instances, I fear, it proceeds not from sentiments of enlarged benevolence, but from the promptings of ambitious greed. Even where the motive from which it springs is pure and sincere, the doctrine is, in my view, not the less unsound. The acknowledged supremacy of the British power in India gives to it the right, and imposes upon it the duty, of maintaining by its influence, and (if need be) compelling by its strength, the continuance of general peace. It entitles it to interfere in the administration of Native Princes if their administration tends unquestionably to the injury of the subjects or of the allies of the British Government.

But I recognize no mission confided to the British Government which imposes upon it the obligation, or can confer upon it the right, of deciding authoritatively on the existence of native independent sovereignties, and of arbitrarily setting them aside, whenever their administration may not accord with its own views, and although their acts in no way affect the interests or security of itself or its allies.

Still less can I recognize any such property in the acknowledged supremacy of the British Government in India as can justify its rulers in disregarding the positive obligations of international contracts, in order to obtrude on Native Princes and their people a system of subversive interference, which is unwelcome alike to people and prince.

36. In the case of the Nizam the British Government is bound by the solemn obligations of a treaty to abstain from all interference in His Highness's internal affairs. The Sovereign has been, and still is, strongly and consistently adverse to any the slightest evasion on our part of these obligations. His people have shown no desire for our good offices, nor have ever furnished us with the slightest pretext for interposition. And, whatever may be the tenor of His Highness's administration, it cannot be said as yet to have materially affected the security of any portion of British territory, or to have damaged the interests of British subjects.

37. I find, then, no sufficient reason for abandoning the course of policy that has heretofore been pursued, or for seeking to obtain the Nizam's consent to the temporary alienation of the powers of government from his hands.

It cannot, I think, be doubted that His Highness's consent to such a measure would never be voluntarily given, and that, if obtained at all, it would be extorted only by the open exercise of a power which he feels he could not resist, or by the fear that we should proceed to some such extreme.

I deprecate, therefore, the introduction to the Nizam of a proposal which His Highness of himself is certain to reject, and which if it be accepted will be adopted only under the pressure of an influence on our part which would be reasonably open to misconception, and which would probably tend to discredit our name.

38. Were it otherwise I should still entertain the strongest objection to the particular measure which the Resident has in contemplation. It points to the formation ultimately of such relations between the two States as would in effect establish a mixed government in Hyderabad, a form of administration which experience has abundantly demonstrated to be objectionable in principle and unmanageable in detail.

Under such a form of government, if provision be made for carrying it actively and practically into operation, all the toil of a laborious task and all its real responsibility must ever fall on the British agent, by whom the native ministry is controlled. The agent, on his part, while he reaps no advantage from his labours for his own State, must feel himself to be without that undivided authority; he cannot rely on that cordial co-operation which alone could enable him in such a position to carry into effect the measures which he judges necessary for the accomplishment of the objects he has in view, and for the full benefit of the people with whose interests he has been charged.

39. With such experience before us, I conceive that I shall best do my duty by adhering in all respects to those principles of policy which have hitherto



guided me in relation to His Highness the Nizam, and which I believe to be in entire accordance with the wishes of the Honourable Court of Directors.

40. Whether it would not be for the mutual advantage of the Government of India and of the subjects of the Nizam that his territories should be transferred to other hands ; whether that event might not even now, if it were desired, by some means be brought to pass ; whether at some time the State of Hyderabad will not become a portion of the British Empire in India, are questions which I refuse to entertain.

41. I refuse to entertain them, because we acknowledge the Nizam as an independent prince. We have bound ourselves by treaty to shield him from every enemy, and we have guaranteed to him the exercise over his own subjects of his own sole and absolute authority. The British Government, therefore, cannot honestly entertain, and has never entertained, any intention of open aggression on the independence of this Prince. It nourishes no secret and insidious design of standing aloof while his sovereignty is fast crumbling under the weight of his own incapacity and folly. The Resident at His Highness's Court continues and will continue to persevere in the endeavours he has made in past times to support His Highness's power, and to promote the good of his people. He will be instructed to give, on every fitting occasion, the services of the Contingent Troops, or, if need be, those of the Subsidiary Force also, for the maintenance of the Sovereign's just authority. In so doing he will exercise the power with which he is vested of judging in each case of the fitness of the purpose for which the troops are required, and of demanding subsequently the adoption of such measures as are the proper consequence of his interposition.

He will address the Nizam, as heretofore, on every occurrence which may seem to call for an expression of its sentiments by the Government which he represents, and which is entitled by its position of supremacy, and by long-standing alliance, to address His Highness in the language of remonstrance and reproof.

He will warn him on every fitting occasion of the evils which his administration may involve ; he will point out the remedy for the abuses he may have denounced ; and he will tender freely to His Highness all the aid which the Government of India can supply, whether by its counsel or by force of arms, for meeting the opposition which may be raised to the application of the remedies he may have suggested.

42. But so long as the alleged evils of His Highness's Government are confined within his own limits and affect only his own subjects the Government of India must observe religiously the obligations of its own good faith. It has no just right to enter upon a system of direct interference in the internal affairs of His Highness's kingdom, which is explicitly forbidden by the positive stipulations of treaty, which would be utterly repugnant to the wishes of the Sovereign our ally, and is unsought by the people over whom he rules.

43. If, indeed, the effect of His Highness's misgovernment should be felt beyond his own bounds ; if the safety of our territory should be placed in doubt, or the interests of our subjects in jeopardy, I shall be prompt to demand, and to enforce, reparation for the aggrieved, as well as the infliction of signal punishment on the aggressors.

If, unhappily, the Nizam should allow fresh claims to accumulate against his State, I shall not permit those claims to be evaded, but shall demand that they be promptly satisfied, observing, at the same time, all due forbearance towards a feeble ally.

If recent insults to British subjects and soldiers within His Highness's territory should occur with increasing frequency, I shall not be satisfied, as on some past occasions, with the punishment of individual offenders ; I shall probably feel myself called upon in such case to require the adoption of such stronger measures as shall effectually put a stop to outrages which, unless they are repressed, cannot fail to lower the estimation in which our power is held by Native States, and in some degree to tarnish the honour of our name.

44. It may be that every effort we can make will be insufficient to avert the crash which the recklessness and apathy and obstinacy of the Nizam are all tending to produce ; it may be that the Government of India may, after all, be compelled



to resort to that direct interference in His Highness's affairs which it still most earnestly desires to avoid.

If ever that time should come, the officer who may then be entrusted with the charge of this Indian Empire will doubtless be prepared to act as the circumstances of the times and as his duty to his country may seem to him to require. But he will then be enabled to act with confidence, strengthened by the consciousness that the Government of India has long laboured to the utmost, though in vain, to avert from the Nizam the fate which will then have overtaken him, protecting him by its power, sustaining him by its influence, and striving to rouse him to timely action by warning, remonstrance, and rebuke.

45. Such is the course of policy which the Government of India in recent times has pursued in relation to His Highness the Nizam ; such is the policy to which I steadfastly purpose to adhere.

As the records of the State will show that a different view has been urged with earnestness and frequency on the consideration of the Governor-General, I have thought it necessary to set forth in full the system I have followed, and the reflections which lead me still to abide by it.

I have every confidence that the public principles by which I have shaped my course will meet with the approval of your Honourable Court.

I trust they will think that the mode in which our policy has been carried into effect is calculated to show that in all its dealings with the State of Hyderabad the Government of the East India Company has been actuated by no interested motives, has been seduced by no lust of dominion, but that it has had for its single aim to preserve the independence of an old and staunch ally, and to act from first to last in strict observance of national faith.

27th May 1851.

(Signed) *Dalhousie*.

To His Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad.

After compliments.

Several months have now elapsed since I learned with deep regret from the Resident at Hyderabad that in reply to the demand for the repayment of the large advances which have from time to time been made for the service of the Government of Hyderabad your Highness had intimated to him that you were not prepared to meet that demand ; while the Resident added that your Highness had made no effort either to repay the debt or to diminish its amount.

Your Highness had previously received abundant and emphatic warning that if, at the expiry of the period fixed, a settlement were not effected of the claims which had arisen on the part of the British Government against your Highness's Treasury, I should feel it to be my "duty to take such decided steps as the interests of the British Government may demand."

The time has come when the resolution I declared must be carried into effect.

I have purposely abstained for some time from communicating to your Highness the final determination I have formed, in the hope that reflection on the demand which has been formally made to you by the Resident, and on the consequences to which your disregard of that demand must necessarily lead, would induce your Highness to take such steps as would relieve me from the necessity of resorting to measures which could not be otherwise than painful to your Highness.

My hope has been vain. The silence which your Highness has observed ; the apparent indifference which has not only made no effort for the liquidation of your debt, but which still allows it month by month to increase, have left me no alternative : they compel me, in pursuance of my declared resolutions, to address to your Highness such further demands as have become indispensable for securing the interests of the Honourable East India Company, which are now so largely involved.

Your Highness having intimated your inability to meet in the usual manner the call which has been made on your treasury, it is my duty to require that your Highness shall forthwith make over to the Resident, on behalf of the British Government, those frontier districts of your Highness's territory which are

enumerated in the annexed schedule : in order that the revenues arising from them may be applied to the satisfaction of such claims as have been or may be established against your State on the part of the Government of India.

The course your Highness has long pursued obliges me to apprise your Highness, respectfully but firmly, that the demand I have now the honour to make is peremptory, and that it will neither be withdrawn nor postponed.

It will be necessary that your Highness should in due form convey to the Resident the districts named, and should vest him with full authority for their administration and control.

Your Highness may be assured that the security and happiness of your subjects within the districts to be transferred will be as justly and tenderly cared for as though they were our own people.

Clear and full accounts will be annually prepared, and will be transmitted for your Highness's information, showing the revenue received from the districts above mentioned, and the mode in which they have been applied to the purposes for which they are set apart.

In thus announcing to your Highness the determination which the past proceedings of your Government have at last compelled me to declare, it is my imperative duty to draw your Highness's attention to the effect which this determination may produce on the future fate of your kingdom.

The debt already incurred consists chiefly of advances made for the payment of the Contingent Force. The efficient maintenance of that force is a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of existing treaties. Your Highness is well aware that the efficient maintenance of the force is not only necessary to fulfil the obligations of treaty, but that it is essential for upholding your Highness's authority within your own dominions, and is the main support on which depends the stability of your throne.

The troops of the Contingent serving under the control of the British Government have a right to look to that Government for protection from the grievances by which the other troops in your Highness's service are so frequently oppressed, and to rely upon it for securing the full and regular payment of the monthly stipend allotted for their service.

I request your Highness distinctly to understand that the large advances which have heretofore been furnished, in order to make good deficiency in the payments for the force which are due from your Highness's treasury, will no longer be continued. If such deficiencies should again occur, I shall feel it my duty to provide for the regular payment of the force in future by a measure similar to that to which I have now been compelled to resort for ensuring the early liquidation of your accumulated debt.

The intimation I have made will convince your Highness that the reduction of public expenditure, which has so often been urged on your attention, can no longer with safety be delayed.

It will be obvious to your Highness that if in full possession of the whole revenue of your kingdom you have been unable to supply the funds for paying the Contingent Troops, it will become absolutely impossible for your Highness to meet that demand when the revenues of the districts to be transferred shall pass from your hands, unless immediate and vigorous measures are taken for the reduction of expenditure in some other quarter.

Many different modes of so doing, by revising the various establishments of the State, will doubtless be suggested to you. But there is one source of vast and superfluous expenditure which must at once present itself for your Highness's consideration—I mean the numerous and utterly useless military levies by which your revenue is unprofitably absorbed.

The power of the British Government is drawn round your kingdom, a rampart to defend you from every foreign foe. The Subsidiary Force, the Contingent Troops, are present within your territories, ready to sustain you at all times in the just exercise of your sovereign authority, and capable of repelling every attempt at rebellious resistance.

For what purpose, then, does your Highness think it necessary to maintain around you a horde of soldiery who are requisite neither for the defence of your frontier nor for the support of internal order? Above all, upon what grounds can you Highness justify to yourself and to your subjects, in the circumstances in which you are placed, the needless retention of bands of foreign mercenaries, eating up your revenues, cruelly oppressing your people, to whom you are bound in your duty to give protection, and bearing themselves with insolent violence not only towards your Highness, whom they nominally serve, but towards that great Government by whose friendship alone you have long been sustained, and whose resentment it is dangerous to provoke?

The daily tidings from the State of Hyderabad proclaim to all India that the Arab soldiery in your Highness's pay, whatever they may have been, are no longer your Highness's servants, but your masters. On more than one occasion of late their license has risen to a pitch of arrogance which has emboldened them even to offer open insult to British troops marching within your Highness's territory. Heretofore I have dealt with such offences with considerate forbearance, but I take this occasion of intimating to your Highness that forbearance has reached its limits. It behoves your Highness deeply to consider the risks to which you will yourself be exposed if you persist in leaving in this present condition a body of troops whom your authority appears unable to control, and who by their acts are tending to bring down upon you the indignation of the Government of India, whose indignity these men have already presumed to outrage, and whose power can crush you at its will.

Your Highness has at command a ready mode of averting the risks to which I have pointed, and of effecting at the same time that large reduction in public charges which your present position requires, by dismissing from your service these turbulent strangers with whom time and custom have encumbered you, having first satisfied every fair claim they can advance against your State.

I commend this important question to your Highness's early consideration. The Resident at your Court will be prepared to offer to your Highness, on behalf of the British Government, your ally, all the assistance which counsel can offer, and will aid the fulfilment of your Highness's just intentions by such support as may be required.

Whatever may be the actual course which your Highness may resolve to pursue in the grave emergency in which you are placed, it is imperatively necessary that your Highness should at once put an end to the unusual and mischievous state of uncertainty which has for many months enfeebled your administration and perplexed your relations with the Government of India, by appointing a Minister for conducting the affairs of your Highness's kingdom in subordination to your royal commands. Nearly three years have passed since your Highness was informed that the British Government desired to exercise no interference in the selection your Highness might wish to make of the person whom you might consider qualified to hold the office of Dewan.

In the interval your Highness has made repeated changes in the person of your Minister; but for many months past, disregarding the advice and remonstrances which I caused to be addressed to you, your Highness has appointed no Minister whatever for the execution of your commands, so that the Government of Hyderabad has been virtually in abeyance.

The measures which by this letter I have informed your Highness it has become my duty to enforce render the immediate nomination of a Minister indispensable for carrying into effect the resolutions of the Government of India, and for maturing and executing the several arrangements which it will be incumbent on your Highness to frame.

It well becomes your Highness, as the Sovereign of Hyderabad, to retain the supreme direction of affairs in the kingdom which destiny has committed to your hands; but the agency of a Minister is not less indispensable than the supremacy of the Prince.

I have therefore the honour to intimate to your Highness my expectation

that your Highness will forthwith terminate a state of affairs which is incompatible with the due maintenance of that full official intercourse by which alone your relations with this Government can be properly sustained. I have the honour to intimate my expectation that your Highness, without any further delay, will appoint as your Minister for conducting the details of your government some person whose position in society, whose personal character, and whose acquaintance with public business will constitute him a fit agent for transacting the important affairs which are now depending between the Government of India and the Court of Hyderabad.

I cannot doubt that the terms of the communication which I have now addressed to your Highness must give you pain and cause you anxiety.

I deeply regret that the course which your Highness has for some time past thought proper to pursue has left me no choice but to use the plain and peremptory language in which my letter is couched.

Representing that Government which has long been your Highness's steady friend, I have felt it to be my duty, as it is my right, to set before your Highness respectfully, but plainly and without disguise, the position to which your Highness has reduced yourself. I have dwelt upon the exertions which it is absolutely necessary for your Highness to make at once, if you would save yourself from further humiliation, if you would avert the imminent danger to which the independence of your sovereignty will be exposed unless a timely and vigorous effort shall now be made.

But a short time has passed since I anxiously warned your Highness that if effectual means were not then taken for remedying the condition of your Highness's affairs, before long your treasury will be bankrupt, and your whole kingdom in disorder and confusion.

Your Highness, looking around you, cannot fail to see how much of this warning has already been fulfilled.

Wherefore, once again, on behalf of the Honourable East India Company, your old and constant ally, I respectfully urge your Highness to lay to heart the things which in all truth and earnestness I have now impressed upon your thoughts. I call upon you to shake off the apathy by which you are oppressed, to recognize the real dangers which surround you, and to rouse yourself to such vigorous and prompt exertions as alone can be effectual to avert the further dangers of which you have been forewarned, and still to preserve the State over which you rule in independence and in wealth among the Native Powers of India.

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*

No. 1783.

From the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,—I have the honour to acquaint you that your despatch of 4th February last, No. 35, in which you report that the Nizam was not prepared to meet the demands of this Government, and further submit your own views of the policy which you deem it expedient that the Government of India should pursue, was duly received.

2. The Governor-General has purposely delayed making any communication to His Highness the Nizam until the present time.

3. I am now directed to transmit to you a letter addressed to His Highness by the Governor-General, in which his Lordship has intimated to him the determination he has made it his duty to form, and has called upon him to make over to you for the British Government those portions of his territory which will be specified to him, together with all authority which is necessary for their management. His Lordship concurs with you in considering that the districts named in your 7th para. are the most eligible, consisting of Berar Pain Ghaut, the border districts, from thence down to Shorapore and the Doab, between the Kistna and Toombudra.

4. Having carefully prepared the schedules specifying the particular districts or parts of them to be transferred, you will request an audience of His Highness, and will deliver to him His Lordship's letter, together with the schedules.

5. You will use your discretion in not urging His Highness to compliance with the requirements of the Government with undue haste. But you will meet any remonstrances or solicitations which His Highness may make for further prolonged delay, or for another reference, by the declaration that, after having afforded in vain full time and opportunity for His Highness to act, the Governor-General's determination has now been taken deliberately, and is fixed irrevocably. You will require His Highness to comply with the just demands of the British Government by a transfer of the districts named, in the manner which has been specified above.

6. It is not probable that the Nizam will contemplate any resistance to a demand so just in itself, and which his own conduct has rendered inevitable. If, however, His Highness should not comply with the requirements of the Government within the time which may be specified by you, you will request a final audience, for the purpose of receiving a definite reply. If His Highness should either refuse compliance on that occasion, or should fail to complete the arrangements which are requisite, you will be so good as to report the result to the Governor-General.

7. On receiving such an intimation (which, however, His Lordship is unwilling to anticipate) instructions will be forthwith addressed to you directing you to take possession of the districts named on behalf of the Government of India, and for the purpose set forth.

8. In expectation of such instructions you will state whether you will require any troops in addition to the Subsidiary and Contingent Forces for the purpose of enforcing the determination that has been announced. The probability is that His Highness will yield at once to the necessity which he cannot fail to recognize, and will comply in all respects with the demand which you will convey.

9. Whatever may be the ultimate destination of these districts, whether the Nizam shall hereafter be called upon to set them apart for the special maintenance of the Contingent or not, it must be borne in mind that the present occupation of them is for a temporary purpose only. You will therefore introduce as little change as possible when transferring them to the authority of the British Government.

10. A certain amount of European superintendence over the transferred districts appears to be indispensable; but His Lordship is of opinion that for the present it should be general, and should not extend to any close interference with the details of administration.

11. Three Superintendents, at the utmost, will at present suffice. The experience and past services of Captain Meadows Taylor at once point him out as the proper person for undertaking the direction of those districts which lie towards Shorapore, if his present occupation will admit of his entering on this additional charge.

12. The interests of the British Government will be greatly promoted by entrusting another portion to the management of Mr. H. Dighton, who has long been a resident in Hyderabad. On a former occasion the Honourable Court objected to the employment of Mr. Dighton in the territory of Hyderabad, but upon considerations which are not applicable to the present proposal. Mr. Dighton at that time had received charge of certain districts on behalf of His Highness the Nizam. The Honourable Court very justly objected to any European being employed in the service of a foreign prince in such a manner as to place him beyond their control.

13. The Governor-General's proposal now is to employ Mr. Dighton in the temporary service of the Honourable Company itself. The former objection of the Honourable Court therefore no longer applies; and the high testimony borne by you to the character and the capacity of Mr. Dighton satisfy His Lordship that his selection of him for the present duties will have the approval of the Honourable Court.

14. If a third Superintendent should be required, the Governor-General requests you to suggest an officer of tried ability and local experience in whom you can confide as qualified to discharge the large functions which must be entrusted to him with fidelity and discretion.

15. If the Nizam should accede to the demand of the Government without demur the Superintendents may be appointed at once.

16. Possession of these districts should not be taken for a broken period, but should commence after the termination of an agricultural year, and the consequent payment of the annual revenue, which it is presumed will have occurred about this period. This will relieve us from the demand and adjustment of fractional sums, and obviate much future confusion in accounts.

17. The first act of the Superintendents, and one which should be preliminary to the introduction of changes of any kind, should be to prepare a general report, each of his own district, showing the actual state of the revenue, and the condition of the several branches of administration within its bounds, and drawing attention to any matters which call for the special and immediate attention of this Government. This, of course, requires no surveying parties or deputations of native subordinates, but can be ascertained by mere inspection of records, and personal inquiries directed by the Superintendents to these particular points.

18. The Governor-General has given all due consideration to your suggestions respecting the policy which, in your judgment, it is expedient to adopt in reference to the kingdom of Hyderabad. His Lordship does not approve of the policy you have suggested, and does not purpose to adopt it, for reasons which have been fully stated to the Honourable Court of Directors, but which His Lordship does not think it necessary to enter upon again.

19. You have already been furnished with instructions for your guidance in carrying into effect the resolutions of this Government regarding the transfer of territory for the payment of His Highness's debt.

20. If, in compliance with the advice which has been tendered in the Governor-General's letter to the Nizam, His Highness should seek your aid and counsel in framing those effectual measures which his present position so urgently demands, you will afford to His Highness all the assistance which counsel can supply, and will aid the fulfilment of all His Highness's just intentions by such support as may be necessary.

21. If, however, the Nizam should contemplate any such decided measure as the dismissal of the foreign mercenaries from his service, it will be expedient that you should communicate with the Governor-General regarding the measure which may be proposed for that purpose, and the mode in which it is to be accomplished, before taking any direct step for effecting the design.

22. With respect to the general course of policy to be observed in the affairs of Hyderabad for the future, it is not His Lordship's intention to depart in any respect from the principles of policy by which he has heretofore been guided in relation to His Highness the Nizam.

23. You will continue to persevere in the endeavours you have made in past times to maintain the just authority of the Sovereign, and to mitigate, as far as representation and remonstrance may enable you to do, the abuses which occur from time to time in the public administration of His Highness's affairs.

24. You will give on every fitting occasion the services of the Contingent Troops, and, if need be, those of the Subsidiary Force also; but in so doing you will continue to exercise the power with which you are vested of judging in each case of the fitness of the purpose for which the troops are required, and of demanding subsequently the adoption of such measures as may seem to be the proper consequence of your interposition.

25. You will address His Highness on every occurrence which may seem to call for an expression of its sentiments by the Government which you represent, and which is entitled, by its position of supremacy and by long-standing alliance, to address His Highness in the language of remonstrance and reproof.

26. You will warn the Nizam, on every fitting occasion, of the evils which

His Highness's commands may involve ; you will point out the remedy for the abuses you may have denounced ; and you will tender freely to His Highness all aid which the Government of India can furnish, whether by its counsel or by force of arms, for meeting the opposition which may be raised to the application of the remedies which you may have suggested.

27. Any interference more direct than this in the affairs of His Highness the Nizam it is His Lordship's steadfast purpose to avoid so long as any effort of his can avert it. If at some future time a further measure of interference should unfortunately be forced upon the Governor-General, you will then be furnished with renewed and precise instructions for your guidance in the circumstances in which we may be placed.

28. A copy of the letter addressed to His Highness, with a translation thereof, is herewith transmitted for your information.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *H. M. Elliot,*

Secretary to the Government of India with the  
Governor-General.

Simla, 6th June 1851.

No. 178 of 1851.

From Major-General *J. S. Fraser*, Resident at Hyderabad, to Sir *H. M. Elliot*, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India with the Most Noble the Governor-General, Simla.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward the Nizam's reply to the Most Noble the Governor-General's letter to His Highness of the 6th June last.

2. It will probably be deemed superfluous that I should trouble the Government with any lengthened remarks on this communication, and I need scarcely add that the original draft was not submitted to me, although Suraj-ool-Moolk stated that this should be the case. The omission may perhaps be accounted for by the Nizam's having foreseen that I should not approve of his reply.

3. The most important part of the advice offered to His Highness by the Governor-General, namely, that great reduction should be made of unnecessary expenditure, especially by the disbandment of useless troops, is but slightly noticed ; and all that can be inferred from what the Nizam has said on the subject is that he does not intend to disband any of this class at all.

4. His Highness's determination that the Minister is to take no step whatever without his previous assent and approval assures, in my opinion, the ultimate ruin of the State, excepting in as far as a hope can be entertained that Suraj-ool-Moolk will have it in his power gradually to absolve himself from this restraint, and adopt such measures as he considers necessary for the remedy of existing evils, and the better administration of this country in future.

5. What the Nizam now remarks on the subject of the Arabs in his service is quite inconsistent with the promise he made to me in the year 1843 that the whole of this tribe should be removed from his dominions in two years from that date ; and as to what he says with respect to the Arabs being amenable in future to the law courts of the country I consider this declaration to be one that will never be realized.

6. I addressed a very strong representation on this very subject to the Minister, Chundoo Lall, immediately after my arrival at Hyderabad, and he assured me that the Arabs should thenceforward be rendered amenable to the jurisdiction of the usual law courts of the country, not only in matters of pecuniary claim, but on all occasions whatever, whether of a civil or criminal nature.

7. This assurance, however, was never fulfilled, nor is it likely to be so as long as a person of the Nizam's feeble character continues to retain in his own hand the administration of the country to the extent referred to in his letter to the Governor-General.—I have, &c.

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 29th September 1851.

## TRANSLATION alluded to in the foregoing Letter.

(Duplicate.)

Translation of Khurreeta addressed by His Highness the Nizam to the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, Governor-General of India, 26 Zeecadah 1267 H. (23rd September 1851).

No. 174.

After the usual compliments.

Your letter, filled with kind expressions, so completely fragrant with joy, and indicative of your anxious desire for the better arrangement and welfare of this Government, taking into consideration existing friendship and its continuance, and desiring alone the well-being of the Hyderabad Government, expressive in every way of the most kindly interest, and viewing the mutual engagements existing between the two Governments, and in the mode of true friends, communicated to me what was imperatively necessary, and has reached me at the most auspicious and happy moment.

After an examination of the meaning of the friendly expressions with which it is filled, and the way of kindness pointed out, and the mode of increasing the feeling of affection indicated in so friendly a manner, the veil is truly removed from the face.

From those whose understandings minutely scrutinize affairs this will not be concealed, that governing is altogether derived from the Almighty, and also the desire that old friendships should be undisturbed ; this is particularly apparent where the rights of ancient friendship, and the kindness of former amity, and their increase, are desired by those equal in dignity ; let this be granted, and it is impossible that those who are sincere and constant in mind will be careless about this matter.

By the favour of God, the exalted friendship and the nature of the amity which exists between the Nizam's Government and that of the English Company Bahadoor has been placed on so sure a foundation, and been so increased from day to day, that no cause of separation remains. Thanks be to God, your good deeds, excellent qualities, fine disposition, firm understanding, and solid, deep reflecting judgment, perfections personal and acquired, are celebrated and lauded ; and in inquiring into and examining all things you test everything ; the value (ready money) of the friendship of the two Governments, as is desirable ; beauteous in its amity ; illuminates the assembly of friendship ; wherefore, then, should it be concealed from the glass in which you observe ? Undoubtedly, considering the continued friendship of the two powerful Governments which has been so constant, and [?] will last for ever, the foundations being as strong as the frontier wall erected by Alexander the Great ; and it will increase for the future still more, and become yet more firm.

As the affairs of both Governments are controlled by the same orders, and as what is the desire of both, and what is concealed in the minds of both, is only an anxiety for what is advantageous, and for the stability and better administration of each Government, and nothing else is kept in view : and as it was proper that a Dewan should be appointed, and as it was intimated to me in your communication that this was requisite at the present time, and proper, in order to preserve existing amity, I appointed the high in station, intellectual and exalted dependant and well-wisher of my house, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, Bahadoor, he having promised, in accordance with my commands, that neither in great nor small matters would he give effect to anything without my knowledge and consent. Adopting therefore your advice, it being in accordance with my wishes, and in concurrence with the Resident, Major-General James Stuart Fraser, Bahadoor, I appointed the abovementioned nobleman, the most trustworthy and best acquainted with public affairs among the nobles of my Durbar, to conduct the duties of the Minister. From the able management of this nobleman, arrangements for the payment of the debt due to the Honourable Company's Government, on account of the money given for the pay of the Contingent having been made, amounting to Rs. 34,20,485-11-4, which is more than half the debt in question, has [?] by means of hoondees been paid to the Resident, and the remainder at the



appointed time shall be forwarded. I have directed the abovementioned nobleman to increase the friendship existing between the two Governments, and thereby the dignity of both ; also, that he was to give me satisfaction, and not depart in the slightest degree from what he knew was my pleasure.

In regard to what you from friendship addressed me in your kind note regarding the reduction of expenditure and the disbanding of the Arab soldiery, it is proper that it should be made known to you that since the commencement of the reign of my father up to the present time, the friendship of the British having been taken into consideration, a reduction of nearly 30,000 of the troops has been made, and only those requisite and in accordance with the requirements of the State have been retained. The losses and difficulties into which the Government has fallen, owing to several causes, I have ordered the Minister to correct, as fitting opportunity offers, and by means of appropriate measures. As the affairs of the two Governments are conducted under the same orders, and as the dignity and honour of the Honourable Company's Government is added to by the strength and good administration of the Hyderabad Government, and as from former kindness it does not desire that there should be any disturbances in the Sirkar's territories, it is not proper that you should be kept in ignorance that there are elements of strife and contention in the Government, owing to the different classes of which it is composed, and that it is necessary to take the greatest care in giving effect to the measures of the Government, and in selecting the fitting opportunities. Again, the Arab soldiers are old servants of the State, and, having resided a long time in the city of Hyderabad, have connected themselves with the people, have intermarried with them, and got families ; and further, great numbers of the inhabitants are their debtors. I have therefore issued orders to the abovementioned nobleman (Suraj-ool-Moolk) that the disputes originating in money transactions with them after the present settlement must rest with the Adawlut, and a written agreement to this effect must be taken from them, by which they are bound not to engage in any money-lending transactions for the future. Those who have been guilty of offences have been brought to trial, and been made amenable to such punishment as has been awarded by the Adawlut, in order that they may be made an example to others ; and whatever may in future be found necessary shall be carried out. Consider it undoubted that your friend is always desirous of giving happiness to the people, which is pleasing to God, and that this is ever my wish and intention, that the soldiers and people may all be happy and contented. The prosperity of the cities and people who are bestowed on us by the Almighty, from this fruit will come peace and happiness. This also is all times in my thoughts, that there should be a good Government, and affairs should be well arranged, the fruits of which being excellent, should everywhere be apparent, and a happy result be the consequence. Never at any time am I, with reference to these matters, either indifferent or careless. The good disposition and excellent qualities of the Resident, and his great ability, and the way he gives me satisfaction, and his good-will to this Government, and also his attention to the affairs of the two Governments, and his keeping up the good understanding between them, are well known.

(True translation.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

No. 116 of 1851.

From Major-General *J. S. Fraser*, Resident at Hyderabad, to Sir *H. M. Elliot*, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General, Simla.

SIR,—In continuation of my letter, No. 141, under date the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Government of India, that Suraj-ool-Moolk, Bahadoor, paid me a visit of ceremony on Monday the 30th ultimo, in his capacity of Dewan, to which office he had been appointed the day before by His Highness the Nizam.

2. On the 1st instant I waited on the Nizam for the purpose of delivering to him the Governor-General's letter, accompanied by schedules of the districts to be transferred to our temporary authority.

3. After the usual compliments, I delivered the letter into the Nizam's own hands, when His Highness said that he was aware of its contents, and put it down at his side.

4. He then observed, that three subjects were discussed in the Governor-General's letter: first, the transfer of Districts; secondly, the removal of Arabs, &c.; and, thirdly, a reduction in the number of Ta'inati<sup>o</sup> troops.

<sup>o</sup> *Sic. in orig.*

5. In a subsequent visit which Suraj-ool-Moolk paid me at the Residency, he informed me that His Highness had intended to advert to a fourth subject, namely, the regular payment of the Contingent in future, but he inadvertently omitted to do so in conversation with me.

6. The Nizam afterwards proceeded to remark that it was not customary with the Honourable Company to transfer territory in payment to its creditors; to which I merely replied that the Honourable Company did not incur debts of the description now under consideration.

7. The Nizam then said, "I have appointed Suraj-ool-Moolk, Bahadoor, Dewan. He will discharge the debt due to the Honourable Company, and also pay the Contingent."

8. On the subject of the reduction of the Ta'inati troops His Highness said that a large amount of pay was due to them, and that after the requisite steps were taken for its liquidation they should be gradually reduced.

9. Respecting the Arabs he said that they had claims upon the Circar and individuals to the amount of nearly 50 lacs of rupees, and that after the settlement of these demands they should be gradually removed.

10. His Highness observed that a cordial friendship had long subsisted between the two Governments, and that this Government (Sirkar-i-dowlut Madar) had exhibited a degree of deference and submission (Tawazir) which the Sovereigns of Turkey and Persia had never done.

11. He went on to observe that English gentlemen came to India and returned from thence, but never permanently resided here. That this was not the custom in his dominions; for the descendants of those who came 200 years ago were still here, and that, excepting pilgrims and merchants, no other persons resorted here.

12. Upon this I reminded His Highness that there were 7,000 or 8,000 Arabs in his dominions, 2,000 or 3,000 Rohillas, and 2,000 or 3,000 Sikhs, at present cantoned near the city of Hyderabad, none of whom came under the designations he had been pleased to make use of.

13. His Highness replied, "If these people come here, they do so through the Company's country. My dominions are centrically situated, and surrounded by the territories of your Government. Formerly, in the time of Asaf Jah, they never came here."

14. I remarked that it was true they came through the Company's territory, but that if His Highness's Government did not take them into his service they would have no inducement to remain.

15. His Highness said that a prohibition to this effect had been issued with regard to the Rohillas, and that the Sirkar had none of these men in its service. Upon which I observed that notwithstanding the prohibition on this subject which was issued three or four years ago, during the first Ministry of Suraj-ool-Moolk, there were still Rohillas in the service of the Sirkar and of the nobles of the city. I added that this moment two Sirkar Officers in the provinces were engaged in hostilities with each other, and that each of them had Rohillas in his service.

16. On this His Highness turned to the Dewan, and desired him to seize and remove from the country, by means of the Contingent, the Rohillas alluded to.

17. His Highness then addressed me, in the terms usual on these occasions, to request that I would give the Dewan all requisite countenance and support in

the administration of the Government, to which I returned what appeared to me a suitable reply.

18. Foreseeing no advantage from any further discussion at that time, I remarked to His Highness that the important subjects adverted to in the Governor-General's letter required to be taken into consideration, and that, with His Highness's permission, I should have the honour of receiving the Minister next day at the Residency.

19. To this His Highness assented. And, as any other conversation on matters of business would evidently have been useless, I immediately afterwards accepted the *pan* which His Highness offered to me, and took leave.

20. Suraj-ool-Moolk waited upon me at the Residency the next day, Wednesday, 2nd July, and I commenced conversation with him by inquiring with what extent of power His Highness had vested him for the conduct of public affairs. Suraj-ool-Moolk replied, "His Highness has given full power."

21. I asked him if he had read and thoroughly understood the Governor-General's letter, to which he replied, "I understand it perfectly." I then said, "As you are vested with full power, and have read and thoroughly understand the letter, be so good as to inform me what is His Highness the Nizam's reply to it."

22. To this Suraj-ool-Moolk replied that the Nizam had ordered him to take measures for paying me immediately the full amount of the debt, and to give me security for the regular payment in future of the Contingent; and he then proceeded to detail by what means he proposed to effect the former of these objects.

23. His plans, however, appeared to me to be liable to considerable objection, and I therefore acquainted him that in the event of my assenting under any circumstances to postpone my demand for the transfer of districts it was necessary that I should have a full and distinct explanation of the means by which the Nizam proposed to effect the immediate discharge of the debt, and to give security for the future payment of the Contingent.

24. He soon after took leave, informing me that he would wait upon the Nizam the next morning, and let me know without delay the result of his interview with His Highness.

25. On Friday, the 4th instant, Suraj-ool-Moolk again visited me, and stated that His Highness's instructions to him were to the following effect, and had been expressed in these terms: "His Government had not liquidated the debt due by it at the appointed time, and a temporary transfer of districts was therefore demanded by the British Government. Immediately on receipt of the Governor-General's Khureeta a Dewan was appointed, and that office had been conferred upon Suraj-ool-Moolk. Suraj-ool-Moolk would pay into the Resident's treasury, agreeably to a statement that would be furnished, the amount of debt due to the Honourable Company, which then being fully discharged there would be no necessity for ceding districts. By this means payment of the debt would be immediately realized; whereas by the transfer of districts years would be required to liquidate it. Independently of this, the transferred districts would amount to nearly one-third of His Highness's country; one-third would be required for the regular monthly payment of the Contingent, &c.; and only one-third remaining, the ruin of the country would ensue; for not only would his subjects be reduced to distress for the means of existence, but even His Highness himself would suffer in a similar way. The protection of his government, and of His Highness's person, had always been graciously afforded by the British Government, and it ought ever to be continued so."

26. Suraj-ool-Moolk concluded this recapitulation of His Highness's instructions by remarking to me that the general purport of His Highness's observations to him had been that as the Company's debt would now be immediately and punctually paid there could be no necessity for the proposed transfer of districts.

27. In order that no misapprehension might occur with regard to the exact purport of His Highness's message I requested Suraj-ool-Moolk to be so good as to allow it to be taken down in writing by an attendant Mutsuddy. This

was accordingly done under his own dictation, and a copy of the document is herewith enclosed.

28. Suraj-ool-Moolk then spoke of the manner in which it was proposed that the debt should be liquidated, and again adverted to the same subject in a written communication under date the 5th instant.

29. But both his verbal and written communications on this subject appeared to me to be based on a defective principle, and his proposed measures to be such as would involve much confusion and great embarrassment of accounts.

30. I therefore addressed a note to him on the evening of the 6th instant, of which a copy and translation are enclosed; and as I returned his formal and official visit on the next day, Monday, the 7th, I had an opportunity of further conversing with him personally on the subject, and ascertaining that if the Nizam's general proposition were approved by the Government of India the mode of paying the debt by bills on the Presidencies would be agreeable to the Nizam's Government, and indeed the most convenient to it which could be adopted.

31. On Wednesday evening, the 9th instant, I received a Persian note from Suraj-ool-Moolk, accompanied by an English translation, copies of which respectively are herewith enclosed.

32. As this communication still referred to the detailed arrangements which would be connected with the payment of the Nizam's debt, and as I had, up to that period, neither received an answer to the Governor-General's letter, nor any written communication in due form on the part of the Nizam with respect to his engagement to pay us immediately the total amount of his debt in such manner as should be approved by the British Government, and to give satisfactory security for the future regular pay of the Contingent, I considered it necessary immediately

No. 4 of the packet. to reply to Suraj-ool-Moolk in the terms of a note, of which a copy and translation are enclosed.

33. Suraj-ool-Moolk waited upon me at the Residency on the 11th instant, and communicated to me the proposed draft of his reply to my note of the 9th, which, after reading over, and making in it several corrections and alterations, which I considered indispensably necessary, and in the propriety of which he acquainted me that he fully concurred, he took it away with him, promising to send me the fair copy on the evening of that day, or the next morning at the latest, on receipt of which I acquainted him that I would send him without loss of time my final reply, and that I hoped to be able to address the Government of India on this subject in the course of the same day.

34. In the evening of the 12th instant I received his promised letter, the purport and terms of which he had discussed with me on the 11th instant.

35. A copy and translation of this letter (the latter furnished by Suraj-ool-Moolk himself) are herewith enclosed.

36. It corresponded with the rough draft he had previously shown to me on the 11th, with the exception, however, of an essential difference in the third paragraph, wherein, instead of the expression I had approved of in the draft, and had myself, with Suraj-ool-Moolk's concurrence, caused to be inserted in it, to the effect that His Highness personally and solemnly guaranteed the immediate payment of the debt in the event of his proposition on this subject meeting with the assent of the Government of India, I found that an important alteration had been made, by the substitution, in lieu of the personal assurance as above explained, of a simple intimation that His Highness had approved of the arrangement for the full discharge of the debt, and had given strict commands that it should be punctually carried into effect.

37. I transmit the copy of a private note, which accompanied Suraj-ool-Moolk's official one, in which it will be observed that he terms the alteration I have described a "slight" one.

38. I by no means considered it such, for it altered in point of fact the whole nature of the transaction; and instead of imposing on the Sovereign of this country, as I intended should be the case, an entire and exclusive responsibility for the fulfilment of those conditions on which alone I had assented to the

temporary suspension of my demand for the transfer of districts, it shifted this responsibility to his Minister, and would, no doubt, in the estimation of the Nizam him-self, have exempted him from the ulterior consequences and penalty of non-fulfilment, as he would in that case have been enabled to plead, in the manner habitual with him, that the fault was his Minister's and not his own.

39. Independently of these considerations, there was in the fact itself of the alteration having suggested itself to the mind of the Nizam sufficient cause to suspect that His Highness was but adopting a scheme which might enable him to evade the necessity of advancing any part of his own personal treasures to Suraj-ool-Moolk in aid of the discharge of his debt to the British Government, and to throw the whole burden of this task, as well as the consequences of its non-fulfilment, on his Minister, instead of taking this responsibility upon himself.

40. It seemed but the renewal of an attempt which he has already made on several occasions since the death of Chundoo Lall to sell the office of Dewan to the highest bidder, and to confer it on the person who should take upon himself the discharge of existing liabilities without any necessity for His Highness's personal assistance, and the production of money from his own private treasury for the accomplishment of this object.

41. In every point of view the change in the official letter of the 11th instant now referred to, as compared with the proposed draft previously submitted to me on the same day, was, I thought, objectionable ; and it at once inspired me with some doubt of the good faith of the Nizam, and determined me to hold him bound to the accomplishment of his word by the plainest and most express terms which courtesy and the respect due to his rank and station allowed me to propose, or, in the event of his refusing to incur the obligation, to insist, without further discussion, on his compliance with the demands of the British Government.

42. Under these circumstances, I accordingly lost no time in replying to the Minister's note of the 11th instant, and declined to accept the intimation therein conveyed as one which I could with propriety submit to the Government of India.

43. A copy and translation of my note on this subject are enclosed, as well as a copy of my private note in reply to that from Suraj-ool-Moolk in the same form which had accompanied his public letter.

44. His answer to this communication, in two notes under date respectively the 11th and 15th instant, accompanied by English translations, reached me only yesterday evening : and as his note of the 11th in its ultimately amended form appeared to embody all I could at present desire on the subject in view and to satisfactory, with the exception only of that shade of distrust which had been thrown over my mind by the Nizam's attempt to substitute a mere order to his Minister in lieu of his own personal and absolute assurance, I have the honour of submitting it, together with a copy and translation of my final reply to Suraj-ool-Moolk, under yesterday's date, for the consideration and orders of the Government of India.

45. The instructions conveyed to me in your letter under date the 6th ultimo<sup>c</sup> directed me to demand from His Highness the Nizam the transfer to our temporary authority of certain portions of his country for the purpose of gradually liquidating His Highness's debt to the British Government, and with a view to the possible event of their being hereafter set apart for the special maintenance of the Contingent ; but these instructions did not advert to the possible case of the Nizam's paying at once and immediately the whole amount of his debt to the British Government, and affording security at the same time for the future regular payment of the Contingent.

46. This event was not considered a probable one by myself, nor were, I believe, any serious expectations of it entertained by the best-informed persons at Hyderabad.

47. But His Highness has, notwithstanding, found means to take upon himself the fulfilment of both these objects, namely, the entire and immediate payment of his debt to us, and giving the best security that could be offered for the future regular payment of the Contingent short of the actual transfer to us of part of his country for this purpose.

48. Under these circumstances, I have not considered that I should be justified in at present urging my demand for the transfer of districts, and have consented to postpone it until the pleasure of the Government of India shall be known.

49. My acquiescence in His Highness's proposal, and consent to leave the question of the transfer of districts in temporary abeyance, pending this reference to the Government of India, although not in accordance with the strict letter of your instructions, have appeared to me to be in conformity with the course of procedure which the circumstances of the case demanded; but it is still in the power of the Government of India to accept or to reject, as it shall think proper, the alternative now offered by the Nizam.

50. The conduct I have pursued in this instance will afford sufficient evidence of my own personal opinion that the alternative offered by the Nizam should be accepted, and that it can scarcely in justice and reasonable policy be refused, although no doubt some ground might be found for acting otherwise if it were sought for in the uncertainty of the Nizam's character, and the little reason which his conduct has hitherto given us to place an absolutely implicit confidence in his promises and engagements.

51. Should the Government of India think proper to withdraw its demand for the immediate transfer of districts consequently on the Nizam's engagements now submitted, both with respect to the liquidation of his debt and security for the future pay of the Contingent, I request to be informed on what places it will be considered most convenient that the hoondees be drawn in which the Nizam has proposed to pay the amount of debt, and also from what date the interest on this debt is to cease—whether, as desired by Suraj-ool-Moolk, from the date at which I may receive the hoondees into my treasury in deposit, or that of my (eventually) communicating to the Nizam the acceptance of his proposition by the British Government, or, in conformity with what I have already expressed to the Minister as my opinion, from the date at which the hoondees shall have arrived at maturity and be actually payable to us, since I perceive no sufficient reason why the British Government should consent to suffer any loss whatever from its pecuniary transactions with the Nizam.

52. These pecuniary transactions were forced upon us by the Nizam, not sought by the British Government. They arose from the disordered state of his own finances, and the ill-regulated condition of his Government, and any pecuniary loss resulting therefrom in consequence appears to me to be justly chargeable to himself.

53. I request also to be favoured with any further instructions which the convenience of the British Government, in a fiscal point of view, may appear to render necessary as connected with the financial arrangements now submitted.

54. If either the reception of the Nizam's present proposition by the Government of India, or His Highness's failure to fulfil those engagements he has now formally taken upon himself, shall lead to the British Government persisting in or renewing its demand for the transfer of territory, and that His Highness refuses to give his consent to that transfer, which I regard as a possible event, I do not anticipate that there would be much difficulty in taking possession of the districts, even without his expressed assent.

55. It is difficult to estimate the exact amount of resistance that might in that case be opposed to us; but as there is no probability that any positive resistance or actual recourse to arms would emanate from the Nizam, and that [?] it would occur, if at all, only on the part of some of those bands of Arabs and others who, under the orders of their chiefs, might attempt to hold possession of the forts in which they are now stationed, I am of opinion that the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and the Nizam's Contingent would be fully equal to every military service that could be required of them in connection with this object.

56. It might be well, however, I think, to provide for all possible contingencies by authorizing me to demand such further military aid as I might eventually require from Bellary, the head-quarters of the Ceded Districts under the Madras Presidency, and from the Subsidiary Force at Nagpore, if it could conveniently be spared from thence.

57. Pending the receipt of the further orders of Government, I have

acquainted Captains Commandant Taylor and Bullock and Mr. Dighton that their services are not for the present required here, and I have directed the two former gentlemen to return to their civil and military duties respectively.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 16th July 1851.

TRANSLATION of Suraj-ool-Moolk's Observations made on 4th July 1851.

His Highness's orders are that, as his Government did not liquidate the debt due by it to the Honourable Company at the appointed time, districts have been demanded by the Government of India. Immediately on the receipt of the Governor-General's Khureeta a Dewan was appointed, and that office vested in Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor. Agreeably to a separate list the aforesaid Bahadoor will remit to the Resident's treasury the hoondees of the soucars, and the amount of the debt will be completely liquidated. As the amount of the debt will be fully discharged, there will be no necessity for taking districts, because the money for the debt would be realized early and without trouble, whereas by taking districts it would take up years to liquidate it. Besides, by taking the districts nearly one-third of His Highness's country will be gone, one-third will be required for the regular monthly payment of the Contingent, and the only remaining one will tend to the ruin of the Government, because it would not only be difficult for the people to obtain their living, but it would be difficult to him also. The protection of my government and my person have ever been graciously afforded by the British Government, and so it should always continue.

"Suraj-ool-Moolk said, This is the purport of His Highness's observations: as the debt will be liquidated without any abatement, it is not necessary to give up the districts."

(True translation and copy.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

TRANSLATION of a Note from Major-General *J. S. Fraser* to Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, dated 6th Rumzan 1257 (6th July 1851).

I shall not fail to do myself the pleasure of calling upon you to-morrow at one o'clock, and shall bring with me the statement you desire of His Highness the Nizam's debt to the British Government in Bagh Chulnee rupees, with the corresponding amount in Company's rupees, for which I have granted bills on the Presidencies.

2. In the event of the British Government approving and accepting the proposition now brought forward by His Highness the Nizam, I think it advisable, with a view to avoid a great deal of inconvenience and complication of accounts, which must necessarily occur if the payment of His Highness's debt to us is to be made in several different ways (namely, by bills on the Presidencies, Bagh Chulnee rupees paid into the Residency Treasury at Hyderabad, Shuhur Chulnee rupees, ditto guttotes, soucars' chittees, &c. &c.), that the debt should be liquidated exclusively by bills, namely, to the amount of Company's rupees 34,08,485-11-4 (being the equivalent of Bagh Chulnee rupees 40,00,000), payable, on or before the 15th proximo, into the Company's Treasuries at the places on which they are drawn; and the remainder of the debt similarly payable on or before the 31st October 1851, the places on which these bills are to be drawn being specified by the British Government, and the rate at which they are drawn to be the same as that at which I negotiated my bills to the soucars, as explained in the annexed memorandum; thus adjusting the account, as it appears to me, in the most equitable manner, and leaving the British Government ultimately neither gainers nor losers by the mutual pecuniary transactions of the two Governments during the last six years, which have resulted in the large amount of the debt now due by the Nizam's Government.

3. With respect to the inquiry you make whether it will be convenient to me to receive your hoondees in Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Masulipatam, Benares, and Mirzapore, I shall have the honour of acquainting you hereafter whether these places will suit the convenience of the British Government.

4. In compliance with the request you recently made to me, I beg to subjoin a

memorandum of the probable payments which will be required from His Highness the Nizam's Government, and for the future regular payment of which it will be necessary that such security be given as shall be satisfactory to the Government of India.

	Rs.	a.	p.
Average amount on account of the pay of the Contingent .....	37,89,240	0	0
Ditto of Military Stores .....	59,500	0	0
TOTAL on account of the Contingent .....	38,48,740	0	0
Appah Dessay's Choute .....	1,20,000	0	0
Allowance to the family of Mohiput Ram .....	5,610	0	0
On account of the Thug Department .....	7,971	4	0
TOTAL per Annum.....Rs.	39,82,321	10	8
Per Mensem.....Rs.	3,31,850	2	2

5. The above does not include the lac of rupees per annum paid on account of the repair and construction of roads, and expenses of the Statistical Department, as this payment is a spontaneous one on the part of the Sirkar, and must be regarded in a different point of view from the other items above mentioned, being merely a civil disbursement by the Sirkar, to be continued or not, as it was originally granted at its own pleasure.

6. I take this opportunity of observing that the average annual expense on account of the Contingent, including military stores, is Bagh Chulnee rupees 38,48,740—and not 40 or still less 41 or 42 lacs of rupees, as it has been sometimes stated to be in the loose and vague remarks made on this subject, even in official papers.

7. I beg you will be so good as to submit to His Highness the Nizam my request that he will favour me with a reply to the Khureeta of the Most Noble the Governor-General, in order that I may transmit it to His Lordship.

(True translation and copy.)

(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.

TRANSLATION of a Note from Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, to the address of Major-General Fraser, dated 9th Ramzan 1267 (9th July 1851).

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, on the subject of the payment of the debt due by this Sirkar to the British Government.

2. I concur with you in opinion with regard to the subjects referred to in the 2nd paragraph of your letter; but it will be necessary that I should be favoured with the statement in detail which you promise me in your note of yesterday's date. I beg, however, to observe, with reference to the payment for hoondees, that it is a universal practice to consider the delivery of a hoondee as equivalent to cash payment. You are aware that you pay ready money yourself for hoondees you obtain for the payment of the troops of the Contingent at out-stations, and receive ready money for bills drawn by you, though they are payable at a certain future date. This Sirkar must also pay ready money for the hoondees that will be sent to you, or, if obtained on credit, pay interest on the amount; it would not, therefore, be just that interest on one and the same sum should be paid both to the British Government and to the soucars at the same time. I therefore trust that you will have no objection to give credit in account to the Sirkar for the amount of the hoondees on the day they are given, and cause the interest to cease from that date. This, of course, is to be done on the approval and sanction of the Supreme Government being obtained to the general arrangements.

3. With reference to your reply to my inquiry that you will let me know hereafter whether it would suit the British Government to receive hoondees from me on Calcutta, Madras, Masulipatam, Benares, and Mirzapore, I trust you will receive the hoondees I send, and hold them in deposit till an answer is obtained; and when the proposal is approved by the Supreme Government the hoondees will be paid at the places on which they are drawn, at the period fixed upon.

4. In regard to the lac of rupees for the repairs of roads and the expenses of the Statistical Department, which is optional with this Sirkar, you are correct in saying so, and I will inform you hereafter of His Highness's pleasure on the subject.

5. In the 6th para. you state that the average annual expenditure on account of the Contingent, including military stores, is 38,48,740 Bagh Chulnee rupees,



**HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.**

and not 40 or still less 41 or 42 lacs of rupees. I beg to say that owing to the exchange on hoondees, and premium on Bagh Chulnee rupees, the above amount does not correspond with the sum paid by the Hyderabad Government in the rupees current here, in which it will be about 41 lacs per annum. I am aware that this discrepancy is partly occasioned by the depreciation of the coin current at Hyderabad, and this part of the question will form the subject of an after-arrangement.

6. I shall make a representation to His Highness the Nizam on the subject of a reply to the Khureeta from the Governor-General.

7. I beg to transmit herewith, in English and Persian, a statement of the districts, showing the respective amounts which I have set apart for the payment of the troops of the Contingent, together with the names of the present Talookdars. Should any change hereafter be made in the latter I will duly communicate it to you. All orders on the revenues of these districts have been revoked, and it is not in my power to offer you any better security than is offered by this statement.

8. I beg to remark that the pay of the troops of the Contingent alone is payable into your Treasury in Bagh Chulnee rupees. I believe that Appa Dessaye's Choute is payable at Bombay, and the allowance to Mohiput Ram's family at Benares. On being informed of the exact amount in Company's Rupees, it shall be lodged by hoondees on those two places on the 30th April annually, or, if this arrangement should be inconvenient, by hoondees drawn monthly on the above-mentioned places.

(True Copy.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

**STATEMENT of Monthly Payments to be made regularly and punctually in future on account of the Contingent, &c., from the Revenues of Districts in the Soobahs of Hyderabad, Mohamudabad, Beder, Berar, Balaghat, and Pain Ghaut, Aurungabad, Beejapoor, &c., commencing from the beginning of Fuslee 1261, or the 15th July 1851.**

—	NAMES OF TALOOKDARS by whom the Payment is to be made.	NAMES OF DISTRICTS, &c.	Amount of	Amount of
			Payment Monthly.	Payment Yearly.
			Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
1	Gholam Nukkee Khan Bahadur.....	Pergunna Huvalce Khummumett, &c.	16,833 5 6	2,02,000 2 0
2	Emam Nawaz Jung Bahadoor .....	Pergunna Huvalce, Nelgoondah, &c.,...	30,800 0 0	3 69,000 0 0
3	Gholam Kawder Khan.....	Pergunna Jutpole, &c.,	6,500 0 0	78,000 0 0
4	Rae Kishun Row.....	Ditto Bulkondah, &c.,	19,166 10 6	2,29,999 11 0
5	Ram Row and Anrut Row .....	Ditto Huvalce Nandsir, &c., and Pergunna Buswuntnagger, &c.,	37,000 0 0	4,44,000 0 0
6	Gopal Row and Kishun Row.....	Pergunna Huvalce Goolburgah, &c., and Pergunna Gujwall, &c.	40,000 0 0	4,80,000 0 0
7	Meer Koorban Ali.....	Pergunna Nirmul, &c.,	13,000 0 0	1,56,000 0 0
8	Narrain Row and Venkut Row .....	Ditto Akoat, &c.,	87,000 0 0	4,44,000 0 0
9	Mooshyud Jung Bahadoor .....	Ditto Bhyasah, &c.,	5,000 0 0	60,000 0 0
10	Rajah Narruk Buksh, Rajah Bahadoor...	Sayer Duties of Hoossain Saugor, &c.	6,411 4 0	76,925 0 0
11	Nursing Row .....	On account of Beech koondah, &c., in the Pergunna of Huvalce Kow- lass.	2,000 0 0	24,000 0 0
12	Hyder Narwas Khan, and others .....	Duties on Carta, &c.,	1,288 12 0	15,495 0 0
13	Jumdat-ood-Dowlah, His Goozast has been required, and the appointment of a new Talookdar will be communicated to the Resident.	Pergunna Huvalce Elgundel, &c.,	30,500 0 0	3,66,000 0 0
14	Rafeek Yowurood Dowlah Bahadoor ...	Pergunna Huvalce Beer, &c.,	12,500 0 0	1,50,000 0 0
15	Sooltan Nuwazool Moolk Bahadoor .....	Ditto ditto Raichore, &c.,	17,000 0 0	2,04,000 0 0
16	Gholam Yaseen Khan Bahadoor .....	Pergunna Purbunnee, &c.,	12,500 0 0	1,50,000 0 0
17	Rahgovinda Row .....	Ditto Ambah, &c.,	19,000 0 0	2,28,000 0 0
18	Meer Shurfoodeen .....	Ditto Kheoludabad, &c.,	10,000 0 0	1,20,000 0 0
19	Abdool Kawder .....	Ditto Koopul, &c.,	7,500 0 0	90,000 0 0
20	Rajah Ram Bhopal Bahadoor.....	On account of the Pesheush of Gudwal,	5,000 0 0	60,000 0 0
21	Govind Row .....	Pergunna Umber, &c.,	4,000 0 0	48,000 0 0
22	Shumsoodeen .....	Ditto Sirpoor Tandoor, &c.,	2,000 0 0	24,000 0 0
23	Rajah Enkapah Naik .....	Talooka Audolah, &c.,	3,333 5 4	40,000 0 0
24	Amcenooddeen and others .....	On account of the Sayer Kuroor- geroe duties, &c.,	2,150 0 0	25,800 0 0
		<b>TOTAL, HYDERABAD RUPEES.....</b>	<b>3,40,483 5 4</b>	<b>40,85,800 0 0</b>

*N. B.*—In the event of any change being made in the Talookdars above named it will be duly communicated to the Resident.

(True Copy.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

Hyderabad, 9th July 1851.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Resident to Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor,  
dated 9th July 1851 (9th Ramzan 1267.)

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your Persian letter, with an English translation, under this date, referring to several minor particulars connected with the payment of the debt due by His Highness the Nizam to the British Government, but bringing forward no distinct general proposition on this subject from His Highness which I can submit to the Government of India.

2. I as yet possess no formal and official written communication from you on this subject, but have received only a verbal message from His Highness, transmitted to me through you on the 4th instant, and a written memorandum proposing certain detailed arrangements of payment, to which I have acquainted you that I cannot give my assent.

3. I now beg to have the honour of informing you that I can consent to postpone my demand for the transfer of those districts of which schedules were submitted by me to His Highness the Nizam, with the Governor-General's khureeta, on the 1st instant, only in the event of your furnishing me in writing, and in the most distinct and intelligible terms, His Highness's proposition, and promise, in the event of the Supreme Government acceding to that proposition, to pay, as explained in my note to you of the 6th instant, the equivalent of 40 lacs of Bagh Chulnee rupees on or before the 15th proximo, and the remainder of the debt in a similar manner on or before the 31st October next, and also to furnish me with such security as the Government of India shall approve for the future regular monthly payment of the Contingent, and such other items as were explained in my note to you of the 6th instant.

4. I consider it probable, in the event of the general arrangement being approved by the Government of India, that the security for the future payment of the Contingent, as proposed in your note under acknowledgment, will be considered sufficient.

5. As the khureeta, conveying a demand for the transfer of districts, was written direct by the Most Noble the Governor-General to His Highness the Nizam, I consider it highly desirable that a reply should be given by His Highness himself with the least possible delay, and that this reply should embody His Highness's general proposition and engagement, as stated in the third para. of this note.

6. But if any considerable time is likely to be occupied in preparing an answer to the khureeta I shall not object to receive your written communication to the purport referred to, accompanied, however, with an express intimation that it is made to me by order of the Nizam, and that it includes His Highness's absolute assurance that due effect shall be punctually given to the arrangements therein proposed, if sanctioned by the Government of India.

7. I beg to enclose a detailed statement of the debt of His Highness the Nizam to the British Government in Bagh Chulnee rupees with their equivalent in Company's rupees.

(True translation and copy.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

DETAILED STATEMENT of the Debt of His Highness the NIZAM to the British Government, in Bagh Chulnee Rupees, with their Equivalent in Company's Rupees.

Dr.

Cr.

Advances made.	Rate of Ex- change.	Company's Rupees.	Bagh Chulnee Rupees.	Sums received.	Rate of Ex- change.	Company's Rupees.	Bagh Chulnee Rupees.
	per Cent.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.		per Cent.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
In August 1844...	16½	87,982 13 1	1,02,499 15 9	In Sept. 1841...	16½	87,982 13 1	1,02,499 15 9
September "...	"	3,03,175 15 5	3,53,200 0 0	November "...	14½	1,68,927 12 8	1,93,000 0 0
November "...	11½	2,88,861 0 10	3,30,923 12 0	December "...	"	1,75,115 15 7	2,00,070 0 0
June 1845...	16½	2,91,760 6 11	3,39,171 8 0	January 1845...	"	42,013 2 1	48,000 0 0
July "...	16½	1,71,541 10 0	2,00,274 13 6	February "...	"	1,18,381 9 11	1,35,251 0 0
August "...	17	2,92,156 11 4	3,41,823 9 1	March "...	"	1,050 10 1	1,200 5 6
September "...	16½	2,92,958 7 4	3,42,029 0 0	April "...	"	92,518 8 3	1,05,702 6 6
October "...	"	2,63,701 1 2	3,11,876 0 0	August "...	17	1,31,623 11 11	1,51,000 0 0
November "...	15½	3,03,915 2 6	3,50,017 2 6	September "...	16½	3,69,164 14 2	4,31,000 0 0
December "...	"	68,060 13 6	78,610 1 5	October "...	"	1,61,027 13 4	1,88,000 0 0
January 1846...	11½	2,93,238 6 3	3,35,757 15 3	January 1846...	14½	39,962 0 2	45,756 8 0
February "...	"	2,93,101 12 2	3,35,691 15 3	May "...	"	49,082 15 6	56,200 0 0
March "...	15½	3,02,805 2 0	3,48,982 14 5	June "...	15	89,014 5 7	1,02,401 0 0
April "...	11½	2,95,601 13 8	3,37,725 2 0	May 1847...	14½	1,65,938 13 10	1,90,000 0 0
June "...	15	91,739 2 1	1,05,500 0 0	June "...	"	2,42,791 12 2	2,78,000 0 0
July "...	15½	2,91,920 7 1	3,36,138 5 0	July "...	"	1,42,358 1 3	1,63,000 0 0
August "...	14½	89,519 10 5	1,02,500 0 0	October "...	15½	23,427 5 4	27,000 0 0
September "...	12½	1,90,222 3 7	2,14,000 0 0	November "...	"	21,691 15 7	25,000 0 0
October "...	"	1,03,539 13 2	1,17,000 0 0	March 1848...	"	67,616 7 2	78,097 0 0
November "...	13	1,03,539 13 2	1,17,000 0 0	July "...	16½	32,438 2 1	37,790 6 9
January 1848...	15½	2,67,637 6 0	3,08,452 1 2	August "...	17½	88,201 15 6	1,03,637 5 0
March "...	15½	67,616 7 2	78,097 0 0	December "...	18	59,685 9 6	70,429 0 0
April "...	15½	89,181 15 5	1,03,575 5 11	January 1849...	"	1,13,965 4 1	1,34,479 0 0
May "...	"	2,67,637 10 3	3,09,674 13 1	April "...	"	2,43,847 5 4	2,87,739 13 8
June "...	16½	1,06,919 1 4	1,24,328 5 0	October "...	18½	36,347 10 1	42,981 1 3
July "...	16½	2,33,479 13 3	2,72,004 0 0	November "...	18½	6,51,380 5 4	7,71,885 11 2
August "...	17½	2,71,074 10 9	3,18,512 11 10	December "...	19	757 11 11	901 12 6
September "...	17½	1,67,579 9 10	1,97,324 15 11	March 1850...	19½	80,024 4 5	95,428 15 2
October "...	18	80,508 7 7	95,000 0 0	May "...	19½	47,205 2 7	56,528 2 11
November "...	"	2,56,291 10 1	3,03,253 10 7	November "...	20½	35 9 11	42 14 11
December "...	"	3,32,776 11 5	3,92,676 8 4	December "...	"	1,00,112 8 3	1,20,635 9 3
February 1849...	"	1,72,581 4 3	2,03,645 14 4	January 1851...	20½	37,033 5 2	44,532 9 2
March "...	"	61,551 11 1	82,671 0 0	June "...	20½	9,418 5 6	11,349 1 8
October "...	18½	61,104 13 10	75,804 0 0			36,90,177 2 4	43,02,539 10 2
November "...	18½	2,95,092 0 0	3,49,684 0 3	Balance due on account of			
December "...	19	1,86,336 1 11	2,21,739 15 8	advances made from the			
January 1850...	19½	51,796 10 5	61,897 0 0	Honourable Company's			
February "...	"	2,65,396 3 4	3,17,865 6 6	Treasury to the Troops			
March "...	19½	2,65,673 5 4	3,16,815 6 4	of His Highness the			
April "...	20	2,67,005 9 9	3,20,406 11 8	Nizam's Contingent .....		56,68,981 11 11	66,52,805 4 3
May "...	19½	68,470 9 0	76,006 0 0				
August "...	20½	1,98,130 7 19	2,38,747 3 11				
September "...	20½	3,15,227 10 6	3,80,637 6 3				
November "...	20½	1,39,097 3 1	1,67,612 1 10				
January 1851...	20½	46,195 15 11	55,550 11 0				
February "...	20½	47,134 9 6	56,797 2 11				
March "...	20½	58,755 9 4	70,653 9 5				
April "...	20½	91,351 3 6	1,13,693 3 6				
May "...	"	1,59,583 3 10	1,81,942 0 0				
June "...	"	1,15,696 7 3	1,41,811 3 7				
Total.....		Rs. 93,59,158 14 3	1,09,55,311 14 5	Total.....		Rs. 93,59,158 14 3	1,09,55,311 14 5

	Rate of Exchange.	Company's Rupees.	Bagh Chulnee Rupees.
Balance due on account of Advances, &c.....(brought down)	.....	Rs. 56,68,981 11 11	Rs. 66,52,805 4 3
Amount due on account of pay, &c., to Mr. Ellis, Commissioner for investigating Maharatta claims against the Nizam's Government, from November 1848 to 31st January 1850, and for June and July 1850	21 per cent.	44,711 3 5	54,100 9 0
Allowance to Mohiput Ram's Family from 1st May 1849 to 30th April 1851, at Company's Rupees 5,000 per annum	12½ per cent.	30,000 0 0	*33,660 6 8
Amount due on account of Appah Dessaye's Choute from 1st May 1849 to 30th April 1851, at 1,20,000 Hyderabad Bagh Chulnee Rupees per annum	.....	†9,62,495 5 2	10,80,000 0 0
Balance due by the Nizam's Government to the 30th June 1851...	16½ per cent.	67,06,188 4 6	78,20,565 3 11

\* Less Hyderabad Rupees 24, already received from the Sirkar.

† Calculated at 12½ per cent., but the exact rate to be definitely ascertained hereafter.

(E. E.)

(Signed) J. S. Fraser, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 9th July 1851.

(True Copy.)

(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.

TRANSLATION of a Note from Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, to the address of the Resident at Hyderabad, dated 11th July 1851 (11th Ramzan 1267).

I have received your letter of the 9th July in reply to mine, to the effect that it relates only to matters of minor detail, and does not refer to the general arrangement on this subject on the part of His Highness the Nizam, to enable you to transmit it to the Supreme Government. You are aware of the general arrangement mentioned to you personally by His Highness the Nizam at the interview of the 1st July, and the purport of His Highness's commands was to the following effect: that His Highness had not liquidated to the Honourable Company according to promise, and therefore a demand was made for the transfer of districts. After the receipt of a khureeta from the Governor-General, and in compliance with his Lordship's counsel, a Dewan has been appointed, and the office has been conferred on Suraj-ool-Moolk (that is, on myself), who will pay into your treasury cash and soucars' hoondees with your advice, with a view to the full and complete payment of the debt. On the debt being fully discharged there will exist no necessity for the transfer of districts, and the debt will be easily and quickly paid, whereas it would take years to liquidate by the transfer of territory.

2. As objections are made in the 2nd para. of your note of the 6th instant with regard to the arrangements referred to, that they would prove inconvenient, and cause confusion in the accounts, I concur with you in opinion, and beg now to inform you that, agreeably to the proposition contained in the same para. of your note, the whole amount of the debt due by this Sirkar to the British Government will be liquidated by hoondees on the Presidencies of Calcutta and Madras, and also on other places if approved by the Supreme Government, namely, on Bombay, Agra, Masulipatam, Benares, Mirzapore, and Meerut; and it will be punctually paid according to promise, namely, by hoondees for Co.'s Rs. 34,08,485-11-4, being the equivalent of 40 lacs of Bagh Chulnee rupees, by the 15th August, and the remainder of the debt similarly by hoondees by the 31st October 1851, and they will be discharged at the places on which they are drawn; but the carrying out of this measure will depend on the approval and sanction of the Supreme Government.

3. On my representing to His Highness the arrangement for the full discharge of the debt due by this Sirkar by hoondees, as stated above, His Highness was pleased to approve of it, and gave strict commands that it should be punctually carried into effect.

4. I beg to state, for your information, that although His Highness has given orders for a reply being made to the khureeta from the Governor-General, yet its preparation will depend upon the receipt of an answer from the Supreme Government, and the approval and sanction of these arrangements.

5. I trust you will receive the hoondees I transmit to you, and hold them in deposit till an answer is received from the Governor-General on this subject.

6. To prevent a heavy loss, however, to this Sirkar, I shall be obliged by your informing me whether you will have any objection to give credit in account to this Sirkar for the hoondees on the dates they are delivered to you, as explained in the 2nd para. of my note to you of the 9th instant.

7. With regard to the future regular payments of the Contingent, and other items, I trust the Supreme Government will consider as sufficient and satisfactory the security offered by the statement forwarded to you the day before yesterday. On my making a representation to His Highness on the subject of the payment of the Contingent according to this arrangement, His Highness was pleased to give strict commands that there should be made no difference in it whatever.

(True Copies.)

(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Resident to Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, dated 12th July 1851 (12th Ramzan 1267 H.).

I regret that I cannot accept the intimation you give me in your note under yesterday's date, this moment received, that His Highness the Nizam has

given you strict orders to pay the debt which is now due by His Highness to the British Government as one which I can with propriety submit to the Government of India.

2. I have already acquainted you, and now beg to repeat, that, as an alternative to the immediate transfer of those districts specified by the Government of India, I can assent to nothing less than a personal, unqualified, and solemn assurance on the part of His Highness the Nizam himself that his debt to the British Government shall be paid in the manner and at the times already explained by you, should the Government of India think proper to accede to this proposition.

3. I have received the commands of my own Government to admit of no prolonged delay, and to make no further reference with regard to the transfer of territory demanded.

4. I have, therefore, in these peculiar circumstances, consented to suspend my demand for this transfer until the pleasure of the Government of India shall be known, only under certain general conditions originally proposed by His Highness, and with the particular terms of which, such alone as I could accede to, you are fully acquainted.

5. I have been much disappointed by your note now under acknowledgment, and if I do not receive a more satisfactory one, to that express purport which I yesterday explained to you, and to which I have again adverted in this note, I have to request, on behalf and under the orders of the Government of India, that His Highness will be pleased to name an early day on which I may have a final audience with him, for the purpose of receiving a definite reply with regard to that transfer of districts which the Government of India has peremptorily demanded, and to which, although momentarily suspended, your unsatisfactory note now under acknowledgment has forced me to revert.

(True Translation and Copies.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

MY DEAR GENERAL FRASER,—I have the pleasure to send you the official note drafted yesterday, with an English translation. I delayed its transmission, with a view of sending it with a statement of what passed between His Highness and myself at the interview this forenoon; but as it will occupy much time, a great deal of discussion having taken place, I shall send you the statement (in a private form) in the course of to-morrow.

I have made a slight alteration in the official note, as drafted yesterday, by substituting the words "strict commands" in lieu of the "full assurance" or "promise" of His Highness in the concluding part of the third and seventh paragraphs. As His Highness's promise to give due effect to the measures will be mentioned in the khurecta, His Highness does not think it necessary that it should be so stated in my note. His Highness has given orders for a reply to the Governor-General's khurecta, the draft of which I shall show you, and which will be ready by the time the sanction of the Supreme Government is received to the general arrangement. I expected your reply to this official note, as promised, till a quarter past 10 o'clock this morning, and if it had been received it would have been very serviceable to me at my interview with His Highness. I trust, however, I shall be favoured with it on the receipt of the official note herewith.—Believe me, &c.,

(Signed, in Persian) *Sooraj-ool-Moolk*.

12th July 1851.

To Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, &c., &c., &c., Hyderabad.

MY DEAR SIR,—I very sincerely regret that you have thought proper to substitute the words "strict commands" for those which I recommended to you yesterday, and acquainted you that I could alone accept. This change, I lament

to add, throws a shade of doubt in my mind over the sincerity of His Highness in the whole of the transaction before us, and inspires me with much distrust of his good faith.

I had prepared my reply to your official note, if it had been expressed as I yesterday took the liberty of suggesting to you ; but the change you have made in it has now demanded an altogether different answer.—I remain, &c.,

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser.*

Hyderabad Residency, 12th July 1851.

TRANSLATION of a Note to the Resident from Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor,  
dated 15th July 1851 (15th Ramzan 1267).

I have received your letter of the 12th instant, to the effect that you could not accept the intimation given in my letter on the subject of the debt to the British Government, and submit it to the Government of India. I had an interview with His Highness the Nizam this day, and having submitted your letter for his perusal I received His Highness's commands that the letter should be written and forwarded to you agreeably to the draft which had been drawn up, without any diminution or addition ; I have therefore the pleasure, agreeably to His Highness's commands, to transmit the letter herewith, in accordance with the draft drawn up in your presence.

A. No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a Note to the Resident from Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor,  
dated 11th July 1851 (11th Ramzan 1267).

I have received your letter of the 9th instant in reply to mine, to the effect that it relates only to matters of minor detail, and does not refer to the general arrangements on this subject on the part of His Highness the Nizam, to enable you to transmit it to the Supreme Government. You are aware of the general arrangements mentioned to you personally by His Highness at the interview of the 1st July, and the purport of His Highness's commands was to the following effect : that His Highness had not liquidated the debt to the Honourable Company according to promise, and therefore a demand was made for the transfer of districts. After the receipt of the khureeta from the Governor-General, and in compliance with his Lordship's counsels, a Dewan has been appointed, and the office has been conferred on Suraj-ool-Moolk (that is, on myself), who will pay into your treasury cash and soucars' hoondees with your advice, with a view to the full and complete payment of the debt. On the full discharge of the debt there will exist no necessity for the transfer of districts, and the debt will be easily and quickly paid, whereas it would take years to liquidate by the transfer of territory.

2. As objections are made in the second para. of your note of the 6th instant with regard to the arrangements referred to, that they would prove inconvenient, and cause confusion in the accounts, I concur with you in opinion, and beg now to inform you, that, agreeably to the proposition contained in the same para. of your note, the whole amount of the debt due by this Sirkar to the British Government will be liquidated by hoondees on the Presidencies of Calcutta and Madras, and also on other places if approved by the Supreme Government, namely, on Bombay, Agra, Masulipatam, Benares, Mirzapore, and Meerut, and it will be punctually paid according to promise, namely, by hoondees for Co.'s Rs. 34,08,485-11-4, being the equivalent of 40 lacs of Bagh Chulnee rupees, by the 15th of August, and the remainder of the debt similarly by hoondees by the 31st October 1851, and they will be discharged at the places on which they are drawn ; but the carrying out of this measure will depend on the approval and sanction of the Supreme Government.

3. On my representing to His Highness the arrangement for the full discharge of the debt due by this officer [? Sirkar] by hoondees, as stated above, His

Higness was pleased to approve of it, and gave his full assurance that it should be punctually carried into effect.

4. I beg to state for your information that although His Highness has given orders for a reply being made to the khureeta from the Governor-General, yet its preparation will depend upon the receipt of an answer from the Supreme Government, and the approval and sanction of these arrangements.

5. I trust you will receive the hoondees I transmit to you, and hold them in deposit till an answer is received from the Governor-General on this subject.

6. To prevent a heavy loss, however, to this Sirkar, I shall be obliged by your informing me whether you will have any objection to give credit to this Sirkar in account for the hoondees on the dates they are delivered to you, as explained in the 2nd para. of my note of the 9th instant.

7. With regard to the future regular payments of the Contingent, and other items, I trust the Supreme Government will consider as sufficient and satisfactory the security offered by the statement forwarded to you the day before yesterday. On my making a representation to His Highness on the subject of the payment of the Contingent also, according to this arrangement, His Highness was pleased to give his full assurance that no difference whatever should be made in it.

No. 10.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Resident to Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, dated 15th July 1851 (15th Ramzan 1267).

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your two notes under date respectively the 11th instant and this day, and to acquaint you that it will be forwarded without delay for the consideration and orders of the Government of India.

2. Pending the receipt of further instructions from that authority, I consent to suspend the demand for the transfer of districts which I had the honour, on the part of the Government of India, of submitting to His Highness the Nizam on the 1st instant.

3. I shall not object to receive in deposit, in compliance with your request, the bills of exchange which you may send to me for that purpose, until my receipt of further orders from my own Government.

4. But I regret that it is not in my power to give credit to the Nizam's Government for the amount payable on these bills from the date of their being received in deposit into my treasury.

5. It does not appear to me reasonable to demand, nor am I aware that this would be in consonance with the practice usual on these occasions, and still less that it could with justice be expected under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, that credit should be given to the Nizam's Government, as you propose, from the date of my receiving the bills of exchange in deposit, and that interest upon a corresponding amount of the debt should be discontinued from that date.

6. It appears to me but just that credit should be given for the amount in question, and interest upon it cease in consequence, only from the date at which your bills may arrive at maturity, and are actually payable at the several places on which they may be drawn.

7. The question, however which you have proposed to me on this subject, will be submitted for the consideration and decision of the Government of India.

(True Copies and Translation.)

(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.

No. 2439.

From the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,—I am directed by the Most Noble the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, dated the 16th instant, No. 146, with its several enclosures, detailing the particulars of your interview with the Nizam, when

delivering to him the letter which His Lordship lately addressed to His Highness, and narrating the proceedings which have subsequently taken place under His Highness's orders.

The Nizam having conveyed to you his personal assurance that the debt shall forthwith be liquidated, one-half immediately, and the remainder on the 31st October next, and His Highness having further pledged himself to set apart certain specified talooks in order to ensure the full and regular pay of the Contingent troops, you have consented to suspend the demand for a temporary cession of territory, which you were directed to make, until the sentiments of the Government of India on the present proposals of the Nizam should be communicated to you.

His Lordship certainly approves of your proceedings in this matter.

2. You correctly observe that your suspending the demand for territory was not in strict accordance with the letter of the instructions you received ; but it was in entire conformity with their spirit, and with the obvious wishes and the policy of the Government.

The instructions lately addressed to you did not provide for the event of His Highness's declaring that he would pay his debt at once and in full. The Nizam having for years past failed to observe his reiterated promises to liquidate, or at least not to increase, his debt, and His Highness having replied to the final demand for payment, recently renewed at the expiry of a fixed period, by a distinct statement that he was unable to pay the debt, or any part of it, there seemed to be no necessity nor any reason for providing for an offer of payment in full.

But as the immediate object of the Government of India in requiring a temporary cession of territory was to obtain a liquidation of His Highness's debt, the whole object of the Government was obtained at once by the Nizam's proposed arrangements for a payment in full of the whole debt within a short period, those arrangements being considered by you to be substantial and made in good faith.

The Government of India had no desire to take possession of territory except as a security for the gradual liquidation of His Highness's debt ; when liquidation of that debt, not gradually, but at once, was provided for by His Highness, a cession of territory could no longer be desired by the Government.

You therefore acted with judgment, and in full accordance with the wishes and intentions of the Government of India, when you consented to suspend the demand for cession of the districts named, on receiving the guarantee for payment of the debt before 31st October 1851, which His Highness the Nizam has given.

3. His Lordship authorizes you to receive the hoondees for the sum which is to be paid on or before the 15th proximo. It will be probably most convenient for the Government of India that they should be drawn in equal proportions on Calcutta and Bombay. But, if it should be more convenient to the Nizam's Government to distribute the hoondees of the first instalment over a greater number of places, his Lordship would wish to consult the convenience of His Highness's Government therein.

The Honourable the President in Council will be requested to communicate to you the places on which the second instalment, due on 31st October, should be drawn.

4. Your reply to the request of the Minister regarding the cessation of interest on His Highness's debt from the date at which the hoondees may be deposited in the treasury of the Presidency is fully approved.

Interest upon this debt, as upon every other debt, must, of course, run until the debt is discharged. The interest upon the Nizam's debt, therefore, cannot cease until the date at which the hoondees for the discharge of the several portions of it shall become payable and are actually paid.

5. His Highness the Nizam has solemnly pledged the word of a Prince that the debt shall be fully discharged in the manner he has detailed, and within the period so specified.

The Governor-General will not doubt that a pledge so given, and so far acted upon, will be faithfully redeemed in full.

If, however, from whatever cause, the arrangement to which His Lordship now assents shall materially fail, you will fall back on the instructions conveyed in



my letter of the 6th June last, No. 1783, and will require and enforce the cession of territory therein enjoined. If, in such case, a greater amount of military force than could be supplied by the Subsidiary and Contingent Troops should seem to you to be requisite, you are authorized to require such additional aid from Bellary, or from any other body of troops in the vicinity of the Nizam's territories, as you may think necessary. For any such requisition this despatch shall be your warrant.

6. If, however, the amount of resistance should be uncertain, or you should feel difficulty or doubt on any part of your instructions, the delay which would be incurred in a reference to the Government will not be of any moment.

7. The Governor-General has learnt with much satisfaction that the Nizam has also made provision for the regular payment in future of the Contingent Force, by setting apart for that purpose the revenues of certain talooks specified in a list which the Minister has delivered to you.

If the actual revenues of the talooks are as represented, and if the Nizam, acting in good faith, shall cause these revenues to be rigidly reserved for the purpose to which they are now destined, the arrangement will be sufficient and quite satisfactory.

But as the talooks are to remain in the hands of the Nizam we still have no better security for the future payment of the Contingent than the professed intentions of His Highness.

Accordingly, while satisfaction may be expressed that His Highness, as an additional security, proposes to set apart certain talooks for the payment of the Contingent, &c., His Highness should be made to understand that no further advances will be made to the Contingent from the Residency, and that the general treasury of His Highness is looked to by His Lordship for their full and regular payment.

8. The appointment of a Minister in the person of Suraj-ool-Moolk is a source of satisfaction to the Government of India. His Lordship trusts that His Highness, by confiding in that Minister whom he has appointed, and by imparting to him fully the powers which are indispensable to the efficient discharge of his duties, will give to Suraj-ool-Moolk the weight and the authority he ought to possess under the difficult circumstances in which he assumes the responsibilities of the office of His Highness's Dewan.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *H. M. Elliot*,

Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General.

Simla, 31st July 1851.

No. 2440.—Foreign Department, Fort William.

From the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, to the Officiating Secretary to Government of India.

SIR,—Under instructions from the Most Noble the Governor-General of India, I have the honour to transmit, for the information of the Honourable the President in Council, the accompanying copy of a despatch from the Resident at Hyderabad, dated the 16th instant, No. 146, detailing the particulars of an interview he had with His Highness the Nizam on the subject of the debt due to the British Government, and to inform you that the necessity for despatching immediate instructions to the Resident prevented His Lordship from consulting His Honour in Council respecting the places on which the hoondees of the first instalment should be drawn.

2. His Lordship requests that His Honour in Council will be so good as to consider the subject in the Financial Department, and to inform the Resident upon what places it would be most convenient that the hoondees of the second instalment should be drawn.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *H. M. Elliot*,

Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General.

Simla, 31st July 1851.

No. 147.

From Major-General *J. S. Fraser*, Resident, Hyderabad, to Sir *H. M. Elliot*, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General, Simla.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward, for submission to the Government of India, the accompanying copies and translations of two notes, and of the lists which accompanied them, from Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, and to state that I have received into my treasury in deposit the hoondees therein referred to, for Co's Rs. 16,04,463-8, pending the orders of the Government of India.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 19th July 1851.

TRANSLATION of a Letter to the Resident from Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, dated 18th July 1851 (18th Ramzan 1267 H.).

I have the pleasure to forward herewith 24 soucars' hoondees on Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Masulipatam, and Mirzapore, to the amount of Co's Rs. 13,77,463-8, as per accompanying detailed list in English and Persian, for the purpose of being held in deposit in your Treasury, until the receipt of an answer from the Supreme Government, agreeably to the 3rd para. of your letter of the 15th instant. I shall do myself the pleasure of sending you further hoondees in the course of to-morrow, together with a reply to your letter above referred to, and I shall continue to transmit hoondees to you from time to time agreeably to the period fixed upon, till the whole of the debt of this Sirkar is fully liquidated.

MEMORANDUM of HOONDEES towards the payment of the DEBT of His Highness the Nizam's Government to the British Government.

No.	ON WHOM DRAWN.	Place on which it is drawn.	Date at which it is payable.	AMOUNT.		
				Rs.	a.	p.
1	Hoondee on Seo Lall Kishun Ram.	Calcutta	...61 days' date from 2 July 1851.	1,00,000	0	0
2	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...61 ditto 4 "	21,538	8	0
3	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...61 ditto 2 "	22,000	0	0
4	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...61 ditto 13 "	1,63,000	0	0
5	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...61 ditto 13 "	87,752	0	0
6	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...61 ditto 13 "	60,000	0	0
7	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...61 ditto 13 "	50,000	0	0
8	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...61 ditto 13 "	1,80,000	0	0
9	" Bunsee Lall Abeer Chund...	Madras	...41 ditto 13 "	10,000	0	0
10	" Poorun Mull Sree Kishun Doss .....	Calcutta	...61 ditto 2 "	91,711	8	0
11	" Jowahir Chund Atmaram...	Bombay	...41 ditto 16 "	10,000	0	0
12	" Govardhun Mahraj .....	ditto	...41 ditto 16 "	16,000	0	0
13	" ditto ditto .....	ditto	...41 ditto 16 "	15,000	0	0
14	" Brij Lall Dolup Doss.....	ditto	...41 ditto 16 "	15,000	0	0
15	" Poorun Mull Hurdut Raye.	ditto	...41 ditto 18 "	50,000	0	0
16	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...41 ditto 17 "	49,000	0	0
17	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...41 ditto 16 "	51,000	0	0
18	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...41 ditto 15 "	63,461	8	0
19	" Poorun Mull Sree Kishun Doss .....	Calcutta	...61 ditto 18 "	75,000	0	0
20	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...61 ditto 17 "	50,000	0	0
21	" ditto ditto ...	ditto	...61 ditto 17 "	1,00,000	0	0
22	" Mahanund Ram Poorun Mull	Masulipatam	...41 ditto 17 "	40,000	0	0
23	" Bunsee Lall Abeer Chund...	Madras	...41 ditto 17 "	50,000	0	0
24	" Govind Doss Radha Kishun.	Mirzapore	...61 ditto 17 "	10,000	0	0
24						
TOTAL.....Co's Rs.				13,77,463	8	0

Hyderabad, 17th July 1851.

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

TRANSLATION of a Note from Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor to the Resident,  
dated 18th Ramzan 1267 H. (18th July 1851).

I beg to enclose five hoondees for the sum of 2,24,000 Company's rupees, agreeably to the accompanying English and Persian lists, and to request that you will be so good as to receive them in deposit in the Residency Treasury in the manner determined upon.

## MEMORANDUM of HOONDEES towards the payment of the DEBT of His Highness the Nizam's Government to the British Government.

No.	ON WHOM DRAWN.	Place on which it is Drawn.	Date at which it is Payable.	AMOUNT.	
				Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
	Amount of Hoondees for	warded on	17th July 1851.	.....	13,77,463 8 0
25	Hoondce on Lutchmun Doss Narain Doss	Madras ...	38 days' date from 18 July 1851...	3,000 0 0	
26	" on do. do. ...	Do. ...	38 ditto ditto ...	4,000 0 0	
27	" on Sree Govind Mahraj ...	Bombay...	41 ditto 16 July 1851...	17,000 0 0	
28	" on Lall Kishun Ram ...	Calcutta...	61 ditto 18 ditto ...	1,05,000 0 0	
29	" on do. ...	Do. ...	61 ditto 23 ditto ...	95,000 0 0	2,24,000 0 0
5				Co.'s Rs. ....	16,01,463 8 0
			Total...		
	Amount brought down ...				16,01,463 8 0
30	Hoondce on Tejsee Naynsee ...	Calcutta...	61 days from 18 July 1851 .....		3,000 0 0
			Total...	Co.'s Rs. ....	16,04,463 8 0

(True Copies and Translations.)

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad, 18th July 1851.

No. 160 of 1851.

From Major-General *J. S. Fraser*, Resident, Hyderabad, to Sir *H. M. Elliot*, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 2439, under date the 31st ultimo, and to acquaint you that I have addressed a communication to His Highness the Nizam of the tenor therein directed.

2. The Nizam's Government has this day, in conformity with its promise, completed the payment of the first instalment of its debt to the British Government, Co.'s Rs. 34,08,485-11-4, leaving the balance of Co.'s Rs. 32,97,702-9-2 to be paid on or before the 31st of October next.

3. I enclose a list of the hoondees paid to me up to this date on account of the first instalment, and shall immediately transmit the hoondees themselves to the Governments respectively of Bengal, Agra, Madras and Bombay, for the purpose of being paid when at maturity.

4. A copy of the letter which I have addressed on this occasion to the four Governments respectively is herewith enclosed.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 15th August 1851.

**LIST of HOONDEES furnished by His Highness the Nizam's Government in  
Part-Payment of the Debt due to the British Government.**

By whom Drawn.	On whom Drawn.	Place on which it is Drawn.	Date at which it is Payable.	AMOUNT.	TOTAL.
				Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Sheodut Ram Jysee Ram	Sheo Lall Kishun Ram	Calcutta.	61 days from 2 July 1851.	1,00,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 4	21,538 8 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 3	22,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 13	1,63,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 13	87,752 0 0	
Sheodut Ram Lutchee Ram	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 13	60,000 0 0	
Nuthmull Goverdun Doss	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 13	50,000 0 0	
Sheodut Ram Jysee Ram	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 13	1,80,000 0 0	
Mahanund Ram Poorunmull	Poorunmull Sree Kishun Doss	ditto	61 ditto 2	94,711 8 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 18	75,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 17	50,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 17	1,00,000 0 0	
Sheodut Ram Lutchee Ram	Sheo Lall Kishun Ram	ditto	61 ditto 18	1,05,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 23	95,000 0 0	
Puddumsee Nainsee	Tejsee Nynsee	ditto	61 ditto 18	3,000 0 0	
Sheodut Ram Jysee Ram	Sheo Lall Kishun Ram	ditto	61 ditto 30	40,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 30	10,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 30	25,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 30	25,000 0 0	
Nuthmull Goverdun Doss	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 23 Aug.	25,000 0 0	
Soorut Ram Govind Ram	Soorut Ram Raebhan	ditto	61 ditto 10	25,000 0 0	
Ditto	Manuk Chund Kesree Chund	ditto	61 ditto 10	21,000 0 0	
Mahanund Ram Poorunmull	Poorunmull Sree Kishun Doss	ditto	61 ditto 14	1,25,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	61 ditto 14	75,000 0 0	
Girdharee Lall Futteh Chund	Sadul Sing Beejnath	ditto	61 ditto 11	22,571 0 0	
					16,04,573 0 0
Mahanund Ram Poorunmull	Bunsee Lall Abeer Chund	Madras	41 days from 17 July 1851.	50,000 0 0	
Nuthmull Goverdun Doss	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 13	10,000 0 0	
Lukree Doss Lutchnun Doss	Lutchnun Doss Narain Doss	ditto	38 ditto 18	3,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	38 ditto 18	4,000 0 0	
Nuthmull Goverdun Doss	Bunsee Lall Abeer Chund	ditto	41 ditto 13 Aug.	4,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 16	21,000 0 0	
Soorut Ram Govind Ram	Govind Ram Jyegopaul Doss	ditto	41 ditto 10	25,000 0 0	
Mahanund Ram Poorunmull	Bunsee Lall Abeer Chund	ditto	41 ditto 14	25,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	25,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	21,000 0 0	
Nuthmull Goverdun Doss	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 11	25,000 0 0	
Sheodut Ram Jysee Ram	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	15,000 0 0	
Hunmuth Ram Seeree Ram	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	13,000 0 0	
Girdharee Lall Futteh Chund	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	6,000 0 0	
Lukmee Doss Lutchnun Doss	Lutchnun Doss Narain Doss	ditto	41 ditto 14	20,000 0 0	
Jumna Doss Balkishun Doss	Girchur Doss Wallub Doss	ditto	41 ditto 14	2,500 0 0	
Soorut Ram Govind Ram	Govind Ram Jyegopaul Doss	ditto	45 ditto 14	40,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 16	30,000 0 0	
Jumna Doss Balkishun Doss	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	5,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	4,000 0 0	
Girdharee Lall Futteh Chund	Bunsee Lall Abeer Chund	ditto	41 ditto 14	8,150 0 0	
Jumna Doss Balkishun Doss	Lutchnun Doss Narain Doss	ditto	41 ditto 11	750 0 0	
Narayen Doss Tirmuck Doss	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 11	8,150 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	5,328 10 0	
Jumna Doss Balkishun Doss	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	642 15 0	
Lukmee Doss Lutchnun Doss	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	21,000 0 0	
Jumna Doss Balkishun Doss	Girdhar Doss Wallub Doss	ditto	41 ditto 14	1,500 0 0	
					3,98,021 9 0
Lutchnun Doss Pursotum Doss	Jewair Chund Atmaram	Bombay.	41 days from 16 July 1851.	10,000 0 0	
Ditto	Goverdun Maharaj	ditto	41 ditto 16	10,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 16	15,000 0 0	
Ditto	Birij Lall Dalub Doss	ditto	41 ditto 16	15,000 0 0	
Mahanund Ram Poorunmull	Poorunmull Hurdut Roy	ditto	41 ditto 18	50,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 17	40,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 16	51,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 15	63,461 8 0	
Lutchnun Doss Pursotum Doss	Sree Goverdun Maharaj	ditto	41 ditto 16	17,000 0 0	
Mahanund Ram Poorunmull	Poorunmull Hurdut Roy	ditto	41 ditto 30	65,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 31	15,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 1 Aug.	25,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 7	10,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 11	31,316 2 0	
Sheodut Ram Lutchee Ram	Jysee Ram Sheo Lall	ditto	41 ditto 1	15,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 6	15,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 7	16,016 8 0	
Sheodut Ram Jysee Ram	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 6	29,532 10 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 9	40,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 15	46,395 12 0	
Sheodut Ram Lutchee Ram	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 17	33,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 19	33,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 21	31,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 11	38,161 8 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 15	20,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 18	20,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 20	21,538 8 0	
			Carried forward	8,27,842 8 0	20,02,594 9 0

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

By whom Drawn.	On whom Drawn.	Place on which it is Drawn.	Date at which it is Payable.	Amount.	TOTAL.
				Ra. a. p.	Ra. a. p.
			Brought forward.....	8,27,842 8 9	20,02,594 9 0
Soorut Ram Govind Ram ...	Jyegopaul Doss Pursotum Doss	Bombay.	41 days from 10 Aug. 1851.	25,000 0 0	
Sheodut Ram Lutchee Ram ...	Jysee Ram Sheo Lall	ditto	41 ditto 14	90,000 0 0	
Nuthmull Goverdun Doss ...	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	25,000 0 0	
Sheodut Ram Jysee Ram ...	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	75,000 0 0	
Hannunth Ram Sree Ram ...	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	47,000 0 0	
Jumna Doss Balkishun Doss ...	Nurrotum Doss Hurrybhace.	ditto	45 ditto 14	3,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	45 ditto 14	4,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	45 ditto 14	5,500 0 0	
Narain Doss Tirmuk Doss ...	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 14	6,100 0 0	
Luckmee Doss Lutchmun Doss	Jewair Chund Atmaram	ditto	44 ditto 14	10,000 0 0	
Lutchmun Doss Pursotum Doss	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 15	15,000 0 0	
Lutchmee Doss Lutchmun Doss	Goverdun Maharaj	ditto	41 ditto 14	20,000 0 0	
Ditto	ditto	ditto	41 ditto 15	11,142 15 0	
Soorut Ram Govind Ram ...	Jyegopaul Doss Pursotum Doss	ditto	45 ditto 14	15,714 8 0	
Mahanund Ram Poorunmull ...	Poorunmull Hordut Roy	ditto	41 ditto 14	1,00,000 0 0	
Lutchmun Doss Pursotum Doss	Birij Lall Dulab Doss	ditto	41 ditto 15	15,000 0 0	
Sooltan Chund Bahadur Chund	Bagmull Jeetmul	ditto	41 ditto 14	17,908 8 4	
Mahanund Ram Poorunmull ...	Mahanund Ram Poorunmull...	Masulipatam.	41 days from 17 July 1851.	40,000 0 0	13,14,208 7 4
Nuthmull Goverdun Doss ...	Girdhur Doss Maneckjee	ditto	41 ditto 21 Aug...	6,682 11 0	
Mahanund Ram Poorunmull ...	Mahanund Ram Poorunmull	ditto	41 ditto 14	25,000 0 0	
Nuthmull Goverdun Doss ...	Girdhur Doss Maneckjee	ditto	41 ditto 14	10,000 0 0	
Mahanund Ram Poorunmull ...	Goni Doss Radhakishen	Mirzapore.	61 days from 17 July 1851.	10,000 0 0	81,682 11 0
					10,000 0 0
			Total.....	Co.'s Ra....	34,08,485 11 4

(Signed) J. S. Fraser, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 15th August 1851.

No. 619 of 1851.

From the Resident at Hyderabad to the Secretary to Government of Bengal.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward, for submission to the Government of Bengal, the accompanying copy of a letter which I have addressed, under this date, to the Secretary to the Government of India with the Most Noble the Governor-General, and to transmit herewith 25 hoondees, drawn by the soucars at Hyderabad on their correspondents at Calcutta, for the sum of 16,04,573 Company's rupees, agreeably to the accompanying detailed list, and request that you will be so good as to inform me on what dates respectively the hoondees in question are duly paid, as the interest on that portion of the Nizam's debt which they represent will then cease.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. S. Fraser, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 15th August 1851.

Letter of the same tenor and date (*mutatis mutandis*) to the Governments of Agra, Madras and Bombay.

(True copy.)

(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.

(No. 2770.)

From the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 15th ultimo, No. 160, reporting the payment in full by the Nizam's Government of the first instalment of its debt, and in reply to express his Lordship's satisfaction at this intelligence.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) H. M. Elliot,

Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General.

Simla, 5th September 1851.

No. 163.

From Major-General *J. S. Fraser*, Resident, Hyderabad, to Sir *H. M. Elliot*, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, Simla.

SIR,—I have the honour to submit, for the consideration and orders of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a note from Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor under yesterday's date, and of my reply under this day's date.

2. As I advert, in the course of my reply to the Minister, to the fact of a new coinage recently issued from the Gudwal Mint, containing 10 annas only of fine silver in the rupee, I beg to transmit a copy of Captain Taylor's letter to me on this subject, under date the 8th instant, and of two letters from me to that gentleman in reply.

3. The wretched system of coinage in the Nizam's country, and the indispensable necessity of placing this important department on a better footing, have been strongly urged by me on the attention of Suraj-ool-Moolk, who has promised to give such immediate attention to the subject as its importance deserves.—I have, &c.,  
(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 20th August 1851.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor to the Resident,  
dated<sup>a</sup> 14th August 1851 (15th Shuwal 1267).

I have the honour to submit for your consideration the heavy loss sustained by the Sirkar by the exchange on hoondees purchased and forwarded to you on account of the debt to the British Government. My proposal to discharge the debt by the payment of 4,00,000 Bagh Chulnee rupees by the 15th August, and the remainder by the 31st October next, had reference to the payment in rupees; but as the inconveniences were great, and Bagh Chulnee rupees for the requisite amount could not possibly be procured unless a very extended period were allowed, your suggestion for the liquidation of the debt by the hoondees has been adopted, and I fully appreciate the convenience of this mode of payment. I beg, however, to observe that the demand for hoondees on this account has raised the exchange to a very high rate, and I am obliged to give on an average 130 Hyderabad rupees for 100 Company's rupees remitted to you, for which in return you give this Sirkar credit at the rate of Bagh Chulnee rupees 116-9-10, which is the average rate as shown by the memorandum furnished by you under date the 9th July: this occasions a very serious loss to the Sirkar, as will appear from the subjoined statement.

The amount of debt to the British Government, as per statement 9th July, is Co's Rs. 67,06,188-4-6. In remitting the above by hoondees I pay on an average 30 per cent. in Hyderabad rupees, from which if the premium on Bagh Chulnee rupees (namely, Rs. 6-12 per cent.) is deducted the rate in Bagh Chulnee rupees will be 23½ per cent., at which the above sum of Company's rupees will amount to—

	Rs.	a.	p.
Bagh Chulnee rupees.....	82,65,377	0	6
Deduct Amount actually due to the British Government in Bagh Chulnee rupees.....	78,20,566	3	11
The loss to this Sirkar is Bagh Chulnee rupees .....	4,44,810	12	9
And the difference between the Bagh Chulnee and Shehur Chulnee rupees.....	4,52,667	11	7
TOTAL Loss in Shehur Chulnee rupees.....	Rs. 8,97,478	7	4

Besides the above loss, the Sirkar has already paid interest on the debt to the British Government to the amount of Bagh Chulnee rupees 10,95,767-14-6. This Sirkar will have thus paid, inclusive of interest and exchange, Bagh Chulnee rupees 93,61,114-15 for a loan of Bagh Chulnee rupees 78,20,566-3-11; and to this amount if the current payments be added the Sirkar will have paid at the end of a year above a crore and a quarter rupees. You will perceive how difficult

<sup>a</sup> *Sic in orig.* The original Persian document is dated 19th August (20th Shuwal).

it must be to the Sirkar under present circumstances to pay so large a sum. The rate of exchange on your bills also, on an average of the three places on which you draw, is Rupees 20-14-8 per cent., and the demand on this Sirkar, on account of the Saliandars is converted into Bagh Chulnee rupees at 21 per cent. Under these circumstances, and considering the present embarrassments of the Sirkar, I hope you will have no objection to allow this Sirkar the same rate of exchange (that is, 21 per cent.) for the hoondees remitted to you, which I think would be an equitable rate, and the loss to this Sirkar would be lessened. It is the universal practice to pay a debt at the current rate of exchange, and not at the rate which prevailed when the loan was made; and this you will find, upon inquiry, to be invariably the rule in all monetary transactions. It should also be borne in mind that the present debt has accumulated in the course of seven years by comparatively small sums, and the whole of it is now required to be paid within four months. I trust that these several points will be taken into consideration, and hope that the unity and friendship which has so long subsisted between the two Governments will induce the Government of India to sanction the adoption of the rate I have solicited.

Although the Supreme Government concur with you in opinion as to the date on which credit should be given to this Sirkar for the hoondees transmitted to you, I would yet beg leave to urge the subject on your attention by further observing that by protracting the date on which credit is given, to the period on which the amount of the hoondie is actually realized, an additional loss is entailed on this Sirkar. If, instead of hoondees, the Sirkar paid the amount of the debt to you in cash, and you found it expedient to remit the money to the Presidencies, you would have to pay ready money to the soucars for the hoondees you procured for this purpose; and as I send you hoondees so purchased, instead of the coin, I do not think I am unreasonable in requesting that credit may be given to this Sirkar on the dates the hoondees are delivered to you.

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From the Resident to Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor, 20th August 1851  
(21st Shuwal 1267).

I have had the honour to receive, and shall submit to the Government of India, your note to my address under yesterday's date, accompanied by an English translation, on the subject of the loss incurred by His Highness the Nizam's Government by the financial transaction now in progress for the liquidation of His Highness's debt to the Honourable Company.

The arguments you have brought forward in your note have not induced me to change the opinion I have already expressed to you on the subject; nor do I concur with you in considering it equitable that the loss to the Nizam's Government, of which you complain, should be lessened at the expense of the British Government.

The fact of His Highness having incurred a debt to the British Government at all has been caused by the intolerable state of disorder in which the affairs of this State have been allowed to proceed for some years past, in spite of the most solemn and oft-repeated warning of the certain ulterior consequence of this state of things conveyed to His Highness by the British Government, and frequently urged on His Highness's attention by myself in my personal interviews with him.

Under these circumstances, however much I may regret the financial difficulties with which the Nizam's Government is now embarrassed, I cannot offer my personal opinion in favour of its being relieved from them in any way which may involve a pecuniary loss to the Honourable Company.

You state at the commencement of your note now under acknowledgment that your proposal to discharge the debt by the payment of 40 lacs of Bagh Chulnee rupees by the 15th of August, and the remainder by the 31st October next, had reference to the payment in rupees.

You are perfectly aware, and you now acknowledge, that Bagh Chulnee rupees to the requisite amount could not possibly be procured unless a very extended period for payment were allowed.

But this extended period did not suit the purpose of the British Government, as I have several times had occasion to explain to His Highness the Nizam, and as was expressly stated also in the recent despatch from the Governor-General to His Highness of the 6th June last. In what other manner, then, I would ask, but by means of bills on the Presidencies, could the debt be liquidated? Are you alluding here to its payment, as you originally suggested, in the Shuhur Chulnee or other depreciated coins of the Nizam's country, Guttotes, &c., &c.?

To what purpose, or with what ulterior object, could I have received these into the Residency Treasury? This description of coin would have been altogether useless as regards the payment of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, which you are fully aware is paid only in Bagh Chulnee rupees.

If, then, it were to have been transmitted in payment of the debt to the Presidencies, at what rate could the British Government have consented to receive it? As bullion only, I presume; and I leave it to yourself to judge what in this case would have been the loss to the Nizam's Government when the coins current within the Nizam's dominions have been in course of greater depreciation than ever for a considerable time past, and still are so, to such an extent that, as I recently had occasion to make known to you by a despatch from the officer on special duty at Shorapore, the rupees lately coined at Gudwal are so debased as actually not to have more than 10 annas of pure silver in the 16.

The explanation I have now offered may perhaps be sufficient to convince you not only that the mode of payment by bills on the Presidencies was the most convenient to the British Government, and equally so, as you yourself informed me, to the Nizam's Government, but that this was, in point of fact, the only way in which payment could have been made.

The Government of India will give definitive instructions on the subject of the note to which I have now the honour of replying; but, as far as regards my own personal and individual opinion, I regret to be obliged to observe that the arguments you have thought proper to bring forward have not tended in the slightest degree to alter the opinion I expressed in my note to you of the 15th ultimo, and in the justice of which the Government of India has fully concurred, as I had the honour of informing you, for communication to His Highness the Nizam, in my note of the 12th instant.

(True translation.)

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

No. 941.

From Captain *Meadows Taylor*, on Special Duty, Shorapore, to Major-General *J. S. Fraser*, Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR, — I have the honour to bring to your notice, for the information of His Highness the Nizam's Government, that the circulation of debased coin in these districts appears to be very largely on the increase, proceeding not only from Soogoor, but Gudwal Mints, which are reported to be in very active operation, notwithstanding the former prohibition by the Sirkar.

2. Formerly the Narrainpet Siccas, new and old, were the only coin in circulation at Shorapore, and enough were obtainable to pay the revenue. A small proportion of the old Gudwal and Raichore Siccas now and then appeared, but were rejected at the Treasury, by my orders, as far as possible, and only received where it was obviously impossible to obtain others, and at a charge of one or two pice per rupee.

3. Recently, however, that is, within the last two months, the Narrainpet Siccas have almost disappeared, and the Siccas of Gudwal and Soogoor increased in proportion; and it is now not only impossible to obtain payments of revenue in the old coinage, but the quantity of new Gudwal and Soogoor coinage having increased to so great an extent I have been obliged very reluctantly to authorize, for the present, the receipt and circulation of these coins.

4. Some assays of this coinage have been lately made by the soucars here;



and it appears, from their examination, that there is only 10 annas' worth of pure silver in the new rupee, the rest being copper and tin, or copper only, and, further, that this rupee is less in weight by several grains than the old one. In some trials with Narrainpett Rupees and new Gudwal Siccas I found that in every 10 rupees there was a deficiency of weight of one masha, while the assay touch of the silver showed an evident inferiority to new and old Narrainpett Rupees of, as estimated by the soucars, 10 per cent value. The Soogoor Rupee was a shade better, and equal to the old Gudwal Sicca, but both were at least five per cent. inferior, if not more, to the Narrainpett Rupees.

5. As there is no other coinage in operation in the neighbourhood of these districts but that of Gudwal and Soogoor, and the advantages to be obtained by the dishonest practices which are evidently in operation present two great temptations to be resisted by the shroffs and merchants of the country, it appears absolutely necessary that His Highness the Nizam's Government should take more active measures for the suppression of the Gudwal coinage than it has hitherto done, and prevent the coin of the country, already very inferior to a proper standard, from further debasement; for it is evident that so long as no check or supervision of any kind is attempted the debasement of the coinage will continue to increase.

6. It is reported that the shroffs of the country buy up the old and new Narrainpett Siccas, and sell them to more substantial parties at a premium of five per cent. They are then taken to Gudwal, where they are recoined in the present debased form, at a decrease of intrinsic value, which affords another considerable profit. It is next to impossible to detect these proceedings in any instance; but the rapid disappearance of the Narrainpett Siccas, and the substitution, now nearly universal, of Gudwal and Soogoor Rupees, certainly gives probability to the supposition.

7. I beg also to bring to your notice that there is no copper coinage that I can hear of hereabouts in operation; and as the quantity of pice in circulation diminishes, the exchange becomes higher. Within the last few months the exchange of Narrainpett Rupees into pice has decreased by four pice in the rupee, the former standard having been 60 pice, and the present 56 pice. The new Gudwal Sicca is at 54 pice per rupee, which, taking the old Narrainpett Sicca and price of copper coin as a standard, shows a decrease in value in exchange of rupees into pice of six pice per rupee, or one and a half annas in the rupee, or nine rupees and six annas per cent., which, it is evident, is a great loss to the community.

8. Formerly, that is, as late as the reign of the late Rajah, Shorapore coined enough pice to supply the wants of its own population; and, should you have no objection, I propose to resume the former copper coinage in order to relieve the existing pressure, which must otherwise continue to increase. The circulation of Shorapore, or, as the coinage is termed, "Wagingera" pice will not extend beyond the district.—I have, &c.,

Shorapore, 8th August 1851.

(Signed) *Meadows Taylor*,  
On Special Duty.

No. 599.

To Captain *M. Taylor*, on Special Duty, Shorapore.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 94, under date the 8th instant, and to thank you for the information therein conveyed.

2. It refers to a very important subject, and I shall lose no time in urging it upon the attention of His Highness the Nizam's Government.

3. The proposition brought forward in the last para. of your letter now under acknowledgment, regarding the coinage of copper pice in Shorapore, will be taken into consideration, and receive a further reply hereafter.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 12th August 1851.

No. 616.

To Captain *M. Taylor*, on Special Duty, Shorapore.

SIR,—With reference to your letter to my address No. 94, of the 8th, and my reply, No. 599, of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit for your information the accompanying copy of a note to my address from His Highness the Nizam's Minister, from which you will learn that he has under consideration the adoption of such measures as are requisite for placing on a proper footing the whole system of coinage in His Highness the Nizam's dominions.

2. For the reasons stated in your letter now under acknowledgment, I concur with you in considering it desirable that the coinage termed "Wagingera" Pice should be renewed as formerly at Shorapore, and sufficient to supply the wants of the population of that district, but not to extend beyond it.

3. I express this opinion, with the understanding that this description of coinage was formerly struck at Shorapore, and continued to be so as late as the reign of the late Rajah, and that there is no doubt as to the right of the Sunnasthan to coin money.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 15th August 1851.

(True copies.)

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

No. 2851.—Foreign Department.

From the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General to the Resident, Hyderabad.

SIR,—I have received and laid before the Governor-General your despatch of the 20th ultimo, No. 163, submitting correspondence with Suraj-ool-Moolk regarding loss incurred by the Nizam's Government by the financial transactions now in progress for the liquidation of His Highness's debt to the British Government, and forwarding also correspondence with Captain Taylor relative to a new coinage issued from the Gudwal Mint.

2. I am directed to inform you that His Lordship approves of the reply which you have made to the Minister of His Highness the Nizam.

3. The Minister has represented that a heavy additional charge in exchange is imposed on the Nizam's Government by the necessity of paying the principal sum of 67 lacs Company's rupees within four months to time.

4. With reference to the above, the Governor-General desires me to observe that the necessity for paying this sum within so limited a period was not created by the Government of India: on the contrary, ample warning was given by it, and liberal grace was allowed.

5. When in the year 1849 the Government intimated to the Nizam that his debt must without fail be liquidated in full, more than a twelvemonth was allowed to His Highness for that purpose. At the expiry of the twelvemonth, nearly six months more were allowed to pass before the demand was peremptorily pressed upon him.

6. His Highness did not think proper to pay any attention to these demands, or to make any preparation for a liquidation which, it now appears, His Highness might have effected then, as well as now.

7. The pressure which exists has therefore been created by His Highness's own acts, and the extra charge which that pressure may impose cannot justly be placed on the Government of India.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *H. M. Elliot*,

Secretary to Government of India with the Governor-General.

Simla, 13th September 1851.

## No. 753 of 1851.—Foreign Department.

From *A. R. Young*, Esq., Officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India, to *E. C. Bayley*, Esq., Under-Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General.

SIR,—With reference to Sir Henry Elliot's despatch, dated the 31st ultimo, No. 2440, I am directed by His Honour the President in Council to transmit, for the information of the Most Noble the Governor-General, the accompanying copies of a letter written under this date to the Resident at Hyderabad, and of its enclosure, relative to the places on which it would be convenient that His Highness the Nizam should draw hoondees in liquidation of the second instalment of his debt to the British Government.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *A. R. Young*,

Officiating Under-Secretary to Government of India.

Fort William, 28th August 1851.

## No. 752 of 1851.—Foreign Department.

From the Officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,—With reference to the 3rd para. of Sir Henry Elliot's letter to your address, dated the 31st ultimo, No. 2439, I am directed by His Honour the President in Council to transmit, for your information and guidance, the accompanying copy of an extract from the Proceedings of Government, in the Financial Department, under date the 22nd instant, No. 1308, relative to the places on which it would be convenient that His Highness the Nizam should draw hoondees in liquidation of the second instalment of his debt to the British Government.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *A. R. Young*,

Officiating Under-Secretary to Government of India.

Fort William, 28th August 1851.

## No. 1308.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Hon'ble the President of the Council of India in Council in the Financial Department, under date the 22nd August 1851.

Read an Extract from the Proceedings of the Hon'ble the President in Council, in the Foreign Department, No. 711, dated the 13th instant, forwarding for consideration a letter, No. 2440, dated the 31st ultimo, from the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, inquiring on what places His Highness the Nizam can draw hoondees in liquidation of the second instalment of his debt to the British Government with most convenience to this Government.

*Resolution.*—The President in Council observes that it will be most convenient that the hoondees to be delivered to the Resident at Hyderabad, in liquidation of the debt of His Highness the Nizam, should be drawn on the principal cities of the North-Western Provinces of Bengal, viz., Benares, Mirzapore, Agra, or Delhi. Failing these cities, hoondees on Calcutta will answer next best; and if not to be had on Calcutta, then they may be taken on Bombay, and last of all on Madras; but this latter alternative had better be avoided, excepting in case of necessity.

*Order.*—Ordered, that a copy of the foregoing Resolution be sent to the Foreign Department in reply to the above Extract, and for communication to the Resident at Hyderabad.

(A true extract.)

(Signed) *J. Dorin*,

Secretary to the Government of India.

(True copies.)

(Signed) *A. R. Young*,

Officiating Under-Secretary to Government of India.

No. 170.

From Major-General *J. S. Fraser*, Resident, Hyderabad, to Sir *H. M. Elliot*, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, Simla.

SIR,—I have the honour to request that you will be pleased to submit to the Government of India the correspondence noted below,\* regarding the non-acceptance of four of the hoondees furnished to me by the Nizam's Government which were forwarded by me to the Government of Fort St. George on the 15th ultimo.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 5th September 1851.

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No. 353.—Political Department.

From Sir *H. C. Montgomery*, Bart., Chief Secretary to Government, Fort St. George, to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,—With reference to my letter of the 2nd instant, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to enclose, for your information, copy of one and its enclosure from the Accountant-General, notifying the non-acceptance of four of the hoondees received with your letter of the 15th idem.—I have, &c.,

No. 347, dated 29th Aug. 1851; No. 259.

(Signed) *H. C. Montgomery*, Chief Secretary.

30th August 1851.

No. 259.—Financial Department.

From Sir *Vansittart Stonehouse*, Bart., Accountant-General, to Sir *H. C. Montgomery*, Bart., Chief Secretary to Government.

SIR,—With reference to my letter of the 23rd instant, No. 256, I have the honour to forward copy of one received from the Sub-Treasurer, dated 27th instant, with copies of the correspondence therein alluded to, relative to the non-acceptance by the parties on whom they are drawn of four hoondees out of the 31 which accompanied the order of Government of the 22nd instant, and to suggest that intimation of the same be given to the Resident at Hyderabad, as measures may perhaps still be taken to ensure payment of the bills at their due dates, which will not be before the latter end of September.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *T. V. Stonehouse*, Accountant-General.

Fort St. George, Accountant-General's Office, 29th August 1851.

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No. 366.

From *S. D. Birch*, Esq., Sub-Treasurer, to Sir *Vansittart Stonehouse*, Bart., Accountant-General.

SIR,—I do myself the honour of forwarding copy of a letter addressed by me to the Honourable Company's Solicitor, No. 364, of yesterday's date, and of his reply thereto; the hoondees referred to will be presented on their due dates. I request your further instructions in the event of their not being paid.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *S. D. Birch*, Sub-Treasurer.

Fort St. George, General Treasury,  
27th August 1851.

\* The Chief Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George to the Resident, No. 353, dated 30th August 1851. The Resident to the Minister, dated 4th September, 1851. The Minister to the Resident, dated 4th September 1851. The Resident to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George, dated 5th September 1851. The Resident to the Minister, dated 5th September 1851.

No. 364.

From *S. D. Birch*, Esq., Sub-Treasurer, to *Clement Dale*, Esq., Honourable Company's Solicitor.

SIR,—I do myself the honour of forwarding four hoondees as under, which I have to request you will note for non-acceptance :—

	Co.'s Rs.	a.	p.
1 Hoondee, No. 83, on Lutchmun Doss Narrain Doss, Madras, at 41 days' date, from 14th August 1851, for.....	20,000	0	0
1 Hoondee, No. 96, on Lutchmun Doss Narrain Doss, Madras, at 41 days' date, from 15th August 1851, for.....	8,150	0	0
1 Hoondee, No. 97, on Lutchmun Doss Narrain Doss, Madras, at 41 days' date, from 15th August 1851, for.....	5,328	10	0
1 Hoondee, No. 99, on Lutchmun Doss Narrain Doss, Madras, at 41 days' date, from 15th August 1851, for..	21,000	0	0

I have, &c.,

(Signed) *S. D. Birch*, Sub-Treasurer.

Fort St. George, General Treasury,  
26th August 1851.

No. 249.

From *Clement Dale*, Esq., Honourable Company's Solicitor, to *S. D. Birch*, Esq., Sub-Treasurer, Fort St. George.

Letter from Sub-Treasurer to  
Hon. Company's Solicitor, 26th  
August 1851, No. 364.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to my address noted in the margin, together with its enclosures.

2. I presented the four hoondees for acceptance, when Lutchmun Doss Narrain Doss refused to accept the same, and I noted them, as requested in your letter, and herewith return them.

3. My charges in the aggregate amount to 34 rupees (thirty-four), eight rupees and eight annas for each hoondee, which sum be pleased to receive on my account in case the hoondees are hereafter paid.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *Clement Dale*,

Honourable Company's Solicitor.

Madras, 27th August 1851.

(True Copies.)

(Signed) *S. D. Birch*, Sub-Treasurer.

(True Copies.)

(Signed) *J. L. Lushington*,  
Head Assistant Accountant-General.

(True Copies.)

(Signed) *H. C. Montgomery*, Chief Secretary.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Resident to the Minister, dated 7th Zilkaid 1267 (4th September 1851).

I lose no time in transmitting for your information the accompanying original despatch, which I have just received from the Government of Fort St. George.

I request that the despatch now forwarded may be returned immediately, as it is necessary that I should submit it without delay for the information of the Government of India.

(True Translation.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

TRANSLATION of a Note from Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated 4th September 1851 (7th Zilkaid 1267).

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, transmitting to me the original letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Fort St.

George to your address under this date,\* with enclosures, which I have the honour to return.

\* *Sic in orig.*

2. In reply I beg to inform you that the cause of the non-acceptance of the hoondees referred to is, that the drawer delayed the transmission of the requisite letter of advice to his agents for five or six days, in consequence of some pressing business intervening.

3. The soucars told me of this delay at the time, and suggested I should inform you of it; but the parties being opulent men, and the hoondees at a fixed date, I did not think it necessary to do so, as they would be punctually paid on becoming due, and I trust you will excuse the omission.

4. The drawers, Luckmee Doss Lutchmun Doss, as well as their agents at Madras, Lutchmun Doss Narrain Doss, are men of great wealth and of the highest respectability; and there is not the least doubt of the hoondees being discharged on the dates they become due, and I beg to assure you that every one of the hoondees will be equally discharged without hesitation.

5. I beg to observe that several of the hoondees on Bombay and Madras have been paid already, and returned to the drawers at this place duly receipted, some of them before reaching maturity, as the soucars preferred paying the money at once to retaining it in their hands.

(True copy.)

(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.

No. 691.

To the Chief Secretary to the Government, Fort St. George.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 353, under date the 30th ultimo, with an enclosure from the Accountant-General notifying the non-acceptance of four of the hoondees received with my letter of the 15th ultimo.

2. I lost no time in communicating the purport of your despatch to His Highness the Nizam's Minister, and have the honour to forward a copy of his reply, which, although not altogether satisfactory to me as regards the reason alleged in the second para. for the non-acceptance of the hoondees referred to, will, I trust, be considered sufficient, unless any further obstacle should present itself to the acceptance of the hoondees in question.

3. I shall not fail to bring to the Minister's notice that it was the duty of the Nizam's Government to take care not only that the hoondees I transmitted to you should be paid at the dates specified, but also that they should be accepted on presentation.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. S. Fraser, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 5th September 1851.

(True copy.)

(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Resident to the Minister dated 8th Zilkaid 1267 (5th September 1851).

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your note under yesterday's date, No. 457, on the subject of the four hoondees which have been noted at Madras for non-acceptance by the Honourable Company's Solicitor.

I transmit for your information the copy of a letter which I have addressed under this date to the Government of Fort St. George, and the whole of the correspondence which has taken place on the subject of the hoondees in question will be submitted also to the Government of India.

(True translation.)

(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.

me need be feared, he suggested that I should again address an official note to him, which he might communicate to His Highness, and by this means undeceive him as to my intentions and the nature of the instructions under which I was acting.

23. He further acquainted me that His Highness was certainly in possession of jewels worth about three crores of rupees, besides very valuable property, in the recesses of the palace, accumulated by his ancestors during the course of nearly a century past, and a large amount of money in gold and silver, which, however, he could not specify exactly, in consequence of the Nizam's keeping this matter concealed as much as possible, and always solemnly denying that he had any money whatever left in his treasury.

24. Under all these circumstances, and perceiving that it was avarice, and not poverty, or any real inability of compliance, that I had to contend against, I did not hesitate to write a note<sup>a</sup> to the Minister of the purport he had suggested,

<sup>a</sup> No. 5.

which he took in with him to the city the next morning Saturday, 15th instant.

25. His Highness the Nizam was indisposed on that day, and on the next day Suraj-ool-Moolk himself was taken so seriously unwell as to be obliged to require the attendance of the Residency Surgeon. Other trivial circumstances then intervened, and the Minister had no opportunity of waiting on His Highness until the morning of the 18th ultimo.

26. He returned to Bolarum in the evening of that day, and related to me verbally the particulars of what had occurred in his interview with his master.

27. He acquainted me that this interview had been a successful one, and that he had obtained permission from His Highness to make such temporary use of the property he had made over to him as might render it available in his negotiations with the soucars.

28. He added that His Highness had received him in a very kind manner, and that, besides offering him all the assistance he would require for the liquidation of the debt still due to the British Government, he had authorized and directed him to proceed to the reduction of unnecessary expenditure by the disbandment of useless troops (tyenat jumact) to the extent of 60 lacs of rupees per annum, stipulating only that no reduction should be made in the two items of the Contingent and of the troops personally attached to His Highness himself, or what is designated "Sarfi-i-Khas."

29. He also informed me that he had mentioned to His Highness the necessity of entering without delay into the investigation of the financial liabilities of the Sirkar under the general superintendence of a European officer or officers, and that His Highness appeared fully disposed to concur with him in the propriety of this measure.

30. This subject, however, had not been discussed or arranged in any detail, as the Nizam stated that he was desirous of getting entirely rid of the question of his debt to the British Government before he entered into the consideration of any other business.

31. This conversation between Suraj-ool-Moolk and myself occurred in the evening of the 18th ultimo, and as it was at a late hour when it took place he stated that he would postpone writing to me officially on the subject till the next day.

32. On the 19th he accordingly addressed an official note<sup>†</sup> to me, of which

<sup>†</sup> No. 6.

and of its enclosure I have the honour to transmit copies and translations.

33. It was in the course of this day that he informed me of a further difficulty which had just then occurred to embarrass his financial arrangements, in the reported, but not confirmed, failure of the great soucar Poorun Mull, which sensibly affected the money market at Hyderabad.

34. Suraj-ool-Moolk returned to the city on the 20th, but came back to Bolarum on the 28th, and finally returned to the city on the 30th ultimo, two days after which I also left Bolarum, and came back to my usual residence at Chudderghaut.

35. Between the 20th ultimo and yesterday, the 4th instant, no official communications took place between the Minister and myself on the subject of the Nizam's debt, although I several times addressed him privately, with a view to stimulate him to active exertion, and to allow no longer time to elapse without taking some decided step which might save his master from the dishonour of having violated his engagement.

36. Nothing decided, however, took place until yesterday, when I received from him the note and hoondees referred to in the first para. of this despatch.

37. A copy and translation of the note here mentioned are enclosed, as also a copy and translation of the note which I addressed to the Minister in reply.

No. 7.  
No. 8.

38. The amount that has now been sent to me by no means realizes the expectations I had been led to entertain; but as the Minister states that arrangements for the transmission of hoondees are now in course of accomplishment, and has promised that the whole amount of the second instalment shall be paid in successive portions within one month from this date, it will be for the Government of India to determine whether the partial fulfilment of the Nizam's engagement shall be accepted for the present, or those more rigid measures had recourse to which were referred to in your letter, No. 3429, under date the 31st July last.

39. Upon a review of the steps taken by me for ensuring the Nizam's adherence to his engagement, and the final liquidation of his debt to the British Government, it may perhaps appear that my three notes of the 24th and 30th October and 14th ultimo, to the Dewan and Nizam respectively, were expressed in somewhat too extreme and rigorous terms.

40. But a judgment on this point should be formed with reference to the peculiar character of the Prince I had to deal with. Slow and apathetic even where his nearest interests are concerned, desirous of throwing the burden of every onerous and inconvenient responsibility on his Minister, rather than assume any portion of it himself, and tenacious of his personal wealth to a degree that I felt quite assured no sense of honour or shame would counterbalance nor any motive whatever overcome short of an absolute and decided pressure, from which it might be thought he would be hardly able to escape, I acted upon a personal knowledge of his individual character, and adopted measures which, however unsuitable they might have been in other cases, were alone applicable and likely to be effective in this.

41. I regret that I have not been more successful, and that it is still to the fulfilment of a promise only we are to look for the payment of the debt, instead of this having been actually performed at the stipulated time.

42. If the Government of India consents to allow the Nizam the further short delay which has been requested, and His Highness's debt to the Honourable Company is then discharged in full, the best assurance having been already given for the regular payment of the Contingent in future, short of an absolute cession of territory for that purpose, it will then only remain for the Minister to adopt wise and vigorous measures for effecting a reduction of all unnecessary State expenditure,—for ascertaining the real liabilities of the Government, upon which a remarkable degree of ignorance prevails, in consequence of the dislike which His Highness has always hitherto manifested to have this subject investigated,—and for establishing a general system of government which shall place the Nizam's country in that prosperous condition of which, with good management, it is undoubtedly susceptible.

43. This will, of course, depend principally upon the personal character and capacity of the Minister, and the absence of any obstruction on the part of the Nizam to the measures of administration he may think proper to adopt.

44. Suraj-ool-Moolk evinces much good sense in conversing with me on this subject, and an apparent degree of firmness and decision; but he seems to apprehend that without the avowed countenance and support of the British Government on all fitting occasions his best endeavours may ultimately fail before the perverse ignorance of his master and the corrupt influence of Durbar parties.



45. He has no doubt a difficult task to perform, and time only will show in what manner he will be able to acquit himself of it.

46. If he succeeds in effecting, with the sanction of the Government of India, the complete liquidation of the Nizam's debt to us within one month, and the Government of India shall think proper to give him that commendation which his conduct in that case may appear to deserve, this will not only be gratifying to his personal feelings, but will also tend greatly to support him in his official connexion with his Sovereign.

47. The hoondees I have received from the Nizam's Government will be immediately transmitted to the several Presidencies on which they are drawn, accompanied by a letter to each Government respectively, of nearly the same tenor as that which was addressed to it on occasion of the payment of the first instalment of the Nizam's debt in August last.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 5th December 1851.

No. 1.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Resident to the Minister, dated 28th Zilhaj 1267 (24th October 1851).

We are now so near the termination of the month of October that I am under the necessity of requesting you to inform me, in distinct and positive terms, whether hoondees for the amount of the second and last instalment of His Highness the Nizam's debt to the British Government will be paid to me by the 31st instant, this being the 24th, and not a single hoondee, nor any official intimation from you on the subject, having yet reached me.

In the event of there being any doubt regarding this matter, I beg you will lose no time in acquainting His Highness the Nizam that if, agreeably to His Highness's pledged word, the balance of his debt is not paid in full by the 31st instant, I must immediately act in conformity with the instructions of the Government of India, which will admit of no relaxation on my part, and proceed without delay to assume charge of the whole of those districts which are enumerated in the schedules presented by me to His Highness in my interview with him on the 1st July last.

(True translation.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

No. 2.

TRANSLATION of a communication made to the Resident by Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadur on the 28th October 1851 (3rd Mohorum 1268).

I submitted your note of the 24th October of the present year to His Highness the Nizam, in an interview I had yesterday, and particularly explained the necessity of providing for the liquidation of the second instalment of the debt due to the Honourable East India Company. In reply he issued his commands that I should wait upon you, and represent "that as it was merely on account of not having received payment of the debt due to the Company's Government at the time formerly stipulated that a cession of territory was demanded, on this account I had been appointed Dewan, and had within two months liquidated half the debt by means of hoondees, and had also made arrangements to pay the second instalment, but for several reasons had failed in obtaining the total amount; that I was, however, to pay 19,75,000 Shuhur Chulnee rupees of the Hyderabad currency; and that I was to pay the whole of the remainder, at a short date, not even in a month or a year. If the territory was taken it would require months to collect the revenues, and the excess of expenditure over the receipts is well known; that His Highness had repeatedly in his interview with you explained that three crores had been expended by this Government, and no treasure now remained. His Highness hoped that, taking into consideration the rights of ancient friendships, treaties framed on the firmest basis, and the kindness ever

shown to this (Hyderabad) Government, you will agree to the present proposition, as the debt will be speedily liquidated. It is well known that if at war with any one, and time is requested by the enemy, it is given; how is it possible that in this instance, when there is an ancient friendship of such an exalted nature that it cannot by any possible means be increased, that this is not taken into consideration? Further, when formerly the Company's Government and the Hyderabad Government and the Mahrattas entered into an alliance and carried on war against Tippoo Sultan, and when he applied for time to pay the money agreed on, giving his sons as hostages, it was allowed; and in this manner how often did the Company's Government give further time to that of Lahore for the payments agreed on, and at last, without any objection, took cash-bills and vessels (of gold and silver). At present you (Suraj-ool-Moolk) are deputed by the Nizam's Government, and have full powers to make what arrangements are in your opinion advisable for the better government of this country, and you are empowered in whatever manner may be pleasing to yourself, to carry out what may be requisite."

(True translation.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

### No. 3.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Resident to the Nizam dated 5th Mohurruum 1268 (30th October 1851).

I had the honour of addressing a note to the Minister on the 24th instant, for submission to your Highness, requesting to know whether the second instalment of the debt due by your Highness to the British Government would be paid in full by the 31st instant, agreeably to the solemn promise which your Highness had given to that effect to myself, as well as in the Khurrecta to the Most Noble the Governor-General.

Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor has waited upon me at Bolarum, and has been here for three days; but he has been, and still remains, utterly unable to give me the desired information.

I have therefore but one resource left, which is that of addressing your Highness direct, and requesting that you will be so good as to inform me whether your Highness's promise will be redeemed at the time fixed, to which we have now approached within 24 hours.

Not having immediately at hand any of the description of paper on which I usually address your Highness, I beg that you will be so kind as to excuse me for making use of that on which the present note is written.

(True translation.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

### No. 4.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Minister to the Resident dated 7th Mohurruum 1268 (1st November 1851).

Praise and thanks to God for His goodness, that I have this day obtained an interview with His Highness the Nizam, by whose favour and assistance the amount of 30 lacs of rupees from his own private property, for the purpose of completing the second instalment, that is, for the full and complete liquidation of the debt due to the British Government by that of His Highness the Nizam, in fulfilment of His Highness's solemn promise, has been received by me!

It is only through the excellence and virtue of your representation conveyed in your note of the 24th October, and your representation to His Highness the Nizam made on the 30th of the same month, that this favour and assistance have been obtained from His Highness. Orders were also given in reply that the delay beyond the period to which His Highness has pledged his promise, that is, the 31st October, has arisen from the occurrence of the Dewallee and the ten days of the Mohurruum, otherwise it would never on any account have been exceeded. Do not now entertain any doubt whatever as regards the payment of the whole of the debt, towards which I have this day been favoured with

assistance. Moreover, I have been favoured with a letter in reply to your representation, along with the amount that has been granted to me of the following purport : that 30 lacs of rupees have been granted to the Dewan, that is myself, and accounting for the delay of some days beyond the period aforesaid, for which a positive assurance was given, for the reasons above stated, which shall be transmitted to you without delay. Further, in obedience to His Highness's commands, I personally brought you an official note, and with great pleasure and satisfaction paid you a visit at Bolarum.

(True translation.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

No. 5.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Resident to the Minister, dated 20th Mohurum 1268 (14th November 1851).

With reference to the note I had the honour of receiving from you under date the 1st instant (7th Mohurum), in which you acquainted me that you had succeeded in obtaining 30 lacs of rupees from His Highness's private funds for the completion of the second instalment, that is, for the complete payment of His Highness's debt due to the British Government in fulfilment of the solemn promise made to that effect by His Highness, and to the fact that I have since been honoured by no further official note from you on the subject, nor any satisfactory communication regarding it during our personal conference of this day, I beg that you will be so good as to obtain for me positive information from His Highness the Nizam whether hoondees for the amount of the second instalment of the debt will or will not be paid into my Treasury by tomorrow evening.

(True translation.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

No. 6.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Minister to the Resident dated 25th Mohurum 1268 H. (19th November 1851).

At an interview yesterday with His Highness the Nizam he issued his commands to me that the troops were useless, ill-regulated, and merely expensive, the cause of loss, and a great burden ; I therefore submitted to His Highness a statement of the number of the whole of the troops, and was commanded to except the troops of the Sarf-i-Khas (who are for His Highness's own protection and personal attendance), and also the Contingent ; and in regard to the remaining troops mentioned in the statement, who are in reality useless, not according to account, and partly nominal, I was ordered to inspect the accounts, and make reductions and saving to the amount of 60 lacs of rupees per annum, in order that the saving thus made might relieve the pecuniary difficulties of the Nizam's Government ; I therefore enclose herewith for your perusal a Persian statement, with an English translation.

I, in conformity with the commands of His Highness, have made arrangements for the appointment of a Commission to inquire into the accounts of the troops in question, and His Highness has sanctioned this measure, because much advantage to the Government will be derived from it. The innumerable embezzlements and frauds of the Serishtadars and Mutsuddies, &c., to which there is neither limit nor account, will be looked into, and the arrangement will be made known to you in detail, for the information of the Government of India. The enclosed statement will show the number of the troops, the amount of their pay monthly and annually, and that the annual saving of 60 lacs of rupees will merely be from the sum of Rupees 1,06,41,676-11, exclusive of the troops of the Sarf-i-Khas and the Contingent, which, in conformity with orders, are to remain fixed and determined as at present. You will obtain this information from a perusal of the statement.

(True translation.)

(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

# THE BERARS.

TRANSLATION of a Statement of the Expenditure of His Highness the Nizam's Government from the Revenues of the Soobahs of Hyderabad, Mohumudabad, Beder, Berar, Pain Ghaut, and Bala Ghaut, Aurungabad, Bejapoor, &c.

DESCRIPTION of TROOPS, &c.	Bushers (Men of respectability).	Number of Men.	Assamese.	Horses.	Gun Camels.	Elephants.	Palanquins.	Meenahs.	Bercoo.	Cannon.	Gurnal.	Tumbrils.	Bullocks.	Camels.	Monthly Charges.	Yearly Charge.
															Rs. a.	Rs. a.
Sowars .....	...	7,763	5	6,598	27 153	55 146	...	...	...	...	...	...	43	...	4,00,294 2½	48,03,529 14
Bargeers .....	...	965	3	42	...	...	...	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	18,509 0	2,22,108 0
Arabs .....	...	5,747	...	78	...	11 5	13	...	1	...	...	1	7	...	87,034 1	10,44,408 12
Line .....	...	18,326	1	41	...	5	...	18	23 10	1 20	928	8	...	...	1,54,156 8½	18,49,878 9
Scindians .....	...	1,647	...	...	...	1 4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	20,994 2	2,51,929 8
Sikhs .....	...	1,228	3	92	...	1	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	19,868 0	2,38,416 0
Aligoes .....	...	4,374	8	15	...	3	...	4	...	...	...	...	...	...	32,313 13½	3,87,887 15
Turks .....	...	69	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,567 0	18,801 0
Rahtores .....	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,252 0	15,024 0
Bhallaburdars .....	...	86	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	564 0	6,768 0
Bandars .....	...	110	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	691 12	8,301 0
Munsabders .....	1,875	27	145	26	...	18 19	72	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	95,382 5½	11,20,587 15
Moonsiffs and Meor Adils, &c. ....	43	381	2	...	...	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	8,856 8	1,06,278 0
Mushroot (troops attach- ed to Talookdars) .....	...	444	1	2	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	4,627 1½	55,524 15
Asham (garrisons) .....	...	861	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7,780 0	93,360 0
Shagird Pesha .....	1	2,729	5	106	...	1 8	84	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	31,322 11½	3,76,872 7
Khas Burdars .....	...	627	2	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,587 5	43,047 12
		1,919	45,504	175	6,997	27 193	88 298	24 10	1 21	935	46	8,86,806 6½	1,06,41,676 11			
Sarf-i-Khas, &c. ....	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	12,00,000 0	...
Troops of the Contingent .....	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	38,48,740 0	...
TOTAL .....															Rs. 1,56,90,416 11	

(True copy.)

(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.

No. 7.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Minister to the Resident, dated 10th Suffer 1268 H. (4th December 1851.)

I beg to enclose 34 hoondees, amounting to Co.'s Rs. 8,73,547-8-6, in part payment of the second instalment of the debt due by the Hyderabad Government to the Honourable Company, according to a separate list in Persian, accompanied by an English translation. The balance due is also being collected by the pawning of jewels, and hoondees will be then purchased, and hereafter sent successively. Now that the arrangement for transmitting the hoondees is in the course of being effected, with the help of the Almighty, the amount of the whole of the second instalment will within one month be completed.

(True translation.)

(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.

No. 8.

TRANSLATION of a Note from the Resident to the Minister, dated 5th December 1851 (11th Suffer 1268).

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your note under yesterday's date, giving cover to 34 hoondees, for Co.'s Rs. 8,73,547-8-6, in part-payment of His Highness the Nizam's debt to the British Government, and informing me that the balance of the debt will be paid in successive portions within one month from this date.

The requisite report on this subject will be made by me to the Government, with a view to my receiving such further instructions as may be deemed necessary.

I observe that in the memorandum of hoondees you have sent me, it is stated, with respect to certain hoondees furnished by Poorun Mull Hurdut

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

Raye, that the security of respectable soucars has been taken for the due payment of those hoondees.

With the security of soucars the British Government has of course no concern whatever. His Highness the Nizam himself must be regarded as the security, and solely responsible to the British Government for the consequences of non-payment.

There is a discrepancy between the terms in which six of the hoondees you have sent me are expressed, and the Persian and English lists which accompanied them, as particularly explained in the enclosed memorandum. I therefore return the hoondees in question, and the two lists, in order that the requisite corrections may be made. I request that this may be done immediately, as I should wish to lose no time in sending the hoondees to the several places on which they are drawn.

(True translation.)  
(Signed) *C. Davidson*, Assistant Resident.

## LIST of HOONDEES furnished by His Highness the Nizam's Government in Part- Payment of the Debt due to the British Government.

By whom Drawn.	On whom Drawn.	Place on which it is Drawn.	Date at which it is Payable.	Amount.	TOTAL.
Surgeon D. M'Pherson, 1st Nizam's Cavalry.	J. O'B. Tandy, Secretary N. W. Bank.	Calcutta ...	60 days from 24th Nov. 1851.	Co's Rs. a. p. 10,000 0 0	Co's Rs. a. p. 10,000 0 0
Seodut Ram Jysee Ram ...	Bunsee Lall Abeer Chund.	Madras ...	45 ditto ... 15th ...	9,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 23rd ...	11,000 0 0	
Motee Ram Ram Dhun ...	ditto .....	ditto ...	30 ditto ... 2nd Dec. ...	15,000 0 0	
H. Dighton, Esq. ....	Messrs. Binny & Co. ....	ditto ...	30 ditto ... 2nd ...	60,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	30 ditto ... 2nd ...	50,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	30 ditto ... 2nd ...	50,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	30 ditto ... 2nd ...	50,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	30 ditto ... 2nd ...	50,000 0 0	
					2,95,000 0 0
Seodut Ram, Jysee Ram.....	Jysee Ram, Seo Lall .....	Bombay ...	45 days from 13th Nov. 1851	10,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 24th ...	10,724 2 0	
Seodut Ram Lutchee Ram ...	ditto .....	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 18th ...	11,000 0 0	
Seodut Ram Jysee Ram .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 12th ...	43,103 8 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 12th ...	35,586 4 0	
Seodut Ram Lutchee Ram.	ditto .....	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 13th ...	10,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 15th ...	9,000 0 0	
Seodut Ram Jysee Ram. ...	ditto .....	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 18th ...	11,000 0 0	
Seodut Ram Lutchee Ram.	ditto .....	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 23rd ...	10,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 24th ...	11,724 2 0	
Maharund Ram Poorunnull	Poorunnull Hurdut Raye.	ditto ...	61 ditto ... 31st Oct. ...	10,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	61 ditto ... 4th Nov. ...	40,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	61 ditto ... 6th ...	49,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	61 ditto ... 3rd ...	51,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	61 ditto ... 31st Oct. ...	50,000 0 0	
Kishen Doss Pursotum Doss.	Brij Lall Doolup Doss ...	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 13th Nov. ...	14,482 12 0	
Goomanee Ram Ram Lall ...	Ram Lall .....	ditto ...	51 ditto ... 12th ...	53,379 4 0	
Kishen Doss Pursotum Doss.	Sree Gourdhunjee .....	ditto ...	45 ditto ... 13th ...	20,000 0 0	
Goomanee Ram Ram Lall ...	Ram Lall .....	ditto ...	61 ditto ... 23rd ...	50,000 0 0	
Anund Ram Suddasookh ...	Bunsee Lall Abeer Chund.	ditto ...	61 ditto ... 30th ...	12,274 5 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	61 ditto ... 30th ...	2,166 1 0	
Motee Ram Ram Dhun.	Bag Mull Jeet Mull .....	ditto ...	41 ditto ... 3rd Dec. ...	14,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	Kaisree Chund Pool Chund.	ditto ...	41 ditto ... 3rd ...	25,000 0 0	
Ditto .....	ditto .....	ditto ...	41 ditto ... 3rd ...	10,107 2 0½	
Ditto .....	Bag Mull Jeet Mull.....	ditto ...	41 ditto ... 3rd ...	25,000 0 0	
					5,68,547 8 04
				TOTAL.....Co's Rs.	8,73,547 8 0½

(Signed) *J. S. Fraser*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 6th December 1851.

No. 214 of 1851.

From the Resident at Hyderabad to the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, Simla.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 3466, under date the 7th ultimo, and to acquaint you that I have addressed the requisite communications thereupon to Brigadiers Mackenzie and Mayne.

2. I had already given orders that the instructions of the Government of India regarding the discontinuance of any further enlistment should be carried into effect in every branch of the Nizam's Army, as reported to you in my letter under date the 17th September last, No. 173 ; and I had not permitted the execution of those orders to be postponed, or in any way affected by the subsequent representations received from Brigadier Mackenzie and Brigadier Mayne.

3. In the 6th para. of your letter, now under acknowledgment, you remark, with reference to the statement of my belief that the Nizam himself does not entertain any wish for a reduction in the Contingent or diminution of its present strength, that this assertion is one of much importance in the relations of the Nizam and of the British Government, but that it cannot be satisfactorily established merely by the opinion of the Minister, or by my own belief, or by anything but the authority of the Nizam himself ; and I am therefore instructed to quote those statements of the Nizam, and recite the facts on which I have founded my belief as to His Highness's wishes regarding the amount of the Contingent.

4. The grounds on which I found my belief in this respect are, first, the absence, as far as my recollection serves me, of all remonstrance whatever, or complaint, or unfavourable representation from the Nizam on the subject of any excessive strength of the Contingent, or unreasonable expense on this account, either direct from himself, or indirectly through his Minister, since I have held the Office of Resident at Hyderabad ; from which I naturally infer, and (I think reasonably) believe, that the sentiments of the Nizam are such as I have referred to. Had the Nizam considered either the maintenance of the present numerical strength of the Contingent, or the expense attending it, as constituting a just cause of complaint or remonstrance, it can scarcely be supposed otherwise than that in the long period of 13 years he would have expressed himself to this effect.

5. But what I have now stated is a negative reason only for the belief I entertain ; and a more positive one is presented in the fact of that conversation which I had with the Nizam on the 8th October 1850, as reported to you in my letter of the same date, No. 257, and of which, for the convenience of reference, I beg permission to subjoin the following extract :—

“The other instance of misconduct he (His Highness the Nizam) particularly alluded to was his (Rajah Ram Buksh's) failing either to take any measures for liquidating the debt due to the Company, or for regularly disbursing the pay of the Contingent.”

“Upon this last point His Highness dwelt at considerable length. He stated that he had always considered it of primary importance, as the payment to be first made, and in preference to all others. He observed that Maharajah Chundoo Lall had repeatedly impressed upon his mind the importance of maintaining the Contingent, and regularly paying it, as an indispensable means of preserving the peace and tranquillity of the country.

“His Highness spoke warmly on this subject, repeated his sense of the value of the services of this force, and did not drop the slightest hint that he considered the Contingent either an unnecessary burden upon his finances, or otherwise than a valuable body of troops, which ought at all hazards to be maintained.”

6. In the concluding para. of your letter, I am directed to set forth the grounds on which I believe that the Nizam entertains up to the present time the sentiments I represent His Highness to hold regarding the Contingent Force.

7. This question is partially answered by the reasoning of the preceding paras., which I consider sufficient to account for the belief I continued to entertain until the 14th October last, the date when I expressed it.

8. But the same belief is confirmed down to a more recent period by the conversation which took place between the Nizam and his Minister on the 18th ultimo, as reported to me verbally by the Minister on the evening of that day, and communicated on the next day, the 19th, in a written official note, a copy of which formed one of the enclosures of my despatch to you, by express, of the 5th instant.

9. For the convenience of reference, and in order that my present letter may be completed in itself on the subject under consideration, I subjoin a copy of the note just alluded to :—

“Translation of a Note from the Minister to the Resident, dated 25th Mohurram 1268 (19th November 1851).

“At an interview yesterday with His Highness the Nizam, he issued his commands to me that the troops were useless, ill-regulated, and merely expensive, the cause of loss, and a great burden. I therefore submitted to His Highness a statement of the number of the whole of the troops, and was commanded to except the troops, the Sarf-i-Khas (who are for His Highness's own protection and personal attendance), and also the Contingent ; and in regard to the remaining troops mentioned in the statement, who are in reality useless, not according to account, and partly nominal, I was ordered to inspect the accounts, and make reductions and saving to the amount of 60 lacs of rupees per annum, in order that the saving thus made might relieve the pecuniary difficulties of the Nizam's Government. I therefore enclose herewith, for your perusal, a Persian statement with an English translation.

“I, in conformity with the commands of His Highness, have made arrangements for the appointment of a commission to inquire into the accounts of the troops in question, and His Highness has sanctioned this measure, because much advantage to the Government will be derived from it. The innumerable embezzlements and frauds of the Sheristedars and Mootsuddies, &c., to which there is neither limit nor amount, will be looked into, and the arrangement will be made known to you in detail for the information of the Government of India. The enclosed statement will show the number of the troops, the amount of their pay, monthly and annually, and that the annual saving of 60 lacs of rupees will merely be from the sum of Rs. 1,06,41,676-11-9, exclusive of the troops of the Sarf-i-Khas and the Contingent, which, in conformity with orders, are to remain fixed and determined as at present. You will obtain this information from a perusal of the statement.

“(True translation.)

“(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.”

10. I had the honour to receive your letter, to which I am now replying, on the 19th ultimo, and it may be observed that the Nizam's note to me above quoted bears the same date. But the information contained in the note is in exact accordance with that which the Minister had verbally given to me the evening before, and could not, therefore, have been modified or affected in any manner by the questions agitated in your letter.

11. Independently of this, I may add that when he wrote to me his Note of the 19th ultimo, he was ignorant of my having received any letter whatever from the Supreme Government regarding the Contingent, and still, as far as I am aware, remains so.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. S. Fraser, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 7th December 1851.

MINUTE by the Most Noble the Governor-General.

The Resident at Hyderabad, in his letter dated 5th December 1851, reports that the second instalment of the Nizam's debt to the British Government, which His Highness had promised to pay on or before the 31st October 1851, had been discharged only in part. The Resident describes the several causes of delay. He recites the promises which have been made by the Nizam for gradual liquidation of the whole within a limited period and the measures which have been taken by His Highness for the performance of those promises. Adverting to these, the Resident asks for the approval of the Government to the course he has pursued, in giving further time for payment.

2. It has before been emphatically stated, that the Government of India did not desire to take possession of any portion of the Nizam's territory, or seek pretexts for so doing.

The sole object of the Government was to enforce full payment of the enormous debt which the Nizam had incurred, and which he was still increasing. It took this step after long delay and frequent warnings, as the only effectual mode of obtaining re-payment of advances which it could no longer spare ; and especially because that peremptory demand, strengthened by the declaration that territory would be occupied in the event of failure to meet the demand, was the only method left of checking the Nizam in the reckless course he had so long pursued.

3. The debt had not been paid in full at the time named. But a considerable sum in the second instalment has been furnished, and the Resident appears to be satisfied that His Highness, under the advice of his Minister, is exerting himself in good faith to liquidate the whole.

4. Experience of the past renders it impossible for me to feel any strong confidence in the promises of this Prince. But, so far as we may safely judge by appearance, he is now in earnest, and will at last fulfil his pledge.

I therefore approve equally of the determined language in which the Resident addressed the Nizam, for the purpose of disabusing his mind of the impression that a part of the debt having been paid, the demand for the rest would not be insisted upon ; and of the discretion which he has exercised in not proceeding to extreme measures, when he saw cause to believe that His Highness was in sincerity labouring to meet the requirements which such measures were intended to enforce.

5. The Resident will report the progress made in the promised payment, and he will be instructed from time to time in accordance with the intelligence that may be received.

6. This report of the Resident is especially satisfactory, as conveying the first indication of His Highness's intention to take measures for meeting his financial difficulties, and for reducing the useless bodies of troops with which he is surrounded. It is to be earnestly desired that His Highness may remain firm in this intention, and that, aided by his able and apparently energetic Minister, he may carry the measures he has sanctioned into full effect.

7. The letter of the Resident is further of much importance in connection with his subsequent letter of the 7th ultimo, in regard to the question of His Highness's Contingent.

Without entering at present into that question generally, proposing to treat it separately in a subsequent Minute, I still feel it right to observe that, in my judgment, it has never stood on a satisfactory footing. The Contingent has been frequently commented upon officially and out of doors. It has been represented as an incubus upon the Nizam, odious to him, useless to him, and a just ground of complaint on his part. In these extreme views I have not concurred ; although, as I have said above, the Contingent did not appear to me to stand on a satisfactory footing, but seems to call at least for revision.

8. In this view, I took steps for preparing the way to revision simultaneously with the orders which were issued for effecting a settlement of claims with the Nizam. For some time I have not filled up the vacancies that have occurred in the Nizam's army and I have directed that all recruiting should also cease.

9. In replying to the despatch which conveyed these orders, the Resident at Hyderabad expressed his belief that the Nizam desired to see no reduction made in the Contingent Force.

Aware of the value of the Contingent to the Nizam, aware of the security it gave him, and knowing that, far from being useless, its services were in very frequent requisition, and were never withheld when His Highness's demand was just, I was prepared to acquiesce in the belief that the Nizam did not regard the maintenance of the Contingent as odious and oppressive, as he has been sometimes supposed to consider it. But there was no formal specific statement by His Highness of his feelings on record, so far as I was aware.

Accordingly, I requested the Resident to set forth the grounds on which he founded his belief that the Nizam did not desire any reduction in the Contingent.

10. Before this question had reached Hyderabad, the Nizam had already, on his own part, voluntarily, and without any solicitation or communication with the Resident, formally stated his wishes respecting the Contingent. The Dewan, Suraj-ool-Moolk, in his letter to the Resident, dated 19th November 1851,



communicated the Nizam's orders for the reduction of certain troops, "exclusive of the Sarf-i-Khas and the Contingent, which, in conformity with orders, are to remain fixed and determined as at present."

11. This expression of the Nizam's wishes, coupled with other conversations and incidents detailed in the Resident's letter of 7th December 1851, to which I request particular attention, sets entirely at rest any doubt which might be entertained as to the present wishes of the Nizam regarding the maintenance of the Contingent.

Nevertheless, I remain of opinion that the Contingent is necessarily costly; and that the same or a sufficient Force could be maintained at a less expense than is now imposed on His Highness's Treasury.

I have already had the honour to point out that some time ago I took measures with a view to reducing the charges of the Contingent. I still entertain that intention; I propose shortly to address His Highness the Nizam with direct reference to the Contingent, and trust that means may be found of lightening the burden involved in its maintenance without impairing its real efficiency. In so doing, I am confident that the approbation of the Honourable Court of Directors will not be withheld from the measure I contemplate.

12. Address the Resident at Hyderabad in terms of paras. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

The Minute, with the whole of the relative papers, should go to the Court of Directors by the next mail.

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*

3rd January 1852.

MINUTE by the Most Noble the Governor-General of India in Council,  
concurring in by the Members of the Board.

1. THE act of the Officiating Resident at Hyderabad in advancing pay for His Highness the Cavalry may be approved. He may be directed not to Nizam. cease urging the Minister upon the subject of the pay, but if he fails to obtain it, to disburse it to the troops from the Residency Treasury monthly.

2. With reference to the existing state of affairs at Hyderabad, as well as to the expediency of preparing the Nizam for communications which his own acts have rendered inevitable, I think it would be well to direct Major Davidson to demand an audience of the Nizam.

3. He should be instructed to acquaint His Highness that the recent conduct of the Government of Hyderabad is justly regarded by the Governor-General in Council with greater dissatisfaction than on any previous occasion. For not only are the promises of the Sovereign left unfulfilled, and the obligations of the State disregarded, but for the first time since relations existed between the two Powers the Minister is permitted wholly to neglect the repeated communications of the Resident, and thus to treat with discourtesy, and even with contempt, the Representative of the British Government in India.

4. The Governor-General in Council cannot permit the continuance of such a condition of affairs.

5. He has appointed, as Resident at the Court of Hyderabad, Colonel Low, C.B., an officer in whose abilities and character the Government of India has long felt entire confidence, and who has already resided for a short period at His Highness's Court.

The Governor-General in Council has directed Colonel Low to proceed to Calcutta, there to receive from the Governor-General in Council personally the important instructions with which he will be charged. To the communications he will be directed to make to the Nizam, the Governor-General in Council invites the serious consideration of His Highness, as deeply affecting the interests of himself and of his kingdom.

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*

28th December 1852.

(Signed) *F. Currie.*

28th December 1852.

(Signed) *J. Lewis.*

29th December 1852.

No. 58 of 1853.

From Colonel *J. Low*, C.B., Resident, Hyderabad, to *C. Allen*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, Fort William.

SIR,—Having now been nine days at this capital, I have the honour to address you for the purpose of reporting the chief occurrences that have taken place during that time between the Nizam's Court and myself.

2. I do not think it necessary in such a report to notice the ordinary official correspondence which passes daily between my office and that of the Nizam's Prime Minister, because, as a general rule, I think that such correspondence is sufficiently indicated to my own Government by the weekly diaries.

3. I shall, however, on this occasion, make one exception to that general rule, were it only to show that, even on the arrival of a new Resident, the Prime Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, cannot refrain from his inveterate habit of making injudicious official promises which he is unable to fulfil.

4. I allude to the following circumstance, viz., that during the nine days above mentioned the Minister voluntarily made two written promises to me to send to my Treasury, on two separate days, and at specified hours, the pay due to the Contingent for October and November last, and that, as he entirely failed to perform either of those promises, I gave orders for the pay for the two months in question to be issued from the British Treasury.

5. It is only fair, however, to observe that various matters of other business (not pecuniary), which required more than ordinary trouble to be taken by the Minister, have been brought to a satisfactory conclusion by Suraj-ool-Moolk since my arrival.

6. The occurrences of the week alluded to at the commencement of this letter consisted chiefly in my receiving and paying official visits, which, with one exception, to be noticed in a subsequent part of this letter, need not be very particularly described.

7. Five visits in all have been paid to me and by me since my arrival here on the 7th instant. I was first visited by two gentlemen of high rank from the Court, named Ihtzad-ud-Dowlah Bahadoor and Sudar Jung Bahadoor, and whose object was solely to congratulate me on the part of the Nizam on my safe arrival at Hyderabad. The second visit was paid to me by the Minister and his nephew, Salar Jung, for the purpose of settling the day when I should pay my first visit to the Nizam, which was accordingly settled for the 12th instant; the next was one from the Minister, to breakfast with me on the 12th instant, and to conduct me immediately after it to the Palace, where I paid my first visit of ceremony to the Nizam, to present the Governor-General's Khurecta to His Highness, and to have my credentials as British Representative read in open Durbar; and the last one was that of my having accepted an invitation to dinner yesterday evening at the Minister's along with a large party of ladies and gentlemen from Secunderabad and Bolarum, and the vicinity of this Residency.

8. On paying my visit to the Nizam, I was accompanied by Major Davidson, the Assistant, Major Briggs, the Officiating Military Secretary, Dr. Maclean, the Residency Surgeon, Lieutenant Duncan, Commanding the Escort, and by two visitors, viz., Brigadier Mayne, of the Nizam's service, and Ensign Bell, of the 2nd Madras E. L. Infantry.

9. As such ceremonies have often been reported to Government, I need not describe the mode of my reception at the Nizam's Durbar during the public part of my visit, further than to say that all the forms usual at this Court were gone through in a proper manner; and I may add that several of the gentlemen present remarked that His Highness's manner was unusually affable and polite, both towards myself and to all the gentlemen who accompanied me.

10. Before proceeding further, I may as well mention that when the Minister first called upon me, he endeavoured to persuade me that at my first visit to the Nizam it would be proper to avoid having a private conference of any kind; but I

politely declined to follow that advice, and desired Suraj-ool-Moolk to apprise His Highness of my intention to make a communication to him from the Governor-General at a private conference, separate from the ceremonial part of my reception at the Durbar.

11. After conversing some time in the Public Durbar, a conference accordingly took place on the 12th instant, between His Highness and myself, which was entirely private; and as some portions of His Highness's questions and remarks on that occasion were very peculiar, and as he spoke of the Contingent troops particularly in a manner which he never did before, I believe, to any European, at least certainly not during the last 18 or 19 years, I have thought it best to describe the whole of my private conference in a separate Minute, which I have now the honour to enclose.

12. I drafted that Minute immediately that I returned hither from the Durbar, excepting the Postscript, which I have added this day; and as nothing material has been omitted that occurred at that private conference, I am not aware that I can in this letter add anything to the subject which can be interesting to the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, excepting this, that as yet it is quite a mystery to me whether the principal question which the Nizam put to me originated with himself, or was suggested and recommended to him by some other person; and if the latter be the true state of the case, I am equally ignorant who the person was who made the suggestion. I may as well state, in conclusion, however, that although I did not, as will be observed, at all discourage conversation on the subject, yet, from what I have heard and seen of the Nizam's character, my belief is that most probably he will not again agitate the question as to "why the Contingent was kept up after the conclusion of the last war with the Mahratta powers." I have, &c.

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 16th March 1853.

MINUTE of a private conference which I held with His Highness the Nizam, in the forenoon of this day, viz, the 12th of March 1853, no third person being present till towards the end of my visit, when the Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk was called in.

1. As soon as all the attendants had been sent off to such a distance as not to be able to hear what might pass between His Highness and myself, I opened the conference, by alluding to the paper delivered to him by Major Davidson on the 22nd of January last, from which, as I stated, His Highness "must know that I had communications of a very serious nature to make to him."

2. His Highness here interrupted me, by saying, "Oh, yes; but I am sure you will not make any communication to me that is not that of a friend." I replied, "Your Highness may be assured that all that I am about to say is in the spirit of true friendship."

3. I then proceeded to explain that the Governor-General, with great consideration for His Highness, had abstained for the present from giving me official orders to insist upon any new measures, in order to give me time previously to explain personally to His Highness, and in the most friendly manner, the views and intentions of the British Government towards His Highness, in the hope that such friendly personal discussions would greatly facilitate a speedy and amicable settlement of everything that was required for the satisfaction of both States; and then, without waiting for any further remark from His Highness, I spoke to the following effect, viz., that the Governor-General of India had no wish to be harsh in any way towards His Highness, and still less, if less were possible, had he any wish to interfere in the interior management of His Highness's Dominions; that I myself was very anxious to do all the duty that I might have to do connected with His Highness's Government in friendly concert with himself; but there are some things which the British Government is bound in honour to insist upon being done, and which had not been done at all of late years, viz., that all those money payments

for which we are guarantee must be paid with regularity, especially the monthly payments for the Contingent Force, and the annual payments on account of Appa Dessaye's Choute and Moluput Ram's family; that two lacs must be paid next month on the latter account; that three lacs were required every month for the Contingent troops, and that no less than forty-five lacs of rupees and upwards were now due to the British Government on account of pay that we had advanced for the Contingent. I also expatiated at some length upon the vexation to us (which I said we could no longer submit to), and the humiliation to His Highness, caused by the frequent and often fruitless demands on our part for money to pay those troops, and by the undignified evasions and unworthy breaches of promise of which his Minister was continually guilty respecting those payments; and I then placed into His Highness's hand a Persian memorandum on the subject of the arrears, which exhibited the precise sum now due to us, viz., Hyderabad Rs. 45,41,734-4-2.

4. His Highness then spoke as follows, and in an emphatic manner: "You say you wish to act in friendly concert with me; that is particularly what I want. If you will be my friend and my partner in business, all will go on prosperously." He then gave a hasty glance at the memorandum, and said, "This is very extraordinary." I said "No; it is really not surprising that it had run into arrears, because you neither keep any permanent general treasury into which the revenues of your country are paid, and from which the current expenses of your Government are disbursed, nor have you made any separate assignments of land revenue for the payment of the Contingent: your Minister promised to assign certain districts for that payment; but he did not perform his promises, and it is necessary that I should tell you that my Government is determined no longer to rely upon promises. Some substantial arrangement must be made that will produce the monthly sum required to a certainty; and I really know of no other that can be relied upon, excepting assignments on the revenue of districts for the specific purpose."

5. The Nizam then exclaimed, "But there is no reason why the Contingent should not be paid monthly with perfect regularity; and if it had not been so, it is entirely the fault of the Dewan." I replied, "The Dewan is your officer, not mine. I look to you to see that the duty of your Government is performed by your officers; you are the ruler (malik) of this country." "God is malik," said the Nizam; and then His Highness, in a very altered tone of voice, lowering it almost to a whisper, said to me, "Colonel Sahib, I want to ask you a question about this Contingent." I said, "Very well, do so;" when His Highness addressed the following remarkable speech to me. I shall relate it in His Highness's own words precisely, according to the best of my recollection. They are correctly translated in the following separate paragraph:

6. "In the time of my father (said His Highness) the Peshwa of Poonah became hostile both to the Company's Government and to this Government, and Sahib Jung (meaning Sir Henry Russell) organised this Contingent, and sent it in different directions, along with the Company's troops, to fight the Mahratta people; and this was all very proper, and according to the Treaty, for those Mahrattas were enemies of both States; and the Company's army and my father's army conquered the ruler of Poonah, and you sent him off a prisoner to Hindostan, and took the country of Poonah. After that there was no longer any war; so why was the Contingent kept up any longer than the war?"

7. To the above remarkable and very unexpected speech, I replied as follows: "I do not see why your Highness should expect me to answer questions about events that occurred in your father's kingdom six-and-thirty years ago; and especially so as I was not in this part of India at that time; but I imagine it must have happened somewhat in this way, namely, that the promise made by your father in the Treaty to have so many thousand infantry and so many thousand cavalry ready at all times to co-operate with the British armies, had been broken in former times, and that Sahib Jung thought it was for the good of this Government that the Contingent should be kept up, because it would always

be ready for work, by its being paid through the Residency, efficiently armed and equipped, and commanded by British officers. And moreover, I suppose that your father thought it a good arrangement, and that he therefore consented to it."

8. I was here interrupted by the following exclamation: "Don't say my father; say the Maharajah." I asked if he meant Rajah Chundoo Lall; and as he replied in the affirmative, I went on to say, "Well, but your father allowed Chundoo Lall to act as he did. If the natural Sovereign of any country takes no trouble about his own affairs, and allows his Minister to exercise all the powers of Sovereignty, other States must carry on public business with that Minister; they cannot avoid it." In reply to that observation upon my part, the Nizam said, "That is very true, perfectly true; I only wished to ask you the question, and I trust you will excuse it." I replied, "Most assuredly; indeed there is nothing to excuse, for I wish you to speak to me freely on all subjects, and I will always answer any question you like to put to me, if it be in my power to do so."

9. The Nizam thanked me for the answer just related, and from the expression of his countenance at that moment, and from what followed subsequently, I am now inclined to think that he would not have again reverted to the subject at all, if I had not resumed it in the following manner: I said, "But, I beg your Highness to tell me what your object is in speaking thus about the Contingent? Do you think that the Arabs and Rohillas and Sikhs, and other plunderers, and many evil-disposed men in your country, would let you collect your revenues quietly, if they were not overawed by the presence in your territories of the Contingent? or is it your wish to lessen the expense of the Contingent? Because if it be so, the Governor-General is so much disposed to act liberally towards you that I believe he would authorize me to give you good aid towards lessening the expense of that force in a gradual and equitable manner, provided that you make proper arrangements for the regular pay of the number of men and officers which it may be determined to keep up permanently with the Contingent, for that is the grand desideratum."

10. The Nizam's answer, if it can be called an answer, to my last observation, was given in the following few words precisely, neither more nor less: "No,\* no; they are excellent troops, very useful troops indeed, but I won't trouble you with any more conversation to-day; I'll send for Suraj-ool-Moolk, and order him to attend to your wishes."

11. I had no intention of making any rejoinder to the short speech just quoted, but, what is not so easily accounted for, the Nizam himself was evidently resolved to drop the subject as suddenly as he had introduced it; for he had no sooner uttered that short sentence than he called out in a loud voice to a Chobdar who was standing at some distance, desiring him to send for Suraj-ool-Moolk, who came back accordingly, and the private conference was thus brought to a conclusion.

12. As soon as the Minister had taken his seat, the Nizam told him in a few words that he must set to work forthwith to satisfy Colonel Low in all arrangements relative to the Contingent, observing at the same time, "When Ram Buksh was Minister, the Contingent had been paid regularly for 10 months in succession."† On this, the Minister, approaching near to His Highness, said something which has not audible to me, when the Nizam turned round to me, and said that he would consult fully with the Minister and other officers of his Government on financial affairs in the course of the next two or three days, and that he would then send the Minister to me to communicate various projected measures of importance.

13. His Highness then briefly renewed the expression of some complimentary remarks about myself, and alluded again to his confidence in my friendship. The several British officers who accompanied me to the Durbar (and who, during the

\* I have given the Nizam's little speech exactly as it was spoken; but I really do not know to what part of my own remarks or questions the words "No, no," were meant to apply.—(Signed) J. Low, Resident.

† I find from Major Davidson that that assertion of His Highness is a very erroneous one respecting the pay of the Contingent in the time of Ram Buksh.—(Signed) J. Low, Resident.

private conference, were seated in another apartment) were then sent for, and His Highness called for the uttur and pan, when we took our leave, and returned to the Residency.

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 12th March 1853.

*P. S.*—Since the foregoing Minute was signed, it has occurred to me that it will be more complete if I add the following remark, viz., that when I spoke to the Nizam of the “humiliation” to His Highness involved in our constantly recurring complaints of neglect, and our demands for money payments, both his manner and his few words on the subject left a deep impression on my mind that he scarcely comprehends how such occurrences can by any person be thought humiliation to him, although he seemed to think it natural enough that the Governor-General and the Resident also should be displeased when such pecuniary demands on his Minister are neglected. His Highness seems to suppose that disgrace of that description (if he considers it at all in so serious a point of view) falls exclusively upon his Minister.

That want of proper feeling, on the part of the Nizam, for the honour and credit of his Durbar, and his inveterate habit of supposing that he can escape all blame (or at least all vexation to himself) by imputing every error or shortcoming of his Government to his Prime Minister for the time being, are sad defects in the public character of His Highness; and unless such defects be cured, which I fear is very improbable, they must render any material improvement in the management of this State almost hopeless during the administration of the present Ministry.

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 16th March 1853.

#### MINUTE by the Most Noble the Governor-General of India.

1. Nearly two years have passed since the Government of India found it necessary to adopt a line of policy towards His Highness Hyderabad. His Highness the Nizam, the Nizam which, although it bore an appearance of harshness, was imperatively called for, not less by the real interests of the State of Hyderabad than by the interests of the British Government.

2. At that time the debt due by His Highness to the Government of India had been accumulating for several years. No portion of the principal had ever been liquidated; even the interest remained for the most part unpaid. The pay of the Contingent was disbursed more irregularly than ever; and thus the debt, which arose mainly from advances made to supply the deficiency of the Contingent pay, continually and rapidly increased, till it amounted to upwards of 70 lacs of rupees.

The Nizam had been repeatedly warned of the risk he was running, and had been told that any further increase of financial embarrassment within his State must be avoided, as injurious in the highest degree to his own interests.

To these warnings His Highness paid no attention whatever; the limit of time for repayment of His Highness's debt that had been fixed by the Government of India was reached; so regardless was the Nizam of the difficulties in which he was involving himself, and of the advice and warnings of the British Government, that for many months he had omitted to appoint any Dewan or other Chief Minister for conducting the affairs of his kingdom.

3. The Government of India now found that it was necessary to act. The Nizam was required, as he had declared himself unable to pay the debt, to make over certain districts (including Berar Pain Ghaut and others), for the full liquidation thereof; and he was further required to make satisfactory provision for the payment of the Contingent, without fail, in the future.

4. Upon receiving the despatch which contained this resolution of the Government of India, the Nizam, although he had previously declared himself unable to pay any portion of the debt, prepared at once to do so. Considerable sums were transmitted to the Resident; Suraj-ool-Moolk was again appointed

Dewan, and he engaged to discharge the whole debt before the end of the year 1851. Thereupon the demands of the Government of India for the temporary cession of Berar, &c., were at once relaxed. The solemn personal promise of His Highness the Nizam to fulfil these engagements, and to set apart the revenues of certain talooks, which were enumerated, for the regular payment of the Contingent, were accepted. Although the Government of India, from the experience it had long had of the policy of the Court of Hyderabad, and from knowing how lightly its promises were made and forgotten, could feel no strong confidence in the assurances that were now given, still it had hope that, the Sovereign having personally pledged his word for the payment of the debt, and for the security given for the payment of the Contingent troops, these pecuniary troubles between the two States might be brought to an end.

And, at all events, the Government of India was desirous of affording to the Nizam every indulgence that its public duty would permit, and of rendering him all assistance in effecting those reductions and improvements within his own administration which he had professed himself anxious to effect, and which his financial position rendered indispensable.

5. Acting from these motives, the Government of India abstained from pressing its demands urgently upon the Nizam.

6. The end of the year 1851 arrived, but it brought with it no fulfilment of the promises that had been made; not only was a portion of the debt still unpaid, but the pay of the Contingent, for which certain districts had been set apart, again was allowed to fall into arrears. Remonstrances on this violation of his pledged word having been addressed to the Nizam by the Resident, His Highness repudiated having made any promise to set apart districts. The pledge is upon the records of this Government, in an Official Note written by the Minister,

Resident 5th Dec.  
1851. Enclō.

Suraj-ool-Moolk, in the name of the Nizam. But even supposing that statement by the Minister to have been unauthorised, the general engagement that the Contingent

pay should not fall into arrears was undoubted; yet month after month passed on, bringing a constant succession of complaints from the Resident regarding continued arrears, which were met by positive promises of payment by the Minister, and by certain failure to pay when the time arrived. Early in the summer of 1852 the arrears had become so large that the Contingent was reduced to great difficulties. Representations were made, both officially and privately, that officers and men alike were suffering great hardships; the long arrears had compelled them to seek advances of money in the bazaar; they could be obtained only at the exorbitant rate of 24 per cent., and heavy loss and injury were thus sustained.

Instructions were then issued to the Resident to give his whole attention to obtain their pay for the Contingent from the Nizam, postponing for the present all demands concerning the debt. The Resident was further empowered, if he thought fit, to advance monthly pay to the troops from his own Treasury.

7. In this condition affairs have continued to the present time. The pledge given by the Nizam to pay the debt due to the British Government has not been fulfilled. The promise given by His Highness that the pay of the Contingent should not again fall into arrears has been flagrantly violated. The increasing solicitations and remonstrances of the Resident meet with no attention. Money is advanced sometimes by dribblets, but never in sufficient amount to meet the whole current charges of the time. Thus the arrear continues; money is advanced for pay from the British Treasury, and by these means the debt is again rapidly accumulating.

No effort whatever has been made by the Nizam to better the condition of his internal administration, though the abuses have been pointed out to him, the remedies suggested, and full assistance tendered to him in effecting changes that would be equally beneficial to himself and to his kingdom.

\* Resident, 8th October 1850, para. 18: "I then inquired from His Highness whether I was to understand that, besides this proposed mode of liquidating the debt due to us, the pay of the Contingent would be furnished without fail regularly every month; to which he replied, Certainly, that it should be so."



So unsatisfactory have the relations between the two States become of late, that the notes and communications of the Representative of the British Government at the Court of Hyderabad in many instances have not even received a reply.

8. The war in which the Government of India has been engaged during the last year, and a hope, which I have been reluctant to forego, that the Nizam would be induced to provide for at least the regular payment of the Contingent Force, have hitherto deterred me from proposing to my colleagues the renewal of active measures towards the Court of Hyderabad. But the debt is again accumulating so rapidly, the condition of the officers and men of the Contingent has become so painful, from the uncertainty in which they now always stand, and from the frequent pecuniary difficulties to which they are reduced by the irregularity of their payment, and the total insensibility, both of the Sovereign and of his Minister, to the warnings, the advice, the demands, and the threats of the Government of India, has become so palpable, that the time has apparently arrived when some final settlement of the question which has so long created trouble and discussion between the two Governments must absolutely be insisted upon.

9. That question, the sole source of all the discord which vexes the States, is the Contingent Force.

The debt to the British Government which burdens the Nizam has been produced by the Contingent. The monthly subsidy, for which the Resident at Hyderabad maintains a perpetual wrestle with the Dewan, and which transforms the Representative of the British Government by turns into an importunate creditor and a bailiff in execution, is the pay of the Contingent. Were that source of demand and dispute once adjusted, there is no Native State in India whose relations with the British Government would, as far as we know, be more friendly and unruffled. The Nizam has been our ally for much more than half a century. The Treaty which makes the friends and enemies of the one the friends and enemies of the other, is in full force and operation. This Government disclaims not only the intention, but the wish, of doing any act by which the independence of the Nizam can be in any degree impaired. The Treaty itself offers a bar to any such design, by declaring, in the most emphatic terms, that the Government of India binds itself in no way to interfere with His Highness's subjects, servants, or concerns; and the Government of India has for many years past voluntarily strengthened that bar by declining to interfere in matters of internal administration within the State of Hyderabad, even when invited to do so by its ruler. Nor is there anything in the condition of the State which is likely to cause dispute, so long as we observe this principle of non-interference to which the Treaty binds us.

The Nizam is neither cruel, nor ambitious, nor tyrannical; and although, in our view, his affairs are badly administered, there is nothing in the character, either of himself or of his administration, which is calculated to endanger the security or the interest of those who inhabit British territory round his State. The Arabs are universally looked upon as an element of strife and danger within the territories of Hyderabad. But nothing, I think, is less probable than their attempting any aggression against the English; and if they should do so, nothing can be less doubtful than the issue. The Subsidiary and Contingent Forces at our command within the State of Hyderabad, comprising 16 regiments of infantry, of which one is European, seven regiments of cavalry, and 42 field guns, would be quite sufficient to crush any internal tumult which the Arabs might attempt.

Under such circumstances, the relations between the Government of India and His Highness the Nizam ought to run on peacefully and smoothly; and they would do so if we could but find a way to avoid continual rude jarring upon the subject of His Highness's Contingent.

10. So obvious and so manifold are the evils of the present state of things, and so ineffectual have been all our previous efforts to counteract or to cure them, that I feel it my duty to submit to my honourable colleagues that it would be well worth the while of the Government of India, and well worthy of its reputation, that it should consent to considerable sacrifices on its own part, if they should be found necessary for securing an effectual remedy for the evils under which we



suffer. It would be well worth the while of the Government of India, because a mutual agreement, whereby all grounds for future dispute regarding the Contingent shall be taken away, would save much of the time and labour of public servants, would relieve both the officers and soldiers of the Contingent from the irksome position in which they are, would no longer exhibit the British Government as perpetually exacting, with difficulty, an impost from the Nizam, and would remove the soreness—the mingled exasperation and humiliation—which the proceedings (the necessary but still obnoxious proceedings)—of the Government of India towards him during the last few years, must have produced in the mind of the Nizam.

It would be worthy of the reputation of the Government of India, because, although His Highness has not paid off the debt due by him, he has certainly made considerable exertions to do so, having, at a heavy cost to his Treasury, obtained the means of paying between 40 and 50 lacs; and still further because, in my humble judgment, we owe some consideration to His Highness in regard to the costly scale upon which he has long been maintaining the Contingent at our suggestion, if not by our persuasion.

11. It has frequently been and still is very commonly contended, that the support of this Contingent is an obligation distinctly imposed upon the Nizam by the Treaty of 1800. In so far as His Highness may have tacitly accepted such an interpretation of the Treaty, and in that he did actually consent to maintain permanently a military force of the nature of a Contingent, I hold that His Highness was unquestionably bound to provide adequately, in all respects, for the pay, clothing, equipment, command, and every other charge necessary for the efficiency of the force he had voluntarily engaged to keep up.

12. But I feel myself bound to declare my opinion that if the Nizam had originally rejected any such interpretation of the 12th Article of the Treaty as has been contended for; if he had asserted that he was not bound to uphold a Contingent of the nature of that which has long been established; or if His Highness had at any intermediate time refused, or should now refuse, any longer to sustain the present Contingent, the Government of India could not make good any right by Treaty to enforce the continuance of the Contingent on the part of the Nizam.

13. The 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 contains these provisions:—"The contracting parties will employ all practicable means of conciliation to prevent the calamity of war; and for that purpose will at all times be ready to enter into amicable explanations with other States, and to cultivate and improve the general relations of peace and amity with all the powers of India, according to the true spirit and tenor of this defensive Treaty. But if a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other power whatever, then His Highness the Nawab Asoph Jah engages that, with the reserve of two battalions of sepoys, which are to remain near His Highness's person, the residue of the British Subsidiary Force (consisting of six battalions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry, with artillery) joined by 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry of His Highness's own troops . . . shall be immediately put in motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy."

This provision, viz, that the British Force in Hyderabad should be "joined by 6,000 infantry and 9,000 horse of His Highness's own troops, in time of war, has been made to justify our requiring of the Nizam that he should uphold a force of about 5,000 infantry, 2,000 horse, and four field batteries, officered by British Officers, controlled by the British Resident, trained on the British system, not in war only, but permanently, at a very costly rate, and so as to be available for the use of the Nizam only when the Representative of the British Government has given his consent.

14. I submit that neither the words nor the intention of the Treaty can be held to warrant such a construction of its obligations.

The plain intention of the Treaty was that, whenever war arose, the Nizam should reinforce the British army by a body of 15,000 of his own troops. It never contemplated that the Nizam should be made to raise and pay a large body of troops distinct from his own, to be placed at all times, in peace and war alike, under the sole control of the Government of India.

15. If it be said, as I have heard it said, that His Highness's own troops were rabble, and that to ensure our being aided by good troops when war came we had a right to require the maintenance, under our own control and training, of a smaller body during peace, I reply that the article confers no such constructive right. It gives a claim to 15,000 of His Highness's own troops during war; we had a right to that number of his best troops; we have a positive right to it still. But we have no right to set up any arbitrary standard of our own by which the quality of those troops is to be measured, and to demand that a small army should be permanently embodied and made over to us by the Nizam, in order that we may ensure its being kept up to our peculiar standard.

Our right is to require 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry in time of war only. Our practice is to insist on 5,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 24 guns at all times, whether in peace or war. Our right is to an occasional use of His Highness's troops; our practice is to convert them permanently into troops of our own. For 35 years the Nizam's troops could never have been asked for in accordance with the spirit of the treaty; for within that period the Nizam and the Government of India have never taken the field together, yet during all that time the Contingent has been maintained at various strengths.

According to the present political aspect of India, it is difficult to conceive the possibility of the two Governments ever again taking the field together. Yet no diminution of the Contingent has been proposed.

16. These are the reasons by which I have found myself forced to the conclusion that the Government of India has no right whatever, either by the spirit or by the letter of the Treaty of 1800, to require the Nizam to maintain the Contingent in its present form.

17. I am not to be understood to say that we have had no right to require from His Highness the regular payment of the Contingent as it stood, or that we have wrongfully compelled His Highness to maintain it, or that it has been kept up wholly for our own interests, and has been of no value to His Highness. On the contrary, I have already observed that the Nizam having nearly for 40 years consented to maintain a fixed force on certain terms, he was solemnly bound to fulfil those terms, at least so long as his original consent to its maintenance was not withdrawn; and I have myself enforced this observation of the obligations under which he had come.

Para. 11.

18. Neither is there any ground for asserting that the consent of the Nizam to the maintenance of the Contingent was compelled, or that the force has been of no use to him. The system commenced during the time of Rajah Chundoo Lall, who always strongly urged his master the Nizam to maintain it. The present Nizam is said formerly to have been adverse to it. But there is no official testimony (so far as I can discover) to that effect; and if he ever did entertain those feelings, they have passed away. A question was put to the Resident directly upon this head in 1851, in consequence of his having stated, "The Nizam himself does not, I believe, entertain any wish for a reduction in the Contingent, or a diminution of its strength, and I know it to be the opinion of the Minister that its continued maintenance in a state of unimpaired efficiency, with a view to the general good order and tranquillity of the country, is indispensable, if any considerable reduction is expected to be made in the number of the Irregular Troops."

To Resident No. 3466, 7th November 1851.

The Resident alleged as the grounds of his belief that the Nizam desired no reduction in the Contingent, "the absence, as far as my recollection serves me, of all remonstrance whatever, or complaint, or unfavourable representation from the Nizam, on the subject of any excessive strength of the Contingent, or unreasonable expense on this account, either direct from himself, or indirectly through his Minister, since I have held the Office of Resident at Hyderabad; from which I naturally infer, and (I think reasonably) believe, that the sentiments of the Nizam are such as I have referred to. Had the Nizam considered either the maintenance of the present

No. 189, 14th October 1851, para. 7.

No. 214, 7th December 1851, para. 4.

numerical strength of the Contingent, or the expense attending it, as constituting a just cause of complaint or remonstrance, it can scarcely be supposed otherwise than that in the long period of 13 years he would have expressed himself to this effect."

The Resident proceeds: "But what I have now stated is a negative reason only for the belief I entertain; and a more positive one is presented in the fact of that conversation which I had with the Nizam on the 8th October 1850, as reported to you in my letter of the same date, No. 257, and of which, for the convenience of reference, I beg permission to subjoin the following extract:

"The other instance of misconduct he (His Highness the Nizam) particularly alluded to was his (Rajah Ram Buksh's) failing either to take any measures for liquidating the debt due to the Company, or for regularly disbursing the pay of the Contingent."

"Upon this last point His Highness dwelt at considerable length. He stated that he had always considered it of primary importance, as the payment to be first made, and in preference to all others. He observed that Maharajah Chundoo Lall had repeatedly impressed upon his mind the importance of maintaining the Contingent, and regularly paying it, as an indispensable means of preserving the peace and tranquillity of the country."

"His Highness spoke warmly on the subject, repeated his sense of the value of the services of this force, and did not drop the slightest hint that he considered the Contingent either an unnecessary burden upon his finances, or otherwise than a valuable body of troops, which ought at all hazards to be maintained."

The Resident then affords additional confirmation of the wishes of the Nizam, He adds: "The same belief is confirmed down to a more recent period, by the conversation which took place between the Nizam and his Minister on the 18th ultimo, as reported to me verbally by the Minister on the evening of that day, and communicated on the next day, the 19th, in a written official note, a copy of which formed one of the enclosures of my despatch to you by express of the 5th instant."

"9. For the convenience of reference, and in order that my present letter may be complete in itself on the subject under consideration, I subjoin a copy of the note just alluded to:

"Translation of a Note from the Minister to the Resident, dated 25th Mohurrum 1268 (19th November 1851).

"At an interview yesterday with His Highness the Nizam, he issued his commands to me that the troops were useless, ill-regulated, and merely expensive, the cause of loss, and a great burden. I therefore submitted to His Highness a statement of the number of the whole of the troops, and was commanded to exempt the troops of the Sarf-i-Khas (who are for His Highness's own protection and personal attendance), and also the Contingent; and in regard to the remaining troops mentioned in the statement who are in reality useless, not according to account, and partly nominal, I was ordered to inspect the accounts, and make reductions and saving to the amount of 60 lacs of rupees per annum, in order that the saving thus made might relieve the pecuniary difficulties of the Nizam's Government. I therefore enclose herewith for your perusal a Persian statement, with an English translation.

"I, in conformity with the commands of His Highness, have made arrangements for the appointment of a Commission to inquire into the accounts of the troops in question, and His Highness has sanctioned this measure; because much advantage to the Government will be derived from it. The innumerable

\* The conversation with the Nizam, as reported verbally by the Minister to the Resident, on the evening of the 18th, was narrated in the Resident's letter of 5th December, para. 28. The Minister stated that the Nizam had "authorised and directed him to proceed to the reduction of unnecessary expenditure, by the disbandment of useless troops (Syenati Jauret), to the extent of 60 lacs of rupees per annum, stipulating only that no reduction should be made in the two items of the Contingent and of the troops personally attached to His Highness himself, or what is designated Sarf-i-Khas."—Resident, 5th Dec. 1851, para. 28.

embezzlements and frauds of the Sheristadars and Mutsuddies, &c., to which there is neither limit nor account, will be looked into, and the arrangement will be made known to you in detail for the information of the Government of India. The enclosed statement will show the number of the troops, the amount of their pay monthly and annually, and that the annual saving of 60 lacs of rupees will merely be from the sum of Rs. 1,06,41,676-11-0 exclusive of the troops of the Sarf-i-Khas and the Contingent, which, in conformity with orders, are to remain fixed and determined as at present. You will obtain this information from a perusal of the statement.

“(True translation.)  
“(Signed) C. Davidson, Assistant Resident.”

“10. I had the honour to receive your letter to which I am now replying on the 19th ultimo, and it may be observed that the Nizam's note to me above quoted bears the same date. But the information contained in the note is in exact accordance with that which the Minister had verbally given to me the evening before, and could not, therefore, have been modified or affected in any manner by the questions agitated in your letter.

“11. Independently of this, I may add that when he wrote to me his note of the 19th ultimo, he was ignorant of my having received any letter whatever from the Supreme Government regarding the Contingent, and still, as far as I am aware, remains so.”

Subsequently, on the 3rd March 1852, the Resident encloses a letter from the Minister, dated 2nd March, in which he expresses the wishes of the Nizam regarding the Contingent even more strongly. He says (para. 5), “On the 19th November I wrote to you that His Highness had particularly desired me not to make the slightest reduction in the Contingent and Sarf-i-Khas, and authorized me to make reductions to the amount of 60 lacs in the expenditure of Rs. 1,06,41,676.”

On the 26th March the Resident reported a repetition of the same sentiments by the Minister during an interview with the Assistant Resident on that date. The Minister, adverting to the order for stopping recruiting, said, “Neither His Highness nor myself desires any reductions in the number of the Contingent.” It is added, “This part of the conversation ended by his expressing his conviction that the Hyderabad Government could not be carried on by the Minister without the Contingent, and that His Highness concurred fully in this conviction.”

19. These extracts prove from the Nizam's own lips that he has upheld the Contingent of his free will, that he is himself fully sensible of its value for his own interests, and that he desires its continuance in its present form.

But notwithstanding this, although the Nizam has voluntarily subjected himself to the expense of the Contingent, and has not remonstrated against its amount, although the Force is undoubtedly of the highest value to him, and although he expresses his wish for its continuance, I feel strongly the justice of the objections that might be made to the very heavy cost at which it is maintained.

It consists of eight regiments of infantry, five regiments of cavalry, and four field batteries; yet for this force there are no less than five Brigadiers with Brigade Majors. A Military Secretary has been appointed for it, who draws the same salary as the Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army. Although there is a Superintending Surgeon for the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, who has only ten Regiments and some Artillery to look after, another Superintending Surgeon has been appointed for the Contingent. Although the Subsidiary Force has its magazines on the spot, the Contingent supplies its own stores, and has its Commissaries of Ordnance accordingly. The superior officers all are highly paid. By the rules of the force, officers are promoted to superior grades and to higher pay earlier than they would be in their own service, whereby the cost of the force is proportionably enhanced.

Some portions of the force in like manner are very highly paid. The sowars receive not less than 40 Hyderabad rupees, equal to about 32 Company's rupees,

a month. Hence the aggregate expense of the Nizam's Contingent is unusually and unnecessarily heavy.

The Gwalior Contingent, which contains about 1,000 men less than His Highness's Contingent, has only one Brigadier, and all other establishments proportionably small.

Nor can it be alleged that if the cost is greater the quality of the Nizam's Contingent is in all respects better : such is not the case. The high pay of the Nizam's sowars certainly obtains men of a better class than usual ; and the Cavalry of the Contingent is consequently of a high order. But I have been informed by those well qualified to judge, that the Gwalior Contingent, of all arms, is inferior to nothing that is to be seen in the Honourable Company's Native Army.

20. In the preceding paras. I have traced the course of the relations between the British Government and the Nizam since His Highness was last addressed in special terms in June 1851. I have shown the present condition of affairs, and have made it plain that the time has now arrived when a final settlement of the question out of which all the troubles between the two States has sprung must be insisted upon.

It has been shown that the sole source of these troubles has been the Nizam's Contingent, and that if this were once adjusted upon a definite and satisfactory footing it is probable that our relations with Hyderabad would be wholly undisturbed.

The importance of some adjustment has been pointed out as of value to all concerned, and I have expressed my conviction that it would be worth the while of the Government of India, and worthy of its character, to obtain that adjustment even at considerable sacrifice to itself.

It would be worth the while of this Government, because it would greatly improve the position of the Contingent, by substituting a formal agreement for the present state of things, in which, as I conceive, it exists only by sufferance, and it would tend to maintain the dignity and harmony of the two States. It would be worthy of the character of this Government, because, according to my humble judgment, the Government of India owes much consideration to the Nizam in regard to his Contingent force, for although his assent to the interpretation of the treaty under which the Contingent has been held to exist has been of long standing, although the value of the force to His Highness is undoubted, and although, conscious of its value, he is still desirous of maintaining it, and has made no remonstrance against its expense, yet its cost is far greater than is necessary for securing to the Nizam every advantage that he derives from the Contingent in its actual form.

21. For some time past, preparations have been made, under the orders of this Government, for attempting to effect changes in the force. Recruiting has been stopped ; no officers have been named to vacancies ; and the Brigadiership which Colonel Twemlow has lately resigned has not been filled up.

I have already said that the war, and the discussions long in progress with the Court of Hyderabad, have deterred the Government of India from more active measures. The war, it is to be hoped, is near its close ; the discussions have reached a point at which discussion appears to be no longer profitable, or even possible. The appointment to the Residency of Hyderabad of Colonel Low, on whose judgment, firmness, and conciliatory demeanour I greatly rely, is eminently calculated to facilitate negotiations with the Nizam ; accordingly, I propose that the Government of India should at once take measures for obtaining—if necessary, for insisting upon—a settlement of the question regarding the Nizam's Contingent.

22. In any negotiations that shall be opened with His Highness the Contingent must form the chief object of attention ; at the same time I conceive that there are other points which claim our notice, and that advantage should be taken of this favourable occasion for endeavouring to effect such changes regarding them as may seem expedient.

23. Among these is a payment annually due from the Nizam, known as Appah Dessaye's Choute. It would be convenient if this periodical payment could be provided for in common with the payment of the Contingent.

24. Some modification, too, might be sought of the conditions under which the Government of India maintains the Subsidiary Force within His Highness's territories, considerably to the advantage of this Government, without in the smallest degree diminishing the benefits it may afford to the Nizam.

More than 50 years have passed since the Subsidiary Force was granted to the Nizam in its present form; it consists of eight battalions of sepoys, or 8,000 firelocks, two regiments of cavalry, and a due proportion of artillery, comprising at present two troops of horse artillery and two field batteries. The eight battalions, by reason of the reduction of regimental numbers, do not give 8,000 firelocks; but as one of the eight regiments of infantry is European the numerical deficiency is much more than made up to His Highness by additional efficiency and value.

The Subsidiary Force was, by the treaty, to be stationed "in perpetuity" within the territories of the Nizam. It is so stationed, and of course will continue to be so unless His Highness can be induced to modify that article in the treaty.

The condition of public affairs in India, and the position of the Nizam himself, have wholly changed since the compact was made. The power of Tippoo Sultan had, indeed, been just before destroyed; but the Nizam was still encompassed with unfriendly neighbours on almost every side. The Mahratta potentates were still menacing and powerful; the Peshwa was in possession of all his territories to the eastward, and was hostile; the Rajah of Berar was to the northward, ready to act against the Nizam; beyond were Holkar and Scindiah, formidable chiefs. In those times it was really necessary for the fulfilment of the "treaty of general defence and protection" that the Subsidiary Force should be stationed permanently within His Highness's dominions; for unless it were placed, the Peshwa or the Rajah of Berar might have been at the gates of Hyderabad before the promised Subsidiary Force could have come to His Highness's aid. All this has completely changed; the Peshwa is gone, and his territories have passed into the hands of the British Government; Holkar has no military force of any moment, and British troops are interposed between him and the Nizam; Scindiah has been reduced within narrow limits, and maintains a Contingent force; the Rajah of Berar has been deprived of a considerable portion of his territory, which has been transferred to His Highness, and a British force is stationed close to Nagpore.

From external enemies, therefore, the Nizam has absolutely nothing to fear. So far as danger from without is concerned, the presence of the Subsidiary Force within the State of Hyderabad is altogether superfluous.

It is very right and very essential that the Nizam should have aid at hand to protect him against the violence and excesses of the multitude of turbulent soldiers which he persists in maintaining, and which, but for the presence of such aid, would often be of a nature very formidable to their master; but, the Contingent force being upheld, so large a body of troops as is comprised in the Subsidiary Force cannot be required permanently within the bounds of the State.

On the other hand, there is some inconvenience occasionally felt by this Government from so large a force being locked up in the Deccan, and it would undoubtedly be advantageous if it could be differently distributed.

Wherefore, if the Nizam could be induced so far to modify the articles concerning the Subsidiary Force as to exempt the Government of India from the obligation of keeping the whole of it perpetually within His Highness's territories, while a portion, to be specified, should still be retained there, and the whole should be made available whenever His Highness should call for its aid and defence, some benefit would be obtained by this Government, and some addition made to its effective resources.

25. In the proposed negotiation, then, the objects that are to be pursued are these:—

First.—The establishment of the Contingent force upon a clear and definite footing, so that its existence shall no longer depend, as at present, upon the caprice of the Nizam.

Secondly.—The determination of the number of men, and of the description of troops of which it shall consist.

Thirdly.—The specification of its duties.

Fourthly.—Provision for its payment, by the cession of certain territories to the Government of India, as was done in the case of the Subsidiary Force.

Fifthly.—A readjustment of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

Sixthly.—A settlement, in some form, of the question of principal and interest of debt now due to the Government of India.

Seventhly.—Provision for the regular payment of Appa Dessaye's Choute.

26. I submit the draft of a treaty which I have prepared, and which appears to me to accomplish the several objects we have in view, those objects being, not an abrogation of the engagements now subsisting between the two States, but only partial modification of them. I have adhered to the general provisions of the treaty of 1800, and even, where it was practicable, to its wording, so as to avoid all unnecessary appearance of extensive change.

I am desirous of explaining fully the effect and the intent of the several clauses.

27. The heading of the treaty is in the usual form, and is taken from the Treaty of 1800.

The preamble recites, in the words of Lord Wellesley's treaty, the long-established friendship between the States, and the special exertions which were made by him to cement their union, and to identify their interests, by the formation of a treaty of general defence and protection between them. It points out that, in the lapse of more than half a century, changes have taken place not only in the position of the contracting parties themselves, but in the condition of surrounding States, whereby the military arrangements of those days have been put out of date, and a readjustment of them, so as to bring them more into accordance with present necessities and circumstances, would be for the advantage of both parties to the treaty of defence. The preamble then refers to the difficulties which have arisen of late years out of the undefined character of the Nizam's Contingent, and out of the failure on His Highness's part to supply the pay for those troops which the British Government has felt itself to have virtually guaranteed to them. For the introduction of the modification which changing circumstances require, and for the adjustment of the difficulties and disputes which have long perplexed the States, the preamble proceeds to propose the agreements which are contained in the eight articles that follow.

28. Article I.—This is identical with the first article of the treaty of 1800. I have repeated it here for the express purpose of identifying the policy, the feelings, and the intentions of the British Government of this day towards His Highness the Nizam, with the policy, feelings, and intentions which dictated the friendly treaty of 1800, in the reign of his predecessor ; and in order to give His Highness assurance that we seek now no change of general principles or of political relations, but merely a regulation of details which require amendment, in order to avert a disturbance of the harmony in which the two States have been united for the greater part of the 50 years during which the existing treaty has been in force.

29. Article II. accordingly proceeds to renew the compact by which a Subsidiary Force was furnished to His Highness by the British Government.

The number of regiments to be contained in the Subsidiary Force is the same as in 1800. The specification of its duties is taken, word for word, from the 5th Article of the Treaty of 1798, wherein was laid down the position in which the Subsidiary Force was intended to stand, and which it has since occupied.

The proposed provisions of this article differ from the original treaty in two respects :—1st. The latter declares that the force shall consist of " eight battalions of sepoys (or 8,000 firelocks), and two regiments of cavalry (or 1,000 horses)."

2nd. It stipulates that the whole of this force shall be " stationed in perpetuity in His Highness's territory."



The numerical amount of the regiments has been omitted, because the numbers of each regiment of sepoys amounts now-a-days only to 750 men, and of each regiment of cavalry to 420 troopers ; and as I apprehend that the number of regiments to be employed was the thing mainly stipulated for, and not the number of men, I conceive the alteration now introduced is in the spirit of the original treaty.

I have already stated at length the reasons which induce me to propose a modification of the words which compel the presence of the whole Subsidiary Force within His Highness's territories, and need not now repeat them.

Para. 24.

30. Article III. places the Contingent on a fixed and definite footing, analogous for the most part to that on which it has in practice been placed, but quite different from that on which it stands in the Treaty of 1800.

I have made it here an auxiliary body of troops to be maintained for the Nizam, in the same way that we maintain the Oude local regiments for the King of Oude.

The numerical amount fixed, of 5,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, and four field batteries, corresponds very nearly to the present amount. I have fixed it thus because His Highness has expressed a strong desire that it should not be reduced, and because it will give six regiments of infantry and four regiments of cavalry of ordinary size, thus saving several officers and some cost, while it will be equally effective in the field.

In the last clause of this article I have endeavoured to secure to the Nizam the fullest right to the services of this auxiliary force at all times, in every part of his dominions, and on every occasion on which he may call for them, excepting for duties which properly belong to Sebundy corps. One condition only is attached to the employment of the Contingent against offenders, namely, that "the reality of the offence shall have been duly ascertained." This condition was attached to the use of the Subsidiary Force for similar purposes in the 17th Article of the Treaty of 1800. It has in practice always been required by the Resident, when the services of the Contingent have been sought by the Nizam, and it is very necessary that it should not be omitted now, lest His Highness's subjects should be sufferers thereby. For it must be remembered that the Contingent, as well as the Subsidiary Force, while it is of great value to a Sovereign who rules well and justly, may be made a cover to one who rules unjustly and tyrannically, and an instrument of coercion against the indignation of his people, who but for its presence might be able to vindicate their rights, and to resist the wrong done to them. It is a part of our duty, therefore, to see that while we maintain the Contingent for a friendly Sovereign we do not unconsciously make it an engine of oppression to his people. To that end we should provide, as is done in the article under review, that before placing the Contingent force on any occasion at the disposal of the Nizam we should satisfy ourselves that it is to be used not for oppressive purposes, but truly for the rightful maintenance of His Highness's authority and of public order.

The moral effect of this provision is of itself sufficient to prevent the Nizam from applying for the use of the force on any other than fitting occasions. Thus the ready use of the Contingent, which the Honourable Court of Directors has enjoined, will always in practice be at the command of the Nizam.

31. The 4th Article of the Treaty is taken very closely from the 17th Article of the Treaty of 1800.

32. The 5th Article embodies those of the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 regarding the Contingent in war which it is necessary to make applicable to the Auxiliary Force to be upheld under the present engagement. By the present article the use of the Subsidiary Force joined by the Contingent is given in time of war, in the same manner as the use of the Subsidiary Force joined by 15,000 of His Highness's troops was given before. The presence of two battalions of sepoys with the Nizam is reserved as formerly, and His Highness is absolved from the further claim for all his other troops which was imposed in the former treaty.

33. Article VI. is the most essential portion of the proposed agreement : it provides for the regular payment of the Contingent by the ceding of certain districts of His Highness's territories, whose revenues shall be applied to this purpose.



Article VII. regulates the mode of transferring these districts ; and Article VIII. declares that the cession of the said districts shall be taken as a full satisfaction, not only for the regular pay of the Contingent, but for all annual payments, and furthermore for the principal sum of debt due by His Highness to the British Government.

The proposed cession of certain districts for the payment of troops is no novelty : it was agreed to by the Nizam himself in the Treaty of 1800 for the payment of the Subsidiary Force ; it was agreed to by Scindiah in the Treaty of Surji Anjengaum in 1803 ; it was agreed to by the King of Oude in 1801. All of these treaties are now in operation.

The Government of India, therefore, in asking for the cession of territories for the payment of the force, asks nothing that is new. It does not ask it until the absolute necessity for such a measure, in order to enable this Government to keep faith with the Contingent, has become apparent, as has been shown in the former portion of this minute ; nor does it ask it in a manner which would be injurious to His Highness's pecuniary interests. On the contrary, the terms it proposes are in a high degree advantageous to His Highness. This will be seen by the following statement of His Highness's liabilities to the British Government. The sums are stated in Hyderabad rupees, as in the accounts transmitted :—

	Rs.
1. Annual cost of Contingent.	38,80,000
2. Appa Dessaye's Choute, &c. ....	1,32,000
3. Interest on debt on 1st March, amounting to about Rs. 46,00,000 .....	2,76,000
Annual Payments due by His Highness...Rs.	42,88,000

The districts which it is proposed the Nizam shall cede are those which in 1851 were selected, from their position and other circumstances, to be temporarily ceded in payment of the debt due to this Government. The net value of those districts was estimated by the Resident at Rs. 36,82,000. The amount, therefore, will stand thus :

	Rs.
Present Annual Payments due by His Highness the Nizam .	42,88,000
Annual Revenue of Lands to be ceded in lieu thereof .....	36,82,000
Annual Gain by His Highness...Rs.	6,06,000

If, then, His Highness shall agree to the treaty proposed to him, he will be a gainer of more than six lacs of rupees annually, together with exemption from the ultimate repayment of a principal sum of 40 lacs of rupees.

34. I have advised that the Government of India should endeavour to conclude a treaty with the Nizam, even at a sacrifice. It will be seen from the statement just made that the sacrifice will be a considerable one ; it will involve the surrender of a sum of 46 lacs of rupees ; and at first it would appear to inflict upon the Honourable Company an annual loss of the six lacs which the Nizam will annually gain.

This, however, would be overstating the case against the British Government. An immediate reduction of one lac in the charges of the Contingent may certainly be effected. I am satisfied that within five years such further reductions may be gradually made therein that the charges of the Contingent, Appa Dessaye's Choute, &c., will then be fully covered by the present revenues of the districts now to be ceded. Looking beyond that date, I feel assured that ultimately the Government of India will be no pecuniary loser by an act of policy which affords considerable immediate relief to our ally, and exhibits towards him a very liberal consideration. The districts in question are supposed to be of great natural capacity ; they are well adapted for the growth of cotton and sugar ; they are recommended, as I formerly observed, by their geographical position, on political grounds, as well as for commercial reasons ; and I have no doubt that, considerable as the sacrifice certainly is which I propose now to submit to, it will be entirely made good to the Government of India by means of the improvement of the ceded territories at no very distant date.

Nor is it to be supposed that the gain which I am now anticipating for the Government of the Honourable Company hereafter will be the Nizam's loss ; if these anticipations of mine shall be realized, it will be by the introduction of our administration within the ceded districts ; by the prohibition of extortion ; by the maintenance of order ; by the restoration of security for life and property ; and by those benefits of well-regulated rule which lead directly and rapidly to the improvement of the physical condition of a country, and to the increase of public wealth.

If these districts shall remain under the Government of the Nizam no such change will ever take place ; they will follow the general rule, and, like the rest of his dominions, they will go on, and will be content to go on, as they have done, from bad to worse.

35. The review I have taken in the eight preceding paras. of the Treaty submitted for consideration must, I unfeignedly believe, be successful in convincing all who may read it that the Treaty fulfils the professions of its preamble, and, if concluded, would truly be "for the mutual advantage of both Powers."

The Nizam would gain by it a renewal of those obligations for his defence which were assumed by the British Government half a century ago ; he would obtain the services, as before, of the Subsidiary Force, and, though its distribution should be slightly modified, he would enjoy all the substantial benefit he has hitherto derived from it ; he would retain the services of the Contingent Force, which he has enjoyed for 35 years, and which he well knows, and has openly avowed, are essential to the tranquillity of his dominions ; he would be freed from the annoyance of perpetual demands, and from the humiliation which such necessary demands on the part of the British Government for the performance of his obligations must naturally be supposed to inflict upon his pride. Lastly, though he cedes certain portions of his territory to the British Government in order to meet his liabilities, His Highness is a direct and immediate gainer by the transaction of more than six lacs of rupees annually, and is moreover absolved at the same time from all demands for the repayment of his principal sum of debt, amounting to not less than 46 lacs of Hyderabad rupees.

The Government of India, on its part, would gain the use of certain portions of the Subsidiary Force, which is now locked up at Hyderabad and Jaulna, whereby other troops may be set free for employment in Pegu, or elsewhere, while we should still remain at all times fully in a condition to act up to all the obligations of the Treaty whenever we might be required. The Government of India would see the Contingent placed thereby on a permanent footing, available for the preservation of order in the Nizam's dominions during peace, and available for the use of the British Government, together with the Subsidiary Force, during war. Above all, it would gain the means of paying the Contingent troops with regularity, greatly to the benefit of their interests and to their comfort ; it would be emancipated from the irksome labour of perpetually pursuing the Government of Hyderabad with menacing but fruitless importunity for that which is due to the troops and to itself ; and if, as must be admitted, the Government of India obtains these advantages only at a large pecuniary loss, yet I conceive that those advantages are cheaply purchased ; for I am satisfied that the annual loss will be of very short duration, and that the aggregate loss, though considerable at present, will by our own exertions be fully made good to us before many years shall have passed over our heads.

36. When the mutual advantages which would be secured to both contracting parties by the conclusion of the proposed Treaty are so many and so manifest, it is earnestly to be hoped that it may be concluded without delay ; and when the especial advantages to be derived from it by His Highness the Nizam are so indisputable, it is difficult to understand how His Highness can feel any repugnance to adopt it. Nevertheless there is good reason to fear that such may perhaps prove to be the case ; hence it becomes necessary that the Government of India should determine now upon the course which it will take in the event of the Nizam objecting to certain portions of the draft Treaty, or refusing to accede to any part of it.

37. I have heard said that His Highness has a deep-rooted, almost a superstitious, prejudice against the alteration of any established Treaty, conceiving, according to his theory, that any such partial alteration would be but the forerunner of a subsequent and total abrogation of the Treaty itself.

If such be really His Highness's feeling, it is probable that he will resist all such portions of the proposed engagement as are in substitution of any portion of the Treaty of 1800. Should he do so, the Resident will, of course, use his best efforts to combat such a prejudice if it should be declared, or to counteract its effects if it should practically be acted upon. The arguments for so doing are to be found in this Minute, and others will probably present themselves to the mind of the Resident. These, it is to be hoped, may induce His Highness to consent. If, however, he should be obstinate in his resistance, I would not press the point.

It is hardly necessary for me to say that I have not the least desire to repudiate any of the obligations of the Treaty of 1800, or to resile from the fulfilment of them. I desire to do everything that the Treaty has bound us to do, and seek only a permission to do it in such different manner from the mode actually prescribed as would be equally beneficial to the Nizam, while, in consequence of change of circumstances, it would be more convenient to the Government of India. If explanations to this effect, and all persuasions, should prove unavailing, the Resident should be instructed to abandon that portion of the draft Treaty. In

"And whereas, in the lapse of time, many changes in the condition of Princes and of neighbouring States have taken place, by reason of which it has now become expedient to revise the military arrangements that were formerly agreed upon for the fulfilment of the said Treaties."

such case those words of the preamble which are quoted in the margin, together with the second and fourth Articles of the draft Treaty, and the word "further" in the first line of the third Article, must be omitted, and the numbering of the Articles, and minor consequential alterations, must be made in the draft by the Resident.

38. The Treaty will then stand by itself as a new engagement, having exclusive reference to the establishment of the Contingent upon a new footing, and to the settlement of the questions connected with it.

39. The advantages to be gained by the Government of India will be diminished by the abandonment of the Articles regarding the Subsidiary Force, and the sacrifices it was prepared to make will be made for a less return. Nevertheless, the settlement of the Contingent question is of such great and immediate importance, that I should not propose to make any alteration in the terms of the 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Articles of the draft in consequence of the relinquishment of the 2nd and 4th Articles.

It must be expected, as a matter of course, that the Nizam will feel an extreme dislike to the surrender of territory. The feeling will probably be encouraged by the pride and by the interests of the principal persons in the State. The Berar portion of the cession is, I believe, not an hereditary possession of the Nizam; still there will no doubt be a great reluctance on his part to make over the sovereignty of those districts to the East India Company.

The transfer should be contended for in its fullest extent by the Resident, and no exertions should be wanting on his part to obtain His Highness's consent. If the Resident's endeavours should fail, an attempt may be made to obviate the objections of the Nizam, by declaring that the transfer of the districts shall be made, not in perpetual sovereignty, but on the footing of the cession recently agreed to by Scindiah for the like purpose of maintaining a Contingent.

If, too, His Highness should object to the Contingent being kept up otherwise than in his own name, the Treaty may be worded in accordance with that of Kotah. In each of these cases the wording of the draft must be altered.

40. If the Contingent is still to be maintained in His Highness's name the first clause of the 3rd Article will run thus: "His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk . . . . agrees, for himself, his heirs and successors, to maintain an Auxiliary Force, which shall be styled the Hyderabad Contingent. It shall consist of not less," &c., &c., &c.

41. If the sovereignty of the Assigned Districts is nominally to be reserved to the Nizam, the 6th Article will stand thus :

“For the regular payment of the expense of the said Hyderabad Contingent the revenues of the districts enumerated in the schedule annexed to this Treaty shall be permanently assigned to the Honourable East India Company, and shall be appropriated to the maintenance of the said force, and for purposes hereinafter named. For the better securing of the due payment of the revenues of the districts so assigned, and for the better preservation of good order within the same, the civil administration thereof shall be under the exclusive management of the Honourable East India Company, whose authority therein shall be as full and complete as that of His Highness the Nizam’s has heretofore been. It is to be understood, however, that the assumption of the management of the said districts by the Honourable East India Company, and the exercise of its authority therein, does not involve the abolition of the sovereignty of His Highness the Nizam.”

42. It still remains to provide for another contingency, which I fear is at least very possible, if it should not rather be regarded as probable—it still remains to provide for the case in which the Nizam, objecting to the Treaty altogether, should refuse to give his assent to any part of the settlement we are proposing to him.

43. His Highness may do this in two ways : first, repeating the sentiments he has usually expressed, he may declare his sense of the value of the Contingent, and may desire that it should be kept up. Throwing, as is his wont, the blame of all past failure upon his Minister, he may by an effort succeed in liquidating the principal sum of debt, and exhibiting some plausible scheme for the regular discharge of the pay of the Contingent in future, he may at the same time refuse either to cede to us districts, or to assign revenues under our management.

A very important and interesting despatch which has been received from the Resident gives an account of his first interview with His Highness on the 12th instant. The narrative confirms all my anticipations that His Highness would be well disposed towards Colonel Low, would be prepared to receive him in a friendly spirit, and to view any proposals he might have to make as not emanating from a hostile feeling towards His Highness or his Government. But the impressions I have received from the report of the interview, and from demi-official communications from Colonel Low himself, do not tend to render me more sanguine of success in the negotiation of this Treaty than heretofore. It is known that His Highness has already intimated to many of the more wealthy of his subjects that he expects them to contribute from their resources, “to save the country,” evidently contemplating a fresh effort to liquidate the debt ; and the tenor of the report generally satisfies me that it is His Highness’s intention to carry on affairs as he has hitherto so long succeeded in doing.

44. Secondly, His Highness, as appears from Colonel Low’s report, may adopt a different and hitherto unexpected course.

Providing, as above described, for the liquidation of the debt, His Highness may call in question his obligation to maintain the Contingent, may object to its continuance, and refuse to assign districts for the charges of a force which he no longer consents to uphold.

The despatch from the Resident to which I have already referred affords evidence that this step on His Highness’s part, though unexpected, is by no means impossible. It will be seen that during his interview with Colonel Low upon the 12th instant His Highness asked the very plain and pertinent question, “Why was the Contingent kept up any longer than the war?”

That little query comprehends the whole Contingent question. The Resident, I think, did well in not seeking to escape from it, and he gave it its proper answer. Lest His Highness, on being further pressed, should again take refuge in his query, the Government of India must equally be prepared to meet with it.

I, for my part, can never consent, as an honest man, to instruct the Resident to reply that the Contingent has been maintained by the Nizam from the end of the

Resident, No. 58, 16th  
March 1853, Enclosure,  
para. 6.

war in 1817 until now because the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 obliged His Highness so to maintain it. The true and only answer to be given to His Highness is that the Contingent has all along been maintained because the Government of Hyderabad considered it to be for its own interest to do so; its assent was given; British officers were appointed, selected from the Company's army: other British officers, not being in the service of the Honourable Company, were employed: the payment, the training, and the whole control of the force was conceded to the British Government; and thus the good faith of that Government has become pledged to all who are on the roll of the Contingent that they shall receive from His Highness justice and their rights. This is the reason why the Contingent has been maintained. In all of this His Highness the present Nizam has acquiesced, and for all that is the natural and just consequence of the past acquiescence therein His Highness is undoubtedly responsible.

But the question has now been raised, not less by His Highness's words to the Resident than by the actual position of the Contingent and its affairs, "whether that force shall be maintained for the future," and upon this question a decision must forthwith be come to.

The Resident inclines to believe that the query was only a passing idea which was put into His Highness's brain, or which flitted through it, and which, in either case, the Nizam himself was not inclined and is not likely to recall.

Whether this shall prove to be so or not; whether, on the commencement of negotiations, the Nizam shall take the first of the lines I have supposed, expressing his wish to keep up the Contingent, but refusing to cede districts for its support; or whether he shall take the other less probable line, wholly denying his obligation to furnish the Contingent in time of peace, and refusing any longer to do so; I am of opinion that, in either case, the Government of India should adopt for itself the same course of policy towards His Highness.

45. The question of the Contingent will, in either of the cases supposed, have reached a crisis; and the sole question for the determination of the British Government will then be whether it is prepared to maintain the Contingent from its own Treasury.

It is now many years ago since the payment of the force began to be made irregularly. After a time the Government of India directed that, as a temporary accommodation to the Nizam's treasury, as well as a convenience to the troops, the pay of the Contingent should be issued by the Resident whenever it fell into arrears beyond three months. The accommodation was abused by His Highness's Government; instead of diminishing the arrears the Minister habitually allowed them to increase. In the year 1851, the debt due by His Highness on account of advances to the Contingent had accumulated to not less than 75 lacs of rupees, or three-quarters of a million sterling. The utmost endeavours were then made by the Government of India and strong measures were resorted to for the purpose of inducing the Court of Hyderabad to resume the regular payment of the Contingent. The success of those endeavours was partial and short-lived; arrears again accumulated; they have now risen to 46 lacs of rupees, or near half a million sterling; and for several months past the pay has been advanced wholly from the British Treasury. It would be on our part a stupid credulity if, after our long experience of the promises, the devices, and guarantees of this Government, and of the utter falsity and worthlessness of them all, we were now to give ear to any fresh scheme for the regular payment of the Contingent which fell short of that which is required by the draft Treaty. If districts are not made over to the Government of India, and to its exclusive control, whose revenues are equal to the charges of the Contingent, it is an absolute certainty, proved by several series of facts, that the force will never be paid at all unless by the British Treasury. Is the Government of India prepared, or is it necessary for its interests, or worth its while, to pay from 25 to 30 lacs of Company's rupees annually for a force the chief use and value of which is enjoyed by the Nizam, and which only indirectly benefits us?

I am well aware that, indirectly, we do derive benefit from it. It preserves

order within the dominions of the Nizam, and so performs duties which in some degree would otherwise fall on the Subsidiary Force. Neither do I overlook the fact that if the Contingent should be abolished our obligation to protect His Highness's person, and to repress important resistance to his authority, would remain in force, while our means of fulfilling the obligation would be diminished. But the Subsidiary Force is not required by treaty to perform all the petty services that now fall upon the Contingent. For all occasions of ordinary importance the Subsidiary Force, consisting of one regiment of European infantry, six regiments N. I., two regiments of cavalry, and 24 field guns, would suffice to do what is required. If more troops should be needed they are to be found at hand for temporary use. I see, therefore, no such risks to the Subsidiary Force, or to this Government, arising out of the abolition of the Contingent as should induce us to pay 25 lacs a year for its continuance. At any rate, if more force were required, it would be better to maintain it in another form, and entirely on our own behalf.

For these reasons I am very clearly of opinion that if the Nizam should refuse to assign districts to our management for the payment of the Contingent, or should directly refuse to uphold the force at all, our conclusion must be that it is not for the interest of the Government of India to maintain the Contingent from its own revenues; and thereupon the Resident should be instructed to inform the Nizam that if he persists in his refusal, the Contingent Force must be disbanded.

46. Before the Resident proceeds to make this declaration to His Highness formally and definitively, he should earnestly and emphatically solicit His Highness's attention to the consequences of his present line of conduct. He will point out that the Contingent was originally embodied with the consent of the State, for the preservation of internal tranquillity by a body of superior troops under the command of British officers, and that it has been maintained since that time by the Court of Hyderabad from a consciousness of its conspicuous value to the State, which His Highness himself has publicly and warmly acknowledged. The Resident will cause His Highness to remark that the Government of India derives no direct advantage from this force, nor any other benefit than that which is involved in the preservation of general order throughout India. The withdrawal of British officers from their own corps to serve in the Contingent has of late years been regarded as an inconvenience by the Government of India; the necessity for advancing the pay of the force has constituted a heavy charge on the British Treasury, and the transactions and the correspondence to which these pecuniary advances have led between His Highness's Government and the Resident at Hyderabad have been felt by the Government of India to be vexatious and derogatory to its dignity, while they must of necessity have been humiliating to His Highness.

It is not, therefore, in pursuance of any object of its own that the Government of India instructs the Resident to urge upon His Highness's consideration the importance which has hitherto been attached to the Contingent, and its unquestionable value to him, and to call his attention most earnestly to the probable consequences of his being deprived of its support against the Arabs, Sikhs, Rohillahs and other unruly bands who are scattered throughout His Highness's territory. For His Highness must bear in mind that while the Subsidiary Force, as required by treaty, will protect His Highness's person, and act on occasions of importance, it is not called upon to perform, and will not perform, all those duties which have hitherto been discharged by the Contingent, and which have preserved in the most distant part of His Highness's dominions that sovereign authority which without the Contingent Force His Highness is little likely to sustain. If, however, notwithstanding these considerations, His Highness shall deliberately refuse to make the only arrangement for the payment of the force which the Government of India can accept as satisfactory or trustworthy, he must be informed that the Government of India will no longer participate in the maintenance of that force; it will no longer trust to promises which have again and again been violated; it will no longer incur the heavy charges to which it has heretofore consented to become liable, and will no longer submit to the vexations which its endeavour to promote His Highness's interests have imposed upon it. The Contingent Force will therefore cease to exist.

47. But its reduction cannot be effected at once and suddenly; it must be made gradually, and with due regard to justice towards those who are serving in it. The Government of India cannot consent that a large body of trained soldiers should be simultaneously let loose in His Highness's dominions in the Deccan, to the great danger of peace and order throughout the country.

The faith of the Government of India has virtually been pledged to those officers and men whom it has permitted or induced to serve in the Contingent, relying on the acquiescence of the Nizam, and trusting to the permanency of the employment he sanctioned. It cannot permit these persons to be suddenly discharged from His Highness's service without any consideration for their future interests. In order, therefore, to meet the expenses of the gradual reduction of the force, and furthermore to liquidate the debt due to the British Government (which, in the event of the force being maintained, it was willing to surrender), the Government of India must still require that the districts already mentioned shall be temporarily assigned to it. An engagement will be executed with His Highness to this effect. The revenues, after paying the expenses of management, shall be applied to the payment of the Contingent while in course of reduction, to the payment of interest on the debt at six per cent per annum, and finally to the liquidation of the principal sum of debt, &c., &c.

Regular accounts shall be submitted annually by the Resident for His Highness's information. When the whole of the charges of every description connected with the Contingent, and with payments due to the British Government, shall have been paid off, a settlement of accounts will be made, and the districts will be restored to His Highness the Nizam.

48. If His Highness shall refuse to enter even into this agreement, a peremptory demand for the assignment of the said districts for the temporary purposes specified should be addressed to the Nizam. If this should be disregarded, it will become necessary for the Government of India to enter upon military occupation of those districts, and thus to enforce the rights which belong to it, and which His Highness will then have wrongfully withheld.

49. I am not without hope that, after every other effort may have failed, the prospect of the loss of the Contingent Force hitherto upheld under the countenance of the British Government, and the necessity of still making over districts temporarily into our hands, may induce His Highness to consent to the engagement into which we have to propose to him to enter. If His Highness should not be moved by the prospect before him, and should obstinately reject the engagement, I am of opinion that the policy indicated in paras. 45, 46, 47, and 48 should at once be acted upon.

50. I trust that the Honourable Court of Directors will approve of our adoption of this alternative. If they should doubt the propriety of the resolution to abandon the Contingent, their orders upon that head, and their directions as to the form in which the future force is to be maintained, and its amount, will be received speedily, and before any material progress can have been made in the gradual reduction of the present Contingent.

51. This Minute has extended to so great a length that it will probably be convenient that I should add a brief summary of its statements and suggestions.

52. The effort made in 1851 to arrest the progress of the debt which the

#### Summary.

Nizam was recklessly permitting to accumulate against him having failed, the advances having again increased to about 45 lacs of rupees, while the pay of the Contingent has fallen six months in arrears, and the applications of the Resident regarding it are entirely disregarded, it has become apparent that a settlement of the Contingent question must now be finally insisted upon.

Avowing my own conviction that the Nizam is not bound by treaty, and cannot be justly compelled, to maintain the Contingent if he should refuse to do so, I have shown that His Highness has of his free will acquiesced hitherto in the maintenance of that force which his predecessors consented to establish, that he has declared his sense of its value, and has strongly expressed his desire for its continuance. Under these circumstances, His Highness is



not only liable for the cost of the Contingent while he has acquiesced in it, but is bound, if he desires its continuance, to provide effectually for its charges in future.

For that purpose, it is proposed that a new treaty should be offered to the Nizam, whereby His Highness shall consent to the establishment of the Contingent on a definite footing, and shall provide for the expenses of its maintenance. It is proposed that in order to induce His Highness to consent to this engagement, and in consideration of the heavy charges he has hitherto borne, the Government of India should make considerable sacrifices in his favour.

It is further proposed that advantage should be taken of this opportunity to obtain from His Highness some modification of the terms on which the Subsidiary Force is furnished to him.

Accordingly, a draft Treaty is submitted, by which the above-mentioned small modifications in the terms of service by the Subsidiary Force are effected, in a manner which will afford convenience to this Government, while it continues to the Nizam every substantial advantage he now enjoys.

The Contingent Force is formally established to be maintained by the Government of India, and officered and controlled in all respects thereby. The fullest provision is made for its use by the Nizam during peace, while its abuse is guarded against on behalf of his subjects. Provision also is made for its use by the British Government in time of war, in the same manner as the Force for which it is substituted.

The Nizam is bound by this Treaty to make over in perpetuity certain districts for the support of the Contingent; and as an inducement to His Highness to consent to this arrangement, and in further proof of the friendship of the Government of India, these districts are declared to be accepted in full satisfaction, not only for the pay of the Contingent, but also for the interest of debt and for other annual payments due by the Nizam, and even for the principal sum of debt amounting to about half a million sterling.

These terms are mutually advantageous to both the contracting parties.

The Nizam especially will save a large amount of annual payment now made, and he will gain, besides an additional support to his throne, the very considerable aggregate sum just now mentioned.

The Government of India will suffer a large immediate sacrifice, but it will gain the settlement of a vexatious question, and its pecuniary losses will, from the nature of the country transferred, be eventually made good under our management and by our improving care.

Beneficial as these proposals are, especially to the Nizam, it is anticipated that His Highness will be reluctant to assent to them.

It is supposed that he may object to any alteration whatever of the terms settled by the Treaty of 1800. Accordingly, the Resident has been instructed, if he should be unable to remove His Highness's scruples, to abandon altogether the Articles regarding the Subsidiary Force.

Again, it is believed that if the Contingent is to be maintained His Highness may object to its being kept up under any other name than his own. In that case the Resident has been instructed to alter the wording of the Treaty, and to declare that the Contingent is maintained by His Highness, his heirs and successors. The control of it, however, must be, as heretofore, in the British Government.

It is much feared that the Nizam will entertain an invincible repugnance to ceding the sovereignty of any districts to the British Government, for whatever purpose it may be.

The Resident is instructed to contend for the cession to the utmost, but, if unsuccessful, to propose that (as in the recent case of Gwalior) the revenues of certain districts should be assigned, the districts shall be managed by the Government of India, and the civil administration fully made over to it, while the sovereignty over them remains with the Nizam.

If all these concessions fail, and His Highness should ultimately either refuse to uphold the Contingent, or, professing to desire to uphold it, should obstinately adhere to his resolution not to assign to the British Government the districts



required for its support, His Highness is then to be informed that in that case the Contingent must cease to exist.

If districts be not assigned, we have learnt with certainty, from long experience, that the Contingent will not be paid unless by the British Government. Admitting the value of the Contingent to this Government indirectly, it is thought that the advantages we indirectly derive from it do not warrant the expenditure of from 25 to 30 lacs, which it will annually cost; and that, if expenditure for some additional military force, besides the Subsidiary Force, be necessary, it may be made more advantageously than upon the Contingent in its present form.

The Nizam, accordingly, is to be informed that, in consequence of his refusal to provide for its support in a satisfactory manner, the Contingent is to cease; but he is further to be informed that the faith of the British Government is virtually pledged to the officers and men of the force; that this Government will not permit the peace of the Hyderabad country to be put in risk by suddenly disbanding a large body of trained soldiers; nor will it agree that their services shall be thus abruptly dispensed with without some regard to their personal interests. The reduction of the force, therefore, must be gradual, and the assignment of districts must still be made to meet the expenses of the force while its reduction is in progress. Moreover, as the Nizam will in such case no longer have any just claims on the consideration of the Government of India, the principal sum of debt, with interest, which it was prepared to surrender, must be liquidated.

When all this shall have been effected from the revenues of the districts assigned they will be restored to His Highness.

An engagement to that effect will be offered to him.

If he refuses it possession of the lands will be required.

If this is not at once complied with, military occupation of the districts will be ordered; and the Resolution of the Government of India will be put into operation for the dissolution of the Contingent, and for the payment of the debt.

The Government of India ventures to feel confident that if the proposed Treaty be obtained from the Nizam, even with the modifications that have been anticipated, the Honourable Court of Directors will approve of the present sacrifices which the Government of India has made for this object; and that if the Treaty be rejected by His Highness, the Honourable Court will approve the adoption of a decided line of policy which affords the only definite solution of a state of affairs which is daily involving the Government of India in deeper losses on behalf of an unreasoning and thankless ally.

If the Honourable Court should be of opinion that the Contingent, or some other military body in its stead, should still be maintained, the course of policy adopted by the Government of India will in no respect interfere with the issue of such instructions as the Honourable Court may think proper to give upon that head.

53. In concluding this Minute I desire to add but a very few words—

If His Highness the Nizam should reject the settlement that has been proposed for his benefit, and if evil should consequently befall his State, the Government of India must stand acquitted of all blame towards him.

I have already shown in a previous Minute<sup>a</sup> that the Government of India has long laboured by every means in its power to avert the perplexities in which His Highness has deliberately involved himself. From the period, now many years ago, when His Highness first began to neglect the regular payment of the Contingent, so that advances from the Residency Treasury were required, constant remonstrances, complaints, reminders, warnings, and expostulations have been addressed to His Highness on the part of this Government; when all these have failed, the Governor-General had recourse to a measure of severity, and voluntarily incurred the odium of compelling the stoppage of any further accumulation of debt by demanding payment, or territory in lieu thereof. He did so less for the interests of the Government of India than from the hope that it would alarm the Nizam, and induce him to avoid the like embarrassments to his State for the future. When His Highness, in consequence of this act, showed some desire to exert himself, the pressure of the Government of India was at once relaxed, and he has been treated

with the utmost consideration and forbearance to the present hour. Even now, when the payment of the troops has almost wholly ceased, the Government of India is prepared to make on its part a large immediate sacrifice for His Highness's benefit, on condition that he will give his consent to an arrangement which will provide for the future at a rate considerably less costly to him than heretofore. The indulgence and friendly interest exhibited by the Government of India have been accompanied by the strictest observance of good faith.

The Treaty has been rigidly adhered to. In recent times no interference has taken place in the internal administration of Hyderabad, and the independence of His Highness in all respects has been studiously upheld. In the present document I have expressed my determination not to wrest the Treaty to any meaning which it does not fairly bear, and to suffer such inconveniences and to run such risks as the abolition of the Contingent may involve, rather than avoid them by insisting upon an interpretation of the Treaty which I conscientiously believe to be wholly erroneous.

Conscious that its conduct towards our old ally the Nizam, has in all the matter before us been characterized by justice, good faith, forbearance, and generosity, the Government of India may stand prepared to meet the consequences of its present resolution, whatever they may be, with a well-founded conviction that it has done its best for His Highness's interests, and has upheld the honour and character of the British Government.

54. Instructions founded upon this Minute, if it shall be concurred in by my honourable colleagues, will be prepared for the Resident. Any small details that may have been omitted in this paper will be provided for there.

55. I think the Resident should be assured that the Governor-General in Council has the utmost confidence in his judgment and firmness, and in his zeal for the honour and for the interests of this Government; that with these feelings he commits the negotiations to his hands, earnestly hoping for their success, and with no inclination to impute blame to the Resident if, notwithstanding all his exertions in observance of these instructions, he should be unable to induce the Nizam to conclude the Treaty that is offered to him.

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*

30th March 1853.

No. 70 of 1853.

From Colonel *J. Low*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to *C. Allen*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Fort William.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 1660, dated the 8th ultimo, containing full instructions for my guidance in the projected negotiations with the Nizam's Government, and enclosing in a separate paper a draft of a treaty to be offered for His Highness's acceptance.

2. Those important documents reached me on the 20th ultimo. I immediately requested the Prime Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, to visit me at the Residency, who did so accordingly on the 22nd idem; and on the last-mentioned day I delivered to the Minister a Persian translation of the draft treaty enclosed in your despatch, along with the Persian note from myself of which I now subjoin a translation,\* instructing him to show both the draft treaty and the note to the Nizam, and to request him to appoint an early day for me to wait upon him to explain any details on which His Highness might require further information.

\* Translation of a note from the Resident to Nawab-Suraj-ool-Moolk, dated 22nd April 1853:—

I have to-day personally made you acquainted with the subject of the instructions forwarded to my address by the Government of India, dated the 8th April 1853 (28th Jamadee-ul-Sanee). It is now requisite that you should submit this matter to His Highness the Nizam, and have an early day for an audience with me appointed in order that I may explain all matters personally and fully to His Highness. I have had a Persian translation of the draft treaty forwarded to me by the Governor-General prepared, which is now enclosed; and, with a view to His Highness's perfectly understanding the meaning of what is required, I beg to intimate to you that the revenues of the talooks alluded to in the draft treaty amount to 36 lacs of rupees of revenue per annum.

(A true translation.)

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

3. Before proceeding further, it is proper that I should mention that many days previous to the receipt of your despatch I had a long personal private interview with the Nizam, at which I announced to him distinctly that a new treaty would soon be proposed to him, the principal objects of which I explained to His Highness.

4. The interview with the Nizam just alluded to occurred on the 2nd ultimo; but immediately after that date, for nearly three weeks, all business of importance between the Residency and the Durbar was suspended, in consequence, first, of a very severe illness from which the Minister was suffering, and afterwards, for some days, owing to some religious ceremonies in which the Nizam himself was engaged.

5. At the conference above alluded to, the Nizam expressed a very decided repugnance to making any alteration in the existing treaty; when I expressed an opinion to him that the only way for matters between the two States to be put upon a proper footing would be to add some new articles to the treaty, his first exclamation was, "God forbid that I should suffer such disgrace!"

6. The above exclamation on the part of the Nizam, and other remarks of a somewhat similar tenor which followed from His Highness, led to a long discussion between us, in which my chief object was to remove such erroneous notions and prejudices from His Highness's mind; but I shall not burden this despatch by describing the details of that conversation, because it will be my duty to detail fully what occurred between me and His Highness only three days ago, viz., the 30th ultimo, which conference took place by appointment after His Highness had had the draft treaty before him several days, and had discussed the matter fully with his confidential advisers.

7. It seems now, therefore, sufficient to state, with respect to my conference of the 2nd ultimo, that although I could not succeed in persuading His Highness that a new treaty could be of any advantage to him, because, as he said, "A change in a treaty, be it what it may, can never be an advantage to a Sovereign who prefers, as I do, that there should not be any change at all;" yet I so far succeeded at that time in getting over the Nizam's dislike to the affair that he promised me to read over attentively any draft of a new treaty that I might prepare for his perusal, saying that he would compare it with the old treaty, which he had not looked at for many years, and that he would then talk over the scheme for a new one; but he ended that conversation by stating emphatically as follows: "I don't want any new treaty at all, how much soever you or any other person or persons may fancy it to be advantageous to my interests."

8. My discussions relative to a new treaty had accordingly reached the stage above described when your despatch of the 8th ultimo reached me; and, therefore, when I saw that the preamble of the draft treaty, and the first eight articles of it, explained so well the necessity for a new treaty, and showed so distinctly the improved position which the Nizam would occupy for the good management of his remaining dominions by his concluding such a treaty, I made up my mind to commence the negotiation by giving a Persian translation of the draft treaty to the Minister for delivery to the Nizam, and to request the latter to fix an early day for permitting me to wait upon His Highness. The note addressed to the Minister, of which a translation is subjoined to the 3rd paragraph of this letter, was written at the request of the Minister, by way of a credential to him, to authorize his presenting the draft treaty to his master.

9. The Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk, after reading over the draft treaty, and discussing the whole subject fully in conversation, first with me separately, and afterwards with Major Davidson and myself together, assured us both, more than once, that in his opinion his master's general affairs were now in such a state that he ought to consider himself fortunate in having an opportunity of forming such a treaty. One of the expressions made use of by Suraj-ool-Moolk before he quitted my office on that occasion with the draft treaty in his hand was this, that "Even a child, if he were free from prejudice and the advice of evil counsellors, would see that there are great and manifest advantages for the Nizam, and for his Government, in concluding the proposed treaty."

10. But as I perceive that this despatch has already extended to a considerable length, I think it will be more convenient to the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council if my last conference with the Nizam, which took place three days ago, and a visit from the Minister to me, which occurred yesterday, should be described in a separate despatch, and I shall accordingly have the honour of addressing you again to-morrow on those subjects.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 3rd May 1853.

No. 71 OF 1853.

From Colonel *J. Low*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to *C. Allen*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Fort William.

SIR,—With reference to the concluding part of my letter, No. 70, dated yesterday, I have now the honour to address you for the purpose of reporting my negotiations with His Highness the Nizam relative to the proposed new Treaty.

2. The Nizam having fixed the forenoon of Saturday, the 30th ultimo, as the time for receiving me to discuss the abovementioned important subject, I accordingly waited upon His Highness at the hour appointed.

3. In the first instance the interview was a private one, only His Highness and myself being in the reception room.

4. Before I proceed further, I may as well mention that I found His Highness the Nizam in a state of considerable excitement; his face was much flushed, and his eyes appeared somewhat inflamed. Were I to judge from his appearance only, I should say that he was under an excitement caused either by wine or opium, but his subsequent conversation made me doubt that his appearance and manner (although both were very unusual) could have been caused by inebriation. Possibly the alteration in his countenance may have been caused by his sitting up nearly all night (which I afterwards heard that he did), conversing in anger about the proposed treaty; at all events, whatever may have been the origin of his peculiar appearance, it neither deprived him of his ordinary amount of intellect, nor impeded his powers of speech; on the contrary, I have never known him more acute in argument, nor more fluent in conversation, than he was on that occasion. But his manner was often vehement, and his remarks were more than once uttered with a very loud voice.

5. I began the conversation by adverting to the last visit which I paid to His Highness, from which I observed that he was aware that this Treaty was then on its way from Calcutta, or, at least, that orders were coming to me to propose a treaty of this kind to him: "Yes," said His Highness, "you told me that you were going to propose a new Treaty, but you never told me that such a Treaty as this was to be proposed to me; you never told me that you were to ask me to give up a large portion of my dominions in perpetuity" (His Highness dwelt particularly on the word "perpetuity"): and he went on to say, "Did I ever make war against the English Government, or intrigue against it, or do any thing but co-operate with it, and be obedient to its wishes, that I should be so disgraced?"

6. That speech led to a long address on my part, in which I did all in my power to persuade His Highness that there was no disgrace whatever in forming such a treaty as that which was proposed to him; but His Highness seemed determined not to allow anything that could be said on the opposite side of the question to induce him to deviate at all from a few of his favourite assertions, one of which was the following: "Two acts on the part of a Sovereign Prince are always reckoned disgraceful; one is to give away unnecessarily any portion of his hereditary territories, and the other is to disband troops who have been brave and faithful in his service."

7. At the conference now described (which lasted nearly three hours) I am sure that the Nizam repeated the sentence above quoted, and in the same words precisely, at least three different times; and when I explained to him both that

there was no disgrace at all to him in the proposed scheme, and moreover that the possession of land by us for the pay of the Contingent is really and truly necessary for their efficiency, he always declared that it was not necessary, because he would now not only pay up the entire debt due, but would arrange also for the pay being issued as regularly to the Contingent Force as is done to the troops at Secunderabad.

8. Having anticipated something like the opposition that I met with on this occasion, I had brought an office box with me containing your despatch of the 8th ultimo. I accordingly took out that paper and looked over many parts of it while I was sitting by the Nizam, and I can assure the Governor-General in Council that there is not a single argument contained in my instructions that I did not mention and enlarge upon in addressing His Highness; while I also introduced other arguments which I thought might be useful, such as that by making over land to us for the payments now made to his troops and pensioners he himself would be relieved entirely from the personal vexation to which he had of late years been continually exposed by the pressing demands of the Resident for these monthly pecuniary payments; and I particularly pointed out to him how free he had always been from any trouble connected with the troops at Secunderabad and Jaulnah, solely because land had been ceded to us for their support.

9. In regard to the Nizam's offer to pay the entire debt, I replied that my Government would of course not refuse to receive payment if tendered without delay; but I explained to him in detail how much more profitable to himself, and how very advantageous it would be to his own troops and other public servants, if he would pay the 46 lacs of rupees which he now tendered to me to those troops and servants of his own to whom he was deeply in debt. I argued that after paying up his troops they would be obedient and would be of service to him, whereas now they were discontented and even mutinous, and were many of them worse than useless to him; but nothing that I said could reconcile His Highness to the notion of making any new treaty at all.

10. After our conversation had lasted, I should think, about half an hour, the Nizam agreed to have the Treaty read over to him in my presence, in order that I might hear his objections, and answer them in detail, and His Highness sent for the Minister, and also for the Urz-Begee, an old man, named Etezam-ool-Moolk. The Urz-Begee was desired to read the draft Treaty, while I looked at my copy, and it was agreed that His Highness should state any objections that occurred to him.

11. The first part of the draft Treaty which attracted His Highness's notice was that which is now quoted in the margin,\* and which led him to expatiate at some length to the following purport, viz., "It is evident," said the Nizam, "that the Governor-General has proposed this treaty in consequence of the differences and discussions which had occurred respecting the adjustment of charges about the Contingent, and with a view to prevent a recurrence of such discussions; and that as he, the Nizam, was now prepared himself to make an arrangement by which the Contingent would be paid on the 1st of every month, like the East India Company's own troops, it is equally clear that there is no necessity at all for making any new treaty."

12. When I reminded His Highness that he held similar language before to General Fraser and yet had not performed his promises, he again and again said that he never himself made such promises as he was now making, and was prepared to make to me with the guarantee also of others (alluding, I believe, to some bankers); and on one occasion when His Highness was holding this language, which was often repeated, he added, "Besides, this is a new state of

\* "And whereas differences and discussions have for some time existed between the contracting parties regarding the adjustment of charges connected with portions of the Military arrangements subsisting between the States; and whereas it is fit and proper and for the mutual advantage of both Powers that such differences should now be finally settled, and that the recurrence of such discussions, which tend to disturb the friendship and harmony of the contracting parties, should effectually be prevented."

things entirely ; the former promises were only those of the Dewan, and above all, there never, in the time of General Fraser, was such a thing as that brought to me," pointing to the draft Treaty which was lying on the floor. His Highness seemed to look on that paper with a sort of horror.

13. The Urz-Begee continued to read the draft treaty, but excepting some few questions which the Nizam asked of the Minister (in a low tone of voice), about the Subsidiary Force, which I did not hear distinctly, His Highness did not make any observation until the 6th article was read, which he loudly objected to, using similar arguments to those which he had before used, and I answering them in the same manner as I had done before, as above described.

14. In the course of the dialogue between the Nizam and myself, His Highness more than once said, "Wah!" in a loud tone of voice, and with an expression of countenance which was certainly not polite, but I do not think that he intended any personal rudeness towards me. He was evidently, from some cause or other, or perhaps from various causes, much excited, and he could not entirely command either his language or his manner.

15. About this time the Nizam suddenly ordered every one to retire to another room, so that our conference again became a private one ; when he entreated me, as a personal favour, to endeavour to persuade the Governor-General to give up the scheme of a new treaty, and to advise His Lordship to trust to His Highness's word that all future payments in which the British Government are in any way concerned will be paid with the utmost regularity, to which I replied that "Such a procedure on my part was totally out of the question."

16. The Nizam then made a very long rambling speech, which I should not think of reporting at all were it not that a brief description of it may tend to make His Highness's peculiar and strange character somewhat better known to the Government of India than it has hitherto been.

17. The speech above alluded to was first to the following effect: That some men were born in situations so different from those of other men, and had such different duties to perform through life, that the one set of men could never sympathize with, or even comprehend the feelings of, the other set ; for instance (said the Nizam), "Gentlemen like you, who are sometimes in Europe, and at other times in India ; sometimes employed in Government business, at other times soldiers ; sometimes sailors, and at other times even engaged in commerce,—at least I have heard that some great men of your tribe have been merchants—you cannot understand the nature of my feelings in this matter. I am a Sovereign Prince, born to live and die in this kingdom, which has belonged to my family for seven generations ; you think I could be happy if I were to give up a portion of my kingdom to your Government in perpetuity ; it is totally impossible that I could be happy ; I should feel that I was disgraced. I have heard that one gentleman of your tribe considered that I ought to be quite contented and happy if I were put upon the same footing as Mahomed Ghouse Khan<sup>\*</sup> ; to have a pension paid to me like an old servant and have nothing to do but to eat, and sleep, and say my prayers." Here His Highness made use of an exclamation in Arabic which expresses both surprise and anger, and with a manner and a tone of voice which seemed to me to indicate anger in no ordinary degree.

18. After recovering from that ebullition of temper, His Highness then said, "You are not quite so preposterous in your way of judging of me as that, but you too don't comprehend the nature of my feelings as a Sovereign Prince ; for instance, you talked of my saving at least eight lacs† of rupees per annum by making this treaty as something that I ought to like! Now I tell you that if I were quite certain that I could save four times eight lacs of rupees I should not be satisfied, because I should lose my honour by parting with my territory."

<sup>\*</sup> Meaning the present Nawab of Arcot.

† I had mentioned eight lacs of saving to the Nizam instead of the six lacs mentioned in the 15th paragraph of your despatch, by noticing the interest that he is constantly obliged to pay when borrowing money for the payment of the Contingent.—(Signed) J. Low, Resident.

19. The Nizam then went on to say that it was a very extraordinary proceeding on our part to ask territory from him, because we ought, properly speaking, to give some more territory to him instead of taking any from him; adding that we had never given him any share of the lands of the Carnatic, which we had taken from Mahomed Ally, who was a vassal of his.

20. I replied in a few words that His Highness had no claim to a single acre of the Carnatic, because Mahomed Ally was entirely independent of Hyderabad long before we had any quarrel with him, and had made treaties with us and with other powers without at all consulting the Nizam's forefather, Nizam Ali Khan.

21. The Nizam made no rejoinder to my reply about the Carnatic, but then said to me, "What has become of my share of Masulipatam and Chicacole, &c. ? What has become of my seven lacs of rupees a year which my grandfather agreed to take from you in lieu of those Circars? What sin have I committed that I should lose that seven lacs of rupees a year of tribute?"

22. In reply to the last question, I reminded the Nizam that the Peshcush in question had been redeemed by the payment of a crore and several lacs of rupees in specie into the hands of William Palmer and Co. on account of his father's Government, which would otherwise have had to pay that amount for the support of this very Contingent; and I took the opportunity of saying that if originally the pay of the Contingent had been arranged for by a cession of territory, all that annoyance which he mentioned about losing the Peshcush, and all the annoyance of the present discussion, would have been saved to His Highness; and I again urged him to accept of the present Treaty, as being by far the most advisable step that he could take in the present emergency.

23. The Nizam here complained in bitter terms of having been compelled (by William Palmer and Co., as he said) to lose the Masulipatam and Chicacole "Peshcush;" not, as he asserted, for the loss of seven lacs of rupees per annum nearly so much as for the loss of honour, declaring that to lose tribute was almost as great a disgrace as to lose territory. His Highness then made some further rambling observations to this effect: that if his grandfather, Nizam Ali Khan, who was a clever man, were alive, he would have astonished me, and would instantly have refuted all my arguments; but that unfortunately he was dead and gone, and that ever since his death he, the present Nizam, feared that both the talents and the good fortune of his family had been decreasing.

24. In answer to the last-mentioned remark, I endeavoured to make a suitable observation, to the effect that the good fortune of his family might still continue if he would act sensibly on the present occasion; and I begged him to give his serious attention to the expediency of accepting the terms that had been offered to him by my Government. His Highness then again called for Suraj-ool-Moolk; and not only for that Minister, but also for the two sons of Shums-ool-Oomra, Oomdut-ool-Moolk, and Iktadar-ool-Moolk; so that during the remainder part of my visit, besides the Nizam and myself, there were five other persons present, besides two or three apparently confidential servants whose names I did not hear.

25. The five persons just alluded to were the two sons of Shums-ool-Oomra, Oomdut-ool-Moolk and Iktadar-ool-Moolk, the Minister Suraj-ool-Moolk, his nephew Salar Jung, and the Urz-Begce, Itizam-ool-Moolk.

26. I have recorded the names of the above-mentioned five native gentlemen, because it was in their presence that the Nizam made a public declaration in regard to the Contingent Troops, which shall be detailed presently, and which gives to the British Government a more complete right, and renders it in fact a more distinct duty, to insist upon a proper provision being made for the maintenance of that Contingent, than anything that was ever said before either by the late Nizam or the present one.

27. None of the five native gentlemen above mentioned took any part in the discussion, but of course they heard all that was said on the subject, which must have been His Highness's object in inviting them to be present. After their arrival in the darbar room, many of the remarks that had been made before,



both by the Nizam and myself, were made over again ; but I need not repeat those remarks, as they are already recorded in the previous paragraphs of this despatch ; but what I wish to record now is the speech that the Nizam made to me in regard to the Contingent ; and nothing could be more fair towards His Highness than the previous remarks on my part which led to the speech which I am about to record.

28. Finding that the Nizam's dislike to the words "in perpetuity" was extreme, and fearing that the whole negotiation might fail if I insisted on that word, I announced that that was a part of the scheme which my Government had allowed me the liberty to alter if necessary ; and I announced formally that, if His Highness wished it, the districts might be made over merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it ; and, further, that if he declared to me that he did not require that force the Governor-General would gradually reduce it entirely, by discharging some men who were unfit, pensioning others who were old, and providing for others by employing them in other corps, &c., and when the whole should be reduced, which it might be in a very few years, he, the Nizam, might get the districts back again to his own management ; and I went on to point out that my Government, for the express purpose of avoiding any unnecessary amount of land being made over to us, had purposed that the amount of the Contingent Troops by the new Treaty should be less by at least 1,400 men than the strength of the present force ; and hence that a smaller extent of territory was proposed to be made over to us than if it had been settled that the force should be kept up to its present strength.

29. On hearing the last-mentioned remark from me, the Nizam spoke in the most clear and distinct manner as follows : "I beg you to write to the Governor-General that I do not want the Contingent to be reduced from its present strength ; I am able to pay those troops, and willing to pay them, regularly every month ; I undertake this myself independently altogether of the Minister's promises ; and if I fail in my undertaking in four months from the present time you may take possession of the districts ; but until I shall fail in my undertaking I claim from the Governor-General that he will not expose me to the disgrace of having any districts of my dominions placed under British officers, or call upon me to make any new Treaty at all."

30. In order that there should be no mistake in regard to the above-quoted declaration on the part of His Highness the Nizam, as well as with the view of having that declaration well impressed upon the memories of the several native gentlemen present, I repeated this sentence opposite to which I have now made a marginal black line to the Nizam, and I ask him if that was the message which he wished me to convey to the Governor-General? His Highness replied distinctly that such was the message, and he even repeated the words, "If I fail, you may in that case have your own way, and take the districts."

31. Immediately after the last-mentioned speech the Nizam expressed a wish to retire. I consented, but I again earnestly recommended to His Highness to reflect more fully on this matter, adding that I was sure that the most sensible and respectable of his own friends and subjects would advise him to accept the offer that had been made to him. The native gentlemen present still remained perfectly silent (I think they must have been ordered to be silent), but the Nizam so far altered his tone that he requested me to abstain from reporting to my Government till after I should hear, in a couple of days, what a deputation from His Highness would explain to me about the securities that he can produce for the regular pay of the Contingent in future ; and I accordingly agreed not to report to Government until I should receive the promised visit from the deputation in question, along with which the Nizam said that he would send some three or four lacs of his own money in part payment of the debt, and the Minister promised at the same time to send three separate lacs of rupees for a month's pay now overdue to the Contingent. I then took my leave of His Highness, and returned to the Residency.

32. On the Monday following (that is, the day before yesterday) the Nizam's promise was so far performed that I was visited by a deputation, but it was of a very different character indeed from that which had been nominally arranged on



the Saturday. The deputation consisted only of the Minister and his nephew. They did not bring any money at all, either in payment of the debt, or for the current pay of the Contingent; they only brought me a message from the Nizam to this effect, that he begged me, as a favour, to consent to send a Khureeta from His Highness to the Governor-General, and to stay all further proceedings till a reply should arrive here from His Lordship.

33. I was very angry at being thus treated in regard to the deputation, and I did not at all conceal that feeling of displeasure from the Minister, whom I permitted to stay at the Residency only long enough to enable me to dictate a Persian memorandum, which I signed officially, and then delivered it to him, with my request that he would take it without delay to his master.

34. I herewith subjoin an English translation of the memorandum in question, and I have only to add to this already too long despatch that I have this day received a note from the Minister Suraj-ool-Moolk apprising me that His Highness the Nizam wishes to see me on Saturday next, the 7th instant, to converse further about the proposed Treaty; and I have a separate message from the Minister stating that he trusts I shall have every reason to be satisfied with what I shall then learn of His Highness's intentions. —I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 4th May 1853.

TRANSLATION of a Memorandum delivered this day, the 2nd of May 1853, by Colonel *J. Low*, Resident at Hyderabad, to the Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk.

The Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk has come to me to-day, very much to my surprise, without any money in part payment of the debt due to the British Government, and without the three lacs of rupees for the pay of the Contingent for last January; and it appears to me from his conversation that no arrangements whatever are even in progress for making those payments. This is very strange and improper conduct, after what passed the day before yesterday at the Durbar, when the Nizam told me distinctly that in that case I must have payment without delay of the debt due to the Company, principal and interest; that I must have immediate payment, that is to say, this very day, the 2nd of May, of three lacs of rupees for the payment of the Contingent for last January, and that I must also arrange for sufficient talooks being made over to the management of British officers for the regular future monthly payment of the Contingent Force.

The Dewan has now asked me this question from the Nizam, viz., Am I willing to send a Khureeta from His Highness to the Governor-General, and to await a reply from His Lordship? My answer is that I do not refuse to send such a Khureeta; I will send my Khureeta at any time that His Highness chooses to write to my Chief, the Governor-General; but that I do refuse positively, in this case, to stop my present proceeding until an answer shall arrive from His Lordship, because I have received my final and precise orders on the subject from the Governor-General himself.

If the Nizam be willing to form a new Treaty on the basis of the draft which I have laid before him, I am entitled, as I explained the day before yesterday fully, to make certain alterations in parts of the present draft; that the Nizam said to me that he is unwilling to form any new Treaty. Be it so. I do not force a Treaty upon him; but if a new Treaty is not formed, my orders are positive to demand payment of the full debt of 46 lacs of rupees due to the Company, principal and interest; also to require that three lacs of rupees should be paid to me forthwith, without one day of delay, for the pay of the Contingent due for last January; and I am further ordered to lose no time in arranging for a sufficient amount of districts to be made over to the management of British officers for the regular future payment of the Contingent Force. So many promises have been made and broken by the Nizam's Government during a long course of years about the pay of that Contingent, that the British Government has finally and positively resolved not to consent to any other

arrangement for those payments than that districts which will produce the amount required shall be placed under the exclusive management of British officers.

It is needless to write more at present excepting this, that I require three lacs of rupees to be sent to me this very day, for the pay of January last.

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 2nd May 1853.

(A true copy of Memorandum.)

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

No. 74 of 1853.—Foreign Department.

From Colonel *J. Low*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to *C. Allen*, Esquire, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Fort William.

SIR,—In my despatch, No. 71, in this Department, of the 4th instant, I apprised you that His Highness the Nizam had fixed on Saturday, the 7th instant, for another conference in the Palace respecting the proposed new Treaty, and the object of this despatch is to report what occurred on that occasion, and since that day up to the present time, in regard to these negotiations.

2. As I had been informed that the Nizam intended at the conference of the 7th instant to have several men of high rank at the Durbar in addition to the Minister and the Urz-Begee, I directed Major Davidson to accompany me on that occasion, under an impression that unless the Nizam should express a wish for an entirely private conference, (in which case I should of course have attended to His Highness's wishes,) the presence of Major Davidson, from his minute knowledge of past occurrences, might be useful to me in my discussions with His Highness ; and that anticipation was fully verified by the result.

3. The Nizam appeared on this occasion to be in perfect health. There was something of sadness in his expression of countenance, but he received us with due courtesy and politeness.

4. In the first instance the only persons permitted by His Highness to remain in the reception room in addition to Major Davidson and myself were the Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, and his nephew, Salar Jung.

5. According to a plan which I had previously resolved upon, I commenced this conference by an address to His Highness, which I had on the previous day committed to paper and shown to Major Davidson ; and, in order to be sure that no part of it should be omitted, I took that paper with me. I put it down on the carpet between Major Davidson and myself, and I requested him, if I should omit any part of it, to point out the omission to me, in order that I might repair it.

6. I proceeded accordingly to address the Nizam in polite terms, but in an earnest manner, to the following effect, viz., that the present is a very serious and important business between the two States ; that I have known the wishes and desires of my own Government on the subject for several months past, even before I left Calcutta ; that it is useless either for His Highness or for me to repeat over and over again what we have already said to each other ; that a wrangling kind of conversation between him and me is not suitable to either of our positions ; that I know exactly to what extent I am authorized to make any alterations in the proposed Treaty, and I know what points I am not permitted to concede, and therefore that I thought it would be advisable that I should now briefly explain those points.

7. His Highness having here requested me to explain whatever I chose, I proceeded to state as follows : "Your Highness dislikes to cede districts in perpetuity to the British Government ; very well. I am authorized to modify that part of the plan, by having districts only made over to our management, your sovereignty over them remaining undisputed, and being proved to the world by our rendering annual accounts to you of their revenues, and after paying the cost of the Contingent, Appah Dessaye's Choute, and certain pensioners of yours who are paid through the Residency, and the expenses of managing the districts in question, the Resident will pay any balance of cash that may exist into your Highness's hands, with perfect regularity and good faith.

8. "Further, the Governor-General intended (believing that it will be agreeable to your Highness) to cancel your debt to us entirely in this general arrangement. You told me, however, on Saturday last, distinctly, that you preferred paying off the debt in specie; very well; that part of the draft Treaty can also be altered. I shall receive the money, if such be your wish, and there will be something less of territory for you to make over to our management; but I cannot help repeating to you what I said last Saturday, that I think it would be much more to your Highness's advantage to pay that money, which now amounts to nearly 50 lacs of rupees, to your own public servants and troops, to whom you are much in debt, by which act of justice and kindness you would make them contented and obedient to your orders.

9. "Further, the Governor-General proposed to lessen the strength of the Contingent by upwards of 1,400 men. You told me on Saturday last you did not want any of those men to be reduced; very well; I can alter that part of the draft Treaty also; but I am not permitted by my Government to make any change in that part of the plan which prescribes that districts must be made over to our exclusive management to provide for the monthly pay of the Contingent, whatever the strength of that force may be. I beg your Highness therefore to tell me whether you are willing to form a Treaty on that basis or not; tell me yes or no, in order that I may communicate your answer to the Governor-General. If you say no, I shall regret it for your own sake, for the truth is that as by your own admission you require the services of that Contingent Force, we must have districts under our management equal at least to the amount required for the payment of that force."

10. At this part of the conference I explained to the Nizam (which was in addition to the address that I had committed to paper), that the making over of land to us, either in perpetuity, or to our exclusive management, for the pay of troops kept up according to the system of European discipline, had been found by long experience to be absolutely necessary all over India. I cited Oude as a case in point, from which districts had been ceded to us in perpetuity; and I cited Gwalior as being a case exactly similar to what I was now recommending to His Highness, viz., that of districts being made over to our management for the pay of a contingent, accounts of the receipts and disbursements thereof being annually rendered to Scindia, and a balance of specie being paid into His Highness's Treasury every year.\*

11. I then closed my address to His Highness in the way that I had committed it to paper, namely, as follows:—"If you consent to form a Treaty on the basis above explained I shall be glad of it for your own sake, because there will be great comfort for yourself by your forming such a Treaty; there will be a large saving to your Government, in comparison to its present expenses, and there will be much additional leisure and means for your Ministers and officers to pay your own people regularly, while there will be entire security for your Government, which will be cordially protected, and assisted, when necessary, by the irresistible power of British armies. What do you say, yes or no?"

12. His Highness replied, "I will neither say yes nor no, but I offer you the guarantee of some of the principal noblemen of my Court for the future regular payment of the Contingent every month, and I also engage to pay off the debt in the course of four months. If I write a Khureeta to the Governor-General to that effect you will send it to His Lordship?"

13. I replied, "I will forward any Khureeta from you to the Governor-General without any delay; but I tell your Highness distinctly that the Governor-General will not consider any personal guarantee as sufficient security for the pay of the Contingent; the Governor-General in Council has decided that nothing can be deemed sufficient security for that purpose except the plan of having British

\* The purport of the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th paragraphs of this letter was previously committed to paper, in order that I might be sure not to forget any portions of them; and I beg to state that Major Davidson assured me that nothing was omitted, the only difference being that the address which was spoken by me was more ample than that which I had written.—(Signed) J. Low, Resident.

officers in exclusive charge of districts that will yield net revenue to the amount required.

14. His Highness here said, in an angry tone of voice, "Suppose I were to declare that I don't want the Contingent at all?" I answered him *instantly* by saying that I was quite prepared for that case, only that the removing of that force from His Highness's service must be done gradually, in order to preserve the good faith of the British Government towards those troops, which had been heretofore kept up for the advantage of the Hyderabad Government, first by his father's consent, and then by his own, for a long course of years, had been trained and disciplined and commanded by British officers; some years I said might perhaps elapse before all those men could either be otherwise provided for or discharged, as they might respectively merit, and that until the whole could be removed from His Highness's service we must still have command temporarily of districts for their regular payment.

15. The Nizam here remarked that the Contingent might easily be paid from the districts on the other side of Kurnool, which now yielded a much larger sum than was required for the Subsidiary Force; to which I merely replied that the districts alluded to are not within the frontiers of His Highness's dominions.

16. About this time the Nizam sent for Shums-ool-Oomra's two sons, for Lyfe Jung, who had been for a short time Minister, also Gunnessh Rao, who at one time had been named Peshcar, and likewise the Urz-Begee, and several other persons whose names I did not learn.

17. The two sons of Shums-ool-Oomra took their seats directly opposite to His Highness and very near to him, and it was chiefly those two gentlemen who were addressed by His Highness during the remainder of the conference when he was not speaking to myself.

18. The Nizam then explained, in a very distinct and even lucid manner, the chief propositions of the British Government as contained in the draft Treaty, and his own principal objections to that Treaty. He adverted also to some of the arguments that I had made use of in discussing the subject with His Highness; and it struck both Major Davidson and myself that His Highness stated the case very fairly; and he ended this speech, which may be said to have been addressed to all the six or seven of his officers who were seated, by asking them what they advised him to do.

19. No one made any reply excepting Shums-ool-Oomra's second son, Iktadar-ool-Moolk, who said, "If it is the Governor-General's determination to have districts for the pay of the Contingent what advice need we give? your Highness does not require our advice or any further consultation on the subject."

20. As there was then an entire silence on all sides, I thought it advisable to speak direct to the native gentlemen present, in order that they should know as exactly as I could recollect the various arguments that I had made use of to persuade their master to agree to the Treaty, and His Highness made no objection whatever to my doing so. It would be superfluous here to record those arguments, as they have been already fully related in my despatches. It is sufficient now to say that all the party present listened attentively to what I said, but none of them would make any observations in reply, either of assent or dissent, to my reasoning.

21. When I was relating to the native gentlemen present what had passed between the Nizam and myself, I referred to what he had said about an hour previously, of his adverting to the possibility of his not requiring the Contingent at all, but before I could go on any further in my narrative I was interrupted by His Highness, who said "No, no, I do not wish to disband the Contingent; I was not speaking seriously when I put that supposed case to you." Shums-ool-Oomra's eldest son, Oomdut-ool-Moolk, took that opportunity of echoing the sentiment that the Contingent troops were very necessary for keeping down the turbulent spirit that was often evinced amongst the people of this country.

22. It is proper that I should here record the fact that the Nizam at this Durbar stated distinctly, more than once, that he must have the services of the Contingent troops; and on one occasion he spoke rather pettishly respecting the

reduction in their numbers, as proposed in the draft Treaty, seemingly intending to indicate that any reduction of them ought to depend upon himself.

23. The Nizam at one time made use of rather a sarcastic expression, to the effect that all this vexatious discussion had arisen from the high value that the British Power places upon money ; adding, when speaking to Shums-ool-Omra's sons, "These gentlemen" (meaning British officers) "are such managers that if they get a village from me that yields a thousand rupees per annum they will in a few years make three thousand rupees of it ;" and I therefore took particular pains to prove to the party assembled that my Government had no desire to gain money for itself in this arrangement. "Whatever surplus money we can make" (said I) "by the good management which His Highness talks of will go into the coffers of His Highness himself by the plan which I now offer to him of having districts only made over to our exclusive management, and not transferred to us as our own property." And I concluded by saying, with a smile, "I suppose you do not suspect us of being likely to cheat you in making up the accounts."

24. My last observation seemed to restore a certain degree of good humour to the party, and led to some civil speeches being made about the truthfulness and good faith of British officers, and also led to some general conversation, in which almost every person present joined more or less. The chief subject of that conversation was the difficulty that exists in almost all Native States in paying troops monthly with that extraordinary precision which is practised by the British Government, and this led the Nizam to mention, as he had done on a former occasion, that Ram Buksh, when he was in office, had paid the Contingent regularly for ten months in succession. I said, "I fear your Highness has been much misinformed in that matter ; pray ask Major Davidson how it was." Major Davidson was asked accordingly, and immediately proved that Ram Buksh had been peculiarly defective in his arrangements about the payment of the Contingent. The Nizam then said that when he had acted as his own Minister the Contingent had been regularly paid every month ; but here again His Highness was proved to have been mistaken, by the testimony of Major Davidson, who informed him that during that short period of time the Contingent had nine lacs of rupees of arrears due to them. This part of the conversation ended by its being admitted on all sides that the only time since the resignation of Rajah Chendoo Laul that the Contingent had been paid with *bona fide* regularity was the five months during which Shums-ool-Omra was the Minister.

25. The Nizam, finding that he could not make good any of his assertions in regard to former payments, reverted to the language he has so often made use of during these discussions, namely, that the future ought not to be judged of by the past, and as he is now more fully determined than ever he was in his life to insist upon the Contingent being paid monthly he would have that object effected in one way or other. He added, "If I cannot do it through one Minister I will do it through another." I replied that the choice of the officers of his Government was his own concern, and not mine, as he had been told some years ago by the Governor-General's own Khureeta. "Yes," said the Nizam, "apparently that was the case, and yet how was my Mutsuddy Gunesh Rao treated when I appointed him ?" and, without waiting for any answer, he added, "I have tried much to please your Government in such matters ;" to which I replied that he might rest assured that my Government was thoroughly sincere in declaring to him that he was entirely at liberty to select his own Ministers.

26. The conversation being again at a stand-still, I reminded His Highness that he had not yet answered my question as to whether he would consent to form a new Treaty, when he answered, in a very testy manner, as follows: "I could answer in a moment, but what is the use of answering? If you are determined to take districts, you can take them without my either making a new Treaty or giving answer at all."

27. The moment that the Nizam uttered the sentence above quoted, the youngest son of Shums-ool-Omra leant forward and urgently begged His

Highness to take two more days to consider of the matter, and to appoint Tuesday the 10th instant (this day) for the final settlement of this important matter. The Nizam gave his consent, and so did I, to that proposition ; and I was then informed by His Highness that a deputation from him would wait upon me on Tuesday the 10th ; and thus ended my long and unsuccessful conference of the 7th instant, at which there was only one circumstance which was satisfactory to me, viz., that so many men of consequence about the Durbar had an opportunity of knowing precisely what has actually been said by me on this subject to their master ; for I cannot help thinking, from the manner of several of the most influential of those men, and from messages that I have received from them, that they really believe that the transfer of some districts to our management is not merely the only possible way of paying the Contingent, but that such an arrangement will also be both a saving of money and a practical relief to the current working of the Native Government.

28. I regret, however, to state that the promised deputation has not visited me to-day, and that instead of my receiving those gentlemen this day His Highness begs me to receive on the morning of Thursday next (the day after tomorrow) a visit from his uncle-in-law, Shums-ool-Omra ; and I have consented (though reluctantly) to that extra delay of two days, chiefly because I think it will be of some advantage to me to discuss these matters with an influential person of such good sense as Shums-ool-Omra. I have never hitherto even seen that nobleman, but I believe him to be a man who has been remarkable through a long life for truthfulness and general respectability of character.

29. According to general rumour in the city of Hyderabad yesterday and to-day, the Nizam has particularly requested Shums-ool-Omra to accept the office of Prime Minister, and the latter has positively refused the office on the score of his advanced age and delicate health ; and it is therefore believed here at present that Shums-ool-Omra's projected visit to me the day after to-morrow will be chiefly, if not entirely, for the purpose of endeavouring to persuade me to ask the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council to give the Nizam a further trial of paying the Contingent in his own way, and to solicit His Lordship to abstain from any demand for the management of districts unless the Nizam shall again fail to pay those troops with the regularity which we require.

30. I need scarcely add, in conclusion, that I shall not recede at all from the assertion that I have hitherto continued to make, that nothing short of our having exclusive management of territory will be admitted by my Government to be sufficient security for the payment of the Contingent Troops.—I have, &c.,  
(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 10th May 1853.

No. 78 of 1853.—Foreign Department.

From Colonel *J. Low*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to *C. Allen*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Fort William.

SIR,—Referring you to the concluding portion of my despatch, No. 74, of the 10th instant, I have now the honour to report that Shums-ool-Omra paid me his promised visit yesterday, accompanied by both of his sons.

2. Shums-ool-Omra, although bearing visible marks of old age, has still to all appearance much more of bodily strength than I supposed from the accounts that I had heard of his health ; while his intellect, I should say, has not yet been at all impaired, either from his advanced period of life or from any other cause. His manner and conversation are particularly pleasing, and evince much manliness and good sense.

3. The only persons present at the conversation on business which passed between Shums-ool-Omra and myself were his two sons above mentioned and Major Davidson.

4. After we had been seated in a private room only a very few minutes, I discovered that the chief message (and I might also say the only positive one) that

the Nizam sent to me was simply this, that "His Highness begged to have four months given to him from this time for paying off his debt, and for arranging everything to the satisfaction of the Resident."

5. I immediately observed, in a tone of surprise and displeasure, "So His Highness has neither sent any money for the last and the present month's pay due to the Contingent, nor even professed to be making any arrangements for the pay of that force during the four months alluded to:" in reply to which, Iktidar-ool-Moolk, the youngest son (who is believed to be ambitious of being the Prime Minister), said, "Oh, that is an understood point; if His Highness can obtain the four months' delay that he asks for, in order to pay off the debt, he will, of course, pay the Contingent for last month, and pay it regularly also during the four months:" but the father, with his characteristic honesty, immediately said, "My son, His Highness may have meant all that you mention, but he did not say so to me; I have delivered the message that I was charged with correctly to the Colonel."

6. Shums-ool-Omra then mentioned a second message which the Nizam had gone through the form of sending to me, to the following purport, viz., that he is prepared to make over districts yielding 40 lacs of rupees per annum to the exclusive management of Shums-ool-Omra, for the sole purpose of paying the Contingent; but Shums-ool-Omra went on to say, "Such is the information that the Nizam has desired me to announce to you, but it is only due to myself that I should also tell you what I said to my master on that subject; I said, 'I am an old man, and I don't want such an arduous charge at all, but if it be your Highness's wish I will undertake it on the condition that the districts shall be actually made over to me, and that I shall not be interfered with at all by the Minister, or the Peshkar, or the Dufturdars; I could not succeed in such a business unless I performed the duty entirely under the orders of the British Resident.'"

7. When I asked what the Nizam's reply had been to the above-mentioned proposition, Shums-ool-Omra replied, "I am bound as a man who speaks the truth to say that although His Highness did not say no, yet neither did he consent to the condition that I demanded."

8. The foregoing statement of what had passed between Shums-ool-Omra and the Nizam, showing as it did the continued repugnance of the latter to forming the proposed Treaty, even on the modified plan that I suggested to His Highness on the 7th instant,\* led to a long conversation, in which all of us (five in number) who were present took part; but as that conversation chiefly related to all that has already passed between the Nizam and myself respecting the proposed Treaty, all of which has already been duly reported, I need not add to the length of this despatch by detailing the conversation that now took place. It will be sufficient to mention a suggestion that was made to me by Shums-ool-Omra, and which I adopted, at least to a certain extent, as I now proceed to explain.

9. The suggestion alluded to was to the following purport, that although the Nizam evidently would not consent to Shums-ool-Omra having charge of districts under the orders of the Resident, because that would be, in fact, like making the districts over to the Resident himself, and thus separating them from the Nizam's Government, "it was possible" (said Shums-ool-Omra) "that His Highness would execute the Treaty if the districts were nominally made over to the Resident and to Shums-ool-Omra jointly, as that would save appearances; that is to say, it would save the honour of the Nizam, and yet be efficient for our purposes, because the management of the districts would be in reality in the hands of the Resident, although nominally he would be associated in the charge with a nobleman of the Nizam's Government."

10. There are several serious objections to such a scheme as that above sketched, and, therefore, I at once and finally determined not to commit my Government in that matter by saying that I could procure the Governor-General's

\* Vide 23rd para. of my Report, No. 74, dated the 10th instant.



consent to it ; but as the Nizam seems at present to adhere obstinately to his plan of holding the language reported in the 26th para. of my despatch, No. 74 (and

\* 26. The conversation being again at a standstill, I reminded His Highness that he had not yet answered my question as to whether he would consent to form a new treaty, when he answered in a very testy manner as follows:—"I could answer it in a moment, but what is the use of answering? if you are determined to take districts, you can take them without my either making a new treaty, or giving any answer at all."

now for ready reference copied in the margin),\* and as I consider that the Governor-General in Council might perhaps rather have a Treaty modified as now suggested by Shums-ool-Omra in the 6th Article than that we should have no Treaty at all, and hence be compelled to take possession of districts by physical force, I agreed to consent on certain conditions (and if the Nizam should particularly wish it) to ask the Governor-General whether His Lordship is or is not willing to give a trial to the proposed plan. But, in order to be sure of being on the safe side, I announced to Shums-ool-Oomra my own opinion that the Governor-General would not be satisfied

with such a mode of managing the districts which are to provide for the payment of the Contingent.

11. Such being the understanding between Shums-ool-Omra and myself as to the extent to which I would adopt his suggestion, Major Davidson and I immediately drafted in English a new Article No. 6 for the Treaty, and a note which I proposed to address to Shums-ool-Omra himself, and I then read those two drafts over to him in Oordoo. He understood their contents perfectly, and it was settled that I should send Persian papers to him to the same purport in the course of the afternoon ; it was also settled that Shums-ool-Omra should on the morrow (that is to say, this day) take those papers to the Nizam, and return to me on the 14th instant, to communicate to me His Highness's final answer. I accordingly expect another visit from Shums-ool-Omra to-morrow.

12. In conclusion, I beg to say that I herewith enclose copies and translations of the several papers which I sent to Shums-ool-Omra yesterday evening, as also a copy and translation of a note received from him this afternoon. I trust that my note of yesterday to Shums-ool-Omra cannot be disapproved by Government (although it offers to forward a request from the Nizam differing from any part of my instructions), seeing that I concluded that note in the following words, viz.: "Be pleased to bear in mind that unless the Nizam shall send to me at least six lacs of rupees forthwith, to show that he is serious in his desire to do what is just towards the Contingent Force, I cannot even ask the Governor-General if he is willing to make any change whatever. Moreover, I tell you distinctly that I don't think the Governor-General will consent to the alteration proposed, viz., that there shall be a joint management of districts between the Resident and a nobleman of this Durbar ; therefore, I once more earnestly advise the Nizam to consent immediately to the Treaty, with an Article in lieu of the present 6th one, like to the enclosed paper marked No. 2.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 13th May 1853.

#### TRANSLATION of a Note from the Resident to Shums-ool-Omra, dated 12th May 1853.

As the Nizam has so great a dislike to the 6th and 7th Articles of the present draft Treaty, and as I find that His Highness wishes to avoid the appearance of giving over districts exclusively to the management of British officers, even upon the plan of their only having the management of such lands, I herewith enclose draft of an Article, marked No. 1. For the sole purpose of pleasing His Highness, I am willing to ask the Governor-General if he will consent to it as a substitute for the 6th and 7th Articles of the present draft Treaty ; but I repeat to you now, what I said to you verbally this forenoon, that by far the best plan for His Highness is to consent at once to the entire Treaty only with the present 6th Article altered to be like the paper enclosed in this note marked No. 2.



Be pleased to bear in mind that unless the Nizam shall send to me at least six lacs of rupees forthwith, to show that he is serious in his desire to do what is just, I cannot even ask the Governor-General if he is willing to make any change whatever. Moreover, I tell you distinctly that I do not think the Governor-General will consent to the alteration proposed, viz., that there shall be a joint management of districts between the Resident and a nobleman of this Durbar. Therefore I once more earnestly advise the Nizam to consent immediately to the Treaty with an Article in lieu of the present 6th one like to the enclosed paper marked No. 2.

## No. 1.

Article 6th. For the regular payment of the expenses of the said Contingent and payment of Appa Dessaye's Choute, allowance to Mohiput Ram's family, the Mahratta Sahandars, as guaranteed in the 10th Article of the Treaty of 1822, and the interest, at six per cent. per annum, of the debt due to the Honourable Company so long as the principal of that debt shall remain unpaid, and which now amounts to about 50 lacs of Hyderabad rupees, the Nizam hereby assigns the districts mentioned in the accompanying Schedule, marked (A), yielding an annual gross revenue of 40 lacs of rupees, to the entire management, as Commissioners, of the Resident at Hyderabad for the time being, and Shums-ool-Omra, the Amir-i-Kub-beer Bahadoor, or in the event of his death or resignation, such nobleman or officer of the Hyderabad Government as may be selected by the Nizam and the Resident.

Article 7th. The districts in the Schedule (A) above mentioned to be immediately transferred to the Commissioners named in the preceding Article, and no interference whatever with their joint management is to be exercised, either now or hereafter, in any way, by the Nizam's Government or any of its Officers. Accounts will be rendered annually by the Commissioners to the Nizam; and all surplus revenue, after the payment of the Contingent and the allowances above detailed and the interest of the debt, shall be paid regularly by the Resident to His Highness.

*N.B.*—You will understand that Article VIII. of the draft Treaty, forwarded to His Highness, will be struck out altogether.

## No. 2.

Article 6th. For the regular payment of the expenses of the said Contingent, and payment of Appah Dessaye's Choute, allowance to Mohiput Ram's Family, the Mahratta Sahandars, as guaranteed in the 10th Article of the Treaty of 1822, and the interest, at six per cent. per annum, of the debt due to the Honourable Company, so long as the principal of that debt shall remain unpaid, and which now amounts to about 50 lacs of Hyderabad rupees, the Nizam hereby assigns the districts mentioned in the accompanying Schedule, marked (A), yielding an annual gross revenue of 40 lacs of rupees, to the entire and exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at Hyderabad.

Article 7th. The districts mentioned in Schedule (A) are to be immediately transferred to the Resident's management, who will render accounts annually to the Nizam, and make over any surplus revenue to His Highness, after the payment of the Contingent and the other items detailed in the preceding Article.

*N.B.*—You will understand that Article VIII. of the draft Treaty, forwarded to His Highness, will be struck out altogether.

TRANSLATION of Note from Shums-ool-Omra Bahadoor to the Resident, dated 13th May 1853.

I had an interview this day of full two hours with His Highness the Nizam, to whom I fully represented the whole of the matters you communicated to me yesterday. His Highness has directed me to attend at the Residency to-morrow, and to convey to you the expression; therefore I shall do myself the honour to wait upon you at 11 o'clock to-morrow, and inform you of His Highness's commands.

(True translation.)

(Signed) J. Low, Resident.

## No. 79 of 1853.—Foreign Department.

From Colonel *J. Low*, C.B., Resident, Hyderabad, to *C. Allen*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Fort William.

SIR,—In continuation of the subject of my despatch, No. 78, dated yesterday, I have now the honour to report that Shums-ool-Omra, according to his promise, paid me a visit this forenoon, accompanied, as before, by both of his sons.

2. I regret very much to state that the message brought to me on this occasion from the Nizam was most unsatisfactory. It amounted, in fact, merely to this : that His Highness cannot perceive the necessity for British officers having anything to do with the revenue management of districts in his dominions, and that if Shums-ool-Omra cannot persuade me to recommend to my Government to allow the Nizam four months from the present time to make suitable arrangements for paying off the debt, and for providing the means of regular future payment for the Contingent, that His Highness would request me to visit him at his palace once more, in order that he should explain his plans to me himself.

3. Shums-ool-Omra assured me that he was much grieved at being the channel, after all that had passed, of conveying such a message to me, and that he felt ashamed at the obstinacy and most erroneous judgment which have been evinced by the Nizam during the last few days, connected with this negotiation.

4. Shums-ool-Omra declared solemnly to me (and to Major Davidson, who also was present) on this occasion that he yesterday, in presence of both his sons, not only advised but entreated the Nizam to agree to the Treaty upon the plan suggested by me in the paper marked No. 2\* which I sent to Shums-ool-Omra on the 12th instant, but that His Highness was inflexible in his adherence to his own views, and that he made use of rude and illiberal expressions to Shums-ool-Omra when the latter stated opinions at variance from those of His Highness.

5. Shums-ool-Omra mentioned, as an instance of the rudeness of temper yesterday exhibited by the Nizam, that His Highness said at one time, "If I am ever compelled to give up districts to the British Power, I will take an equivalent from you and others of my subjects who enjoy Jagheers." Shums-ool-Omra, however, after relating the speech above quoted, immediately added, "But I am sure that His Highness will not be so cruel and unjust as to act in that manner, although he said he would do so."

6. When Shums-ool-Omra at one part of this conference was speaking of the difficulty that he and other men of rank must always have in effecting any object with the Nizam contrary to His Highness's own previous inclinations, he mentioned that a favourite Khidmutgar of the Nizam's, named Booran-ood-Deen (who was constantly in attendance at the Durbar), could at any time, by a single glance, induce His Highness to stop short in any promise that he was making, or opinion that he was expressing, to a Minister or a nobleman in the State, and that he, Shums-ool-Omra, felt sure that the undue influence of Booran-ood-Deen had been exerted against his own recommendations yesterday.

7. In reply to the message sent to me by the Nizam, I spoke as follows to Shums-ool-Omra : "I will not refuse to visit the Nizam if he sends for me, but that I consider it useless ; and that I must now immediately report His Highness's obstinacy and folly to my own Government, and if His Highness does not forthwith depart from his present foolish conduct he will assuredly hereafter have much cause to regret that folly ; but that this will be no fault of mine, as I have done all that I could do to guide him to a wiser course, by honest and disinterested explanations and advice." Shums-ool-Omra and his sons concurred in those sentiments, and nothing more occurred during their visit which requires to be recorded.

8. Shums-ool-Omra and his sons left me to return to the city, two hours ago. Immediately after their departure from the Residency I wrote a note to the Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, requesting particularly that he would, without delay,

\* A translation of that paper accompanied my despatch, No. 78, dated yesterday.—(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

come to see me on business of urgent importance, to which note I have just received a reply, to the effect that he will call upon me at seven o'clock this evening. To-morrow is Sunday; but on the following day (the 16th) I shall have the honour of addressing you again on the general subject of my late unsuccessful negotiations.

9. I am not without some hope that the very circumstance of Shums-ool-Omra having failed in his attempt to influence the Nizam in this matter may prove a powerful incentive to his rival Suraj-ool-Moolk to exert himself more now than he has ever hitherto done in favour of my views; and as I believe that he has lately, by pecuniary donations, and promises of more, gained over to his interests, generally speaking, the famous "Booran-ood-Deen" (mentioned in a previous part of this letter), it seems to me quite possible that Suraj-ool-Moolk may yet have the means of doing much good in this negotiation, if he will but duly exert himself for that purpose; and I shall of course do my utmost to induce him to make the requisite exertions.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 14th May 1853.

No. 81 of 1855.—Foreign Department.

From Colonel *J. Low*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to *C. Allen*, Esq.,  
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Fort William.

SIR,—My last despatch to you in this Department was dated the 14th instant, and explained the state of things here as regards the projected new Treaty up to the afternoon of that day.

2. The Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, visited me the same evening (the 14th instant), according to an urgent request from me to that effect, expressed in a note which was sent in original to the Nizam by the Minister, with a view to the latter procuring permission from His Highness to come to me immediately.

3. My object in demanding an immediate visit from the Minister was to impress both his mind and that of the Nizam with the belief that further unnecessary delays in settling this matter one way or other would not be permitted by my Government.

4. Before Suraj-ool-Moolk had left his house in the city to pay me this visit I furnished him with copies of the notes and papers which had passed during the previous two days between me and Shums-ool-Omra, and I promised in a note to the Minister to relate to him on his arrival here all that had passed verbally between me and Shums-ool-Omra and his sons, and which I accordingly did relate to Suraj-ool-Moolk before I adverted to any other part of the general subject.

5. I then spoke to the Minister, in a very serious manner, to the following purport, viz., that if he had entertained different views from me as to the expediency of the projected treaty, and had honestly declared that opposition of sentiment, I should never think of blaming him for such conduct, but that as he had announced to me from the first that he entirely approved of the proposed treaty I was much displeased at the last durbar at perceiving that he did not say one word of encouragement to the Nizam to enter into the new treaty, although His Highness had given him, by asking a question, a very natural and suitable opportunity of giving good advice in the matter.

6. The Minister, in reply, made what appeared to me some very lame excuse for not speaking to the Nizam at the time, such as that His Highness appeared only to address himself to the two sons of Shums-ool-Omra, &c., &c., and added that he (Suraj-ool-Moolk), when alone with his master, had warmly advocated the expediency of accepting the proposed treaty on the plan of districts being made over to the management only of the Resident and officers under him, and not transferred in "perpetuity" to the British Government.

7. I told the Minister that his private advocacy alone of the scheme was useless to me, and that if he were really sincere in the opinions he had expressed

to me and to Major Davidson (which he had on various occasions expressed to us both) he must now hold similar language publicly at his own durbar, or I should be under the necessity of denouncing him, both to the Nizam and to the Governor-General, as a man whom I suspected to have been expressing one opinion to me, on a matter of very serious public importance, and a totally different opinion to His Highness, thereby causing mischief to the two States. I added that it was my intention that very night to write a full account of the state of things here to my Government, and that the tone and tenor of that report might somewhat depend upon what he could now tell me that he intended to do or say on the morrow at the durbar. I took that opportunity also of telling Suraj-ool-Moolk that I was aware of the fact that he had lately gained over to his interests the Nizam's favourite Khidmutgar, named Booran-ood-Deen, and therefore that it was useless for him to tell me now, as he used formerly to tell me, that his advice was often entirely overruled and set aside by that very influential khidmutgar.\*

8. The Minister admitted to me that he had, "to a considerable extent," gained the good will of Booran-ood-Deen,† and after some further conversation on the general subject Suraj-ool-Moolk begged me to postpone writing to my Government till Monday, the 16th instant, declaring that he would go on the 15th to the Durbar; that he would again most earnestly advise the Nizam to accept the treaty; that, if necessary, he would not only repeat his former explanation of its advantages, but would add everything else that he thought was likely to be useful; and that if His Highness should still demur, he, Suraj-ool-Moolk, would declare it to be impossible for him to carry on the government upon the former plan of the Contingent being paid by the Minister.

9. I made the required promise not to write to my Government till Monday, and the Minister left me, on the understanding that he was to pay me another visit on that day (the 16th), and then to bring to me the Nizam's final answer on the subject. It struck me at this interview that Suraj-ool-Moolk had now become much more zealous in the cause than he had ever been before, and that he was particularly desirous now to succeed, if it were only to prove to the world that he could command success in a case wherein his great rival Shums-ool-Omra has failed.

10. In the evening of Sunday, the 15th, I received a note from the Minister stating that the Nizam had at last consented to the treaty. The Minister in that note wrote as follows:—"Booran-ood-Deen and I persuaded him to accede to it. This was done when we were alone, but His Highness afterwards called in two other noblemen, and in the presence of us all again declared acquiescence in the measure"; and the note went on to say that he would breakfast with me the next morning, when he would explain many particulars of his conference with the Nizam, and would remain with me until the necessary papers could be drafted.

11. Suraj-ool-Moolk accordingly breakfasted with me on the 16th, and he and his nephew Salar Jung and a Moonshee of the Durbar remained in my office that day, along with Major Davidson and myself, for nearly eight hours, at the end of which I gave to the Minister a draft treaty, in Persian, of what I am prepared to sign, and what the Minister at the same time not only promised to me to recommend the Nizam to sign, but assured me of his own firm belief that His Highness would sign it.

12. I herewith enclose an English translation of the paper alluded to in the preceding paragraph, for the perusal of the Most Noble the Governor-General

\* I beg to remark that although the individual here mentioned is styled "khidmutgar" he is not, and never has been, employed in any menial capacity. It is true that some men who have the very same designation are menial servants; but Booran-ood-Deen is a sort of Commandant over the servants of all classes within the palace grounds, and his rank and some of his general duties, such as conveying orders from the Nizam to Ministers, and other men of the highest rank in the State, something resemble those of a confidential Aide-de-Camp to a Sovereign Prince in Europe, except that Booran-ood-Deen is not allowed to sit at a public durbar in the presence of the Nizam.--(Signed) J. Low, Resident.

† Suraj-ool-Moolk made this remark with a smile on his countenance, and seemed to me rather proud of his achievement in gaining over Booran-ood-Deen to his interests.--(Signed) J. Low, Resident.

in Council, as I have every reason to hope and believe that in a very few days hence I shall have the satisfaction of forwarding to you a formal treaty very similar to the enclosed paper, for the ratification of the Most Noble the Governor-General.

13. It will be observed that the first five articles of this treaty are exactly the same as the first five articles in the draft received from your office, but that the 6th, 7th, and 8th articles differ considerably from those in the original draft.

14. The present articles No. 6 and No. 8 became necessary in consequence of the repugnance of the Nizam (described in my previous despatches) to cede any territory in "perpetuity" to the British Government, and the present 7th article was introduced by me at the particular request of the Minister, although it is really a superfluous one, inasmuch as that the concluding sentence in the 5th article conveys exactly the same assurance; but I did not hesitate to insert the present 7th article as it now stands, in order to satisfy the scruples of the Nizam, and to convey a full assurance to his mind that he shall no longer be liable, even in time of war, to be called upon to furnish the cavalry and infantry to accompany British troops in the field which are specified in the 12th article of the Treaty of 1800.

15. There may be still some difficulties to encounter, and some little delays that I must submit to, before all the villages to be given up to our management can be settled, especially so if I succeed in obtaining some small districts which I wish to obtain on the western frontier of the Nizam's dominions; but as Major Davidson passed several hours in the Minister's office the day before yesterday for the purpose of comparing the Durbar records with our own information respecting those villages, and succeeded in obtaining the Minister's consent to an allotment of districts in that direction which would perfectly satisfy me, I have now some hope that at the durbar of the day after to-morrow I may succeed in having both the treaty and the annexed schedule finally executed by the Nizam.

16. Nothing whatever could be done during the whole of yesterday in the city, as regards the new treaty, in consequence of the very severe illness of the Minister; but he is better to-day, and went from his own house to the palace in the forenoon, after having received from Major Davidson both a treaty and a schedule (completely drawn out in English and Persian), which I sent to him by that officer this morning, along with some verbal explanations from me which the Minister wished to be possessed of before waiting on the Nizam with those papers.

17. I do not enclose a copy of the schedule above alluded to in this despatch, because the Nizam has not yet given his consent to giving up so many villages as are noted in that schedule. As yet, the Nizam has only consented to give up to our management the valley of Berar to the north of the Adjuntah Hills, and the Raichore Doab, which is situated at the southern frontier of His Highness's dominions; but as those two districts might not yield quite so much net revenue as would be desirable for our objects, I wish, if possible, also to procure small districts near Sholapore and Punderpore, of the Bombay Presidency.

18. It would probably have been more convenient to the British Government if the Nizam's districts, above alluded to, near to Punderpore and Sholapore could have been made over to the management of the Bombay Civil Servant in charge of Sholapore; but the Nizam's Government expressed an earnest desire that all the officers in charge of districts should perform their duties solely under the orders of the Resident at Hyderabad, and not receive their orders from the Madras or Bombay Governments, as an arrangement of the latter description would have the appearance, the Minister said, of such districts having been made over in perpetuity to the British Government. It was in consequence of those feelings on the part of the Nizam's Government that I wrote the concluding part of the 6th article in the following terms, viz., "to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at Hyderabad, and to such other officers, acting under his orders, as may from time to time be appointed by the Government of India to the charge of those districts."

19. I am not aware that I can add anything to this despatch that is

necessary in explanation of the reasons which induced me to write the '6th, 7th, and 8th articles of the projected new treaty in the terms which the Governor-General in Council will see in the enclosed paper. It is, after all, still possible, too, that the treaty itself, when signed by the Nizam, may not be precisely what I have made it in communication with his Minister only ; but as my belief is that the Nizam having given his consent to the main provisions and conditions of the treaty will be satisfied with the expressions that I have made use of to describe those provisions, I have thought it best to give the above explanations now, in preference to waiting till the treaty shall be actually executed.

20. It is very possible that I may be required to alter the schedule, which is this day being presented to the Nizam, but I consider it very improbable that he will now ask for any material change to be made in the wording of the treaty.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 19th May 1853.

**TREATY** between the Honourable the English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor, settled by Colonel *J. Low*, C.B., Resident at the Court of His Highness, by virtue of full Powers to that effect vested in him by the Most Noble James Andrew Marquis of *Dalhousie*, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, and Governor-General appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their Affairs in the East Indies.

WHEREAS friendship and union have subsisted for a length of time between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor, and have been cemented and strengthened by treaties of general defence and protection ; and whereas in the lapse of time many changes in the condition of Princes and neighbouring States have taken place, by reason of which it has now become expedient to revise the military arrangements that were formerly agreed upon for the fulfilment of the said treaties ; and whereas differences and discussions have for some time existed between the contracting parties regarding the adjustment of charges connected with portions of military arrangements subsisting between the States ; and whereas it is fit and proper and for the mutual advantage of both Powers that such differences should now be finally settled, and that the recurrence of such discussions, which tend to disturb the friendship and harmony of the contracting parties, should effectually be prevented : therefore the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor have agreed upon the following Articles of a Treaty between the States.

Article I.—The peace, union, and friendship so long subsisting between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor shall be perpetual ; the friends and enemies of either shall be the friends and enemies of both ; and the contracting parties agree that all the former treaties and agreements between the two States now in force and not contrary to the tenor of this engagement shall be confirmed by it.

Art. II.—The Subsidiary Force, which for general defence and protection has been furnished by the Honourable East India Company to His Highness the Nizam, shall be continued, and shall consist, as heretofore, of not less than eight battalions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry, with their requisite complement of guns and European artillerymen, fully equipped with warlike stores and ammunition. Unless with the express consent of His Highness, there shall never be less than five regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, with a due proportion of artillery, of the said Subsidiary Force stationed within the territories of His Highness ; and the residue of such Subsidiary Force shall at all times be brought into His Highness's territories without delay on His Highness's making requisition therefor.

The said Subsidiary Force shall be employed, when required, to execute services of importance, such as protecting the person of His Highness, his heirs and successors, and reducing to obedience all rebels and excitors of disturbance in His Highness's dominions ; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, or, like Sebundy, to be stationed in the country to collect revenue.

Art. III.—The Honourable East India Company further agrees that in lieu of His Highness's present Contingent it shall maintain for His Highness, his heirs and successors, an Auxiliary Force, which shall be styled the "Hyderabad Contingent," according to the provisions for the maintenance of that force which are detailed in the 6th Article of this Treaty.

It shall consist of not less than 5,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, with four field batteries of artillery ; it shall be commanded by British officers, fully equipped and disciplined, and controlled by the British Government, through its representative the Resident at Hyderabad.

Whosoever the services of the said Contingent may be required, they shall be afforded at all times to His Highness the Nizam, fully and promptly, throughout his whole dominions. If rebellion or disturbance shall be excited, or if the just claims and authority of His Highness shall be resisted, the said Contingent, after the reality of the offence shall have been duly ascertained, shall be employed to reduce the offenders to submission,

Art. III.—As the interests of the two States have long been identified, it is further mutually agreed that if disturbances shall break out in districts belonging to the Honourable East India Company, His Highness the Nizam shall permit such portions of the Subsidiary Force as may be requisite to be employed in quelling the same within the said districts. In like manner, if disturbances shall break out in any part of His Highness's dominions contiguous to the territories of the Honourable East India Company, to which it might be inconvenient, owing to the distance from Hyderabad, to detach any portion of the Subsidiary Force, the British Government, if required by His Highness the Nizam, shall direct such portions of its troops as may be most available to assist in quelling the disturbances within His Highness's dominions.

Art. V.—In the event of war, His Highness the Nizam engages that the Subsidiary Force, joined by the Hyderabad Contingent, shall be employed in such manner as the British Government may consider best calculated for the purpose of opposing the enemy ; provided that two battalions of sepoy shall always remain, as settled by former treaties, near to the capital of Hyderabad ; and it is also hereby agreed that, excepting the said Subsidiary and Contingent forces, His Highness shall not, under any circumstances, be called upon to furnish any other troops whatsoever.

Art. VI.—For the purpose of providing the regular monthly payment to the said Contingent troops, and payment of Appa Dessaye's Choute, and the allowance to Mohiput Ram's family, and to certain Mahratta pensioners, as guaranteed in the 10th Article of the Treaty of 1822, and also for payment of the interest at 6 per cent. per annum of the debt due to the Honourable Company, so long as the principal of that debt shall remain unpaid, which debt now amounts to about 50 lacs of Hyderabad rupees, the Nizam hereby agrees to assign the districts mentioned in the accompanying Schedule, marked (A), yielding an annual gross revenue of about 50 lacs of rupees, to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at Hyderabad, and to such other officers acting under his orders as may from time to time be appointed by the Government of India to the charge of those districts.

Art. VII.—By the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 the British Government can, in time of war, call upon that of His Highness the Nizam to furnish 9,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry to accompany the British troops in the field ; the present Hyderabad Contingent, which is to be maintained at all times (whether in peace or war), is accepted as an equivalent for the larger body of troops above specified to be furnished in time of war ; and it is accordingly hereby declared that the Nizam shall not be called upon at any time by the British



Government to furnish any other troops, but those of the Subsidiary Force and the Hyderabad Contingent, and that part of the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 which requires the Nizam to furnish 9,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry is accordingly hereby annulled.

Art. VIII.—The Districts mentioned in Schedule (A) are to be transferred to Colonel Low, c.b., the Resident, immediately that the ratified Treaty shall be received from Calcutta, and that officer engages on the part of the British Government that the Resident at the Court of Hyderabad for the time being shall always render true and faithful accounts every year to the Nizam of the receipts and disbursements connected with the said districts, and make over any surplus revenue that may exist to His Highness, after the payment of the Contingent, and the other items detailed in Article VI. of this Treaty.

Art. IX.—This Treaty, consisting of nine Articles, being this day concluded and settled by Colonel John Low, c.b., on behalf of the Honourable the English East India Company, with the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor, Colonel Low has delivered one version thereof in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the Nawab, who, on his part, has also delivered one copy of the same, [duly executed by himself; and Colonel Low hereby engages to deliver a copy of the same] to His Highness the Nizam, duly ratified by the Governor-General in Council, within thirty days from this date.

#### No. 83 of 1853.—Foreign Department.

From Lieut.-Colonel *J. Low*, c.b., Resident at Hyderabad, to *C. Allen*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William.

Sir,—I have herewith the honour to forward a Treaty which was this day executed according to the usual forms by His Highness the Nizam and myself, in anticipation of its being approved and ratified by the Most Noble the Governor-General.

2. The dislike evinced at first by the Nizam to form any new Treaty; the habitual delays of this Durbar in all matters of important business; and latterly the severe attacks of fever and ague by which the Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, has been often afflicted, have combined to extend these negotiations over a much longer period of time than I could have wished; but the final result of them will, I trust, be satisfactory to the Governor-General in Council.

3. It will be observed that the Treaty is precisely the same as the copy which I sent for the perusal of Government in my despatch, No. 81, of the 19th instant; and as I stated my reasons very fully, in that despatch and some others of previous dates, for having found it advisable to make the 6th, 7th, and 8th Articles of this Treaty considerably different from the original Draft Treaty sent to me by Government, it seems unnecessary now to say anything more on that part of the subject.

4. As we do not by this Treaty obtain any territory as our own property, and only are to have charge of certain districts to govern and manage them for purposes, it may be said, of the Nizam's Government, the Schedule attached to it, exhibiting, as it does, a gross revenue of about 50 lacs of rupees per annum, would appear at first sight to show a larger extent of territory than is necessary for our objects; but this will not be the case for the first couple of years of our undertaking, because about nine lacs of rupees out of the above-mentioned 50 will not be included at all in our receipts; the villages which yield those nine lacs are like separate small islands (if I may use that term) in the districts, and the revenues of those small villages are to continue to be enjoyed by the same persons who now enjoy them, some members of the Nizam's own family being among those individuals; the police duties connected with those villages, and all other public duties belonging to the Government of a country respecting them, will be performed by the Resident at Hyderabad, and the officers employed under his orders in those districts; but the revenues of those "Sarfi-i-Khas" villages, as they are called, are to continue to belong to the individuals above alluded to. Some few local inconveniences may occur to the officers in charge of the districts under our management in consequence of the revenue exceptions above alluded



to ; but I beg to say that I could not have induced the Nizam to conclude the Treaty on any other terms, and that detached "Sarfi-Khas" villages of the same sort exist in all parts of His Highness the Nizam's dominions, which circumstance accounts in a great measure for the repugnance that has been evinced by all the most influential persons at this Durbar to our obtaining any districts as the *bona fide* property of the British Government.

5. As I am anxious not to lose the mail of this evening, for the purpose of forwarding the Treaty, I shall postpone till to-morrow any description of what occurred at the Durbar to-day ; but I should consider myself chargeable with great neglect if I closed this report without bringing to the notice of Government the cordial zeal and highly efficient exertions that have been manifested by Major Davidson in the performance of his duties as my Assistant during the late negotiations at this Durbar. His aid has in many ways been very useful to me, and especially so by the manner in which he conducted various separate conferences<sup>o</sup> in the course of the month that has just passed, with the Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk, and by the zeal and ability with which during the last few days he examined and tested native district records produced to him in that Minister's office, whereby I have been enabled to prepare the Schedule both at an earlier date and more to my satisfaction than would otherwise have been practicable. The efficient performance of the last-mentioned duty was of itself a service of importance to the public interests.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident at Hyderabad.

Hyderabad Residency, 21st May 1853.

(A.)

#### DRAFT TREATY.

DRAFT OF TREATY between the Honourable the English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk, settled by Colonel *Low*, C.B., Resident at the Court of His Highness, by virtue of full Powers to that effect vested in him by the Most Noble James Andrew Marquis of *Dalhousie*, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, and Governor-General appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all the Affairs in the East Indies.

WHEREAS friendship and union have subsisted for a length of time between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nizam-ool-Moolk, and have been cemented and strengthened by Treaties of general defence and protection ; and whereas, in the lapse of time, many changes in the condition of Princes and neighbouring States have taken place, by reason of which it has now become expedient to revise the Military arrangements that were formerly agreed upon for the fulfilment of the said Treaties : and whereas differences and discussions have for some time existed between the contracting parties regarding the adjustment of charges connected with portions of the Military arrangements subsisting between the States : and whereas it is fit and proper, and for the mutual advantage of both Powers, that such differences should now be finally settled, and that recurrence of such discussions, which tend to disturb the friendship and harmony of the contracting parties, should effectually be prevented : therefore the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk have agreed upon the following Articles of Treaty between the States.

Article I.—The peace, union, and friendship so long subsisting between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nizam shall be perpetual ; the friends and enemies of either shall be the friends and enemies of both ; and the contracting parties agree that all the former Treaties and Agreements between the two States now in force, and not contrary to the tenor of this engagement, shall be confirmed by it.

\* I was obliged to direct Major Davidson to hold those separate conferences owing to the illness of the Minister, who was several times totally unable to leave his own house on days which had been previously fixed for his visiting me at the Residency on business connected with the Treaty.—(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

**Art. II.**—The Subsidiary Force, which for general defence and protection has been furnished by the Honourable East India Company to His Highness the Nizam shall be continued, and shall consist, as heretofore, of eight Battalions of Sepoys and two Regiments of Cavalry, with their requisite complement of Guns and European Artillerymen, fully equipped with warlike Stores and Ammunition. Unless with the express consent of His Highness, there shall never be less than five Regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry (with a due proportion of Artillery) of the said Subsidiary Force stationed within the Territories of His Highness; and the residue of such Subsidiary Force shall at all times be brought into His Highness's Territories without delay on His Highness making requisition therefor.

The said Subsidiary Force shall be employed when required to execute services of importance, such as protecting the person of His Highness, his Heirs and Successors, and reducing to obedience all rebels and excitors of disturbance in His Highness's Dominions; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, or, like Sebundy, to be stationed in the Country to collect the Revenue.

**Art. III.**—The Honourable East India Company further agrees that, in lieu of His Highness's present Contingent, it shall maintain for His Highness, his Heirs and Successors, an Auxiliary Force, which shall be styled the "Hyderabad Contingent."

It shall consist of not less than 5,000 Infantry and 2,000 Cavalry, with four Field Batteries of Artillery. It shall be commanded by British Officers, fully equipped and disciplined, and controlled by the British Government, through its representative, the Resident at Hyderabad.

Whenever the services of the said Contingent may be required they shall be afforded at all times to His Highness the Nizam, fully and promptly throughout his whole Dominions. If rebellion or disturbance shall be excited, or if the just Claims and Authority of His Highness shall be resisted, the said Contingent, after the reality of the offence shall have been duly ascertained, shall be employed to reduce the offenders to submission.

**Art. IV.**—As the interests of the two States have been long identified, it is further mutually agreed that if in time of peace disturbance shall break out in the Districts ceded by Treaty to the Honourable East India Company, His Highness the Nizam shall permit such portions of the Subsidiary Force as may be requisite to be employed in quelling the same within the said Districts. In like manner if disturbances shall break out in any part of His Highness's Dominions contiguous to the Territories of the Honourable East India Company to which it might be inconvenient to detach any portion of the Subsidiary Force, the British Government, if required by His Highness the Nizam, shall direct such portions of its Troops as may be most available to assist in quelling the disturbances within His Highness's Dominions.

**Art. V.**—In the event of War His Highness the Nizam engages that the Subsidiary Force joined by the Hyderabad Contingent shall be employed in such manner as the British Government may consider best calculated for the purpose of opposing the Enemy; provided that two Battalions of Sepoys shall always remain near His Highness's person; and provided further that, excepting the said Subsidiary and Contingent Forces, His Highness shall not, under any circumstances, be called upon to furnish any other Troops whatsoever.

**Art. VI.**—For the regular Payment of the expense of the said Hyderabad Contingent, His Highness the Nizam hereby cedes and assigns to the Honourable East India Company, in perpetuity, all the Districts enumerated in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty, which Districts shall hereafter be subject to the exclusive Management and Authority of the said Company and of its Officers.

**Art. VII.**—As soon as the Resident shall signify to His Highness that the Officers of the Honourable Company are ready to take charge of the Districts ceded by the 6th Article, His

Highness will issue the necessary orders to his Officers to deliver over charge of the same to the Officers of the Honourable Company; and it is hereby stipulated and agreed that all collections made by His Highness's Officers subsequent to the date of the said orders shall be carried to the account of the Honourable Company.

Art. VIII.—And whereas certain sums, amounting to \_\_\_\_\_ lacs of Rupees, are due by His Highness the Nizam to the Honourable East India Company, together with an annual payment of 1,17,000 Rupees under the name Appah

(Blank to be filled up by the Re-sident.)

Dessaye's Chout; and whereas the Honourable East India Company is desirous of removing for ever all grounds for difference and discussion regarding pecuniary transactions between the States, and furthermore is desirous of affording to His Highness a fresh proof of its friendship and of its regard for his interests, the Honourable East India Company hereby agrees to accept the Revenues of the

Treaty 1800, Art. 8.

Districts above mentioned as a full and complete satisfaction for all demands on account of the pay and charges of the said Contingent, as well as on account of Appah Dessaye's Choute, and the said principal sum of \_\_\_\_\_ lacs of Rupees, the true intention and meaning of this Article being that the assignment of the said Districts shall be considered as a final close and termination of accounts between the contracting parties with respect to the charges of the said Contingent, and all other payments whatsoever for which His Highness the Nizam is now liable to the Honourable the East India Company.

Art. IX.—The Treaty, consisting of nine Articles, being this day concluded and settled by Colonel Low, C.B., on behalf of the Honourable the English East India Company with the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk,—

Colonel Low has delivered one copy thereof in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the Nawab, who on his part has also delivered one copy of the same, duly executed by himself; and Colonel Low hereby engages to deliver a copy of the same to His Highness, duly ratified by the Governor-General in Council, within 30 days from this date.

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*

30th March 1853.

MINUTE by the Honourable Sir *F. Currie*, Bart.

I HAVE gone very carefully through the Governor-General's Minute, and the references contained in the box. The subject is one with which I have been long conversant, and the various points noticed by His Lordship have been fully considered by me. The Minute contains a full, lucid, and impartial statement of the Nizam's and our position in respect to the Contingent Force, and the large debt due by the Nizam to us, chiefly on account of advances made from our Treasury for the payment thereof.

I so fully and entirely acquiesce with the Most Noble the Governor-General in the view taken by His Lordship of all the points discussed in this comprehensive paper, and the principles on which it is proposed that the Government of India should now act, that it seems necessary for me to do little more than record my general concurrence in the line of policy which His Lordship purposes to pursue at the present juncture.

I have always felt the difficulty of the position in which we should be placed if the Nizam were to fall back upon the Treaties, and call upon us to explain by what authority, and on what grounds, we had organized in his name\* this costly army, and impose this incubus upon the revenues of his State, and had assumed the right of regulating its every movement, and of giving and withholding at will the services of the Force for purposes connected with the administration of the

\* The Governor-General, in his Minute, paras. 13 and 15, writes of the Nizam having been made "to raise and pay, and having embodied and made over to us," &c.; but the facts are even stronger. The Nizam is not, as I believe, allowed a voice in the enlistment of a single Recruit, the promotion of a single Officer, Native or European, the dress or equipment of the Troops, or anything regarding them, more than if they were a portion of the Queen's or Company's Army.

Nizam's own Government ; and I feel that the sacrifice which His Lordship proposes now to make, in order to obtain an equitable adjustment of the past, and to place the Force, and our relations with the Nizam in respect to it, on a sound and just basis for the future, large though it appears, will be more than compensated by the result, should His Highness be wise enough to acquiesce in either of the arrangements on the adoption of which it is intended that the sacrifice shall be consented to.

The Contingent on its present footing seems to have been the device of Mr. Russell, the Resident, and Chundoo Lall, the Minister of the day ; and, as far as I have been able to ascertain, there exists no direct recorded approval and sanction of the arrangement, by either the Government of India or that of the Nizam. But notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding the absence of all authority in the Treaty for the establishment of the Force, I concur with the Governor-General that its existence for the last 40 years nearly, with the acquiescence of both Governments, is a substantive fact which fully warrants our taking the measure proposed by His Lordship for recovering the sums which have been advanced by us for its payment hitherto, and for securing the regularity of that payment in future, as long as the Force continues to be kept up.

I have great hope that Colonel Low will succeed in negotiating some satisfactory arrangement based upon the very liberal and considerate terms and principles described in the Governor-General's Minute. I do not believe that the Nizam will, under any circumstances, desire or persist in the disbandment of the Force. The host of foreign mercenaries (Arabs and Rohillas) which have been introduced into his territories by the Nizam (in consequence, no doubt, mainly of his regular army not being under his control) renders the continuance of this regular force indispensable now to the continuance of his government, and when the Nizam finds that the eventual disbandment of the Force will be the alternative of his rejection of the terms now offered I hope and think that he will acquiesce.

If he do not do so, and if he take the most foolish of the courses suggested by the Governor-General as possible, the coercion in such case contemplated by His Lordship must be had recourse to ; but I would suggest that the Resident, before he has recourse to such coercion, should be directed to apply to the Supreme Government for specific instructions as to the means to be employed, and the mode in which those means should be used.

I think that if we are driven to this extreme measure we shall have to exercise great caution and circumspection in its execution.

I state this with reference to the Governor-General's Minute of the 27th May 1851, para. 20, one of the papers in the box.

I think, under the peculiar circumstances of the location of the Subsidiary Force in the Nizam's Dominions, and the stipulations of the Treaty of 1800, it is doubtful if we could with propriety take advantage of the position of these troops, placed within the Hyderabad territory, for the express purpose declared in the Treaty, to conduct operations against the Nizam himself. I say it is, in respect of the Subsidiary Force, doubtful ; but I have no doubt that that portion of the Nizam's own army commonly called His Highness's Contingent ought not to be so employed. I am quite satisfied that the troops of the Contingent would, at the command of the Resident and their Officers, march against the other troops of the State, against Hyderabad, and against the person of the Nizam himself, if so ordered, as readily as against any other parties, so entirely have they been taught to consider themselves our soldiers ; but we must not, on that account, lose sight of the fact that they are *bonâ fide* the Nizam's troops, enlisted (by British Officers, it is true, but by British Officers in the pay and service of the Nizam) in his name, sworn to allegiance to him, and obedience to his orders. It would be, to my mind, the very height of anarchy to order these troops to coerce their master in any way, but more especially so to use them for the purpose of taking violent possession of a portion of that master's territories in order to provide for their own pay.

(Signed) F. Currie.

2nd April 1853.

MINUTE by the Honourable *J. Lowis*.

HYDERABAD affairs, which form the subject of this Minute of the Most Noble the Governor-General, have been on many occasions under discussion during the last four years, and have had my best consideration.

No. 82. Hyderabad Affairs.

His Lordship's paper appears to me to exhaust the large subject of which it treats, and to leave no room for further administration. It contains a full and clear exposition of the relative positions in which this Government and that of our ally stand to each other, and of the nature and causes of the pecuniary entanglement into which the Nizam has fallen. It makes candid admission of the infirmity of the footing of the letter of the Treaty of 1800, on which existing arrangements for the Contingent stand, and offers that Government exceedingly liberal terms for placing things on a firmer basis; and it provides adequately and most judiciously, in my opinion, for any contingency which arises from the obstinacy or recusance of the Nizam. I have, therefore, only to signify my entire concurrence in His Lordship's views.

The difficulty suggested by my honourable colleague Sir F. Currie can hardly arise unless we be compelled to resort to the *ultima ratio* of actual war with the Nizam; and it appears quite impossible that he should be so ill-advised as to drive us to that. The Subsidiary Force is, I conceive, part and parcel of the Madras Army, and available for any duty the Government of India may require of it. The Contingent is part and parcel of the Army of the Nizam; but, officered by British subjects, it would necessarily be useless to him in case of a breach.

(Signed) *J. Lowis*.

4th April 1853.

TREATY between the Honourable the English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor, settled by Colonel *J. Low*, C. B., Resident at the Court of His Highness, by virtue of full Powers to that effect vested in him by the Most Noble James Andrew Marquis of *Dalhousie*, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, and Governor-General appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their Affairs in the East Indies.

Whereas friendship and union have subsisted for a length of time between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor, and have been cemented and strengthened by Treaties of general defence and protection; and whereas, in the lapse of time, many changes in the condition of Princes and neighbouring States have taken place, by reason of which it has now become expedient to revise the Military arrangements that were formerly agreed upon for the fulfilment of the said Treaties; and whereas differences and discussions have for some time existed between the contracting parties regarding the adjustment of charges connected with portions of the Military arrangements subsisting between the States: and whereas it is fit and proper, and for the mutual advantage of both Powers, that such differences should now be finally settled, and that the recurrence of such discussions, which tend to disturb the friendship and harmony of the contracting parties, should effectually be prevented; therefore the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor have agreed upon the following Articles of a Treaty between the States.

Article I.—The peace, union, and friendship so long subsisting between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor shall be perpetual; the friends and enemies of either shall be the friends and enemies of both, and the contracting parties agree that all the former Treaties and Agreements between the two States now in force and not contrary to the tenor of this engagement shall be confirmed by it.

Art. II.—The Subsidiary Force, which for general defence and protection has

been furnished by the Honourable East India Company to His Highness the Nizam, shall be continued, and shall consist as heretofore of not less than eight Battalions of Sepoys and two Regiments of Cavalry, with their requisite complement of Guns and European Artillerymen, fully equipped with warlike Stores and Ammunition. Unless with the express consent of His Highness, there shall never be less than five Regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry (with a due proportion of Artillery) of the said Subsidiary Force stationed within the Territories of His Highness, and the residue of such Subsidiary Force shall at all times be brought into His Highness's Territories without delay on His Highness making requisition therefor. The said Subsidiary Force shall be employed when required to execute services of importance, such as protecting the person of His Highness, his Heirs and Successors, and reducing to obedience all rebels and excitors of disturbance in His Highness's Dominions; but it is not to be employed on trilling occasions, or, like Sebundy, to be stationed in the Country to collect Revenue.

Art. III.—The Honourable East India Company further agrees that in lieu of His Highness's present Contingent it shall maintain for His Highness, his Heirs and Successors, an Auxiliary Force, which shall be styled the "Hyderabad Contingent," according to the provisions for the maintenance of that Force which are detailed in the 6th Article of this Treaty.

It shall consist of not less than 5,000 Infantry and 2,000 Cavalry, with four Field Batteries of Artillery. It shall be commanded by British Officers, fully equipped and disciplined, and controlled by the British Government through its representative, the Resident at Hyderabad.

Whensoever the services of the said Contingent may be required they shall be afforded at all times to His Highness the Nizam, fully and promptly, throughout his whole Dominions. If rebellion or disturbance shall be excited, or if the just claims and authority of His Highness shall be resisted, the said Contingent, after the reality of the offence shall have been duly ascertained, shall be employed to reduce the offenders to submission.

Art. IV.—As the interests of the two States have long been identified, it is further mutually agreed that if disturbances shall break out in Districts belonging to the Honourable East India Company, His Highness the Nizam shall permit such portions of the Subsidiary Force as may be requisite to be employed in quelling the same within the said Districts. In like manner, if disturbances shall break out in any part of His Highness's Dominions contiguous to the Territories of the Honourable East India Company, to which it might be inconvenient, owing to the distance from Hyderabad, to detach any portion of the Subsidiary Force, the British Government, if required by His Highness the Nizam, shall direct such portions of its Troops as may be most available to assist in quelling the disturbances within His Highness's Dominions.

Art. V.—In the event of war, His Highness the Nizam engages that the Subsidiary Force, joined by the Hyderabad Contingent, shall be employed in such manner as the British Government may consider best calculated for the purpose of opposing the enemy; provided that two Battalions of Sepoys shall always remain, as settled by former Treaties, near to the Capital of Hyderabad; and it is also hereby agreed that, excepting the said Subsidiary and Contingent Forces, His Highness shall not, under any circumstances, be called upon to furnish any other Troops whatsoever.

Art. VI.—For the purpose of providing the regular monthly payment of the said Contingent Troops, and payment of Appah Dessaye's Choute, and the allowances to Mohiput Ram's Family, and to certain Mahratta Pensioners, as guaranteed in the 10th Article of the Treaty of 1822, and also for payment of the interest at six per cent. per annum of the debt due to the Honourable Company, so long as the principal of that debt shall remain unpaid, which debt now amounts to about 50 lacs of Hyderabad rupees, the Nizam hereby agrees to assign the Districts mentioned in the accompanying Schedule marked (A), yielding an annual gross revenue of about 50 lacs of rupees, to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at Hyderabad, and to such other Officers acting under

# HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

his orders as may from time to time be appointed by the Government of India to the charge of those Districts.

Art. VII.—By the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 the British Government can, in time of war, call upon that of His Highness the Nizam to furnish 9,000 Cavalry and 6,000 Infantry to accompany the British Troops in the field. The present Hyderabad Contingent, which is to be maintained at all times (whether in peace or war), is accepted as an equivalent for the larger body of troops above specified to be furnished in time of war; and it is accordingly hereby declared that the Nizam shall not be called upon at any time by the British Government to furnish any other troops but those of the Subsidiary Force and the Hyderabad Contingent; and that part of the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 which requires the Nizam to furnish 9,000 Cavalry and 6,000 Infantry is accordingly hereby annulled.

Art. VIII.—The districts mentioned in Schedule (A) are to be transferred to Colonel Low, C.B., the Resident, immediately that the ratified Treaty shall be received from Calcutta; and that Officer engages, on the part of the British Government, that the Resident at the Court of Hyderabad for the time being shall always render true and faithful accounts every year to the Nizam of the Receipts and Disbursements connected with the said Districts, and make over any Surplus Revenue that may exist to His Highness, after the payment of the Contingent and the other items detailed in Article VI. of this Treaty.

Art. IX.—This Treaty, consisting of nine Articles, being this day concluded and settled by Colonel John Low, C.B., on behalf of the Honourable the English East India Company with the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk Asoph Jah Bahadoor, Colonel Low has delivered one version thereof in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the Nawab, who on his part has also delivered one copy of the same to Colonel Low, duly executed by His Highness; and Colonel Low hereby engages to deliver a copy of the same to His Highness the Nizam, duly ratified by the Governor-General in Council, within 30 days from this date.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad, 21st May A.D. 1853 (12th Shabun A.H. 1269).

(Signed) *J. Low*, Colonel, Resident at Hyderabad.

## (A.)

SCHEDULE of DISTRICTS in Berar, the Raichore Doab, and Borders of the Sholapore and Ahmednuggur Collectorates, Bombay Presidency, transferred to the Management of the British Resident at Hyderabad, agreeably to the provisions of Article VI. of the Treaty of 1853 (Fuslee 1263), entered into by the Honourable East India Company with His Highness the Nizam.

The Districts in Berar transferred to British management are those lying to the North of the range of Hills which extends from Adjuntah, on the West, to Woon, near the Wurdah, on the East. Any Villages not named underneath, within the above-mentioned boundary, will be included hereafter among those transferred to the management of the British Resident at Hyderabad.

Pergunnah :	Rs.	Pergunnah :	Rs.
Akola .....	1,24,944	Nargaom .....	975
Dheanda .....	1,33,844	Ilalagaom .....	8,750
Barragaom .....	17,381	Pandur Koura .....	2,000
Thoogaum .....	61,425	Boxhi Kheir .....	2,000
Korar .....	2,250	Wunmaidi .....	28,033
Posud .....	17,158	Numba .....	12,000
Argaom .....	10,000	Bodnarapooljee .....	32,068
Nursi .....	73,129	Boomki .....	2,702
Mahore .....	14,360	Damodi, alias Damori .....	18,923
Chicholee .....	12,722	Gooboo .....	6,000
Larkheir .....	4,556	Bowenber .....	14,000
Yawuk, alias Yawuth Mahal .....	2,287	Julka .....	3,000
Kullam .....	2,510	Seralla .....	10,000
Chicknee .....	2,501	Poosda .....	5,000
Mahagaom .....	11,370	Urgaon (Small) .....	1,500

**THE DERARS.**

Pergunnah :	Rs.	Pergunnah :	Rs.
Akote.....	77,000	Bath Kolec .....	38,596
Urgaon.....	1,25,000	Pathrote .....	1,37,932
Julgaon.....	97,000	Malkeera .....	10,871
Jamodi .....	35,155	Pallas Keira.....	10,011
Morsi .....	36,000	Sawurgaon Taklee .....	2,500
Palla .....	3,000	Noer Pursoo Pundet .....	8,360
Malghat .....	15,000	Nandgaon Caze .....	13,263
Dhoolghat.....	2,401	Devicota .....	3,226
Soongaom.....	7,500	Damnuko .....	2,899
Moorgram .....	1,500	Parsoli .....	2,200
Juroor .....	9,000	Manjur Keir.....	8,525
Karlah .....	8,020	Oomrawntee Rane .....	4,665
Bhil Keira .....	2,563	Hewer Keir .....	22,601
Oomrawntee .....	58,442	Annair .....	6,855
Rathore Sheik Baboo .....	15,881	Serugaon .....	19,189
Barsee Taklee .....	12,076	Danapoor .....	75,000
Babun .....	3,881	Mana .....	22,000
Nandgaon.....	18,592	Girovli .....	10,000
Pathooda .....	24,001	Koorum .....	18,000
Penjur .....	16,682	Mortizapoor .....	45,000
Peepulgaon Raja.....	37,946	Mungalore Peer .....	40,000
Buneira Bebee .....	37,759	Koora .....	45,000
Kolapoor .....	33,807	Mungalore Dustigeer.....	12,000
Thullagaom .....	21,173	Kusbeo Korum Keir, &c. ....	8,708
Tiktah .....	3,500	Dhumej, &c.....	5,320
Lakpoori .....	2,401	Ussalgaom .....	10,105
Raoja .....	1,500	Akote.....	9,000
Buroor .....	90,394	Balapoor .....	2,41,275
Soorli .....	2,991	Mulkapoor.....	51,319
Unjungaombari .....	2,918	Raichore .....	2,499
Seacealla, alias Seerala .....	7,014	Rajoora .....	3,742
Nowari .....	1,036	Rohin Kheir.....	2,491
Bukki .....	1,468	Chandore .....	20,727
Ellichpoor .....	1,00,000	Nandcora .....	9,846
Kurujgaom .....	1,00,000	Nundgaon.....	3,736
Unjungaom .....	1,05,219	Jeypore .....	4,146
Dharoor.....	20,000	Koleli.....	990
Akoli .....	96,500	Devulghat.....	17,955
Bulgaom .....	95,000	Dharsangvi .....	6,159
Budneira Gungaoe .....	59,843	Darea .....	17,436
Punchgawun.....	30,371	Karinja Bebee .....	23,535
Salood .....	23,912	Kari Dhamini .....	14,297
Papoo, alias Papul .....	7,911	Kanurgaon .....	2,230
Punj Mahagaom .....	51,921		
Reithpoor .....	61,710		
Chinchona .....	11,139		
Khed Belloora.....	14,910		
Seona .....	14,820		
Banoda .....	17,855		
		Total.....Rs.	30,95,309
		Deduct amount of Personal Jageers° ...	35,000
		Total.....Rs.	30,60,309

The above amount is exclusive of Deh Sadur, Russooms, Muktahs, Yeomeas, Enams, and all charitable allowances hitherto held, which will only be paid to the several Claimants after they have established their rights by the production of proper Sunnuds, or other Official Documents acknowledged to be correct by the Nizam's Government.

DISTRICTS in the Raichore Doab transferred to the Management of the British Resident, the boundaries of which are the Rivers Kishna and Toombuddra, on the North, South, and East, and the Honourable Company's Frontier, belonging to the Bombay Presidency, on the West.

(Any Talooks or Villages not named underneath within the above-mentioned boundary will be included hereafter among those transferred to the management of the British Resident at Hyderabad.)

	Rs.
Pergunnah Deodroog, &c., and the Talook of Kadloor, &c.....	1,07,872
The Gudwal Peshcush.....	1,15,000
Pergunnah Huvelce, Raichore, and Mahalat .....	3,95,380
Pergunnah Kanegheri, &c., and Gooboor and Tharavah .....	2,22,280
Pergunnah Kopai, &c.....	1,84,887
Pergunnah Moodkhee and Moodgul.....	59,063
Pergunnah Gungawuttee.....	66,860
Total .....	Rs. 11,51,342



## HYDERABAD AFFAIRS.

No claims in these Districts will be allowed for personal Jagheers hitherto held, till the rights to the same shall have been established by the production of proper *Sunnuds*, or other Official Documents acknowledged to be correct by the Nizam's Government.

The above rule is also applicable to Russooms, Muktahs, Yeomeeas, Enams, and all charitable allowances.

DISTRICTS on His Highness's Western Frontier, bordering on the Honourable Company's Bombay Collectorates of Ahmednuggur and Sholapore.

1. The 16 Villages in the Beer District, on the boundaries of the Jamkhair Talook, in the Honourable Company's Territory ; viz.—

## REVENUE.

	Rs.	a.	p.		Rs.	a.	p.
Karagaon .....	902	11	3	Secrapoor Dhomulla .....	1,417	15	0
Kutola .....	773	14	6	Bhateli .....	1,452	3	9
Koptee .....	574	5	6	Bawee .....	505	0	0
Bhubkul .....	740	5	6	Jam .....	292	0	0
Moralah .....	1,595	13	0	Vernee .....	624	3	0
Mandah .....	374	7	0	Madmapore .....	232	10	0
Warjur .....	1,189	0	0	Vadolee .....	436	11	0
Roopoor .....	104	8	6				
Kotun .....	1,965	4	0				
				Total.....Rs.	13,181	0	0

## 2. All the Villages in the Districts of

Kateo,	Bhoon,	Nuldroog,	Gumjotee,
Maideo,	Kullum,	Tooljapoor,	Alund, and
Peraindah,	Latoor,	Lohara,	Ufzulpore ;
Darasoo.			

and which Districts are within the boundaries on the North and East of the Manjeera, on the West of the Honourable Company's Territory in the Ahmednuggur and Sholapore Collectorates of the Bombay Presidency, on the South of the Bheema, and on the East in as direct a line as can possibly be drawn between the town of Nittoor, on the Manjeera, and Ufzulpore, on the Bheema, yielding a Gross Revenue of about eight Lacs of Rupces per annum, exclusive of personal Jagheers, Yeomecas, Russooms, and charitable allowances.

No claims on these Districts will be allowed for personal Jagheers hitherto held, till the rights to the same shall have been established by the production of proper Sunnuds or other Official Documents acknowledged to be correct by the Nizam's Government.

The above rule is also applicable to Russooms, Yeomecas, Enams, and all charitable allowances.

THE TALOOKS detailed hereafter, belonging to Surf-i-Khass and the Noblemen mentioned underneath, will be left to the Revenue Management of the Officers appointed for that purpose by the Hyderabad Government.

BERAR.

Surf-i-Khass Talooks :	Rs.	Jagheer Talooks belonging to Suraj-ool-Moolk Bahadoor :	Rs.
Badneira Guugaiee .....	59,843	Dhurreeapore.....	75,000
Punchgohan.....	30,371	Mana .....	22,000
Salood .....	23,912	Garowlee.....	10,000
Papeo, <i>alias</i> Papul .....	7,911	Koorun .....	18,000
Punj Mahagaon .....	51,921	Moortizapoor .....	45,000
R-eithpoor .....	61,710	Mungalore Dustigeer .....	12,000
Hinchona .....	11,139	Mungalore Peer.....	40,000
Khed Bullora .....	14,910	Kora .....	45,000
Seoun .....	14,820		
			2,67,000
Banoda .....	17,855	Doab Talooks belonging to Surf-i-Khass :	
Bath Koleo .....	38,596	Mooshkee and Moedgul .....	59,063
Patrete .....	1,37,932		
Mal Keira .....	10,871		
Pullas Keira .....	10,011		
Ra.	4,91,802	Total.....Ra.	8,17,865

TALOOKAS on the West of His Highness the Nizam's Territories, bordering on the Collectorates of Ahmednuggur and Sholapore.

Surf-i-Khass : Villages in the Lohara Talook.

Ditto „ „ Gunjotee Talook.

Ditto „ „ Allund Talook.

Shums-ool-Oomra Bahadoor's Talook of Ufzulpore.

(Signed *J. Low*, Colonel, Resident at Hyderabad.

Hyderabad, 21st May 1853.

[*Note*.—A copy of the original document, written in Persian, is deposited, for purposes of reference, in the Library of the House of Commons.]

No. 84 of 1853.—Foreign Department.

From Colonel *J. Low*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to *C. Allen*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Fort William.

SIR,—With reference to the 5th paragraph of my despatch, No. 83, dated yesterday afternoon, I have now the honour to report what occurred at the durbar on the forenoon of that day.

2. Major Davidson accompanied me to the durbar, and the only other persons present in the reception room at the first part of the interview were the Minister and his nephew, Salar Jung, and the Urze-Begee; but before we had been many minutes seated the two sons of Shums-ool-Oomra also arrived, and took their seats near to His Highness.

3. We were received with politeness by the Nizam, and I commenced the conversation by a short address to His Highness to the following purport, viz.: that I had brought with me (pointing to my office box, which was near to me) the Treaty which His Highness had agreed to sign; that it was needless, I thought, for us to have any more conversation now on the subject of it, so I would only assure His Highness once more, which I did with full sincerity, that in my opinion the Governor-General of India would feel pleased at the friendly spirit which His Highness had evinced by concluding this new engagement with the British Government; that he had acted wisely in agreeing to the Treaty as it now stands, not merely as regards his pecuniary interests, but also as regards his personal comfort, and the real dignity of his position as a Sovereign Prince; that the Contingent Force would now be at all times a highly efficient one, and ever ready for the service of his Government; that he would be protected by the paramount State from all external foes in the same complete manner that he has hitherto been; and that he would never, in any point of view, have cause to regret the act of this day.

4. The Nizam made a short reply, to the effect that it was always his wish to give satisfaction to the British Government; and he immediately desired the Urze-Begee to read the Treaty.

5. The Urze-Begee accordingly read the whole Treaty through, in a slow and very distinct manner, to which His Highness paid minute attention from first to last.

6. When that part of the preamble was read which is now noted in the margin, His Highness turned towards me and said, "It is evident that if the pay of the Contingent had always been issued to them regularly by my Ministers the draft Treaty which you brought to me would never have been written." I replied to the effect that His Highness was perfectly correct in that observation, but that there was no use now in our again going over such discussions; in support of which opinion I quoted a Hindoostanee proverb to the effect that it is often wisdom in this world to let bygones be bygones, and say no more about them; when His Highness observed with a smile on his countenance, "That is very true;" and he immediately desired the Urze-Begee to go on with the perusal of the Treaty.

"And whereas differences and discussions have for some time existed between the contracting parties regarding the adjustment of charges connected with portions of the Military arrangements subsisting between the States; and whereas it is fit and proper, and for the mutual advantage of both Powers, that such differences should now be finally settled, and that the recurrence of such discussions, which tend to disturb the friendship and harmony of the contracting parties, should effectually be prevented."

\* His Highness repeated that observation almost precisely in the same words at a subsequent part of this conference, glancing at the time reproachfully at the Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk.—(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

7. Shortly after this, the Urze-Begee came to a word (namely, "Derka") the meaning of which he did not understand. I immediately explained that it was merely a clerical mistake, and that the word ought to have been "Derkar," which would render the meaning of the sentence quite clear. The Minister made an attempt to get up with a pen in his hand to correct the error, but was so weak from illness that he could not rise without assistance; and the Nizam himself then with his own hand added the required "r" to the word, which act of course was duly admired by his adherents, and the perusal of the Treaty was continued.

8. On the perusal of the 6th Article, which alluded to a gross revenue of 50 lacs of rupees per annum, the Nizam asked two or three questions of the Minister and of Shums-ool-Omra's sons respecting their "Surf-i-Khass" villages included within those Districts; and His Highness was soon satisfied, adverting to the value of those villages, that 50 lacs of rupees of gross revenue is not too much for the objects in view.

9. The next and last part of the Treaty which attracted the Nizam's notice was the 7th Article, which (as explained in one of my former despatches) had been inserted in order to satisfy His Highness's mind that he could never in future be called upon to send any other troops along with British armies in the field from the Hyderabad dominions except the Contingent and the Subsidiary Force. His Highness on this occasion listened attentively to a full explanation from me on that head, and seemed to be much satisfied when I declared to him that the right that we had by the Treaty of 1800 to call upon him in time of war for 9,000 Cavalry and 6,000 Infantry, to accompany our troops in the field, is positively abrogated by the 7th Article of the present Treaty. His Highness did not require the Schedule to be read, as he said that he had carefully perused it on the previous day.

10. His Highness the Nizam then called for his seal, while I produced mine from my office box, and the Treaty was immediately sealed and signed, one copy being handed to me for despatch to the Governor-General, and the other copy being delivered by me into the hands of His Highness.

11. His Highness then called for the pan-dan, when Major Davidson and I took our leave, and returned to the Residency, the whole visit at the Durbar not having occupied much above half an hour.

12. Before I close this report, I beg respectfully to observe that in my opinion it would have a very useful effect here if the Most Noble the Governor-General would, along with the ratified Treaty, send to me a Khureeta, addressed to the Nizam, somewhat to the same purport as that part of the 3rd paragraph of this letter opposite to which I have now drawn a black marginal line, in order to show precisely the nature of the sentiments which, if expressed by the Governor-General in a Khureeta addressed to the Nizam, would assuredly in my opinion have a beneficial effect on His Highness's mind, and thereby aid me in effectively carrying out some of the provisions of this Treaty.

13. In conclusion, I may as well also mention my opinion (although it is of very inferior importance to the abovementioned Khureeta to the Nizam) that it might perhaps be useful to me if a paragraph were introduced in a despatch from your office to my address acknowledging the good service performed to us on this occasion by the Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, for he certainly has been very useful to me during the latter part of these negotiations, and the knowledge on his part that his services were appreciated by the British Government<sup>a</sup> might be an incentive to him (if it be his fate to live during the next few months) to co-operate with me cordially in the practical working of the new Treaty, so far as the working of it can depend upon the Nizam's Government.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident at Hyderabad.

Hyderabad Residency, 22nd May 1853.

<sup>a</sup> In the case supposed I would only mention verbally to the Minister that the Governor-General in Council approved of his conduct. Were I to give him a written record of that circumstance it might indirectly prove to be the cause of injury to him.—(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

MINUTE by the Most Noble the Governor-General of India.

1. INSTRUCTIONS founded upon the Minute dated the 30th March regarding the affairs of His Highness the Nizam were transmitted to the Resident at Hyderabad. The successive despatches from Colonel Low have from time to time informed the Government of the progress of the negotiation which was opened, and of the fluctuating prospects of its issue. This morning I had the gratification of receiving by express a letter from the Resident in which he announces the important fact that the Nizam has formally executed a Treaty of the nature required. The Resident encloses the document for the approval and ratification of the Governor-General in Council.

2. The Nizam, as had been anticipated, expressed at the first a strong disinclination to form any new Treaty at all. His Highness made no objections to the proposed alteration in the distribution of the Subsidiary Force; His Highness not only did not welcome the opening which was afforded him for getting rid of the Contingent Force if he were unwilling to maintain it, but he frequently and emphatically repeated the declaration he had previously and publicly made, that he did not desire the disbanding of the Contingent, that he was fully sensible of its value, and objected even to its numbers being reduced.

His Highness did not receive with favour the proposal of the Government of India to cancel the principal sum of debt due by His Highness as an inducement for the cession of certain portions of His Highness's territory for the payment of the Contingent Force. He showed himself from first to last absolutely and inflexibly resolved to refuse all cession of territory in perpetuity, and he expressed the utmost reluctance even to assign districts to our management, the sovereignty remaining with himself.

To this latter measure, however, he at last consented, and he signed the Treaty as it was drafted, with two exceptions, which will be referred to hereafter.

3. The preamble of the Treaty stands as it was drafted.

By the 1st Article the friendship and alliance between the States are confirmed.

By the 2nd Article the modification of the amount of the Subsidiary Force, that is to be at all times stationed within His Highness's Territories, is conceded, and the duties of the Force are defined.

By the 3rd Article the Contingent is formally recognized and established: it is to be no longer the Nizam's army, but is to be an auxiliary force kept up by the Government of India for the use of the Nizam, officered, paid and controlled by this Government. Its amount is fixed, and its duties are defined.

By the 4th Article the Subsidiary Force may be employed for occasional service in the British territories, and other British troops besides the Subsidiary Force are to be employed in the Nizam's territories as occasion may require.

The 5th Article secures to the British Government the use of the Subsidiary and Contingent Forces during war, and limits the obligations of the Nizam to the British Government, in respect of military aid, to his affording the use of those two bodies of troops.

The 6th Article assigns to the management of the British Government certain districts belonging to the Nizam, which yield an annual gross revenue of 50 lacs of rupees. The revenues of these districts are to be applied to the payment of the Contingent, of Appah Dessaye's Choute and other pensions, and to the liquidation of the interest of the debt of 50 lacs due to the British Government so long as the principal shall remain unpaid.

By the 8th Article it is agreed that these districts shall be made over as soon as the Treaty is ratified, that annual accounts shall be rendered to the Nizam, and that any surplus existing after payment of the charges above mentioned shall be paid over to His Highness.

4. As the annual revenue of the districts is stated in the Treaty to be 50 lacs of rupees, it appears at first sight as if a greater extent of territory had been made over than was contemplated in the Minute of 30th March. This,

however, is not the case ; the apparent excess is caused by the Treaty making mention of the gross revenue (including nine lacs of Jagheers), instead of the net revenue mentioned in the 33rd paragraph of the Minute.

The districts enumerated in the Schedules annexed to the Treaty appear to be identical with districts which General Fraser proposed to obtain. They comprise the talooks in Berar, those on the western side of His Highness's dominions contiguous to the British territories, and the Raichore Doab, between the rivers Kistnah and Toombuddra. A Map showing the districts and their boundaries is annexed.

They include, in Berar, tracts which are reputed to be the finest cotton-growing districts in India, and they are, from their position and productiveness, calculated to be eminently advantageous to British interests, both in a political and commercial point of view ; although the present charges of the Contingent, the heavy interest of debt, and the expenses of management will probably cause the Government of India to be a loser by the compact in the first instance, the reduction of charges hereafter and the improvement of the districts will, I have no doubt, reimburse the Government fully in the end.

5. The 7th Article expressly annuls that part of the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 which requires the Nizam to furnish 9,000 Cavalry and 6,000 Infantry in time of war, and it declares that the Nizam shall never be called upon for any other troops than the Subsidiary and Contingent Forces. This limitation of his obligations had already been secured to the Nizam by the concluding sentence of the 5th Article. But as His Highness was specially anxious for the introduction of the 7th Article, the tautology may be overlooked, and the Treaty may stand as it is.

By the 9th Article the Resident engages to obtain a ratification of the Treaty within 30 days.

6. From the foregoing summary of the several Articles it will be seen that the Treaty signed by the Nizam differs from the draft suggested by the Governor-General in Council in two particulars : 1st. The Nizam does not cede the districts specified in perpetuity, though he assigns them to the British Government. 2nd. The Government of India on its part does not surrender the principal sum of 50 lacs of rupees, which it was prepared to give up.

I regard, however, the stipulations of the Treaty that has been concluded as mutually and singularly advantageous to the two contracting powers.

7. The Nizam obtains by the Treaty a renewal of the obligations by which the British Government bound itself 50 years ago to protect him against all external enemies and all internal danger.

His Highness retains the full right to and use of the Subsidiary Force, though the distribution of it has been modified. He retains the services of the Contingent, secured to him in the amplest manner and placed on a permanent footing. He is released from the demand for a larger military force exigible from him under the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800.

He gains an annual saving of at least six lacs of rupees, and exemption from the demands of the Government of India for immediate repayment of the sum of 50 lacs due to it. Lastly, the Nizam obtains rest and relief from the harassing solicitations to which he has necessarily been subjected for many years by the mismanagement of his Ministers, and by his own obstinacy, for pecuniary payments which he was unprepared to meet, whereby great discontent was created among the troops, and discredit was brought upon the State of Hyderabad.

8. The Government of India, for its part, obtains by this Treaty a less restricted use of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force for its own purposes, though its obligations to supply such Subsidiary Force remain unchanged.

It obtains a formal recognition of the Contingent Force, and its establishment upon a definite footing as an auxiliary body of troops supplied by the British Government and wholly under its authority, instead of being, as heretofore, a foreign force nominally belonging to His Highness the Nizam.

It obtains by the assignment of districts positive security for the payment of the Contingent Force and other charges, and for the liquidation of the interest and ultimately of the principal of the large debt due to it by the Nizam. Above all,

obtains a final termination of the difficulties in which it has long been placed by the existence of pecuniary transactions with the Court of Hyderabad; and it is freed from the necessity for having recourse to measures towards the Nizam and his Minister which were harassing to the servants of this Government, and hardly compatible with the maintenance of its dignity.

9. Doubtless the Treaty would have been more complete, and still more advantageous to the British Government, if the territories now merely assigned had been ceded absolutely and in perpetuity.

But in securing, as it does by the present Treaty, beyond risk, the means of regularly paying the Contingent, and of terminating all pecuniary transactions and consequent causes of dispute with the Nizam, the Government of India secures the object which it had most at heart; and when it is remembered that for the purpose of obtaining that all-important object the Government of India was prepared not merely to accept an assignment of districts only, but further to cancel the debt of 50 lacs of rupees due to it, the Government may well be content with a Treaty which gives it what it sought without requiring the sacrifice it was ready and willing to make in return.

10. Fully content with the success of our negotiations, I gladly consent to ratify the Treaty which the Resident has submitted.

11. In compliance with the suggestion conveyed by Colonel Low in his last despatch, a Khureeta should be addressed by the Governor-General to His Highness the Nizam in the following terms:

"The Governor-General has received with the highest satisfaction the Treaty which His Highness has signed; and he has ratified at once the act of the Resident, who signed it on behalf of the Government of India.

"By that Treaty the long-existing friendship of the States has been still further confirmed, and mutual benefits will result to both.

"The Governor-General recognizes in this act of the Nizam the friendly spirit by which His Highness is actuated towards the British Government. He recognizes not less the wisdom which has been displayed by His Highness in entering into a new and formal engagement, whereby not only the financial interests of His Highness's State will be promoted, but his personal comfort will be enhanced and his dignity as a Sovereign Prince will be protected.

"The Contingent Force will be maintained in the highest state of efficiency, and its services will at all times be available for the use of His Highness's Government in the mode which the Treaty declares.

"The obligations of the Government of India to afford His Highness the protection of the Subsidiary Force will at all times be fulfilled. All grounds of dispute, all cause of difference, will be removed, and the Governor-General entertains a confident expectation that uninterrupted harmony will henceforth prevail in the relations between the States, which have already been so long united by the bonds of substantial friendship."

12. The Resident may further be instructed to convey to the Minister verbally an expression of the satisfaction with which the Governor-General in Council has viewed the conduct of Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk during the negotiations that have just been brought to a successful issue. The Governor-General in Council is sincerely convinced that in advising his master to sign the Treaty as it now stands the Dewan gave proof of his fidelity to his Sovereign, and contributed materially to the real interests of the Nizam, and to the honour and stability of His Highness's throne.

I discharge an imperative and most grateful duty in offering to the Resident, Colonel Low, assurances of the unqualified approbation with which the Government of India has viewed his proceedings in the conduct of this negotiation, and in tendering to him the best and most cordial thanks of the Governor-General in Council for the important and valuable service he has rendered to the State by procuring the conclusion of the Treaty, which the Governor-General in Council has rejoiced to ratify.

The provisions of the Treaty when proposed were mutually advantageous to both the States, and eminently beneficial to the interests of the Nizam. Nevertheless success in securing its execution was more than doubtful. That the negotiations

have been brought to a prosperous issue I believe to be mainly due to the personal exertions and qualities of Colonel Low. It is to his ability, to his perseverance, to his rare combination of suavity of temper with firmness of determination, that I attribute all our success; and to him, therefore, I desire to ascribe the merit.

13. While thus rendering justice, and no more than justice, to the services of Colonel Low, I beg to add that I am very sensible of what is due to the exertions, the ability, and the zeal of his Assistant, Major Davidson. The Governor-General in Council has had every reason to be highly satisfied with the conduct of that officer in his present office, and while conducting the duties of the Residency after the departure of Major-General Fraser. He requests the Resident to convey to Major Davidson the expressions he has just employed, and to offer to him the special thanks of the Governor-General in Council for the valuable aid he has rendered upon this occasion.

14. Much remains to be done in providing for and conducting the administration of the districts that have now been assigned. These matters will form the subject of other Minutes.

Much trouble, too, must no doubt be expected in obtaining full possession of the districts assigned, and on other points connected with the Contingent troops.

I believe, however, that by the conclusion of this Treaty all serious risk of future trouble between the two States has been averted, and that the relations of His Highness the Nizam with the British Government will henceforth be maintained in concord.

15. I do not indeed expect, nor do I believe, that the kingdom of the Nizam will be freed from all embarrassments by the execution of this Treaty.

The sentiments expressed by His Highness, and recorded by Colonel Low, contain abundantly the germs of future troubles: "Two Letter 4th May, para. 6. acts on the part of a Sovereign," said His Highness, "are always reckoned disgraceful; one is to give away unnecessarily any part of his hereditary territories; the other is to disband troops who have been brave and faithful in his service."

Adherence to these two maxims had led the Nizam in times past into courses the most dangerous to the interests and security of his throne. The first led him obstinately to refuse the cession or assignment of territory, which measure alone could enable him to pay the Contingent troops, whom he could not safely dispense with. The other has induced him steadily to refuse the advice which has been given him to disband the Arabs, Rohillas, and other mercenaries who infest his territories and consume his revenues.

Happily for his own interests, the Nizam has been persuaded to depart from the first of his maxims for kingly guidance, and he has agreed to assign to us a portion of his hereditary territories. But he still adheres to the second maxim, and it is to be apprehended that he will do so now even more positively than before, since he will consider himself entitled by his concession regarding the Contingent to immunity from all further interference regarding the levies in his own pay.

If this anticipation should be fulfilled trouble can hardly fail to arise. For the alienation of the revenues of the districts His Highness has assigned to the Government of India must needs curtail the means at his disposal for the payment of the mercenaries whose services he still retains, and failure in their pay must tend to multiply the outrages to which a similar course already every day gives rise within the territories of Hyderabad.

16. It may be that these troubles may call for our interference, or more probably for our interposition in His Highness's behalf. Notwithstanding the reputation generally enjoyed by the Arabs, everything that has passed in the Nizam's dominions during the last five years affords me ground for believing that any such contingency as I have been contemplating may be readily and successfully dealt with by the troops at our command.

In the mean time the good offices of the Government of India shall be employed to guide the Nizam in the path of his own true interests, and to preserve his kingdom in prosperity and independence.

17. In the Minute of 30th March I ventured to express a confident belief that, in consideration of the importance of the object to be attained, the Honourable

Court of Directors would approve of the heavy sacrifices which the Government of India had then resolved to make for the purpose of obtaining it.

Since every principal object the Government had in view has been secured, and secured without the sacrifices to which the Government had determined to submit, I feel still stronger confidence than before that the Honourable Court of Directors will be pleased to approve of the Treaty that has been concluded, even though it does not include the cession of territory in perpetuity, which it was the endeavour of the Government to obtain.

18. The Treaty, with all the relative papers, should be transmitted to the Honourable Court by the next mail, covered by a letter, of which a draft is annexed.  
(Signed) *Dalhousie*.

30th May 1853.

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MINUTE by the Honourable *J. Lowis*.

I concur fully in the satisfaction expressed by the Most Noble the Governor-General in the termination to which Colonel Low has brought the negotiation at Hyderabad.  
Treaty with the Nizam.

The Treaty secures the two points which were of most vital importance to this Government, viz., the distinct recognition of the Contingent by the Nizam, and absolute security for the future payment of that force.

That the assigned districts have not been ceded in full sovereignty I think is a point of minor importance. With full judicial, police, and revenue jurisdiction, and full power, consequently, both to protect the people and to develop the resources of the country, it is a matter of secondary consideration into which exchequer any surplus revenue may go; and as we retain our principal demand against the Nizam of 50 lacs of rupees, and relinquish nothing substantial except a right of calling for troops, which never by any possibility could have been of use, the whole arrangement appears to me eminently advantageous.

I candidly concur in the praise bestowed by the Most Noble the Governor-General on Colonel Low. He has displayed patience, and temper, and judgment, and determination in a very large degree, and both Governments are indebted to him for the salutary termination to which this affair has been brought. Captain Davidson also has well earned the commendation bestowed upon him.

I agree in the terms proposed for the Khureeta, and in the views of His Lordship on the other points noticed in the Minute.

(Signed) *J. Lowis*.

31st May 1853.

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MINUTE by the Honourable *J. Dorin*.

This Treaty places our relations with His Highness the Nizam on a much more definite and secure footing than they have yet stood, and I have only to record my applause of the moderate and wise policy that has dictated this mode of settlement of a very complicated question, and the able negotiations that have brought the measure to a successful issue. It is to be remembered that the Government was already hampered by a treaty of old existence, and that, therefore, there was no scope for improving some of the conditions of alliance that could never have been agreed to in the present paramount position of the British power in India.  
Treaty with His Highness the Nizam.

(Signed) *J. Dorin*.

1st June 1853.

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MINUTE by the Most Noble the Governor-General of India, concurred in by the Members in Council.

In the Minute which was circulated yesterday regarding the ratification of the Treaty lately concluded with the Nizam I observed that the districts assigned were believed to be identical with those which Major-General Fraser proposed to occupy.  
Hyderabad.—His Highness the Nizam.



A close comparison has been since made in the Foreign Department appear that the impression stated above was erroneous, and that there is a considerable discrepancy between the Schedule sent by Colonel Low and that submitted by Major-General Fraser.

The discrepancy appears to be of importance.

2. The Schedule sent by Colonel Low includes no districts which were not included by General Fraser, but it omits large tracts which General Fraser included. Some of these are Dowlutabad, Beytul, Peyton, Bheer, and Koolburga. The annexed Note, prepared by the Secretary, shows more correctly the particulars.

The districts omitted appear to be worth 12 lacs of rupees. Yet the list of Colonel Low, from which they are omitted, makes the aggregate available revenue of all the districts assigned to amount to the same sum as the list of General Fraser, in which extra districts are included.

It is obvious either that the estimate of General Fraser was too low, or that the estimate of Colonel Low is much too high, in which case the Government of India will be a heavy loser.

3. The estimate of General Fraser was not made from documents, but from the oral statements of Parsee Pestonjee, who had long farmed some, if not all, of the districts in question. Major-General Fraser, however, seemed satisfied that the estimate was practically correct.

The Schedule of Colonel Low was prepared by Major Davidson after a laborious inspection of the official accounts, aided by the Minister.

It does not seem probable that there could be any mistake, or any deceit practised, in the midst of so much precaution and personal examination.

Nevertheless it is necessary for the Government to proceed with caution. The Treaty professes to assign a certain amount of revenue, not more than sufficient for certain purposes. If those revenues are over-estimated to the extent of 12 lacs, the purpose of the Treaty will not have been accomplished, and the intentions of the contracting parties will not have been fulfilled.

4. The risk cannot be guarded against by the introduction of a provision similar to that in the Treaty with Scindia of 1844, by which it is declared that if the revenues of the districts assigned do not come up to the estimate in the Schedule, Scindia shall make good the deficiency in cash; because that would only open again the door for disputes on pecuniary transactions between the States, which it is one of the main objects of the Government of India to close for ever.

The practical course to be followed appears to me to be that the Treaty should be ratified by the Governor-General in Council subject to an adjustment of this doubtful point. The Treaty should be transmitted to the Resident. The discrepancy between his estimate and that of his predecessor should be pointed out, and the doubts entertained by the Government of India should be expressed. He should be directed to withhold the delivery of the ratified Treaty until he has satisfied himself of the substantial correctness of his estimate. If on reviewing it he should be satisfied in his own mind (and the discretion may very safely be left to Colonel Low) he may deliver the ratified Treaty. If he should find that the value of the districts is incorrectly estimated, the Resident must endeavour to get the Schedule amended.

If the Nizam refuses to do so, and the deficiency is not so great as to make the assignment altogether a permanently losing transaction to the Government of India, I conceive that a final settlement is of so great consequence that we may well in this case, as before, consent to make a present pecuniary sacrifice in order to obtain it.

My own conviction is that Colonel Low's estimate will prove to be substantially correct.

31st May 1853.

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*

I concur.

(Signed) *J. Lowis.*

And I.

(Signed) *J. Dorin.*

1st June.

NOTE by Mr. Officiating Secretary *C. Allen*.

The territories now assigned by the Nizam do not include all of those formerly proposed for assignment by General Fraser, and their values are in the two Schedules estimated at different amounts.

The territories are naturally resolved into three marked Divisions—

- I. The Berar Districts, or those north of the Ajunta Hills.
- II. The Frontier Districts, or those on the Nizam's western frontier.
- III. The Raichore Doab.

The first and third Divisions apparently contain the same Districts in both the Schedules, but the second Division contains in General Fraser's Schedule the Districts of Beytul Waddy, Dowlatabad, Peyton, Bheer and Koolburga, together with some Pergunnahs of Ahmedabad, none of which with the exception of 15 small villages in Bheer are included in the Schedule attached to the Treaty.

	Rs.
Beytul Waddy.....	13,156
Dowlatabad.....	3,27,827
Ahmednuggur Village..	71,856
Peyton.....	76,309
Bheer (exclusive of 416)	4,33,046
Koolburga.....	3,44,210

Rs. 12,66,404

General Fraser estimated the gross value of the above-named districts, exclusive of jagheers, at 12,66,404, as per margin.\*

General Fraser estimated—

Colonel Low has estimated—

	Rs.
The first division, exclusive of Jagheers, at	17,03,252
Second division, ditto .....	15,35,469
Third ditto ditto .....	9,03,965
Total.....	41,92,686
Deduct value of the territories now excluded .....	12,66,404
	29,26,282

	Rs.
At 30,60,309 the first division, exclusive of Jagheers.	8,00,000 ... Second division.
	11,51,342 ... Third division.
	50,11,651
	8,17,865 ... Value of jagheers.
	41,93,786 ... Value of lands assigned.
	29,26,282
	12,67,504 ... Difference.

There is consequently a difference of 12½ lacs between General Fraser's and Colonel Low's estimate of the lands given up.

I have compared some of the details, and while I find that a few villages are entered at the same sums in both, others are estimated more highly by Colonel Low than by General Fraser; for instance,

	Rs.
The first on Colonel Low's list is Pergunnah Akola, which he estimated at	1,24,944
And General Fraser at .....	82,492
Difference.	42,000

(Signed) *C. Allen*,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Fort William, 31st May 1853.

No. 92 of 1853.—Foreign Department.

From Colonel *J. Low*, c.b., Resident at Hyderabad, to *C. Allen*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Fort William.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 2491, of the 6th instant, along with two versions of the Treaty lately concluded with His Highness the Nizam, both of them duly ratified by the Government of India.

2. Both of the Treaties were yesterday signed and sealed by His Highness the Nizam, in open durbar, and the Schedules attached to them were signed by His Highness at the same time, after they had been filled up (as will be observed) by His Highness's orders, and at my request, with the names of a sufficient number of villages in Southern Berar above the Ghats to make up for some deficiencies found to exist in the western districts after the original Treaty was signed, in consequence of there being more extensive "Surf-i-Khass" lands in that quarter than the late Minister, Suraj-pool-Moolk, was aware of.

3. I shall address you separately and more fully in reply to your despatch

No. 2492, to explain the apparent, but not real, discrepancy between the estimates made by General Fraser and myself of the value of certain districts ; but in the mean time I beg to state that the chief cause of its having appeared at first sight to you that either General Fraser must have under-estimated the value of those districts or that I must have over-valued them is this, that he excluded from the lands he intended to take possession of a number of Tunkha Jagheers and Zat Jagheers, all the former of which, and some of the latter, I insisted upon being included in the lands now to be made over to our management.

4. I suppose that General Fraser excluded those Jagheers partly to please the Minister, and partly because the General then expected that the whole of the districts would only remain a short time in our hands ; but as I knew that those districts are to be permanently in our hands I thought it necessary that those Tunkha Jagheers should at once come under our own exclusive management in every respect, because we have no use for the quotas of troops for the support of which those Tunkha lands were granted. Those lands, and the Zat Jagheers also, are upon a totally different footing from the Surf-i-Khass Jagheers, which are Crown lands ; and the late Suraj-ool-Moolk at once admitted the reasonableness of my demand that the Tunkha Jagheers should be given up to the Resident by the Treaty : on this part of the subject I have only for the present to add that the following is an abstract of a very carefully estimated present value of the districts which have actually been assigned to us, viz. :

	Ra.
Valley of Berar ...	30,60,309
Balaghat ditto ...	5,48,601
Western districts	2,29,588
Raichore districts	11,51,342
	49,89,940
Deduct Surf i-Khass	9,07,533
	40,82,307

5. His Highness the Nizam having intimated to me that he did not wish any business to be discussed yesterday, and that he intended the meeting to be a public one, merely for the purpose of signing and exchanging the treaties, I asked him if he had any objection to my bringing some gentlemen from Secunderabad and Bolarum along with me on the occasion ; in reply to which His Highness apprised me that he should be happy to see any number of gentlemen not exceeding 30 who might wish to attend.

6. The durbar was accordingly an unusually full one, as I was accompanied (in consequence of the above-mentioned permission from His Highness) by Brigadier Bell, commanding the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, and his staff, and several officers of the Contingent, and some other gentlemen, so that the whole number of Europeans present, including myself, amounted to 24 persons.

7. The Nizam so far forgot his own request, that no matter of business should be thought of except exchanging the treaties, that he announced to me his intention of immediately making his Minister write to me officially to urge a decided claim upon the British Government for the profits of the Abkarry Revenue of Secunderabad ; but with that single exception, which did not occupy two minutes, his conversation had no reference whatever to any matters of business between the two States.

8. His Highness was, however, in particularly good spirits. He expressed himself as being much gratified with the tenor of the Governor-General's Khureeta, which was read aloud in the open durbar ; he was unusually particular and polite in returning the salutations of the gentlemen whom I presented to him ; and he was good-humoured and even facetious in many of his remarks during the ten or twelve minutes that were occupied in fetching his great seal from the interior of the palace, and in allowing the impression of it on the Treaty to dry fully on that version of it which he subsequently delivered to me, and which I have herewith the honour to forward, along with the Schedule, for custody in your office.

9. I beg to add that His Highness the Nizam particularly requested that the first Treaty on which his seal was affixed, and which was sent to you in my

despatch of the 21st ultimo, should now be returned to him. His Highness seemed to dislike the idea of there being two treaties left in Calcutta with his seal on them : although he is, of course, quite aware that both of those documents contain exactly the same words.

10. Before closing this despatch, I beg leave on the part of Major Davidson as well as on my own part to express our heartfelt gratification at finding that our late exertions at this durbar have been honoured with such marked approbation by the Government of India as is conveyed in your despatch now under reply, an honour which we trust will prove a powerful incentive to us both to use our utmost endeavours at all times to merit a continuance of the very favourable opinion of us which has thus been recorded by the high and respected authority of the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad, 19th June 1853.

No. 120 of 1853.—Foreign Department.

From Colonel *J. Low*, c.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to *J. P. Grant*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Fort William.

SIR,—I have the honour to report, for the information of the Government of India, that the districts transferred to British management by His Highness the Nizam, in accordance with the provisions of the late Treaty, have now been all completely taken possession of by the Deputy Commissioners appointed for that purpose, and this without the slightest disturbance of the public peace.

2. At eight or ten different places the native local authorities demurred and objected to obey our first demands on them to make the required transfers to our rule : some alleging that the orders they had received from the Durbar were not sufficiently explicit ; and others alleging that the soldiery in garrison (especially at some small forts and walled villages) refused to move out until their arrears of pay should be settled ; but, partly by my urging the Durbar here to issue more positive orders on the subject, and still more so by the patience and firmness of the Deputy Commissioners themselves, all those difficulties have been finally overcome, and we have now the great satisfaction of knowing that all the territory which we require is actually in our possession, and the inhabitants thereof quietly pursuing their occupations under our rule, without one sword having been drawn in earnest, or a single shot being fired on either side.

3. In fact, we have now obtained more territory than we require ; and I herewith enclose correspondence, as noted in the margin, showing that the Nizam earnestly urges a claim, which I conceive to be a just one, to have lands, yielding upwards of three lacs of rupees per annum, immediately returned to him.

4. On the last-mentioned subject I beg leave to submit the following general explanation : it will be remembered that although I originally estimated the western districts to be worth nearly eight lacs of rupees of gross revenues, yet that I afterwards, as described in my despatch, No. 92, of the 19th June last, considered those western districts to be about the value of only 2,29,588 rupees, "in consequence of there being more extensive Surf-i-Khass lands in that quarter than the late Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, was aware of."

5. It will also be in the recollection of Government that, adverting to the said supposed deficiency in the western districts, I demanded that certain new districts in Balaghat Berar should be made over to us ; and that such lands were accordingly entered in the Schedule attached to the final Treaty, valued at 5,48,601 rupees, and I have now to report the fact that those lands in Balaghat Berar are actually in our possession.

6. But it has lately been positively proved, by Captain Taylor, the Deputy Commissioner, having obtained actual possession of them, that the late Suraj-ool-Moolk's estimate of the value of the western districts was a remarkably correct one ; and my belief (as reported in my despatch No. 92) that they were only worth

2,29,588 rupees, was caused indirectly by some attempts to impose upon us, before the Treaty was finally signed, on the part of Lalla Bahadoor and other Dufturdars, who declared to Major Davidson that such and such villages did not belong to such and such talooks to the westward; and as the late Minister, who agreed to the transfer of certain talooks, had in the interim died, and as Salar Jung, who was quite new to office, did not know that the assertions of those Dufturdars were falsehoods at the time when the Treaty was ratified and returned from Calcutta for final signature, I had no choice left but to claim and obtain lands in Balaghat Berar in lieu of those other villages said to be outside of our bounds, but which are now proved, beyond all doubt, to be within those bounds, and they have accordingly been actually given up to Captain Taylor, and he consequently has now several lacs more of lands in his western districts than I supposed to be allotted to him when I wrote my despatch, No. 92, dated the 19th of June last.

7. This was not the fault of either the Nizam or his present Minister, but the fault entirely of some inferior officers; but, cunning although they are in many things, they did not perceive (or perhaps they were not aware of the fact) that one sentence which I had introduced, with the consent of the Minister, into the Schedule, the day before Major Davidson originally went to his office in the city, was sure to save us from any ultimate loss that might at first appear to be caused by falsehoods of that description—I mean the sentence which declares that all villages not Surf-i-Khass within certain great rivers and named points on the banks of those rivers are to be under our management, and which could not fail to enable us in the end to secure for ourselves all the villages found to be within those well-defined boundaries, although they might be in the first instance falsely declared not to belong to the talooks to which they did really belong; for when our agents are on the ground there is no mistaking whether any named village is to the east or the west of a river; that is perfectly well known to all the inhabitants of the country through which it runs. And thus the attempt to impose upon us, on the part of Lalla Bahadoor and others, has proved to be an entire failure.

8. As I said before, however, the unworthy proceedings above alluded to were not authorized by, or even known to, either the Nizam or his late Minister, who both (after His Highness consented to sign the Treaty) behaved with perfectly good faith in the matter, and the present Minister is pursuing an equally honourable course.

9. Adverting, then, to the several facts and circumstances above described, I consider that it would be not only proper, but just, to comply with His Highness the Nizam's request as comprised in the accompanying correspondence noted in the margin, viz., that districts of the value of Rs. 3,13,309 in Berar should be at once retransferred to the Hyderabad Government.

10. I am especially of this opinion because I have found that His Highness the Nizam and his present Minister, Salar Jung Bahadoor, throughout all my negotiations regarding the transfer of territory, have acted up to the spirit of the Treaty with the utmost honesty and good faith and friendly feeling; and the retransfer could just now be more easily effected, before we have begun to collect the revenue of any of the Berar talooks, than afterwards. And I would also beg to suggest that it should be made from the Balaghat districts, agreeably to the estimates of the value of those talooks, as furnished by the present Minister.

11. If this request on the part of the Nizam be complied with, as I trust will be the case, the district of Southern Berar, under Major Johnston, will be extended more to the northward; and Captain Bullock's Northern Division will be proportionally reduced in size, which last measure will be very convenient, as that Division is at present too extensive (which has already been represented by Captain Bullock), unless more than three European officers were appointed to it.

12. In further explanation of my having reported<sup>a</sup> that the western districts were only of the value of 2,29,558 rupees, I beg to state that it was a correct estimate of those talooks, as so denominated in some of the Hyderabad dufturs (records), but I discovered after Captain Taylor had obtained possession that the Dufturwallahs

<sup>a</sup> Report, dated 19th June 1853, No. 92.

had subdivided the ancient Circars of Perainda, Nuldroog, &c., which were those mentioned by me in the Schedule of the Treaty, into an infinity of small Talooks, which were held by Tunkha Jagheerdars and their own dependants, in lieu of their "Tukreer," or commission, as collectors of revenue, and which, therefore, they were desirous should not be transferred to British management.

13. If I had acceded to the views of the Hyderabad Duffturwallahs, and not required those Talooks to be given up to our management, all the inconveniences and disputes arising from ill-defined frontiers, which formerly caused so much trouble, might have been in a great measure perpetuated, and it was my earnest object to provide for the future against all such inconvenience.

14. I therefore directed Captain Taylor, Deputy Commissioner, to consider more the districts within the actual boundaries mentioned in the Schedule of the Treaty than to enter into any particulars about the names of the districts to which petty talooks belonged. That officer, having carried out these instructions, has sent me detailed accounts, from which it appears the revenues of the western districts, after providing for certain personal Jagheers, excepted at the request of His Highness, are very nearly what the late Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, estimated them at,\* namely, about eight lacs of rupees of gross revenue, or 6,80,000 Hyderabad rupees after providing for village expenses.

15. Along with this despatch I have the honour to forward an account showing the revenues of all the transferred districts as they now stand, agreeably to the estimates of the Deputy Commissioners, and the amount of disbursements chargeable on them, from which it will appear that after the retransfer of districts of the value of 3,13,309 rupees a permanent surplus revenue amounting to 2,49,867 rupees will still remain to meet the temporary expenses which it may be necessary to provide for until the proposed revision of the Contingent shall be fully completed, and also any future contingencies at present unknown.

16. In further elucidation of the preceding paragraph, I beg to explain that a maximum of 4,51,721 Hyderabad rupees has been assumed as the amount required to meet certain temporary charges which will in about two or three years be altogether absorbed, when the revision of the Hyderabad Auxiliary Contingent† shall have been completely carried out. In the mean time the present temporary deficiency will amount to 1,26,432 Hyderabad rupees annually, to be set against a permanent surplus of 2,49,867 Hyderabad rupees.

17. I am more anxious to comply with His Highness the Nizam's request as it will, to a certain extent, relieve his present great financial embarrassments, and enable him to pay some of his own immediate public establishments, without which it is in vain to expect anything like a good administration of the Native Government, and as I do not apprehend that the amount of revenue collected from the districts transferred to British management will at all fall short of the present estimates, but, on the contrary, I feel confident that in a very few years it will be largely in excess of those estimates.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. Low*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 2nd September 1853.

* Captain Taylor's Estimate :		Rs.	a.	p.
Gross Revenue .....		11,52,572	11	3
Deduct Surf-i-Khas Districts .....	Rs. 3,63,496 0 6			
Jagheers .....	„ 1,02,591 14 0			
		4,66,088	14	6
		Rs. 6,86,483	12	9
† Prospective saving in the expenses of the Contingent .....		Rs. 4,51,721		
Proposed re-transfer to the Nizam's Government .....		3,13,309		
	Total.....Rs.	7,65,030		
Deduct, Surplus Net Revenue:.....		6,38,598		
	Deficiency.....Rs.	1,26,432		

**TRANSLATION of a Note from the Minister to the Resident, No. 882,  
dated 16th June 1853 (8th Ramzan 1269).**

With reference to the deficiency in the estimated amount of revenue of the western districts alluded to in the Treaty, which has been found on examination of the Duftur accounts to amount to 4,58,000 rupees, and to the necessity of deducting the value of certain Surf-i-Khas villages, which have been inadvertently included in the Schedule of the Treaty, amounting to 89,600 rupees, I beg to state that I have obtained His Highness the Nizam's permission to make over districts to the value of 5,47,600 rupees, as per separate list, to make up the deficiency, and in lieu of the Surf-i-Khas villages. I have therefore to request that you will be so good as to include the names of these villages in the Schedule, and exclude the Pergunnahs of Budrara, Pooljee, &c., and the Pergunnah of Bhoorn, the Jagheer of Rajah Arjoon Bahadoor.

From the Minister to the Resident No. 35, dated 7th August 1853  
(1st Zilcaid 1269).

In my Note of the 28th Shawal I transmitted Ahkams for delivering over districts to the Deputy Commissioners, and you will have observed from the list which accompanied it that the estimates of the districts for which Ahkams were sent amounted to 2,99,601 rupees ; thus districts for the value of 3,13,309 rupees have been made over in excess, as you will perceive by the accompanying list ; besides which, the villages of the talooks of Beer, Amba, and Dharoor, &c., and other talooks, the names of which are not known, are also included, and their value will be learned as soon as detailed information regarding them is received.

I beg to request, in conformity with the orders of His Highness the Nizam, that, for the present, districts in lieu of the excess may be given from the talooks in Berar, and that orders may be sent accordingly to the Commissioners in those districts.

With respect to the villages of Beer, Amba, &c., above alluded to, their value is not yet known ; when a report regarding them is received from the Deputy Commissioners, and their amount of revenue is ascertained, of course the Nizam's Government will make an application for villages in lieu of them.

**LIST OF DISTRICTS.**

Value of Districts agreeably to the Schedule attached to the original Treaty, viz. :	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
Districts in Pain Ghaut, Berar .....	30,60,309	0	0			
Ditto in Doab Raichore, &c.....	11,51,342	0	0			
Western Districts, the value of which was not specified in the Schedule .....	2,29,588	0	0			
Villages in the Berar District adjoining Jumkhair in the Company's Territory .....	13,181	0	0	41,54,420	0	0
Districts in Balaghat Berar, agreeably to List forwarded with Letter No. 876, dated 7th Ramzan 1269, subsequently (15th June 1853) added to Schedule .....	5,48,601	0	0			
Districts on the western frontier, agreeably to List forwarded with Letter No. 30, dated 28th Shawal 1269 (4th August 1853)...	2,99,601	0	0	8,48,202	0	0
<b>Deduct :</b>				53,02,622	0	0
Surf-i-Khas Districts, namely, agreeably to Schedule as first drawn up :						
In Pain Ghaut.....Rs. 4,91,802						
Doab Raichore....." 59,063						
	5,50,865					
In Balaghat, by List subsequently added to the Schedule.....	48,568					
	5,99,433	0	0			
Suraj-ool-Moolk's Districts in Pain Ghaut.....	2,67,000	0	0			
The District of Bhom, belonging to Rajah Arjun Bahadoor.....	43,000	0	0	9,07,433	0	0
<b>Balance.....</b>				43,95,189	0	0
Pay to the Contingent.....	36,00,000	0	0			
Interest of Debt .....	3,00,000	0	0			
Appah Dessaye's Stipend.....	1,20,000	0	0			
Mohiput Ram's Allowance.....	5,610	0	0			
Mahratta Salianadars .....	56,270	0	0	40,81,881	0	0
<b>Surplus Districts to the Value of Rupees.....</b>				3,13,309	0	0

(True translation.)

(Signed) A. W. Thornhill, Second Assistant.

# ESTIMATED REVENUE and DISBURSEMENTS of the Districts transferred by the Treaty of 1853 to the Management of the British Resident at Hyderabad.

Estimated value of the Revenues of Northern Berar, agreeably to Captain Bullock, Deputy Commissioner of that District ...	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Disbursements on account of Establishments, agreeably to the Estimates furnished by Captain Bullock, Deputy Commissioner, Northern Berar ...	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Estimated value of the Revenues of Southern Berar, agreeably to Major Johnston, Deputy Commissioner of that District ...	19,87,971 0 0	0 0	Disbursements on account of Establishments, agreeably to the Estimates furnished by Major Johnston, Deputy Commissioner, Southern Berar ...	2,23,548 0 0	0 0
Estimated value of the Revenues of the Eastern Division, Raichore Doab, agreeably to Major Hampton, Deputy Commissioner of that District ...	8,00,000 0 0	0 0	Disbursements on account of Establishments, agreeably to the Estimates furnished by Major Hampton, Deputy Commissioner, Eastern Division, Raichore Doab ...	86,688 0 0	0 0
Estimated value of the Revenues of the Western Raichore Doab, agreeably to Captain Balmain, Deputy Commissioner of that District ...	5,20,357 0 0	0 0	Disbursements on account of Establishments, agreeably to the Estimates furnished by Captain Balmain, Deputy Commissioner, Western Division, Raichore Doab ...	63,936 0 0	0 0
Estimated value of the Revenue of the Western Districts, agreeably to Captain Taylor, Deputy Commissioner of that District ...	5,53,600 0 0	0 0	Disbursements on account of Establishments, agreeably to the Estimates furnished by Captain Taylor, Deputy Commissioner, Western Districts ...	64,848 0 0	0 0
	6,80,000 0 0	0 0	Resident's Office, Civil Department, inclusive of Second Assistant's Salary, Stationery, &c. ...	69,384 0 0	0 0
			Civil Disbursements, hitherto made in the Military Secretary's Department, and paid at the request of His Highness the Nizam's Government ...	17,160 0 0	0 0
			Dacoitee and Thuggee Department ...	26,772 0 0	0 0
			Estimate of probable Disbursements on account of Miscellaneous Civil Charges, which may require to be debited hereafter ...	7,980 0 0	0 0
			Interest of Debt of Rs. 49,76,132-3-8, at 6 per cent. per annum ...	50,000 0 0	*6,10,386 0 0
			Appah Desaiya's Choute ...	2,98,568 0 0	0 0
			Mohput Ram's Family ...	1,20,000 0 0	0 0
			Salianadars ...	5,610 0 0	0 0
			Military Disbursements of the Revised Hyderabad Contingent, after all reductions are effected ...	56,270 0 0	0 0
				28,43,616 0 0	0 0
Grand Total...	45,72,978 0 0	0 0	Total Charges ...	33,24,064 0 0	0 0
			Surplus or Net Revenue ...	39,34,380 0 0	0 0
			Grand Total...	6,38,598 0 0	0 0
				45,72,978 0 0	0 0

\* Being at the rate of Rs. 13 5-6 per cent. upon the Revenue for Civil Charges.

## MEMORANDUM.

Present Annual Disbursement on account of the Hyderabad Contingent According to the proposed Revision .....	Hyd. Rs. 39,20,847 0 0 28,41,204 0 0	
Personal Disbursements .....		
From which deduct Amount of immediate Saving .....	Eventual Saving.....	
From which deduct Amount of prospective Saving .....		
Agreeably to proposed Establishments .....		
Hyderabad Residency, 2nd September 1853.		

(Signed) J. Low, Resident.



## MINUTE BY THE MOST NOBLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

1. The Resident at Hyderabad now reports the gratifying intelligence that the whole of the districts made over by the Nizam in the Treaty recently signed have been taken possession of by the Deputy Commissioner, on the part of the British Government, without a single shot being fired on either side, or a sword drawn in anger.

Having regard to the condition of many of these districts, and to the character of the Talookdars and the soldiery by whom they have been held until now, the peaceful transfer of them is a fact which does credit to all parties.

The satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council should be expressed to the Officiating Resident, with a view to its being communicated to the District Officers.

2. The Resident brings to notice that we have now obtained more territory than we need to meet the expenses which the revenues of the Assigned Districts were intended to defray ; and he reports an official application from the Nizam for the restoration to His Highness of districts whose revenues amount to the surplus which is apparent, viz. Rs. 3,13,000.

The Resident advises compliance with the application, on the grounds not of expediency only, but also of justice.

3. The occurrence of the surplus is explained by an attempted trick on the part of the subordinates to curtail the assignment, the result of which has been that too much was taken from excess of precaution. The Resident wholly acquits the Nizam and his Minister of any complicity in this trick.

4. The question for decision is whether the districts asked for, to the extent of Rs. 3,13,000, shall be restored or not.

I am of opinion that they should be restored.

5. The Resident shows that according to his calculations there will be a deficiency, if the districts be restored, of Rs. 1,26,000 for two or three years, and a surplus of Rs. 2,46,000 annually thereafter.

6. It is true that the districts possibly may not produce the revenue estimated. It is probable, too, that the expense of management will be higher than the present first estimate, as is usually the case.

But to prevent this, vigilance must be exercised in keeping down the cost of establishments ; and I do not think the revenues will fall short of the estimate. On the contrary, I think they will increase as the districts improve, and will more than meet any charges of increased establishments.

7. Entertaining this belief, I think we should be quite safe in restoring the districts.

8. Furthermore, I think the Government of India would lay itself open to just strictures if it refused to restore them, now that they are proved to be superfluous.

By assigning certain districts the Nizam has seriously diminished his own available resources. His troops and his creditors will be more difficult to satisfy than before. Those creditors are not confined to the gates of his palace ; we have lately seen them, in the case of the house of Pestonjee, suing for remedy at the hands of the Imperial Parliament. But these creditors, and others, and the Nizam himself, may justly complain if we withhold from His Highness any of the means for meeting their claims which ought to be at his command, since they are proved to be superfluous to us, being in excess of the amount of revenue which we required as satisfaction of all our demands, and which being given ought to preclude our retaining a rupee more.

9. To these arguments I think there is no honest answer.

I would therefore return to His Highness districts from Berar, of the number of those added subsequently to the schedule, and to the amount of Rs. 3,13,000. The restoration, however, should probably be made to appear upon the face of the schedule, to obviate the possibility of future confusion.

10. Letters received from Colonel Low lead me to look for his arrival from

Masulipatam every hour. He will be best able to suggest the precise directions which should be given the Officiating Resident for recording this restoration.

11. The Officiating Resident should be requested, when this has been done, to cause a map to be prepared showing on a correct scale the districts transferred, and the limits of the several Deputy Commissionerships.

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*

20th September 1853.

There appears to me to be no doubt on this subject. The territory yielding the surplus revenue could not with justice be retained.

Colonel Low is now in the river.

(Signed) *J. Lowis.*

21st September 1853.

In justice and honesty we must give back the districts that were inadvertently taken in excess of the territory requisite to secure us against loss.

(Signed) *J. Dorin.*

22nd September 1853.

MINUTE by the Honourable Colonel *J. Low*, C.B.

MEMORANDUM.

With reference to the 10th paragraph of the Governor-General's Minute, dated the 20th instant, now copied in the margin, I would suggest that Major Davidson, the Officiating Resident, should merely be instructed to make over to His Highness the Nizam, as soon as possible, districts in the Balaghat Berar, of an estimated value not exceeding three lacs thirteen thousand three hundred and nine (3,13,309) rupees per annum, leaving it to Major Davidson to select the particular laras which can most conveniently for our own general purposes be given back to His Highness's Government.\*

The preparation of maps, as mentioned by His Lordship, will be a highly useful measure, and the sooner this can be done the better; and in order that the alteration now required in the schedule may be a final one, I would suggest that no change in the present schedule should be made till the maps in question shall have been submitted to Government.

(Signed) *J. Low.*

28th September 1853.

MINUTE by the Most Noble the Governor-General.

The Resident at Hyderabad should be directed to restore districts to the Nizam Hyderabad Assigned to the extent of Rs. 3,13,009 in the mode suggested by Districts. Colonel Low, and to prepare the Maps.

When this has been done, the lists may be finally adjusted. Perhaps the best plan will be to leave the schedules as they are, and to add to it a list of the districts subsequently restored, which may be signed by the Nizam.

1st October 1853.

(Signed) *Dalhousie.*

3rd October 1853.

*J. Lowis.*

6th October 1853.

*J. Dorin.*

6th October 1853.

*J. Low.*

\* Of course the first part of the letter to the Officiating Resident will explain the reasons why the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council had readily complied with the request of the Nizam in this matter.—(Signed) *J. Low.*

## No. 4409.—Foreign Department.

From *J. P. Grant*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India,  
to Major *C. Davidson*, Officiating Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Colonel Low's letter No. 120, dated the 2nd ultimo, reporting that the districts transferred to British management by His Highness the Nizam, in accordance with the provisions of the recent treaty, have been peaceably taken possession of by the Deputy Commissioners appointed for that purpose.

2. In reply I am directed to say that, having regard to the condition of many of these districts, and to the character of the talookdars and the soldiery by whom they have been held until now, the peaceful transfer of them is a fact which, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, does credit to all parties. I am therefore desirous to express to you the satisfaction with which the Governor-General in Council has received this intelligence, and to request that you will communicate the same to the District Officers.

3. It is brought to the notice of His Lordship in Council that we have now obtained more territory than we need to meet the expenses which the revenues of the Assigned Districts were intended to defray, and that on this ground the Nizam has made an official application for the restoration to His Highness of districts whose revenues amount to the surplus which is apparent, viz., Rs. 3,13,309. A compliance with this application is recommended in the letter under acknowledgment, on the grounds not of expediency only, but also of justice.

4. The occurrence of the surplus is explained by an attempted trick on the part of the subordinates of the Nizam's Government to curtail the assignment, the result of which has been that too much was taken from excess of precaution. Colonel Low has wholly acquitted the Nizam and his Minister of any complicity in this trick.

5. The question for decision is whether the districts asked for, to the extent of Rs. 3,13,309, shall be restored or not. His Lordship in Council is of opinion that they should be restored.

6. Colonel Low has shown that, according to his calculations, there will be a deficiency if the districts be restored of Rs. 1,26,432 for two or three years, and a surplus of Rs. 2,49,867 annually thereafter.

7. It is true, His Lordship in Council observes, that the districts possibly may not produce the revenue estimated. It is probable, too, that the expense of management will be higher than the present first estimate, as is usually the case. But, to prevent this, vigilance must be exercised in keeping down the cost of establishments, and His Lordship in Council does not think the revenues will fall short of the estimates. On the contrary, he is of opinion that they will increase as the districts improve, and will more than meet any charge for increased establishment.

8. Entertaining this belief, His Lordship in Council directs me to convey to you his authority to make over to His Highness, as soon as possible, districts in the Balaghat Berar of an estimated value not exceeding Rs. 3,13,309 per annum.

9. His Lordship in Council leaves it to you to select the particular lands which can most conveniently, for our own general purposes, be given back to His Highness's Government.

10. When this has been done, it is requested that you will cause a map to be prepared showing on a correct scale the districts transferred, and the limits of the several Deputy Commissionerships, and that you will cause the schedules of the districts to be finally adjusted. Perhaps it may be the best plan to leave the schedules as they are, and to add to them a list of districts subsequently restored, which may be signed by the Nizam.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *J. P. Grant*,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Fort William, 18th October 1853.

No. 161 (A.) of 1853.

From Major C. Davidson, Officiating Resident at Hyderabad, to J. P. Grant, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William.

SIR,—I have the honour to report, for the information of the Government of India, that this morning I had an interview with the Nizam, when I submitted and obtained His Highness's signature "Ilhaq" to the enclosed document, by which the talooks, of the value of Rs. 3,13,183 in Balaghat Berar, therein mentioned, in conformity with the instructions contained in your letter\* (No. 4409) under date the 18th October last, were restored to His Highness's immediate authority.

2. After the above-mentioned document had been read in durbar, and the Nizam's signature attached, which occupied about ten minutes, I informed His Highness that Mr. Bushby, the Resident, who had been appointed to his Court by the Governor-General, was expected to arrive on Monday, the 28th instant, and that it was not probable I should have again to wait on His Highness as Officiating Resident on the part of the British Government. The Nizam bowed courteously, and requested to know at what Court Mr. Bushby had been lately Resident. I informed him that of Scindiah, and that he had formerly been an Assistant at Hyderabad, under Sir Charles Metcalfe. His Highness observed, "The Deccan is a warmer climate than that of Hindustan," and then ordered pân, when I took my leave.

3. I have issued the necessary instructions to Major Johnston to deliver over to Syud Saad-ood-deen, the officer appointed by the Hyderabad Government to receive charge of them, the talooks mentioned in the accompanying list, and shall hereafter, when transmitting the map required in your letter above referred to report what readjustment of Major Johnston and Captain Bullock's respective charges have been made.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) C. Davidson, Officiating Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, 22nd November 1853.

List of Pergunnahs, Cusbahs, and Mouzahs in Balaghat Berar agreeably to their estimated Value in Schedule (A.) of a Treaty between the Honourable the East India Company and His Highness the Nizam, ratified on the 18th June 1853, which have been restored to His Highness the Nizam's immediate authority, in accordance with instructions conveyed in a despatch from the Government of India, No. 4409, dated the 18th October 1853.

	Rs.		Rs.
Pergunnah Omerkhair ....	89,208	Villages, Pergunnah Kurrar .....	6,656
Do. Kullomnooree ..	38,770	Villages, Talooka Kurrar .....	6,000
Do. Nandaroor ....	26,600	Mouzah Salapoor, Pergunnah Patroe .....	14,000
Do. Sewalah .....	24,515	Do. Koorurgaon .....	5,000
Do. Oundah .....	20,197	Do. Untolee and other Villages of	
Do. Tamsah .....	15,054	Pergunnah Chintore .....	4,895
Do. Munnatah .....	8,171	Do. Chickultana, Pergunnah Chartana .....	829
Do. Chicho'e .....	12,722	Do. Uroolee, and other Villages,	
Do. Mahagaon .....	11,370	Pergunnah Kooroor .....	5,142
Do. Patchlagaon .....	8,470	Do. Moongla, Pergunnah Sirpoor .....	1,286
Mouza Dhar	8,012	Do. Chandoor, Pergunnah Sirpoor ...	438
Do. Leh, &c. ....	1,867		
Cusbah Seogaon ..	1,731		
Pergunnah Kurrar	2,250		
		Total.....Rs.	3,13,183

(Signed) C. Davidson, Officiating Resident.

Dated at Hyderabad, 22nd November 1853 (20th Suffer 1270).

[Note.—A copy of the original document, written in Persian, is deposited, for purposes of reference, in the Library of the House of Commons.]

(True Copies.)

(Signed) T. L. Peacock,

Examiner of India Correspondence.

\* Para. 8 conveys the authority of the Governor General in Council to make over to His Highness, as soon as possible, districts in the Balaghat Berar of an estimated value not exceeding Rs. 3,13,309 per annum.

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated 20th August 1867, for "copies of any correspondence that may have passed since the year 1865 between the Nizam's Government and the Indian Government on the subject of the Cession of Berar :"

"And of the Political Section of the Administration Reports for 1861 and 1862, made by Colonel Davidson, Resident at Hyderabad."

*J. R. Melville,*

Assistant Secretary, Political Department.

India Office, 27th November 1867.

(Foreign Department.—Political—No. 30.)

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Right Honourable Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for India.

Fort William, 14th February 1867.

My Lord,—We have the honour to forward, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, the accompanying copy of papers relative to a proposition by which His Highness the Nizam desired to obtain restoration of those districts in Berar which are at present held by the British Government in trust for the payment of the Hyderabad Contingent, and the other charges specified in Article 6 of the Treaty of 1860.

2. The Hyderabad Durbar endeavoured to show that, on three separate accounts, the British Government had incurred, or was about to incur, debts to the Nizam amounting in all to 60 lakhs of rupees per annum. These debts the Nizam declared himself willing to forego provided the British Government would give him back Berar.

3. We found, after careful inquiry, that the alleged debts had no existence ; and, as the essence of the arrangement by which the British Government has undertaken to be responsible for the payment of the charges in question is the retention in our hands of a permanent source of income adequate to the demand, we caused the Durbar to be informed that we could see no opening for any modification of the present assignment of Berar.

4. The most important feature in this correspondence is a claim which the Nizam has set up to share equally with the British Government in the expected lapse of the Mysore State. For the grounds on which we have disallowed this claim we beg to refer your Lordship to our despatches No. 66, dated 31st August 1864. No. 46, dated 5th May 1865. See Parliamentary Paper No. 112 of 1866. noted on the margin, and to our Officiating Secretary's letter to the Resident at Hyderabad, forming one of the enclosures of this despatch.

5. In our former communications we have had occasion to examine and disprove the Maharaja of Mysore's assertion that his tenure of that State is one of perpetual and indestructible sovereignty. We beg to point out that the pretensions to reversionary rights in Mysore which the Nizam has now advanced are fundamentally irreconcilable with the Maharaja's argument, and that, consequently, the advocates of either theory have no option but to disallow the other.

6. Your Lordship will observe that the Nizam does not ask for the maintenance of a "separate Government" in Mysore, under Article 4 of the Partition Treaty of 1799. On the contrary, His Highness so entirely approves of the annexation of the State that he does not hesitate to speak freely of the Maharaja's death, and offers to barter his imaginary claims to a share in the lapse for the immediate practical advantage of recovering Berar. If there is any obloquy to be incurred by the appropriation of Mysore the Nizam obviously does not shrink from bearing his part of it. His Highness, as is natural, looks only to his own interests in the matter ; but, even according to this rule, we believe that the indifference with which he contemplates a measure said to be unpopular in India is shared by the other Native States. Ever since Lord Canning specially excluded the Maharaja of Mysore from the general privilege of a right to adopt, the chiefs of India have all known that the continuation of that dynasty was doubtful, and

they have all felt that its fate would in no degree compromise the perpetuation of their own houses.

7. We shall take advantage, however, of this opportunity to offer some remarks upon the term "separate government." The word for "separate" in the Persian copy of the treaty is simply "alahidah,"—"apart" or "distinct"—which conveys no meaning of independence. How little force was attached to the word by the framers of the treaty may be judged from the circumstance that in the fifth Article, although the English version includes the term "separate," the corresponding word is absent from the Persian copy, in which the "separate government of Mysore" is translated simply "riyasat i mulk Mysore,"—the government of the country of Mysore.

8. Both the fourth and the fifth Articles make the establishment of the kingdom of Mysore dependent on conditions to be subsequently laid down. Those conditions, defined by Article 9, comprise the maintenance of a British force under the terms of the separate treaty between the British Government and the Maharaja. The effect, therefore, of these three Articles is to erect the provisions of the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam into the conditions on which the "separate" government of Mysore was to be established. But the provisions of that treaty in themselves, even without the light of Lord Mornington's authoritative explanations, are manifestly incompatible with the existence of an independent government. The result is that the word "separate," whatever else it may have meant, could never have been intended to mean isolated from the British power. We hold that it must have been used to denote merely such a setting aside of one portion of the conquered territory as would admit of a ready distribution of the remainder among the allied conquerors.

9. Another point which may also be here noticed is the phrase at the close of the preambles of both the treaties, to the effect that the engagement shall be binding "as long as the sun and moon shall endure." The wording of the original Persian is "ta aiam-i-quaiam Shams o Kamar," literally, to the times of the enduring of the sun and of the moon. The Government Persian Officer at the time the treaty was written affected a quasi-rhythmical style of diction, much admired by Oriental scholars, and this may have had something to do with the selection of this particular conjunction of sounds. But, be this as it may, the phrase is certainly nothing more than a rather poetical form of a hyperbolic expression, common enough in all Eastern languages, signifying long endurance quite as often as perpetuity, and placed where it stands, in the preambles of the treaties, it can hardly be held to import more than the promise of "perpetual amity and friendship," to be found in the same position in many European treaties; nor is it as solemn as the invocations by which those promises are frequently confirmed. In any case the words cannot be held of sufficient force to override any conditions in the several Articles of the Treaty which are positively inconsistent with perpetuity. Such conditions, we maintain, do exist in both treaties. For Lord Mornington reserved to himself "an unlimited right of assuming the direct management of the country," and that right, whenever it might be put in force, would necessarily put a period to the existence of the Mysore State. In fact, the treaties of 1799, so far from guaranteeing perpetuity of existence to the Raj of Mysore, contain specific provision for the contingency in which its extinction might become desirable. The contingency was remote, but it did at last arrive, notwithstanding the honest and assiduous efforts of the British Government to stave it off.

10. In the same view we desire to invite your Lordship's attention to the marked difference that exists between the terms of the two very similar arrangements by which the Maharaja of Mysore in 1799 and the Raja of Satara in 1819 were, at the expense of dynasties which had in former times usurped their power, each respectively created by the British Government head of a separate state. In the Satara treaty the engagement is throughout for the Raja, "his heirs and successors." In the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam the Maharaja of Mysore alone is mentioned, and the treaty is clearly a personal treaty of no effect beyond the single life of the Maharaja.

11. The question of a native ruler's right to adopt a successor has not much bearing on the case of Mysore ; but we may mention that we intend to lay our views on the subject before your Lordship in a separate despatch.—We have, &c.,

(Signed) *John Lawrence.*  
*W. R. Mansfield.*  
*H. S. Maine.*  
*W. Grey.*  
*G. N. Taylor.*  
*W. N. Massey.*  
*H. M. Durand.*

From Sir *George Yule*, C.B. K.C.S.I., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William (No. 18) ; dated 14th November 1866.

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter of the 27th October last, addressed to me by the minister of His Highness the Nizam, and which he desires me to submit for His Excellency the Governor-General's consideration.

2. The minister's object in this letter is the restoration of the assigned districts. He briefly reviews the treaties of 1853 and 1860, by which the districts in question were assigned to the British Government for the payment of the Contingent and other specified expenses, and he puts forth the non-payment of the surplus revenues of the said districts to His Highness, which the treaty provided should be paid, and his own want of funds to carry out improvements in His Highness's administration, as the reasons inducing him to propose restoration, provided satisfactory arrangements can be made for the payment of the Contingent and other treaty expenses. It is clear, then, the minister would not have made this proposal, however desirous he might be of the restoration, unless he was able to suggest an arrangement which he considered satisfactory, and if his arrangement fails, his proposal falls to the ground. I will, therefore, review his arrangement, before considering his reasons for desiring the restoration.

3. Briefly, then, he claims from the British Government :—

	Rs.
1st. Half the revenue of Mysore .....	41,50,000
2nd. Do. do. Goomsoor.....	1,50,000
3rd. The revenue of Kurnool, less the peshcush, or tribute.....	17,00,000
Total.....	Rs. 60,00,000

And he proposes to give up these claims in return for the restoration of the assigned districts.

4. With reference to the claim on Mysore, it is unnecessary for me to offer any observations, as the subject does not lie within the sphere of discussion proper to my office.

5. The claim to half the revenue of Goomsoor is based upon the fact that His Highness's troops (part of the Nizam's Contingent, as it was then called) took part in the conquest, and that consequently, by the 3rd of the separate and secret Articles of the treaty of 1800, the Nizam is entitled to one-half of the conquered territory ; but this seems to me a perverted application of the Article in question. The treaty to which it is attached was one of a general defensive alliance between the contracting parties, with a view to the effectual preservation of peace and tranquillity for the complete and reciprocal protection of their respective territories against the unprovoked aggressions or unjust encroachments of any enemies, and the Nizam bound himself, in case of war between either of the contracting parties and any other power, to assist at once with 12,000 infantry, 10,000 horse, and the requisite artillery, and subsequently to bring into the field the whole force which his dominions could supply. The 3rd Article itself provides, that only in case of unjust and unprovoked aggression, and after the failure of their joint endeavours to obtain satisfaction, shall the contracting parties proceed to hostilities. It is clear from the expressions I have quoted and from the whole tenour of the treaty,

that it was intended to provide and guard against external aggression by a power more or less dangerous to either party or to both. It was never intended to apply to the case of a small disturbed tract in British territory, in reducing which to order and subjection the Nizam, as a friend and for convenience sake, and not under the provisions of any treaty whatever, lent us the aid of a few troops.

6. As regards the Kurnool claim, the minister argues that, by the treaty of 1800, the peshcush, or tribute only of the Kurnool jagheer was ceded to us, and not the revenues of the jagheer itself, which remained the property of the Nawab of Kurnool, a feudatory of the Nizam, and on the Nawab being ousted the jagheer should have reverted to the Nizam, whose seigniorial rights were never ceded. He quotes also the 6th Article of the treaty which ceded Adoni, with whatever territory may be in the possession of, or dependent on, His Highness south of the Toombudrah, or south of the Kistnah, below its junction with the first mentioned river, and he says that this Article applied to His Highness's possessions at the time only, and not to any reversionary rights within the line mentioned.

7. The utter groundlessness of this claim is at once seen on referring to the Partition Treaty of Mysore, No. 9, of Aitchison's Hyderabad Treaties, and to the one following it, No. 10. In No. 9, Schedule B., is given the Nizam's share of the countries conquered from Tippoo Sultan, and in the list we find Kurnool peshcush amounting to 66,666 pagodas. This treaty was settled in June 1799. In the treaty of the following year with the Nizam, he assigned and ceded in perpetuity all the territories acquired by him under the treaties of 1792 and of June 1799, and the list attached to the treaty specifies, among the talooks acquired by the 1799 treaty and thus ceded, the Kurnool peshcush of 66,666 pagodas. Whatever rights, then, the Nizam acquired over Kurnool by the first treaty he ceded by the second; nothing was reserved. And, as if to leave no doubt whatever on the point, the 6th Article of the treaty of 1800 expressly declares that the Nizam ceded whatever other territory \* \* \* was dependent on his government south of the Toombudra or south of the Kistnah below the junction of the two rivers. Kurnool is in the position thus described, so that, even if it had not been specifically mentioned otherwise, its cession would have been ensured by this article.

8. I shall now return to the grounds assigned by the minister for desiring the restoration of the assigned districts.

There is no doubt that His Highness was unwilling to assign any land whatever, but he saw that the British Government would not undertake the payment of the Contingent without the assignment of territory yielding sufficient revenue to cover the above charge, with the expenses of management, &c. Previous experience of His Highness's inability to advance the necessary sums, or to repay them when advanced by the British Government, forced this determination upon the latter, and His Highness seeing this yielded. His Highness was resolved that the Contingent should be kept up; he knew this could be done only by the British Government, and as the British Government was equally resolved not to take the payment on its shoulders without a material guarantee, the Nizam gave in. He was unwilling to assign the districts, but he was still more unwilling to give up the Contingent, or take it from British management.

9. Secondly. As regards non-payment of the surplus revenues agreed by the treaty to be paid to His Highness, it might be sufficient to say that in the resolution\* of His Excellency upon the mode of keeping the Berar accounts, orders have been given for the payment of the surplus amounting probably to ten lakhs or upwards at the close of the year. When it is recollected at the Berar accounts for any one year could not be made up until accounts had been received from all the administrations and departments with which Berar had dealings either on its own account or on account of the Contingent, it is evident that some delay in ascertaining the amount of surplus, if any existed, must necessarily occur even under the new system of account.

10. Moreover, the administration of Berar was at first conducted on a very

\* No. 2,628, dated 13th October 1866.



inexpensive scale—few officers, no roads, no buildings. Great reform was necessary on all points, but it could only be carried out gradually as the stability of the revenue and its progressive increase became assured. The revenue has very greatly increased, from 32 lakhs to 50, and so has the expenditure, but not so quickly, and hence the surplus; but the two are now pretty equal. Under these circumstances, with a revenue raised directly from the cultivators, with the prospect of greatly increased expenditure in the civil administration, and the possibility of such any day in the Contingent, I think it would have been unsafe to pay over to the Nizam any estimated surplus at an earlier period than has now been directed by His Excellency. It is safe to do so now—still, however, retaining a margin in case of accidents—because we have seen from experience of the six years which have elapsed since the treaty was made, that there is a remarkable degree of stability in the revenue, that it steadily every year increases, and the enormous prices of cotton and grain have enriched the ryots to an extent which could be affected only by a series of bad years.

11. The second reason of the minister for the restoration is his want of funds to carry out reforms in His Highness's dominions under his charge.

Now there can, I venture to think, be no doubt of Salar Jung's immense superiority over his predecessors, of his earnest desire to improve the administration and the country, and of his honest endeavours to do so. But his desire for improvement, his perception of what should be done, and his capacity to do it, are not shared by his master, or by any other officer or noble in the State; his successor might be little better than those who went before him, and it would be unwise, merely because he is a good minister upon whom dependence can be placed, to restore Berar with the probability of having to do over again, in the event of any accident to him, that which has already been done.

12. The assignment of Berar was rendered necessary by the failures of his predecessors to pay the Contingent,—failures which caused constant and most disagreeable relations between the Governments; the arrangement was brought about only a few years ago with great difficulty, and it would be unreasonable to set it aside now, because there happened to be for the time a minister superior to his predecessors; and as regards Salar Jung himself, though he has greatly economised the State expenditure, still very much now remains to be done. A very large portion of the revenues of His Highness's dominions are still misapplied, and though the minister says that the evil is of long standing and can only be gradually and slowly remedied, still so long as it is unremedied, the want of funds cannot be assigned as a valid reason for the restoration of Berar.

13. There is a point of minor importance mentioned by the minister which, perhaps, I should notice. It is the statement regarding General Low's assurance that the assignment would be the same thing as giving the districts in charge to a jemadar, meaning thereby that the cost of administration would be but trifling. I can find nothing on record on this head, and I imagine that if General Low did express himself to the effect stated, he did not refer to the mode or expense of administration, but to the nature of the measure by which the districts were put into British charge, viz., that they were assigned in trust for certain purposes as villages are assigned to individuals for payment of troops, temples, &c.

From *Salar Jung*, Minister of His Highness the Nizam, to Sir *George Yule*, C.B., K.C.S.I., Resident at Hyderabad.—(No. 18), dated Hyderabad, 27th October 1866.

MY DEAR SIR GEORGE YULE,—I am very reluctant to trouble you and the Government of India with this letter, but circumstances and the repeated inquiries of His Highness the Nizam on the subject render it necessary for me to do so.

2. You are aware from the correspondence on record in your office of the great difficulty with which His Highness the late Nizam was persuaded to assign Berar to the British Government in 1853. The British Government, in the first instance, desired the districts should be ceded in perpetuity, to which His Highness would not consent, and it was only to prevent the unpleasantness inseparable

from pecuniary transactions between two Governments, and the assurances of General Low that the assignment would be just the same thing as giving districts into the charge of Arab or other jemadars, that His Highness was prevailed upon to accede to the measure, expecting that he would derive considerable benefit by it. Accordingly, the terms of the treaty required accounts to be furnished yearly, and the surplus to be paid to His Highness ; but it is well known that neither of these conditions was fulfilled. In consequence of this, the Circar applied to the British Government for the restoration of districts held in excess of the amount required by treaty, as well as the accounts and surplus which may have accumulated during this period. The districts of Raichoor &c. were restored, but no surplus was paid, nor any accounts rendered ; but as the British Government gave up the claim of 50 lakhs against the Nizam, His Highness could not with propriety press the demand, and therefore acceded to the supplemental treaty of 1860, which dispensed with the accounts altogether for the "past, present, or future," but rendered it obligatory on the British authorities to pay the surplus thereafter to His Highness, expecting that thenceforward, at least, the surplus would be paid to him regularly. In this expectation, likewise, the Circar has been disappointed up to this time, although six years have elapsed, and His Highness has not received a rupee of the surplus yet ; and, if anything is paid hereafter, it can only be a small sum, considering our expectations and the very great expenditure allowed in Berar. I have no official data on which to speak, but I understand the revenues of the assigned districts have amounted to about 50 lakhs, 27 of which being appropriated to the purposes of the treaty, the remaining 23 lakhs are absorbed in administrative establishments, public works, &c. ; thus the latter expenditure is nearly eight annas on the rupee, about four times as much as was incurred on this account under our direct management. Berar is one of the most productive portions of His Highness's dominions, and the surplus revenues it is capable of yielding ought to be shared in by the less fortunate divisions of the country, and not appropriated exclusively for the benefit of Berar itself. This is more particularly felt at the present time, when the scarcity of corn presses so heavily on the people, and the urgent need of works of irrigation &c. to extend cultivation is so manifest ; and you are aware that these works are much more needed here than in Berar.

3. This Government has not the means of carrying out many administrative reforms, as you know. The civil establishments are very much underpaid, and to make them efficient, liberal salaries must be offered to attract men of ability and character. The police department also requires considerable outlay towards its efficiency, and in public works, such as cutcherries, works of irrigation, &c., not only are new works imperatively called for, but old ones stand much in need of repairs ; and, to meet all these demands, considerable sums of money are required, which this Government, in its present financial state, cannot afford. Although the credit of this Government is pretty good with the capitalists of the country, as compared with former administrations, yet it cannot raise loans to be repaid at pleasure, as the British Government can do.

4. Under the circumstances above stated, it is but natural that His Highness should seek to have Berar restored to him, which has indeed been his desire all along, if satisfactory arrangements can be made for the payment of the Contingent &c.

5. That such arrangements are practicable I beg leave now to submit trusting my representations will meet with the same kind and liberal consideration from the British Government which this Circar has always experienced.

6. The British Government has announced its resolution to annex the Mysore territory on the death of the present aged Rajah. In this case His Highness the Nizam will, of course, under existing treaties, receive the share that falls to him as the ally of the East India Company in the conquest of that country, in the same manner as the rest of the conquered territory was divided under the treaty of 1799.

7. It was the policy of the British Government to cede a portion of the conquered country to the Rajah ; had it been otherwise, there can be no question

that the present province of Mysore would have been included in the division made between the British Government and His Highness the Nizam. This is supported by the opinion of Lord Wellesley himself, who, referring to the 5th Article of the Subsidiary Treaty of Mysore, 1799, declared that, if the Rajah deemed it objectionable, "he saw no alternative but that of dividing the whole territory between the allies."

8. Article 8th of the Partition Treaty of 1799 provides, in the event of the Peishwa refusing to accede to this treaty &c. that the right of sovereignty of the several districts reserved for eventual cession to the Peishwa shall rest jointly in the East India Company and the Nizam; and Article 2 of the separate Articles stipulated that two-thirds of the share thus secured shall fall to His Highness, and accordingly two-thirds of the districts were made over to His Highness. In like manner, on the lapse of the Mysore territory, the Nizam's right to share it jointly with the British Government cannot justly be questioned. The 5th Article of the Partition Treaty declares that the cession of Mysore was the act of His Highness the Nizam as well as the British Government, mutually and severally. On its lapse, therefore, the appropriation of the territory should be with the consent of the Nizam. The 1st and 2nd Articles of it give to the East India Company and the Nizam shares of territory equal in value, and the treaty shows the acknowledged rights of each party. His Highness the Nizam himself observed to me in conversation that treaties are very solemn engagements, and no change of circumstances of the contracting parties can weaken, much less cancel, their obligations except by mutual consent.

9. The claims of the British Government on the Rajah by the Mysore Treaty were contingent on the non-fulfilment of certain conditions. The penalty involved in the infringement of these conditions was not incurred, and the lapse of the Mysore territory arises only and exclusively from the want of an heir, or the refusal of the British Government to permit the Rajah to adopt one. In the case of a lapse, therefore, the country reverts to its original condition before the cession was made to the Rajah, and under this condition His Highness the Nizam has a clear right to share in the division of the country.

10. By the 3rd Article of the separate and secret Articles of the Treaty of perpetual and general defensive alliance of 1800 it is stipulated that the Nizam "shall be entitled to participate, equally with the other contracting parties, in the division of every territory which may be acquired by the successful exertion of their united arms," &c.; and this treaty is confirmed by every successive treaty between the British Government and His Highness the Nizam. In accordance with this provision the Nizam received, in 1804, the cession of the territories conquered from the Rajah of Berar and Scindiah; and in 1822 His Highness received a further accession of territory, after the overthrow of the Peishwa.

11. His Highness the Nizam's troops have since taken part, more or less, in almost every campaign in which the British troops have been engaged in Southern India. They were actively engaged in Goomsoor, Kurnool, and throughout the mutinies in Central India, and assisted in the acquisition of territory forming now portions of British India; consequently, His Highness is entitled to an equal share in any territory so acquired; of course, I do not refer to territory belonging entirely to the British which was in a state of revolt, but only to such States the revenues of which did not belong to the British Government, but to the native rulers, and which, by conquest, have been added to the revenue of British India. Of the latter description, to say nothing of other petty States, are the countries of Goomsoor and Kurnool. His Highness the Nizam has a fair claim to half the revenue realized from Goomsoor, which, at the lowest calculation, will be about Rs. 1,50,000 yearly.

12. By the treaty of 1800 the peshcush only of Kurnool was ceded, not the revenues of the entire district, which remained in the possession of the Nawab of Kurnool, a feudatory of the Nizam; and on the conquest of that country it should have become the property of the Nizam, whose seigniorial rights were never ceded. By the 6th Article of the Treaty of 1800, in making an exchange of certain districts, His Highness ceded to the Honourable Company "the district of Adoni, together

# THE BERARS.

with whatever territory His Highness may be possessed of, or is dependent on His Highness's Government, to the south of the Toombudrah, &c." This applied only to His Highness's possessions at that time, and did not include His Highness's reversionary rights to any property situated within that boundary. I therefore submit that His Highness's claim to the revenue of Kurnool is a just and valid one.

	Rs.
This revenue, less the peshcush, would be about.....	17,00,000
And Goomsoor .....	1,50,000
Total...	18,50,000
Revenue of Mysore, say Rs. 83,00,000, the half	41,50,000
Total...	<u>60,00,000</u>

making a total of 60 lakhs of rupees at the lowest computation.

13. I beg leave to submit that, with reference to these just and equitable claims, arrangements should be made for the restoration of the assigned districts to His Highness the Nizam.

14. As the lapse of the Mysore State will be a work of time, I would submit that the claims in regard to Goomsoor and Kurnool, amounting to Rs. 18,50,000 should be taken as part of the sum required for the payment of the Contingent, &c., and the most satisfactory guarantee accepted for balance of Rs. 8,50,000.

15. You may, perhaps, think that the above claims in regard to Kurnool and Goomsoor should have been made at an earlier date. I do not know whether the late Nizam ever gave Rajah Chundoo Lall any directions on the subject, but I know that His Highness often referred to his claim to Kurnool, in conversation with my uncle; and, though I have no documentary evidence on the point, my impression is that His Highness himself mentioned these claims to General Fraser, but I am certain that my uncle did so to that gentleman. The state of affairs at that time was so embarrassing and complicated that, so far from bringing forward such claims, it was as much as we could do to keep our own.

16. As the British Government is now disposed to do strict justice to Indian rulers, and to carry out the spirit of Her Majesty's gracious Proclamation, the apprehension that claims of this nature would create annoyance and displeasure has been dissipated, and I am emboldened to bring forward these just claims, feeling assured that a generous consideration will be given them by His Excellency the Viceroy, and the districts will be restored to His Highness.

17. It may possibly be objected that the restoration of Berar to the Nizam would bring back the former misrule and disorder; but you may have observed that this has not been the case with regard to the restored districts of Raichoor, Dharaseo, &c., in which the system of administration under the British Government is continued in all its main features; and not only so, but the same system is being introduced into all the other districts under this Circar. In respect to Berar, also, there would be little or no change in the system pursued, and the native officials, trained to the work under British officers, would be either continued or sent into other districts to carry out the same system of administration.

18. I have received many kindnesses from the British Government, for which I feel a sincere attachment, and desire its welfare quite as much as I do that of my own Government; but His Excellency will perceive that it is only an act of justice for which I am now pleading, and I am sure the well-known generosity and sense of justice of His Excellency will pardon this intrusion on his time and attention.

(Foreign Department.—Political—No. 145.)

From *J. W. S. Wyllie*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to Government of India, to the Resident, Hyderabad, dated Fort William, 13th February 1867.

SIR,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 18, dated 14th November last, forwarding for the consideration of the Government of India, a communication addressed to you by the Nizam's Minister, Sir Salar Jung Bahadoor,

K.C.S.R., in which he advances propositions for the restoration to the Nizam's Government of those tracts in Berar, which, under the designation of the Assigned Districts, are at present held by the British Government in trust for the payment of the Hyderabad Contingent, and the other charges specified in Article 6, of the Treaty of 1860.

2. The Minister alleges that, under the third of the separate and secret articles appertaining to the Treaty of 1800, the Nizam has a perpetual right to divide equally with the British Government, any territory which may be acquired by the united arms of both powers, and that in virtue of this right, His Highness holds an unsatisfied claim against the British Government, on account of the joint conquest of Goomsoor, amounting to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs of rupees per annum. Sir Salar Jung further asserts that the rights in Kurnool, which the Nizam ceded to the British Government by the Treaty of 1800, comprised nothing more than the peshcush; that, therefore, when Kurnool was conquered by the joint efforts of the two Governments, the whole revenues of the district, excepting the peshcush, should by rights, have lapsed to the Hyderabad Durbar; and that compensation on this account is now payable to the Durbar at the rate of 17 lakhs per annum. Lastly, the Minister declares that according to the partition treaty of 1799, the Hyderabad Durbar is entitled to an equal share with the British Government in the anticipated lapse of the Mysore State, and that the British Government must consequently be prepared, in carrying out the annexation, to indemnify the Durbar to the extent of half the revenues of Mysore, or  $41\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs per annum. Hence the total demand built up by Sir Salar Jung against the British Government reaches an annual sum of 60 lakhs; and, as a mode of clearance, he proposes that the assigned districts of Berar, which are estimated to yield annually 32 lakhs, should be restored to the Nizam.

3. The minister characterises these claims as "just and equitable." He states that the apprehension which he might have felt lest claims of this nature should create annoyance and displeasure, has been dissipated by a conviction that "the British Government is now disposed to do strict justice to Indian rulers, and to carry out the spirit of Her Majesty's gracious proclamation." He is therefore "emboldened to bring forward these just claims, feeling assured that a generous consideration will be given them by His Excellency the Viceroy."

4. Sir Salar Jung, I am instructed to observe, would have done well to avoid the imputation which his language contains, that there was a time when the British Government was less disposed than now to do strict justice to the princes and chiefs of India. The Right Honourable the Viceroy cannot admit that in this respect Her Majesty's proclamation engrafted any novelty upon the principles by which former Governors-General of British India had been wont to shape their policy. It was their duty and desire, as it now is his, to deal justly with all men, and he emphatically repudiates the compliment offered to his Government at the expense of the illustrious statesmen, his predecessors.

5. Neither can the Viceroy allow that the present claims of the Hyderabad Government are "just and equitable." After close and anxious consideration in Council, such as was due no less to the gravity of the subject than to a regard for the Nizam's tried loyalty to the British Crown, the conclusion forced upon His Excellency is, that these claims are altogether baseless, and unsupported by a shadow of a right. It is painful to the Government of India to speak in harsh terms of any application from a Native State; but the spirit of extravagant assertion which pervades Sir Salar Jung's letter, unworthy alike of his princely master's dignity and of his own reputation for enlightened statesmanship, leaves the Governor-General in Council no alternative but to require that the future communications of the Hyderabad Durbar shall be framed in a tone more serious and circumspect.

6. I now proceed, under the instructions of His Excellency in Council, to an examination of the circumstances which are said to have given the Nizam rights co-ordinate with those of the British Government in the territories of Goomsoor, Kurnool, and Mysore respectively.

7. The campaign in Goomsoor took place in the years 1835-36, and the expedition against Kurnool in 1839. It is after an interval, therefore, of 30 years in the one case, and of 27 years in the other, that the Government of India is for the very first time informed of its having incurred debts to the Nizam. Even, therefore, if the alleged debts had originally been substantive, the protracted silence of the creditor would still remain inexplicable.

8. But the Governor-General in Council cannot admit that any obligation ever existed in either case.

9. The district of Goomsoor was formerly included in Chicacole, one of the five Northern Circars, and, as such, it formed from 1713 to 1752 a portion of the territory governed by the Nizam under authority from the Emperor of Delhi. In 1752 the French obtained possession of the Circars, but seven years afterwards they were expelled by the English. In 1765 the conquests of the latter were confirmed by a firman from the Mogul emperor, dated 12th August, which gave the Circars, "by way of enam or free gift," to the East India Company. Any rights which the Nizam may have had separately in these tracts he surrendered to the Company by a sunnud dated 12th November 1766; and by Article I. of the treaty of 1768 he not only recognized the validity of the Delhi firman, but he "further acknowledged and agreed" that, in consideration of an annual payment of seven lakhs of rupees, "the said Company should enjoy and hold for ever as their right and property the said five Circars." Subsequently, in 1823, the British Government redeemed this periodical contribution of seven lakhs by a single equivalent sum in ready money. The last vestige of the Nizam's connection with the Northern Circars having thus disappeared, it is manifest that the British Government's sovereignty over Goomsoor—a century old in practice—rests upon a title which, at any rate since 1823, has been absolute and unqualified, and which the Nizam is trebly pledged to recognize.

11. The campaign of 1835-36 arose out of the misconduct of the Zemindar of Goomsoor, who fell into arrears with his rent, and became otherwise contumacious. Hostilities commenced in September 1835, and were continued in a desultory fashion during the following year. On the 12th August 1836 the forfeiture of the zemindaree, which had already been provisionally ordered, was declared by a Proclamation of the Madras Government to be "absolute and complete." Two months afterwards, when the insurrection was verging to a close, the Nizam was invited to lend the British Government the services of some cavalry, a request to which he "cordially assented."<sup>c</sup> One hundred sabres of the Nizam's horse were accordingly marched to Berhampore. Whether this detachment, during its brief absence beyond Hyderabad limits, saw any active service is doubtful; the records of the Foreign Office favour the presumption that it did not.

12. The plain facts, then, of the Nizam's co-operation in Goomsoor are, as stated by you in the 5th paragraph of the letter under acknowledgment, that, for the purpose of reducing to order a small disturbed tract in British territory, "the Nizam, as a friend and for convenience' sake, and not under the provisions of any treaty whatever, lent us the aid of a few troops." Inasmuch, however, as the Hyderabad Durbar pretends that although treaty engagements were not specifically mentioned at the time, the British Government nevertheless could not have accepted military aid without becoming necessarily liable to resign half the revenues of the confiscated zemindaree to a coadjutor, it becomes necessary to inquire how far the article cited by Sir Salar Jung may be really applicable to the case.

13. Sir Salar Jung is correct in his quotation that the Nizam "shall be entitled to participate, equally with the other contracting parties, in the division of every territory that may be acquired by the successful exertion of their united arms." But he omits to give the important condition which immediately follows this clause, namely, "provided His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah shall have faithfully fulfilled all the stipulations of the preceding treaty, specially those contained in the 12th and 13th Articles thereof." Likewise he takes no notice of the contingency in which alone this right was to take effect, namely, "in the

<sup>c</sup> Letter from Colonel Stewart, the Resident at Hyderabad, to Mr. Secretary Macnaghten.

event of a war and of a consequent partition of conquests between the contracting powers." Now the treaty mentioned as the "preceding treaty" is that of the 12th October 1800, which, though the Nizam's earnest solicitations eventually gave it the form of a general defensive alliance against all enemies, had been in the first instance intended only as a provision against the expected encroachments of one particular power, Dowlut Rao Scindia. Hence its terms are drawn up with reference mainly to the single emergency then present. The "other contracting parties" are the Peshwa and the Bhonsla, both of whom, it was hoped, would have joined the league. The real purport of the article therefore amounts to this, that if a war took place, especially the impending war with Dowlut Rao Scindia; and if, for the prosecution of the war, the Nizam furnished a force of 6,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry, and otherwise put forth all the military resources of his State, and if, at the conclusion of the war, it was possible and expedient to have a partition of conquests, then, and only in that case, the Nizam would be entitled to participate equally with the British Government, the Peshwa and the Bhonsla in the division of territory. This, it must be acknowledged, is a very different thing from the right, unconditional and perpetual, now arrogated by the Hyderabad Durbar, to share equally with the British Government in every conquest which the two powers may at any time jointly achieve.

14. Sir Salar Jung asserts that the right, as he reads it, was practically conceded by the British Government in 1804 and again in 1822. In this, I am to observe, he is mistaken. The districts wrested from Scindia and the Raja of Berar, which the Nizam obtained in 1804, were not granted on the ground of the Nizam's right to participate in the conquests of the war. On the contrary, Lord Wellesley (having some reason to be dissatisfied with the manner in which the Hyderabad State had performed its duties as an ally)<sup>\*</sup> caused his representative to inform the Durbar in plain words that the lands were assigned "simply as a gratuitous cession on the part of the British Government on grounds distinct from any question of a right to participation of conquests." In like manner in 1822 the Nizam's pretensions to an equal partition were again ignored. Lord Hastings was then Governor-General, and the occasion was after the overthrow of the Peshwa. In fixing the advantages assignable to the Nizam, Lord Hastings† looked to two principles only, the extent to which the Nizam was justly entitled to benefit by reason of his actual services in the campaign, and the extent to which such fair earnings might be enhanced by British liberality and favour. The article to which Sir Salar Jung refers occupied no place in His Lordship's deliberations, and in no way affected the settlement.

15. In truth, Sir Salar Jung's argument is faulty from first to last. His reasoning, stated in the simplest form, is that in all joint conquests the Nizam is entitled to share equally with the British Government, that Goomsoor was such a conquest, and that, therefore, the Nizam should be granted half its revenues. But it has above been demonstrated that the Nizam has no such title, and that even if he had Goomsoor was not a joint conquest. It follows that the Nizam's demand for an annual payment of one lakh and a half must be rejected.

16. The Governor-General in Council remarks that 300 men of the 3rd Nizam's Cavalry were employed at Sholapore in February 1845, and that a considerable portion of the Hyderabad Contingent saw active service against the rebels in 1857. Sir Salar Jung makes no request that these services should be paid for; but were he to demand half the Sholapore Zillah and half the Bengal Presidency such pretensions could hardly be more preposterous than those which he actually asserts to half the Zemindaree of Goomsoor.

17. Turning now to Kurnool, the Governor-General in Council observes that the history of that chiefship may be summarized as follows:—Originally the Nawabs of Kurnool were feudatories of the Nizam's Government, holding the jagheer on payment of pesheush to their sovereign. About the year 1760 Hyder

<sup>\*</sup> Letter to the Court of Directors, dated 10th June 1804, entered as No. XXX, Vol. IV. of the Wellesley Despatches.

† Mr. Secretary Adam's letter to the Resident dated 26th September 1818.



Ali seized the country ; and the peshcush, which up to that time had been payable at Hyderabad, was diverted to Mysore. Hyder Ali and his son, Tippoo, remained undisputed lords of Kurnool for nearly 30 years. After the war, which ended in Tippoo's ceding half his dominions to the British and their allies, the Nizam availed himself of the opportunity of his rival's weakness to revive his dormant claims over Kurnool. But these efforts, involving as they did an infraction of the Treaty of Seringapatam, were persistently discouraged by Lord Cornwallis, and had no definite result. It was not until 1799, when the result of the second war with Tippoo had placed all Mysore at the disposal of the conquerors, that the Nizam's anxiety to re-assert sovereignty over Kurnool had any opportunity of being gratified. Lord Mornington, in making a partition of the conquered territory, included the peshcush of Kurnool in the share reserved for the Nizam. This arrangement, however, was only of a year's duration ; for by Article V. of the Treaty of 1800 the Nizam transferred this same peshcush to the British Government. In this way the Nawabs of Kurnool, after having owed allegiance successively to the Nizam, to Tippoo, and again to the Nizam, ended by becoming, in 1800, vassals of the British Government.

18. The reason for the expedition of 1839 was that the then Nawab of Kurnool had shown signs of putting himself in warlike opposition to the British Government. The British troops came into collision with the Nawab's levies on 18th of October : the latter were routed, and their master captured. The natural penalty of this rebellion was the resumption of the jagheer by the British Government.

19. If any of the Nizam's troops were associated with our own on this occasion, the aid afforded could not have been considerable, for the records of the Foreign Office are altogether silent on the subject. All that is clear is that, in accordance with the right secured to us by Article XVII. of the Treaty of 1800, a portion of the British subsidiary force cantoned in Hyderabad territory was taken up for service in Kurnool. It is possible, however, that some of the mortars and howitzers mentioned on the margin of paragraph 1 of the Madras Government's despatch to the Resident, No. 337, dated 12th August 1839 may have belonged to the Nizam. And in any case the Governor-General in Council has no desire to dispute Sir Salar Jung's statement that the Nizam did render active assistance. Indeed, the point is of little or no importance, for what the Hyderabad Durbar now claims is not half the revenues of Kurnool under the treaty article, but the whole of the revenues bating the peshcush, and it may therefore be assumed that the basis of the claim is not military co-operation, but the Nizam's ancient sovereignty over this particular district.

20. Sir Salar Jung maintains that, notwithstanding the Nizam's specific transfer of the peshcush to the British Government by the treaty of 1800, and also his general cession of all territorial rights south of the Toombudrah by the same treaty, the Nawab of Kurnool nevertheless continued a feudatory of the Nizam, and that therefore the Nizam's reversionary right to benefit by the confiscation of the jagheer remained unimpaired ; but as a matter of history it is certain that the sovereignty of Kurnool has always lain with the holder of the peshcush, and that after the year 1800 the jagheerdar recognised none\* but the British Government as his superior. If Sir Salar Jung intends to imply that the British Government's assumption of the supremacy was improper, and that the Nizam's rights of sovereignty rested on a title different from that of the enjoyment of the peshcush, and anterior to the events of 1799, a reference to the records of 1793 sufficiently shows the emptiness of any such pretension. All the Nizam's original rights in Kurnool were lost by him to the usurping Sultan of Mysore. Lord Cornwallis, in addressing the Resident, Sir J. Kennaway, under date the 12th April 1793, writes as follows : " Nothing appears to be more evident

\* On the 29th October 1804 Lord Wellesely issued a sunnud to the Nawab of Kurnool formally defining the Nawab's tributary obligations. In this document not only is the Nawab described as one who, by the transfer of his allegiance to the Honourable Company, had become a feudatory of the British Government, but he is expressly declared subject to the " immediate authority " of the Madras Government.



than that the Nizam has in fact, though not in form, suffered his title of lord paramount of Kurnool to be superseded, and that he must be considered to have given it up when he ceased to protect his feudatory against the usurpation of Hyder Ali; and even if it were otherwise, it would be impossible to reconcile the discordant claims of a demand for tribute by Tippoo with that of a paramount right in the Nizam." \* \* "The interference of the allies could only be warranted by a formal establishment of the Nizam's rights to the property of Kurnool; to this he does not pretend, and his title of lord paramount was certainly, as I have already said, superseded when Hyder exacted a tribute from his alleged feudatory, without resistance on the part of the Nizam."

21. These extracts prove that in 1793 the lord paramount of Kurnool was not the Nizam, but Tippoo. During the six years that followed the Nizam did not succeed in recovering the title from Tippoo; and when he eventually attained his object it was only in virtue of the arrangements made by Lord Mornington after the final defeat and death of Tippoo. Beyond the peshcush assigned to him by the Partition Treaty of 1799 the Nizam in the year 1800 possessed no rights in Kurnool of any description. When he ceded the peshcush he ceded every right of which he was competent to dispose; and, as you, Sir, correctly point out, this cession is further confirmed by Article VI. of the Treaty of 1800, which assigns to the British Government, in general terms, the whole of the Nizam's possessions south of the Toombudrah.

22. The unavoidable conclusion is that the British Government in 1839 acted within its strict right in monopolizing the benefit of the resumption of Kurnool, and that Sir Salar Jung's demand for an annual compensation of 17 lakhs on this account is as utterly without foundation as his other claim to 1½ lakhs on account of Goomsoor.

23. There remains for investigation the claim to 41½ lakhs derivable from Mysore.

24. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council considers it sufficient in this place to point out that the Nizam can have no concern, present or contingent, in the affairs of Mysore.

25. You should invite Sir Salar Jung's attention to the history of the Partition Treaty.

26. In February 1799, at the commencement of the second war against Tippoo, the Nizam conveyed to the Governor-General, Lord Mornington, full power over all the interests of the Hyderabad State involved in the enterprise. The words employed by his Highness are: "In the same manner as the affairs of the Company are entrusted to the guidance of your Lordship's enlightened understanding, so do I, on the part of my Government, commit to your Lordship's approved judgment all affairs, general and detail, relating to the present war."

27. Of the 30,000 men who took part in the war no less than 20,000 were purely British troops, and 6,500 belonged to the British subsidiary force, which the Nizam was bound by treaty to mention. Only the small remainder<sup>2</sup> represented the quota furnished by the Nizam, and even that, though nominally under the command of Meer Allum, was subject to the orders of British officers. A British general, Lieutenant-General Harris, was at the head of the whole united army; and Lord Mornington, with plenary powers, directed and controlled the expedition as he pleased. The conquest, therefore, of Mysore was really a British conquest; and although, from courtesy and views of expediency, the Nizam's Government was spoken of as conjoint in the operations, such phraseology was conventional, and deceived no one, least of all the Nizam.

28. Seringapatam was stormed on the 4th May 1799. On the 17th Lord Mornington wrote to the Resident at Hyderabad as follows:—

"Although his Highness the Nizam has unreservedly committed the interests of his Government in the final adjustment of the concerns of the triple alliance to

\* "The Nizam's force formed so small a proportion, either in point of number or efficiency, of the whole army, that it would have been the height of injustice to have admitted His Highness's claim to an equal participation of the whole prize.—*Lord Mornington, to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated 30th June 1799.*

my charge, yet being desirous of consulting him in the present important conjuncture of affairs, as far as is consistent with a prompt and efficacious arrangement, I desire that you will, without delay, intimate to His Highness and the Minister my wish to be informed of their sentiments, not only with respect to the general arrangement of affairs in Mysore, as affecting the combined interests of the triple alliance, but also with regard to His Highness's particular views and pretensions." Again, on the 23rd May, Lord Mornington, writing to the same officer, said :—" My wish is that the whole arrangement of our conquests should be left implicitly to the Company's Government, but I should be glad to be furnished with a general outline of the views and pretensions of the Nizam." The Resident accordingly sounded the feelings of the Hyderabad Durbar ; and his overtures resulted in the Nizam's addressing to Lord Mornington the following response :—" As the intimate connection subsisting between us renders the concerns of both States one and the same, and as I have committed all pending concerns, general and detail, to the guidance of your Lordship's enlightened understanding, whatever plan of arrangement your Lordship's well-directed understanding may suggest will have my approbation, and will be most calculated for the tranquillity and happiness of our respective dominions and subjects." These quotations establish beyond cavil that Lord Mornington was sole master of the situation, and that he was recognized as such by the Nizam.

29. By the 4th June Lord Mornington had conceived and prepared a plan for the division of the territory at his disposal. On that day he appointed commissioners for the settlement of the conquered tract, and unfolded to them his designs in the following terms :—" The restoration of the representative of the ancient family of the Rajahs of Mysore, accompanied by a partition of territory among the allies, in which the interests of the Mahrattas should be conciliated, appearing to me, under the circumstances of the case, to be the most advisable basis on which any new settlement of the country can be vested, I have resolved to frame, without delay, a plan founded on these principles ; and I hope in the course of to-morrow to be able to forward to you the articles of a treaty, with proper instructions annexed, for the purpose of carrying the abovementioned plan into effect." The following day His Lordship despatched the promised draft of a treaty to the commissioners. He at the same time furnished the Resident at Hyderabad with a copy, and called on that officer to obtain from the Nizam the nomination of Meer Allum as a plenipotentiary to execute the proposed engagement with the commissioners. Meer Allum, it may be remarked, was selected for this duty in order to save time ; for the treaty was to be executed at Seringapatam, where the commissioners had no one except Meer Allum present to act on the Nizam's behalf. The Nizam readily made the required nomination, and in informing Lord Mornington of the fact added,— " I have the most perfect conviction that your Lordship, agreeably to that justice and moderation which characterize you, will effect such an arrangement in concert with Meer Allum respecting the affairs of Mysore as shall meet with my concurrence and approbation, and be a subject of universal praise and admiration among the chiefs of this country." On the 22nd June the treaty was executed by the commissioners and Meer Allum at Seringapatam ; on the 26th it was ratified by Lord Mornington at Madras, and on the 13th July it received the ratification of the Nizam at Hyderabad. The mere rapidity of negotiation which these dates indicate would of itself imply that the will of a single master-mind was carrying everything before it. And an examination of the actual circumstances proves that the Nizam was pledged beforehand to Lord Mornington's arrangements, whatever they might be, and that he did in fact accept them unconditionally as soon as they were made known to him. Whenever, therefore, a doubt may arise as to the interpretation of any passage in the Partition Treaty of Mysore, not only is it just to look to Lord Mornington's own writings for the key, but it would be absurd to consult any inferior source of information.

30. Briefly stated, the substance of the treaty is that a certain portion of the conquered territory shall be appropriated by the British Government, a second

portion of equal value awarded to the Nizam, a third of less amount reserved for the Peshwa, and the large remainder created into a separate government under a native Prince of Lord Mornington's nomination.

31. This separate government and native nominee are respectively the existing State and Maharaja of Mysore. What their position in the system of Indian politics was to be, Lord Mornington dictated in a second or subsidiary treaty simultaneously executed. The Nizam was not admitted to be a party to the subsidiary treaty; the engagement lay between the British Government and the Maharaja exclusively.

32. It is fortunate that Lord Mornington has left on record his intentions with regard to both treaties in the clearest language.

33. His Lordship's letter to the Resident dated Fort St. George, 30th June 1799 states distinctly the fundamental principles on which he framed the Partition Treaty. "I have always," he writes, "been disposed to pay not only every attention to the just pretensions of His Highness the Nizam, but even to exceed the limits of his strict rights in allotting the measure of his participation in the advantages of our late conquests, but I cannot admit the claim of His Highness to an equal partition of all or any of those advantages to be founded on any principles of justice or reason. His Highness cannot avail himself of the Treaty of Paungul\* to maintain his claim, because the article of that treaty relating to an equal partition of conquests could not be construed to apply to the late war. No other written or verbal engagement existing to support such a claim on the part of His Highness, I have endeavoured to estimate his rights under the alliance by an entirely different and, in my opinion, more equitable standard. My view has been to distribute the recent acquisitions of revenue between the two States in a due proportion to the efficient share which each has borne in the expense and hazard of the war, as well as to the security which each is likely to derive from the assistance of the other in maintaining their common interests and in consolidating the basis of the peace. Although," he continues, "I have assumed this principle as the general foundation of the whole settlement, I am persuaded that a fair review of the details of the Treaty of Mysore will convince any impartial mind that I have made concessions to the Nizam far exceeding the limits of the rule which I had thus prescribed to myself as the just measure of His Highness's rights." He then proceeds to review the several articles of the treaty. Coming to the 4th Article†, he writes:—"The 4th Article contains the basis of an arrangement founded on the strongest principles of justice, humanity, and policy. It does not appear to me necessary to state anything further on this or the 5th Article‡; you will naturally observe that if the Nizam's claim to an equal partition of territory had been founded in right, and consequently admitted by me, this adjustment, so honourable to the moderation, generosity, and wisdom of the British character, would not have taken place." Finally, in the concluding paragraph of the despatch he declares:—"The Treaty of Mysore appears to me to be highly favourable to His Highness's interests. If, however, he should object to the basis and fundamental

\* Sir Salar Jung wisely makes no allusion to the Treaty of July 1790, known as the Treaty of Paungul, but it nevertheless deserves a passing notice, because the 6th Article of that treaty seems to be the original source of all the untenable claims, including the present one, which the Nizam's Government has from time to time put forward for an equal division of conquests. The most cursory glance at the treaty book (Aitchison, vol. V., pp. 43-47) is sufficient to show that the whole tenor of the engagement excepting Article 10 is, as Lord Mornington avers, of a strictly temporary character, applicable only to the first war against Tippoo, and not extending beyond that period. Article 6 provided that whatever acquisitions might come of that war should be equally divided between the British Government, the Peshwa, and the Nizam. The war was brought to a close in 1792. The Nizam then got the one-third share of the conquered territory to which he was entitled, and there the stipulation terminated, satisfied in full. If further proof were needed that the treaty thenceforward ceased to have any force, it could be found in the significant fact that Lord Cornwallis expended much tedious negotiation in an unsuccessful attempt to bring about a fresh treaty which should revive the extinct Treaty of Paungul.

† Article 4.—A separate government shall be established in Mysore; and for this purpose it is stipulated and agreed that the Maharajah Mysore Krishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor, a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, shall possess the territory hereinafter described upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

‡ Article 5.—The contracting Powers mutually and severally agree that the districts specified in Schedule C hereunto annexed shall be ceded to the said Maharajah Mysore Krishna Rajah, and shall form the separate government of Mysore, upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

principles of it, he will not excite an emotion of alarm and uneasiness in my mind. I am perfectly prepared to carry the new settlement into effect by the aid of British arms alone ; and His Highness must be aware of the advantages which he will open to the Court of Poonah if he should compel me to resort to such extreme measures."

34. Lord Mornington repeated these views when reporting his proceedings to the Court of Directors on the 3rd August 1799. "The Nizam," he said, "certainly could not assert any just claim to an equal participation with the Company in the advantages of peace. The operation of the 6th Article of the Treaty of Paungul, respecting an equal division of conquests, was limited to the war which terminated in 1792. Since the Peace of Seringapatam the 10th\* is the only Article of the Treaty of Paungul which can be considered to continue in force, and no subsequent engagements had been contracted with the Nizam which could entitle him to any advantages in the present peace exceeding his relative proportion in the expenses and exertions of the allied force during the late war. It was, however, desirable that the territorial revenue retained in sovereignty by the Company (after deducting whatever charges might be annexed to the tenure) should not exceed the Nizam's portion ; and, consequently, I determined that this principle should be observed in the partition, reserving, however, to the Company, as a just indemnification for their superior share in the expenses and exertions of the war, the principal benefit of whatever advantages might flow from any engagements to be contracted with the new Government of Mysore."

35. Quotations from Lord Mornington's despatches might be multiplied in the same strain, but the Governor-General in Council considers that those above given are enough to establish

Firstly, that Lord Mornington, unshackled by any *à priori* pledges to his allies, held and did practically enforce the right to divide the territory won from Tippoo in 1799 entirely according to his own sense of what was right and proper.

Secondly, that the principle on which Lord Mornington founded his division was not, as Sir Salar Jung erroneously argues, one of equal shares to the British Government and to the Nizam ; on the contrary, that he expressly repudiated that principle, and set up a different one in its stead, viz., a distribution proportionate to the exertions and expenditure of either party in the campaign.

36. It is true that the shares of territory which the Partition Treaty assigned in immediate sovereignty to the British Government and to the Nizam respectively were of equal value, being each rated at 5,37,000 Canterai pagodas. And so far there is some colour for Sir Salar Jung's theory of equal rights. But this was one only of three elements in an arrangement which must be read as a whole.

37. The reservation of certain districts for the Peshwa may be regarded as the second element. Article II. of the separate Articles attached to the Partition Treaty provided for the contingency of the Peshwa's refusing these districts, by a declaration that in that event they were to be divided between the British Government and the Nizam. Now, if Sir Salar Jung's argument were sound, the division should have been equal. As a matter of fact, however, the article apportioned two-thirds to the Nizam and one-third to the East India Company. Moreover, the contingency provided for actually took place. The share offered to the Peshwa was refused by him, and accordingly came to be divided, as had been settled beforehand, between the Nizam and the Company, in the proportion of 176,000 pagodas to the former and 88,000 to the latter. The net result, therefore, of the two first elements in the arrangement, taken collectively, was anything but an equal partition ; for the Nizam's acquisitions amounted to 713,000 pagodas, while those of the British Government were 625,000 only.

38. But the end at which Lord Mornington intended to arrive was not merely an unequal partition. It was to be a partition in which the British Government should obtain, as it had fully earned, a clear lion's share of the spoil.

\* Article 10.—If after the conclusion of the peace with Tippoo he should attack or molest either of the contracting parties, the others shall join to punish him, the mode and conditions of effecting which shall be hereafter settled by the contracting Powers.

Yet, up to this point, you will observe the advantages granted to the Nizam had exceeded the Company's profits by 88,000 pagodas. Under these circumstances, it would be only natural to presume that there must have been in the remaining element of the arrangement relating to Mysore certain benefits secured to the British Government which redressed the balance to Lord Mornington's satisfaction. An inspection of the subsidiary treaty confirms this presumption, and Lord Mornington's own declaration seals it as correct. In the passage from his despatches which has been above quoted he has distinctly stated that he reserved to the Company, "as a just indemnification for their superior share in the expenses and exertions of the war, the principal benefit" of whatever advantages might flow from any engagements to be contracted with the new Government of Mysore."

39. The advantages in question are detailed in Lord Mornington's despatch to the Court of Directors dated 3rd August 1799. Speaking of the subsidiary treaty between the British Government and the Maharaja of Mysore, he says: "In framing this engagement it was my determination to establish the most unqualified community of interests between the Government of Mysore and the Company, and to render the Rajah's northern frontier, in effect, a powerful line of our defence. With this view I have engaged to undertake the protection of this country in consideration of an annual subsidy of seven lakhs of star pagodas; but recollecting the inconveniences and embarrassments which have arisen to all parties concerned under the double governments and conflicting authorities unfortunately established in Oudh, the Carnatic, and Tanjore, I resolved to reserve to the Company the most extensive and indisputable powers of interposition in the internal affairs of Mysore, as well as an unlimited right of assuming the direct management of the country (whenever such a step might appear necessary for the security of the funds destined to the subsidy), and of requiring extraordinary aid beyond the amount of the fixed subsidy, either in time of war, or of preparations for hostility. Under this arrangement, I trust that I shall be enabled to command the whole resources of the Rajah's territory, to improve its cultivation, to extend its commerce, and to secure the welfare of its inhabitants. It appeared to me a more candid and liberal, as well as a more wise policy to apprise the Rajah distinctly, at the moment of his accession, of the exact nature of his dependence on the Company, than to leave any matter for future doubt or discussion. The right of the Company to establish such an arrangement, either as affecting the Rajah or the allies, has already been stated in this despatch."

40. You will notice that Lord Mornington had in mind the circumstances of Oudh while dealing with the future condition of Mysore, and making provision under certain circumstances for the assumption of the direct management of Mysore. Shortly afterwards his attention was called to the case of Oudh itself, and to the possibility of assuming the direct management of that province. The views which he then put on record contain an expression of his determination never to make such an assumption "under a limited or temporary commission." It is tolerably certain, therefore, that if it had fallen to Lord Mornington to carry out the assumption which he contemplated in Mysore, he would have taken care that the measure should be neither limited nor temporary.

41. The Governor-General in Council, however, declines in this place to discuss the details of the subsidiary treaty any further. The British Government and the Maharajah of Mysore are the only parties interested in that engagement: and the Nizam has no concern in it whatever. For the same reason His Excellency in Council cannot pause to refute Sir Salar Jung's erroneous statement that the anticipated lapse of the Mysore State "arises only and exclusively from the want of an heir, or the refusal of the British Government to permit the Rajah to adopt one." Sir Salar Jung takes too much upon himself when he attempts to instruct the Government of India in the interpretation of treaties to which the Hyderabad Durbar is not a party.

\* Later in the same despatch, Lord Mornington speaks of the collateral benefits which the Nizam also would enjoy by reason of the Company's connection with Mysore, referring, as the context shows, to the establishment of a friendly state on the Nizam's frontier.

42. His Excellency in Council holds it sufficient to have shown that the Nizam was never entitled to so much as an equal share of the conquered provinces, and that His Highness was granted more than an equal share on the express understanding that the reversionary claim on the territories which constitute the present principality of Mysore should be vested solely in the British Government.

43. So clearly did the Nizam of the day comprehend the British Government's intention to keep Mysore as its own appanage<sup>o</sup> for ever that in making arrangements the following year for the maintenance of the Subsidiary Force he "assigned† and ceded in full and in perpetuity to the Honourable Company the district of Adoni, together with whatever other territory His Highness might be possessed of, or was dependent on His Highness's Government, to the south of the Toombudrah, or to the south of the Kistnah below the junction of those two rivers." In fact, he consented that his power should be permanently confined to the north of the Toombudrah and Kistna. How incompatible such a consent is with the Durbar's present pretensions to have throughout retained a lien upon Mysore it appears superfluous to point out.

44. The Governor-General in Council remarks that Sir Salar Jung quotes a saying of His Highness the present Nizam to the effect that "Treaties are very solemn engagements, and no change of circumstances of the contracting parties can weaken, much less cancel, their obligations, except by mutual consent." The maxim commands the entire assent of His Excellency in Council, who cannot but regret that the possession of so laudable a principle should not have availed to make the Hyderabad Durbar pause before it heedlessly challenged engagements which have the sanction of more than sixty years' acknowledged validity.

45. The final result, then, of the whole inquiry is that, whether for Mysore, for Kurnool, or for Goomsoor, the British Government is under no pecuniary obligations whatever to the Hyderabad Durbar.

46. Sir Salar Jung is, as you remark, prepared to admit that any request for the restoration of Berar must be preceded by the invention of some satisfactory arrangement for the payment of the Hyderabad Contingent from another source. It might therefore have appeared sufficient simply to inform the Minister that as the alternative source of payment suggested by him had no existence the restoration of Berar still remained an impossibility. But the Governor-General in Council cannot have this reply communicated to the Durbar without some accompanying remarks upon Sir Salar Jung's exposition of the reasons which render the Hyderabad Government anxious to recover possession of Berar.

47. Referring to the original assignment of Berar in 1853, Sir Salar Jung insinuates that the Hyderabad Durbar was reluctantly drawn into this concession upon the strength of verbal assurances by which it was misled, and documentary stipulations which were never fulfilled.

48. As to the Nizam's unwillingness to make any assignment of land for the support of the Contingent, the facts are correctly stated in the 8th paragraph of your letter under reply. The British Government having had considerable experience of the Nizam's failure to provide the necessary funds, or to repay the money when it was advanced to him, gave His Highness the option either to see the Contingent disbanded, or to assign lands the revenue of which, after deduction of the cost of their management, might suffice to cover the expenses of the Contingent. The Nizam, as you remark, "was unwilling to assign the districts, but he was still more unwilling to give up the Contingent, or to take it from British management." Of the two alternatives, therefore, he voluntarily elected the assignment of land.

\* "It is my intention to exclude both the Nizam and Mahrattas, especially the latter, from any interference in the affairs of the Rajah of Mysore, who is to be considered as a dependant of the Company."—*Lord Mornington to the Resident at Poona, dated 4th July 1799.*

"The dominions of the Rajah of Mysore are inseparable from those of the Company, and he is as dependent on our power as the Nawab of Bengal or the Rajah of Benares."—*Lord Mornington to H. Inglis, Esq., dated 27th January 1800.*

"The territories placed under the nominal sovereignty of the Rajah of Mysore by the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam constitute substantially an integral part of our dominion."—*Lord Wellesley to the Court of Directors, dated 9th June 1800.*

† Article 6 of the Treaty of 1800.

49. In charging the British Government with a breach of the terms upon which the assignment was made Sir Salar Jung is doubtless not alive to the gravity of the matter he takes in hand. But the Governor-General in Council cannot on that account allow the accusation to pass unanswered.

50. With regard to the assurance which General Low is said to have given "that the assignment would be just the same thing as giving districts into the charge of Arab or other Jemadars" you report that you "can find nothing on record on this head;" and you imagine that "if General Low did express himself to the effect stated" his meaning could not have been that the British Government's system of administration would be of an inexpensive character, leaving a large surplus for the benefit of the Nizam, but that the nature of the contemplated transfer was a mere assignment in trust for a particular purpose, to last only so long as that purpose might require to be maintained. There is reason, I am to observe, in your conjecture; but even if the alleged expression had a more definite value the Governor-General in Council could not consent to discuss the bearing of a solitary sentence uttered in conversation, so long as there existed a clear and full account not only of the instructions on which General Low was proceeding, and of the communications he undoubtedly did make to the Durbar, but also of the meaning which the Durbar attached to his proposals. Out of the abundance of evidence forthcoming on the subject, it will be sufficient to cite the testimony of your immediate predecessor. In a demi-official letter on the records of this office, addressed to Lord Canning, under date 25th April 1857, Colonel Cuthbert Davidson, speaking of General Low's negotiations, throughout which he had been personally present, writes as follows:—"I can positively testify it was then understood we were to manage the revenues in the manner we deemed most proper, on condition we made no further pecuniary demands on the Nizam's Government." After this it is impossible for the Hyderabad Durbar to pretend that General Low could have pledged his Government to establish a system of administration in the assigned districts specially differing in point of minor expense from that in force in British territory, for the express purpose of benefiting the Nizam. The fact is that the British Government in 1853 assumed the administration of Berar fettered by no conditions except those of furnishing accounts and paying over to the Nizam any surplus that might be found available.

51. No surplus was ever paid over to the Nizam, for the simple reason that the transaction after a five years' currency terminated in a deficit. The first purpose to which the profits of the assigned districts had to be put was the liquidation of the arrears of pay due to the Contingent. This charge, amounting to Rs. 13,76,654, not only swallowed up all the annual balance between the ordinary receipts and expenditure, but actually left the British Government worse off by Rs. 9,31,613 than it had been at the commencement.

52. Looking to this result of the accounts when they were finally closed, the Governor-General in Council cannot allow that the Nizam suffered any real loss from the British Government's omission to furnish annual accounts of its administration of the assigned districts. This, however, is not the ground on which His Excellency in Council wishes to justify what the British Government has always confessed to have been a dereliction from the letter of Article 8\* of the treaty of 1853. The justification is to be found in the treaty of 1860.

53. Partly from the delay which, under the complicated system of accounts formerly observed, of necessity attended any attempt to balance the books for a particular year, partly from the occurrence of the Mutiny, which for many consecutive months absorbed the Governor-General's whole attention, and partly also from the circumstance of the administration in the assigned districts being organized according to a higher standard of efficiency than the Nizam considered necessary, the British Government found that the obligation it had undertaken regarding accounts was beyond its powers of fulfilment. As soon as the

\* Article 8 — . . . The Resident at the Court of Hyderabad for the time being shall always render true and faithful accounts every year to the Nizam of the receipts and disbursements connected with the said districts.



pacification of India allowed Lord Canning time to turn to matters of less vital interest the difficulty was frankly acknowledged, and negotiations at once opened for putting the arrangement on a more practicable basis.

54. The result was the treaty of 1860, by which the British Government purchased cancelment of its obligations to render accounts, as well for the past as for the future,\* at a cost of resigning one-fourth of the assigned districts and forgiving the Nizam a debt rated at 50 lakhs of rupees principal, and 2½ lakhs annual interest. Surely a more handsome atonement for an insignificant default was never made by any Government. Even, however, if the case were reversed, the default heavy and the atonement inadequate, Sir Salar Jung should remember that the matter is finally closed by the treaty of 1860,† and that if he now makes a grievance out of the non-receipt of accounts from 1853 to 1858 he at the same time imperils the hold which the Nizam derives from the same treaty on the lands of Dharaseo, Raichore, and Shorapore.

55. Lastly, Sir Salar Jung complains that the British Government is failing to fulfil its engagements under the existing treaty of 1860. He says that none of the surplus revenue of Berar, which the Nizam is entitled to receive under article IV., has yet been paid by the British Government; and, further, that the country is administered on a scale too expensive to admit of there ever being such a substantial surplus as the Nizam has a right to expect.

56. In respect to the non-payment of the surplus, the Governor General in Council takes for granted that Sir Salar Jung, whose letter is dated the 27th October last, could not at that time have obtained information of the Government's order in the Financial Department issued at Simla on the 13th idem. In that order an abstract was given of the receipts and charges of Berar, showing that for the interval from 1860-61 to 1864-65 there was a surplus of over 10 lakhs, which, however, the expected deficits of the two following years, 1865-66 and 1866-67, would considerably reduce. It was at the same time announced that as soon as a closer approximation to the exact amount of the net surplus for the whole period could be obtained a payment would immediately be made to the Nizam. The pledge was soon redeemed, for on the 31st December further orders were issued in the Financial Department, by which the Governor General in Council was "pleased to direct that five lakhs of rupees be paid to His Highness the Nizam, as an advance on account of the surplus of the Berars, and that a triennial adjustment of the surplus be made, a balance being kept in hand to meet any additional expenditure." Five lakhs of rupees, therefore, have already been paid to the Nizam, and the Governor General in Council hopes that on closing the accounts for the current year it may be possible to pay an additional instalment. In any case the Nizam is assured that there shall be a triennial adjustment of his claim. Under these circumstances, the good faith of the British Government's proceedings and intentions regarding the surplus is no longer open to the faintest doubt. The utmost that Sir Salar Jung can object is that there has been some delay in the issue of the recent orders. But the cause of this delay is amply explained in the 9th and 10th paragraphs of your letter:—"The Berar accounts for any one year could not be made up until accounts had been received from all the administrations and departments with which Berar had dealings, either on its own account or on account of the Contingent;" and, in the second place, the administration of the province had at first been conducted on so poor a scale that it was impossible, until some years' experience had been obtained of the country's real wants and financial capabilities, to gauge the amount of new expenditure that might be properly devoted to procuring a stronger staff of officers, making roads, and erecting necessary buildings.

57. As for Sir Salar Jung's complaint that the cost of the administration now established in Berar "is nearly 8 annas on the rupee, about four times as much as was incurred on this account under" the Nizam's "direct management,"

\* Article 4.—His Highness the Nizam agrees to forego all demand for an account of the receipts and expenditure of the Assigned Districts for the past, present, and future.

† By this same treaty the valuable district of Shorapore was ceded in free gift to the Nizam as a reward for his loyalty during the Mutiny.



I am directed by the Governor General in Council to request that you will call Article IV. of the Treaty of 1860 to Sir Salar Jung's remembrance. According to the terms of that Article, the Nizam is admitted to the benefit of the surplus revenue upon the express condition<sup>a</sup> that the amount of money to be expended on the administration shall be left entirely to the discretion of the British Government. Sir Salar Jung has shown himself so tenacious of the Durbar's right to the surplus that his forgetfulness of the British Government's co-existing and co-extensive right to organize an administration of unlimited expenditure appears the less excusable. For a full explanation of the Article in question he may be advised to refer to the letter which, under instructions from Lord Canning's Government, Colonel Davidson addressed to him on the 29th November 1860. The penultimate paragraph is as follows:—"To the payment to the Nizam of any surplus revenue which may accrue from the districts to be retained, when the charges upon them and the expense of administration shall have been met, the Governor General in Council will agree. But it must be on the understanding that the widest latitude is allowed to the British Government on this head, and that all charges which its officers consider proper and necessary for the administration of these districts will be defrayed from the revenues, without question, before any surplus can be made over to the Nizam, and that any deficiency arising from excess of expenditure over income in one year will be made good by the surplus in another. His Excellency in Council also understands that no accounts are to be rendered to the Nizam's Government, but that when a surplus accrues it is to be made over. The British Government having taken upon itself the administration of these districts, the Governor General in Council entertains the strongest objection to hold them on any terms which would hinder the Government from establishing a sound and efficient administration, or from promoting general advancement; while to revert to a system of annual accounts would be to revive a source of unpleasant discussion and possible misunderstanding." Sir Salar Jung, it is to be hoped, will now understand that in criticizing the cost of the Berar administration he entered upon a subject which has been specially removed by treaty from the cognizance of the Court of Hyderabad.

58. A good administration is necessarily an expensive one. But it is a duty which every ruler owes to his people to give them as good an administration as possible, and this course is also the most profitable in the end. It is the main cause of the great increase that has been obtained in the annual revenue of Berar since that province came under British management. And were His Highness the Nizam to follow the British Government's example in this respect, spending liberally where the good of his subjects is concerned, and economizing in other directions where at present there is a large misapplication of his resources, there can be little doubt that the want of funds which His Highness now has to lament would soon cease to be felt.

59. You will be so good as to furnish Sir Salar Jung with a copy of this letter. You will at the same time intimate to him that it is a matter of unfeigned regret to the Right Honourable the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to have been obliged to reject with censure an application proceeding from a Minister whose generally admirable conduct has merited the frequent thanks of this Government, and lately has even been distinguished by a high mark of royal favour from Her Gracious Majesty herself, the Queen of England and of India.

(Foreign Department.—Political.—No. 67.)

The Governor General of India in Council to the Right Honourable Sir *Stafford Northcote*, Bart., Secretary of State for India.

Fort William, 9th April 1867.

SIR,—With reference to our despatch, No. 30, dated 14th February last, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a communication from the Government of Fort St. George reporting the extent

<sup>a</sup> Article 4.—... But the British Government will pay to His Highness any surplus that may hereafter accrue, after defraying all charges under Article VI., and all future expenses of administration, the amount of such expenses being entirely at the discretion of the British Government.

of military assistance rendered by the Hyderabad Government in the campaigns 1835-36 and 1839 respectively.

2. The letter, proving that the assistance given by the Nizam was very slight, corroborates the argument adduced in paragraphs 11 to 22 of our No. 145, dated 13th February, addressed to the Resident at Hyderabad, disallowing the claims advanced by the Nizam on account of alleged co-operation in the campaigns directed against Kurnool and Goomsoor.—We have, &c.,

(Signed) *John Lawrence.*

*H. Maine.*

*W. Grey.*

*G. N. Taylor.*

*W. N. Massey.*

*H. M. Durand.*

From *A. J. Arbuthnot*, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, Fort St. George, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (No. 8), dated the 15th March 1867.

I am directed by the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter<sup>a</sup> of the 14th ultimo, calling for information as to the exact extent of military assistance rendered by the

Hyderabad Government in the campaigns of 1835, 1836 and 1839 respectively.

2. On reference to the records of this Government it appears that the aid rendered by His Highness the Nizam in the Goomsoor campaign consisted of a detachment of horse of the strength noted in the margin, while the Madras troops consisted of—

1 Captain.	2 Trumpeters.
2 Jamadars.	1 Camel Hurkara.
5 Duffadars.	2 Mootoosuddies.
5 Naib Duffadars.	2 Chupprassies.
88 Horsemen.	10 Dooley Bearers.

Details of Artillery.

A Havildar's party 2nd Light Cavalry.

A detachment of 3rd Regiment of Light Infantry.

The 6th Regiment Native Infantry.

A wing of the 14th ditto.

17th Native Infantry.

A wing of the 21st Native Infantry.

43rd Native Infantry.

49th ditto.

50th ditto.

A detachment of Sappers and Miners.

3. In the campaign against Kurnool in 1839 a risala and a half of the Nizam's cavalry, numbering about 700 rank and file, was sent by the Resident at Hyderabad to that part of the Nizam's country which is opposite to Kurnool, mainly to prevent the escape of the Nawab of Kurnool to the northward, and to save the Nizam's villages from being plundered by the Arabs, Rohillas and Pathan followers of the Nawab. This force did not cross the Toombudrah river, and consequently took no part in the action at Zorapore, at which the Nawab of Kurnool was captured, but it is understood, though there is nothing on record on this point, that the Nizam's cavalry rendered some service in cutting up a few of the fugitive Arabs and Rohillas who succeeded in crossing to the Hyderabad side of the river.

The British force employed at Kurnool was as follows :—

Detachment of F Troop Horse Artillery.

1 Squadron 13th Light Dragoons.

1 ditto 7th Light Cavalry.

1 Company Foot Artillery.

Detachment of Sappers and Miners.

2 Companies, Her Majesty's 39th Regiment.

34th Regiment or C. Light Infantry.

4. Copies of the papers<sup>a</sup> noted below are enclosed.

#### GENERAL ORDERS.

Head Quarters, Choultry Plain, 8th March 1837.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council having addressed the subjoined orders to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to be published to the army, they are accordingly published in Military Orders.

<sup>a</sup> General order by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, dated 4th March 1837.

Letter from the Officiating Resident at Hyderabad to the Chief Secretary to Government, Fort St. George, dated the 1st September 1839.

General order by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council dated 25th October 1839.

General Orders by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, Fort  
St. George, 4th March 1837.

No. 43 of 1837.—By reports lately received from the Honourable Mr. Russell, Commissioner, and Brigadier-General Taylor, commanding the northern division of the army, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council has had the satisfaction of learning that the portion of the Ganjam district lately disturbed has been restored to such a state of peace and security as to admit of the withdrawal of all the troops excepting those to be permanently stationed in the district.

The following are the troops that have been actively employed on field service in this district since the commencement of hostilities in November last :—

Regiment and Detachments,	Commanded by
Artillery, Details of.	Captain Geils.*
Nizam's Horse, Detachment	Captain Byam.
2nd Light Cavalry, Havildar's party.	
3rd Regiment Light Infantry, Detachment of .....	Lieutenant Allan.
6th Regiment .....	Lieutenant-Colonel Hodgson.
14th ditto Wing of .....	Lieutenant Walker.
17th ditto .....	Major Watson.
21st ditto Wing of .....	Major Nowell.
43rd ditto .....	Lieutenant-Colonel Noble.
49th ditto .....	Lieutenant-Colonel Alves.
50th ditto .....	Major Walter.
Sappers and Miners, Detachment of .....	Lieutenant Smythe.*

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council has observed with high approbation the exemplary conduct of all the troops employed in the late arduous and harassing service, their patient endurance of extraordinary fatigue and privations, and the gallant and resolute spirit with which they executed every enterprise to which they were led by their officers, whose activity and energy have been conspicuous.

The 49th Regiment deserves particular notice. This corps was the first to enter Goomsoor at the commencement of the rebellion in September 1835, accompanied by the 8th Regiment (both under the command of the late Lieutenant-Colonel Hodgson), and suffered severely from fever brought on by the harassing duties it had to perform until the month of June 1836, when it returned to cantonment at Berhampore. On the first intimation that hostilities were likely to recommence in the month of November following, this regiment came forward for the service bodily, and with a spirit which reflects the highest credit on it, and is a proof of the high state of discipline it is in, the attachment of the men to the service, and the admirable management of the European officers of all ranks in inspiring their men with these feelings.

The 8th Regiment suffered so much from the severe and incessant duties it had to perform during the first campaign that it was thought proper not to permit it to take the field again; but the Right Honourable the Governor in Council feels that it would be wanting in justice to that regiment and its gallant leader, the late Lieutenant-Colonel Muriel, were its services to be passed over in silence.

The detachment of the 3rd Regiment Light Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant and Adjutant Allan, consisting of two complete companies, is also deserving of notice, as being composed of volunteers, notwithstanding what the regiment had suffered before in the Ganjam district and Kimedý.

The party of His Highness the Nizam's Horse, under Captain Byam, likewise merits special notice: in order that he might be in time to join before the commencement of hostilities, Captain Byam made a march of 588 miles in 31 days, and brought his men and horses to the frontier of Goomsoor fresh and perfectly efficient; his services and theirs were, during the time they were employed, fatiguing and incessant, but were performed with unwearied zeal and alacrity, greatly to their own credit, and to the benefit of the public interests.

\* Vide 45 of 1837, 14th March 1837.

The Commissariat also deserves particular notice ; the arrangements made by this department for the supply of provisions to the numerous detachments spread over a wide extent of country, and through different passes, have been most effective, and speak highly for the management of the Commissariat, under the supervision of Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council has observed with great satisfaction the report made by Brigadier-General Taylor of the highly meritorious conduct of the Medical Department with the Goomsoor force, especially of the exertions of Acting Superintending Surgeon G. B. M'Donnell and his deputy, Assistant Surgeon Conning, which, both at the field hospital and in other situations, were laborious in the extreme, unremitting and successful; as well as his mention of the abilities and devotedness to their profession displayed by Assistant Surgeons Eyre, Kelly, J. Fuller, Bedwell, and J. Shaw.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council has also observed with great pleasure the terms of unqualified praise in which Brigadier-General Taylor mentions the services of Majors Butterworth and Hitchens, who were respectively placed under his orders in the Quartermaster-General's and Adjutant-General's Departments.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council desires to express to Brigadier-General Taylor the thanks of Government for his personal exertions in the exercise of the general military control, and for the able assistance he has on all occasions rendered to the Honourable Mr. Russell. The Right Honourable the Governor in Council is satisfied that the service has been greatly promoted by his presence in camp with Mr. Russell, by which every exigency was immediately provided for, and has observed with much satisfaction the good feeling which has existed between the military and civil officers employed in the operations.

To Brigadier Anderson, commanding the Goomsoor Field Force, the thanks of Government are due for the support and assistance he has always afforded to Brigadier-General Taylor and the Commissioner, and for his zealous exertions in the cause generally.

(Signed) *Hy. Chamier*, Chief Secretary.

EXTRACT from the Minutes of Consultation of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council under date the 4th March 1837.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council cannot permit this opportunity to pass without recording his sense of the Honourable Mr. Russell's devotion to the public interests, in having, though at great inconvenience to himself and family, proceeded to the Ganjam district, and directed in person the measures by which the rebellion in that district has been brought to a termination, thereby voluntarily exposing himself to great labour, trouble, and personal risk, when his official situation exempted him from undertaking those arduous and responsible duties.

Those duties having now been brought to a happy and successful issue, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council performs a gratifying duty in acknowledging the meritorious services rendered by the Honourable Mr. Russell. The whole of his conduct in the discharge of the highly important trust confided to him has met with the unqualified approbation of Government. The intelligence, judgment, and prudence with which his measures have been planned, the ability, energy, and firmness with which they have been prosecuted, and the success with which they have been carried into effect, reflect the highest credit upon him. He has vindicated the authority and upheld the character of Government in a manner which has already produced the most salutary results, and caused an impression which it is hoped will be of permanent efficacy in restraining excesses such as those by which this part of the country has been lately disturbed, and preserving peace and order.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council considers Mr. Stevenson, the Collector and Magistrate of Ganjam, and Captain Campbell, of the 41st Regiment Native Infantry, at first Secretary to the Commissioner, and afterwards

Assistant to the Collector and Magistrate of Ganjam, to be entitled to high commendation for their zealous and efficient co-operation with the Honourable Mr. Russell on all occasions, and he observes with much pleasure the approbation expressed by Mr. Russell of the services of Captain Macdonald, both as Deputy Judge-Advocate-General in conducting the trials of the rebels and as Secretary to himself.

(A true copy.)

(Signed) *Hy. Chamier*, Chief Secretary.

By order of the Commander in Chief,

*T. H. S. Conway*,  
Acting Adjutant-General of the Army.

From *J. S. Fraser*, Esq., Officiating Resident, Hyderabad, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Fort St. George, dated 1st September 1839.

I have the honour to state, for the information of the Government of Fort St. George, that in consequence of the probability of approaching hostilities with the Nabob of Kurnool, and the risk there may be that he will endeavour to escape towards the northward through the Nizam's territory, and that at all events his Arab, Pathan, and Rohilla followers are very likely, on the fall of Kurnool, to cross the river, and either plunder the Nizam's villages, or by taking service with the troublesome zemindars of this country increase the very evil which it has been so long our object to diminish, I have, as a measure of precaution, and with the entire assent and concurrence of the Minister of this State, ordered a risala and a half of the Nizam's Cavalry from Mominabad, amounting to about 700 rank and file, to move down immediately upon that part of the Nizam's country which is opposite to Kurnool, from which parties will be detached and stationed at proper places eastward along the northern bank of the Kistnah, as far, probably, as the district of Kurnool extends, and westward in a similar manner for a few miles along the northern bank of the Toombudra.

2. The special and direct object of this measure will be the security of that part of the Nizam's dominions; but, if thought desirable by the Madras Government, I shall be happy to give instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Blair, who will command the party, to be prepared to comply with any requisition he may receive from Major-General Wilson for the assistance and co-operation of this force, or any part of it, even beyond the river, in any such way as the Major-General may deem advisable.

3. It were, in my opinion, to be wished that in the event of the fall of Kurnool, and the garrison of that place being made prisoners, the Arab portion of it should be marched to Bombay and removed altogether out of the country, as they are a lawless and very troublesome description of troops in the Native States wherein they contrive to establish themselves.

4. I shall at all events be glad to learn, if there is no impropriety in my asking for the information, what orders the Madras Government propose giving to Major-General Wilson for the ultimate disposal of the Arabs, Rohillas, Turks, and Pathans who may fall into his power on the capture or surrender of Kurnool, as it will be indispensably necessary for this State to keep an eye upon them in the event of their being liberated, and retiring, as they no doubt will, to the Nizam's country.

5. I beg to take this opportunity of mentioning that I have received information that an emissary of the Nabob of Kurnool arrived at Hyderabad a few days ago with 60,000 rupees to purchase horses for his master, and that I consider myself justified, under all the circumstances of the case, to demand from the Minister the detention of this individual, and the seizure of his money for the purpose of being kept in temporary deposit.

6. Orders to this effect were in consequence given immediately, but it appears that the man hastily left Hyderabad, to return to Kurnool, three days ago, on hearing that our troops had marched in that direction. He had not brought ready money with him, but hoondees drawn at Kurnool upon Sahoocars in this country.

7. I am happy to be able to add that I have this moment received private information of the apprehension of Illihi Buksh, not at Kurnool, where I thought he was, but in the talook of Nilgundah, in the Nizam's country, and that he is now on the way for the purpose of being delivered up to me.

8. I attach considerable importance to the seizure of this man, as, independently of the known fact of his having been recently employed as a messenger between the Nabob of Kurnool and Mubariz-ood-Dowlah, I have been informed by one of his own associates that he was the person who excited so much disturbance at Bangalore and Cuddapah in 1832 by throwing dead pigs into the mosques of those places, and that in doing so he acted under the orders of Mubariz-ood-Dowlah.

GENERAL ORDER by Government, No. 174, dated Fort St. George, 25th October 1839.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council, in directing the publication in General Orders of the subjoined despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Dyce, commanding a detachment of the Kurnool Field Force, while he laments that the humane efforts of that officer to prevent bloodshed have been defeated by the infatuation of the Nawab of Kurnool's followers, cannot refrain from expressing the high sense he entertains of the gallantry and soldier-like conduct displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Dyce, the officers and men of the detachments, in the attack upon the Durgah at Zorapore.

COPY of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. Dyce, 34th Light Infantry, commanding Detachment Field Force, to the Commissioners for the affairs of Kurnool, dated Camp near Kurnool, 18th October 1839.

Agreeably to the instructions conveyed in your communication of last evening, I have the honour to state that I moved at daylight this morning with a detachment, as per margin, under my command towards the village of Zorapore, where I arrived at half-past six, and halted on the outskirts. I then proceeded into the village accompanied by Captain Balfour, Major of Brigade, Artillery, who acted as my staff throughout the morning; here I had an interview with the chiefs Yaseem Khan, Nowal Khan, and Ushreef Khan, when the terms<sup>a</sup> offered by Government were distinctly explained to them; after some discussion they appeared satisfied, but wished to confer with some of the other chiefs, which was acceded to. They returned after some time, but the result of these and several other interviews proved unsuccessful; and, as upwards of two hours had now elapsed, I determined to try the effects of intimidation, and immediately placed the troops in position to attack, if necessary, the Durgah and stone inclosure occupied by the Nawab and his followers; this produced an immediate visit from the beforenamed parties, accompanied by several others, and among them the Rohillah Shah Wully Khan, who seemed chiefly to direct the negotiation.

On this occasion (anxious to avoid unnecessary bloodshed) I again used every endeavour to induce them to agree to the terms offered, pointing out the inevitable consequences of refusal, but in vain; the conduct of Shah Wully Khan amounted to extreme insolence, and he distinctly avowed his determination that the Nawab should not surrender unless I would on the spot adjust all claims of arrears of pay and furnish them with passports to proceed to Mecca, stating that the paper, alluding to the communication addressed to him and the other chiefs by the Commissioners (which, I should here remark, he positively refused to receive),

<sup>a</sup> The terms tendered to the foreign troops near Zorapore were a guarantee for the payment of all arrears which might be due to them, and passports to enable them to proceed to their own country with security of life and property.

was useless, and that he placed no faith in promises. The party then withdrew to the Durgah, and did not again make their appearance.

After this there appeared to be considerable commotion at the Durgah, and parties of the enemy moved out and lined the walls; three hours and a quarter having now elapsed I sent the Persian moonshee, Abdul Ally, to beg the chiefs would consider the terms offered, and accede to them, or that I should be obliged to attack them: to this they replied, "Attack us; we also are ready." I now ordered the guns to open, which was done with admirable effect by Major Bond, and which was instantly returned by a very heavy fire of musketry and ginjals from every direction; finding the enemy determined to hold his position behind the strong stone walls at which he had taken post, I charged and drove them out at the point of the bayonet. The struggle at the Durgah and inclosures was for some minutes very desperate and hand-to-hand, the men confining themselves almost entirely to the bayonet, opposed to the swords and daggers of the Rohillas and Arabs.

The conduct of the detachment of Her Majesty's 39th Regiment was such as always characterizes British soldiers, but nothing could exceed the behaviour of the 34th Regiment L. I. I beg particularly to bring to the notice of superior authority the conspicuously gallant conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Wright, of Her Majesty's 39th Regiment, who has been dangerously wounded; of Major Bond, commanding the batteries; of Major Montgomerie, commanding detachment cavalry; of Major Armstrong, 34th C. L. I., who himself seized the Nawab; and of Captain Balfour, B. M. of Artillery, who acted as my staff throughout the morning, and for whose exertions and assistance I feel much indebted. The loss of the enemy has been severe, and the bodies of the Rohilla Chiefs Shah Wully Khan and Noor Khan, and of the Arab Jamadar Shaik Saeed, have been among the killed.

The Pathan Chief Ushreef Khan and 98 prisoners have been brought into camp.

The cavalry, having been employed in cutting off and securing fugitives, were not under my immediate observation, but Major Montgomerie, who commanded them, has reported in the highest terms of the conduct of officers and men, more particularly of Captain Lawrence, 7th Light Cavalry, of Lieutenant Cameron, Her Majesty's 13th Dragoons, and of Cader Hoosseini, subadar, 7th Light Cavalry.

I beg also to report that Captain Pears, the Commanding Engineer, was with me the whole time, and that Lieutenant Ouchterlony, of the Engineers, in a personal encounter with some of the enemy, has been severely wounded.

A number of elephants, horses, treasure, and other property have been captured, a list of which I shall do myself the honour to forward as soon as the committee now sitting closes its proceedings. A return of killed and wounded is herewith enclosed.

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RETURN of Casualties of the Detachment of the Field Force under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel *Archibald Dyce*, at the village of *Zorapore*, on the 18th day of October 1839.

*Killed.*

Her Majesty's 39th Regiment.—1 Lieutenant, 1 Serjeant, and 1 Private (European).

34th Regiment Light Infantry.—1 Sepoy.

Total killed.—1 Lieutenant, 1 Serjeant, 1 Private (European) and 1 Sepoy.

*Wounded.*

Engineers.—1 Lieutenant.

Artillery.—3 Sepoys, 1 horse, and 1 bullock.

Her Majesty's 39th Regiment.—1 Lieutenant-Colonel and 8 Privates (European).

34th Regiment Light Infantry.—1 Lieutenant, 1 Jemadar, 1 Naique, and 7 Sepoys.

Total wounded.—1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 2 Lieutenants, 1 Jemadar, 1 Naique, 8 Privates (European), 10 Sepoys, 1 horse and 1 bullock.

*Missing.*

Her Majesty's 13th Light Dragoons.—1 Private (European)\*.

Total killed, wounded, and missing.—1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 3 Lieutenants, 1 Jemadar, 1 Serjeant, 1 Naique, 10 Privates (European), 11 Sepoys, 1 horse, and 1 bullock.

*Officers' Names.*

Killed.—Lieutenant Thomas White, Her Majesty's 39th Regiment.

Wounded.—Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas E. Wright, Her Majesty's 39th Regiment, dangerously; Lieutenant Edmund John Yates, of the 34th Regiment Light Infantry, severely and dangerously wounded, since dead; Lieutenant John Ouchterlony, of the Engineers, severely wounded; Jemadar Sevondum, of the 34th Regiment Light Infantry, slightly wounded.

(Signed) *A. B. Dyce*, Lieut.-Col.,  
Comdg. Detacht. Field Force.

(Political.—No. 103.)

The Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council.

India Office, 31st May 1867.

Para. 1. I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letters of the 14th February, No. 30, and 9th of April, No. 67, of 1867, forwarding correspondence relative to a proposition by which His Highness the Nizam desired to obtain restoration of those districts in Berar which are at present held by the British Government in trust for the payment of the Hyderabad Contingent, and the other charges specified in Article 6 of the Treaty of 1860.

2. You have shown that the debts which the Hyderabad Durbar alleges to be due from the British Government to His Highness the Nizam, and which His Highness alleges as a ground for his present application, have no existence. I entirely concur in your reasoning upon this point.

3. As regards the claim set up by the Nizam to share equally with the British Government in the expected lapse of the Mysore State, while Her Majesty's Government cannot admit that the Nizam has any reversionary rights in the Mysore territory, it is at present sufficient to observe that the claim put forward by Sir Salar Jung is founded upon an hypothesis which is incorrect, and it is wholly unnecessary therefore to enter upon any discussion of it.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) *Stafford H. Northcote.*

EXTRACT from Colonel *Davidson's* Administration Report for 1860-61.

## SECTION VIII.—POLITICAL.

71. With a view to simplify the arrangements of the two Governments, to determine certain matters not dealt with in the Treaty of 1853, and to give all possible solemnity to certain acts marking the high esteem in which His Highness the Nizam is held by Her Majesty the Queen, modifications of that Treaty to the following purport, agreed upon between the Viceroy and Governor General on behalf of Her Majesty, and the Nawab Uzool-ood-Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahadur, were ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General on the 31st day of December 1860.

72. The territory of Shorapore was ceded in full sovereignty to His Highness the Nizam; the debt due by His Highness to the British Government, amounting to almost (50) fifty lakhs of Hyderabad rupees, was cancelled; all account of the receipts and expenditure of the assigned districts, for the past, present or future, His Highness agreed to forego; but the British Government, on their part, stipulated to pay to His Highness any surplus revenue that may hereafter accrue after defraying the expenses of the Hyderabad Contingent and of other charges

\* Drowned in the Toombudrah.



guaranteed under the Treaty of 1853, together with all future cost of administration, the amount of such cost being entirely at the discretion of the British Government.

73. To provide for these payments, such additional districts, adjoining those already assigned to us in Berar, as would suffice to make up a present annual gross revenue of 32 lakhs of rupees, British currency, were to be held in trust by the British Government; all the districts in excess of this assignment hitherto administered by us in the Raichore Doab and on the western frontier of the Nizam's dominions, being restored to His Highness.

74. The estimated financial result of this arrangement is as follows :—

										Annual Revenue. British Currency Rupees.		
DISTRICTS RESTORED to His Highness the NIZAM :										Rs.	a.	p.
Dharasco Districts, exclusive of village expenses	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8,10,861	14	11
Raichore Doab ditto ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	13,25,901	3	4
Shorapore Territory ditto ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,20,177	1	7
TOTAL...										Rs. 24,56,940	3	10
Deduct 12½ per cent. allowed by the Native Government for management of their Districts										...	...	...
										3,07,117	8	6
Net Revenue...										Rs. 21,49,822	11	4
DISTRICTS RECEIVED from His Highness the NIZAM :										Rs.	a.	p.
Crown Lands and other Territory in East Berar	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4,86,089	0	8
Ditto ditto West Berar	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,68,969	11	3
Districts on the Pacon Gunga River	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,65,775	1	1
										8,20,833	13	5
Net Increase to His Highness the Nizam's Annual Revenue										Rs. 13,18,988	13	11
Or, in Hyderabad currency (at 21 per cent.)										Rs. 16,08,076	8	6

75. Thus, besides the remission of the debt due to the British Government, amounting to about 50 lakhs of Hyderabad rupees, the restoration of these districts benefits His Highness by more than 16 lakhs of Hyderabad rupees per annum.

76. The liberality thus manifested towards His Highness the Nizam induced the expectation that, retaining the titular sovereignty of the Berar provinces, His Highness would readily concede to the British Government an unreserved control over the revenues then or thereafter to be derived from them. But the Nizam's apprehensions that by renouncing all claim to any surplus revenue that might accrue he would be virtually relinquishing all his rights to these districts, and be regarded by his subjects and the surrounding States as having alienated in perpetuity the fairest portion of his ancestral dominions, rendered the proposition so evidently distasteful to His Highness that it was withdrawn.

77. The administration of the Berar districts by the Nagpore Commission presented advantages of economy and convenience should our Government obtain the surplus, and this was consequently a measure which the British Government were desirous to effect. But on this point His Highness the Nizam was, perhaps more than on any other, inflexible. He chafed at the idea of these provinces being annexed to a Mahratta State (though under British rule) from which his ancestors had wrested them after years of contention. The hereditary hatred, the implacable mistrust and jealousy which have so long existed between the Mahomedan and the Mahratta are strong as ever at the Hyderabad Durbar. His Highness also urged that while his districts were administered by the British Resident at Hyderabad they were administered by an officer of his own court, with whom he had constant opportunities of communication, and with whom he could advise or remonstrate; that his honour and dignity as a sovereign were thus not only preserved in reality, but remained unimpaired in the estimation of both friends and enemies. Many other arguments were also advanced, especially the views of

his late father when urged upon this point during the negotiation of 1853, and His Highness's objections to this proposal were also acquiesced in.

78. While these concessions and restoration of territory have been gratifying to His Highness the Nizam, the British Government have derived no inconsiderable advantages from the recent arrangements. The inconvenient strip of land belonging to the Nizam on the left bank of the Godavery and its confluent, containing the talooks of Sironcha, Albaca, Cherla, Rackapully, and Budrachullum, so necessary to us to secure the uninterrupted control of the hydraulic works on the Godavery, has been ceded to the British Government in perpetuity.

79. The navigation of the Godavery to its junction with the Pranheeta, and of the Wurdah and Pranheeta rivers, has been declared free, and all transit and customs duties have been abolished.

80. Land in the Raichore Doab for the railway and Madras Irrigation Company has been guaranteed, and the Hyderabad Durbar have stated that they will be prepared to give land elsewhere in the Hyderabad territory for similar purposes.

81. The Minister, Salar Jung, has recently placed 5,000 rupees at the disposal of the Great Peninsular Railway Company for the survey of a line of rail between Sholapur and Hyderabad.

82. Magisterial powers within the railway fences have been conferred by the Hyderabad Government on British officers residing within their territory.

THE FRIEND OF INDIA AND STATESMAN, *July 23, 1881.*—*The Berars.*—I.—It is almost beyond hope or reasonable expectation that an unbiassed opinion, or even unadulterated information, as to the relative condition of the Berar districts and of the provinces under the Nizam's direct rule should be drawn through what are called the authorized channels. We need not look for self-depreciation or a self-denying ordinance from the officials of the Berar Commission, from the officers of the Hyderabad Contingent, from the Residency staff, or from the Secretaries and Councillors at Simla. The problem of retiring gracefully from the discreditable position we occupy in Berar is one—as is every first-class Indian problem—that can only be satisfactorily solved by an Imperial statesman, free alike from local prejudices and from professional attachments. Up to this day every part of this question, from the original process of seizure down to the administrative prospects in case of restitution, has been systematically misrepresented officially, whenever a reference has been made; and yet by the mere force of events, incidentally and inadvertently, nearly all the truth has been placed on record, and can, by careful research and comparison, be traced out and found. A very general impression has prevailed, partly founded on the preamble of our treaty of 1860 with the Nizam, and fostered by the language used by the authorities in India, that the districts of Raichore and Nuldroog, seized with the Berars in 1853, were restored to the Nizam in 1860 by way of reward, as a matter of grace, and “in recognition of the services rendered by His Highness personally, and by the Government of Hyderabad, during the revolt of 1857-58.” We are very far from denying that it was a matter of great satisfaction to the Nizam and to his Minister, the Nawab Salar Jung, to obtain the restoration of these districts. But only in one very restricted sense can this retransfer be considered as having been a boon, *viz.*, that the enormous power of the British Government enables it to be the absolute judge in its own cause, so that every concession which it makes is an act of grace and favour, just as it was an act of grace on the part of the wolf, in the fable, when he released from his jaws in safety the head of the poor stork who had pulled the bone out of his throat. Beyond this there was no element of favour or reward in the treaty of 1860.

It is not easy, except by a cynical boast of domination, to give the aspect of reward to a partial restitution of sequestered lands, when the acknowledged owner has persistently protested against being kept out of them and has made six formal demands for total restitution. It would seem even less easy to make this partial restitution look gracious or graceful when it was balanced by new exactions, still greater exactions being baffled by the resistance of the weaker party. Between the

assignment of territory in 1853 and the negotiations commenced in 1860 the two successive Nizams had six times applied for the restoration of all the districts. But the echoes of Lord Dalhousie's pretence of a treaty right to the Contingent, and of his "threats and objurgations" and menaces of military coercion, in 1851 and 1853 had not yet died away. These early applications, therefore, were made without any attempt at controversy as to the merits, the Nizam simply asking to have the districts restored, and undertaking "to make satisfactory arrangements for the punctual monthly payment of the Contingent." All these proposals were rejected. "The Governor-General"—we quote a letter to the Minister from the Resident—"will on no account consent to forego the fundamental principle of the treaty of 1853, namely, that so long as the Contingent is maintained the British Government shall hold a material guarantee for its punctual payment."

As a consequence, however, of the vital services rendered to us by the Nizam and his Minister during the revolt of 1857-58 a change had come over the spirit of their intercourse with the British Resident and Government. The Hyderabad Court had grown in self-respect and confidence; the imperial power was for a time really touched by a sense of obligation and by an instinct of common interests. It was a healthy change on both sides, and if it could only have lasted might have proved most beneficial, as indeed in its establishment and extension throughout India lies the best hope in the future for the prosperity of the protected States and the stability of the Empire. But it did not last: the impression made upon the official class and the provincial authorities was never very deep. The contemptuous and domineering temper soon revived in the "political" department. No plan ever emanated from that quarter for a territorial cession to any Native State. The first suggestion of thus emphatically marking the sense entertained by Her Majesty's Government of the invaluable aid rendered by the princes of India will be found in a despatch dated July 28, 1858, from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors—Lord Stanley, now Earl of Derby, being President of the Board of Control—to the Governor-General containing these instructions:—

"We desire that you will, as expeditiously as possible, furnish us with a list of those Princes, Chiefs, and others, who have distinguished themselves by acts of fidelity and friendship to the British Government, together with a statement of their services, and of your views with respect to the best means of rewarding them, whether by territorial grants, by pensions or gratuities, or by honorary distinctions.

"The first of these modes would doubtless be the most acceptable to those whom we desire to gratify.

"High on the list you will, we feel assured, place the names of Scindia, Holkar, the Nizam, and the King of Nepal, as well as those of the able and influential Ministers of the two latter Princes, Salar Jung and Jung Bahadur."

Scindia's trials and services are well known. A very little study of the map, and a glance at a few records of the time, will suffice to remind us of the critical and vital support rendered by Holkar and the Nizam, and of the good reasons Lord Stanley had for placing them "high on the list." If the Bombay sepoys did not drift into universal mutiny like their brethren of the Bengal army, and if the Mahratta chieftains of the west were not driven into rebellion along with them, it was mainly owing to Holkar's influence. "The whole country would have risen," said Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, in July 1857, but "all the smaller Chiefs" waited "to take their cue from Holkar." And while to Holkar was mainly due the preservation of peace in Malwa, Guzerat, and the Mahratta country, and security from the general defection of the Bombay army, the obedience of the Madras army and the allegiance of the south of India depended on a word from the Nizam. In tone and spirit, as to a great extent now, the Madras army was then essentially a Mahomedan army looking up to the Nizam as an Imaum or great religious leader as well as a great Prince, as the Nakhshbandi as well as the Nawab. Nor was the political and spiritual influence of the Nizam confined to the Deccan and the Carnatic; it extended all over India. A very distinguished officer, General Sir Sidney Cotton, who in 1857 commanded at Peshawar, states that "intercepted letters reached him from Hyderabad in the Deccan, addressed by

Sepoys of one of the rearmed corps at Peshawur to brother Mussulmans in the Nizam's territory, calling on the Mussulmans generally to rise, and make an effort to rid themselves of their common enemy." A little further on he says :—

"The natives of the upper class of the north-west frontier repeatedly assured the author, up to the very last moment of his sojourn there, that there will be some day or other a general rising of the Mussulmans of India against our Government. Since the removal of the descendants of the Great Mogul from Delhi they look to the Nizam in the Deccan as the great Head and Chief of the Mussulman cause."

The exigencies of space will not permit us to multiply, as could easily be done, independent as well as official testimony to the invaluable assistance given to the Imperial cause in its time of need by the Hyderabad State. The same necessary restriction must be put on our citation of evidence as to the services of the Nawab Sir Salar Jung. We shall give only one extract. In a letter to the Government of India dated 29th of March 1858 Colonel Davidson, the Resident at Hyderabad, says :—

"The unhesitating energy and promptitude with which the Nizam's Minister assisted the English Government were beyond all praise."

He adds in the same despatch :—

"From his [the Nawab Salar Jung's] open and avowed determination to assist us at all hazards he became most unpopular, and was almost outlawed by the Mahomedan population; but no invectives, threats, or entreaties ever made him swerve from the truly faithful line of conduct he had from the first adopted. His assassination was planned a dozen times, and I believe he was fully aware of this; but neither dread on that account, nor for a time the continued intelligence of repeated reverses to our cause in the North-West, shook him for a moment. Every contingency and every requisition made to him by me was met with the same firmness and consistency; and the resources of the Nizam's Government were, as far as lay in his power, placed unhesitatingly at my disposal."

We may take it, then, as beyond all doubt or question that Lord Stanley was amply justified in directing that measures were to be adopted for the recognition and reward of those "acts of fidelity and friendship" by which the Nizam and his "able and influential Minister" had distinguished themselves. The most liberal interpretation, after cooling down for two years, of Lord Stanley's suggestion of a "territorial grant" in favour of the Nizam, to which the Calcutta Government could rise, was that which is embodied in the treaty of 1860, whereby a part of the districts which he had been coerced into assigning in 1853 for the liquidation of a debt he did not owe, and for the payment of a force that had been fraudulently imposed upon him for our exclusive benefit, was restored to His Highness's administration. In the words of Colonel Davidson, the Resident, "we virtually restored nothing." There was a partial but not an unpurchased restitution, and certainly there was no reward. If complete restoration had been handsomely carried out at that period it would have approached very near to a reward. But the haggling over the matter, the refusal of accounts, and the beneficial arrangements for ourselves, turned it into a transaction. Still it was a transaction very satisfactory to the Nizam and his Minister. It was something gained which they have much desired, and which they could not have obtained otherwise, or on other terms. As Sir Charles Wood, now Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State, remarked in a despatch dated 18th June 1861 :—

"The transfer of the Assigned Districts was not obtained from the Nizam without much unwillingness and opposition on his part, and His Highness more honestly desired a restoration of that territory, partial or entire, than any other object which could be presented to him as worthy of acceptance in acknowledgment of his services."

Sir Charles Wood nevertheless characteristically added :—"I cannot but express regret that you were unable to obtain from His Highness the cession of the retained districts in full sovereignty."

## II.

There is this excuse for Sir Charles Wood having been anxious in 1861 to obtain the absolute cession of Berar, that the Secretary of State, while, as he says, "not insensible to the weight of the considerations which induced His Highness to refuse wholly to relinquish any part of his paternal dominions," was deeply impressed with the assurances in connection with this case and with that of Mysore, and others, as to the "regularity and freedom from oppression" introduced into the administration, "the local improvements," and the familiar notes of the general chorus of self-glorification raised in Calcutta, that for many years had resounded in the India Office. The Nawab Salar Jung must have been fully conscious of this obstacle. He must have often had it set up before him in the British Residency. Colonel Davidson himself, who had taken part in extorting the treaty of 1853, and who, during the negotiations of 1860, evinced a lively sense of the Nizam's claim to reparation, had yet gained so much of his early experience in the Hyderabad country during the financial agonies caused by the Contingent and the ruthless expedients of our creature Chundoo Lall that he could hardly credit the progress already organized by the young statesman whose reputation in official eyes then consisted more in his conspicuous co-operation on our behalf during the rebellion than in the quiet course of reform, in which the Resident could claim no share, and from which he could reap no direct advantage for his own Government. Colonel Davidson, in his despatch of the 12th of October 1860, speaks of "the perfect horror and dismay, among almost every class, with which the intelligence was received in the Raichore Doab and Dharaseo districts that they were to be again transferred to the government of His Highness's naibs." The Resident adds that, "from long residence in the Hyderabad territory," he well knows "the tyranny and grinding oppression with which these miscreants treat the inhabitants of the country." Sir Richard Temple, as Resident at Hyderabad, confirms Colonel Davidson's statement as to these prejudices and fears, and bears testimony to their dissipation in the light of actual results. In a despatch dated August 16th, 1867, referring to these very Raichore and Dharaseo districts, which, "after remaining under our management for several years, were transferred to His Highness's government," he says, "I certainly have understood, from officers in a position to know, that the people much regretted the retransfer, and were full of apprehension. Such, I believe, was the fact at the time, though they have since not had any cause to lament, for the Nizam's civil government in that quarter has been well conducted." Further on in the same despatch he says, "In the Deccan of late years the constitution, system, and principles of the Nizam's civil government are really excellent."

The Nawab Salar Jung could not but be well aware of all that stood in the way of total restitution, and must have considered as one of the greatest advantages of the treaty of 1860 that it afforded him the means of dispelling these groundless apprehensions and prejudices. We have just quoted Sir Richard Temple's testimony to the administrative progress of seven years. To this the Nizam's Minister called the attention of our Government when, in 1867, he instituted that appeal for the Berars, partly based on the intended annexation of Mysore, in the answer to which he was told that he "took too much upon himself," and which was dismissed "with censure." "It may possibly be objected," he said, "that the restoration of Berar to the Nizam would bring back the former misrule and disorder; but you may have observed that this has not been the case with regard to the restored districts of Raichore, Dharaseo, &c., in which the system of administration under the British Government is continued in all its main features; and not only so, but the same system is being introduced into all the other districts under the Circar. In respect to Berar also there would be little or no change in the system pursued, and the native officials trained to the work under British officers would be either continued or sent into other districts to carry out the same system of administration."

The Nizam's demand to share in any partition of the Mysore State, though

somewhat unskilfully diluted with other claims of a weaker and slighter quality, against which the answer from Calcutta was chiefly directed, was really irresistible. The Secretary to Government, in fifty-nine wrangling paragraphs, characterized this demand, which the Nizam proposed to forego in exchange for the restitution of the Berars, as "altogether baseless, and unsupported by a shadow of rights." It did not appear so "baseless" to very competent and unbiassed judges. Sir Frederick Currie, a member of the Indian Council, who had been successively Secretary to Government and Councillor under Lord Dalhousie, dissenting from a despatch refusing to replace the Rajah of Mysore at the head of his Government, makes the following remark:—"I think the decision impolitic also as likely to lead, when the permanent exclusion of the Maharajah from the possession of Mysore is promulgated, to inconvenient questions with the Nizam, whose treaty rights in Mysore, though kept out of sight in this despatch, and the proceedings of Lords Dalhousie and Canning referred to in it, cannot be ignored." This special claim, however, soon became really "baseless." The intended annexation of Mysore was defeated, and the appeal for the Berars could not be renewed on that particular line.

The Nawab Salar Jung having been told that he "took too much upon himself," and enjoined to be more "serious and circumspect," the form that his next appeal for the restitution of the provinces was made to assume was extremely serious and very circumspect indeed—in fact quite prosaic and business-like. The Government of India had repeatedly stated that its only object in retaining Berar was to have "*a material guarantee*" for the payment of the Contingent, territorial security not being declared to be indispensable. In 1853, beyond all question, the Nizam could have given no other security; but the finances and credit of the State had so improved under the administration of Sir Salar Jung that in 1872 the Co-Regents of Hyderabad were able to propose the most practical and satisfactory arrangements, against the feasibility and permanence of which no objection could be urged. On several occasions between 1872 and 1874 the Regents argued against the security for the pay of the Contingent being necessarily territorial, and against the Hyderabad State being under any obligation to keep up the Contingent at all, that force being illegitimate in its origin and existing solely for our own benefit, the debt of 1853 being fictitious, and the treaty of that year extorted under a combination of threats and formal assurances by the Resident, Colonel Low, that the territorial assignment was temporary—"only for a time, so long as the Nizam might require the Contingent." But "their desire being to meet the wishes of the British Government," and the Viceroy having objected to their proposal to capitalize the pay of the Contingent, because it might necessitate a large loan by the Hyderabad State, they offered to furnish a "material guarantee" to the extent of two, three, or more years' payments, to be deposited in advance—which would have amounted to not more than £1,000,000 sterling—a fund which they could supply and maintain without any extraordinary effort or external aid.

Even Lord Dalhousie, when commencing his course of pressure on the Nizam, emphatically stated that he only asked for an assignment of lands in default of payment or of other good security. "The immediate object of the Government of India," said a despatch of July 31st, 1851, "in requiring a temporary cession of territory, was to obtain a liquidation of His Highness's debt." He repeatedly and continuously declared that a territorial assignment was taken only because the Nizam could not otherwise make a "satisfactory provision for the payment of the Contingent without fail in the future." There could have been no real doubt in 1874 that the Hyderabad Government was well able, in the way suggested, to make such a "satisfactory provision" as would have contented Lord Dalhousie, and to furnish that "material guarantee" which Lord Canning required, in the most substantial and tangible form.

Since 1874 the question of restitution, in every one of its aspects, has been so thoroughly argued and examined that no real doubt can remain on any point of importance. The claim of the Nizam is unanswerable. The inhabitants of Berar would gain by restoration. Our Government would lose no revenue,

abandon no military advantage, and gain much moral authority. The restitution of Berar and the removal of the Contingent would bring a real accession to imperial influence, not in Hyderabad only, but throughout the allied and protected states. It is in that direction that we should seek for the cheap defence of the Empire, not in the jobbery and the patronage, the supercilious intrigue, and the overbearing subterfuges, that have defiled for so many years the method of the Indian Foreign Office and of its provincial agency. But for such remedial work we must have a statesman.

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*TIMES OF INDIA, August 13, 1881.—Sir Richard Meade and the Berar Question.*  
—The following is from our own correspondent, dated London, August 12 :—

“The Marquis of Hartington agrees with Sir Richard Meade’s desire that there should be an official inquiry into the falsehood of the *London Statesman’s* charges against the late Resident at Hyderabad regarding the Berar question.”

We are glad to learn from a telegram from our London correspondent that the Secretary of State for India quite agrees with Sir Richard Meade that an official inquiry should be made into the falsehood of the charges brought against him, as the late Resident of Hyderabad, by the *London Statesman*. These charges had only one meaning—and that meaning was bribery.

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*TIMES OF INDIA, August 15, 1881.*—Mr. Robert Knight is no sooner clear of one affair than he plunges into another. The action brought against him by the Co-Regent of Hyderabad failed on a technical point, and he immediately replied by an article on the “Restitution of the Berars,” which extended the area of his attacks, so as to include the late Resident and Assistant Resident of Hyderabad, who, as he was aware, were both in England when his article was timed to appear. The gravamen of his attack is founded on what became known through our own columns as the Great Hyderabad Case. Our London correspondent telegraphs that the Marquis of Hartington agrees with Sir Richard Meade’s desire that there should be an official inquiry into the falsehood of the *London Statesman’s* charges against the late Resident of Hyderabad regarding the “Berar Question.” But the inquiry will, we imagine, be limited rather to the proceedings “which,” according to the *Statesman*, “have so deeply disgraced the British name at Hyderabad of late years”—that is, the conduct of affairs by the Co-Regent, and the support alleged to have been given him by Sir Richard Meade and Colonel Euan Smith. Mr. Knight’s charges are very explicit, and were he not unfortunately given to exaggerated writing of the intense order would of themselves have compelled an inquiry. He says :—“Who can wonder that the ex-Resident’s name is associated with rumours of the most painful character in that city? We shall not conceal, for we ought not to conceal, the fact that rumours have been prevalent at Hyderabad for the past three years which unless explained are fatal to the character both of the Resident and of Major Euan Smith. Incidents, the full particulars of which are in our possession, which demand explanation, and which may be explainable as innocent on their merits, though hardly defensible in any case against the charge of unaccountable imprudence, are necessarily invested by public suspicion with the most sinister aspects, especially when there is on the face of the transactions generally so much that is difficult to account for. . . . With Sir Richard Meade in London, we demand that these charges against him should be inquired into, for the honour of the nation, and the reform of our Indian administration.” The inquiry has now been demanded by Sir Richard Meade himself, and so far as it relates to the conduct of affairs at Hyderabad cannot fail to be of great public interest.

*FRIEND OF INDIA, August 20, 1881.—The London Statesman and Sir Richard Meade.*—A special telegram to the *Times of India* announces that “the Marquis of Hartington agrees with Sir Richard Meade’s desire that there should be an official inquiry into the falsehood of the *London Statesman’s* charges against the late Resident at Hyderabad regarding the Berar question.” It is perhaps hardly



necessary to say that this journal ceased months ago to be "published in correspondence with the *London Statesman*," and is not in any way connected with the article referred to. At the same time, the subject is one which we have frequently discussed, and our readers will share our satisfaction in hearing that there is to be an official investigation into the whole matter. This is doubtless what the *London Statesman* desired, and we only hope that the investigation will be *bonâ fide* and thorough. To be so it must not be left to the officials of the Government of India. It is not a sham inquiry, like that which was made last year into the Mysore jewel scandal, that can do any good, and it is to be hoped that the Secretary of State will see to it that the investigation shall be conducted by a thoroughly independent body. The way to ensure a real disclosure of the whole facts of the case would doubtless be for Sir Richard Meade to bring a civil action against Mr. Knight, but if there is really an honest desire on the part of the authorities to have the case fully and fairly investigated, the official inquiry cannot but bear good fruit, whether it lead to the establishment of the truth or the falsehood of the *London Statesman's* charges. The article is contained in the July number of that periodical, and gives the history of the whole question of the Hyderabad Contingent and the controversy about the Berars. The portion of the article which will form the special subject of inquiry will probably be that which describes the manner in which the present Co-Regent, the Amir-i-Kabeer, was appointed to his high office, the manner in which he has acted since his appointment, and the conduct of the Resident, Sir Richard Meade, in connection therewith. A few extracts from the article will show those who have not read it how serious are the charges brought against the Government and the Resident :—

"Sir Richard Meade, when recommending Wikar-ool-Oomra for the position of Co-Regent, was fully acquainted with that nobleman's previous history, with the proscription from which he had been but partially relieved in 1869, and with very recent instances of his incurable hostility to the cause of good order and to the first principles of regular government. The more serious and unequivocal instances of Wikar-ool-Oomra's misconduct were on record in our own archives ; the plot for the personation of the Resident's wife by the woman Murray in 1861, with all its incidents of bribery and deception, had been judicially investigated at the Residency. It was on being "found guilty" of this corrupt and nefarious intrigue that the sentence of "complete political extinction" had been pronounced against Wikar-ool-Oomra. Moreover, the records of Sir Richard Meade's own office accused Wikar-ool-Oomra of having been closely connected with Moulwee Ala-ood-Deen, who organized the attack on the Residency in 1857, which, had it been successful, would have spread the flames of the mutiny over all Southern India ; of having, in 1858, harboured and comforted mutineers and rebels against the British Government, and of having on several other occasions been suspiciously allied with disaffected persons and even with dangerous criminals.

"At this very critical conjuncture (about the 22nd of September 1877) Sir Richard Meade took a trip by railway to a junction-station about 120 miles from Hyderabad, to pay a flying visit to Lord Lytton, who was on his way to Mysore. On the Resident's return a message was conveyed to Sir Salar Jung, we may be sure by an indirect channel, to the effect that full powers having now been obtained from the Viceroy, if he again refused to acquiesce in the "final orders," *his arrest and deportation to Madras* by a special train, on the Nizam's own State railway, would follow. When one of these master-strokes of "political" cajolery or coercion is undertaken, the communication is always verbal if possible, or, if anything must be written, a private and familiar note from an inferior hand is chosen, and the official form avoided. We are not, therefore, in a position to give absolute proof of the authenticity or authority of this disgraceful threat, the reality of which was widely talked of in Hyderabad ; but although we do not believe the actual perpetration of the outrage to have been intended, Sir Salar Jung himself undoubtedly believed it. Having already been told that a man of the character and antecedents of Wikar-ool-Oomra would be installed, in defiance of the Durbar, without pretext



or warrant, he no doubt assumed that the Resident had full permission to proceed to any extremities, and may well have argued that his duty now lay in submission, for if he resisted until he was made a prisoner the administrative independence of the State would be utterly destroyed, and the reign of unrestrained reaction and corruption instituted. The calculation on which the menace was hazarded proved to be correct. The Minister gave in."

The story is then told of the alleged spoliation by the Amir-i-Kabeer of his nephews, and Sir Richard Meade's conduct is represented in a very unfavourable light :—

"Very soon after the Ameer's appointment his power to sway Sir Richard Meade became evident. Confident of the Resident's support, and intoxicated with the power conferred upon him, he quickly determined to wrest from his nephews the very property inherited by them from their father and uncle, which Sir Richard Meade had pledged himself should be respected. The young men urged these pledges upon the Resident, and upon his Assistant, Major Euan Smith. The Resident was bound, they pointed out, to make the Ameer respect his pledges, for he was a party to them in the way we have already described. They had withdrawn their own candidature, and their opposition to the Ameer's appointment to the Co-Regency, on the faith of the Resident's assurances that no attempt should be made by the Ameer on their possessions. In defiance of all these pledges, the Ameer, shortly after his appointment, made a demand upon them, for which he did not even allege a pretext, for the transfer to himself of estates yielding a revenue of £25,000 a year, and the Resident urged the nephews to let him have their property, 'for the sake of not creating strife.' We make no comment upon the transaction.

"The success of his first operation opened the Ameer's eyes to the full value of a British Resident whom he could thus use to disarm resistance against his exactions. He now asserted that he was in want of ready money, and straightway made a requisition of £50,000 upon the young men for the 'support of his dignity.' The Residency screw was again applied on his behalf and the money paid, in the vain hope that exaction would be carried no further without being finally stopped by a British officer of the high rank of the Hyderabad Resident, holding the blue ribbon of the Indian political service.

"But the robbery of the £50,000 was hardly effected than another demand followed. The claim now made upon his nephews' inheritance was for the magnificent suburban house and grounds, with hanging gardens, artificial lakes, and labyrinths, called the Jehannooma, the most attractive place of Hyderabad. Incredible as it must seem, the Resident supported the monstrous exaction, and once more had the hapless nephews to submit.

"But Wikar-ool-Oomra divined that his power to use the British Resident was by no means exhausted. His appetite 'grew by what it fed on.' The Resident was to be a party to complicity in outrage on a grander scale.

"This was the forcible seizure of two estates still held by the nephews, worth £40,000 a year. The nephews appealed to the Resident.

"The reply of the infatuated officer, dated 13th June, consisted of a direct refusal to receive their representation on the subject, thereby simply giving a *carte blanche* to the Ameer to do what he pleased."

Other similar, if not stronger, passages occur, and the story of the spoliation of the nephews is thus concluded :—

"No more scandalous perversion of justice was ever associated with the administration of a civilized Government. The result is that in the State of Hyderabad, and in every part of India where the facts are known, the very idea of justice emanating from a British officer is scoffed and jeered at, and we now expressly charge Sir Richard Meade with inflicting this shame upon our nation."

We shall give but one more passage, and perhaps it may be this passage which Sir Richard Meade specially desires to have cleared up :—

"Who can wonder that the ex-Resident's name is associated with rumours of the most painful character in that city? We shall not conceal, for we ought not

to conceal, the fact that rumours have been prevalent at Hyderabad for the past three years which unless explained are fatal to the character both of the Resident and of Major Euan Smith. Incidents, the full particulars of which are in our possession, which demand explanation, and which may be explainable as innocent on their merits, though hardly defensible in any case against the charge of unaccountable imprudence, are necessarily invested by public suspicion with the most sinister aspects, especially when there is on the face of the transactions generally so much that is difficult to account for."

We have given enough to show that an inquiry is really needed. Such charges ought either to be established or refuted. Sir Richard Meade's desire for an investigation seems to show that he believes himself able to refute them, and, for the honour of the Government he serves, it is to be hoped he may succeed in doing so.

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THE TIMES OF INDIA, August 30, 1881.—*Politics and Parliament*.—The following is from our political correspondent, dated London, August 12:—

The slashing articles on the Berar question which have appeared in the magazine edited by Mr. Robert Knight contain accusations of so serious a nature that it will be impossible to ignore them. I understand that a paper has been drawn up furnishing twenty-two reasons why the papers respecting the Nizam's applications for the restoration of the provinces should be produced; and the character of this document may be judged from the following, which is the last in the long array:—"That since the scandalous appointment of a Co-Regent, the Resident, in return, as may be supposed, for Wikar-ool-Oomra's services in hampering and embarrassing Sir Salar Jung, has connived at and abetted him in the most flagrant acts of spoliation and outrage, whereby a state of civil war has been repeatedly produced in the Nizam's country within the last two years, and has suborned a mockery of judicial procedure, whereby his own character and that of British justice have been brought into shame and contempt." Sir David Wedderburn moves on Monday an address for returns of all the amounts, either in cash or as annual revenues, from territories permanently ceded or permanently or temporarily assigned to the British Government by the Hyderabad State, which have been received by the British authorities in India as consideration for the pay and maintenance of two separate military forces for the service of that State, known respectively as the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and the Hyderabad Contingent; also, of the number of officers and men of all arms which constituted these two forces respectively from year to year, from their establishment up to the latest date readily available; also, of the active military services rendered by each force respectively to the Nizam in maintaining the internal tranquillity of the Hyderabad State, with the nature and dates of such active services and the numerical strength of the bodies of men who took part therein." It is improbable that Sir David will get all he wants from the India Office; for in the course of an incidental reply to Sir George Balfour last night Lord Hartington said it was impossible to say whether any and what papers on the subject could be laid on the table. There were, said His Lordship, certainly a great number of papers: "Some were of an extremely confidential character, and he had no hesitation in saying it would be impossible to lay them on the table." Mr. Richard asked the Secretary of State for India last night whether his attention had been called to an article in the July number of the *Statesman* entitled "The Restitution of Berar," and to the statements in that article as to the conduct of the ex-British-Resident, Sir Richard Meade, in forcing on the Nizam's Minister, Sir Salar Jung, as his colleague in the Regency, one Wikar-ool-Oomra, an alleged enemy of that Minister and of the British Government; and whether the Government can state the reasons which dictated that appointment; whether he has observed the narratives, in the same article, of the said British Resident supporting alleged spoliations and violent proceedings of Wikar-ool-Oomra since his appointment; and whether he will take steps to secure that the inquiry now proceeding shall be thoroughly independent and searching in its character, by not allowing any of the indirectly implicated officials

to take part in it." The reply of Lord Hartington is miserably reported in the London newspapers, the interest and importance of the matter being totally unappreciated in ordinary Fleet Street circles. However, the gist of His Lordship's statement was this, that the article contains imputations of the gravest character on the ex-British-Resident, charging him, in a manner scarcely disguised, with misconduct and actual corruption; that Sir Richard Meade, a very distinguished officer, hitherto of unblemished character, has practically retired from the Indian service, but that as soon as he saw the article he communicated with Lord Hartington declaring that many of the statements in the *Statesman's* attack were falsehoods, and that others were gross misrepresentations. Further, that Sir Richard Meade had placed himself in the hands of the Government of India (to whom that officer was responsible, and by whose authority and approval he acted), expressing a desire that such steps should be taken as they might deem proper to ascertain what grounds there were for the imputations that had been made against him. The understanding amongst the Anglo-Indians in the House is that a full and exhaustive inquiry has been decided upon in common justice to Sir Richard Meade, but it is not likely to extend to the questions of political expediency which the writer in Mr. Knight's magazine desired to raise.

BOMBAY GAZETTE, August 30, 1881.—The following is from our own correspondent, who signs himself J. M. M., dated London, August 12 :—

You have, no doubt, already seen the extraordinary article in last month's *Statesman* about the Berar question, and the treatment Sir Salar Jung received at the hands of Lord Lytton and Sir Richard Meade. The paper is written with so much earnestness and force that it has created a considerable impression in political circles here; and Lord Hartington's reply to Mr. Richard's question last night shows that the Government feels Mr. Robert Knight's charges are too serious and precise to be passed over without an answer. I hope it will turn out that the grosser accusations urged by Mr. Knight against certain British officials are unfounded. As for the political aspect of the case, I have no doubt Sir R. Meade will be able to show that Sir Salar Jung was not altogether the injured innocent he is represented to have been by his devoted champion. It is satisfactory to know that there is to be a full inquiry, for the gossip of native courts, if allowed to go uncontradicted, very often makes mountains out of molehills.

BOMBAY GAZETTE, August 31, 1881.—*Indian Affairs in Parliament.*—*Sir R. Meade and Sir Salar Jung.*—Mr. Richard asked the Secretary of State for India whether his attention had been called to an article in the July number of the *Statesman* entitled "The Restitution of Berar," and to the statements in that article as to the conduct of the ex-British-Resident, Sir Richard Meade, in forcing on the Nizam's Minister, Sir Salar Jung, as his colleague in the Regency, one Vikar-ool-Omra, an alleged enemy of that Minister and of the British Government; and whether the Government could state the reasons that dictated that appointment; whether he had observed the narrative in the same article of the conduct of the said ex-British-Resident in supporting alleged spoliation and violent proceedings of Vikar-ool-Omra since his appointment; and whether he would cause a full inquiry to be made by independent persons into the facts alleged in this article.

The Marquis of Hartington said it was perfectly impossible for him to give anything like a complete answer to the statements contained in the article, which he had seen, and which related to a very complicated matter. It was written with the avowed object of advocating a restitution of Berar to the Nizam. It contained a series of most violent attacks upon the conduct of the Government of India during the whole of the present century, and indeed during the whole of the past century, towards the Government of the Nizam. With regard to the specific point referred to in the question, the conduct of the ex-British-Resident, Sir R. Meade, in the appointment of the Nawab Vikar-ool-Omra as Co-Regent with Salar Jung, that appointment was made not by Sir R. Meade, but by the Government of India, whose proceedings were approved by the Secretary of State at the time. It was

impossible for him to enter into an account of the reason of the appointment, which was the subject of a very full report, but he might briefly say that the main object was to adhere to the spirit of the arrangement which was come to in 1869, he thought, when it was decided to associate with the Regent, who was a very distinguished representative of the official classes at Hyderabad, a representative of the Hyderabad nobility. Whether what was done was done rightly or wrongly, it was done undoubtedly by Sir R. Meade, but not upon his responsibility; he could not be held personally responsible for it. With regard to the alleged spoliations and violent proceedings of the Nawab Vikar-ool-Omra since his appointment, those allegations appeared to be made entirely on the foundation of a memorial which had been presented to the Indian Government by the nephews of Vikar-ool-Omra. He had never seen the memorial. It was, no doubt, in the possession of the Government of India, and the Government of India would, if necessary, make a report upon it. The article contained imputations which were very grave on the character of the ex-British-Resident, Sir R. Meade. It charged him, in a manner scarcely disguised, with misconduct and actual corruption. Sir R. Meade was a very distinguished officer, and hitherto of unblemished character. (Hear.) He was at present on leave, and had practically retired from the Indian service. He was on the Continent, and this article had only just reached him. He had heard from him on the subject. He said that many of the statements contained in the article were falsehoods, and that others were gross misrepresentations. With regard to the charges against himself, he said he thought his proper course would be to place himself in the hands of the Government of India, desiring them to take such steps as they might deem proper to ascertain what grounds there were for the imputations that had been made against him. He had accordingly addressed the Government of India. It would be highly improper for him (the Marquis of Hartington) to take any steps in the matter until he knew what the views of the Government of India on the subject were. (Hear.)

In answer to Sir G. Balfour,

The Marquis of Hartington said it was impossible to say whether any and what papers on the subject could be laid on the table. There were certainly a great number of papers. Some were of an extremely confidential character, and he had no hesitation in saying it would be impossible to lay them on the table.

BOMBAY GAZETTE, *September 3, 1881*.—We give to-day in another column the substance of the violent attack on the conduct of Sir Richard Meade during his tenure of office at Hyderabad which has recently appeared in the columns of the *London Statesman*. In doing so we are actuated by feelings similar, so far as we can judge, to those with which an indictment that does not begin or end with Sir Richard Meade and his stay at Hyderabad, has been received by the highest authorities at home. The Editor of the *Statesman* is no anonymous slanderer; and while the passionate conviction that speaks in every line of his paper suggests the welcome thought that he has allowed his zeal to get the better of his discretion, and while all must share the satisfaction with which, it is evident, the Marquis of Hartington pointed to the fact that the gravest of the charges against Sir Richard Meade personally rest at present on nothing more than the allegations set forth in a memorial which has been presented to the Government of India by the nephews of the Nawab Vikar-ool-Oomra, it is impossible to treat the statements made in this article in any other light than as put forward *bonâ fide* by a responsible writer. But if Mr. Knight is no anonymous slanderer, Sir Richard Meade on the other hand is all that the Marquis of Hartington claimed for him—a very distinguished officer, hitherto of unblemished character; and it must be obvious that while the charges, if sustained, will undoubtedly affect Sir Richard Meade personally, the gravamen of the indictment, in everything but the charge of personal corruption, which Mr. Knight ought not, in our opinion, to have referred to if he was not prepared to vouch for it or disclaim it, lies against the high officials from whom Sir Richard Meade took his orders. Sir Richard Meade must not be permitted to be made

the scapegoat of a policy which he did not initiate, and for which he cannot be held personally responsible. With this proviso we confess that we think it for the public interests that the charges against the Calcutta Foreign office which underlie the whole of this article should receive a full and open investigation. The Marquis of Hartington, in reply to the question put to him by Mr. Richard, stated that Sir Richard Meade, who was on the continent, had informed him that with regard to the charges made against himself he thought his proper course would be to place himself in the hands of the Government of India, desiring them to take such steps as they might think proper to ascertain what grounds there were for the imputation that had been made against him. The Secretary of State added that Sir Richard Meade had accordingly addressed the Government of India in that sense, and that it would be highly improper on his (the Marquis of Hartington's) part to take any steps in the matter until he knew what the views of the Government of India on the subject were. The line thus marked out for himself by Sir Richard Meade is of course from his point of view the proper one. Mr. Knight's accusations, with the exception we have already made, have only a very secondary reference to himself, and it would be "obviously improper" in him to take any steps of which he had not given the Government of India due notice. We have, however, excellent authority for stating that when the reference to the Government of India has been completed, the Secretary of State, whether that step may be recommended by the Indian Government or not, will permit or invite Sir Richard Meade to take the whole matter into a public court of justice by bringing an action for libel against Mr. Knight. Every facility—including what sanction may be required for the issue of a commission to take evidence in Hyderabad itself—will be given to the two parties to the suit. We shall hope to find that Mr. Knight—as indeed he admits may be the case—has fallen unwittingly into error, and more especially in those parts of his statement of which Sir Richard Meade has most reason to complain. We have no doubt at all indeed that the charge of personal corruption, which the Marquis of Hartington sees in some part of Mr. Knight's statements, will be disclaimed at the outset of the proceedings. But whatever the issue to Sir Richard Meade and Lord Lytton may be of the proceedings which are in contemplation, the public interests, whether of the Paramount Power or of the Hyderabad State, must be advantaged by a full disclosure of all the facts of this long, bitter and most unfortunate controversy.

BOMBAY GAZETTE, *September 6, 1881*.—The following is from our own correspondent, dated London, 19th August :—

I have been reading with some attention the article in the *Statesman* on "The Restitution of Berar," to which I referred briefly last week. I pass over all that Mr. Knight says on the Berar question, because that controversy is by general consent closed till the Nizam comes of age, and because the real object of the paper seems to be disclosed in the concluding part, in which the Ameer-i-Kabeer is attacked for having forcibly deprived his nephews of a large portion of their property in the Hyderabad States. This indictment is apparently founded on a memorial prepared by the legal adviser of the "despoiled Princes," Mr. Tyrrel Leith of Bombay; and Mr. Knight has done no more than extend Mr. Leith's brief. I suppose, however, that Mr. Leith is not answerable for the following sentences, in which Sir Richard Meade and Major Euan Smith are distinctly charged with corrupt conduct :—"Who can wonder that the ex-Resident's name is associated with rumours of the most painful character in the city? We shall not conceal, for we ought not to conceal, the fact that rumours have been prevalent at Hyderabad for the past three years which unless explained *are fatal to the character both of the Resident and of Major Euan Smith.*" That such a charge should be brought against Sir Richard Meade, of all men, is laughable; and I am sure Mr. Knight will be obliged ere long to acknowledge that his credulity has been imposed upon.—J. M. M.

**TIMES OF INDIA, September 6, 1881.**—The following is from our political correspondent, dated London, 19th August :—

On Monday night Sir George Balfour asked the Secretary of State for India if he would cause a selection of papers for a long series of years connected with the Government of the Nizam to be laid before Parliament, in order that the real state of the relations of that State with the Government of India might be known, and that the animadversions on the honour and character of the Indian Government and of Indian officers might be cleared away or substantiated by the publication of these official documents. Sir George explained that he had put this question because he believed—and beyond a doubt he expressed a very general feeling—the time had come when the Government of India ought no longer to maintain silence on this matter. He, therefore, very earnestly urged Lord Hartington to give a satisfactory reply. Mr. Onslow interposed with the remark that, as these papers would require some time to get ready, the House would like to hear whether the Secretary of State or Indian Government “had the slightest idea that any of these allegations could be verified.” To this last question Lord Hartington was apparently indisposed to give a direct reply. He said, in fact, that he could add nothing to his statement of last week ; but there was no expression of opinion in that statement upon the points raised by Mr. Onslow. As to the papers for which Sir George Balfour asked, His Lordship reminded the House that a few days ago, when replying to a question put to him without notice, he stated that he felt certain that the greater part of these documents were of so confidential a character that it would be absolutely impossible, consistently with the public interest, to lay them on the table. Further examination of them has convinced Lord Hartington of the truth of his first impression ; and although it would be quite possible to procure some of the papers, the great bulk of them, and these the most important, cannot possibly be produced. His Lordship added that it was possible that the Government of India, or the late Resident at Hyderabad, might think it necessary to make some statement with reference to the animadversions referred to. If any such statement should be made, supported by the correspondence, he would, of course, consider whether it should be laid on the table, but without communication with the Government of India he could not give any more definite reply.

Although nothing more has since transpired on this subject in the House of Commons, there is a general expectation that Lord Hartington and the Indian Government will agree that a full and exhaustive inquiry shall take place into the scandals which have arisen respecting the restitution of Berar to His Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad ; and the result will certainly be awaited with great interest in Anglo-Indian circles at home. Your readers are aware that the question has lately been brought under public notice at home by Mr. Robert Knight, whose ferocious enthusiasm for exposing Indian Government abuses has led him into some expensive literary enterprises in London. In a series of articles couched in the “slashing” language of an older generation than now, Mr. Knight has written, or, more correctly, published, an array of the gravest charges against not only the native intriguers who infest the Court of the Nizam, and who have long covertly sought the destruction and death of the Regent, Sir Salar Jung, but also against Sir Richard Meade and other high officials of the Indian Government. Pending the official inquiry, and the action which has been and is being taken by Sir David Wedderburn, Mr. Richard, Sir George Balfour, and other members of Parliament, it is emphatically reiterated that the Nizam has been contemptuously treated by the Supreme Government, and that his repeated appeals have been passed over with insolent silence ; that the Home Government has been intentionally deceived by the suppression and even the falsification of documents ; that certain persons notoriously disaffected both to the British Power and to the cause of order and good government in the Hyderabad State, and known to be so hostile to Sir Salar Jung as to have repeatedly attempted his assassination, have been ostentatiously favoured by Sir Richard Meade ; and that the chief of these nobles, Wikar-ool-Oomra (who had been attainted by the Government of India itself and condemned to “complete political extinction” by Lord Canning for being involved in a plot to

bribe the Resident's wife to use her influence to compass Sir Salar Jung's overthrow), was forced upon the Nizam as Co-Regent with Sir Salar Jung; that the Resident, in return, as the *Statesman* insinuates, "for Wikar-ool-Oomra's services in hampering and embarrassing Sir Salar Jung, has connived at and abetted him in the most flagrant acts of spoliation and outrage, whereby a state of civil war has been repeatedly produced in the Nizam's country within the last two years, and has suborned a mockery of judicial procedure, whereby his own character and that of British justice have been brought into shame and contempt." I mentioned in my last letter that Sir Richard Meade was absent on the Continent when this unmeasured attack was delivered, but as soon as he became aware of it instantly placed himself in the hands of the Indian Government, for them to take such steps as they may deem proper to clear him from charges which he declares to be either ingenious perversions of the truth or else malignant falsehoods,

DELHI GAZETTE, *September 7, 1881.*—The Hyderabad "Tale of Shame."—We have carefully perused Mr. Knight's article on Sir Richard Meade, and must admire the pluck if not the wisdom with which he has begun an attack that must disclose a mass of information which would otherwise have been lost to the public.

The story of the appointment of Wikar-ool-Oomra as Co-Regent has been often told. That gentleman had made himself obnoxious to the British Government in former years by his supposed participation in a design against the Residency in 1857, and also in other transactions of an equally questionable nature. Time, however, in his case as in that of so many others, seems to have succeeded in whitewashing acts at one time deemed inexpiable, for the man whose "political extinction" had been determined on in 1861 became the trusted friend of the British Government in 1877. So far the facts are beyond dispute, being based upon official records. It is with Wikar-ool-Oomra's conduct *after* his restoration to favour that the gravamen of Mr. Knight's charge lies, and certainly if his statements be true a state of things existed little short of the Bulgarian atrocities, almost under the shadow of the British flag at Hyderabad. The following extract from a petition addressed to the Resident by the inhabitants of certain districts forcibly taken possession of by the new Co-Regent deserves perusal:—

The Ameer's troops were "pulling down their houses for firewood, foraging their horses on their harvests, loopholing their principal buildings, ravishing their women shamefully, and without distinguishing between respectable women and those who are not such;" and adding, "at present one or two women are in a dying state from the harsh usage committed on their persons by the Rohillas."

To this petition Sir Richard Meade is said to have replied, after an interval of five days, by an endorsement as follows:—

"Petitioners are informed that they can make their own representations to His Highness's Government, or the several Nawabs named by them. The Resident cannot interfere, as *he has no knowledge of the facts.*"

The passage we have italicized betrays as great a confusion of ideas on the part of Sir Richard Meade as was displayed about the same time by Lords Salisbury and Beaconsfield in regard to similar transactions in Turkey. Ignorance is put forward as an excuse for neglect of duty, and against offenders who are in power the sufferers are bidden to apply for redress to the culprits themselves!

With the alleged acts of spoliation carried on by Wikar-ool-Oomra against the possessions of his nephews, one of which led to the outrages above described, the general public is mainly interested on account of the terrible results to the unfortunate villagers, who fall a prey to the contending factions. Indian nobles not infrequently indulge in the habit of annexing each other's property, especially when they are nearly related, and in the absence of any clearly defined code of law or morality it is perhaps too much to expect that the demands of strict justice will always be adhered to. But under a British Government there can be no excuse for turning loose a body of armed mercenaries to harry a helpless peasantry. Without going into the question as to whether Wikar-ool-Oomra or his nephews were the rightful owners of the villages so harried, it was incumbent on Sir Richard



Meade to have satisfied himself whether the alleged atrocities had taken place or not. If he really wrote the endorsement that is attributed to him, that fact alone demands the closest inquiry on the part of the Viceroy and Secretary of State. The blessings of British rule are a farce if "cannot interfere" is to be a stereotyped reply in such cases.

In another column will be found Sir Salar Jung's denial of the deportation scare we alluded to in a former issue.

PIONEER, *September 8, 1881*.—A guileless member of Parliament was found to fire off a question at the Indian Secretary on the subject of the *Statesman's* last attack on Hyderabad affairs. Perhaps, as the matter has thus been brought to the front, it may be worth while to look up the article referred to, and explore the mysteries of Mr. Knight's last mare's-nest. At the date of Mr. Richard's question in Parliament Lord Hartington seems to have been unprepared with the means of giving a definite reply. Naturally a minister can only indicate general suspicions as to the accuracy of each new *canard* that the *Statesman* may amuse itself by flying. It is easy to make assertions if one does not mind being convicted, over and over again, of circulating groundless calumnies; it is impossible to contradict any one of these definitely until time has been wasted in instituting laborious inquiries. This is the way in which unprincipled slander can, to a certain extent, be made to pay in English politics. However, we should think that members of Parliament willing to play the humble part that has been assigned to Mr. Richard must now be few and far between. An official and flat contradiction of what the *Statesman* says will be found in another column.

TIMES OF INDIA, *September 19, 1881*.—The Lahore paper regrets that the Berar question is to be reopened. "To discuss the restoration of Berar to the Nizam's Government is pure nonsense; it is highly immoral; the subject should be closed once and for all with a straightforward declaration that Berar, having so long enjoyed the advantages of English administration,—having, in short, become to all intents and purposes a British Province,—can never be allowed to fall again under native rule. All this trifling of humanitarian statesmanship with what it is pleased to regard as native 'rights' creates vast mischief. It excites hopes which if realized would cause the relapse of large portions of India into barbarism. The humanitarian statesman is, in this instance at any rate, infinitely more dangerous than his rival the 'Jingo.' The latter, at all events, proceeds on the wholesome rule of the survival of the fittest; the former argues on principles which, if carried out to their conclusion, imply the equality of men and apes."

TIMES OF INDIA, *September 20, 1881*.—According to native gossip in Hyderabad, Sir Stuart Bayley's sudden departure for England on three months' leave is not wholly unconnected with Mr. Robert Knight's charges against the late Resident. A well-known official of the Berars, Major E. J. Gunthorpe, goes home in the same steamer as the Resident to-day.

TIMES OF INDIA, *March 15, 1882*.—*Sir Richard Meade's Case*.—In the House of Commons on the 23rd ultimo Viscount Baring (son of Lord Northbrook) asked the Secretary of State for India, with reference to his answer in the House of Commons on August 11 last, whether he had been placed in possession of the views of the Government of India in regard to certain allegations made last year in the *Statesman* magazine derogatory to the character of Sir Richard Meade, late Resident at Hyderabad; and if so, what action he had taken in the matter.

The Marquis of Hartington.—A report on this matter was received from the Government of India in October last to the effect that, in their opinion, it was conclusively proved by papers in their possession that in the transactions called in question in the *Statesman* articles Sir Richard Meade had acted under the orders and in entire accordance with the wishes of the Government of India, and that throughout a long and difficult period that officer had been animated with a single



desire to discharge his duty zealously and faithfully. The Government of India stated that Sir R. Meade's career in India had been that of a zealous and upright public servant, that they retained an entire and unshaken confidence in his integrity and honour, and considered the imputations of corrupt conduct brought against him in the articles in question to be without foundation. I desire to add that Sir R. Meade was personally anxious that legal proceedings should be instituted in order to give him the opportunity of denying on oath in the witness-box the charges made against him, and the Government of India supported this wish. I, however, considered that this course would be attended with no advantage unless I was prepared to produce in Court the confidential papers connected with the transactions called in question; and, as I have stated on former occasions, I do not think that this would, at the present time, be for the benefit of the public service. I also considered that this course was wholly unnecessary for the vindication of Sir R. Meade's character, and I caused an intimation to that effect to be sent to that officer with an expression of my entire concurrence in the opinion recorded by the Government of India as to his public services and personal integrity. I have reason to believe that Sir Richard Meade is quite satisfied with the action thus taken, but I am glad to have the opportunity of making this statement.

Mr. Ouslow asked whether the report of the Indian Government could not be published in the *Calcutta Gazette*.

The Marquis of Hartington.—No, sir, that course would be inconvenient, as the report that was sent home contained confidential papers, which it is not desirable to publish.

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TIMES OF INDIA, May 18, 1882.—*The Berars Question*.—The following is from our own correspondent, dated London, 17th instant :—

Mr. Reid has given notice in the House of Commons that on the 2nd of June he will move that an address be presented to the Queen asking Her Majesty to instruct the Governor-General to disband the Hyderabad Contingent and to restore the Berars to the Nizam.

DECCAN TIMES, May 30, 1882.—*Restoration of the Berars*.—A London correspondent of the *Bombay Gazette*, who is likely to be well informed on the subject, gives a startling yet pleasing piece of information, which will be very gratifying to all connected with the Hyderabad Government, as well as to all the subjects of His Highness the Nizam. The information given is that the Berar question has already been practically settled by the Home Government, and that the province will be restored to the Nizam's rule when His Highness comes of age, some two years hence! We are further informed that the Hyderabad Contingent will not be disbanded, but will be considerably reduced, and that a native administration will be gradually introduced into the Berars in substitution of the present European administration.

The question of the rendition of the Berars has always been a very delicate one, regarding which, we need not refrain from saying, very strained feelings at all times existed between the Imperial and the Hyderabad Governments. It would serve no purpose, now that the question is about to be so happily settled, to give a *resumé* of the case from its beginning. It suffices to say that the circumstances under which the province was temporarily ceded to the British Government are completely altered; in fact they may be said to exist no longer. The debt to the Imperial Government has long since been liquidated from Berar revenues; the Contingent Troops have been regularly paid, and for some time past there has been an average yearly surplus of about *twelve lacs* of rupees, which has been regularly handed over to the Hyderabad Government. That the Assigned Districts have greatly improved under healthy British administration there can be no question. The proof is apparent from the result that in the quarter-century the province has been so administered the revenues have increased from 30 to 90 lacs. It has been remarked by some that the restoration of the Berars, though in itself a matter of right and justice, would be injurious to the well-being of that province,

and that on its reversion to Moglai administration the revenue would gradually fall off from the handsome figure at which it now stands. This we think to be a fallacious theory which may be easily disposed of. While admitting the present administrative machinery in Berar to be of a superior kind to that obtaining in other portions of the Nizam's dominions, yet the financial results of both administrations, according to published reports, appear to be pretty much the same. While the Berar revenues under British Government have risen from 30 to 90 *lacs*, during the same period the revenues of the rest of His Highness's territory have also trebled, having gone up from less than a *crore* to three *crores* of rupees.

This latter result is highly creditable to the administrative talents of Sir Salar Jung, especially so when we admit that the machinery by which the Hyderabad State is administered is certainly of an inferior type to that existing in British India. There is no fulsome flattery in saying that the Prime Minister, in spite of many difficulties he has to contend with, has effected, within the last fifteen or twenty years, very great reforms in the various departments of Government. It is equally true that very much remains to be done in the way of reforms. Our correspondent Junius was in a great measure correct when he referred to peculation and corruption prevailing in departments of the State. Doubtless many Government officials there are, mostly among the lesser grades, English as well as native, possessed of neither departmental qualifications nor honest principles, who yet by various means have effected an entrance into the Nizam's service. These sickly sheep infect the character of the entire flock, and a whole department is often sweepingly vilified on account of the rascalities of a certain few. The Government would do well to carefully search out and weed from the service these harpies on the public revenues. On the other hand, we are bound to admit that the Minister has been fortunate, in several instances, in securing for the Hyderabad Government European talent of a high order. Able and upright officials like Major Percy Gough, Messrs. Wilkinson and Trevor, and a few others, would be a credit and ornament to any Government ; and it is more officials of this description that the Hyderabad State requires.

To return to our subject, from which we have somewhat digressed. It appears that the question of the restoration of the Berars to the Nizam's Government was not very long ago taken up earnestly by Mr. Herbert Gladstone, and that he had intended to broach the subject in the House of Commons ; but he found that, owing to his being the son of the Premier, there were serious objections to his adopting that course. He therefore handed over the subject to Mr. Reid, M.P., and asked him to lay the question before the house. If, however, the restoration of the Berars has already been determined by the English Government, there would seem no particular necessity for stirring the question in Parliament, unless it be for the purpose of eliciting from the Secretary of State for India (the subject being so important a one) a formal statement of the grounds upon which the restoration of the province is made.

DECCAN TIMES, June 1, 1882.—*Restoration of the Berars, and the Nizam's visit to England.*—In our issue of Tuesday we informed our readers, on the authority of a London correspondent of the *Bombay Gazette*, that the Home Government had decided on the restoration of the Berars to the Nizam's Government on the occasion of the installation of His Highness, some two years hence. This information, the same journal now tells us, is confirmed by private information received from Simla ; any lingering doubts, therefore, as to the certainty of the measure may now be banished, and the restitution of the assigned districts to the Hyderabad Government—so long a burning question and the subject of much diplomatic fencing for many years—may now be said to be satisfactorily set at rest for ever. We wonder how this news will be received by the official establishments in Berar ; many will very possibly regret the approaching transfer, while others, there is no doubt, among the native officials especially, will be glad to work under a Government less systematic and strict than the British Government.

We believe that the existing administrative staff need have no misgivings as to the security of their various appointments, or as regards their prospects in the service. It is not likely that the Hyderabad Government, on the happy occasion of the restitution of the country, would be desirous to get rid of the establishments who have done such good service, and produced such excellent tangible results, merely for the purpose of substituting a number of their own subjects, who of course will look upon the restored districts as fresh fields and pastures new wherein to find Government employment. We have reason to believe that, as was done by H. H. the Maharajah's Government in Mysore, the existing establishments in Berar, at the time of its transfer, will remain as they are, and native officials will only be introduced as appointments fall vacant, in course of time.

Our contemporary, whose news from the Indian Olympus may always be relied upon, further intimates that, notwithstanding the various doubts and denials on the subject, it seems certain that H. H. the Nizam will proceed to England next spring, and that His Excellency Sir Salar Jung will accompany his master. This is also good news, and very probably on the return of the Regent from Simla we shall hear of preparations for the journey, on a scale befitting the rank and circumstance of the leading Independent Prince in India. A more fitting occasion could hardly occur than the present one for His Highness's visit to England and introduction to the Queen-Empress. The one sore question of years, the restitution of the Ceded Districts, having been at least settled to the complete satisfaction of the Hyderabad Government, both the young Nizam and his devoted Prime Minister (the dream of whose life has been the recovery of the Berars for his Sovereign) will visit England with joyful hearts. Everything appears most propitious to make the visit a happy one—the good health and eager desire of the young Prince to make the visit to England; a great improvement in the government of the State to what it was even a decade back; a steadily increasing revenue; and, above all, the promised restoration of the Berars, and the most cordial relations now existing between the Hyderabad Government and the Government of India. We heartily congratulate His Highness and the Hyderabad Government on the present very bright and promising state of affairs, so different from what they were barely two years ago, and in marked contrast to the distracted condition of things in other Mahomedan countries, such as Turkey, Afghanistan and Egypt, which are not under the suzerainty of the British Crown. While most of the leading Governments of the world are at present either alienating the loyalty of their subjects by their arbitrary rule, or watching to seize and rob by force the territories of others, the voluntary restoration of the Principalities of Mysore and Berar to their former rulers, and the granting of Self-Government to the different races that compose the immense population of the Indian Empire, illustrate beyond all praise the high principles of justice and generosity that characterize the Government of Great Britain.

**NATIVE OPINION, July 16, 1882.—*The Restitution of the Berars.***—We suppose it is not quite inconsistent with the principles of the political morality of any civilized government to hand over any portions of territory which a paramount government may happen to hold in trust for a State in subsidiary alliance with it to its proper owner when the purposes for which it was so held have ceased to exist. For in no other light can we now view the so-called successive cession of territories to the British Indian Government by its ever "faithful ally" in one form or another, and unless Her Majesty's Government has the unnatural boldness to declare that, whether the circumstances that led to such cessions of territories were now in existence or not, they were not prepared to return a tract of country so rich and fertile to its proper and lawful owner, the question of restoration seems not to admit of two answers. We have greater confidence in the liberal views and honesty of purpose of the present British cabinet than we could have afforded to place in the now defunct Beaconsfield ministry, and therefore may hope that when the question of the restitution of the Berars is placed before Parliament in a due form and at an opportune moment it cannot fail to evoke a sympathetic, nay, a unanimous

decision in favour of the young Nizam. For when the question was last raised, during the viceroyalty of Lord Lytton, a distinct promise was given at the time that the Berar question would be taken up when H. H. the Nizam would reach his majority, and be duly considered. The time is now at hand, and it is no wonder that the whole Indian public should watch, with all the anxiety of a feeling heart, the solution of the question.

The principal objections that are now and then launched whenever the restitution of this province comes to be discussed by a portion of the British public are that since the province's cession its revenue has been doubly or trebly increased, that a railway line has been built up through it up to Nagpore and is thence to run to Calcutta, and that the Beraris, having once enjoyed the sweets of British rule, would be very unwilling to return to the care of their former ruler. Whatever the palpable value of these may be, one thing is clear, that the very urgency with which these objections are urged against the restoration of the Berars in preference to treaty claims, proves beyond all doubt that even the staunch supporters of the annexation of this province to the British empire have lost all faith in the grounds on which the justification of the cessions has been hitherto upheld. The above change in the public opinion on this question is, we presume, due to a proper and just appreciation of the bearing of the same by the British and a portion of the official public, and we have no doubt that if they were to examine the case more fully and closely with a calm and judicial mind it is quite possible, we believe, that they may more clearly perceive the justness and legality of the claims which the Government of the Nizam has been repeatedly pressing. Few people like the idea of depriving themselves of a valuable possession, however clumsily it may have been obtained, and the British Government is just in the same position; a great moral effort at self-abnegation on their part will be required for returning to the Nizam what he is justly entitled to. We have confidence in the British public opinion that it will be able to drive to their legitimate conclusions certain facts about this Berar question which are based upon strong historical evidence. We do not propose on the present occasion to go into a detailed history of it, showing on how many occasions and under what peculiar circumstances the Government of the Nizam had to cede large tracts of territories for the support of the British contingent that had been posted at his capital to protect his person and make his authority respected in every part of his dominions. Suffice it to say that such cessions of territories were made twice or thrice and for the above purpose only. If this be a fact, as we have no doubt it is, one is naturally disposed to inquire whether one promise from one party entitles him to demand two or three different considerations at three different times. Performance of a contract on such terms may appear to be just to those statesmen only whose antecedents point out to them as the exponents of a policy that has for its first principle acquisition of land at any cost. The Nizam was an independent ruler, and if the presence of the British troops was necessary at his capital to support his authority the transfer of a portion of the Nizam's territory in payment of the services of such soldiers was required but once only. But as matters of fact stand, every time the Nizam stood in need of British help the British contingent at Hyderabad, it is alleged, would not move to do its appointed work before a slice of the Nizam's country, or a money payment, was again made to the British for a reassurance that the contingent would do the work for which it was retained at his capital, and for the payment of whose services arrangements had already been made. It was in this way that while the Nizam's power remained lax, and British protection became all the more indispensable in his case, the British Government took advantage of every opportunity to advance their interests. Such a state of things continued for some time, until after, in 1853, we find the Nizam entering into a fresh engagement with the British Government, handing over to them the province of the Berars for the repayment of his accumulated debts on account of the services of the said contingent.

The question of the repayment of these debts apart, we should like to know whether the time for the sweeping away of this unfortunate contingent has not yet

arrived. When the arrangement for keeping a British contingent at Hyderabad was entered into the Nizam was an independent prince, but his power was disputed by several of his nobles and he was surrounded on many sides by certain enemies. Equally with the Nizam the then Company's Government, though comparatively strong in their military power, had also many hostile rivals to contend against. In a general scramble towards supreme power in India the Nizam is said to have always sided with the British, until he merged his own interests into those of a feudatory chief. And what is his treatment at the hands of his late equals, now his superiors? We wish the British Government should have had the generosity towards their once equal and a "faithful ally" to reconsider the contingent question before the Berar treaty was patched up. It is a sorry exhibition for our rulers to make that while they should profit themselves considerably at the expense of the Nizam they should hold with persistent tenacity to the contingent arrangement, the necessity for which has long since become extinct. The Nizam has no enemies to contend against any longer; there is peace in his dominions, none of his nobles undertaking wilfully to dispute his lawful authority; the affairs of his kingdom are marvellously well managed, and may compare favourably with those of the British Government one of these days. When such is the state of things, where is the necessity of the old Contingent compact? With the cesser of the external and internal difficulties of the Nizam the compact for the contingent's payment falls to the ground; and since the contingent has been paid for three times over why should the Berar compact be at all allowed to continue upon such a false basis?

We have above referred to the general grounds upon which people now-a-days advocate the annexation of the Berars to the British territories. The reasons given are the flimsiest possible. The argument of a railway running through the Berars is simply childish. It is to be remembered by those who urge this objection that, like all Native States, the railway lines whereof are under British control, the line through the Berars will also remain under the jurisdiction of the British power, though the territory may pass to its legitimate ruler. The argument of the Berars' revenue having been raised is equally flimsy. If the Berars under British management pay more, the Hyderabad dominions proper equally pay an increased income now, so that the British Government need entertain no fear of the Berars' falling in pecuniary value when the province comes to be transferred to the Nizam's sway. The third argument, about the people of the Berars not wishing their allegiance to be transferred to the Nizam, is equally worthless. We shall not say much about a portion of the British peasantry having migrated to the Nizam's kingdom during the last famine. But, may we ask, if the British rule is so perfect, how is it that we do not find any numbers of the subjects of Native States migrating to our own territories? The fact of the matter is that while one can always afford to be blind to one's own personal defects he is ever ready to discover those in others to the outside world; and we do not feel much surprised at the line of the arguments the detractors of Hyderabad seem to have chosen for themselves. We, however, hope that when Mr. Reid's motion comes before Parliament for discussion due care is taken to place all the facts of the case before the House, so that they may be enabled to come to a satisfactory determination of this most vexed question.

From Colonel Meadows Taylor's *Story of my Life*, Chapter XIII., 1855-56 :—

Although suffering from a severe attack of acute rheumatism, I with my assistant, Lieut. Cadell, pressed on to Sholapoor, where it was necessary that I should meet the Collector, who congratulated me very heartily on my appointment to the district, which joined his own, and we could work together with good accord, and looked forward to much pleasant intercourse from time to time.

My assistant had no knowledge whatever, or experience, in civil affairs ; but I thought it best to place him at once in a prominent position, and to give him general directions which, as he was very clever and willing, I thought would suffice. I therefore made over to him part of the small establishment I had collected, and directed him to take possession of all the ceded districts which lay along the left bank of the Seenah river, between it and the range of hills that formed the "Bálá Ghát," or upper portion of the whole province ; and with an escort of cavalry he set out to do what he could.

Fortunately the cession had been made at the close of the financial year, so there was no confusion of demand and account between the outgoing administration and the incoming one. I did not anticipate any opposition ; but the British forces at Sholapoor and Ahmednugger had been warned to hold themselves ready to assist me in case any resistance might be made.

Nuldroog had been fixed upon as my head-quarters, and I proceeded there without delay. I found a squadron of the Contingent cavalry encamped without the fort, which was in the possession of a large body of Arabs, who refused to allow the cavalry to enter, and whose temper appeared very doubtful.

At first, too, I was refused admittance. Their chief declared that he held a large mortgage on the fort and its dependencies, and that his men were in arrears of pay, and that until all his demands were settled, or I gave him a guarantee from the British Government that they would be settled, he would not give me up the fort. I however, took no notice of his demands whatever. I told him the Nizam's Government was the only one with which he could have dealings, and that if he and his men did not at once march out I had no resource but to summon the military force at Shorapoor, when I could not answer for the consequences. All the Arabs blustered a great deal, but finally retired inside to consider matters ; and a message was brought to me in the evening to the effect that in the morning the fort would be given up. And so it was ; and as soon as they had bivouacked outside on the esplanade I marched in at the head of my splendid cavalry escort, hoisted the English flag I had with me, and took possession forthwith. I should have regretted exceedingly if the obstinacy of these Arabs had brought about any collision, for their example was looked to by all the various parties of Arabs in the province ; and had they resisted my authority all the rest would have done so too, and the Arab chiefs of Hyderabad were almost in possession of the whole tract.

They held it in assignment for their pay and debts ; and it was a convenient district for them, as fresh men could constantly reach them from Bombay and the coast without attracting observation, and be forwarded to Hyderabad to reinforce the main body. Also many private individuals living at Hyderabad possessed estates and villages in the province, and had mortgaged them to the Arabs—so that in point of fact the whole area was under their control, with very little exception ; and the tenacity with which they stuck to their possessions, whether for arrears of pay or any other monetary consideration, had been too often experienced to be doubted now. The Arabs in my fort of Nuldroog could not have held it against any force, as the guns were useless ; but had they continued their opposition our occupation of the country would have assumed a very different aspect, and might have caused a disturbance and collision with the Arabs at Hyderabad—a consequence which would have had, in all likelihood, serious results.

Although I had often before been at Nuldroog, I had never seen the interior of the fort, nor the English house belonging to it, which had been built by the late Nawab, who in old times had been a great friend of mine. The ladies of his family had used it, and it was now to become my residence. I found it a handsome building,

although not very commodious. In the centre was a large hall, with two semicircular rooms on each side ; above the hall a bedroom of corresponding size, with bath-room attached, from which there was a beautiful view all over the fort, the town, and the adjacent country. In front there was a broad veranda, supported upon pillars, and near at hand the portion set apart for the zenana, and which was still occupied by the ladies, who were to leave shortly. In the fort itself were several massive buildings, terraced, and bomb-proof, which had been used in former days as barracks, hospital, powder-magazine, and guard-houses. There were also some other good native houses—all empty now, but useful for my English clerks and escort, and for conversion into treasury, jail and public *cucherry*, or court, until more commodious buildings could be erected, or possibly another head-station fixed upon.

The fort of Nuldroog was one of the most interesting places I had ever seen. It enclosed the surface of a knoll or plateau of basalt rock which jutted out into the valley or ravine of the small river Boree from the main plateau of the country, and was almost level. The sides of this knoll were sheer precipices of basalt, here and there showing distinct columnar and prismatic formation, and varied from 50 to 200 feet in height, the edge of the plateau being, more or less, 200 feet above the river, which flowed at the base of the precipice on two sides of the fort. Along the crest of the cliff, on three sides, ran the fortifications, bastions, and curtains alternately, some of the former being very firmly built of cut and dressed basalt, and large enough to carry heavy guns, and the parapets of the machicolated curtains were everywhere loopholed for musketry. On the west side the promontory joined the main plateau by a somewhat contracted neck, also strongly fortified by a high rampart, with very roomy and massive bastions ; below it a *faussebraye*, with the same ; then a broad, deep, dry ditch, cut for the most part out of the basalt itself ; a counterscarp, about 20 or 25 feet high, with a covered-way ; and beyond it a glacis and esplanade up to the limits of the town.

The entire circumference of the *enceinte* might have been about a mile and a half, and the garrison in former times must have been very large, for nearly the whole of the interior was covered by ruined walls, and had been laid out as a town with a wide street running up the centre. All the walls and bastions were in perfect repair, and the effect of the fort outside was not only grim and massive, but essentially picturesque.

Nuldroog held a memorable place in local history. Before the Mussulman invasion in the fourteenth century it belonged to a local Rajah, who may have been a feudal vassal of the great Rajahs of the Chalukya dynasty, A.D. 250 to 1200, whose capital was Kullianee, about 40 miles distant ; but I never could trace its history with any certainty, and during the Hindoo period it was only traditional. The Bahmany dynasty, A.D. 1351 to 1480, protected their dominions to the west by a line of massive forts, of which Nuldroog was one ; and it was believed that the former defences, which were little more than mud walls, were replaced by them with fortifications of stone. Afterwards, on the division of the Bahmany kingdom, in A.D. 1480, Nuldroog fell to the lot of the Adil Shahy kings of Beejapoor ; and they, in their turn, greatly increased and strengthened its defences. It was often a point of dissension between the Adil Shahy and the Nizam Shahy potentates—lying, as it did, upon the nominal frontier between Beejapoor and Ahmednugger—and was besieged by both in turn, as the condition of the walls on the southern face bore ample testimony, as well from the marks of cannon-balls as from breaches which had afterwards been filled up. In 1558 Ali Adil Shah visited Nuldroog, and again added to its fortifications, rebuilt the western face, and constructed an enormous cavalier near the eastern end, which was upwards of 90 feet high, with several bastions on the edges of the cliff ; but his greatest work was the erection of a stone dam across the river Boree, which, by retaining the water above it, afforded the garrison an unlimited supply. I quote from a letter to my father written a few days after my arrival :—

“I was greatly delighted and surprised by the view from the back of the house, where there is a balcony. You look up and down a valley in which there



is a fine brawling stream ; and about a quarter of a mile below the house a huge dam of solid masonry has been built across the ravine, which holds the water back, and forms a pretty little lake. Above this, on the south side, the walls of the fort are built on the side of a precipice of about 50 feet to the water's edge, and the tall grim bastions have a fine effect. The dam connects the main fort with one opposite to it on a knoll on the north of the lake, whose bastions and curtains extend down the north side of the ravine ; so on looking down you see the two forts, one on each side of the valley, the lake between, and the precipices beyond. The dam is truly wonderful—it is 90 feet high, 300 yards long, and 100 feet broad at the top. The river at its ordinary height runs over the crest of the dam in channels arched over, and the water falls into the pool ; but when there is a flood the whole of the water runs over the crest of the dam, forming a huge cataract, and is indeed a magnificent spectacle. About the centre of the dam there is a flight of steps by which you descend into a small, beautifully-ornamented room, in the Saracenic-Gothic style ; and there is a very ingenious contrivance by which, even when the river is in full flood and the cataract falling in front of the balcony of the room, the water which comes down the staircase is turned off down a tunnel in another direction, and cannot enter the room. The look-out from this apartment is extremely picturesque—the great pool below, the sides of the ravine clothed with shrubs and creepers, and the brawling waters as they run down the valley, forming altogether a striking and very beautiful picture, of a character I had never before seen."

It may easily be imagined that I was quite content with my new quarters ; and in a few days' time, when all the rooms had been well washed out, and the broken panes in the excellent English glass doors and windows repaired, my pictures hung up, my precious books unpacked, and some furniture and carpets I had brought with me placed in the large room, the result was a very comfortable apartment. There was, too, a good garden about the house, which was very soon cleaned up, and eventually became one of my greatest pleasures—for nowhere that I had been in India did English flowers and vegetables grow so well ; and there were several fine orange-trees and vines too, which, when properly looked after, gave abundant produce, as did the other fruit-trees, with which the garden was well stocked.

My first task was to take stock of my new province. Its boundaries had been ill defined at Hyderabad, and had to be rectified before the whole could be brought well together. To the west the river Seenah, from a point nine miles from Ahmednugger to its junction with the Bheema, formed an excellent general line. Inside this lay portions of British territory belonging to the Collectorate of Sholapoor ; but that did not signify. To the north a range of mountains, which bordered the valley of the Godavery, formed another distinct frontier. The river Manjera, which flowed eastwards, rising among these mountains, gave another distinctly-defined boundary to a certain point, where it diverged ; and from this point to Afzulpoor, on the Bheema, an arbitrary line had been drawn, which, as it included several large counties that were private estates belonging to one of the chief nobles of Hyderabad, could not be attached. Within the general boundary, too, many portions had either been wilfully concealed or improperly and dishonestly retained. However, the whole province, as defined in the treaty, would have been more than was really required ; and in the end, after I had gone over the whole carefully, my boundaries became more definite, and it was satisfactory to think that all the country lying within them was under my own control.

As fast as I could get them, I despatched managers to the different head-centres of counties with my orders, and to convey my assurances of goodwill to the people. The Arabs were fast betaking themselves to Hyderabad, and neither my assistant nor I had experienced any except very temporary difficulties from them. In almost less than one month I was able to report that we had established the authority of the British Government of India in every part of the province. My assistant's father, Mr. Cadell, was an eminent Writer to the Signet in Edinburgh ; and I was much amused when he wrote to his son that the proceedings of two men, with a small escort of cavalry, taking possession coolly of a province half as large as Scotland, with a strange population, were, to his perception, the "most consummate



piece of assurance" he had ever heard of; and "pray, how were we going to govern it?" Our district was rather more than 15,000 square miles in area; but though the shrewd old Scotch lawyer saw, I dare say, a thousand difficulties, I saw none which could not be overcome by patience, hard work, and steady perseverance.

It was a fine climate, fortunately, and very healthy. The tract lying between the Seenah river and the hills was lower than the rest; but it was open, free from jungle, and for the most part well cultivated. From it the basalt plateau named the "Bala Ghat" rose to a height varying from 400 to 1,000 feet, some of the highest summits showing 2,400 feet above the level of the sea. This plateau, culturable from its very edge, sloped gradually eastwards to the Manjera river, and joined the northern mountain boundary, which extended to Ahmednugger.

Nuldroog itself lay 2,200 feet above the level of the sea; and, compared with Shorapoor, the climate, even during the hottest part of the year, was much less trying, while in the cold season it was very cold indeed, and not unfrequently frosty.

The "Bala Ghat" was renowned all through the Deccan for its luxuriant crops of wheat and barley, pulse and oilseed. Cotton did not thrive, and what was produced was of very short fibre, harsh and unfit for export. Sugarcane grew well and there was a good supply of hemp and linseed; but the beautiful white millet of Shorapoor was wanting, and that grown was coarse and hard in comparison.

I had known the people before when I was a boy, and many still remembered me and my red trousers, and came to see me. The population was almost entirely agricultural—thrifty, industrious, practical farmers and gentry, who tilled their somewhat hard soil with singular perseverance and success; they were better farmers than those at Shorapoor, and kept improving their fields till they would have done credit to an English landowner.

I had liked the people in my early days because of their sturdy, independent character. Mahratta was the only language spoken, and this I had at my command—a circumstance which I felt sure would inspire confidence, for everybody soon knew that they could come to me and speak out their minds freely whenever they had occasion, without any go-between, or interpretation, being necessary. I knew, too, that the normal crime of the district, *dacoity*, not only still existed, but was largely and desperately practised; and this, which had defied me in former years, must now be eradicated with a strong hand.

I believe that the people at large, with the exception of the small portion forming the hereditary criminal class, welcomed the new rule with sincere delight. They knew it meant security of their land and possessions, as well as justice and protection, and extension and protection of trade. Those who were unacquainted with the working and ways of English rule in other districts were perhaps somewhat disturbed at first at the idea, but they were few, and the feeling soon wore off.

When I took possession of the province there was no court of law or justice whatever, civil or criminal, any more than there had been at Shorapoor, and none such had ever existed within the memory of any person. The agents of the Nizam's Government, and the Arabs, used to punish gross criminal offences, and in some cases petty thefts; but in the great crime of *dacoity* all seemed to have had a share, inasmuch as the agent always received part, according to his share, of the property stolen! As for murder, no one ever noticed it, or thought of bringing the perpetrators to account.

After a great deal of very hard work—during almost night and day while it lasted—I had gained, partly from old accounts and partly from the details sent in from my new managers, a tolerably correct estimate of the resources of the province, which I submitted in a report to the Resident.

If I had taken the province according to the estimates and orders of transfer of the late minister and the *duftardars* of Hyderabad I should have had a revenue of about *two and a half lakhs*, and a few scattered portions of territory, and there would have remained within my boundary line large tracts of country not under my jurisdiction. This would have caused much confusion and vexatious embarrassment, and probably constant disputes would have arisen. Now, when I had got

all together in a kind of ring-fence, as it were, I found, according to my rough estimate, that I should have about *eleven and a half lakhs* of Hyderabad rupees.

Colonel Low was just going away to Calcutta to be sworn in as a member of the Supreme Council ; and before he went he wrote me his very hearty approval of what I had been able to effect in so short a time, and particularly his great satisfaction at the complete and bloodless expulsion of the Arabs.

I must here likewise record my grateful thanks and remembrance of the very essential services rendered to me in respect to the latter by the native officers and men of the cavalry detachments sent for my assistance. The native officers were all gentlemen by birth, most intelligent, and highly respected by the people wherever they went. They proved excellent negotiators, and were fully trusted by all, even by the Arabs themselves.

At Owsa, a far stronger fort than Nuldroog, my manager presented my letter to the Arab chief commanding the garrison, requesting him to evacuate the place. The request was indignantly refused ; but on the appearance of a squadron of cavalry which I sent to my officer's assistance the Arabs received the native officers with "honours," marched out at once, and gave up all the large dependencies they had held in mortgage from the Nizam's Government without any demur. Owsa was the last, indeed the only place, that caused me any anxiety ; and I knew that the Resident had also been very anxious about it, owing to its reputed great strength and the large number of its garrison. In Owsa, Purraindah, and Nuldroog I now held the three strongest forts of the Deccan ; yet all had submitted without using any violence and no further display of force than I have mentioned.

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On my return from my pleasant little stay at Sholapoor I went out to my tents, which were pitched at Tooljapoor, my old favourite resort in 1825. How beautiful it was ! The hills were all clothed with verdure, and the view from my tent was lovely. On the north side of the promontory where I was lay the town, built on both sides of a deep ravine, and at its head the celebrated shrine of Bhowanee or Kalee, which lay in the hollow beneath—not indeed in itself a remarkable edifice at all, but surrounded by picturesque cloisters and courts, always thronged by pilgrims, and which formed a curious combination of all kinds of Hindoo architecture.

Above the temple towered rugged cliffs on either side, and the ravine opened out into a large amphitheatre, bounded by precipitous hills that seemed like buttresses to the plateau above. To the south was a great undulating plain, stretching to the dim blue horizon, dotted by thriving villages, surrounded by luxuriant cultivation, and checkered by ever-varying masses of life and shade. The line of the hills and plateau extending towards the east or Nuldroog direction was broken by headlands and ravines descending to the lower country. There was no wood, it is true ; but the diversified outlines, now rugged, and again more regular, redeemed the landscape from any monotony.

The climate was delightful, like that of an English summer-day, in turn cloudy and sunshiny, with occasional light showers.

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It was the rainy season, but there was so much to see after that could only be done on the spot in each division of my district that my personal convenience must not be studied in any way ; and I marched along the edge of the plateau from one division to another, halting at the head-station of each for the purpose of investigating old accounts, records of cultivation and the like, and, above all, gaining as I went knowledge of the people.

A settlement of the country for five years had been directed, and inquiries were necessary before any attempt could be made to carry out the measure. I did not even know what the revenue of the whole district might amount to ; and the accounts received from Hyderabad, if not actually designed to mislead, were at all events most incorrect and incomprehensible, proving to be of no use whatever. I therefore began at the foundation—the village accounts—and was glad to see that they had been far better kept than those of Shorapoor when I began a like inquiry

there. The village accountants had proper lists of proprietors and occupants of land, according to the ancient Deccan system, which had never been altered, however much it might have been abused ; and among the records of some of the chief towns and villages were ancient settlements of the officers of the Bahmany kings of Gulburgah and Beeder and the Adil Shahys of Beejapoor. The most regular and valuable records were the settlements by Mullik Umber, the great regent of the Ahmednugger State, which were more minute than those of the Emperor Akbar, and were founded upon an actual survey of the lands and their assessment according to their productive quality. But these had only been preserved here and there, and it would be impossible to found any new settlement upon those that existed as a basis for all. The Nizam's Government had taken no record of cultivation ; but the sums received from villages were entered in an account for every *talook*, or division, which was signed by the hereditary ministerial officers of each county, and which, up to the last financial year, had been regularly sent up to the head accountant's office at Hyderabad. From these documents, compared with the village accounts and registries, I could see my way to a new form of account which would embrace all particulars ; and copies of these forms were made by the village accountants, to be filled up when the yearly period of settlement arrived.

It was very tedious work ; but unless it were done it would be impossible to submit to Government any clear or complete statement of the general revenue, or whence it was derived. My progress was necessarily very slow.

In the original instructions given to the Deputy Commissioners they had been directed to make use of the existing local Courts of the Nizam's Government for the trial of all cases, civil and criminal ; but as no local tribunal or judicial office of any kind was found by me, and none had existed for years, I determined to introduce a code of laws of my own, civil as well as criminal ; and I took the regulations of Bombay as my guide, drawing up a short definition of crimes and their punishments—and, in civil cases, of general procedure—simple and intelligible to all classes. I assigned various powers to *patells*, or heads of villages, to *talook* officers, to my assistant, and to myself—mine being the highest court of appeal in the province from the decisions of subordinate courts, and the Resident being the final one, to whom all appeals against me were to be referred.

This code and general plan of mine were approved of as a temporary measure at Calcutta, and I put it in force as soon as it was sanctioned. It lasted till Macaulay's penal code was sent for a practical trial in the assigned districts, but the civil procedure I had drawn up was, I think, retained. These, with instructions for the guidance of police, revenue proceedings and collections, and for the conduct of every department, occupied a great deal of my time ; but all were as brief and concise as possible, though necessarily embracing every point for general direction.

After Colonel Low's departure from the post of Resident at Hyderabad several distinguished officers were named as his probable successors. Sir Henry Lawrence, to whom I believe Lord Dalhousie offered the appointment, and my old friend James Outram, whom I would have gladly welcomed, were, among those talked of ; but as the office of Resident now involved the head administration of the assigned districts, and as everything in regard to them was still in an incomplete state, a civilian of administrative experience was held to be the fittest person ; and Mr. Bushby, once an assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad, was appointed to the office, which, until his arrival, was conducted with much ability by (then) Captain Davidson.

It was his wish, as it had been that of Colonel Low, that my district should have a well-defined frontier ; and all the boundaries except those to the north had been gradually adjusted. I had even been exempted from the vexatious task of administering justice and police affairs in the reserved portions which lay along the Bheema to the south-west, and they remained under the charge of their native proprietors. But to the north, on the borders of the Ahmednugger and Nizam's territory, there remained a small tract, hitherto undefined, and often much disturbed, the British and Nizam's villages lying confusedly together.

This was by far the prettiest and most picturesque portion of my province. The plateau of the "Bala Ghat" continued to the hills forming the Ahmednugger range ; but at one point it lowered considerably, breaking into ravines, which ran south towards the Seenah, and north-east to the Godavery,—a very rough tract, with a corresponding rough class of inhabitants, who required to be kept well under control.

While encamped at Patola, the station of my native collector, I explored the whole of the crest of the plateau towards the north-west, and found the scenery very beautiful. There was no jungle, but the grassy hills afforded fine pasturage for cattle, and the views from the summits of the highest knolls were in some instances very grand.

In one place a small river, the Incherua, which received the drainage of a great portion of these hills, fell into the lower level of the western portion of my district with one leap of 398 feet sheer perpendicular fall, and now, being well filled with water, formed one of the most graceful waterfalls I have ever seen. I did not expect to come upon anything so grand or picturesque as this fall and the basalt chasm into which it precipitated itself, and I was lost in admiration, remaining at the place for several days, in order to sketch the ravine and waterfall from every point of view. I have described it fully in my novel of "Secta," to which I refer any curious reader who may wish to know more.

I descended by a well-known pass to the low country north of my district, and found, as I had anticipated from a copy of the trigonometrical survey map, exactly the frontier I desired. A considerable stream flowed from the west, almost in a direct line eastwards. Its name was the Suitana ; while a smaller one, the Domeri, rising on the plateau, flowed due north, and fell into it. Within this line were sixteen scattered villages of the Nizam's mingled with British villages and my own ; and after representing the difficulty of maintaining all three jurisdictions in a state of amity they were transferred entirely to me, under the orders of the Nizam's Government. The whole tract had been in a state of chronic feud for years, and the correspondence and other references regarding all manner of disputes had been vexatious and endless. I found no less than *seventy* boundary disputes had to be adjusted, of which I settled the worst, leaving the tract for the final supervision of my assistant, who now joined me. I determined to proceed to Ahmednugger, in order to confer with Mr. Bell, the Collector there, as I had already done with Mr. Loughman, the Collector of Sholapoor, upon all matters which required settlement.

Cadell had had a little adventure at Purraindah, by far the strongest fort in the district, situated in his division. He had not been able to visit it personally before, and when he arrived the garrison shut to the gates, mounted the bastions, and declared they would not give it up. He might do what he liked with the dependencies, but they were the garrison, and they declared that until they received orders from Hyderabad they would not open the gates. Finding remonstrance useless, Cadell wrote to me for help in the shape of a troop of cavalry, with which he could watch the place to see that no malcontents got in to help the garrison. I wrote to the *killadar*, or castellan, desiring him to evacuate the fort, to which he demurred ; and I then wrote again, saying he *must* do so, or fight, for that no orders could now come from Hyderabad, the country having been entirely ceded to the British Government. The troop of cavalry arriving almost immediately after my letter reached him, the *killadar* saw that I was in earnest, and thought "discretion the better part of valour ;" so he opened the gates, and as Cadell marched in and took possession the garrison laid down their arms, which he at once returned to them. He described the place as the strongest he had seen, and quite perfect in every way, and there was a very respectable garrison of Rajpoots. I was glad on every account that the affair had been tided over so peaceably. I visited Purraindah myself afterwards, and shall describe it later.

Having made all the arrangements I could in the newly acquired territory of Manoor, I went on to Ahmednugger. One of my villages lay within nine miles of the station, and, owing to its beauty, was a favourite resort for country parties and picnics. I met Mr. Bell there, and he hospitably invited both Cadell and myself to

his house, where we spent some days very pleasantly at the great station. I had not been there since the year 1826, and found it greatly improved and enlarged.

In my journey both to and from Ahmednugger I had been much struck with the capabilities of the country for large irrigation works, and in particular for tanks. Streams descending from the table-lands to the north, and tributaries to the Seenah, afforded ample supplies of water ; and the ground, from its peculiar character, provided most convenient basins, which only required dams at certain places across their mouths to be converted into tanks.

In one instance a stream which had a catchment area of upwards of 200 square miles, after leaving the hills ran through a nearly level plain of about four square miles in area, which ended in two bluffs about a quarter of a mile asunder. A dam of fifty feet high was perfectly practicable at a comparatively small outlay, and the water held back would form a lake twice the size of Bohnal. I determined, with as little delay as possible, to get up a report on the subject, and try to have some works of the kind begun for a country which was absolutely thirsting for water, and where every drop that could be procured from wells or from streams was used for the production of sugar-cane, ginger, turmeric, and other rich and valuable crops.

Mr. Bell met us at a village which we had agreed upon, where there was good camping-ground, and which, though under his charge, was within our frontier, and there we passed some days in November very agreeably. As he had brought his establishment with him, we compared our work, and he was not a little surprised, I think, to find mine quite as regular in all respects as his own, except in the revenue department, the particulars of which we had still to unravel, whereas his had been decided by survey. I was now settling three divisions in order to enable my assistant to work for himself ; and when these were completed I left him, to look after my eastern districts on the table-land, which I had not yet visited.

By the end of the year 1853 the whole was in fair working order, and giving me no anxiety except as to the scarcity which seemed to threaten us owing to failure of crops. There had been no rain since September, and comparatively little before that. Portions of the Bombay Presidency were already suffering, and Shorapoor was also in distress. The accounts from thence were very sad. Neglect, riot, and crime prevailed ; and I was indeed grateful that although I was worse paid as a Deputy Commissioner than I should have been as Political Agent there, yet I was spared the pain of seeing all the fair structure I had striven so long and so hard to raise rapidly falling into ruin and decay.

By the close of the year I had already made considerable progress in the suppression of the terrible normal crime of dacoity. Several old dacoits had turned approvers, and had given details of robberies and murders, which had been shockingly numerous. Through them stolen property was traced, and recovered too, to a very large amount ; and out of one dacoit's house at Owsa articles of various kinds, to the value of 1,200 rupees, were taken, which had been his share of the plunder secured on that occasion. I was blamed at first by the Resident for raking up old cases ; but I held my ground, for those I had tried were all comparatively recent, though the crimes had been committed before the cession. I was determined to eradicate the pest if I could, and I thought the only chance lay in attacking the old gangs and in bringing their crimes home to them. This had been done in thuggee, why not in dacoity ? The question was referred to Calcutta, and soon decided as regarded the assigned districts. All criminal offences such as dacoity and murder were deemed open to trial within a period of ten years from the date of their perpetration ; and according to this rule I was at liberty to work, and I did so vigorously. Already I had achieved something, and more would follow.

By Lord Dalhousie's request I kept up my correspondence with Mr. Courtenay ; I think His Lordship liked to know unofficially what I was about, and I wrote freely and unreservedly. A report I had sent in upon my system of administration had interested him a good deal, and I heard he took it away to study in private, and that he desired I might be told this. He had also entirely acquiesced in my plan

of revenue settlement to precede a survey; and to hear that what I had done was approved of was very cheering.

I found the eastern portion of my district in a far worse condition than the western, and I find myself writing thus to my father in March 1854 :—

“While at Nelingan I was more oppressed with work than I had been anywhere. I found the districts in shocking order: no paper accounts, and no confidence among the people; a ruined, impoverished set of pauper cultivators, who have been so long oppressed and neglected under the Arab management that they are, I imagine, blunted to all good perceptions. Murder, robbery, attacks on villages, plunder of cattle, and destruction of crops had got to such a height last year that civil war could not have had a worse effect upon the people or on the revenue; and all agreed that if British rule had not come in this year the whole district would have been utterly ruined and wasted. I never saw anything like it. I thought Shorapoor bad, but this is infinitely worse, and the labour it is to get anything put right has been excessive. I can only say that I have been obliged to work frequently from 4 A.M. to 8 P.M., with only respite for dressing and breakfast; but there is no help for it. I have been giving five years' settlements to such villages as are ready to take them, but there are many which are so disorganized that they require to be specially nursed.”

I had likewise introduced a regular system of village accounts with the rent-payers and the treasurers, which I will briefly detail.

Each village accountant kept a day-book and ledger, in which the sum he was to pay was entered to his debit, and his payments successively at stated times to his credit. His account was entered in the village ledger in the same manner. If he paid an instalment, it was entered to his credit in his book as a receipt; and this payment was entered into the day-book, and afterwards posted to his account in the ledger. Peculation was therefore almost impossible, or any undue exactions, and the people now began to understand the protection that the system implied. The district treasury had a similar account with villages, and the particulars of each village instalment were forwarded to the head treasury with the general remittances. Any error or any exaction by any individual could thus be traced up to its author at once, and the check and counter-check were quite efficient in practice. The village accountants were at first rather clumsy about their books, but they soon grew accustomed to the system; and before the season of collections was over I had the satisfaction of finding that the plan was working easily and well in every portion of my province.

Before I returned to my head-quarters, Nuldroog, I had the satisfaction of beginning two new irrigation reservoirs near Tooljapoor, on plans and surveys which I had previously submitted. I intended that these should form the commencement of a system of tank irrigation from Tooljapoor to Ahmednugger, a question in which the Governor-General seemed much interested, and in which he encouraged me heartily to persevere.

The Resident also, Mr. Bushby, began to see the necessity of it; and I was the more rejoiced at obtaining sanction for this, because great distress was prevalent, though it scarcely amounted to famine yet, and three new works would enable me to employ a great number of persons. I was glad, too, to find that both my neighbours, the Collectors of Ahmednugger and Sholapoor, had become strong advocates for irrigation works, and had sent in urgent representations to Government on the subject. In these undertakings I had to make the surveys, plans, and calculations entirely myself; but I always managed to find time to do these before my daily work began, so that other business was never interfered with or postponed. It seemed strange to me that though irrigation works were progressing in the North-West Provinces with great energy, in the Bombay Presidency no one seemed to take the least interest in them, and, had it not been for these gentlemen, would probably ever have given a thought to the subject; and indeed to this day, I believe, but little progress has been made in these most useful works.

I had great difficulties to encounter in the treasury department for the first year or two. Rents had been paid in all sorts of local currencies, and I was required

to account for them in Company's rupees. Now I had as many as fourteen different kinds of rupees current in my province, each with its separate value, and the market value was often fluctuating; the assay rates did not correspond at all with the market value, and, in short, the whole was a system of inextricable confusion; and I was obliged in the end to notify that none except Company's rupees would be taken in payments to the State, and this relieved us of all difficulty.

For a long time the proposed revenue survey caused much trouble and vexation. A small manual had been sent us from the Punjaub of the system in use there, which was by plane-tables,—and plane-tables were sent afterwards. Every Deputy Commissioner was to have a school of instruction, and to teach the *putwarries*, or village accountants, to survey their own lands; and the work was to begin at once. This was all easy enough to write about; but the carrying such orders into effect was a very different matter. I believe I happened to be the only Deputy Commissioner who knew how to survey, and the rest looked to me to begin operations.

Extensive correspondence on the subject took place, and cost me much additional time and trouble; but I could not use the Punjaub instruments and the compasses with which the work was to be done—it was impossible; and after much writing and loss of time in useless endeavours at explanation I introduced a plan of my own. I had some better plane-tables made, and worked them by back-sight, like a theodolite, and my plan succeeded very well. I also established a school of young men, instead of the *putwarries*, who proved apt scholars, and did good work, and I sent in my report with some specimens of surveyed lands. My plan was approved, and I was simply desired to “go on.”

I found distress very great at Nuldroog—not so much among the people of my own district as among starving wretches who came there from all quarters, so emaciated, and so shrivelled and weak, that all, men, women, and children, were fearful to look upon. Often during my morning rides I came upon dead bodies lying by the roadside, creatures who had sunk down to die before they could reach the town; and many crawled in who were too far gone to be recovered. Except at Hingolee I had never seen famine in its worst form before, and this was horrible to witness. I did what I could myself, and every one at Nuldroog did the same; my own share amounted to several thousand rupees, which I could very ill afford; and it was not for a comparatively long time that I could get any answer to my earnest request to be allowed to use what money I needed, to give employment to those able to work. At length, however, I got a favourable reply, and about four thousand miserable wretches were set to work to cut down the scrubby jungle in the fort, and to clear out the old ruined works. Gradually, as rain fell and prospects brightened, the people began to return to their various homes. What would have become of us at Nuldroog if the famine had been universal I can hardly conceive; for its results from which we suffered were fearful enough.

The monsoon was heavy, and all the month of September proved very unhealthy at Nuldroog. My establishment and nearly all the clerks, both English and native, suffered from fever, dysentery, and other complaints; so that to get through the needful work was very trying. We had no other convenient shelter, and so were obliged to remain; but I thought it doubtful whether the place could be retained as a head-station. However, a further trial of it was directed before it was given up.

The year 1854 had been a truly laborious one to me, and except during the very short period of the late rains I had been under canvas since July 1853. The work accomplished had been enormous. In English, Persian, and Mahratta the references and letters had been 34,474, upwards of 9,000 of which had passed between my assistant and myself, many being on very intricate and tedious subjects. We corresponded officially always in Mahratta.

For my own share I had had 272 criminal cases to dispose of, thirteen of which were indictments for murder; of civil cases and appeals I find no record among my letters, but no doubt they may have been mislaid or lost.

My revenue for the financial year was all collected—except about 3,000 rupees, which still had to be remitted—and amounted to 10 lakhs and 66,000 rupees



of all sorts, which, allowing for large deductions, exchanges, &c., became Rs. 8,86,565-13-3.

The revenue for the previous year had been, according to the local accounts, Rs. 6,99,305-11-8, so that there had been an increase of Rs. 1,87,260-1-7. The amount of land previously under cultivation had been 11,92,395 *beegahs*; that for the present year 12,21,947 *beegahs*, or an increase of 29,552.

Further particulars are unnecessary, and would scarcely interest the general reader.

In spite of a little fever, from which I suffered at Nuldroog, I was in rude health. I enjoyed the climate of the district, and along the edge of the table-land it was generally cool in the hottest weather.

I was always able to work at least twelve hours every day, and often more, except on Sundays, when I always read the service in my tents to my English clerks.

Every department of the district was now in fair working order, and I was quite prepared to show the Resident, if he came to see it, as it was hinted he would, all my interior economy, and wished it to be compared with other districts of the same class.

I was directed by the Resident to meet the Collector of Sholapoor on the frontier, in order to settle a boundary dispute which had arisen between the Rajah of Akulkote's territory and the Nizam's, and in regard to which there had been some serious fighting and bloodshed; so I made for the spot early in November, expecting that everything would be satisfactorily arranged in a few days.

It proved, however, that I had to survey 26 miles of disputed boundary, and to make a map of it, before the question could even be understood at all; documents on both sides had to be examined, and evidence taken. Finally, after recording our opinion in separate minutes, part of the boundary was laid down; but the Akulkote men came in the night, pulled up the stones which had been placed as landmarks and threw them away.

As I could wait no longer, and the Collector had no authority to enforce our decision, I left the place on the 18th December, heartily regretting that my detention had been so long and so unprofitable; and I moved to a village on the eastern frontier to begin the revenue settlement for the year. I should then be close to the Resident's line of march from Hyderabad to Nuldroog, and could easily join him at the nearest point.

I was glad to find the people on the eastern and western frontiers taking heart; and I had the pleasure of letting nearly all the uncultivated lands, which had become covered with low mimosa jungle. There was a better spirit abroad in the country, and the local bankers were ready to make advances for the cultivation of these waste lands on low rates of interest to any extent. The fact was that agents from some of the great mercantile houses in Bombay had acted upon a circular which I had sent them some months before, pointing out to them the capabilities of my province for the production of oil-seeds and other staple commodities of trade; and they had sent agents with bills of exchange to a very large amount to invest in these purchases. One of these agents had bills to the extent of three lakhs (£30,000); and in all I traced more than £60,000, which was a very welcome addition to former capital. No such influx of money had ever been known before, and I recommended the agents to deal directly with the farmers, without the intervention of any third party; and they took my advice and ultimately all were quite satisfied.

The Resident and his staff left Hyderabad on the 20th December, and I met him at Kullianee, in the Nizam's territory, on the 1st January 1855. He received me very kindly. As I rode into camp he was just starting on his elephant, and he asked me to come with him, which I did, and we were soon deep in friendly talk about all sorts of things. We travelled together to Nuldroog, where I had plenty to show him—all the treasury books and accounts, the jail, &c., &c.; and I had collected the *putwarries* of a number of villages, and their books, and explained my system to him. He was pleased to say he "could hardly believe that so perfect a system could have been organized;" and he was more and more satisfied as we proceeded further, and the books of other groups of villages were



shown to him. He did not like Nuldroog at all, and said there must be another head-station, and in this view I quite coincided ; but there could be no change made for the present.

I was very anxious to lay my projects for irrigation works before him, and he marched with me to Tooljapoor, where the largest tank had been marked out, and this seemed to decide him in regard to the more extended system which I had advocated. He said he was very anxious to show that the "assigned districts could do as much for their size as the Punjab," and promised to send on to Government all the plans and estimates that could be prepared.

He could propose no change in judicial matters, as my small code was working very satisfactorily ; and he confided to me that I was the only Deputy Commissioner who had attempted to introduce anything of the kind.

The Resident had not very much time to spare ; we therefore went on from Tooljapoor to Owsa, but I regretted his being unable to see the prettiest part of the district, which lay along the edge of the table-land.

He was immensely struck, however, with the regularity and beauty of the fine old fort of Owsa ; and indeed, if the Arabs who formed the garrison when I first took possession of it had chosen to resist, the place could only have been taken by a regular siege. I left the Resident at Bhalkee, a point on the Hyderabad road ; and we had, when we parted, settled everything as far as we could. I showed him the survey work, which pleased him. No other Deputy Commissioner had as yet even attempted a commencement, and it gratified him that I had done so, in spite of my refusal to make use of the Punjab system. We parted very good friends ; and as I fancied on his first coming that he had acquired rather a prejudice against me I was the more pleased at the result of our meeting. I knew my district was in a much more orderly and regular condition than any other ceded at the same time, and I was anxious it should be inspected.

At the request of the people, I chose the site of a new market-town near Nelingah. There were more than a hundred applications for sites, so I designed a market-place and a hall of assembly ; and the Resident having given his sanction we began to build at once. Nelingah was now a place of trade and a resort of merchants, yet how it was reduced ! The old accounts showed its revenue to have been 12,000 rupees a year ; now it did not reach above 3,000.

After much tedious and lengthy correspondence respecting the difference in value of currencies collected during the first year, which I had cut short by accepting only Company's rupees in payments during the present year, I was able to submit my accounts of revenue and collections at an early period, and the following copy of a memorandum I sent to my father in July will show what progress had been made :—

"*Cultivation.*—Contrasting the returns of 1852-53 with those of 1854-55, and after adjustment of all transfers of villages attached to proprietors, lands released, &c., there is a clear increase of new cultivation of *beegahs* 1,39,190. A *beegah*, by the average of local measurement, is here upwards of an acre—about 1·30.

"*Revenue.*—The gross and net revenue of 1851-52, including all estates resumed by us, customs duties, &c., was :—

Gross revenue, Hyderabad rupees,	...	...	...	...	8,56,263	7	5
Village expenses, ...	...	...	...	...	1,64,882	13	5
Balance, net revenue, Hyderabad rupees,	...	...	...	...	6,91,380	10	0
Gross revenue for 1854-55 in Company's rupees,	...	...	...	...	9,22,666	8	0
Deduct village expenses, ...	...	...	...	...	97,993	8	9
Balance, net revenue, in Company's rupees,	...	...	...	...	8,24,672	15	3

*Result.*

Net revenue, 1854-55, Company's rupees,	...	...	...	8,24,672	15	3
Net revenue, 1851-52, Hyderabad rupees,	...	...	...	6,91,380	10	0
Increase in tale,	...	...	...	Rs. 1,33,292	5	3

“ The value of the different rupees is not here given ; and either the Hyderabad rupees may be turned into Company’s at 21 per cent. or the Company’s into Hyderabad, and here is the result :—

Company’s rupees 8,24,672 at 121 for 100 Hyderabad rupees, ...	9,97,853	1	11
Net revenue of 1851-52, as above, ... ..	6,91,380	10	0
Net increase, value, Hyderabad rupees, ... ..	3,06,472	7	11

Or if the Nizam’s Government’s share only of 1851-52 for the whole province is reckoned the amount will stand as follows :—

Net revenue of 1854-55 as above, Company’s rupees 8,24,672, at 121 per 100, ... ..	9,97,853	1	11
Realized by the Nizam’s Government in 1851-52, according to account, ... ..	5,62,457	14	9
Given to the Nizam’s Government by cession on the result of 1854-55, in Hyderabad rupees,... ..	4,35,395	3	2

“ Even this is not all, for the Rs. 5,62,457-14-9 contained the customs duties abolished in 1854-55. These amounted to Rs. 35,000 ; and there is a further profit in decrease of village charges, which were 19·41 per cent. on the gross revenue in 1851-52, and in 1854-55 10·84 per cent.

“ The average rate of assessment per *beegah*, or acre, is nine annas and two pies (about one shilling and three halfpence); and there is no other tax or cess whatever.

“ In reference to the gross revenue of 1854-55, the total remission from unrealized balances is Rs. 620-5-6—or 9,22,666-8 Company’s rupees have been realized all but Rs. 620-5-6 ; or £92,266 all except £62.”

There remained, therefore, no doubt whatever that the cession of this province had been highly profitable to the Nizam’s Government. The actual receipts had very nearly doubled, and the revenue was secured in Company’s rupees instead of in fluctuating currencies. The local profits of the Nizam’s talookdars, or collectors, had been enormous. They had collected all the revenue, for the most part in a local currency which was little short in value in the market of the Company’s rupee ; but instead of giving their Government the benefit of the exchange into Hyderabad rupees they had paid Hyderabad rupees only by bills on Hyderabad, which were cashed in the local debased currency of the city itself.

If this were a specimen of one province, what must have been the result from them all ? Berar, like Nuldroog, showed a similar difference of value and increase in favour of the cession.

In August of this year the distress seemed almost greater than the year before. There had been no rain since June, and the poorer classes, who were accustomed to gain their living by weeding fields and other agricultural work, were now starving, and flocking in crowds to Nuldroog. We all did what we could, as we had done the year before, and it was a heavy drain on private individuals. I urged the Resident to allow me to begin the roads to Sholapoor and Hyderabad, which he had promised, and which would have greatly relieved the local strain upon me and others, but I had to wait a weary time for an answer.

During this month, too, I lost the valuable services of my assistant Cadell. He had gone to Hyderabad on leave for a month, and when there Bullock, who was Commissioner in Berar, applied for furlough to England on medical certificate ; the Raichore Commissioner was ordered to act in Berar, and Cadell was sent to Raichore. I was very sorry to lose my friend. He had managed four out of my ten divisions admirably from the first : he was always kind, courteous, and considerate to natives of every degree, and had won golden opinions from all. We had worked well together, and he was thoroughly acquainted with his duties in every respect. Personally I was very much attached to him, and shall never forget, while I live, our pleasant days together.

No assistant was appointed in his stead, and the whole work of the province fell

upon me, without any additional pay, but I was grateful for excellent health, though I hardly hoped it would long hold out under the terrible strain now put upon me.

We had no rain till September ; but the new roads, to the commencement of which a tardy sanction had at length been given, provided labour for upwards of 4,000 men, women, and children, and saved them from starvation. I also cleared out the fort altogether, and thus employed 1,500 more persons : every old wall was levelled, and the stones were thrown into hollows and covered with earth. In October heavy rain fell all over the district, and we thanked God that all dread of famine was at an end. The very early crops had withered, but now every acre of land was being re-ploughed and sown, and the prospects were very cheering. Another road to Tooljapoor was sanctioned, and put in hand ; and I had completed thirty miles of one and fifteen of another, having been obliged to do all the surveying and laying out myself. They were only cleared and levelled to begin with, and would be metalled afterwards.

My brother-in-law, William Palmer, was at last appointed as my assistant. He had served in a similar capacity in North and South Berar. In the latter province no system whatever had been introduced, neither revenue, account, nor judicial, and the Resident had gone there on a tour of inspection. Cadell, too, wrote from Raichore to say that he had everything to originate there, and he did not like it at all ; but I hoped he was in a fair way for promotion. The work at the large tank at Tooljapoor had been stopped, pending formal sanction by Government—but this had been granted ; and after testing all my old levelling by a new instrument which my father sent to me from England the embankment was begun in earnest. In December all looked well—crops were luxuriant, work progressing, and people happy and contented ; and for this peaceful close to a very trying year I felt most grateful. I again received orders to meet the Resident on his return from South Berar to Hyderabad, at any point nearest to my boundary. I therefore, while waiting for him, carried on the survey of the road from Tooljapoor to Kullianee, and contrived to get through from seven to nine miles per day, laying down marks for the contractors and workmen. I finally met the Resident at his camp at Bundapoor on the 14th January 1856. He was exceedingly kind and friendly towards me. He expressed himself dissatisfied with the condition of South Berar, and was pleased to say many flattering things about the order and regularity in all departments which he had found at Nuldroog. As still further improvement had continued since his visit, I would have liked to have taken him through part of my district ; but time did not permit of it, and he could not delay longer his return to Hyderabad. There was no difference of opinion between us except in regard to the survey, as to which I consistently maintained my first position, that unless it had a scientific basis, and the surveyors had a practical education and knowledge of their work, they could not deal with village lands like those of Nuldroog, some of the areas of which were from 20,000 to 30,000 acres in extent ; and that to persevere in the Punjaub scheme would not only entail loss of time, but of money also.

We had several hot arguments about this ; but at last the Resident confided to me that the Punjaub work had been an utter failure when scientifically tested, and he showed me some of the correspondence, which was convincing.

I was therefore allowed now to work out my own tables in my own way. I had a number of clever pupils, who were ready to set to work at once, and I promised to show results in a very short time, which I hoped would be considered satisfactory. All official clouds and differences were dispersed, and we were of one accord in all matters. In private Mr. Bushby was one of the pleasantest of companions ; and we sat up each night into the small hours of the morning, engaged in pleasant talk, and schemes for the further improvement of my district. He had sent on all my plans for roads and irrigation works ; and estimates, exceeding a lakh of rupees, had been passed by Government. All this made me very hopeful.

On the 6th March Lord Dalhousie departed from Calcutta for England, leaving behind him a minute, which has its place in history, in which he detailed what he

had done during his viceroyalty. His last annexation had been Oudh ; but that had not been his own work. It had been for some time imminent, and was finally decided upon by the Court of Directors and the Government of England. It is only in future histories of India, and from his own papers should they ever be published, that the character and acts of Lord Dalhousie as Governor-General can be properly estimated ; as yet, he has had his eulogists, and his bitter opponents, almost, indeed, amounting to defamers.

To my humble perception he was the most practically useful and single-minded ruler that India had ever possessed. His great mind took in every question with a singular clearness, whether it were large or small, momentous or unimportant, and he improved everything he touched. To him India owes electric telegraphs, railways, extension of practical education, large irrigation projects, roads, and the removal of many disabilities under which natives suffered. No one who ever worked under Lord Dalhousie could for a moment question his unerring detection of any weak point, and the great power of mind and application which distinguished him, and at no period of Indian history had the administration of India been so admirably conducted.

To receive a word of praise from him was the desire which lay nearest every heart ; and when given it was never in a cold or niggardly spirit, but warmly and most encouragingly. To myself personally, though I knew him not, he had been, both privately and officially, kind and considerate from first to last ; and I only regret that I cannot find among my papers the last expression of His Lordship's sentiments towards me in transmitting a copy of the last despatch of the Court of Directors in reference to the affairs of Shorapoor.

I have spoken of my own work, and have called it hard, lasting from twelve to sixteen hours daily ; but this was made up of the petty details of one province. Lord Dalhousie did as much each day with the direction of all India on his mind. "No one can record," wrote the *Times*, "for few knew, of his daily toil, or how, with a delicate frame, he overcame it, but which overworked and destroyed his physical powers, and in 1860 sent him to his grave."

When he left her, India seemed secure and peaceful, and he retired with a very sincere conviction that so she would long remain !

I was desired in February to meet a native commissioner from Hyderabad, to settle the boundary of jurisdiction, which had been under dispute, and we were to act in concert. I waited wearily for a month, losing the best period of my season ; and when at length the commissioner arrived he had received no instructions, and further delay ensued. At length, after he had made references to his Government on various points, we arranged affairs amicably.

I was principally engaged in trying criminal cases, which were both numerous and heavy ; but there were no dacoities now, and these cases belonged chiefly to the period before the cession. As a proof of what I had to do in judicial affairs, I may here mention that Mr. Compton, who was Judge of Sholapoor, sent me a memorandum of the result of his work within a certain period. He had tried 72 cases, whereas my file showed 172 for the same !

My police system was working well. Every *patell*, or head of a village, was made a local magistrate, with certain powers, and a small allowance ; and as a mark of distinction the post was much esteemed. It gratified me also to find that my rules for the police were ordered for adoption in every province of the cession.

My accounts were made out, and sent up to Hyderabad with the administration report in July. The increase of cultivation in three years had been 184,000 acres. In 1855-56 72,000 acres of new land had been taken up, but 34,000 were abandoned in the famine, which would not have been the case had rain fallen, and we should have had, with that, 218,000 acres of increase. As the revenue augmented, petty taxes would be remitted, as I had arranged from the first. This year 40,000 rupees would be struck off, yet the whole revenue would not be seriously affected. I need not give again all the details, as those of the previous year will suffice.

In August Mr. T. N. Maltby, of the Madras Civil Service, was appointed head-Commissioner, and Mr. Bushby was relieved from the extra duties which had been imposed upon him, and which were very onerous. We looked out now for changes and amendments, which would form part of a more regular system than we had yet experienced. It was very evident to our Commissioner, in the first place, that without increased establishments the demands for regular reports, constantly increasing, could not be complied with, nor could the strain on any one who could and would do the work be borne much longer. As some relief to me, my head ministerial officer, "Baba Sahib," a very shrewd and excellent revenue officer, whom I had brought with me from Sholapoor, was promoted to the rank of extra assistant; and he, with my assistant Mr. Palmer, relieved me of much of the petty detail which had distressed me before. Cadell had been appointed Deputy Commissioner in South Berar, and Eastern Raichore had been added to the western portion as part of the new arrangements. He was now, I was glad to see, on the highroad to promotion, and he had truly well earned his advance. My work never slackened in amount; and in reply to my father's query as to how my day was spent I wrote as follows: "Up at 5 A.M., and go out about the survey of the roads. In by eight o'clock and answer letters, English and Mahratta, till ten; bathe and breakfast, over at eleven. Then to *cucherry* work, trials, &c., till 6 P.M., without stirring—often, indeed, till seven. Dine and sit an hour or so with Palmer, if he is there, or with some native friend, by way of a rest, which brings up the time to half-past eight or nine. Then to my room, and work at translations or other business till eleven or twelve. Count up all this and you will see there is no time for anything except hard work; yet, I am very thankful to say, I have neither pain nor ache."

The public works did not slacken either. Every road I had surveyed and marked out was in active progress, and there were now six long distances under the labourers' hands.

Our new Commissioner had written to me to say that he proposed taking my district the first in his projected tour of inspection. He was to leave Hyderabad on the 20th November; and as I had a little leisure time and needed rest I went into Sholapoor on a visit to my kind friends Mr. and Mrs. Compton. What a treat this was to me! She was a highly-accomplished and exquisite musician, and it was delightful to listen to her. I had heard so little music since I had been in England, and had nearly forgotten all I knew; but it came back to me, and I had the great delight of singing all my favourite ditties, Italian and English; and they were so kind and sympathetic, these dear friends, that my heart warmed to them both, nor did our friendship ever lessen. My pleasant stay ended abruptly, as I had to return to Nuldroog sooner than I expected. Another assistant was added to my staff, Lieutenant Temple of the Madras Army, who, having passed an examination as civil engineer, and having been employed in the survey, and as superintendent of roads and tanks, would be of the greatest use to me. He arrived at Nuldroog on the 30th November, and was followed by a second native assistant, Jewanjee Rustomjee, a Parsee, so that now I had two English and two native assistants. Mr. Maltby had seen at a glance that it was no use overworking his Deputy Commissioners. He unfortunately met with a severe accident, which prevented his leaving Hyderabad; and I was much concerned at this, for I had looked forward to his coming with sincere pleasure, and I knew that he was one to appreciate all I had done and was striving further to accomplish.

During my little visit to Sholapoor I made the acquaintance of the surveyor-in-chief for the railway, and I asked him to come with me to see my embankment works, roads, &c., and, above all, to test my survey with the theodolite. He came to Nuldroog, tested the surveys of three considerable village lands, and gave me a certificate that he could find "no appreciable error whatever." Here was a grand triumph for me! Government had refused me a theodolite, and I had been working in my own fashion, and somewhat in the dark.

My system with the plane-tables was quite new to my friend, and he did me the honour to ask me for one of my instruments, which I considered a high

compliment. The certificate he had given me was too valuable to retain, as it entered into full details of his tests, and I forwarded it to the Commissioner.

Although he had not seen them in actual working, Mr. Maltby ordered at once the adoption of my system of accounts in all departments, and directed it to be put in force in all districts of the Commission. My police regulations had already been adopted, and, at length, what I had been working for so hard seemed to be appreciated; and I received, by a minute of the Supreme Council, the "special thanks of the Governor-General in Council for my valuable services." And so ended the year 1856, with many thanks to God for all His merciful protection. Everything around me was peaceful and prosperous; there was good hope of a fine season; my roads were opening out lines of traffic all through the country; and trade was brisk and profitable.

New Year's Day of 1857 found me at Nelingah, where I had been for two days. All was now very prosperous, and the crops were splendid. Every one was in good heart, and applications for waste lands were very numerous; in a comparatively short time none would remain to be taken up. My new assistant, Temple, had gone to work steadily, and was studying Mahratta with every prospect of becoming a proficient. He liked the people, and they liked him; and, as I had before done with Cadell, I made several yearly settlements to show him how the work was done, and he was a very patient and good-tempered scholar. He had been with me on the Hyderabad road so far as it extended, and he completed the survey of two branch lines to Nelingah and Sowara to Latoor—all of these I left to him to look after as he could afford the time; but the works were making rapid progress everywhere. From Nelingah I went to Kharosa, half-way to Owsa, as I was very anxious to see some Hindoo cave-temples of which I had heard a good deal, and none of the archaeologists of Bombay seemed to know anything about them. I found them well worthy a visit—excavated in a cliff of laterite or coarse stone; but some of the pillars left were richly decorated with carving, and several of the halls of the temples were large and airy. The whole were a miniature, apparently, of the caves of Ellora, but very humble copies of these noble temples; and although there did not exist even a tradition of their origin I concluded they must have been the work of the Rajahs of Kullianee—either the Chalukyas, or their successors the Yadavas of Deoghur or Dowlatabad. I could discover no inscription to copy and send to the Asiatic Society of Bombay, but I measured the temples and sent plans of them, as I did also those of the fine Buddhist excavations near Daraseo, which in many respects were very remarkable, and had been previously unknown.

The day I arrived at Kharosa I received the melancholy intelligence of the death of the Resident, Mr. Bushby. He had over-fatigued himself when out on a country excursion, and brought on an illness from which he never rallied. I regretted him very much; for although we had had some differences of opinion on various local questions, yet to me individually he had been kind and encouraging. We corresponded constantly, and he was ever urging me on to attempt and begin further public works, and expressing satisfaction at the result of those already completed. It was impossible to conjecture who might be his successor.

After staying a few days at Owsa, for the trial of the prisoners confined in the jail there, I went by the new line of road to Sowara and Nuldroog. This latter portion was quite finished, and measured 24 feet in width, looking like a good gravel-walk the whole way. This had before only been a rough track for carts—indeed sometimes merely a path winding among the great basalt boulders. At Nuldroog the first building I had used as a jail was now too small, and I began enclosing the large magazine with a wall 21 feet high and plastering it inside. There were now 400 prisoners in the jail, and I had established a school of industry, which was going on well. Some of the prisoners were making rope and tape, others weaving, and more manufacturing carpets of strong cotton—some of these were very pretty, and showed much skill. Nor did I allow the women to be idle; they made various articles in a kind of knitting which was taught them, and other

kinds of work. The prisoners were likewise set to build the new jail wall, and were useful in a multitude of ways.

After a good look round Nuldroog, just to see that all was right, and testing all the surveys of villages within reach, I went on to Sholapoor for a few days' rest, and to indulge myself in a little music; and I promised to go there for a long visit during the rains, when I could not move about my district. My friend the surveyor-in-chief was not at Sholapoor, but Lieut. T. of the Artillery, who had belonged to the Trigonometrical Survey of Scinde, accompanied me to Tooljapoor, bringing his theodolite with him. He was curious to see what I was doing, and he remained long enough to test my surveys of several large villages—all of which, I am glad to say, he found correct.

I asked him to make a report to me on the subject, which he did, explaining in detail the tests he had made, and their results, which I sent on to Mr. Maltby—and if the Commissioner had any doubt about our work I knew this report would remove it; but he wrote word that he was sure we were fully able to carry it on correctly; and I was rejoiced to find that my plan of using the plane-tables was turning out so thoroughly successful.

I had now leisure to make measurements for the completion of the noble embankment at Bhatoree, which was one of my principal projects. The high-water level showed an area of upwards of two square miles; the water would have an average depth of 25 feet, and the irrigation channels on the right bank of the stream would carry water to Ahmednugger itself, which needed it sorely. This great work had been begun, according to tradition, by Salabut Khan, the great Minister of Ahmednugger, who died in 1588, and whose mausoleum overlooks the admirable site for the lake which he had selected. As each would benefit alike by the work, the Nizam's and the British Governments were to share its expenses; and I was so anxious to see it put in hand that I worked very hard at all the plans, sections, and surveys. Bhatoree was one of the most delightful of all my villages, and I had constant visitors from the cantonment. Lieut. Cotgrave of the Engineers, with an assistant, was sent to help me.

Between us all we finished what we had to do; and the cross-levels of this basin gave a result of upwards of sixty millions of cubic yards of water storage, while the expenses of the work would be comparatively moderate. Mr. Cotgrave had not had experience of tank engineering, but he very soon took in the project, and entered into its details with great spirit and zeal; and on looking into the particulars of the former portion which had been completed we were both exceedingly struck by the profound science which had been evinced by the ancient Mussulman engineers.

A survey of the high watershed lying between my district and the great valley of the Godavery river was necessary in order to calculate the amount of rainfall for storage in the large tanks I had proposed; and I began this from Bhatoree, and finished about 100 square miles of it, which all fell into the basin I had tested when I came first to the district.

I had now gained the amplest data for irrigation projects both here and at Bhatoree; and when I should find leisure to do so would submit them with my administrative report. How anxious the people were for water!—not only for cultivation, but for their cattle; and what noble memorials would these works be of our rule in the province! I had discovered among the hills a refuge in hot weather—a village 2,470 feet above the sea-level by barometer and boiling-point of water. I did not leave it till the end of March, and then it was quite cold at night and very agreeable during the day. The scenery was beautiful all along the mountains to Ahmednugger westwards, and over my own district eastwards; while to the north lay the wide plain of the Godavery, and Aurungabad and its hills beyond. Even with the naked eye I could see the glitter of the marble dome of the great tomb of Aurungzeeb's daughter in the far distance, and of other domes and minarets in the city; but my time was up—I had to meet my assistant Palmer, and to lay out a new piece of road south to Daraseo and north towards the city of Beer. After all was done the rainy season would begin, and we should assemble at Nuldroog.



My plans were changed by a note received from Colonel Davidson, from Baroda, where after leaving Hyderabad he had been appointed Resident. Now, it appeared, he was promoted to the vacancy at Hyderabad, and sent me word that he should be at Nuldroog on the 12th April. I received his note while at Manoor on the 6th, and I had 120 miles to travel over as best I could in order to meet our new chief, who was an old friend of mine. By relays of horses, and a palankeen from Teoljapoor, I managed to reach Nuldroog on the morning of the 10th, as the sun was rising, and I found everything looking very nice. Next day at 4 A.M. the Resident arrived, and I was very glad to welcome him, and to congratulate him on his new appointment. He had been overworked at Baroda, and looked ill; but the offer of the Hyderabad Residentsip was too tempting, and he had abandoned his previous idea of going on furlough to England for a few months' leave, until he should have established himself in his new position.

As soon as it was light he asked to be shown all over the fort, expressed his approval of the new jail, and heard all about my schemes for roads, and all the irrigation projects, to which he promised his help and countenance, declaring that one of his first undertakings at Hyderabad would be to complete the road to a junction with my frontier. I explained the progress of the survey, and, in short, everything connected with my work in all departments, and he had not one single objection to offer to any of my plans. He stayed with us till the evening, Temple having ridden in from Owsa during the day; and we then sent him on, with our hearty good wishes for a safe journey, and after this relapsed into our usual monotonous routine of daily work.

I returned to my camp, and made surveys and plans for the last large tank I had to prepare for execution in the ensuing year. It would collect the drainage of  $57\frac{1}{2}$  square miles; would have an average depth of 24 feet, and an area of  $13\frac{1}{4}$  square miles; and would, when completed, be a truly noble work.

[In the month of August Captain Taylor was promoted to the Deputy Commissionership in North Berar, and proceeded to his new station at Booldana.]

JAUINAH, September 7, 1857.

I have got so far on my journey to my new country,—that is, about three-fourths of the distance. We cannot travel luxuriously as you do, but I have come about 180 miles in nine days, with my tents and servants well up, which is not bad work. I give all a rest here, and hope that Bullock will come in from Booldana to-day, till when I shall occupy myself with writing, and first to you. I had intended to have done so on the road; but the double marches, evening and morning, though they are not over ten or twelve miles at the most, interrupt every attempt to settle to anything. My journey has been a very pleasant one; there was no rain to speak of; and through the Nizam's country, in which I could not possibly have been treated with greater civility and distinction had I been the Resident himself, deputations met me from all the large towns and stations, and I was helped on in every way I could desire. The country is perfectly peaceful and loyal to us. But it is sad to see so much of it waste, and to hear the people complaining, not so much of active oppression, as of no one taking the least interest in them except to screw what can be got out of them. I see, however, changes for the better in the system of district management, and there seems to be a system at last; but it must be, even with Salar Jung, that he has little assistance, much opposition, and in all cases very lukewarm co-operation. I trust, however, that a man so thoroughly in earnest and single in purpose will succeed as he deserves to do. His conduct through the trying crisis of June and July has been very admirable; and as it has passed the ordeal of the Mohurrum safely Hyderabad may be considered thoroughly safe, I think, as its people throughout the country are entirely well affected.

I have nothing particular to say of myself. I was very sorry to leave the Nuldroog district; the people were quiet and attached, the country was fast



improving, and improvements as to roads and other matters were in active progress. I do not know on what principles Berar has been managed, and have to get acquainted with the people,—a long matter, with a district of its size. I will write you more from Booldana by-and-by, and when I see my way into what is before me. God bless you.—With my dear love to all kindred, believe me ever yours faithfully,

MEADOWS TAYLOR.

BOOLDANA, NORTH BERAR, *September 26, 1857.*

I arrived here on the 14th, and took charge of the district, and your letter of 6th of August reached me a few days after. I wrote to you from Jaulnah, when staying there to wait for Bullock, and I hope that latter has come safe to hand.

So long as Hyderabad remains quiet and attached, there is no apprehension, I think, for Southern India ; and I sincerely believe that it is both. The Mohurrun passed off quietly, and there is no excitement at present. On one point they appear obliged to temporize, which is, the trial of Tora Baz Khan, the Rohilla zemindar, who led the attack on the Residency. He has not been hanged, as he ought to have been, nor given up, nor will the head of the Adalat in Hyderabad condemn him for taking part in a *holy war* ; it would be against Mohammedan laws, and the Minister appears helpless in respect of bringing him to punishment for the present. He is, however, still in confinement, and it is safe policy not to press anything at the present.

I cannot find my usual statement of revenue and cultivation for this official year, 1856-57, which would have given the details of each department. I only find in a letter to my father, dated 4 June, that the net amount of revenue was 9,19,000 rupees in round numbers, and that the 40,000 rupees lost by abolition of customs duties had been nearly made up.

The increase in cultivation had been very nearly 35,000 acres in the year, which, together with the previous increase, made a total of 219,000 since the cession. 237 miles of road had been completed, and much more had been surveyed, marked out, and was in progress.

The survey showed a result of 260,000 acres completed ; and the surveyors, who could not do field work in the rains, were now occupied in making fair copies of village maps and registries. These maps were most creditably executed, and some of my pupils evinced decided talent as draughtsmen.

I was in daily expectation of a reply in regard to the principles and working of the survey which I had drawn up and submitted in November 1856 ; but eight months' work had shown decided and continuous improvements in every respect ; and as the tenures of land had not entered into the first propositions, and I had to make many explanations in regard to future contingencies, my final report was delayed. My readers would scarcely understand the minutiae of village and landed tenures, and I will not inflict them upon them here ; but I may mention that I found a great proportion of the occupants of land to be *mirasdars*—that is, persons who hold their portions of land in hereditary occupancy, and had so held it for generations, on a fixed rent. Most of these had suffered from local exactions, and but too many had thrown up their ancestral lands, and had emigrated to the British provinces. Of these great numbers had now returned, and had taken up their former estates where they were in possession of yearly tenants. Others, in cases where the land had been improved, had paid the occupant a sum of money for reoccupancy ; but all *miras* rights were reclaimable within a period of forty years of absence.\* To preserve the local rights of these *miras* proprietors the tenants of *miras* lands had only been recognized as yearly tenants ; but they were not disturbed so long as they paid their rent regularly.

The third was a fluctuating class, who took up lands which generally belonged to the village area, on yearly tenure only. These were constantly changing, and passing from village to village, for the most part unthrifty people, with neither capital nor credit, and but few cattle.

I could see plainly the advantage of settled classes, and of giving them security of tenure, in order to induce the employment of capital and the improvement of their estates; and I proposed that all holders of land should be made proprietors, and that the land should be not only actual property to all, but that it should be allowed to be bought and sold or mortgaged like any other marketable commodity. Also, as the lands in all surveyed villages had now been defined, that the owners and occupants should have the option of taking out title-deeds for them, on stamped paper, which at the head should have a map of the land or state, whatever it might be, great or small; and that in the body of the deed the boundaries and general description of every field or division should be detailed, the estate to become the hereditary property of the holder, subject only to a lien on the part of Government.

I fixed the term of thirty years for the first settlement of revenue, at the expiration of which period a revision should be made, and the rent fixed as a permanent settlement in perpetuity.

The Bombay survey was admirable, as far as it went, and the occupants of land were secured by registry; but I thought that possession required more security than registry, and that actual title-deeds would provide this, enable the land to be bought and sold, and satisfy the proprietors. I saw, too, that by the plan I proposed the real marketable capital of the country would be enormously increased, and the intrinsic value of the land would become a source of wealth to every individual holder. I also, at the same time as the land survey, carried on a survey of village sites. Every house was numbered, and its boundaries defined and measured, and title-deeds for this description of property were to be given separately.

When all my rules were drawn up and completed I made a translation of them into Mahratta; and having assembled the chief men of villages, the officers and *mirasdars*, as well as other landholders and occupants, as many as would attend, I laid before them the paper I had drawn up telling them what I proposed to do if permitted by Government.

At first anything so definite and so valuable was doubted, and I believe the people, who had all through their lives been under a system of exaction and oppression, thought there was some dark sinister plan lying below the surface; but when they came fully to comprehend the projects laid down, and received my assurance that title-deeds would be given for all lands, even the smallest holdings, the delight (for I can call it nothing else), the enthusiasm, and the gratitude of the people knew no bounds. It seemed to all as if a new life were opening before them—peace for themselves, and their descendants after them.

Two years previous to this I had saved the people from a measure proposed on the system of the North-West Provinces, by the Supreme Government. This was to make a settlement of my district, and all the others were placed in the same category, with zemindars. Now there were no zemindars in the Bengal sense of the term in the ceded districts, with whom any settlement could be made. The officials who went by that name were the ancient hereditary officers of counties, not necessarily landed proprietors, except in payment of their local services. It was impossible to elevate such persons into landholders, or to give them the rank and position of such, or to transfer to them properties which belonged to other people. Such a course would have interfered seriously with those landed proprietors in villages who were very sturdy in maintaining their hereditary rights; and the settlement in this manner seemed to my perception utterly impossible, and any attempt to force it on the people would have produced not only universal discontent and anger, but in all likelihood a serious insurrection. I wrote, as I was obliged, a great deal on the subject, and I believe I was considered "most impracticable and obstinate," and incurred, I have little doubt, much ill-will; but for that I cared absolutely nothing. I could not uphold what I believed would be an injury and a wrong to my people, or become a party to any course which I considered was not only unjust and unpopular to the last degree, but which would abolish all those ancient hereditary tenures to which the people had clung with

devoted pertinacity through all revolutions and vicissitudes for many centuries, and which the old Mussulman kings and rulers of the Deccan had continuously respected.

My view of this question was very strenuously supported by my friend Bullock, Commissioner in Berar ; and, in the end, I rejoice to say that we so far prevailed as to enlist the sympathies of our Chief Commissioner on our side, who earnestly protested against the system proposed from Bengal, and was successful in his opposition, inasmuch as the question was deferred for "future consideration." In his Administrative Report of 1870 Mr. Saunders, Resident at Hyderabad, and *ex-officio* Chief Commissioner, states, p. 14 :—

"Orders were actually issued by the Government of India for a settlement of rights on the basis of the village community system, and were suspended only in deference to the earnest protest of Mr. Maltby, the then Commissioner of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, some of whose assistants, such as Mr. Bullock and Captain Meadows Taylor, had passed their working lives in the Deccan, and perfectly understood the nature and meaning of the facts they had to deal with in their newly-acquired provinces."

Again, after the final territorial arrangements with His Highness the Nizam in 1860 were completed, the question was revived by the Government of India, and orders were again issued in the most stringent terms. All honour is due to Mr. Saunders, who, although himself a Bengal civilian, possessed ample means of studying the question from previous reports and local observation, and had the firmness to resist and maintain the existing system; and, as he states, "when the report was drawn up the final orders of Government were passed, and the system of field assessment and recognized recognition of cultivating occupancy was formally sanctioned."

The people of Berar had also obtained a zealous advocate in Mr. Lyall, Commissioner of the province, also a Bengal civilian, whose report, after study of all previous correspondence, formed perhaps the basis of those by Mr. Saunders, and rescued the rights of the hereditary and all other classes of occupants from transfer to a class of persons who had never possessed them, and who, indeed, made no pretence whatever to them in any way. I had the subject much at heart, and must apologize for this long story about it ; yet I cannot refrain from quoting Mr. Lyall's own words, which explain the system on which the new settlement was made in 1869 :—

"The English Government has now placed the tenure of land in Berar on a stable foundation. After some hesitation, for a settlement on the North-West Provinces model was first actually ordered, the Bombay system of survey and settlement according to fields has been adopted. The whole country is being marked off into plots, and assessed at rates which hold good for thirty years. Subject to certain restrictions, the occupant is absolute proprietor of his holding ; may sell, let, or mortgage any part of it, cultivate it, or leave it waste, so long as he pays its assessment, which is fixed for the term of thirty years, and may then be raised only on general principles; that is, the assessment of an entire district or village may be raised or lowered as may be expedient ; but the impost may not be altered to the detriment of any one occupant on account of his improvements. . . . When the registered holder alienates his estate, he does it by surrender and admittance, like in English copyholding. Indeed the Berar occupancy has many features resembling the copyhold estate in the reservation of manorial rights. Thus, in fifteen years, the Berar cultivator has passed from all evils of rack-renting, personal insecurity, and uncertain ownership of land, to a safe property and a fixed assessment."

All this is in exact accordance with the plans laid down by me in 1856 as the principle of my own survey of the province of Nuldroog ; but in my humble opinion it does not go far enough. It neither gives title-deeds for the land, nor does it assure the landholder that after the expiration of the thirty years' assessment any further adjustment of rates shall be final and unchangeable in perpetuity. Possibly the grant of title-deeds may be deferred only till the present

term of thirty years has expired ; but I rejoice to see that a perpetual settlement with all *bond fide* proprietors of land throughout India is now publicly advocated, if not publicly notified ; and I trust the bill to be passed on the subject will include the issue of title-deeds. I cannot imagine a more beneficial or more popular measure, or one more calculated to secure the gratitude of the agricultural classes of India. These deeds would be issued by millions, and the property in land would be an enormous addition to the national wealth of India.

I feel that this digression may have been wearisome to some of my readers, but in writing the "Story of my Life" I cannot pass this over without notice, as it was a point on which, firmly believing myself to be in the right, I deliberately risked not only the goodwill of the Government of India at that time, but my own employment as Deputy Commissioner. I would never have agreed to carry out the unjust measure proposed in ignorance of local tenures by the Government of India, and my friend Bullock and myself were prepared to have resigned our appointments in case stringent orders were issued on the subject ; and there is no act of my public life which, to this day, gives me more sincere pleasure and satisfaction than my successful resistance to the orders of Government to the settlement being made according to the North-West system.

On the 23rd July I was very agreeably surprised by a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Maltby, informing me that I had been nominated "settlement officer" and "surveyor-in-chief" to all four districts of the cession, on a salary of 1,500 rupees a month for the present, and 300 rupees travelling allowance. All my maps and proposed plans of settlement had been approved and confirmed, and I was to set about collecting an establishment as soon as possible, so as to begin my work directly the monsoon admitted of my so doing. This was indeed good news ; and I looked anxiously to the time when I could surrender all revenue affairs to a successor, who I hoped would be Cadell, as he knew the district and the people so well, and all were attached to him. My new duties would be infinitely more congenial and agreeable ones to me, I felt ; and to get rid of the interminable details of revenue business would be a very great relief. I was in high spirits at the prospect opening before me, and at the thought that all my labour at the commencement of the survey would now bear good fruit for the people and save me much trouble. Mine was, however, "the only district in which any attempt had been made to carry out the orders of Government, and my proceedings, from first to last, had been eminently successful, and reflected the highest credit upon me." So wrote Mr. Maltby ; and I was very much gratified at his kind expressions.

I was quite easy about my district in every respect. The revenue would increase up to two lakhs, which would be its maximum, till the conclusion of the survey ; and in all other respects everything was progressing steadily and well. There had not been a single case of dacoity for upwards of a year now !

But I was doomed to disappointment, and all my pleasant dreams rudely dispelled, at least for the present, by the receipt of an express from the Chief Commissioner, on the 24th August [1857], informing me that I had been appointed Deputy Commissioner of Berar, *vice* Bullock, who was transferred to my district ; and I was to proceed there with all possible speed.

With this public notification came private letters from the Resident and Mr. Maltby both to say that my immediate transfer was a necessity—but why, they did not tell me. Their letters urged me to make no delay whatever, and the Resident's note was characteristic :—

"Go to Berar directly, and *hold on by your eyelids*. I have no troops to give you, and you must do the best you can. I know I can depend upon you, and I am sure you will not fail me."

I would have started that very day, but my camels were out grazing in the country, and Temple was absent, to whom I must make over the treasury and all current business. What would come of the survey now I knew not, nor of my appointment as "settlement officer." I saw the call was very urgent. It was not a time to waste words or thought in idle speculations. My duty was clear before

me, and the times were too exciting to venture to ask any questions. I was, however, assured that I should be promoted to be a Deputy Commissioner of the first class on a salary of 1,500 rupees a month.

It became known later that the survey operations had been suspended till more peaceful times, and all public works as well—till the present threatening aspect of affairs was at an end.

On the day appointed for me to leave—the 27th August—I was presented with a public address from all the official and principal persons of the province. This ultimately received 1,622 signatures, and I append a translation of it here. I had not the least conception that such a proceeding had ever been intended. The address was beautifully written in Mahratta, and presented to me on a very handsome silver salver, which I now use constantly.

*True Translation of a Mahratta Address to Captain Meadows Taylor, Deputy Commissioner, Daraseo District, August 27, 1857.*

(After the usual preliminary compliments.)

“Since your arrival in this country we have all been happy and prosperous. Now an order has come from Government that you are to go to Berar, and Government has no doubt directed this because of your qualifications, and fitness, and ability for that duty. As it is a higher office than this, it will be a source of pleasure to you; and we all pray to God that He will be pleased to protect so kind and merciful an officer, and we shall be very grateful, so God will hear our prayers.

“But now we are to be separated from you, and are thereby fallen into a sea of grief. We shall never be able to give sufficient praise to you for the manner in which you have protected the people hitherto—how you have created means of prosperity—and for your various good qualities. Still we have it in our hearts to address you in some sort, and you are to be pleased to accept it in order to gratify all.

“In the year 1853 you came to this district as Deputy Commissioner; and, considering its circumstances then and now, there is a very great difference in its condition, of which you are the sole cause. When you came there were no good roads in Nuldroog; all the village streets and paths were filthy and useless, and even men travelled with difficulty. But you, with much personal exertion, have made proper arrangements for the good comfort of all. We all know this, and it has all come of your kindness.

“There was an immense quantity of waste land in the district. This has been cultivated since you came, and is now inhabited; and by provision of water and other circumstances in the country, hamlets, villages, and market-towns have been founded and built, and trade has very greatly increased, by which all obtain a livelihood, and there is no distress of any kind.

“Before, in this district, dacoits and gang-robbers and plunderers who openly committed murder used to go about in force, and the inhabitants were much afflicted by them. But you established police, and settled everything, and so entirely extirpated these people that not even a trace of them remains. From this protection of life and property one of the principal benefits which result from the British Government was secured to this district.

“In the year 1855 there was a very heavy famine in this land, and it was difficult even for rich people to support themselves. In that hard time many poor people were at the point of death; many could get no food, and in their straits even abandoned their children. We all saw this. Then you made great exertions to save these poor people, and began with large establishments to clear the fort, and to make roads—as well to the advantage of Government as to the people; and thus you maintained the poor, who had no other means of subsistence. Of those who were not able to labour, you, from your own private funds, supported thousands. So if we seek for benevolent and useful people like you we find few of them.

“From the tanks which you strove to get constructed this district will be greatly benefited, and from this your name will be sung with praise when our

women grind at their mills. But if we now say all we have to say it would only fatigue you, and take up much time ; therefore we will be concise, and close this with what is due to your good qualities.

" But what shall we say ? You were as father and mother to the ryots. You heard the complaints of the poor and protected them. In your *darbar*, as flies to honey, all classes and degrees of persons gathered and mingled together without apprehension ; but we never saw yet that you ever used harsh expressions to any one. Your perfect knowledge of our language assured complainants, for they knew they were understood, and were contented ; and never, on any occasion, have we seen that any one was treated with indignity or affronted in your *darbar*.

" We who are the servants of Government in this district, as also all the ryots, well know what your conduct has been, and know also that your kindness to us has never decreased. You have taken care of us as of our children. Were we to relate how you have exerted yourself for us we should never make an end of it. It will be difficult for us to obtain another superior like you, and we considered it good fortune when we obtained service with you. Now you are going from us, and our misfortune is apparent to us. Be it so. Wherever you go, may God prosper you, and may our country be prosperous through you. So we entreat God. Our hearts are full, and we can say no more. So also before you came here you were at Shorapoor, and there, too, you made all happy, and made that district prosperous. Such praise have we heard from many persons who came from thence.

" Now our last request is this, that as you have bestowed on us so many obligations, and so much love upon us, we, to show our gratitude to you, have signed this address, which all assembled have agreed on, and we pray you will be pleased to accept it. This is our unanimous representation, which you are to be pleased to accede to.

(Signed) "JEWUNJEE RUTTONJEE,  
SHUNKUR RAO RUGGONATH,  
*Extra Assistant Commissioners ;*

" And 1,123 *samindars, patells*, and other respectable inhabitants."

(Dated Nuldroog, Aug. 27, 1857.)

I can never forget the scene in the public *cucherry* when this was read to me. My old friend Shunkur Rao Baba Sahib read it with the tears running down his cheeks, and there were few dry eyes among the vast crowd that had collected. The old cry, "Mahadeo Baba ke Jey !" was raised outside and taken up by thousands. It was the first time I had heard it at Nuldroog. I was much moved. Nothing, I thought, could exceed this simple but earnest expression of the feelings of the people towards me, and their manifestation of regard and affection was very grateful to my heart ; and if I had stood between the people and wrong in the matter of land—if I had governed them justly to the best of my ability—if I had ensured for them peace, and laid the foundation of prosperity, this was indeed a grateful reward—all I could have hoped or wished for on earth.

That night as I left the fort and town I found all the road and street lined with the people, cheering me with the old shout, "Mahadeo Baba ke Jey !" and many were weeping and pressing round to bid farewell ; and I was followed for more than two miles out of the town with the same cheer, by a crowd from which it seemed difficult to get away.

At every village I passed through that night, and till my frontier was reached, the village authorities, elders, and people came with their farewells and best wishes, in crowds, from all points within their reach, praying for my speedy and safe return. My departure from Shorapoor had been affecting and painful to me, but the demeanour of the people here was, if possible, more touching and affectionate.

Idem, Chapter XIV., 1857-58 :—

I arrived at Jaulnah on the ninth day. I had intended to travel faster, but a feverish cold I caught on leaving Nuldroog, when my palankeen doors were open and a chill night wind blowing through them, confined me to my bed for

one whole day and night, and retarded my progress, so that I could not make double marches. The warm greetings and farewells did not cease till I reached the city of Beer, in the Nizam's dominions,—everywhere the same reception, most hearty and affectionate.

The native district officer at Beer on behalf of the Nizam's Government came out to meet me, with a large retinue, a distance of six miles; and I found my tents pitched in a very pleasant garden close to the city, and a most ample breakfast cooked at the officer's house, and ready to place upon my table. He pressed me very much to stay as long as I could, but I dared not linger; and in the afternoon I pushed on again to a village on the Hyderabad road where there was a good bungalow.

Next day I had to cross the Godavery at Shahgurrh; fortunately it was not in high flood, but it was not fordable. Here I found all my camels, baggage-ponies and servants clustered together on the bank of the river—the ferrymen would not permit them to pass; and as soon as I came up there were some very ominous cries of *Deen! Deen!* while the ferrymen, who had taken their boat to some distance, waved me off. I had no escort—only four men out of twenty-four who had been sent with me from Beer; the rest had already crossed the river. I had not brought my own cavalry escort from Nuldroog; some of them still appeared very restless, and I thought it was safer to leave them where they were. As I and my servants were parleying with the boatmen, an old Byragee whom I had never seen before raised the old cry loudly: "Mahadeo Baba ke Jey!" he shouted—and many joined, drowning the *Deen! Deen!* most completely; while on the opposite side of the river, near the town of Shahgurrh, a large body of cavalry came in view, making it very doubtful to my mind what would be the next move. This, however, was soon decided by one of the horsemen, the officer in command of the party, tying a white scarf to his spear, and at the same time despatching two other boats with a few dismounted men to my assistance. On seeing this the party who had set up the cry of *Deen! Deen!* bolted up the bank, looking sulky enough, and I saw them no more; while the three boats took me, my bearers, servants, baggage, and camels, across the river in safety.

The horsemen had been sent by an old friend of mine, the Talookdar of Umber, with orders to see me safe over the river. He did not expect me so soon, or he would have sent them before. He had heard that the Mussulmans of Shahgurrh had betrayed a very fanatical spirit, and had said I was not to be allowed to proceed; and he feared for my safety.

This escort would not permit me to halt at Shahgurrh, but carried me on to a village eight miles further, where they had ordered a small tent to be pitched for me, and there I slept. Next morning we all went on to Umber. My old friend was ill and could not leave his house; but he sent his son with a large cavalcade to meet me, and entertained me most hospitably all day.

My friend, who was able to visit me in the evening, told me that he feared several mutineers of the Aurungabad cavalry were concealed at Shahgurrh, and that a Mussulman priest had been preaching rebellious addresses, but that he should send fifty men to the crossing-place for the protection of travellers. I left the escort here that had accompanied me from Beer. The men were sadly vexed at the scene at the river, and that they had not been with me; but as we could not all have crossed together, I, anticipating no difficulty, had desired them to precede me. I now dismissed them with a letter to the Talookdar of Beer thanking him for their services.

Next day I marched twenty miles, and arrived at Jaulnah. I was rather amused at the "cloud of cavalry" sent to attend me by my old friend, whose only regret was that he was not well enough to accompany me himself. Orders had been forwarded to a Parsee merchant at Jaulnah to see that a house was ready for me; and as the cantonment was nearly emptied of troops there were plenty at my disposal, and I found myself located in a very comfortable well-furnished bungalow

belonging to the colonel of the 6th Cavalry. Here Major Gill, who had been for some years employed by Government in copying the Buddhist frescoes in the caves of Ajunta, came to see me, and gave me a letter from Bullock, which had come in by express, begging me to wait for him at Jaulnah, which I was glad to do, especially as a heavy fall of rain set in, and marching would have been next to impracticable. Two days afterwards my friend joined me, and told me what had occurred. On the outbreak of the Mutiny several of his cavalry escort had broken away, very much as mine had done, and the whole district was reported to be unsound. He had asked for troops, which it was impossible to send him; and after a very sharp correspondence on both sides our sudden exchange of districts was peremptorily ordered. I had been told nothing of this, but had simply acted according to the short urgent letter I had received; but the prospect of having to keep Berar quiet after what I now heard was not encouraging by any means.

I was likewise told that I must be prepared to find the internal economy of the district very irregular. When Bullock had gone on furlough to England his successor had not carried out the general instructions promptly, and I should find the progress made slow, but he hoped I would soon set things all right; he had begun to work hard on his return, and thought he had put matters in training. I told him he would not have much trouble with my district, as it was in capital working order; and so we parted. This was no time to show vacillation or uneasiness, and I was determined to go through the country and among the people exactly as I should have done had I heard no unpleasant rumours. There were no troops to be had, so there was no use thinking about them. As much of the Contingent as could be spared, and several half-mutinous regiments of cavalry and infantry, were collected at Edlabad, near Boorhanpoor, and prepared for service with (then) Sir Hugh Rose's force; and for the time no bolder course could have been adopted. Nevertheless the Resident was assailed fiercely by the press—accused of shifting the responsibility of managing mutinous troops on others, and of ruining the chances of Sir Hugh Rose's success by placing in his rear a large brigade of the best troops in India, who could not possibly be depended on. But Colonel Davidson knew his men. He issued a spirited address to them, appealing to their loyalty, and encouraging them to go forward and win fame under Sir Hugh Rose. The men obeyed; and after the brigade joined Sir Hugh it shared in the whole of the Central India campaign with him, and behaved well to the very last. Colonel Davidson had in view a much higher aim than merely keeping the troops employed in the field. His object was to show that the Nizam had no sympathy with the re-establishment of the monarchy of Delhi, and that his own troops were assisting the English to quell the Mutiny and crush the authors of it; and in this point the Resident's bold measure was successful beyond his hopes.

On the 19th July the Residency at Hyderabad was attacked by a concourse of Rohillas and other city fanatics, who were easily repulsed; but the Resident was at issue with the commander of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, who not only differed from him on the question of retaining the Residency at all as a fortified post, but advised its total abandonment, and the location of all belonging to it within the cantonment. Happily the Resident took his own way, and he saw clearly that his desertion of the Residency would have the effect of weakening the Minister (now Sir Salar Jung, G.C.S.I.), and also the Nizam himself, both of whose lives had been threatened by fanatics. It was when it was determined that the Contingent Force should take the field that my friend had applied for troops, and the utter impracticability of the request was resented. "Berar," wrote the Resident to me, "which contains more than two millions of people, *must* be kept quiet by moral strength, for no physical force is at my disposal."

Delhi, attacked first in June, and before which a position only was maintained till the siege began on the 1st September, was taken by storm on the 14th, but resistance continued inside until the 20th. Every native in India who could think at all had watched the progress of the siege from June to September with the greatest anxiety as to which would win the victory—England or the Moghul;



and many doubted whether the small force of English in India could make any impression on the immense power of the native army of Bengal. And the long delay, to which they were so little accustomed in English operations generally, strengthened this feeling considerably.

As I approached the head-station of Berar, Booldana, I received deputations from the principal landholders, merchants and bankers of the chief towns, who were all eager for authentic news ; but I could discover no symptom whatever of disaffection. The great Mussulman colony below the plateau of Booldana had been one of the chief points of anxiety to my predecessor ; and, as soon as I could, I marched there, sending down a light tent before me. I gave no other warning, and was quite unexpected by the native officials and my English assistant, whom I found in charge. Though my sudden appearance at the head-town of the country, when I had as yet visited no other, at first excited some surprise, and perhaps suspicion, we soon became excellent friends. At first I felt rather doubtful, as nobody came near me, and my servants heard very disagreeable rumours ; but at length one leading man came forward, then another, and another—I suppose, to take my measure ; and then all my people came, many hundreds, and raising the old cry, “ Bolo Mahadeo Baba ke Jey ! ” which some one set up, the whole assembly joined in heartily, and proffered service whenever and however I needed them. “ They would watch the frontier,” they said ; “ they would not let in Scindia’s disaffected people ; they would follow me to Delhi if I would only take them there ; they wanted no pay—only food, and ammunition for their matchlocks ; they would be true and faithful to the English,”—and many more promises were made, and faithfully kept.

From that day they never gave me the least uneasiness, and, if I had had occasion to call them out, would, I firmly believe, have done their duty nobly.

I wrote what had occurred, privately, to the Resident, by express, and I believe my despatch was a very considerable relief to him, as he was under great anxiety about Berar.

I need say nothing upon the condition of the internal economy of Berar at this time. Cultivation and revenue alike seemed to have declined, and did not exhibit the elasticity of Nuldroog. I had to set things to rights as much as I could, and the Commissioner wrote that he would come to me in January. Very hard work fell on me, as my assistants were new to the duties, and had not been trained to a regular system, which, had it been adopted from the first, would have rendered matters easy now to all. There was, too, a heavy arrear of appeals and civil suits ; but every allowance was to be made, for the territory had undergone so many changes from one hand to another ! and my friend Bullock’s health having failed, and his being obliged to take furlough just after his appointment, had not given the district a fair chance. The climate was very enervating, and the district so extensive that I felt very thankful my first appointment to it had been altered for Nuldroog, as I am quite sure my health would never have held out under its relaxing influence. Indeed I felt anxious now as to whether I should be able to stand it ; but this only experience would prove.

Booldana was a pleasant place on the south table-land, above the valley of Berar, and had been fixed upon as the head-station on account of its fine climate ; for there was the greatest possible difference in the air up there and that in the valley below. The views were beautiful down the wooded ravines, and my early morning rides were far more picturesque than any about Nuldroog. But I had no time to stay there long, and, after a few days’ rest I took my establishment into the valley, and began work in earnest. It was not by any means pleasant, as I was obliged to find much fault with the managers of divisions, who being provided with ample instructions had neglected to carry them out, and had neither kept their own accounts in order, nor those of the villages under them. Neither were the village books nor the records properly kept. These were matters of detail, as to which I need not perplex my readers, for except at great length they could not be explained intelligibly ; and if they were it would not answer any purpose.

I confess I thought I had been badly paid at Nuldroog, having received 300

rupees a month less than had been granted to the Deputy Commissioner in Berar, solely because the latter had a higher revenue and population ; the area of both were nearly similar. However, it was no use grumbling now. I had done the work at Nuldroog to the best of my ability, and now I was going to try to set things straight here, and I hoped to get the district rapidly into order. As yet I had received no additional pay. I, as second-class Deputy Commissioner, was holding a first-class district ; Bullock, as first-class Deputy Commissioner, holding a second-class district. But we supposed some arrangement would be come to in time.

Although both Delhi and Lucknow had been taken, yet the pacification of the country was far from complete ; and rebellion in the Central Provinces, close to my own northern frontier, had made, and was making, rapid progress.

There was now much more alarm and uneasiness than before the taking of Delhi, which was far too distant from us to excite more than passing interest.

I received many anonymous letters, apparently from friends, warning me of contemplated assassination, and stating that when I was disposed of the native troops at Ellichpoor were prepared to rise, and, aided by the military and predatory classes of the district, would plunder the chief towns, and join the rebel forces beyond the Satpoora range, which constituted my whole northern frontier. At Nimawa Captain Keatinge had been obliged to conceal himself in the jungle, having his wife and children with him ; and they escaped almost by a miracle.

At Jubbulpore and Sangor rebellion was at its height, not only in the mutiny of native regiments, but by the risings of petty rajahs and nawabs, and of the people of the district, always noted for their turbulent and predatory habits.

There was hardly one spot where loyalty prevailed ; for as the regiments broke away from their several stations, with or without violence and murder, as it might be, all restraint was removed from the lawless classes of the people at large, and these were every day growing stronger under the evil spirit and licence which could not be checked.

On the eastern portion of Berar lay Nagpore, by no means to be trusted ; and it was owing to the large force of faithful Madras troops who were stationed there that no serious outbreak occurred in favour of the deposed family, on whose behalf, it was reported, intrigue was busy throughout the whole country. On my western frontier lay Khandeish, not secure either. Nana Sahib had active agents there, as he aspired to be Peshwah ; and all the northern frontier of that province was in contact with Scindia's and Holkar's territories, where rebellion was rife.

Berar was the centre of these three great provinces, which stretched across the whole of India, and formed, as it were, the barriers that were to prevent the rebellion from spreading southwards ; and of the three Berar was the most important perhaps, as if the rebels had broken through the passes of the Satpoora range—a very easy proceeding—and had been joined by the military classes and indigenous marauders of the province, it is impossible to say how far disaffection might have extended to the Nizam's dominions.

From October, therefore, as the circle of war and mutiny grew wider, reaching my northern frontier, the danger increased almost daily ; and it was only the thorough attachment and loyalty of the people to the English rule which saved Berar, under God's blessing, from insurrection.

I have already mentioned the goodwill and proffered devotion of the Mussulmans of the western portions of my district ; and as I travelled up the valley slowly to Akola I was equally gratified by the conduct of the Rappoots, who resided therein in large numbers. There had been fierce and bloody feuds between these two great classes from time to time, on occasions of religious festivals ; and this seemed a good opportunity for them to break out again : for I had literally no troops on whom I could rely, and those at Ellichpoor were more a source of uneasiness to me than anything else, as, although they were as yet orderly and quiet, it was felt that any excitement might cause them to break off and join their rebel brethren at Jubbulpore or in Central India. Their officers were very

mistrustful of them, for many were from Oudh ; and who could rely on them after the mutiny of Scindia's troops and their march to join the main body of the rebel forces ?

I was grateful for the attachment evinced by the Rajpoots of the Akola district, who also proffered service wherever and whenever it might be of use. All I could do was to ask their aid in watching the passes and in apprehending parties from the north who might seek to sow rebellion among us. This they promised to do ; and in two instances they actually did so, succeeding in arresting and bringing to justice a number of delegates from Scindia's mutinous troops at Boorhanpoor, whom I tried and sentenced to transportation and penal servitude. And these events prevented any further attempt of the like nature.

There were several petty rajahs of the mountain tribes of Gonds who received hereditary allowances or stipends from the Berar administrators, and who were responsible for the several passes which led from the north. All these came to me and tendered their services, nor did any one case occur of disloyalty or neglect.

The northern frontier was thus made as secure as I could under these circumstances make it ; but, in Colonel Davidson's expressive phrase, I was literally "holding on by my eyelids."

I will not deny that it was a period of fearful anxiety. No aid could be expected from without, and the anonymous warnings were more frequent than ever, while evil reports flew daily through the country. My servants kept a horse saddled for me every night in case of necessity for escape.

I had no guards except a few police, and I was carrying on my duties in my tents as usual : making the yearly settlement ; examining village books, district books, and accounts ; trying appeal and civil cases ; holding criminal trials, and the like. One great benefit to me was my being able to speak the vernacular language, Mahratta, fluently. The people felt that I understood them, and came to me freely with petitions as to any real or imaginary grievance.

There had been some corruption at work among my *chuprassies* or office attendants, which seemed to be of long standing ; and I one night overheard a conversation between two of them who lay outside my tent walls, when they thought I was asleep, about division of the proceeds of their gains upon the receipt of petitions, which would have been amusing enough but for the mischief that such extortion for presenting petitions to me occasioned. I at once adopted my Nuldroog plan, which was to have a large box fitted with hinges and a padlock ; a slit was cut in the lid, and notification made that all petitions henceforth were to be dropped into it, and that petitioners were to attend every afternoon, when the box would be opened before me, and the papers publicly read. The box was placed in an open space before my tent, and was presently filled with petitions ; the two men whose confidential talk I had overheard were then called up. I took my usual seat outside my tent, and after addressing the crowd I had the men's badges removed, and they were turned out of camp in disgrace.

I think, nay, I am positive, that if every Deputy Commissioner situated as I was had such a box they would find it an admirable plan. It had an excellent effect in my district, and inspired great confidence among the people. Any frivolous complaint was at once dismissed ; but many corrupt practices and grievances were brought to light ; and as each petition was taken out of the box the name of the petitioner was called out, and every applicant knew that his paper was considered, and heard it read before me. A memorandum was then written on the back, referring it to the district native officer for report if necessary.

I was now fairly among the people ; and, though so often cautioned and advised of danger, I felt that reliance on them was the safest course. Once, in a Bombay paper, it was stated that I had been attacked and murdered ; but I wrote to contradict the report before the departure of the mail for England, and the dear ones at home knew nothing of it ; nor did I, as I see by my letters home, mention any current reports, and, indeed, I alluded very little to the condition of

affairs at all, or my own cares. I lived, however, in a state of perpetual alarm, and every day added to the anxiety I endured. Every detail of deeds of violence in Central India—of which almost daily fresh rumours reached me, sometimes very much exaggerated—the arrival of every “express,” night or day, in camp—caused unavoidable excitement. Who could say what news it might not bring? At that time all Deputy Commissioners of provinces and political officers used to send such expresses, when and how they could, to each other, giving local news, and with a request that the express might be forwarded to the next authority. Many a man in India was “holding on,” never flinching from his post, dying there bravely in many a terrible instance, or, when hope was gone, escaping with bare life, often through hosts of enemies, and thankful for that mercy. “What if Berar should go?” I often thought; “and how could I hope to escape?” How thankful I was that I was alone—that I had only myself to think of. Had I had wife and children with me, as many had, my anxiety would have been increased a thousandfold.

True, my people appeared steady and trustworthy, and business proceeded as usual as I moved my camp from village to village; but Berar was 250 miles long, with an average breadth of 60 miles or more, and the population was two millions. Who could answer for all! And from day to day for some months one felt as if in the morning one might be murdered before night, or at night be dead before the morning.

The Resident’s anxiety on my account seemed to increase; but I assured him in my letters, which were rare, that so far I could not trace any disaffection, and that a good spirit seemed to prevail among the people, even where I had felt most uneasiness myself. Still I often longed to be in the roughest scenes in Central India rather than bear the load of responsibility on my mind day and night; it was a terrible strain upon me.

I was at Ellichpoor on the 9th December, and I stayed there till the 13th. It was very cold, the thermometer showing 36° and 40° in the mornings. It was the head civil station of a subdivision of my district, and I was greatly indebted to Captain Hamilton, who superintended it, for his watchful supervision of the frontier. The people were deeply attached to him, and gave him information freely. How welcome were the large baskets of delicious peaches grown in his garden at Chiculdah, the sanitarium of Ellichpoor! and I wished I could go up there again and revisit the old scenes.

The native officers of the cavalry and infantry both visited me, and I congratulated them on the honours which their regiments were winning in Central India. They appeared to be intensely gratified at the news which reached them from time to time, both in newspapers and private letters, and at the prospect which was opening for further good service under Sir Hugh Rose, whose forces were now advancing into the disturbed districts.

Many of the men also came to me “for a talk,” and raised the old cry of my regiment, which was known to all. So I hoped the disaffection of the cavalry at Ellichpoor was a groundless rumour.

When the glorious news came from the Northern Provinces, the victory over the Gwalior troops at Cawnpore, and the second relief of Lucknow, with many other successful engagements in Central India, the year 1858 opened very brightly, and with good hope that the general campaign against the rebel forces would be brought to a brilliant conclusion in a few months. Already the various combinations of the rebel army and the various rebel chiefs had been much broken; now they were growing dispirited, and had nothing to fall back upon. When the constant arrival of troops from home made it manifest to all that England was fully roused, and was putting forth her strength and her enormous resources to save and help her sons, the hopes of the rebel leaders fell, and they felt their inability to war against her.

I am not, however, writing a history of the time,—that is in far abler hands than mine. I can only relate what affected me personally.

My own position was decided by the Governor-General, who decreed, as I

thought he would, that my friend was to be reinstated in Berar, and I to return to my old quarters, Nuldroog. The Commissioner, Mr. Maltby, had been at Nuldroog, had seen all my work, and approved of it, and had been much struck by the independent, though thoroughly respectful, demeanour of my Mahratta farmers. They had visited him freely and assured him of their prosperity and loyalty, and he wrote me a very flattering letter on the condition of the district generally. In Berar I had done my utmost to redeem irregularities and reconcile conflicting accounts ; but three months had been too short a time to do all I wished, or to leave things as straight as I should have liked.

Bullock was to leave Nuldroog at once, and wished me to meet him in the eastern portion of the district as soon as I could ; and I too was anxious to get back to my old work before the very hot weather began. Berar was beginning to tell upon me ; the old fever had returned in periodical attacks, and I was tormented with severe neuralgia, from which I could obtain no relief whatever. I had used the hot springs at Salbudlee with some good effect, but it was not lasting, and I greatly dreaded the hot season. All the accounts had been sent in, and I found that one lakh out of two set down for remission was recoverable : the village books were now in order, and only careful supervision was needed.

While in the eastern portion of the district I had been able to perform an essential service to Government, which had great effect on the war in Central India. One day I received an express from Colonel Hill, Assistant Quarter-master-General of the Madras army, attached to General Whitlock's force at Nagpore, which had not marched, and was not able to do so, for want of draught and carriage bullocks. He requested I would, if possible, purchase and send to him 600 at once, leaving 400 more to follow ; and added, if I could not manage this there would be no hope of getting any except from Mysore. The Nagpore province either would not or could not supply them. I set to work directly. The province of Berar contains the finest draught cattle in India, and plenty were to be had at moderate prices. No sooner were my wants known than my camp was crowded with noble beasts. In two days I had got half the number, which were sent on under an escort of police, and day after day other herds were despatched ; and this enabled the siege-train and heavy stores to be sent on without delay, so that eventually the whole force was set in motion, with an ample supply of trained cattle.

I received not only the thanks of the generals commanding for this assistance, but of the Governor of Madras in Council ; and it was very clear that if these cattle had not been sent up from the south Whitlock's force could not have accomplished what it did in marching upon Jubbulpore, and, by a lucky stroke, capturing the Kirwee treasures. I thought myself fairly entitled to a share of the Kirwee booty for the service I had rendered ; but it was decreed afterwards by Sir J. Phillimore that as I did not belong to the force "my chance, *though just in equity*, was not admissible."

In my letters home at this period I wrote very earnestly on the question of pressing the direct rule of the Crown in the future government of India, and that the time had arrived for a change to be made with advantage.

There was a very general impression that the great Company was only a farmer of the revenues ; and while royal houses would acknowledge and respect the Crown, they would have, especially after late events, no such feeling for the Company.

I suggested many other material changes as to high courts of justice and tenures of land, several of which have been carried out ; and I had the honour done me of some of my letters being read in the "House."

The letters written to my cousin Reeve, and already given, embody most of my opinions and suggestions.

Strange indeed was the weird prophecy of Plassey in 1757-58 !

The Company's rule was to last for a hundred years. In 1857-58 it had virtually expired, and 1859 witnessed its total extinction !

It was my intention, after leaving my friend, to go direct *via* Aurungabad to

Beer. Mr. Maltby was now on his way to Berar, and Bullock and I moved on to meet him early in February, when he asked me to accompany him through the districts, and to visit with him the caves of Ajunta and Ellora. This would have been a very pleasant holiday for me ; but again I was to be disappointed. We met the Commissioner near Oomrawuttee, on his way to Ellichpoor, and the very next day came an "express" from the Resident directing me to lose not a moment in proceeding to Hyderabad on business relating to Shorapur.

I had seen by the papers a short time before that the Rajah had been suspected of treason, and that troops had been sent to watch the eastern and western frontiers of his district. Now I learned that he had attacked a small force which had been ordered to Captain Campbell's assistance, this officer having been sent to Shorapoor on a special mission ; and the Rajah being defeated had fled to Hyderabad, where he had been arrested.

Mr. Maltby spoke very kindly to me of all he had noted in the Nuldroog district, and hoped I should soon be again at liberty to continue my work there, especially the survey operations. I ventured to ask whether I might be allowed anything for my labours in Berar ; but he could not say—and my travelling expenses had been a very serious pull upon my resources. I was to receive plenty of thanks ; but, although these were very gratifying, they did not pay me for the very hard work and terrible anxiety I had gone through : but—there was one comfort—I had "held on by my eyelids !"

I pushed on now by double marches to Hingolee, and thence to Hyderabad, where I arrived on the 18th March, after having travelled 300 miles in sixteen days—not very fast perhaps ; but my continued travelling had blistered my people's feet and I could not get on quicker.

I went of course to Mr. Palmer's house, and found him well and cheerful ; but the Resident would not hear of my being with any one but himself, and sent for me directly. I was very kindly received. He at once increased my pay, appointed me now Commissioner of Shorapoor, on 1,800 rupees a month, or, at the least, 1,500, and said his wish was to keep me altogether in the political department.

He told me all the high officials, and chiefly the Governor-General, were more than satisfied with what I had done in Berar.

MADRAS MAIL, May 17, 1880.—The following is from a correspondent :—

It was rumoured the other day that Sir Salar Jung, emboldened by the fall of the Ministry which had snubbed him, intended to personally repeat his demand for the restoration of Berar to their successors, whom he hoped to find more complacent ; but for the present at any rate, His Excellency has postponed his second visit to England *sine die*. In England the merits of the dispute are unknown outside a limited circle of retired Indian officials ; and even among Englishmen in India there is some sympathy with an attempt to escape from a bargain under the disguise of a claim of right. It will therefore be useful to set forth a plain statement of the facts of the case.

There is a common delusion that the Berar districts were assigned to us that we might pay to ourselves from the net revenues a large debt due by the Nizam for the pay of the Hyderabad Contingent ; that this debt has been paid off, but, that the British Government dishonourably refuse to give back the districts, alleging philanthropic reasons, but being really moved by avarice and earth-hunger. The only elements of truth in this view are that there was a debt, and that the unwillingness of the people, who have not yet had time to forget the state of things from which we raised them, is a valid reason for not giving them back to the rule from which they were glad to escape. There was a debt, a debt of fifty lakhs ; but it has not been paid off, nor were the Berar Districts assigned for such a purpose. In 1853 Lord Dalhousie could no longer go on advancing money for the maintenance of the Contingent, which the Nizam, as he did not deny, was bound to keep up for service against common enemies, in accordance with the treaty of 1800, as modified by subsequent practice and agreement. The debt then amounted

to forty-five lakhs, and but for the money thus advanced, the pay of the troops would have been in arrears for two years or more. The finances of the Nizam's State were in frightful confusion, and there was no prospect of improvement in his credit, or his management. A material guarantee for the up-keep of the Contingent was imperatively required. The Nizam therefore was induced to make the treaty of 1853, by which the Berar Districts, yielding 28 lakhs, the Raichor Doab, yielding 11 lakhs, and Naldroog Dharaseo, and other parganas on the borders of Sholapur and Ahmednagar, yielding 8 lakhs—in all territories yielding 47 lakhs of gross revenue, were assigned to British management for the support of the Contingent, and the payment of interest on the debt, and of certain political pensions. Accounts were to be submitted every year to the Nizam, and he was to receive any surplus remaining after payment of the above mentioned charges, and those of the local civil administration. The Contingent, which had hitherto been a part of the Nizam's army, though officered by Europeans (of whom Meadows Taylor was one), was removed from his control and organized as a British auxiliary force under the management of the Resident. By the 12th Article of the treaty of 1800, the Nizam had bound himself to furnish 9,000 horse and 6,000 foot to the British Government in time of war; but in practice a regular force of four batteries of artillery, 5,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry had been kept up, always ready for use. By Article 7 of the new treaty, the old obligation was cancelled, and the new practice made binding in its stead.

There was no surplus, and in 1860 the debt had become fifty lakhs. "The provisions of the treaty of 1853, which required the submission of annual accounts of the Assigned Districts, were," says Aitchison, "productive of much inconvenience and embarrassing discussions. Difficulties had also arisen regarding the levy of the 5 per cent. duty on goods under the commercial treaty of 1802. To remove these difficulties, and at the same time to reward the Nizam for his services in 1857, a new treaty (No. XVII.) was concluded in December 1860." By Article 3 the debt was cancelled. By Article 2 the territory of Shorapur near Raichor, forfeited by the rebellion of its Raja in 1857, was ceded to the Nizam. And by Article 5, the Raichor Doab and the other western districts were restored. On the other hand, the Nizam, in Articles 8 and 9, ceded six jungly taluks on the left bank of the Godavari, and renounced his right to levy tolls on goods going up or down that river. In Articles 4, 6, and 7 he agreed to forego all demands for accounts of the Assigned District of Berar, to which the enclosed jaghir and inam lands, formerly reserved, were now added; but the British Government agreed to pay to him any surplus which might remain after defraying the charges of the Contingent, certain political pensions, and the local civil administration, the amount of such charges being entirely at the discretion of the British Government. In Article 6 the Nizam agreed that the Berar Districts already assigned, together with some additions to make up the gross revenue to 32 lakhs, should be "held by the British Government in trust for the payment of the troops of the Contingent," etc; without any limitation as to the time, and without any reservation or condition, except that of paying over the annual surplus. The revenue assigned was at first hardly sufficient, but it rapidly increased. Even before the American War, improved government led to increased cultivation, and put a stop to much of the trickery on the part of village officers and other subordinates from which the Nizam had suffered.

But the closing of the southern ports, on the outbreak of the American Civil War and consequent rise of cotton to famine prices, wrought a change so great as to be almost a revolution in the economic condition of Berar. Not only was cultivation greatly extended, but the greatly increased value of produce justified higher rates of assessment as the new settlement went on, and enabled the people to benefit Government by more freely indulging their love of liquor and litigation. The construction of a railway confirmed the prosperity of the country, and though the price of cotton has fallen, the crop is still so profitable that the people are among the most flourishing in India. The revenue went up by leaps and bounds, till, in 1870, it reached 70 lakhs. Since then it has not greatly varied. The



gross revenue, according to the latest accounts, is Rs. 83,00,000. But of this sum Rs. 13,00,000 go to Local and Village Service Funds. The expenditure has also greatly increased, both Contingent and civil administration having necessarily been improved. But after the first year there has been an increasing surplus to hand over to the Nizam. From 1870 this has generally been about fourteen lakhs a year. The total charges are Rs. 56,00,000. The Contingent costs Rs. 29,50,000 and the civil administration and Public Works Rs. 26,50,000. The civil establishments are liberal compared with those of the stinted and undermanned districts of the Madras Presidency. But they are in no way excessive. A couple of Madras districts, together equal in size and population to Berar, would have seven or eight lakhs spent on each, in all perhaps fifteen. It must, however, be remembered that as Berar is not attached to any British Local Government, it has to keep up a small head-quarters staff of its own.

It will be seen that Berar has been assigned to us as security for the performance of a contract. In asking it back, therefore, the Nizam is asking that part of the agreement should be cancelled because he is disappointed with his bargain, and wishes to make an arrangement more advantageous for himself. The unexpected prosperity of Berar has been a source of intense chagrin to his courtiers. If the revenue had remained what it was, or increased only slightly, he would have said nothing. But the Berar surplus could be doubled by governing the country in the cheap Hyderabad fashion, and, therefore, the British Government is pressed to abrogate the treaty of 1860. What arrangement is proposed instead is not exactly known outside the Calcutta Foreign Office; but it is certain that the Nizam does not offer any other territory as security in place of that which he wishes to get back. At most, he merely promises to pay regularly in future. The British Government have, however, had sufficiently unpleasant experience of putting their trust in Asiatic princes. The Government therefore stick to the treaty, and wisely refuse to look at any security less tangible than the broad acres of Berar. And for this they are denounced as a gang of breakers of faith and dishonest bullies. It is easy to imagine the outcry which would be raised by the natives and their white servants if the British Government had proposed to cancel a treaty with a Native Prince for their own advantage. Yet here we have an outcry by the same persons, because the British Government have refused to entertain a demand by a Native Prince that a treaty shall be done away with for his pecuniary advantage. But this probably is not the worst feature of the demand. There are grounds for believing that the Nizam has not even promised to pay for the Contingent from his general revenues, but demands that the Contingent be abolished on the ground that his reformed troops will serve the same purpose. As one of the duties of the Contingent now is to guard against the possible misconduct of these very reformed troops, there is something to admire in the audacity of the request. But even if it were possible to take such a proposal seriously, the British Government have two insurmountable objections to offer; for in the first place, the reformed troops are not efficient, and, in the second, they are not to be trusted. When the large military forces and expenditure of the Nizam have been commented on as signs of hostility and elements of danger to the Empire, some newspapers have hastened to assure us that the greater part of the 36,000 men, costing Rs. 66,00,000, is a half-armed rabble and the 7,000 reformed troops little, if at all better than the rest. We hear of their imperfect drill, slovenly bearing, and rusty equipment. We are particularly asked to notice that they had to borrow rifles from the British stores to be fit for service against the Rumpa rebels. We are gravely told of a jocular remark of a British field officer that he could knock over the reformed troops with his walking stick. But when Sir Salar Jung, in pursuance of the agitation into which he has unhappily been forced against his better judgment, asked the British Government to let these troops take the place of the Contingent, he doubtless gives a very different description of their military qualities.

Rejecting the two opposite descriptions, coming from the same source, but suited to different purposes, we may with confidence say, that while the reformed



troops are by no means harmless for evil, they are nearly useless for good. They undoubtedly fall far short of our standard of military efficiency. We could not take them into the field in time of danger, when we could and would take the Contingent. But that is not the worst. We could not trust them to do faithfully such duty as they may be fit for at home. The Contingent is an Imperial force thoroughly under British control. It is not only as efficient, but as trustworthy as the regiments of Madras and Bombay. The reformed troops, on the other hand, are composed of Arab and Sidi mercenaries, combined with a variety of native Indian swashbucklers. They, of course, have no feeling of allegiance to the Imperial Government, which have nothing to do with their organization or management. They are the servants of a Prince who longs for independence, and assumes or intrigues for as much as he dares. In time of war, or danger of war, they would not only be no help to us, but positively a source of weakness. They would always be apt to mutiny either with or against their immediate sovereign. The subsidiary force would hardly be sufficient to watch them and the other elements of danger scattered over the 100,000 square miles of Hyderabad and Berar, and would have to add to it from the armies of Bombay and Madras. In short, we would have exchanged the Contingent for something a great deal worse than nothing. That is the practical meaning of this phase of the agitation for Berar. Whether the agitation may not be successful is, unhappily, still matter for doubt. After the great Mysore scandal, one can feel no confidence that any folly is too great for a Minister who knows nothing of India. But the outlook is far more hopeful than could have been anticipated when the late Ministry fell. The impulsive and self-willed Duke of Argyll has not returned to his field of mischief. India is fortunate in having the most calm and solid judgment of the Liberal party to direct her affairs. Lord Hartington, moreover, is said to be as modest as he is soberminded, and may be expected to give respectful attention to the superior knowledge and experience of the Councils at London and Calcutta. If these expectations are happily justified, all will yet be well with Berar.

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BOMBAY REVIEW, *May* 29, 1880.—The era of "Brummagem Imperialism," which its laudators affected to believe was permanently inaugurated by the theatrical and costly pageant at Delhi, has already approached its descending arc. This is well : otherwise the true and historical imperial bond—trust and loyalty on the side of our allies and feudatories, strength and scrupulous good faith on the part of the paramount power—would ere long have suffered irremediable tension. This tension has been traced in the pressure cleverly and secretly applied—but severe to the extreme of endurance—that has been exerted in carrying through the salt and opium scheme by which Native India has virtually been brought under contribution to Sir John Strachey's treasury. Similiar tension has been applied to Kattiawar and Kutch, not only in the fiscal matter just alluded to, but in forcing on railway schemes, for our "imperial" purposes, at the cost of the States through or near which the lines run. In regard to Kashmir, as all the world now knows, the sham and callous "imperialism" of the period has been hard at work and had all but succeeded in its pharasaical scheme of selfish and dishonourable aggrandisement. Altogether the morbid political atmosphere of the time served well for the evolution of those plausibly phrased but most audacious articles in the *Madras Mail* opposing the rendition of Mysore—in spite of that measure having been settled and the question closed a dozen years ago by all the authorities concerned.

However futile that kicking against the pricks in the matter of Mysore may be, the incident serves as one of many sinister signs of recent times, and has, naturally enough, elicited a manifestation from some kindred spirit of reaction and political recalcitrancy. We allude to a communication in the said *Mail* of the 15th, headed the "Rendition of the Berars." The excuse for this pretentious contribution—which bears marks of amateur, but demi-official writing and strong personal animus—is some alleged rumour to the effect that H. E. the Minister of the Nizam "intended to personally repeat his

demand for the restoration of Berar." As the rumour was probably set going by some of the demi-official scribes who have had the cue given to disparage and misrepresent Sir Salar Jung by any means that may serve, it is quite in character that it should be followed up by insinuations and incuendos which amount to gross misrepresentation of that Minister's position and proposals. For instance, it is intimated that Sir Salar Jung has asked that the "Reformed Troops" should take the place of the Hyderabad Contingent. We have never heard of such a proposal, which is utterly improbable on the face of it; but the allegation is cunningly spread over a considerable portion of this political libel, as if with intent to deride and discredit the Minister who is almost the only really responsible functionary of the Nizamate. The writer of this mischief stirring concoction is, of course, anonymous and irresponsible; but, if it and similar evil communications that have appeared elsewhere are found to coincide with insinuations and misstatements that have been countenanced by those who have favoured and patronised the factious and law-defying elements at Hyderabad, this will form a subject which new masters of India may have to inquire into very closely. The daring travesty of "the Berar case" comprised in this communication is preluded by the remark that "in England the merits of the dispute are unknown outside a limited circle of retired Indian Officials." But when the whole case comes before Parliament, as, we opine, it must do sooner rather later, it will be found that the plain simple issues at stake will be readily apprehended by the public in spite of all these industrious efforts to distort and disguise them.

The object of thus perversely stirring up the question of the Berars and talking about "agitation," when it is well known that Sir Salar Jung has definitively laid the matter aside, does not appear on the surface. Probably these tactics may be intended, as they are well calculated, to drive off attention from matters of much more practical and personal interest. The Berars question, which is now laid on the shelf, can be taken up and discussed at any suitable time—notably on occasion of H. H. the Nizam attaining his majority; but the attitude and conduct of the Simla Foreign Office towards the Hyderabad State and of those whom it permitted to act in its name, is an emergent question, one that concerns the very life and reputation of British India's political administration. In fact, this subject of the transactions of the (hood-winked) Foreign Office and its representatives against the Nizamate during the last four or five years—since, say, that insensate attempt to force the sickly young Nizam to Bombay to meet the Prince—is just one of the class of topics referred to in this "serious reflection" of the "Political Orphan's" which appeared in a daily contemporary yesterday:—

"I hear that there is going to be a great explosion in a London paper on some Indian subjects. The match has been lighted by one who knows the secret history of many queer and shadowy transactions. Reputations will be shattered beyond the healing art of the Director General of Statistics."

We hope and believe that Mr. U. C. Aitchison is safe; but we should strongly advise some persons concerned at later dates in the affairs of Hyderabad to follow the example mentioned by the same lynx-eyed monitor, namely, to bury six fathom deep certain "files of demi-official correspondence." Meanwhile, if M. Lyall happens to have found in his bureau counterparts of said demi-officials, we should advise him, for his own sake, to keep them intact. He cannot be held responsible for webs woven before he took over charge; and if since that period he has, because of the cunningness of such weaving, been slightly enmeshed himself, large allowance will be made partly because of the harden audacity of the weavers and more because of the devil's cauldron business over the frontier which has absorbed far too much of Mr. Lyall's energy, and neutralised his natural vigilance in the direction of Kashmir and the Deccan. We observe that the writer in the *Mail*, with an instinct worthy of Falstaff, offers up incense to the Marquis of Hartington, and complacently remarks—"India is fortunate in having the most calm and solid judgment of the Liberal party to direct her affairs." Very good and well spoken, but can there be a moment's doubt as to what will be "the most calm and solid judgment of the Liberal party" regarding the means

that have been taken and the tactics adopted to encourage, pamper, and shield the reactionary, bigoted and lawless elements that yet remain at the very centre of the Hyderabad State? Perhaps even Lord Lytton himself may have yet to account for the simplicity with which, at a certain all important juncture of this sinister and really treacherous policy, he allowed himself to be made a cats-paw of, and had well nigh become an actor in a projected *coup d'état*, which, in spite of the famine excitement then raging, would have convulsed Native India from end to end. That phrase "calm and solid judgment" is good, and admirably it serves to characterise the Minister against whom the reactionary and dishonourable policy we have described has been so harshly, disingenuously, and pertinaciously worked. If this new "Berar agitator," who has appeared in the Madras paper, is not aware, we can assure him that "the most calm and solid judgment of the Liberal party" when once it is well informed of the real state of affairs will come down like a sledge-hammer on the abettors of the perverse and disloyal conduct of or under the Foreign Office towards the Minister who saved the Hyderabad State—conduct disloyal in rankest degree to the whole spirit and letter of Her Majesty's Proclamation of 1858.

PIONEER, *January 3, 1881*.—The province now known as Berar first became a part of the Moghul Empire towards the end of Akbar's reign. Its previous history is of little or no political consequence now; it had formed a part of the Bahmani Empire in the Deccan, which about the beginning of the 16th century split up into the five kingdoms of Ahmednagar, Berar to the north, Beddur in the middle, and Bijapur and Golconda to the south. Akbar had sent ambassadors to the Sultans of the Deccan inviting them to accept him as their suzerain. In return he promised to keep them on their thrones and to prevent all internecine wars. They refused the offer, and the consequences were that all that is now known as Berar, together with Ahmednagar, was forcibly annexed to the Moghul Empire. It was occupied by the imperial troops. One of Akbar's generals was encamped at Jalna, and one of the Emperor's sons, Prince Murad Mirza, built himself a palace near Balapur, where shortly afterwards he drank himself to death. During the disturbances which followed on his father's death, shortly after Jehanghir came to the throne, an Abyssinian, Malik Ambyr by name, managed to drive the Moghul army northwards beyond the Tapti, and it was not till the early part of the reign of Shah Jahan, about 1630, that Ahmednagar and Berar were recovered. This Malik Ambyr was a notable man. Though almost constantly engaged in war, the historian tells us, "he found time to cultivate the arts of peace. He abolished revenue farming, and committed the management of taxation to Brahmin agents under Mahomedan superintendence; he restored such parts of the village establishment as had fallen into decay, and he revived a mode of assessing the fields by collecting a moderate proportion of the actual produce in kind, which after the experience of several seasons was commuted to a money payment settled annually according to the cultivation." His assessments, it is said, were two-fifths of the produce of Government land, while his money commutation was about one-third. He died in 1628 and in 1632 Ahmadnagar and Berar were recovered by the Moghuls. In the beginning of the reign of Aurungzebe the situation was as follows:—The Northern Deccan, including Berar, was Moghul territory, bounded to the south by the unconquered kingdom of Bijapur and Golconda. Between 1686 and 1689 Aurungzebe conquered Bijapur and Golconda, and formed the whole into a Mahomedan province under a Viceroy.

We now come to the rise of the Nizams of Hyderabad and of the Mahratta Bhonslas of Berar. While the Nizam in the Deccan was making himself independent, the Bhonslas were founding a kingdom in Berar and Nagpur, first as the vassals of the Mahratta Maharaja and Peishwas, and afterwards independently. It was about the middle of the last century that the four leading Mahratta feudatories, the Guikwar in Guzerat, Holkar and Scindia in Malwa, and the Bhonsla Raja in Berar and Nagpur, founded independent dynasties. The rise of the Bhonslas in Berar, however, dates from the beginning of the 18th century. In

1745 the Emperor Aurangzebe heard that they had overrun the whole of Berar. In course of time the Bhonslas not only established themselves firmly in Berar, they also carried the Mahratta dominion eastwards to Nagpur and Orissa. The nature of the Bhonsla claim to Berar indeed is sometimes questioned. The *Berar Gazetteer* says :—"From 1724 Berar has always been nominally subject to the Nizams of Hyderabad dynasty. The Bhonslas posted their officers all over the province ; they occupied it with their troops ; they collected more than half the revenue, and they fought among themselves for the right to collect ; but with the exception of a few parghanas ceded to the Peishwa, the Nizam throughout all his misfortunes has constantly maintained his title as *de jure* sovereign of this country, and it was always admitted by the Mahrattas." It would require a good deal of transcendental reasoning to prove this theory. The English in India were plain men in those days, and they took Berar by force of arms from the Bhonslas, and presently, as will be seen, gave it as a free gift to the Hyderabad Nizams, who accepted the gift. In the beginning of the present century the ostensible head of the Mahrattas, the Peishwa Baji Rao, was driven by his chiefs into the arms of the English. By the treaty of Bassein we restored him to a limited throne, on the condition that he handed over the Mahratta supremacy to us. This he did, but we had to go to war to assert our new claims. In this first Mahratta war at Assaye, Wellesley defeated Scindia and the Bhonsla, the Bhonsla Raja having fled at the first shot. At the end of the campaign the Bhonsla Raja ceded Cuttack to the east and Berar to the west, and was henceforth known as the Raja of Nagpur. Lord Wellesley made over Berar as a free gift to the Nizam of Hyderabad, but kept Cuttack.

To sum up the above account, we may say that shortly after Berar became a part of the Moghul Dominions, the Moghul Viceroy in the Deccan made himself independent ; but to all intents and purpose he lost Berar to the Mahrattas. The English took Berar from the Mahrattas, and gave it to the Nizam in 1804. He had no doubt *de jure* rights to Berar all along, but in those days *de jure* rights were of very little consequence, and whether they existed or not, now matters nothing. Article II. of the partition treaty of Poona, 1804, says :—

"The territories of which Maharajah Senha Saheb Soubah formerly collected the revenues in participation with His Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and those formerly possessed by Maharajah Senha Saheb Soubah to the westward of the River Wardah, ceded by the 3rd Article of the treaty of Deogaum, and the territory situated to the southward of the hills on which are the forts of Nernullah and Gawilghur, and to the westward of the river Wardah, stated by the 4th Article of the treaty of Deogaum to belong to the British Government and its allies, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to His Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, with the exception of the districts reserved to Senha Saheb Soubah in the 5th Article of the said treaty of Deogaum."

Article III. of the treaty of Deogaum with Roghojee Bhonsla says :—

"He likewise cedes to the Honourable Company and their allies in perpetual sovereignty all the territories of which he has collected the revenues in participation with the Soubah of the Deccan, and those of which he may have possession which are to the westward of the river Wardah."

We have now to explain how it was that Berar came to be handed back by the Nizam to the English. In 1798 Lord Mornington had entered into an alliance with the Nizam. The Nizam was to disband his French battalions, and to maintain an English force in their place. On our side we promised to protect him against excessive Mahratta extortion or attack. The Nizam also was to furnish a Contingent of Hyderabad troops to serve with the British forces in the coming war with Tippoo Sultan. This he did, and after the downfall of Tippoo gave a portion of the Mysore territory to the Nizam. In October 1780 the Nizam became a feudatory of the British Government. The treaty then made secured him in the possession of his dominions, but prohibited him from entering into political negotiation with other States, and made the British Government the arbiter in his disputes with other powers. The British force which he was to maintain in his

dominions was fixed at eight battalions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry, and for the payment of this force the Nizam gave back the portions of Mysore territory which we had given him in 1792 and 1899. This was the origin of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force. The Nizam also agreed by the twelfth article of the treaty to furnish a Contingent of his own troops to help us :—

“ The contracting parties will employ all practicable means of conciliation to prevent the calamity of war ; and for that purpose will at all times be ready to enter into amicable explanations with other States, and to cultivate and improve the general relations of peace and amity with all the powers of India, according to the true spirit and tenor of this defensive treaty. But if a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other power whatever, then His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah engages that, with the reserve of two battalions of sepoys which are to remain near His Highness's person, the residue of the British Subsidiary Force (consisting of six battalions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry with artillery) joined by six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse of His Highness's own troops, and making together an army of twelve thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, with their requisite train of artillery and warlike stores of every kind, shall be immediately put in motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy ; and His Highness likewise engages to employ every further effort in his power for the purpose of bringing into the field as speedily as possible the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions ; with a view to the effectual prosecution and speedy termination of the said war, the Honourable Company in the same manner engage on their part, in this case, to employ in active operations against the enemy the largest force which they may be able to furnish over and above the said Subsidiary force.”

But while the maintenance of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force was provided for, the Contingent which the Nizam was bound to provide in time of war gave endless trouble. The rabble soldiery which he supplied proved worse than useless in the field. In 1812 or 1813 one of the corps at Hyderabad mutinied, and tied their commanding officer to a gun, threatening to blow him away unless their arrears of pay were discharged. In the same year by mutual agreement the Nizam's Contingent was reduced to half its numbers, and was armed, clothed and equipped like the Company's troops and placed under British officers. The Nizam's Contingent on its new footing consisted of 5,500 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and four field batteries. But though the formation of the Contingent was now settled satisfactorily, the difficulties about the pay of troops grew greater than ever. What happened is told in Mr. Wheeler's *Short History* :—

“ From a very early period the Nizam had failed to provide the necessary funds for the maintenance of the Contingent. From time to time large advances were made by the British Government to meet the current expenditure, until a debt accumulated of half a million sterling. The Nizam might have escaped this obligation by disbanding the Contingent ; but this he repeatedly and obstinately refused to do, and indeed the force was necessary for the maintenance of peace and order in his own territories. Again, he might have disbanded the hordes of foreign mercenaries, Arabs and Rohilas, which he kept up under the name of an army, and which were a burden upon his treasury, a terror to his subjects, and useless for all military purposes. But he was obstinate upon this point as upon the other. At last in 1843, he was told by Lord Ellenborough that unless the debt was liquidated and the necessary funds were provided regularly for the future the British Government would take over territory and revenue as security for the payment. The Nizam's Contingent on the new footing consisted of 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and four field batteries. This threat seems to have created some alarm in Hyderabad. Chandu Lal resigned the post of Minister, and the Nizam attempted to carry on the administration alone, but his efforts were fitful and desultory. Meanwhile mere dribblets of the debt were paid off, and the Resident was amused with excuses and promises ; and in this fashion matters drifted on. At last Lord Dalhousie insisted on a cession of sufficient territory to provide for the maintenance of the Nizam's Contingent. He would not touch the hereditary dominions of the

Nizam ; he merely took over the territory of Berar, which Lord Wellesley had given to the Nizam in 1803 after the conquest of the Raja of Nagpur. Accordingly Berar was brought under British administration ; and since then all surplus revenue accruing from the improvements in the revenue system has been made over to the Nizam's treasury."

The arrangements of 1853 were set forth in a treaty of that year. There is little more to be said. We showed the other day how profitable the arrangement was to the Nizam. An idea of the benefits that have been conferred on the people of Berar may be gathered from innumerable reports. "Under our administration, the Berar cultivator has passed from all the evil of rack-renting, personal insecurity, and unascertained ownership of land to a safe property and a fixed assessment." The lately published administration report, that for 1878-79, a year of extraordinary misfortunes, of drought and high prices, of a mortality by cholera and fever, and a scarcity greater than any ever known before, is yet a record of progress and prosperity. One event of the year was the completion of the revenue survey. This survey has cost Rs. 21,90,946. The result of the operations will be an increase of the revenue amounting to Rs. 15,12,003. "The value of the work," says Sir Richard Meade, "may be regarded with unmixed satisfaction, as while the interests of the State have greatly benefited, moderate assessments have been aimed at with the general result that there are several bidders for every acre of cultivated land that is relinquished. The land revenue, amounting to some 62½ lakhs, was collected as usual with remarkable ease. Considering the difficulties of the year, the punctuality with which the land revenue was paid, furnishes another proof of moderate assessments and the means and credit of the Berar cultivator." A revenue of more than 62 lakhs was collected ; only 385 orders to pay were issued ; only 150 persons were sent to appear before the Tahsildar ; personal property was sold only in six cases, and of land only worthless fields. "I doubt," says the Commissioner, "whether any province of India could show better results." There are two things in particular which remain to be done for Berar, and which under British administration will be done ; to improve the water supply of the province, and to improve the educational department. In many parts of Berar water is scarce or bad, but Government has already done a good deal, and is considering further projects for the construction of drinking wells. With regard to education, the results hitherto obtained by the Educational Department are described as meagre and disappointing. At the same time, there is a school to every 277 square miles and to every 3,475 of the population, which is more than can be said of Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and the Central Provinces. As for personal security, murders, says the report, were never so few, and other crimes of a serious nature have also declined. The dacoities were of a very mild type, only one being of the old class. The Banjaras who once gave so much trouble have now ceased to be a criminal tribe.

*TIMES OF INDIA, November 8, 1882.*—An Oomrawuttee correspondent writes under date 5th instant :—

The rosy prospects of the crops which I gave you in my last have become very much dimmed, and were it not for the fear of being put down as an alarmist, I should say that we shall touch closely upon a year of scarcity. The cotton is short and stunted owing to the want of the latter rains, which have utterly failed up to date. I hear that the wells in some places are becoming low. The jowari has suffered as well as the cotton. Whether the cold weather crops, *i.e.*, grain, wheat, linseed, &c., have not been stunted, I cannot at present say, but from the anxiety that cultivators have expressed that rain should come, would make one promise a short crop.

A battery of artillery, marching from Kumptee to Bangalore (while passing through Berar), were attacked with cholera on the 29th of last month. Three men died. Cholera has been prevalent in East Berar this year, and has continued much later than usual.













